Form O - Affidavit Of Service For A Summons To Witness: Fill & Download for Free

Let’s check outLaw Document English ViewRules of the Small Claims CourtWritten Statements, Documents and Records18.02 (1) A document or written statement or an audio or visual record that has been served, at least 30 days before the trial date, on all parties who were served with the notice of trial, shall be received in evidence, unless the trial judge orders otherwise. O. Reg. 78/06, s. 36 (1).(2) Subrule (1) applies to the following written statements and documents:1. The signed written statement of any witness, including the written report of an expert, to the extent that the statement relates to facts and opinions to which the witness would be permitted to testify in person.2. Any other document, including but not limited to a hospital record or medical report made in the course of care and treatment, a financial record, a receipt, a bill, documentary evidence of loss of income or property damage, and a repair estimate. O. Reg. 258/98, r. 18.02 (2); O. Reg. 78/06, s. 36 (2).Details about Witness or Author(3) A party who serves on another party a written statement or document described in subrule (2) shall append to or include in the statement or document,(a) the name, telephone number and address for service of the witness or author; and(b) if the witness or author is to give expert evidence, a summary of his or her qualifications. O. Reg. 78/06, s. 36 (3).(4) A party who has been served with a written statement or document described in subrule (2) and wishes to cross-examine the witness or author may summon him or her as a witness under subrule 18.03 (1). O. Reg. 258/98, r. 18.02 (4).Where Witness or Author is Summoned(5) A party who serves a summons to witness on a witness or author referred to in subrule (3) shall, at the time the summons is served, serve a copy of the summons on every other party. O. Reg. 78/06, s. 36 (4).(6) Service of a summons and the payment or tender of attendance money under this rule may be proved by affidavit (Form 8A). O. Reg. 78/06, s. 36 (4).Adjournment(7) A party who is not served with a copy of the summons in accordance with subrule (5) may request an adjournment of the trial, with costs. O. Reg. 78/06, s. 36 (4).As such:You can rely entirely on the expert’s report at trial without having to call them as a witness, unless a judge orders otherwise.If the other side wants to cross-examine them, it’s up to them to summon them to the courthouse.

Allahabad High CourtMukul Mohan Tripathi Alias Joshi vs State Of U.P. And Another on 4 December, 2018Bench: J.J. MunirHIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD      Reserved   Court No. - 53 A.F.R.      Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 4353 of 2004      Applicant :- Mukul Mohan Tripathi Alias Joshi   Opposite Party :- State Of U.P. And Another   Counsel for Applicant :- A.K. Singh,K.K.Srivastava,S.K.Upadhyay   Counsel for Opposite Party :- Govt. Advocate,Dr.Arun Srivastava      Hon'ble J.J. Munir,J. 1. This Application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been brought with a prayer to quash the summoning order dated 24.04.2004 passed by the A.C.J.M.-VII, Bareilly in Complaint Case no.2527 of 2003, Virendra Raizada vs. Mukul Mohan Tripathi, under Section 500 IPC, P.S., Subhas Nagar, District Bareilly, and, further, to quash the proceedings of the aforesaid case.2. Heard Sri S.K. Upadhyay, learned counsel for the applicant, Dr. Arun Srivastava, learned counsel appearing on behalf of opposite party no.2 and Sri Indrajeet Singh Yadav, learned A.G.A. along with Sri Mayank Awasthi appearing for the State.3. This case is a tale of two teachers. It is about their journey from the class room to the court room. It appears that the complainant/ opposite party is a Lecturer employed with a certain Guru Nanak Khalsa Inter College, Subhash Nagar, Bareilly, whereas the applicant is a Teacher in the same college. The complainant/ opposite party laid a complaint before the Magistrate, alleging facts on the basis of which he prayed that the applicant be summoned and punished for an offence under Section 500 IPC. The short course of proceedings before the Magistrate leading to the summoning order were not very eventful. The complaint aforesaid was filed by opposite party no.2 on 08.12.2003. It appears that statements of the complainant under Section 200 Cr.P.C. and those of the witnesses, PW-1, Sanjay Saxena and another, Ramesh, PW-2, who supported the complaint, were recorded under Section 202 Cr.P.C. The learned Magistrate by his order dated 24.04.2004 passed in Complaint Case no.2527 of 2003, proceeded to summon the applicant to stand his trial for an offence punishable under Section 500 IPC. The aforesaid order, is hereinafter referred to, as the impugned order. None of the parties have annexed the statements of witnesses under Section 200 and 202 Cr.P.C., which ought to have been done, looking to the nature of the prayer, at least by the applicant. However, since the challenge goes far deeper and questions the maintainability of the complaint on the allegations carried, de hors the evidence led in support, the absence of the statements under Sections 200 & 202 Cr.P.C., is hardly of any consequence.4. This Court has carefully perused the complaint filed by the applicant. The first ten paragraphs of the complaint are devoted to a flourish of accolades and enconiums showered upon himself by the complainant with the least concern for the virtues of modesty and humility. It is not the desire of this Court, to censure or educate the complainant, but it has been quite an enterprise for the Court to locate those averments relating to facts in issue, and, relevant facts, that make for the requisite ingredients under Section 499 IPC, punishable under Section 500.5. The first of the relevant averment are to be found in paragraphs 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the complaint. It is said there that the applicant made an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. to the court of the A.C.J.M.-VII, carrying allegations inter alia that the complainant/ opposite party by utilizing forged letter heads of others, and, also forging their signatures, filed false complaints against the applicant. It is averred that in the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. filed by the applicant it was wrongly asserted that the complainant/ opposite party used forged letters of Sri R.N. Verma, Advocate to bring false complaints under his forged signatures against the applicant, when the complainant had never done so. It is further averred that in the application u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C., it has been further alleged falsely that the complainant/ opposite party using a forged letter head of one Didar Singh Oberoi, a Corporator, got a false complaint typed out himself on that bogus letter head, and forging the Corporator's signatures, sent it to the Joint Director of Education, Bareilly, presumably against the applicant, because it is not specifically so averred in the complaint. It is said that on account of these allegations in the application u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C., the complainant's reputation suffered damage in the society. It is averred further in paragraphs 13 and 14 of the complaint that the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, VIIth, Bareilly referred the said application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. for inquiry and report to the police. After a report from Police Station Subhash Nagar, Bareilly, the Magistrate did not find any substance in the application, and, rejected the same.6. Here, it may be added that the applicant has very fairly indicated in the affidavit filed in support of the present application vide paragraph no.2, that his application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., that is the subject matter of allegations carried in paragraphs 12 to 15 of the complaint, was indeed rejected by the Magistrate by his order dated 30.05.2002, and, against that order, a criminal revision preferred to the Sessions Judge has been rejected. An application under Section 482 Cr.P.C., further challenging both orders, has been dismissed by this Court.7. There is a further averment in paragraph 16 of the complaint to the effect that the complainant has incorrectly shown his date of birth in his service book to be 28.12.1958, fraudulently by interpolating the same. In this connection, it is alleged that the applicant has in connivance with the management, regarding which there are averments in paragraphs 17 and 18 of the complaint, caused his service book to be taken in their custody by the management. It is further said in paragraph 19 of the complaint that complaints regarding this matter have been examined and found untenable on inquiry by the Joint Director of Education, Bareilly Region, Bareilly vide his memo dated 26.04.03. By the said memo the applicant's promotion, on the basis of his qualification and service record, granted by the Regional Level Committee, has been notified. It is averred that the complaints regarding manipulation in his service record by the applicant against the complainant are all directed to damage his reputation in society, that are untrue.8. The last imputation carried in paragraph 20 of the complaint on the basis of which the complainant has sought to prosecute the applicant for an offence under Section 500 IPC, is a certain news item published in the Dainik Jagran Hindi Daily, issue dated 06.04.2003, where it is claimed that the applicant has caused news of false allegations about the complainant to be published, that have caused immense harm in reputation to him and embarrassment to his family members. It is not indicated as to what are the precise news published, but the best that can be presumed is that it is about the same subject matter of imputations, that have been mentioned in paragraphs 13 to 19 of the complaint.9. Before proceeding to examine the matter whether a case for quashing the impugned order or the complaint is made out, it is necessary to notice here that though the complaint is based on defamatory publication, that falls in the class of libel, that is to say, defamatory imputation made by words written or other representations in writing, as distinguished from those spoken, the complainant has not filed, as the record reveals, any of the subject defamatory publication. This Court thinks that before a Magistrate can consider whether written representation or imputations claimed to be defamatory and punishable under Section 500 IPC, are indeed worth proceeding, and, issues process under Section 204 Cr.P.C., the writing that is claimed to be defamatory should be there before the Magistrate, to which the Magistrate must apply his mind. In the present case a perusal of the impugned order shows that all that the Magistrate has taken into consideration, as presumably that was all that was before him, are the statements of the complainant and his witnesses under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. There is stark non-mention of any of the published defamatory writing, that is the basis of the prosecution under Section 500 IPC, being filed.10. A perusal of the impugned order shows that the learned Magistrate has proceeded to pass the same in the most mechanical fashion. Though, styled as his satisfaction but the summoning order, is no more than the blind folded acceptance of what the complainant and his two witnesses have said. It is well-nigh settled that while a summoning order need not and must not carry a detailed analysis of evidence, but at the same time, the order being one of moment, at least to the accused, who is thereafter to suffer the rigors of the criminal process, it must disclose due application of mind to all relevant evidence, both documentary and oral, depending, of course, on the nature of the offences involved. In the present case since the case is one involving an offence under Section 500 IPC, where as already said, the imputation is written, or in other words libel, the document carrying the imputation being considered, albeit briefly by the Court while passing the impugned order, would be the minimum requirement of the law. In this connection, the law regarding the requirement of application of mind to the material on record at the stage of summoning by the Magistrate is succinctly laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749, where it is held:"28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused."11. In view of what has been said above, the impugned order does not stand to the scrutiny of a valid summoning order, and, on this score alone, it is liable to be quashed. That would necessitate a remit of the matter to the Magistrate for consideration afresh, subject of course, to the constraint of limitation prescribed by law. But, the learned counsel for the applicant is not content with that and seeks to press his further relief, that is to quash the entire proceedings.12. Turning to the imputations that have been made the subject matter of prosecution, the first is a failed application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. regarding the complainant using forged letter heads, of different men of importance, to bring false complaints against the applicant under forged signatures of such persons. It is submitted that the said application being rejected, the allegation is untrue. The learned counsel for the applicant submits, in support of his challenge to the complaint, on this part of it, that the 8th Exception to Section 499 IPC, clearly acts as a bar to the Magistrate proceeding against the applicant on the basis of his application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. that did not succeed. In order to appreciate the submission of the learned counsel for the applicant, it is necessary to refer to the provisions of Section 499, and, specifically its 8th Exception. The provision reads thus:"499. Defamation.--Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter expected, to defame that person.Explanation 1.--It may amount to defamation to impute anything to a deceased person, if the imputation would harm the reputation of that person if living, and is intended to be hurtful to the feelings of his family or other near relatives.Explanation 2.--It may amount to defamation to make an imputation concerning a company or an association or collection of persons as such.Explanation 3.--An imputation in the form of an alternative or expressed ironically, may amount to defamation.Explanation 4.--No imputation is said to harm a person's reputation, unless that imputation directly or indirectly, in the estimation of others, lowers the moral or intellectual character of that person, or lowers the character of that person in respect of his caste or of his calling, or lowers the credit of that person, or causes it to be believed that the body of that person is in a loathsome state, or in a state generally considered as disgraceful.Illustrations(a) A says--"Z is an honest man; he never stole B's watch"; intending to cause it to be believed that Z did steal B's watch. This is defamation, unless it fall within one of the exceptions.(b) A is asked who stole B's watch. A points to Z, intending to cause it to be believed that Z stole B's watch. This is defamation unless it fall within one of the exceptions.(c) A draws a picture of Z running away with B's watch, intending it to be believed that Z stole B's watch. This is defamation, unless it fall within one of the exceptions.Eighth Exception.--Accusation preferred in good faith to authorised person.--It is not defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject-matter of accusation.Illustration If A in good faith accuse Z before a Magistrate; if A in good faith complains of the conduct of Z, a servant, to Z's master; if A in good faith complains of the conduct of Z, and child, to Z's father--A is within this exception."13. The submission of the learned counsel for the applicant is that it is not the success or the failure of his application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., that would attract the provisions carried in the 8th Exception. He submits that the act of a person, making in good faith an accusation against any person to another, who has by law the authority to deal with the subject matter of accusation, is protected and cannot be subjected to a valid prosecution for an offence under Section 500 IPC. Learned counsel submits that the Magistrate is eminently a person authorized by law to deal with an accusation laid before him, through an application u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C., seeking a direction to the police to register and investigate a case. He further submits, that the fact that the Magistrate did not find substance in the application to order registration of a case, would not take the matter out of the teeth of the 8th Exception to Section 499 IPC. Learned counsel appearing for the complainant/ opposite party has submitted that the issue whether the applicant is entitled to the protection of the 8th Exception, is one of defence, on the basis of which the proceedings cannot be quashed, inasmuch as, the exception is attracted only when the accusation to a person in authority is made in good faith. The burden to prove that good faith is on the accused, which he can prove at the trial, and, not otherwise. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the complainant/ opposite party has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in M.A. Rumugam vs. Kittu alias Krishnamoorthy, (2009) 1 SCC 101, where it has been held thus:"18. Allegations made in the said complaint petition, thus, in our opinion, make out a case for proceeding against the appellant under Section 500 of the Penal Code as thereby imputation concerning the respondent had been made intending to harm or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation would harm his reputation.19. For the purpose of bringing his case within the purview of the Eighth and the Ninth Exception appended to Section 499 of the Penal Code, it would be necessary for the appellant to prove good faith for the protection of the interests of the person making it or of any other person or for the public good.20. It is now a well-settled principle of law that those who plead exception must prove it. The burden of proof that his action was bona fide would, thus, be on the appellant alone.21. At this stage, in our opinion, it would have been premature for the High Court to consider the materials placed by the appellant before it so as to arrive at a definite conclusion that there was no element of bad faith on the part of the appellant in making the said complaint before the police authorities."14. Learned counsel for the applicant on the other hand has placed reliance on a judgement of the Supreme Court in Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande v. Uttam, (1999) 3 SCC 134, where dealing with the said issue it has been held:"7. The next question that arises for consideration is whether reading the complaint and the report of the Treasury Officer which was obtained pursuant to the Order of the Magistrate under sub-section (1) of Section 201, can it be said that a prima facie case exists for trial or Exception 8 to Section 499 clearly applies and consequently in such a case, calling upon the accused to face trial would be a travesty of justice. The gravamen of the allegations in the complaint petition is that the accused persons made a complaint to the Treasury Officer, Amravati, containing false imputations to the effect that the complainant had come to the office in a drunken state and abused the Treasury Officer, Additional Treasury Officer and the Collector and circulated in the office using filthy language and such imputations had been made with the intention to cause damage to the reputation and services of the complainant. In order to decide the correctness of this averment, the Magistrate instead of issuing process had called upon the Treasury Officer to hold an enquiry and submit a report and the said Treasury Officer did submit a report to the Magistrate. The question for consideration is whether the allegations in the complaint read with the report of the Magistrate make out the offence under Section 500 or not. Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code defines the offence of defamation and Section 500 provides the punishment for such offence. Exception 8 to Section 499 clearly indicates that it is not a defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with regard to the subject-matter of accusation. The report of the Treasury Officer clearly indicates that pursuant to the report made by the accused persons against the complainant, a departmental enquiry had been initiated and the complainant was found to be guilty. Under such circumstances the fact that the accused persons had made a report to the superior officer of the complainant alleging that he had abused the Treasury Officer in a drunken state which is the gravamen of the present complaint and nothing more, would be covered by Exception 8 to Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code. By perusing the allegations made in the complaint petition, we are also satisfied that no case of defamation has been made out. In this view of the matter, requiring the accused persons to face trial or even to approach the Magistrate afresh for reconsideration of the question of issuance of process would not be in the interest of justice. On the other hand, in our considered opinion, this is a fit case for quashing the order of issuance of process and the proceedings itself. We, therefore, set aside the impugned order of the High Court and confirm the order of the learned Sessions Judge and quash the criminal proceeding itself......"15. It appears that the two decisions of their Lordships above referred lay down law that is applicable to two different situations on facts. One is where an accusation is laid before a person in authority empowered by law to determine it, and, upon due determination the accusation finally fails, with no further inquiry or proceeding pending. In that kind of a situation, it would be for the accuser to prove it as a matter of defence at the trial, once he is summoned on the complaint of the exonerated accused under Section 500 IPC, that he made the accusation bonafide and is, therefore, entitled to the protection of 8th Exception to Section 499. This was the position which their Lordships dealt with in Rumugam (supra). The other contingency would be where the accusation is finally accepted, and yet the accuser is summoned at the instance of the accused, on a complaint under Section 500 IPC to stand his trial for an imputation that have withstood the competent authority's scrutiny. In that situation, the 8th Exception to Section 499 IPC would come to the immediate rescue of the accused, entitling him to have those proceedings quashed. It was this kind of a contingency that their Lordships dealt with in Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande (supra).16. In the present case, a perusal of the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. shows that the accusations regarding the use of bogus letter heads by the complainant/ opposite party, under forged signatures of the owners of those letter heads, in order to address false complaints against the applicant, though did not find favour with the Magistrate while dealing with the applicant's prayer under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., that was rejected throughout, by this Court too, an FIR on those allegations did come to be registered by the police on 01.03.2004 giving rise to Case Crime no.123 of 2004, under Sections 419, 420, 468, 470, 471 IPC, Police Station Subhash Nagar, District Bareilly, against the complainant/ opposite party. The said FIR led to a charge sheet being filed on 25.03.2004, thus, prima facie vindicating the imputations. The said fact is asserted in paragraph 4 of the affidavit in support of the present application u/s 482 Cr.P.C., and, in paragraph 6 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the complainant/ opposite party, the fact of registration of the FIR as aforesaid, culminating in a charge sheet after investigation, has not been denied.17. It must be said here that an application u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. is a procedural remedy as distinguished from a substantive remedy. It does not by itself determine the truth or falsehood of anything that is alleged there. Though some satisfaction of sorts about the truth of the allegations made in the application, is now the requirement of the law on the Magistrate's part, after their Lordships' decision in Priyanka Srivastava and another vs. State of U.P. and others, (2015) 6 SCC 287, yet that by no means alters the nature of those proceedings. The requirement of examining the truth of the allegations in Priyanka Srivastava (supra) is to ferret out those annoying, frivolous and sometimes embarrassing prosecutions, particularly, in certain class of cases, that act to the grave detriment of public affairs. But, all in the end of it, the conclusion of a proceeding under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is not the decision about the truth of an allegation. It is only the refusal of a remedy to invoke the process of investigation, that otherwise remains open to the concerned police agency, if they are satisfied, at any stage, that the allegations do require investigation. Also, it does not debar the complainant from invoking the jurisdiction of the Magistrate, to proceed in the matter as a complaint. This being the position, the rejection of the applicant's prayer under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. does not in the least show that the accusation brought by the applicant against the complainant/ opposite party, relating to use of forged letter heads, to lay false complaints against him, in the name of those who never made those complaints, has been proven false before an authority invested by law with jurisdiction to determine it. Rather, the subsequent registration of an FIR on the same allegations against the complainant/ opposite party at the behest of the applicant, that led to a charge sheet being filed against him, a fact not denied to the complainant/ opposite party, leads to a completely different consequence under the law.18. The fact that the applicant's imputation of the bogus use of letter heads to lay false complaints against him by the complainant/ opposite party, that is one limb of the impugned proceedings, has been found vindicated in an investigation by the police on the basis of an FIR, in the opinion of this Court, would attract the principle in Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande (supra), rather than Rumugam (supra), where the 8th Exception can be invoked by the applicant to seek quashing of proceeding under Section 500 IPC. It is not a case where the exception would have to be pleaded as a defence and established at the trial. The position would have been different, in case a complaint on those allegations were preferred by the applicant to the Magistrate, and, rejected, with the rejection becoming final. Here, an investigating agency of the State has interposed to probe the applicant's allegations that the complainant/ opposite party has used bogus letter heads of others to lay false complaints against the applicant, and, found the same vindicated, so as to move the investigating agency to launch a prosecution through a police report. Thus, as far as the imputation in question goes, the impugned proceedings are liable to be quashed.19. The other imputation on the basis of which the applicant has been summoned is regarding the wrong entry of his date of birth in his service record. It is submitted that the said imputation is one regarding which the complaint shows in paragraph 15 of it, to be acknowledged for a fact, that a First Information Report has been registered by the police giving rise to Case Crime no.30/2003, under Sections 324, 504, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 IPC, Police Station Subhash Nagar, District Bareilly. The said fact about the applicant lodging an FIR against the complainant/ opposite party, regarding an incorrect entry in the complainant/ opposite party's service record as to his date of birth, besides forgery made in his certificates and mark sheets, has been asserted by the applicant in paragraph 3 of the affidavit filed in support of the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The said fact has not been denied in paragraph no.5 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the opposite party, though the locus standi of the applicant is to lodge such an FIR and his bonafides in doing so, have been questioned. The fact remains that the imputations relating to manipulation of his date of birth by the complainant/ opposite party, are the subject matter of a criminal investigation, commenced on the basis of an FIR. The said imputation also, for the same reason as the last considered, does not fall into that class of a rejected and discarded allegation made to an authority competent by law to determine it, that may invite on a complaint under Section 500 IPC, a requirement for the applicant to raise a defence at the trial based on the 8th Exception to Section 499. It can, and, ought to be quashed.20. So far as the last allegation mentioned in the impugned complaint regarding publication of some false allegation in the Hindi Daily Dainki Jagran, dated 06th January, 2003 is concerned, the said allegation reads as under (extracted verbatim in Hindi vernacular):" 20- ;g fd mijksDr f?kukSus d`R; ls tkucw> dj >wBs QthZ feF;k vkjksi yxkdj nSfud tkxj.k fnukad 6 tuojh 2003 dks izdkf'kr O;kid izpkj] izlkj dj foi{kh us oknh dh lkekftd izfr"Bk dks {kfr igqWpkdj Hkkjrh; n.M lafgrk dh /kkjk 499 ds vUrxZr vijk/kh nq"d`R; fd;k gS tks fd Hkkjrh; n.M lafgrk dh /kkjk 500 vkbZ0ih0lh0 ds vUrxZr n.Muh; vijk/k gSA rc ls oknh o mlds ifjokj okyksa dk lkekt esa mBuk cSBuk nqHkj gks x;k gS] yksx rjg rjg dh izkFkhZ o mlds ifjokj ij NhVk dlh djus yxs gS bruk gh ugha vf[ky Hkkjrh; egk lHkk ds lnL;ksa us ekSf[kd o fyf[kr :i ls oknh ds egkeU=h in ls gVkus rd dh ekax dj Mkyh gSA bl lEcU/k esa lat; lDlsuk rFkk jes'k pUnz flUgk us fyf[kr :i ls oknh dks gVkus dks v/;{k ls ekWx dh gS ftls layXu dj Lo;a oknh ls v/;{k Jh vkj0 ,u0 lDlsuk us Li"Vhdj.k ekaxh gS ftlls oknh dks o mlds ifjtuksa o b"V fe=ksa dks dkQh ekufld vk?kkr igqWpk gSA"21. A perusal of the said paragraph, carrying the imputation under consideration, shows it be woefully vague and indeterminate. It does not mention as to what precisely was the content of the imputation that was published in the newspaper, so as to enable the Court to ascertain prima facie, that in fact the publication was defamatory in character. No offence punishable under Section 500 IPC is made out, on the basis of allegations said to be published in the Hindi Daily, as per allegations in paragraph 20 of the complaint.22. In the result, this Application succeeds and is allowed. The impugned proceedings giving rise to Complaint Case no.2527 of 2003, Virendra Raizada vs. Mukul Mohan Tripathi, under Section 500 IPC, P.S., Subhas Nagar, District Bareilly pending on the file of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-VIIth, Bareilly, are hereby quashed.23. Let a copy of this order be communicated to the trial court forthwith by the office through the Sessions Judge, Bareilly.Order Date :- 4.12.2018 AnoopSource: Mukul Mohan Tripathi Alias Joshi vs State Of U.P. And Another on 4 December, 2018