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Seriously bro you need to get a life... I do agree with you that it is a populous city, but migrants from rest of the india constitute 24% of the population. Now so many people don't come to hyderabad just because its a miserable city and people are unfriendly and treat outsiders unequally.Also do note that the sex ratio of Hyderabad city is 945 female per 1000 males, higher than the national average of 926 per 1000. Among children aged 0–6 years, 373,794 are boys and 352,022 are girls, giving rise to the ratio of 942 girls per 1000 boys. Hyderabad city's literacy rate is 82.96% (male 85.96% and female 79.79%), higher than the national average of 74.04%.As for the your statement about it being the last place on earth to talk about progress well here are certain statistics1. Hyderabad is the capital of Telangana and a common capital of Andhra Pradesh (period not exceeding 10 years), India. The city is the largest contributor to the state's GDP (Gross domestic product) and state tax.2. In 2011, Hyderabad generated revenues of 700000 million (US$11 billion) and contributed a third of the state's tax revenue.3. The per capita income of Hyderabad was 44300 (US$700) in 2011.4.In 2008, the nominal GDP was US$60bn, placing the city fourth in India and 93rd in the world.5.Hyderabad and its suburbs house the highest number of special economic zones among India's cities6. In March 2012, The Indian Union Tourism Ministry declared Hyderabad as the first ever "Best Heritage City of India7.Hyderabad was the World's third best city to visit in 2013, according to Lonely Planet.8. In 2011 the city was ranked nineteenth in the world by The New York Times in The list of 41 Places to Go in 2011, the only Indian City in the list.9.Hyderabad emerged as a pharmaceutical and biotechnology hub and is known as India's pharmaceutical capital and "Genome Valley of India".10. In 2008–2009, Hyderabad's bio-pharmaceuticals exports reached US 3.1 billion$11. Institutes like Indian Institute of Chemical Technology, National Institute of Pharmaceutical Education and Research, the Centre for Cellular and Molecular Biology and National Institute of Nutrition along with the regional institutions make Hyderabad the hub of pharmaceutical and biotechnology in India.12.The World Bank Group ranked the city as the second best Indian city for doing business in 2009. In 2010, the economic analysis group GaWC ranked Hyderabad in its third tier (Gamma+ World City) of cities by importance.In 2011, DTZ ranked Hyderabad as world's third most affordable office location,while Business Today ranked Hyderabad as the fourth best city to live in India.And her comes the icing on the cake..Hyderabad is among the global centres of information technology for which it is known as Cyberabad (Cyber City).The city's IT sector includes the IT-enabled services, business process outsourcing, entertainment industries,and Financial services. During 2008–09, Hyderabad's IT exports reached US$ 4.7 billion,and 22% of the NASSCOM's total membership is from Hyderabad. The development of a township with related technological infrastructure called HITEC City prompted global and particularly US—based companies to establish their operations in Hyderabad. The Deloitte, Franklin Templeton Investments, GE Capital, Accenture, HSBC, Bank of America, ABN Amro are some of the financial services companies with offices in the city.The major multinational IT firms located in Hyderabad are Microsoft (the largest R&D campus outside the US), Google, Facebook (first office in asia)Thoughtworks, CA Technologies, Amazon.com, IBM, Motorola, Samsung, Agilent, Automatic Data Processing, Oracle Corporation, Yahoo!, Dell, Texas Instruments, Hewlett-Packard, Virtusa, Kewill, Facebook and others.The major Indian firms with development centres in the city are Mahindra Satyam, Infosys, Wipro, Cognizant, Tata Consultancy Services, Polaris, and others.As far as the weather is concerned well go get yourself an ice cream at the famous ice cream parlour (mozzamjahi market)...

Be careful reading too much into short-term price actions and the news.Remember 2010? Gold was hitting record after record. Silver went up by about 300% to hit $49 at one point!Oil went up to $130 with some speculating that the 2008 record would be breached again.Commodities were soaring. So were emerging market currencies linked to them like the Brazilian Real. Many were talking about parity.Emerging market stocks were also soaring thanks, in part, to commodities. The USD was weakening.The media were suggesting that QE and 0% interest rates would cause inflation, a weaker USD and a second stock market crash because the economy was struggling but the stock market wasn’t (sound familiar anybody?!).What happened in the next 10 years?1.Gold has been stagnant at best in real terms. It was around $1,600 in 2010, $1,900 at the peak in 2011 and is now $1900. So adjusted for inflation it is stagnant over the last 10 years and lower than it was 9 years ago2. Silver went down to less than $15, and has now “soared” to about $26. So it is trading at less than half its inflation-adjusted price of $49 in 2011.3. Commodities, especially oil, have fallen hard.4. There has been low inflation.5. QE hasn’t weakened the USD. In fact, despite the recent weakness, it is still stronger than it was in 2010 against the Euro, Pound, RMB etc.6.Most major US Stock Markets have beaten gold, silver and commodities. 200%-300% returns have been seen adjusted for dividends being reinvested7. USD short-term government bonds have shown themselves to be the true safe heaven asset. Both during 2008–2009 and March 2020, they outperformed other assets.8. Gold, and silver, have shown themselves not to be safe heavens. They both fell during 2008–2009 and again in March 2020. They have actually done better during periods of relative calm, like 2010–2011 and once investors knew lockdown wasn’t going to be the end of the world.Here were the gold prices in March, courtesy of Gold Price.org, during the worst of the covid situation:And here is 2008–What makes this more interesting is that gold had a good 2000–2011, and was increasing since 2018.In other words, gold has gone down during the worst of two big stock market crashes, despite being on a bull run during both episodes!It only resumed its bull run in 2010, and from April/May this time, once investors knew the world wasn’t going to end.I am not implying that gold and silver won’t go up this year or next.They might do. Nobody knows. However, long-term they are awful investments.They merely pay inflation long-term. Even gold bugs admit it is just a store of value.The problem is, nobody knows which periods will be good for gold for sure.So holding gold long-term is a losing strategy compared to just owning stock and bond trackers.Bonds have had a consistent period of outperforming during market crashes, and stocks have ran rings around gold for over 200 years.And remember gold and silver don’t pay dividends either. So the only way you can “win” with gold and silver, relative to bonds and stocks, is through luck.In other words, buying at the right time, which is more linked to luck than people think.After all, everybody has the same information. If buying, or selling, gold or silver was so obvious, then why isn’t everybody doing it?In a world of millions of institutional investors like banks and hedge funds, why would people miss an “obvious” buying opportunity?So I have never, not once, met somebody who bought gold in 2000, sold in 2008, bought in 2009, sold in 2011 and then bought again in 2017, sold in March 2020, then bought again in April!I have met plenty though that bought 1–2 years before 2008, felt smug for a few years after the crisis (2010–2011) and then regretted holding onto it during the 2011–2018 period.Some ReadingIs Gold a good investment?Adam Fayed PodcastDIY Investing and Platforms for Beginners: Does it Work9 things stopping people from achieving success

Some data in Hostess filings with the bankruptcy court does support your hypothesis. Specifically, the Disclosure Statement which Hostess filed (I've uploaded a copy to Scribd: Hostess Disclosure Statement) contains the following financial disclosures related to revenue from snack products:Net Revenues for the Last Three Years53 Weeks Ended June 2, 2012: $2.467 billion52 Weeks Ended May 28, 2011: $2.474 billion52 Weeks Ended May 29, 2010: $2.585 billionDisclosures Regarding Demand for Hostess ProductsFrom page 101 of the above-linked document ("Debtors" refers to Hostess):The Debtors have experienced a significant decline in the demand for their branded sweet goods and bread products. According to data from Information Resources Incorporated (the "IRI"), an independent market research concern that reports sales trends in most supermarkets (excluding mass merchandisers, club stores and discount stores), the Debtors' total unit volume of branded sweet goods declined by 4.3% during the latest 52 weeks ending September 5, 2012, and revenues from the Debtors' branded sweet good products declined 1.5% during the same period. The Debtors' total unit volume of branded bread products declined by 9.6% during the latest 52 weeks ending September 5, 2012. Revenues related to the Debtors' bread products declined 5.3% from the comparable period one year ago. Data from IRI also indicates that the declining unit trend in branded bread and sweet goods products was evident in the industry during the 52 week period ending September 5, 2012. The Debtors believe that they will continue to experience reduced demand for their products based on various factors, including some of the factors discussed in greater detail below.However, in court filings made at the time of the current bankruptcy filing (January 2012), Hostess Brands' CEO Brian Driscoll primarily blamed other factors for the chapter 11 filing. In a declaration filed with the bankruptcy court (again, I've uploaded a copy of the document to Scribd: Hostess First Day Declaration), he stated (pages 17-20):These chapter 11 cases were commenced to effect the fundamental operational and financial changes that the Debtors' businesses require in light of their declining performance, aging infrastructure, strained liquidity levels and excessive debt, and the significant challenges facing the Debtors, including, but not limited to, uncompetitive and unsustainable labor and legacy costs and an intensified competitive environment.Declining Financial PerformanceAs non-public companies, the Debtors are not required to file annual or quarterly reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Debtors do, however, prepare audited financial statements as one of the terms and conditions of their long-term debt agreements. The Debtors' audited financial statements for the fiscal year ended May 28, 2011 have not yet been finalized. According to the Debtors' most recent unaudited financial statements, for the 2011 fiscal year, the Debtors recorded annual net revenue of approximately $2.5 billion. As of May 28, 2011, utilizing book values, the Debtors had assets of approximately $1 billion and liabilities of approximately $1.4 billion.Since their February 2009 emergence from the IBC Bankruptcy, the Debtors' financial performance has not kept pace with the projections set forth as part of the 2008 IBC Plan and has deteriorated significantly in recent quarters. For the fiscal year ended May 29, 2010 — the first full year after emergence from chapter 11 — the Debtors' experienced a net loss of approximately $138 million. For the fiscal year ended May 28, 2011, the Debtors' unaudited books and records indicate that the Debtors' net loss was approximately $341 million, reflecting $132 million in write-off of deferred debt issuance costs and debt discount which occurred when long term debt was reclassified as current debt.Factors Responsible for Declining Financial PerformanceThe Debtors believe that three main factors are responsible for their recent economic troubles: (a) high legacy costs; (b) inflexible labor work rules and structures; and (c) unsustainable debt levels that prohibit the Debtors from adapting their business to current competitive conditions thereby increasing profitability. As a consequence, the Debtors do not have a competitive cost structure and cannot achieve viability on a long-term sustainable basis in their industry.Crippling Legacy Costs. As stated above, the Debtors participate in 40 Multiemployer Plans. The Multiemployer Plans are structured to place the financial burdens of all of the retirees under the plans upon the remaining companies in the plans that have active union employees. Over the last several decades, the number of companies supporting the Multiemployer Plans has shrunk significantly as a result of the voluntary and involuntary withdrawal of many employers and the fact that virtually no new employers join multiemployer plans today. This significantly increases the burden on the companies, such as the Debtors, that remain. The Debtors' annual cash pension contributions associated with the Multiemployer Plans is approximately $103 million. Additionally, the Debtors have annual retiree medical obligations of approximately $1.4 million.Inflexible and Uncompetitive Collective Bargaining Agreements. As stated above, the Debtors are party to 372 separate collective bargaining agreements (collectively, the "CBAs"). The CBAs collectively mandate maintenance of 80 different health and welfare benefit plans, the sheer number of which impose excessive administrative and cost burdens on the Debtors. The CBAs mandate increases in wages and medical and other benefits for the fiscal year ending June 2, 2012 that total an additional $31 million. In addition, the CBAs contain a variety of different work rules that hamstring operations and make the CBAs uncompetitive as well as extremely difficult to administer. For example, the Debtors often provide both bread and cake products to an individual customer location. The existing work rules require that, on many routes, separate trucks must deliver the bread and cake products to that single customer location. The work rules also require that, in some bakeries and distribution centers, a separate individual must be used to load the trucks (the Debtors' competitors have drivers who load their own trucks) and separate people must load either bread or cake onto a truck. Finally, work rules require that, in some instances even when a route representative is already visiting a customer location, that representative may not move product within that location; rather, a separate employee must visit the customer location to move product from the back room to the shelf. Often, this so-called "pull-up" employee cannot move both bread and cake and, thus, two "pull-up" employees must make this same trip. This multiplies the number of individuals necessary to deliver product to customers and doubles the costs associated with trucks and fuel. Finally, the work rules prevent the Debtors from implementing alternative distribution systems into new, currently unserved markets.Unsustainable Debt Levels. As set forth above, the Debtors have several tranches of secured debt totaling approximately $860 million. While the impact of this debt burden was somewhat ameliorated in the near term by the carefully constructed payment-in-kind features, it is incompatible with achieving a competitive cost structure, funding sorely needed capital improvements and long-term viability.In conclusion, I think that the best answer is, as with most large, complex corporate failures, Hostess is beset by a number of challenges which collectively have caused its business to be unable to compete. But changing consumer tastes certainly haven't helped, although the annual declines for the last several years are smaller than I had anticipated before I looked up the numbers for purposes of answering this question.