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Well, this is a complicated multi-faceted issue which is also bit cluttered at multiple levels.The whole issue is blown out of proportion when Kerala Govt objected privatization of Trivandrum airport which was announced by Central Govt by handing over the airport operations to Adani Group.I will just give a brief background to the context for those who have no idea of its whole context and then to current context.Thiruvananthapuram International Airport is one of India’s oldest airports, much to the league of Delhi or Mumbai. It was established in 1932, the fourth airport facility after Juhu (Mumbai), Safdarjung (Delhi), Karachi, established as Royal Travancore Air Club as the Consort Prince- HH G. V. Raja (H.H The Queen’s husband) was quiet interested in flying and decided to start his own flying club to learn civil aviation.That year, JRD Tata started his airline- the famous Tata Air Services which started its first flight between Karachi to Mumbai, that impressed Travancore Govt and the Maharaja personally sent a mail to JRD Tata to consider flying to Trivandrum. So immediately JRD Tata made India’s first longest flight connecting Bombay to Trivandrum carrying mails meant for Royal Anchal (Travancore Post services). Also in 1935, Tata launched first commercial operations connecting Bombay to Trivandrum via Kannur (that time there was a small airport in Kannur), making it the first scheduled Domestic service in India (prior to that, all airline operations of Tata were Royal Air Mail services). This lead conversion of a small flying club to proper airport and Travancore Govt funded to make it into a proper airport, making it the first airport among Native Princely states of India (Kannur was then part of British India and no airport facility, rather just an airfield).The old ads of Tata Airlines (Air India) prior to 1947 highlighting its longest domestic flight in the countryTravancore govt acquired land for runway as well as bldg etc (there was an issue in Land that time, as aircrafts were prohibited to fly over Sree Padmanabhaswamy temple due to local traditions, so runway was constructed in such a way that air planes can bypass the city core when flying into Trivandrum). However the runway passes thro’ the royal road where the Lord’s Arattu (religious procession) would pass to reach the beach shore, but it was decided to halt all flight operations only on the Arattu days for the procession to use the traditional route (a tradition strictly followed today too). British Govt in Delhi didn’t spend a penny to fund this airport as Travancore wasn’t part of British India then.When Travancore merged with Indian Union in 1949, the airport land was handed over to the provincial state of Travancore-Cochin Govt. When Indian constitution was made in 1950, Civil Aviation became a Central Subject, hence the TC Govt handed over the airport and its land to Central Govt just like any other airports in the country.Now originally the airport land was limited airfield as it was located in thickly populated fishermen colony area (just close to Shankumugham Beach), which was okay for the aircrafts of 1940s-50s era. However when Jet flights came and much larger aircrafts started coming, the runway became insufficient and some more land were acquired by Kerala Govt and handed over to Central Govt to expand the runway. However the big push came in 1970s when Gulf migration started and people started migrating to Gulf countries in big way. In that era, India allowed international flights only from 4 airports- Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai and Kolkatta. However as Malayalees started migrating to ME in larger numbers, state owned Air India started limited flights from Trivandrum to Sharjah and Riyadh via Mumbai towards end of 1970s. However soon these international flights became so lucrative for Air India. However due to presence of many Bombay based lobbies, the limited flights from Trivandrum to Gulf countries ceased by 1983, which caused a huge resentment among NRK community. Air India cited lack of runway space for larger flights as a reason and Kerala Govt responded by additional land acquisition on priority basis in 1985. The proactive approach of Kerala Govt addressing NRK concerns and apathy shown by AI in delaying direct flights, lead to a huge protests among NRK community and in 1987, there were intense protests in Bombay airport (where Malayalee Passengers arriving from Gulf would sit in the runway to disrupt flight operations) seeking Govt of India to grant direct International flights to Trivandrum.This finally forced India Govt to grant special permissions to allow direct International flights along with limited foreign flights (Air Lanka, Air Maldives and Gulf Air started towards end of 1980s along with Indian Airlines connecting to many Gulf countries. In meantime, IAAI also extended the runway to facililate much larger flights. And finally in 1991, Trivandrum became the first Non-Metro International Airport of India and the 5th International airport after Mumbai, Delhi, Chennai and Kolkatta. Ever since regular international flights both by domestic and foreign carriers started.In this time, there was huge protests for second airport in Kerala, which lead birth of Calicut Airport in 1992, where NRIs crowd-funded for an airport which AAI built it. And that also lead to demand for third airport- Kochi, which was functioning inside Navy’s INS Garuda Airport. But India Govt didn’t agree for a third airport citing no funds and Kerala Govt said that it can build its own airport in Kochi, if central govt gives permission. And with such a permission, Kerala Govt started embarking on a project inspired from Calicut experience of NRK crowdfunding, but eventually it lead to birth of CIAL (Cochin International Airport Limited), India’s first Public-Private Participation model airport. in 1999. Infact prior to CIAL, there was no such concept of PPP in aviation sector or most of the sectors in India. CIAL also became India’s first airport outside Govt of India’s ownership (outside AAI’s control) and the model was also unique. It was basically a permanent JV between Govt of Kerala, Banks and Private entrepreneurs as well as private individuals, not the concessionaire system as you find later PPP models like Bangalore or Delhi etc.And CIAL model worked. It became THE MOST SUCCESSFUL PPP story in Kerala and became a sort of template for Kerala Govt. This also later gave birth to another entity- the Kannur International Airport Limited- KIAL which also functions same way as CIAL.And this also lead to policy concept difference between Kerala and Central govt over the concept of PPP. According to Kerala, PPP is a permanent JV between State and Private party where state will also have an active role in day-to-day activities. In short, Kerala’s concept of PPP is state and private individuals forming a company and that company managing the facility. This is called JV model or BOO model (Build-Own-Operate)On the contrary Central Govt’s PPP concept is different. Central Govt proposes to give away a sector to a Private concessionaire who will own/manage/develop a facility for a certain period and give back to Center upon expiry of the term. This is called Concessionaire model which has multiple variants like BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) or DBFOT (Design, Build-Finance-Operate-Transfer) or BOLT (Build-Operate-Lease-Transfer model) or LDOT model (Lease-Design-Operate-Transfer).The last 3 models, ie DBFOT, BOLT and LDOT models are common for private airports in India (barring CIAL and KIAL).These models are opposed by Kerala Govt in general (not very strongly, but more commonly). Kerala Govt and society enlarge isn’t supportive for pure private enterprise culture, due to the adherence of Left-Socialist values in the society. Even though the society accepts that private entrepreneurs drives better growth, the society equally highlights the negative side of animalistic spirits of entrepreneurs which may harm larger social interests. So the public opinion is more towards PPP where govt equally have a role to play to control. Also there was a consensus among both alliances that, new projects can be in DBFOT/BOOT models considering the fact that Kerala Govt donot have enough money to invest and take a controlling stake, while existing entities if to privatize must be made in JV model only, with Govt having a major stake.Kerala’s experience with concessionaire system was always negative as concessionaire companies are always aimed to make maximum revenue within shortest period of time. So concessionaire models in NH development always ends up as a social issue in Kerala with numerous protests regularly happening at Thrissur Toll gate citing day light robbery in name of tolls. So as the first BOT project- the BOT Thommumpady Bridge in Kochi also became the biggest battle ground between citizens and the BOT Company citing excessive tolls. Due to all these, the social attitude where a private operator controls a govt facility for a specific period is always frowned upon.On the contrary there is a huge positive attitude towards JV approach where Kerala Govt holds a stake and huge voice within the directorial board in every major decision. CIAL is the best example for that as technically its a private airport with majority being private investment, but controlled by Govt (thro’ govt appointed MD). Since Kerala Govt has a huge voice in the directorial board, the accountability factor of govt towards public is equally protected. Another similar example is the Technopark-Infopark model where Kerala Govt owned IT Parks owns land and invite private entities to invest as co-developers instead of doing directly.In every way, Kerala society demands govt active participation in business entities. Thats why Kerala Govt is virtually present every sphere of Keralan Life from running grocery shops to airports.Now specific to TVM issueTrivandrum airport is owned by Govt of India under AAI, which runs in very typical Sarkari fashion. Despite of being the oldest airport in the state and one of the oldest in the country, hardly any major upgrades or facilities exist in the terminal. This becomes more severe when we compare Trivandrum Airport with Cochin or recently with Kannur, as latter are private airports under Kerala Govt.Over last one decade, Kerala Govt was actively pursuing the idea of take over remaining two airports (Trivandrum and Kozhikode) under its control. Govt has made enough lobbying with central govts to take over these airport after successful experience of managing CIAL and now KIAL. The govt actively pushed for closure of current Karipur airport (Kozhikode) by shifting the facility to Thiruvambady where a greenfield airport can be constructed for Kozhikode under CIAL model. However it didn’t work out much.Demand for airport at Thiruvambady hots upNew airport in Kozhikode: Govt orders feasibility studyIn terms of Trivandrum, the govt donot wanted the airport to shift from its current location as being the only airport in the state located within the Central business district or inside the downtown which is heavily patronized by govt officials, ministers, politicians etc apart from other passenger base.And that exactly is the problem with TRV. Trivandrum airport being its location inside the city, is always constrained by the space. Hardly there is any room for any expansion. And Kerala Govt knows that, its chance to take over TRV exists over this bargain chip, ie Land.In 2005, Central Govt requested Kerala govt for additional 50 acres of land for expansion as the airport terminals were reaching its saturation point. With no scope of acquiring land in the old terminal side (Shankumugham beach area), Kerala govt somehow acquired 23 acres of land in the opposite side (Chakka area) which is closer to NH 66 at a very premium price. But Kerala govt prior to handover made a demand to make the state as joint owner of Trivandrum airport, which then the central govt didn’t comply as there was no provision under AAI Act to have a state or any other party as co-owner in an AAI facility. But the then Manmohan Singh Govt made a public assurance that, in event of privatization or similar, the state will be given a stake in the SPV to be formed in lieu of the value of the land which the state has acquired for. And in this land, AAI constructed the current T2 facility meant for international travellers.Untill 2017, there was no active proposals of privatization of TRV airport and whenever any proposal comes, Kerala Govt used to make a claim as they believed they have a right to claim so for the land they provided twice which was acquired a very premium rate ( being inside the city center and the airport area is thickly populated zone). In meantime, even the current facility reached its saturation stage and urgently require minimum 18 Acres to expand both terminal and parallel taxiway.However the families around the airport were resisting any sort of acquisitions. In this context, Kerala Govt officially wrote to Central govt, if to provide any additional land, they must have a controlling stake in TRV airport as a company, where they can implement CIAL model.CIAL ModelIn CIAL land acquisition stage, there was heavy public opposition as the land was again a premium factor in Kerala. CIAL overcame thro’ innovative means, ie by announcing a wholesome very attractive compensation package.Announcing govt guaranteed jobs within CIAL to all families who lose the land. This means, every family who gave land to CIAL will get assured jobs within CIAL for minimum of 3 generations in accordance to one’s qualifications. This means any direct member of the victim family has the first right to claim for any job within CIAL from CEO to a peon position in accordance to vacancy and qualification. This sort of reservation was first of its kind in a corporate sector and since GOK has an active stake in CIAL, the govt guaranteed that CIAL will uphold this promise perpetually.Those families who lost their livelihood due to airport project in CIAL will be given a taxi car and badge to become official airport taxi driver. CIAL formed its own Taxi company- the CATS (Cochin Airport Taxi Society) where taxi drivers and CIAL have equal stake and CIAL will procure modern cars and provide to the taxi drivers at No-Interest basis (only principal amount need to pay back). They also have monopoly to take passengers from the airportCIAL assured to all erstwhile landowners that the company will provide subsidized utilities as part of its CSR to them and in last 20 years they kept the promise as CIAL provides subsidized electricity, water and even education to people of Nedumbassery locality (where the airport is located).CIAL also provided plots to those families whose houses were acquired in process of airport temple and constructed a colony for them- Vimana-nagaram or Airport city close to the airport gates as well as tied up with Federal Bank and Hudco to provide home loans at subsidized interest rates.These all measures are independent of standard GOK compensation. This was possible because CIAL was an autonomous company and can make such offers that GOK can’t do directly as latter is bound by rules and procedures.Due to this factor, LA was pretty easy in CIAL as most of the landowners can’t refuse such huge offers. This same model was used in Kannur airport project too.Kerala govt’s stand is that, to acquire more land in TRV, they need CIAL/KIAL model where the company has to assure the locality of these benefits, so that they will give up the land. Its impossible for Kerala Govt to pay ridiculous/astronomical land prices (market value). Thats why Kerala Govt press for its stake in Trivandrum airport, so that it can use that to give offers indirectly and procure land.However, there was no positive response from Central Govt on that in 2017.But instead the GOI came up with open tendering in 2018 for privatizing TRV under LDO model. However the biggest game changer was GOI modified the terms.In standard privatization model, it was more of fixed lease value to be paid to AAI during the concession period as done in Mumbai or Delhi models. But in the new plan, GOI made it per passenger based revenue sharing model, ie an amount to be paid AAI depending upon passengers patronizing it which was highly unusual. And also the clause of previous experience in Airport construction and management was removed. This lead to allegation that, these changes were made to help those cronies which were closely associated with NDA govt.Kerala govt objected to Trivandrum’s Privatization as such, rather claimed that center must handover the airport to State lead SPV directly (with a central stake too) and there is no need of tendering, if its an inter-govt transfer. But centre didn’t agree and after intense lobbying, central govt allowed State to participate in the tendering process and gave First rights of refusal (if within 10% range).Kerala govt also formed a SPV- TIAL and flouted a global tender for a private investor which brought Frankfurt Airport and some other companies into potential partnership. However many sources clearly indicate that GOI has pre-fixed Adani for gaining these airports, thus most of the companies which were supposed to form TIAL were doubtful to invest. So the condition was, let Kerala Govt alone procure the operational rights for Trivandrum and once it gains, TIAL will be formed with other partners.Trivandrum international airport: Going gets tough for state bid11 companies evince interest in Trivandrum airportWhen tenders were opened Adani became the highest quoting a ridiculous figure of Rs 168 per passenger (to be paid to AAI), while KSIDC (representing the GOK) quoted Rs 135 per passenger, whereas most of other established players like GMR etc quoting less than 100.This means, Adani has to get back atleast double the amount, if they have to pay 168 Rs to AAI per passenger, which means the passenger expenditure at TRV will be of ridiculous level.And interesting, ADANI quoted similar ridiculous extraordinary pricing for all other airports that went for bidding. This has pushed Kerala Govt to reassure that its a pre-fixated deal between Modi govt and Adani (as everyone in India knows both Modi is closely associated with Adani) and the govt refused to accept it. It became a huge issue with entire Airport staff (including BJP’s own unions inside the airport) opposing Adani to take over the airport and interestingly every party including BJP Kerala officially opposing it. Moreover it was in Jan 2019 which was prior to elections of 2019 and BJP can’t antagonize ordinary people in Trivandrum with the image of selling national properties for Adani (as there was a chance for BJP to win from Trivandrum). So that time, many BJP leaders from Kerala went and met Suresh Prabhu (the-then Civil Aviation minister) seeking to reconsider the tender decision for TRV. Pinarayi Vijayan also met Modi to reconsider and even offered him the same price which Adani is offering (Rs 168) to get the airport under GOK control.BJP Trivandrum District President- Adv S Suresh launching the protest meet lead by BMS Airport Trade union to protest against Adani taking over Airport in Jan 2019.V Muraleedharan in 2018 wrote a detailed FB post the importance of keeping TRV under state control and not to hand over to Adani or any private entrepreneurs. The same Muraleendaran supporting privatization nowThus this became a prestige issue for Kerala Govt and the state govt said, in no manner it will allow the state’s premier airport to go to Adani. As per Pinarayi Vijayan and many other ministers, they got an assurances from Modi that, final decision will be made only after taking the state in full confidence.A case was filed by GOK in Kerala High Court against this (the original case was dismissed by High Court, but restored by Supreme Court of India and now in front of HC about the validity of Adani’s tendering to the airport).In 2020, the current Civil Aviation Minister made an assurance to Parilament that no decision was made over Trivandrum’s privatization as the matter is sub-judice now.And contrary to the Minister’s claim, last day, Central govt cleared Adani’s right to hold all the 6 airports, despite of the fact, the airport issue is still pending before Kerala High court.This once again re-ignited the matter and Kerala Govt vowed, it will NOT cooperate with the decision. If Kerala Govt refuse to cooperate, then the whole TRV airport will be jeopardized as it has reached its saturation point and without land acquisition, the airport operations will be severely affected.Further the airport has issue with road access to its facility from the highway and Kerala Govt can effectively block plans of new flyover/ramps etc which will complicate passenger convenience to the facility. In addition, the airport unions (including BJP ones) are opposed to the Adani, which means they can easily lockdown the airport operations effectively.Pinarayi’s letter to PM Modi after the all Party meet announcing absolute non-cooperation for any private party take over in TRV and request for reconsideration of leasing to AdaniAlready the people around the airport announced, they will not give up their land for land acquisitions if Adani takes over the airport (as they won’t get CIAL like benefits) and if state govt halts any land acquisition process, it means every expansion plans will stop.Land owners to back out of offerAs of now, every political party in Kerala barring BJP is opposed Adani taking over Trivandrum airport and the govt of Kerala got a consent from all opposition parties for any harsh steps to prevent Adani taking over airport. As state elections are approaching, this shall likely to be a major political issue too in Trivandrum as privatizing a national property like TRV has created a sense of distrust element. For traditional Trivandrumites, the airport is seen as Sree Padmanabha’s property as the airport is situated the lord’s procession road and handing over his property to an outsider also invokes negative feeling against BJP (they are trying to reduce that anger by making a counter argument that CPM is trying to gain the airport to prevent Sree Padmanabha’s annual processions to enter into the facility).Overall, among the commoners of Trivandrum, this became a huge issue and LDF sees its a potential tool to outsmart growing fortunes of BJP in Trivandrum district.Pinarayi dares Modi to send Adani. But can Kerala seriously defy Centre's airport authority?State cooperation necessary to run TVM airport smoothly: Pinarayi during all-party meetThe other side of the storyAs I mentioned, it has both political and social factors for Kerala Govt to oppose.But there is also a group of supporters to Adani’s take over apart from hardcore BJP cadres (who support just out of political compulsions). These supporters are mostly young Techie community of Technopark as well as group of Trivandrum based entrepreneurs and investors.For a long time, they were pained seeing the pathetic state of Trivandrum airport under AAI and their pains increase when they see how Cochin Airport is progressing rapidly. So they want privatization of the airport at any cost. In South India, almost all capital cities (Bangalore, Hyderabad and Chennai to some extend) has world class airports, but Trivandrum ended up with a shit-hole like TRV airport only because of AAI. So they believe, only a private entrepreneur can change fortunes of their city.And current Trivandrum MP Shashi Tharoor is an active supporter of this group. He along with this community were launching many initiatives to make Trivandrum, a city equal to Bangalore or Hyderabad. One of their famous campaigns is #MoveToTrivandrum highlights their passion to make their city great. The upcoming Vizhinjam Seaport is one great hope for this community to see Trivandrum moving out of its traditional laid back attitude and becoming a major commercial city (Trivandrum since its inception was always an administrative city and never had anything of commercial city status in past)As Vizhinjam Seaport is built by Adani group, in partnership with GOK (GOK has a policy that they allow concessionaires for new projects), this community believes, if airport also comes under Adani, it creates a huge synergy.Shashi Tharoor in 2019, made it clear to public, he will support any private investor- X Y or Z as long as Trivandrum airport is privatized. So even now, he repeat his stance, he supports TRV’s privatization irrespective what KPCC says. He said, while he don’t support Adani’s ridiculous pricing, he says he sees no other alternative for TRV at the momentTharoor’s interview in 2019 that he will support any private investor to take over TrivandrumMost of the supporters are technocrats/business investors from TRV feels, TRV is no where in the aviation race when compared to Kochi or even the much recent Kannur, only because its under AAI. And they want Adani to invest as it shall be a clear success story (because central govt will do any extend to support Adani’s business) which will help Trivandrum to grow more better, projecting these success stories.Apart from this, they fear, the hard attitude of the state against Adani may send wrong signals that state is opposed to private entrepreneurs (in reality its not, as state itself is trying to bring international players). The argument is simple. If there is a pure Private player without state stake, many in Trivandrum aspire their airport may be of league of BLR or BOM or HYD or DEL where GMR/GVK invested so much and made radical changes unlike CIAL model which is always known as Common Man’s Airport etc with lesser investment. The show-off factor values so much in Trivandrum social culture, so an ultra huge-gold plated airport definitely has a boasting value as one sees in BOM or HYD etc.Regulator looks into airport cost inflationAnd thats the exact point where Kerala Govt and others oppose. They feel, just like how GMR/GVK gold plated their private airports for charging so much from the passengers, the same will be done in TRV too.Kerala air passengers traditionally NRKs who were mostly middle class or lower class strata. For them affordability matters a lot, rather than paying premium for airport facilities. Its for this reason, the Users Fee in airport is always a controversial subject in Kerala.If one looks, CIAL was the first airport in the country to bring the concept of Users Fee way back in 2000. But it also became the first airport in the country to ROLL BACK the Users fee concept in 2006 as public was opposed paying huge amount to use a facility. Today CIAL remains the only private airport in India without an user fee (BLR charges 308 Rs while untill recently HYD used to charge 1700 Rs)Bengaluru airport hikes user fee by a massive 120%This is Not the Way to Privatise AirportsKerala Govt fears that if a private operator like Adani, by quoting such ridiculous pricing, ends up huge user fee in TRV, it shall be a major issue for Kerala society. Unlike other states where airports were seen more as a Middle class/upper class facility, in Kerala, airports are always part of every class in the society and affordability of airport is a key political topic too.So both sides have equal points to highlight and argue. The final result, probably only time can tell.In my opinion, I would choose CIAL/KIAL model anyday as Kerala society is not same as Gujarat society or Karnataka society etc. We cannot accept a full fledged private investment without state control/stake etc and in event of so, it shall be a perfect recipe for failure. I don’t wish to see bad stories from Kerala’s civil aviation.Why Kerala is up in arms over Adani Group bagging bid to run Trivandrum airportAdani Group may have to wait to take over Thiruvananthapuram airportTough road ahead for Adani to take over Trivandrum airportCPM to send two lakh emails to PM Modi opposing Thiruvananthapuram airport privatisation

It has financed and leased most of the aircraft it has on order. And even so, that's on shaky ground. The two largest leasing company's in the world, have no lease contracts to Lion Air, International Lease Finance Corporation and General Electric Aircraft Leasing Service. (GEACS) At least, not that are publicly known. There are 18 International Leasing company's out there along with a few private finance syndicates that lease everything from A-380's to A319's. It is likely that much of the financing is coming from Dubai and Riyadh. Some of the lease contracts are not long term. Some are in fact, less than 3 years. So while the order book looks huge, it's clear that they plan to rotate several aircraft based on very short term leases to maximize the best years of the aircraft's life based on time (flight hours) and cycles (a cycle is one take off and one landing), which the latter weighs heavily in the Indonesia because of the number of islands spread out over a relatively short distance.A lot of landing gear are going to need a lot of overhauling. Fuselage fatigue is going to play a factor as well as pressurization cycles are also going to prematurely wear them out. Some of these aircraft are flying 4 to 6 flights a day instead of the global average of 3, except Southwest Airlines, which also flies over the average of 3 flights a day. A short haul B-737 can theoretically fly up to 24,000 cycles per year assuming it flies 300 days a year. The plane's life is practically over in three years. (A DC-9 flew 96,000 cycles and set a record back in the 1980's) Whether this actually turns out to be the case has yet to be proven. Many believe, effectively, the business plan is to fly them until they drop. Change the oil and tires now and then, turn them back to their lease owners without doing the major overhauls, just the light ones.But that doesn't really pan out. For every flight hour (FH), roughly, 0.5 maintenance hour (MH) is required. These aircraft can fly with base maintenance checks that increase the amount of maintenance hours required over a period of time. C-Checks are usually an intensive overhaul of approximately 700-900 rotated components, not including any interior refurbishing. These checks can be progressive (i.e. C-1 through C-5). If they fly anywhere near 20-24,000 flight hours per year, the airline is facing some expensive overhauls before they are returned to the leasing company. One way to blend these costs, is to build it into the overall package price with the leasing company or work with the manufacturer and have them do all the heavy maintenance and pay for it by the flight hour. Airbus and Boeing offer these services and have often used it as a lure to get contracts in competitive circumstances. Lion Air may have done this with both companies.There's another reason it can 'afford' new airplanes. Lion Air doesn't pay much in taxes and has really good deals on infrastructure with the Indonesian Air Force such as hangers and support equipment. Time will tell if this airline really does stay afloat because it could easily wind up grounded - permanently - if it doesn't improve its safety record. The government is also in trouble. It's reputation is in shambles because its believed it does not have any quality controls in place to monitor and properly regulate the aviation industry. So nobody really knows if they are following best practices. Indonesia has been blacklisted as an entire nation from flying into the European Union, twice. Currently only four Indonesia airlines are allowed to fly into the EU, including its national flag carrier, Garuda. Lion Air is banned. It doesn't have any wide body aircraft that fly to Europe anyway, only to the Middle East. But it sure does like making a splash. It crashed a brand new B-737-800 on its first commercial flight skidding off the runway into the water. One hit a cow that was on the runway, a one year old B-737-700. It might need 500 airplanes at the rate they're piling them up in the maintenance hanger.It's also building its own main central airport. It will be interesting to see if this house of cards actually makes it. It has on order 453 aircraft and 106 currently flying. Spread out over 10 years, many of the original aircraft on order will have already been retired and long gone when they arrive.Just my opinion, (I have no direct knowledge), but I bet Boeing and Airbus are not counting on Lion Air order book being fulfilled 100%. Both would be happy selling 30-40% of the contracts. Airbus should have learned valuable lessons after the disaster with Kingfisher Airlines in India, getting burned pretty good. And that was a small deal in comparison. (64 airplanes leased, another 77 on order).

Update, January 2021FAA vs International Civil Aviation Authorizations. This year, the rectified version of the 737 Max is cleared for service in the US. That means that domestic airlines would be the primary users, since landing in another country requires air-worthiness certificates that are no longer automatically granted if the FAA does (Thank you for the naked political interference of the Trump Administration in what had been reputedly independent regulatory agencies like the CDC, the NIH, the FDA, the EPA etc.) So, approval for international flights would take more time, if ever.Re-entry of Mothballed Max’s. Another factor is that hundreds of 737 Max’s have been “mothballed” for over a year, and have to be scrupulously re-validated for service. Do you prefer to fly in an aircraft that has been regularly used and maintained, or one out of service for a long period with no fundamental structural changes that had caused fatal accidents?Studies of COVID-19 Spread in Cabin. One source is from the Harvard Public Health Initiative Aviation Public Health Initiative (APHI).The actual recorded rate of transmission in cabin is much lower than on the ground in closed environments. Recirculated cabin air is passed through two HEPA filters that filter out 0.1–0.3 microns particles, whereas COVID-19 measures some 0.14 microns across - and microdroplets. So, if the choice is by bus, train or air, the shorter exposure time and greater control of airborne spread favors air travel for a given distance.Past studies of airflow dissemination (not specific to Max or Neo) indicated that particles can spread for a few rows around a seat, although the most of the air streams from overhead air inlet vents to ground floor extraction vents in the same row closer to the wings. In other words, your separation from your lateral neighbor is more important than the separation between rows. See visualization of dispersion in a cabin: Pierre-Antoine Rizk on TwitterCOVID-19 Lateral Separation in Cabin. At present, all airlines but stingy American Airlines offer 1 seat separation on domestic flights. So, single aisles would be less risky than single aisle planes, and the 737 Max’ narrower seats will mean 1.5–2 inches less separation than the Neo’s, while much but since millions of viruses can fit on the point of a pin, is potentially significant.So, in domestic economy seating, I would choose the Neo (e.g. Jetblue and Delta flights) over the 737 Max (Southwest, American…), or even the A220 (Delta and soon JetBlue) that has even more seat width than the Neo.In all cases, prefer single-aisle to dual aisle jets since more seats in a row means more sources of infection per row.I would also prefer 2 x 2 seating over 3 x 3, since the first could mean 2 seats and 1 aisle of separation, if the two passengers in the row both sit on the wings. Even the A220 2x3 seating would mean that the person in the two-person side of the aisle would have the separation of 1 seat + 1 aisle.The wing seats, where the extraction vents are located, could mean more exposure risk than aisle seating - in theory. However, in practice, the use of the aisle by staff and passengers may negate any theoretical difference in risk between aisle and wing locations.COVID-19 Row Separation in Cabin. Most particles spread laterally in the same row, but a significant portion reaches the adjacent rows. So airlines that have more seat pitch (row separation) would have less risk (e.g. prefer JetBlue’s 32–34 inches seat pitch to Spirit Air’s 28 inches)Update, August, 2020Since my last update, COVID-19 has fallen upon earth and the entire aviation sector has suffered. Boeing has had hundreds of order cancellations, across the board, as client airlines either face bankruptcy or faith has been lost for specifically the 737 Max that had zero orders until this month from a Polish charter airline for TWO firm orders. It’s backlog has fallen to a still impressive 4,500 orders (about).The Max software update will soon be tested (September) in a number of countries. Talk is that Boeing will retire the “Max” name, and the latest model variants have been referred to as “737–8”. I assume that until the world’s economy recovers - assuming that discretionary air travel ever returns to previous peaks - Boeing may put off creating the 797.In the meantime, even the A320 neo will suffer from reduced demand by an ailing airline sector. However, they will have an advantage over Boeing’s discredited Max that may be “sold” at bargain basement prices (aka “dumping”).Although another model segment, the A220 will probably soar as airlines reconfigure for lower traffic frequency, and smaller passenger loads per flight; the A220 may also cause retrenchment of the very expensive, finely orchestrated “hub and spoke” paradigm. The spacing of seats is also a bit more generous, favoring “personal distancing”.Update, January, 2020Since last month, finally, the waffling CEO has resigned, with a multi-million dollar severance package. It’s outrageous that the US is so blinded by bucks that they allow employees to earn millions, even when they wreck the firm. The bad news keeps coming. From the failure, in extremis, of a software workaround to the aerodynamic instability caused by rushed design, to uncovering of a decades-old tendency of wires routed too close for safety, to leaked memos of deliberate overriding of experienced in-house engineers by bean-counters, and subcontracting out highly-complex manufacturing to untested suppliers with insufficient technical monitoring systems, the brand of Boeing has gone downhill with risk of thousands of employees and the hundreds of suppliers to Boeing. As I noted, knowledgeable insiders over a year ago, indicated that flight simulation training WOULD be needed, demolishing Boeing’s sales pitch that it was just an “ugrade” to the 737; Captain Sullenberger testified so before Congress that he “struggled” to regain control of a test flight simulator.Now, released e-mails of conflicts between engineers and financial managers show that many indicated that they would avoid the Max.Update in December, 2019. Boeing has now admitted that it has little expectation of a definitive date for “re-entry” of the Max into service and plans to cease production in 2020. It’s finally sinking in that the core issue is not a mere “software glitch” but a core flaw in design that gave rise to even the NEED for a software workaround to the inherent tendency to crash during the most crucial phase of flight. Software is ALWAYS going to be less than 100% effective, and so, no matter what “solution” is proposed, the flying public has lost faith not only in Boeing’s management but in that of the FAA, that has been defunded by US Administration and pressured to favor airlines.Boeing may have to eat humble pie, clear out all bean-counting enabling managers of this fiasco and their direct reports and reorganize to return the engineering priority of the company’s direction. However, unless the military division is not made independent of the civilian aircraft, I doubt that the profit vs safety paradigm would change much.Since Boeing is a strategic firm to the US, and the major single source of foreign currency intake, it’s unlikely that the US government would let it fail. Perhaps, it’s time for a US government bailout for the billions that Boeing is on the hook for from existing clients and victims and to restore adequate funding of the FAA. Timaero, the major Irish aircraft leasing firm, has filed a $750k lawsuit against Boeing, and that’s the tip of the iceberg. Boeing would do well to now design and build a brand new aircraft, without trying to cut corners and yield, for a time, to Airbus in the long-and-thin segment. It should also scale back outsourcing until it will have put in place adequate quality control systems and management resources.The Airbus A320 Neo is now without competition in its capacity and range segment at high efficiency, pending technical and criminal investigation into the development and certification procedures of the 737 Max.The other segment of even thinner but slight less long planes is now the A220, that may spell the end of the inevitability of “economies of scale” of the hub and spoke flight orientation of legacy carriers, enabling secondary airports to be linked non-stop, bypassing overcapacity hubs, in a viable economic model. David Neeleman (founder of JetBlue, Azul and major partner in Westjet and now CEO of a renovated TAP) plans a new airline based on the A220 code named “Moxy airlines”.Boeing has no entries in this small jet segment and has acquired the marketing rights to small Embraer jets - but those jets are a generation behind the A220 in some respects.I. Design Comparison - History of Development of the Airbus Neo that spurred hasty development of the 737 MaxThe A320 was designed more than a decade after the 737 and has a larger fuselage section and greater height beneath the wings.Airbus first developed the high-efficiency engine version, the A320 neo, while Boeing rested on its laurels with the 737, focusing on developing the 787, moving its HQ to Chicago and establishing non-union factories in other States from Washington. As Neo sales took off, Boeing was under pressure to quickly come up with a competitor. The strategy they decided to use was to “upgrade” the 737 instead of a brand new design.The elements were:By keeping the same 1960’s origin fuselage but extending it, development would be shorter and cheaper, since manufacturing the fuselage would need minimal retooling.By keeping the model name as “737”, they would market the 737 Max as not requiring expensive flight simulator training for pilots already certified on prior 737 versions. A tablet-based training was all Boeing indicated as necessary for such pilots. This alone undercuts the neo solution by hundreds of millions of dollars for a large airline like AA.In the quest for greater fuel efficiency, everything but the fuselage was to be new (wings, engines, tail, nose, landing gear, flight control systems). It was essentially a new plane with an obsolete fuselage design that was too small and too close to the ground for aerodynamic optimization.The low height off the ground of the 737 fuselage meant retrofitting much larger high-efficiency engines at a higher position to the wing, affecting handling characteristics. The new configuration would be inherently unstable at takeoff with a tendency to push the nose up.In the effort to keep pilot certification cheap (i.e. no flight simulators), the 737 Max, despite having computerized digital control systems, was forcibly designed to reflect the dated 737 instrument display and control layout.All those factors, plus the under investigation “fast track” approval, are now suspected as making the 737 Max abnormally prone to nose-diving after takeoff. It was a case of a commercial development shortcut and a “fast track” FAA certification system that did not exhaustively address the MCAS system, given the lack of flight simulator training obligation.II. Comparison - Passenger vs Airline viewpointsA. Tall or voluminous Passengers (most affected by personal space): A321 Neo width better than 737 Max in coach. Travelers are not very concerned about which plane is more efficient; I only care about my comfort as a passenger.The cabin of the 737 is 4″ narrower than the A320 series.The 737 Max is the most laterally cramped in its category (16.5–17″).The A320 neo provides a wider seat (18″)While leg room is determined by the airline, at least on the Neo an exit row or bulkhead seat with fixed armrests won’t be as narrow as the Max (16.5″ for Max exit row seat vs. 17.5″ for neo’s exit row seats).B. Airline operational and purchasing managers are most concerned with upfront and operational cost/seat/mile. A321 neo equivalent to 737 Max. From the operators’ viewpoint, its a bit “six of one, half a dozen of the other” in terms of performance and economy for the airlines;On paper, the A321neo is somewhat better than the 737Max except in top speed.However, it will take real-life data collection to see if the differences on paper translate to actual differences.The Max may have a lower “purchase price” and suggest that training pilots would be cheaper due to “commonality” with non-Max 737’s; however, in reality, the grounding of the Max and liability issues of the 100% fatal crashes tear asunder any theoretical cost advantage of the Max over the neo.C. Shareholders and financial managers want predictable costs and reliable mechanics. neo is now much better than the Max. The US airlines using the neo (Delta, JetBlue) are seeing their fortunes continue upward whereas those with Maxes are in for a rough ride (SouthWest). In Europe, Ryanair and Norwegian are now facing higher costs, cancelled routes because of the Max grounding; it may be the coup de grace for Norwegian.The other issue to be borne out over time is that unscheduled downtime (unreliability) will dramatically affect running costs as well. The cost of worldwide grounding of the 737 Max in March 2019 would far outweigh any fuel cost advantage supposedly by Boeing’s aircraft, or even higher purchase price.Boeing’s 787 and now 737 Max models, the most recent ones, have had design defects that have been very expensive to airlines who must reroute and redeploy to accommodate passengers.The 787 has been particularly troublesome in the first few years with exploding lithium-ion batteries and defective engines that had to be replaced. Although the airlines had options on engines, it was Boeing’s responsibility to verify that the options were safe and fully integrated with an aircraft’s systems; quality assurance over suppliers is the price one pays for outsourcing.The 737 Max is grounded and under investigation for defective design or imperfect safety verification.One airline that is composed of Boeing 787’s and 737 Max’, Norwegian Air Shuttle, the world’s biggest low-cost long-haul airline, has been particularly affected by Boeing’s defects. It’s 787s had to be grounded for engine replacements. One of its 737’s had to make emergency landing in Tehran, where it was stuck largely due to the US embargo and banking restriction vis a vis Iran - a costly side-effect of using US-built aircraft in the Trump era.With hindsight, it would have been more cost effective to have chosen the A320 neo, even at a higher price or later delivery, as the downtime costs of the Boeing models far outweigh the lower prices of purchase or earlier introduction.D. Marketing/PR managers. Public Reputation: Safety - and Corporate Responsibility. Prior to the Max, Boeing had a longer, more established good reputation/brand. Due to its benefits, even the 787’s problems (lithium batteries, defective engines) were being rectified and NOT 100% fatal. Boeing at risk of destroying its excellent brand reputation.The 737 series is the most common single-aisle narrow body in history, since it was first on the market much before rival Airbus. When it was time to renew and upgrade, Boeing decided to keep the “brand” of the “737” instead of a new model name like 7A7.However, the newer model, the 737 “Max”, is almost a brand new design apart from the fuselage section and an inherited control system configuration - but changed almost everything else.As one may have noticed that two unexplained nose dive/uncontrolled descent crashes in good weather in the minutes after takeoff have occurred with experienced pilots. One theory is there was a systematic design flaw of its MCAS software and the fix is to disable the software that had been installed for safety reasons!The next issue is that it may have been wrong to market the 737 Max as simply an extension of the 737 series. The plane is longer and has different handling characteristics. The engines were bigger than the previous, contributing to an inherently different center of gravity relative to the engine position. This “cost savings” feature of not requiring retraining for pilots already certified on the previous 737’s may well turn out to be false economy.The issue is not that the 737 Max is very unsafe; it’s just not adequate to have “only” 2 in 50,000 or 100,000 flights end in 100% fatality; the standard is 1 in over a million flights! It’s not even some risk but 100% fatal due to uncontrolled nose-diving to the earth.III. Solutions and Corrective Actions SuggestedThe FAA and US government have lost face that may translate as durable problems in plane exports and accession to FAA decision. Boeing may have a commercial disaster on its hands if it doesn’t address the issue upfrontA. FAA actions. The FAA’s brand has been severely damaged. It’s budget and personnel needs to be improved and its mandate expressly made independent of both partisan government and industry lobbies. Even now, foreign aviation regulators indicate that they want to conduct their own evaluation of Boeing’s “solutions”, regardless of what the FAA indicates. Hopefully, once Mr. Trump goes, no future President would irresponsibly weigh in on topics outside of his capacity.B. Boeing Senior Management StepsInstead of the CEO indicating, without any basis for reassurance, that the aircraft is airworthy BUT we should await the analyses of the two crashes, he should have said that until he had proof that no software or design was a factor, the plane should be grounded.The grounding should at least be until they finish and deploy the “software fix” that had been has been “planned” on a increasingly more distant target date.Require certification of pilots as if this were a new model on a flight simulator, not rely upon a computerized training model. Captain Sullenberger testified as such to Congress, after he struggled in a flight simulator with the same conditions as the crashed flights despite having been trained of the issue!The CEO and his immediate reports should indicate contrition and, ideally, a gesture such as foregoing his “golden parachute” in favor of victims’ families. He should basically shut up and let the engineers do their job.C. Unless Boeing has adequate insurance, the US Government may step in to keep a strategic supplier operational.Huge liability, penalty and other costs for Boeing. Grounding the 737 Max planes represents a huge unscheduled cost to the airlines, as Boeing isn’t going to fully compensate them for loss of use. If Boeing doesn’t admit that it is unsure if there is a design issue and it had been a mistake to not require specific pilot certification for the 737Max, the aircraft may go the way of the MD10, that eventually doomed McDonnell Douglas, well after the design flaws had been addressed; the flying public refused to board MD10’s and airlines faced the risk of liability exposure.IV. The loss of the Max slows but doesn’t stop a revolutionary transformation of Commercial AviationA. The end of the concentration of carriers, Jumbo jets and Huge airport hubs as the only or desired business model. The end of the Jumbo era is already in progress. The 747 and A380 are no longer being produced and will be phased out. While there may be a theoretical lower cost per seat mile, the reality is that very few routes can reliably fill a jet with nearly 600 seats.Until recently, jumbo planes, jumbo hubs, jumbo carriers were the result of market forces of the hub-and-spoke economics. It was based on the premise that bigger planes a) had lower per seat costs and b) “feeder” smaller planes would connect mega-hubs with smaller markets.The combination of reaching the limit of the “hub and spoke” efficiency in terms of congestion and infrastructure, and a technological change that produces that smaller jets nearly as efficient over long distances as larger ones, marks the end of “bigger is better” in commercial aviation.B. Larger airlines, smaller seats, weather-related chain reaction unscheduled delays and larger hubs - people hate them.Witness the 11 sub-terminals of CDG2 where you must be fit to get around the miles of maze-like corridors. That is strong incentive to seek point-to-point flights and avoid Paris as a transit airport.Since 9–11, the airport experience has become unpleasant requiring at least an extra 1 hour compared to the 20th Century experience. Lining up for security, being treated like criminals by CBP. No matter how many shops or “amenities” are in airports, it remains an inherently unpleasant place.Concentration of transporters to only three legacy carriers in the US has led to net increase in fares, if one incorporates the myriad “discretionary” fees to the base fare.The hub system is subject to system-wide disruption if there is a failure in any part of the network. So, a storm in Miami can lead to missed flights in Seattle! The system is not robust and few airlines would have redundancy in the form of spare planes sitting around.C. The future - multiple smaller carriers, smaller airports directly linked by longer-range, highly-efficient single-aisle planes.A vision shared by David Neeleman (founder of Westjet, JetBlue, Azul airlines and current CEO of a revitalized TAP) with his planned Moxy Airlines for 2020 and all A220 fleet connecting regional US airports.The A320 series neo XLR, the Max or its replacement, the 787, the A350, the A330 neo and, possibly, an A220 XLR and a Boeing 797 will mean thatroutes like DUB-Milwaukee or Sacramento-Tampa would be feasible. Unfortunately, Norwegian’s DUB-YHM or DUB-PVD have been curtailed or cancelled due to the grounding of the Max.increased frequency even from major airports (e.g. instead of three days a week between BOS and Warsaw, daily flights with smaller planes could become feasible).A decrease in traffic via hubs would reduce stress on air-traffic control and lower “landing slot” pressure and costs.Bad weather or mechanical incidents won’t “contaminate” a national network of an airline, improving robustness of air transport.More direct flights from Dublin, where there is a local CBP pre-Clearance facility, to smaller US airports that lack CBP staffing. Other European airports may also host local CPB facilities to access smaller US airports lacking international passenger ability.