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The United Nations Security Council has emerged as the key arena and barometer for evaluating the promise and progress of accommodating new, rising powers in the international system. The case of India provides one of the best examples of a rising power coming to terms with its increased power, role and expectations of itself and of other powers, great and small, in negotiating its place in the reformed Council as a permanent member. This paper begins by mapping its historical association and varied interests vis-à-vis the Security Council, and its perspectives on various strands to reform the Council and finally, Indian strategies over the years to gain permanent seat in the reformed Council. This paper concludes that only a pragmatic, realpolitik approach that involves hard power bargaining would lead India to achieve its decades old aspiration to sit at the global high table.KeywordsDiplomacy , G4 , India , Permanent Membership , Security CouncilIntroductionIn a truly “historic” move to reforming global governance in the arena of international peace and security, the 193 member-United Nations adopted a consensus resolution in its 69th General Assembly on September 14, 2015 to move from Inter-Governmental Negotiations (IGN) to a Text-Based Negotiations (TBN) process for reforming the United Nations Security Council. Welcoming this General Assembly Decision 80/560 and calling it a “significant development,” India’s Ministry of External Affairs (2015) struck a very optimistic note:We look forward to early commencement of text-based negotiations with a view to securing concrete outcomes during the 70th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. We call upon all Member States to constructively engage in this process so that the long pending reform of the UN Security Council can be achieved so as to equip the Council to more effectively address the global challenges.In the Indian eyes, “no reform of the United Nations (UN) is complete without the composition of the Security Council changing to reflect contemporary realities of the twenty-first century. This requires expansion in the membership of the Security Council in both the permanent and non – permanent categories.” This Indian quest for the Security Council permanent membership, what India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh once rightly described as “an essay in persuasion” lies at the heart of repeated Indian pleas for reforming the UN, the only existing universal organization of global governance. (Nafey 2005, p.1) This paper posits some fundamental questions: what have been the Indian experiences vis-à-vis the Council; what drives the Indian interests in pursuing the permanent seat in the Council; what perspectives and positions have India articulated on the proposed reforms; what bilateral and multilateral strategies has India put in place in pursuance of its Council objectives; and lastly, what roadblocks India needs to surmount before it achieves its objective of a permanent Council seat. Reflecting what Teresita C. Schaffer (2010, p.219) calls India’s multilateral “personality,” this paper seeks to locate current Indian perspectives and positions on the entire issue of reforming the Security Council. It begins with first delineating the nature and role of the Security Council itself and the Indian experiences therein of serving two-year seven terms as a non-permanent member of the Security Council. It then examines the multi-layered calculus in pursuing a permanent seat in the reformed Council by looking at its historic role in the UN system, its intrinsic value and its great power ambitions. Further, Indian perspectives on the five sets of issues marked by the General Assembly and Indian strategies, viz., its diplomacy, are discussed. This paper ends by identifying serious roadblocks to Indian Council seat ambitions and concluding that India has to display more pragmatism, more realpolitik to realize its aspiration to be a permanent member of the Security Council, the global high-power table.Understanding Role of Security Council: Indian ExperiencesBefore examining the Indian ideas, aspirations and strategies, an understanding of the very special nature of the UN Security Council becomes necessary. The founders of the UN were very clear about a “security specialist” Council whose pre-eminent purpose was the maintenance of international peace and security. Its uniqueness lies in the fact that in pursuance of its security-specific mandate and promised efficiency, it has an extremely rigid representation system matched with an extraordinary decision-making power/procedures (Goodrich 1969). To “ensure prompt and effective action” the Council was created as a strictly limited membership body. This membership, not a right but a privilege, was structured in two categories of membership, viz., permanent and non-permanent. Although Article 23 of the Charter names the five member states as permanent members of the Council, the criteria for conferring this privileged permanent membership remained conspicuous by its absence. Thus, a self-conferred status formalized the formidable stature of some states who were on the victorious side who “froze their superior status and built near-insurmountable hurdles to any future alteration attempt.” (Murthy 1995, p.18-20) Regarding the non-permanent members of the Council (that increased from six to eleven in a 1963 Charter amendment that became effective from 1 January 1966), it was seen by the UN’s founding fathers as facilitating legitimacy of the Security Council decisions. Thus, an addition of non-permanent members was seen as providing a much needed representational character to the Council and making it a “microcosm of world opinion.” (Nicholas 1975) Although the Charter has not put any criteria for permanent members, it has provided for a two-part criteria for the election on non-permanent members: the contribution to maintenance of international peace and security and other purposes of the Organization, and equitable geographical distribution. Further, to ensure restricted access to the membership of Council, it was required to elect the non-permanent members with the support of two-thirds of members voting in the General Assembly and it would be only for a two year term. Also, Article 23 explicitly disallowing immediate re-election of a retiring member ensures that the non-permanent members shall not be accorded “even a pretense of permanence.” (Murthy 1995, p. 20) Most significantly, the permanent members were provided with a veto power on substantive matters of peace and security.The Indian approach to the UN, in India’s first PM Jawaharlal Nehru’s words, is characterized by “whole-hearted cooperation” through full participation “in its councils to which her geographical position, and contribution towards peaceful progress entitle her.” (Murthy 2010)The UN Security Council, with its exceptional role in the UN in preserving international peace and security, has always been of significance for India right since its founding years. During the 1945 San Francisco conference itself, India displayed a keen, active interest in Security Council’s composition, especially the basis of election of non-permanent members. Here, India strongly advocated weightage for factors such as population, industrial potential, willingness and ability to contribute to international peace and security, and past performance, and the need for representation for various regions for states to be selected for the Security Council. Significantly, India did not have to press for a vote on its amendment as the Sponsoring Powers accepted this suggestion and modified their original proposals. (Murthy 2011, p.2)India has been elected for seven terms for a two-year non-permanent member seat, the last being 2011-12, only behind Japan, Brazil and Argentina. Except for the first time, when India held the seat earmarked for the Commonwealth group, it has held the seat on every other occasion on behalf of the Asian group. India has been a member of the Council during 1950-51, 1967-68, 1972-73, 1977-78, l984-85, 1991-92, and lastly, 2011-12 which was seen as a “rehearsal for permanent membership” (Srinivasan 2013) During the last term, India won the non-permanent seat with the highest number of votes in the General Assembly showing its impressive electoral popularity. It needs to be recalled that not long ago in 1996, India had lost the elections to Japan by a wide margin for a non-permanent seat.The typical Indian preferences in the UNSC has always been to be the part of the democratic majority contributing to the adoption of broadly acceptable resolutions and decisions. Analyzing all terms of India in the SC barring the last one, Murthy (2011, p.3) points out that India joined 59 per cent of the resolutions adopted either unanimously or without a vote. With regard to aggregate of 113 adopted resolutions (41 percent) that gave rise to a division, India cast an affirmative vote on 101 (89 per cent) of them. Significantly, on not more than a dozen times did India stood aside without joining the concurrent majority, and has not voted against any resolution, and resorted to abstentions only to express its reservations. Remarkably, India was never a loner in abstaining as it always had company of other Council members on many occasions. The Indian behavior herein clearly points to a systematic effort to display a constructive, rule of law abiding and a democratic majority building state in a global, multilateral setting like the Security Council.India’s Security Council CalculusThe origins of the Indian interests in the Security Council can be traced as back to the founding of the UN itself when Mahatma Gandhi felt that India, then including Pakistan and Bangladesh, should become a veto-wielding member of the Security Council. But the leadership precedence for independence and managing the difficult, bloody partition followed by the India-Pakistan conflict on Kashmir moved their attention and interests away from the possible opportunity of a seat. (Cohen 2001, p. 33) Later, India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru shied away from the highly debatable offer to join the Security Council by both the superpowers, the US and the then Soviet Union in 1950 and in 1955 respectively, keeping in mind the emerging Cold war calculus and steadfastly refused to join at the expense of China (Harder 2015). Specifically acknowledging India’s rightful claim to a permanent seat, Nehru wrote:It would do us little good and it would bring a great deal of trouble in its train….India, because of many factors is certainly entitled to a permanent seat in the Security Council. But we are not going in at the cost of China.The Indian calculus on permanent membership of Security Council flow broadly from a mix of, not necessarily hierarchical, three streams, viz., India’s historic association with the UN system itself since its independence, India’s intrinsic value and place in contemporary international politics and its ambitions as a traditional great power in Asia and beyond.India in UN System:In pursuance of its claims to the Council seat, India points out its rich history of consistent international, multilateral posture of cooperation and fraternity, especially when it comes to the UN. The origins of Indian multilateral engagement dates back to 28 June 1919 when India signed the Treaty of Versailles that ended the First World War and created the League of Nations, the precursor of the UN, wherein India, too, was a member. India, also the original member of the UN that signed the Declaration by the UN at Washington on 1 January 1942, participated in the historic UN Conference of International Organization at San Francisco from 25 April to 26 June 1945. (Permanent Mission of India to the UN, New York, no date given)India, since its independence and even before that, has been an active participant in all initiatives undertaken by the UN and the various UN organs including the various discussions on the Agenda for Peace and the Agenda for Development, the Millennium Development Goals, and various UN summits, including most importantly on climate change. India also contributed most importantly by being instrumental in establishing the G77 of developing states at the UN, other than supporting the establishment of various bodies like the UNICEF on a permanent basis, the UNDP, the UNEP, and the restructuring of the economic and social fields of the UN and the UN Development Fund.India also makes a strong case by highlighting its regular, significant contributions to the UN. In the arena of peacekeeping, India has remained the largest cumulative contributor of UN peacekeeping troops with around 180,000 troops since the 1950s. Currently, around 7700 Indian peacekeepers have been deployed in 13 missions (out of the total of 16) in 11 countries. (Permanent Mission of India to the UN, New York 2016)Today, most significantly, India has almost twice the number of peacekeepers deployed in the ground as do China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States combined – also known as the P5, the five countries that wield veto power at the Council. In terms of financial contributions to the UN, India with US$ 20.46 million ranks 23rd in the list of contributors. On this, India has emphasized way back in 1993 itself: “…not just the financial contribution in absolute terms, but also in relative terms. For a country with low per capita income, assessed contribution as per the United Nations scale may entail proportionately higher sacrifice. The record of timely payment also should be taken into account.” Adding further, India asserted: “the financial contribution does not remain static forever, and the crucial issue is the readiness to fulfil the obligations and not the quantum of payment at a particular point in time. The point is India could emerge before long, if its economy performs well, as a sizeable contributor to UN budget.” (Menon 1995, p.15)Indian strategic interest in the Council seat has also been shaped by its history of interacting with the Security Council. In the early years of its independence during its armed conflict with Pakistan on Kashmir, India paid the price for being “idealistic” to take the Kashmir issue to the UN wherein it had to battle hard realpolitik of Cold war years leading to UN interventions over the Kashmir dispute. To prevent this negative outcome ever again, the Indian presence at the Security Council, it is hoped will ensure Indian interests are not sacrificed at the altar of great power politics. Most importantly, it will stall any possible intervention by China, a permanent member at the behest of its ally Pakistan.Indian interests in the Security Council also flow from the larger, many foreign policy debates in India on whether it will be a status quo power that accepts liberal norms and positions itself as a “responsible stakeholder’ in the international system or a revisionist power that seeks to redefine the norms of international engagement. Many pundits agree that India would be moderately revisionist that seeks to adjust international norms and frameworks that suits its global vision, without seeking to overthrow the current international system.India also always seen itself as a champion, a ‘moralistic force’ of the so called Third World, the developing states. Former Secretary General Kofi Annan has been quoted as saying that India has been one of the most significant votaries of shaping the UN agenda on behalf of the developing world. At his speech in New Delhi, Annan stated: “Indians have better understood than many other peoples that the goals of the ‘larger freedom’ that which include development, security and human rights are not alternatives. They have been single-mindedly pursuing larger freedom through pluralist democracy.” (Annan 2005)India’s Intrinsic Value:India’s Ministry of External Affairs has clearly articulated India’s “legitimate” candidature to be a permanent member of the UN Security Council. It declares:By any objective criteria, such as population, territorial size, GDP, economic potential, civilizational legacy, cultural diversity, political system and past and ongoing contributions to the activities of the UN — especially to UN peacekeeping operations — India is eminently qualified for permanent membership.” Going further, it says, most importantly, “India has affirmed its willingness and capacity to shoulder the responsibilities of permanent membership.At the outset itself, demography remains the primary reason why India should be in the Council. India, with its population at 1.25 billion now, is the second most populous country in the world comprising almost one-fifth of humanity. This basic fact itself warrants Indian inclusion and representation in the Security Council. For India, moreover “population represents both an expression of the principle of democracy and an element of power. With increasing emphasis on the principle of democracy at the national level, there is a need for extending the principle to the international level also.” (GA/48/264, 20 July 1993, p. 48)India’s rising economic stature globally has added to Indian claims as well. India is now the fastest-growing major economy in the world, and Asia’s third largest. India’s real GDP growth, as its 2017 Economic Survey predicts, will remain between 6.75% and 7.5% despite international upheavals like growing oil prices, Brexit, growing protectionism and trade related tensions between major economies. India’s leading position in software and its IT-enabled services making it a global technology giant adds to its increasing economic and trade footprint across the world. India is now counted amongst the most influential players in economic organizations like the WTO, BRICS and the G20.India’s newly acquired status as a Nuclear Weapons State (NWS) in May 1998 also makes India a natural claimant as a permanent member similar to the existing permanent members who are all Nuclear Weapon States. Though India has not been accorded a de’ jure recognition of this by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, India now stands recognized as a de’ facto NWS due to the nuclear deal signed by India and the United States in 2005 and the Nuclear Suppliers Group waiver in 2008 to nuclear transfers for India despite not being a NPT signatory. On the negative side, it is argued by critics that India has still not signed the NPT, had rejected the CTBT in 1996 and in fact, was the target of unanimous Security Council Resolution 1172 after it conducted nuclear tests in 1998. But, India’s nuclear diplomacy after the May 1998 tests successfully turned India from a pariah state to being increasingly a part of the non-proliferation regime.India’s Great Power Ambitions:Foremost in Indian calculus, however, lies the Indian aspiration of the institutionalized big power status the permanent seat in the Security Council would confer on India right away. Being a “pen holder” as the permanent member of the Security Council, India would similarly assume the mantle of international peace and security decision-making. India sees itself carrying the necessary abilities, actual and potential, which entitles it to a permanent seat at the Council. Further, the seat on the high table, at the UN’s premier, powerful body would provide it the much needed leverage to expand its geo-political and geo-economic clout globally. It would serve as an equalizer to China, its rival and an emerging hegemon in Asia and an ever increasing strategic and security concern in its immediate neighborhood and beyond. India has always seen itself as a democratic alternative to the authoritarian China in a leadership role in Asia. India’s millennia old civilizational existence also demands it to be at the top of international hierarchy of states.As India’s international profile and capabilities rises due to its ever expanding global and regional footprint in diverse areas like politics, development, economics, and culture and science and technology, India wishes to shift its international position from a rule taker (a constrained role) to a rule maker (a system shaping role). The Indian attempts at joining various regimes like the MTCR and the ongoing, high pitched campaign to join the NSG amply indicate that India is no more satisfied with being either the target or a mere follower of various international norms and rules and wants now to shape and align them to suit Indian ideas and interests.In conclusion, and most significantly, Indian hopes significantly rest on an acknowledgement by UN itself of the need to expand the UNSC. In an interview to The Guardian (2015), former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said that the Security Council must either reform or risk becoming increasingly irrelevant: “If we don’t change the council, we risk a situation where the primacy of the council may be challenged by some of the new emerging countries.”Indian perspectives on Council ReformsThe UN Security Council reforms became an international agenda with the UN General Assembly adopting in 1992 the Resolution 47/62 entitled “The Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council.” In 1993, the Assembly set up an open ended Working Group that would facilitate a full and frank exchange of views. In its report to the 1994 General Assembly, the Group stated:“…..the debate was substantive and constructive, clarifying the positions of member states, (but) no conclusions were drawn. While there was convergence of views that the membership of the Security Council should be enlarged, there was also agreement that the scope and nature of such enlargement require further discussion.” (Murthy 1995, p. 22)The arguments put forward by the Member States centered on four aspects for making the Council more representative: the future size of the Council, the categories of membership, the criteria of membership, and the veto power. It needs to be recalled that the Security Council reformed as back as 1965 when it increased its non-permanent members from 11 to 15, and increased the necessary votes for the adoption of resolutions from seven to nine.The Indian attempts at reforming the Council date as back as 1979, when India’s ambassador to the UN Brajesh Mishra along with other NAM countries submitted a draft resolution to the General Assembly calling for an increase in the non-permanent membership from 10 to 14, arguing an increase in the UN membership as the principal reason. The 1990s also saw Indian attempts at pressing for UN reforms. India joined a number of countries in adopting General Assembly Resolution A/RES/47/62, inscribing this item on our agenda for the first time in September 1992.Calling the 69th UN General Assembly decision of September 2014 “truly historic and path-breaking on several counts,” Asoke Mukerji, India’s then Permanent Representative to the UN, clearly put forward Indian thinking on the matter. Three issues were highlighted specifically. Firstly, that the consensus decision was not a technical, but a substantive decision since it was now adopted through an official formal L document of the UNGA, the A/69/L.92, and the first in the history of the Inter-Governmental Negotiation process. This was “a most positive and unique development” for India as these moved beyond mere statements, compiled texts or summaries. Secondly, the UN General Assembly decision has formally changed the IGN process to a text-based negotiations. And, lastly, quoting the UN General Assembly President’s 31st July 2015 letter that reflected a true mandate, India highlighted that the text attached to the letter “represents a sound basis upon which Member States can engage in text-based negotiations through the next phase of the IGN.” India, in fact, in April 2013 itself, had already called for a conclusion of the IGN process on UNSC reforms by the 70th anniversary of the UN. Hoping that the UN now moves purposefully to conclude the negotiations during the 70th session, India reminded that the World Summit of 2005 had given a unanimous mandate for “early reform” of the Security Council and make it “more broadly representative, efficient and transparent and thus to further enhance its effectiveness and the legitimacy and implementation of its decisions.”In order to move the TBN process forward, India has clearly, frequently and seriously articulated its positions on diverse aspects of the Security Council reforms. Two organizing principles do stand out: first, purposeful, result oriented negotiations and secondly, parity for the unrepresented and the underrepresented.Five sets of issues have been identified by the General Assembly 62/557 decision on “question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters”: categories of membership; question of veto; regional representation; size of an enlarged council and working methods of the Council; and the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly.Categories of MembershipOn the issue of categories of membership, India has argued that an overwhelming majority of Member-States have already supported expansion in both categories. Two largest groups including Africa with 54 members and L.69 with 42 members and CARICOM, G4 and another 233-Member States including 2 permanent members, France and UK have supported expansion in both categories. India claims that around 85% of total submissions that are part of the text and the annex have supported expansion in both categories.India supports increase in both permanent and non-permanent membership of UN Security Council. Making a case that there is an imbalance of influence between the permanent and non-permanent members of the Council, India has called for a “balanced enlargement in both categories.” Herein, India has highlighted the need of Africa to be represented in both categories. This directly challenges the proposed “so called” intermediate models wherein a longer term and immediate re-election are seen as compensations for a permanent membership. India, citing the deliberations held in 1945 itself, pointed out that these models were rejected by an overwhelming majority. India identified number of reasons for its opposition to increase in non-permanent category only. Firstly, the issues raised by the current imbalance between permanent and non-permanent members are not addressed due to lack of any checks or balances. Secondly, the African continent and other developing countries would still not be represented fully in the Council. Importantly, it would mean a new category of members and addition of new members that fails to make the Council more effective and accountable. According to India, only addition of elected, new permanent members which are subject to “stringent review” could provide such an accountability. Siding with the small states, India supported their contention that the chances of the small states to serve at the Council would be reduced as the proposed intermediate models surely enhanced the chances of more resourceful middle powers to contest in both the traditional non-permanent category seat and the “so called long-term seats.”Question of VetoOn the most important question of veto, Indian position is fully aligned with the G4, L.69 and Africa who have called for the abolition of veto and till it exists, it needs to be provided for all members of the permanent category of the Security Council which should have all prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership in the permanent category including the right of the veto. (March 2016) The Indian position is not one of quantity, viz. extending it immediately to new permanent members, but talks about quality, viz., of introducing restrictions. India, showing a marked flexibility, has argued that it supports new members with same responsibilities and obligations as current permanent members as a matter of principle, it is open to not exercising the veto by new permanent members until a decision is taken during a review process.Regional RepresentationOn the question of regional representation, India has forcefully argued for an equitable geographical representation and the urgent need for mitigating the non-representation and under-representation of some regions in both the permanent and the non-permanent categories. Making the case, India has pointed to the increase in the number of states to 193 at present from 51 when the UN was founded, and the un-tenability of whole continents not being represented at all in the permanent category. The Council in its existence of 70 years also does not represent the geo-political and economic realities. The Security Council, for India, needs to reflect contemporary realities and provide adequate representation to all regions of the world. India sees the growing clamor for regional representation as “a cry of frustration and dissatisfaction with the state of affairs.” The demand for regional representation has been made on multiple grounds including historical injustice, entire regions not equitably represented or even unrepresented in a key category, and hope of moving beyond the nation state as the primary actor on international affairs. In Indian eyes, it is “anachronistic” situation that the UN has three of the five permanent members from one region alone while the regions of Africa, Latin America, three-fourths of Asia including the Arab states, the entire Central and Eastern Europe, the Caribbean states and the Small Island developing states remain excluded from the functioning of the Security Council. On the role of regional groupings in the selection of new members, India favored the current practice, viz., each regional grouping would endorse its candidate, to be followed by the need to contest an election on the floor of the General Assembly for occupying a seat at the Security Council.Acknowledging the various existing perspectives on the on the issue of regional representation that vary from one region to another, India has welcomed the approach of regions like Africa who have asked as a collective to be treated as a unique case. But, these should be seen as supplemental in nature and do not replace the Charter requirements of all Member States voting to elect a permanent member for an equitable regional representation. While India accepts the inter-linkage drawn by the African states between the issue of categories and regional representation, India opposes such linkages. (Joint G4 Statement by Brazil, Germany, India and Japan, April 2017) Realizing that such a unanimity in the Asian region does not and will not come about, India has stated that though it respects the unanimous desires of a region like Africa, it cannot be replicated elsewhere where such desires do not exist.Size of Council and Its Working MethodsOn the question of the size of an enlarged Council and working methods of the Council, India has stated that ‘we the peoples’ in whose name the Charter was agreed to have more than trebled since 1945, from about 2.35 billion worldwide to more than 7.3 billion estimated today. Also, at the signing of the UN Charter in 1945, the Security Council had 11 members including 5 permanent members and 6 non-permanent members and a total of 51 member states. Thus, there was one Council member for every five Member-States and one permanent member for every 10 of the General Assembly. The UN membership now has also trebled. (Feb 2016) India, realizing the need to be realistic, has not called for a three-fold expansion in the membership of the Council.Relationship Between Security Council and General AssemblyOn the equally significant issue of the relationship between Security Council and the General Assembly, in India’s view, it should not be competitive or adversarial, but “one of synergy and complementarity” which benefits the UN objectives of the promotion of international peace and security. A relationship with the General Assembly based on transparency, mutual trust and frequent interaction with all Member States will increase the credibility of the Council that includes increase in dialogue between the Council and the Assembly. India thus has called for a greater transparency and consistency to improve the relationship between the two. (G4 Joint Statement 2014)Additionally, and crucial, as it assumes implications for Indian success in getting the permanent seat in the Council, on the issue of election process of new permanent members, India has argued for a process of elections by a secret ballot in consonance with the UN Charter and General Assembly rules. Article 108 of the Charter stipulates that the any amendment to the Charter could be done with a vote of two-thirds of members of the General Assembly. On the other hand, Rule 83 of the GA Rules of Procedure says that two-thirds of the majority of the members present and voting can take decisions of the General Assembly on important questions. Such decisions include recommendations regarding maintenance of international peace and security and the election of the non-permanent members of the Security Council. India has also cited that the General Assembly’s Resolution A/RES/53/30 of 23 November 1998, which was unanimously adopted, decided on a 2/3rd majority of the membership, as the threshold for arriving at substantive decisions on Security Council Reforms.Indian Strategies: Diplomacy in ActionIndia has adopted a multi-layered strategy to assume the highly coveted permanent seat in the Security Council. According to Stuenkel, the Indian strategy of “revisionist integration” into the Security Council consists of two components: Maximizing support in the UN General Assembly and Minimizing resistance in the UN Security Council. India’s continued leadership of various Global South forums such as G 77 and NAM, it hopes would garner the much needed numbers in the UNGA. This is amply reflected in India’s strong defense of the principle of sovereignty and the constant voluble criticism of the “Responsibility to Protect.” On the other hand, India’s growing strategic partnerships with the P5, including the historic nuclear deal with the US in 2005, reiteration of historic ties with Russia, and most importantly, seeking a rapprochement with China, in Indian eyes, paint a favorable picture for Indian hopes in the Security Council by the existing permanent members. (Stuenkel 2010, p. 59) Explicit public declarations supporting India’s candidature as a permanent member in the Council now embodied also in bilateral Joint Statements/Declarations since last few years by most of the P5, including China, have shown Indian successes in garnering agreement for its Council objectives.Parallel to courting powers, big and small, in a bilateral framework, India has also formed the G4 comprising Brazil, Germany, itself and Japan, its “coalition of the willing”, a “collaborative strategy” to negotiate reforms of the Council. After initial euphoria after its creation in 2004 when its first summit-level meeting was held, Indian interest ebbed as its campaign to secure a seat did not fructify in 2004-05. After 2004, G4 has been revived by the current Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. PM Modi, speaking at the G4 Summit held in New York in September 2015 clearly identified the rationale for coming together, viz., “our shared commitment to global peace and prosperity, our faith in multilateralism and our willingness to assume our global responsibilities that the world expects from us.” (“Modi pitches for permanent seat” 2016). He further reiterated that the UNSC “must include the world’s largest democracies, major locomotives of the global economy, and voices from all major continents” to carry “greater credibility and legitimacy.” Making a much stronger case for the G4 in its entirety, he said that “more Member States have the capacity and willingness to take on major responsibilities with regard to maintenance of international peace and security.” In a move to garner substantive support, the G4 Joint Statement pledged to support “Africa’s representation in both the permanent and non-permanent membership in the Security Council,” and highlighted the significance of “adequate and continuing representation of small and medium sized Member States, including the Small Island Developing States, in an expanded and reformed Council.” (Full Text of G4 Joint Statement 2016)India has also joined the L-69, the 42 member grouping of developing countries from Asia, Africa and Latin America. India also, in late 2016, joined as a member the newly founded group of Friends on UN Security Council Reform created to accelerate the negotiating process of Council reforms. India had hoped that in next UN General Assembly session, the 70th one, and entering 10th IGN process and 25th year of the consideration of the issue of the reforming the Security Council by the UN General Assembly would bring out the desired outcomes expressed by a large majority of Member States, but it remains unrealized.However, Mukherjee and Malone (2013) highlight at least three challenges in Indian aspirations at the UNSC: lack of enough Indian government resources for multilateral diplomacy, insufficient engagement with the normative aspects of many UN Security Council issues, and an over-reliance on entitlement as the bedrock of India’s claims to permanent membership, at the cost of more hard-nosed realpolitik bargaining in the UN. Further, with India as part of G4 seems to have limited its options to negotiate a seat for itself as great power and regional politics would circumscribe the G4 attempts to win permanent seats for all as a group (Baru 2015).More significantly, the status quo bias amongst the existing P5, despite the General Assembly consensus, remains the overriding obstacle to adding permanent seats. This has been amply demonstrated by the lack of any progress since 2015 as the US, China and Russia have not yet submitted their country positions for TBNs and no agreement at all on the criteria for deciding permanent membership of the Council.ConclusionsIndia has emerged as a foremost, singularly acknowledged rising power seen by most states, great and small, as making a legitimate claim to a place in the changing architecture of global governance, including the UN Security Council.The Indian interests in joining the reformed UN Security Council stem from its long, civilisational history, an exceptional, globally impacting geography and demography, its rapidly increasing traditional great power ambitions, and assuming its rightful place in the comity of nations in addition to its truly rich, varied and significant historic contributions to the UN system. Successive Indian leadership have therefore, emphasized again and again, the pressing need to democratize the international relations embodied most importantly in the UN and its all-powerful Security Council. Reiterating this, the Indian PM Modi said in September 2014:We must reform the United Nations, including the Security Council, and make it more democratic and participative. Institutions that reflect the imperatives of 20th century won’t be effective in the 21st. It would face the risk of irrelevance; and we will face the risk of continuing turbulence with no one capable of addressing it… Let us fulfill our promise to reform the United Nations Security Council by 2015.Though these Indian desires repeatedly articulated at the highest levels of government remain unfulfilled and seemingly intractable, its ideas and diplomacy, bilateral and multilateral, over the last few decades on the UN Security Council and its reforms including its quest for a permanent seat, highlight a growing, powerful great power consciousness in India. The Indian decision makers realize that it is now historically placed to become an international rule maker and shaper than a meek rule follower in the policy relevant future. It truly marks a rising India’s dramatic desire to move to the centre from the periphery of global politics.

Established upon the ashes of the Second World War to represent “We the Peoples”, it is not surprising that both peace and security were fundamental objectives for the United Nations. While many also wanted disarmament, countervailing lessons were drawn by some political leaders, which made it difficult to get multilateral agreements on disarmament for several decades. Debates around nuclear weapons epitomized and sharpened the challenges. Academics in the United States of America led in developing theories of deterrence to provide legitimacy for these weapons of mass destruction, which soon became embedded in the military doctrines and political rhetoric of further Governments, from NATO allies to the Eastern bloc and beyond. Deterrence theory sought to invert the normative relationship between peace and disarmament by arguing that nuclear weapons were actually peacekeepers amassed to deter aggressors rather than to fight them. From there it became a short step for some countries—including permanent Members of the Security Council of the United Nations—to promote ideologies that equated security and peace with high “defence” budgets and military-industrial dependence on arms manufacture and trade. This is the backdrop for understanding how the United Nations System and disarmament approaches have intersected since 1945, and the way in which reframing disarmament as a universal humanitarian imperative has opened more productive opportunities for future multilateral disarmament treaties.The very first resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations, in January 1946, addressed the “problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy”. Despite civil society’s efforts, led by scientists and women’s peace organizations, leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union rejected measures to curb nuclear ambitions. As the cold war took hold, the leaders that had emerged “victorious” in 1945 raced each other to manufacture and deploy all kinds of new weapons and war technologies, especially nuclear, chemical and biological weapons (notwithstanding the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical and biological weapons in war) and a variety of missiles to deliver them speedily anywhere in the world.After early efforts to control nuclear developments floundered, it was the upsurge of health and environmental concerns provoked by nuclear testing that led the Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, and the Japanese Parliament to call for such explosions to be halted altogether. After an egregiously irresponsible 15 megaton thermonuclear bomb was tested in the Marshall Islands on 1 March 1954, Nehru submitted his proposal for a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to the United Nations Disarmament Commission on 29 July 1954. Since then CTBT has been the centrepiece of disarmament demands from many States, especially the developing countries of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Intended as a first step towards disarmament, the driving force behind CTBT was concern about the humanitarian impacts. Early attempts at multilateral negotiations through a newly created Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament made little progress. Although the leaders of the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom professed their desire for a CTBT, their talks kept stalling. Obstacles from the nuclear laboratories and security advisors were dressed up as verification problems, but they stemmed from these nuclear-armed Governments’ military ambitions and rivalries, and their shared determination to keep their own weapons options open, even as they sought to limit those of others.From 1959 to 1961, various resolutions were adopted by the General Assembly aimed at preventing the testing, acquisition, use, deployment and proliferation of nuclear weapons. In 1961, for example, General Assembly resolution 1664 (XVI) recognized that “the countries not possessing nuclear weapons have a grave interest, and an important part to fulfil” in halting nuclear tests and achieving nuclear disarmament. General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI) went further, noting that the targets of nuclear weapons would not just be “enemies” but “peoples of the world not involved in…war”, with devastation that would “exceed even the scope of war and cause indiscriminate suffering and destruction to mankind…contrary to the rules of international law and to the laws of humanity”. And finally, General Assembly resolution 1665 (XVI), unanimously adopted, called on nuclear and non-nuclear weapons possessors to “cooperate” to prevent further acquisition and spread of nuclear weapons. These early resolutions fed into “non-proliferation” talks between the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, viewed as first steps towards disarmament. However, it took the shock of the Cuban Missile Crisis to achieve concrete progress. Deciding not to ban weapons tests conducted underground, American, Soviet and British leaders finally concluded a Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963. This prohibited nuclear test explosions in the atmosphere, underwater and outer space, and paved the way for the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Notwithstanding humanitarian aspirations in the preambles, the limited nature of the prohibitions they contained demonstrated the military interests of the dominant cold war nuclear-armed Governments rather than the objectives of civilians and the majority of non-nuclear States.The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) was heralded as multilateral, but was largely determined by United States and Soviet interests. Unlike NPT, which, unusually, had designated two classes of treaty parties determined by whether they already possessed nuclear weapons or not, BTWC at least enshrined the same basic prohibitions and obligations on all States parties, including undertakings not to “develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain” such weapons, to “take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery” and to destroy existing stocks. Characterizing their military use as “repugnant to the conscience of mankind”, the objective of BTWC was to “exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons”. It was adopted without verification provisions. Having recognized that it was in their own interests to ban bioweapons because of their indiscriminate and uncontrollable global consequences, the super-Powers chose not to allow lengthy multilateral negotiations on verification to delay the adoption of the treaty, which they believed they could monitor through other means. Their security priority was to achieve international legal prohibitions and embed a bioweapons taboo in norms and practice, before it was too late.Where mutually convenient, the United States and the Soviet Union produced a few bilateral arms limitation agreements which cemented their own strategic relationship but contributed little to disarmament, as both continued to modernize and add to their nuclear arsenals. With the exception of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) treaty dealing with specific types of conventional weapons deemed to be “excessively injurious” and “indiscriminate”, little progress was possible on multilateral disarmament until the cold war ended. The United Nations First Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD I) in 1978 identified key objectives and established the Conference on Disarmament (CD), but had little impact on the military and diplomatic actions of major States. Though billed as multilateral, CD membership was awarded to fewer than 40 States (rising to 60 a few months before CTBT was concluded). Non-members could observe, but in a consensus-based institution, they lacked full participation and rights.Multilateral disarmament pressure came to the fore in the 1980s. Although the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was negotiated between United States and Soviet diplomats, it was driven and underpinned by inspirational and internationally diverse civil society actions for peace and democracy, including direct pressure on nuclear bases. While it is necessary to oversimplify the causes and consequences in such a short article, the movements that made the INF Treaty possible also paved the way for the ending of the cold war. This in turn gave a new lease of life to CD, enabling it to finalize negotiations on two long-standing disarmament objectives: the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the CTBT. Environmental and humanitarian considerations, as well as security, were driving forces in getting both treaties ratified, and this was reflected in their preambles. Contending demands of eight nuclear-capable States, however, led to an untenably rigid entry into force provision for CTBT that has prevented it from coming into full legal force in the 18 years since its adoption, despite 183 signatures and 162 ratifications—far more than most treaties that are already in force. Hobbled by a rigid consensus rule, endgame conflicts resulted in CD being unable to adopt the finalized treaty. Some States then took the text of CTBT to the General Assembly, where it was overwhelmingly adopted in September 1996, with only three States voting against.Although this “leapfrog” tactic was controversial at the time, it is now normal for States that have negotiated multilateral treaties to take them to the General Assembly to be adopted and endorsed by the United Nations. The Secretary-General of the United Nations has become the preferred depositary for modern treaties. By contrast, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union were designated depositary States for NPT, reflecting their interests and status as nuclear-armed States.The last 20 years have seen mixed results for disarmament negotiations at the United Nations. Nationalist tactics and vetoes from a handful of States with high levels of dependency on weapons production and trade have stymied multilateral attempts to strengthen existing treaties such as NPT, BTWC and CCW, and paralyzed CD since 1998. Two highly effective treaties were achieved through humanitarian processes led by cross-regional groups of enlightened Governments in partnership with transnational civil society exerting pressure and providing information and strategies. By reframing prohibition treaty imperatives in humanitarian terms rather than in terms of control and non-proliferation, it became possible to ban anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions through treaties that entered into force in 1999 and 2010, respectively. Meanwhile negotiations under United Nations auspices developed the 2001 Programme of Action on Small Arms and the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).Drawing on these histories and evaluating the role of the United Nations and the comparative effectiveness of multilateral agreements on disarmament, the treaties with universal humanitarian as well as disarmament objectives have proved more successful in concrete and security terms than partial treaties limited by the military interests of dominant States. Regardless of a treaty’s origins and negotiating process, some Governments will always try to stay outside disarmament agreements. That does not invalidate multilateral disarmament, since hold-out States become increasingly drawn into compliance (whether or not they formally accede) as treaties become embedded and respected in international law.Treaties that embed disarmament objectives in “universal humanitarian” rather than “partial control ” terms share a number of elements in common:Whether negotiated in ad hoc or formally constituted United Nations forums, the important requirement for multilateral disarmament success is that negotiations should be open to all United Nations Member States but blockable by none (thereby avoiding the vetoes and consensus deadlock that have paralyzed CD and various cold war treaty review processes.It is up to individual Governments whether they initiate or join negotiations.As with all treaties, it is a sovereign national decision to accede or not, but experience shows that even the policies of opponents become influenced and constrained by well-supported agreements as they become embedded in international law.Relevant United Nations and regional agencies and civil society actors, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, humanitarian and disarmament non-governmental organizations are treated as partners in making these treaties effective.Regardless of how and where a treaty is negotiated, it has become normal practice for negotiators to present the finalized text to be adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, where all States have the opportunity to register their views.Early entry into force is encouraged through representative but practical conditions, so that the treaties can build up legal and normative credibility from the very beginning, making it much harder for the weapons-dependent Governments to continue business as usual.It is not necessary or even desirable to spell out and lock in verification and technical implementation details of the head treaty, given that legal prohibitions and obligations already in place must take precedence. Practical implementation requirements can be agreed upon and adjusted, as the treaties are embedded and more States become parties.Looking forward, three humanitarian disarmament objectives are being put on the United Nations agenda: a nuclear ban treaty that would prohibit the use, deployment, production, stockpiling and transfer of nuclear weapons and require their total elimination; a ban on autonomous weapons intended to preventively ban “killer robots” before they are deployed and become unstoppable; and a treaty or protocol to prohibit the military use of highly toxic depleted uranium. Momentum is building to achieve all three treaties. Opposition is limited to a handful of weapons-dependent Governments—the same few in most cases. As some but not all are in the Security Council of the United Nations, they are recognized to be influential—but not decisive, as other successful treaties have demonstrated.The United Nations was founded for “We the Peoples”. Modern disarmament diplomacy has shown that prohibiting weapons that a few dominating States want to deploy is feasible, as long as the humanitarian arguments are persuasive, the ground is prepared well, and an influential cross section of Governments, humanitarian agencies and civil society actors are willing to move forward, initiate negotiations and achieve effective treaties.ABOUT THE AUTHOR OF THIS ISSUE:Rebecca Johnson is Executive Director of the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy.OTHER SOURCES:Conference Diplomacy from Vienna to New York: A Personal ReflectionThree Lessons of Peace: From the Congress of Vienna to the Ukraine CrisisFrom the Congress of Vienna to Present-Day International OrganizationsThe Power of Peace Diplomacy between the Congress of Vienna and the Paris Treaties 1919The Use of Conference Diplomacy in Conflict Prevention

LOK Sabha members are elected representative of the People for which general elections are held after every 5 years of its term. Lok Sabah members duties are to serve the people of their constituency and make laws for the country. LOK SABHA Members can elect President and Vice President of India.Under the current laws, the strength of Lok Sabha is 545, including the two seats reserved for members of the Anglo-Indian community. The total elective membership is distributed among the states in proportion to their population.Lok Sabha: Functions and Position of the Lok Sabha!The House of the People is popularly known as the Lok Sabha. It is the lower and powerful house of the Union Parliament. It represents the people of India. It is directly elected by all the people. It is fully democratic, representative and national House.I. Composition:The present membership of the Lok Sabha is 545, out of these 523 are elected by the people of all Indian States and 20 by the people of the Union Territories. The President nominates two members of the Anglo-Indian Community to the Lok Sabha. The maximum membership of the Lok Sabha stands fixed at 552 till the year 2010. Odisha has 21 seats in Lok Sabha, out of which some seats stand reserved for SCs and STs.II. Method of Election of the Members of Lok Sabha:The members of the Lok Sabha are elected on the basis of the following principles:(a) Universal Adult Franchise:Every citizen who has attained the minimum age of 18 years has the right to vote in the elections to the Lok Sabha. However, it is essential that his name should stand included in the voters list of his constituency.(b) Reservation of Seats for SCs and STs:Some constituencies are reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. These are called Reserved Constituencies. From each reserved constituency only candidates belonging to SCs or STs, as the case may be, can contest elections. However, all the voters of each such constituency exercise their right to vote for electing one candidate belonging SC or ST as their representative. Presently 131 seats stand reserved (84 for SCs and 47 for STs).(c) Single Member Territorial Constituencies:The whole country is divided into as many territorial constituencies as is the number of the members of the Lok Sabha to be elected. From each constituency one MP is elected(d) Secret Ballot:The members of the Lok Sabha are elected by secret ballot and no one knows his voting decision. Now EVMs are being used in recording votes.(e) Direct Election and Simple Majority Vote Victory system:III. Qualifications for Membership of the Lok Sabha:(1) He must be a citizen of India.(2) He must not be less than 25 years of age.(3) He must not hold any office of profit in the Government.(4) He should not have an unsound mind or be a bankrupt.(5) He should not be a declared offender of a grave crime by any court.(6) He should possess all such qualifications prescribed by the Parliament.IV. Tenure:The normal term of the Lok Sabha is five years. This term can be extended for one year during an emergency. But fresh elections to the Lok Sabha must be held within six months of the end of emergency. Further, the President can dissolve the Lok Sabha at any time when the Prime Minister may advise him to do so or when no party may be in a position to form a government. In this case also a new Lok Sabha has to be essentially elected within six months.V. Sessions:The President can call the session of Parliament at any time but the gap between two meetings of the Parliament cannot be of more than six months. It means in one year, a minimum of two sessions of the Lok Sabha are essential.VI. Quorum:For a meeting of the Lok Sabha the presence of at least 1/10th of its total members is essential. If 1/10th of the members are not present in a meeting of the Lok Sabha, the Speaker of the House can adjourn the meeting for lack of quorum.VII. Presiding Officers of Lok Sabha: Speaker and Deputy Speaker:The Speaker is the chairman and presiding officer of the Lok Sabha. In its very fastest meeting, every new Lok Sabha elects one of its members as the Speaker and another one as the Deputy Speaker. The Speaker presides over the meetings of the Lok Sabha, conducts its proceedings and maintains discipline and decorum in the House. His authority is supreme in the House.He acts as a neutral chairman in the House. In his absence these functions are performed by the Deputy Speaker. When both the Speaker and Deputy Speaker are not present in the House, one member from the panel of chairmen (List of some veteran and experienced MPs of the House) presides over the meeting.VIII. Privileges of Members:Lok Sabha MPs enjoy several privileges. They enjoy unrestricted freedom to express their views in the House. No action can be taken against them for anything said by them in the House. They cannot be detained for any civil offence during and 40 days before and after the session of the Lok Sabha. Their arrest in criminal cases can be made only after the Speaker has been informed of it.Powers and Functions of the Lok Sabha:1. Legislative Powers:An ordinary bill can become law only after it has been passed by both the Houses of Parliament. It can be introduced either in the Lok Sabha or the Rajya Sabha. When a bill is introduced and passed by the Lok Sabha, it is sent to the Rajya Sabha. After it has secured the approval of Rajya Sabha, it goes to the President for his signature.After this it becomes a law. Although ordinary bills can be introduced in either of the two houses of Parliament, almost 90% of the bills are actually introduced in the Lok Sabha. In case the Rajya Sabha rejects a bill passed by the Lok Sabha and returns it with or without some amendments, the Lok Sabha reconsiders the bill.If the Lok Sabha re-passes it and the Rajya Sabha is still not prepared to pass it, a deadlock occurs. If this deadlock remains unresolved for six months, the President summons a joint sitting of the two Houses. The decision of the joint sitting is accepted by both the Houses.2. Executive Powers:For all its work, the Council of Ministers is collectively responsible before the Lok Sabha. The leader of the majority in the Lok Sabha becomes the Prime Minister. Most of the ministers are from the Lok Sabha. The ministers remain in office so long as they enjoy the confidence of majority in the Lok Sabha.The Lok Sabha can remove the ministry from office by passing a vote of no- confidence against it. Thus, the life and death of the Ministry depends upon the Lok Sabha. The Lok Sabha maintains a continuous control over the Council of Ministers.MPs can ask questions from ministers about their policies and activities of administration. They can criticise their policies. They can move and adopt several types of resolutions and motions (adjournment motion, call attention motion, censure motion and no-confidence motion) and can reject any bill of the government.If the Lok Sabha:(i) Rejects any policy or decision of the Cabinet,(ii) Or disapproves the budget or a bill of the government, or(iii) Passes a vote of no- confidence against the Prime Minister, it is. Taken to be a vote of no-confidence against the entire Council of Ministers and it resigns en masse.3. Financial Powers:The Lok Sabha has vast financial powers. A money bill can be introduced only in the Lok Sabha. After having been passed by it, the money bill goes to the Rajya Sabha. Such a bill can be delayed by the Rajya Sabha for a maximum period of 14 days.If the Rajya Sabha fails to pass a money bill and 14 days elapse from the date of the submission of the bill to it, the money bill is deemed to have been passed by both the houses of Parliament. It is sent to the President for his signature.In case of any dispute as to whether a particular bill is a money bill or not, the Speaker of the Lok Sabha gives the decision. His decision is final and it cannot be challenged in any court or even in the Rajya Sabha or the Lok Sabha. Thus, we can any that the Lok Sabha has the final control over the finances of state. No tax can be levied or collected or changed or abolished without the approval of the Lok Sabha. The fiscal policies of the government cannot be implemented without the consent of the Lok Sabha.4. Judicial Powers:The Lok Sabha also performs some judicial functions. The impeachment proceedings can be taken up against the President either in the Lok Sabha or the Rajya Sabha. The President can be removed from office only when an impeachment resolution is adopted by each of the two Houses with a 2/3 majority of its members.The Lok Sabha also investigates the charges prepared by the Rajya Sabha against the Vice-President of India. The Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha can together pass a resolution for the removal of any judge of the Supreme Court or of a State High Court.Both the Houses can jointly pass a special address and present it to the President for the removal of some high officers of the state like the Attorney General, the Chief Election Commissioner and the Comptroller and Auditor General of India. Lok Sabha can also take action against any member or any citizen who is held to be guilty of committing contempt of the House.5. Electoral Functions:The Lok Sabha also performs some electoral functions. The elected members of the Lok Sabha take part in the election of the President. Members of the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha together elect the Vice-President of India. The members of the Lok Sabha also elect a Speaker and a Deputy Speaker from amongst themselves.6. Some Other Powers of Lok Sabha:The Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha jointly perform the following functions:(a) Approval of the ordinances issued by the President(b) Change of the boundaries of the states. State, creation of new states and change in the name of any state.(c) Changes in the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High Courts.(d) Changes the qualifications of the members of the Parliament and State Legislatures.(e) Revising the salary and allowances of the members of Parliament,(f) The setting up of Joint Public Service Commission for two or more states.(g) Passing of a resolution for abolishing or creating the upper chamber of a state legislature,(h) Approval of a Declaration of Emergency.Position of the Lok Sabha:After studying the powers and functions of the Lok Sabha, we can say that the Lok Sabha is a very powerful House. The Council of Ministers is responsible to the Lok Sabha and not to the Rajya Sabha. It remains in office so long as it enjoys the confidence of majority in the Lok Sabha.The Lok Sabha has full control over the finances of the State. It dominates ordinary law-making bills as nearly 90% of the bills are introduced in it. The joint sitting method of resolving the deadlocks between the two Houses tends to favour the Lok Sabha. It also controls the executive.The leader of majority in the Lok Sabha becomes the Prime Minister. Lok Sabha can cause the dismissal of the Council of Ministers by passing a vote of no-confidence or by rejecting a policy or law of the government. Hence, the Lok Sabha is a very powerful house of the Union Parliament.All the members of the Lok Sabha are directly elected by the people. Any voter can cast his vote to elect any candidate of his choice from his constituency. A candidate securing the largest number of votes from amongst all the contestants from a constituency gets elected as the representative of the people of his constituency in the Lok Sabha.RAJYA SABHA members are elected by the Vidhan Sabha Members of the respective state (No. of Rajya Sabha Members are fixed for every state). They also participate in electing President and Vice President of India.Article 80 of the Constitution lays down the maximum strength of Rajya Sabha as 250, out of which 12 members are nominated by the President and 238 are representatives of the States and of the two Union Territories.Rajya Sabha: Functions and Position of the Rajya Sabha!The Rajya Sabha, i.e., the Council of States, is the Upper House of the Union Parliament. It gives representation to the States of the Indian. However, the states do not enjoy an equal representation in the Rajya Sabha. These have been given representations on the basis of the size of their populations.I. Composition of the Rajya Sabha:The Rajya Sabha can have a maximum strength of 250 members; out of these 238 are to be the representatives of the States and remaining 12 members are to be nominated by the President from amongst persons who have achieved distinctions in the fields of art, literature, science or social services.At present, the Rajya Sabha has 245 members 233 elected and 12 nominated. Members of each State Legislative Assembly, together elect their allotted number of MPs for Rajya Sabha. The President nominates 12 MPs of Rajya Sabha. Odisha has 10 seats in the Rajya House.II. Method of Election:The members of the Rajya Sabha are elected indirectly by the people. The people of each state elect the members of their state legislative assembly who then elect the members of Rajya Sabha by a method of proportional representation—single transferable vote system. Each State Legislative Assembly elects as many representatives as have been allocated to it by the Constitution. Odisha Legislative Assembly has 147 MLAs who together elect 12 members of Rajya Sabha.III. Qualifications for the membership of Rajya Sabha:(a) He must be a citizen of India.(b) He must be above the age of 30 years.(c) He must possess all other qualifications as laid down by the Parliament.(d) He must not hold any office of profit under any government.(e) He should not be an insane or a bankrupt.(f) He should not have been disqualified under any law of the Parliament.Now any person residing in any part of India can contest election to the Rajya Sabha from any state. For this purpose residence of the concerned state is not essential.IV. Tenure:The Rajya Sabha is a quasi-permanent House. It is not subject to dissolution as a whole. One third of its members retire after every two years and elections are held only for the vacant seats. The tenure of each member of the Rajya Sabha is six years.V. Sessions:The President convenes the sessions of the Rajya Sabha usually along with the sessions of the Lok Sabha or whenever he feels it necessary. However, there cannot be a gap of more than six months within the two sessions of the Rajya Sabha. The President can call a special session of Rajya Sabha for getting approved an emergency declaration at a time when Lok Sabha stands dissolved.VI. Quorum for the Meetings of Rajya Sabha:The quorum for the meetings of Rajya Sabha is 1/10th of its members. It means that at least 1/10th of the members of the Rajya Sabha must be present for carrying out the work of the House.VII. Privileges of Members:The members of the Rajya Sabha enjoy several privileges. They enjoy unrestricted freedom to express their views in the House. Ho action can be taken against them for anything said by them in the House. They cannot be arrested for any civil offence during, and 40 days before and after the session of the Rajya Sabha. For protecting the privileges of the members of the House, the Committee on Privileges has been in existence since the inception of the Rajya Sabha.VIII. Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha:The Vice-President of India is the ex-officio Chairman of the Rajya Sabha. He is not a member of the House. However, he presides over its meetings and conducts its proceedings. During the absence of the Vice-President, the Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha presides over the meetings. The Deputy Chairman is elected by the Rajya Sabha MPs from amongst themselves.Powers and Functions of the Rajya Sabha:1. Legislative Powers:In the sphere of ordinary law-making the Rajya Sabha enjoys equal powers with the Lok Sabha. An ordinary bill can be introduced in the Rajya Sabha and it cannot become a law unless passed by it. In case of a deadlock between the two Houses of Parliament over an ordinary bill and if it remains unresolved for six months, the President can convene a joint sitting of the two Houses for resolving the deadlock.This joint sitting is presided over by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha. If the bill is passed in the joint sitting, it is sent to the President for his signatures. But if the deadlock is not resolved, the bill is deemed to have been killed.2. Financial Powers:In the financial sphere, the Rajya Sabha is a weak House. A money bill cannot be introduced in the Rajya Sabha. It can be initiated only in the Lok Sabha. A money bill passed by the Lok Sabha comes before the Rajya Sabha for its consideration. However, if within a period of 14 days, the Rajya Sabha fails to pass the bill, the bill is taken to have been passed by the Parliament irrespective of the fact whether the Rajya Sabha has passed it or not. If the Rajya Sabha proposes some amendments and the bill is returned to the Lok Sabha, it depends upon the Lok Sabha to accept or reject the proposed amendments.3. Executive Powers:“The Union Council of Ministers is collectively responsible before the Lok Sabha and not the Rajya Sabha.” Lok Sabha alone can cause the fall of the Council of Ministers by passing a vote of no-confidence.Although the Rajya Sabha cannot remove the Ministry from its office yet the members of the Rajya Sabha can exercise some control over the ministers by criticising their policies, by asking questions and supplementary questions, and by moving adjournment motions. Some of the ministers are also taken from the Rajya Sabha. Now the Prime Minister can also be from Rajya Sabha if the majority party in the Lok Sabha may elect/adopt him as its leader.4. Amendment Powers:Rajya Sabha and Lok Sabha can together amend the constitution by passing an amendment bill with 2/3 majority in each House.5. Electoral Powers:The Rajya Sabha has some electoral powers also. The elected members of the Rajya Sabha along with the elected members of the Lok Sabha and all the State Legislative Assemblies together elect the President of India. The members of the Rajya Sabha Lok Sabha together elect the Vice- President of India. Members of the Rajya Sabha also elect a Deputy Chairman from amongst themselves.6. Judicial Powers:(a) The Rajya Sabha acting along with the Lok Sabha can impeach the President on charges of violation of the Constitution.(b) The Rajya Sabha can also pass a special address for causing the removal of a judge of the Supreme Court or of any High Court.(c) The charges against the Vice-President can be leveled only in the Rajya Sabha.(d) The Rajya Sabha can pass a resolution for the removal of some high officers like the Attorney General of India, Comptroller and Auditor General and Chief Election Commissioner.7. Miscellaneous Powers:The Rajya Sabha and Lok Sabha jointly perform the following functions:(a) Approval of the ordinances issued by the President,(b) Ratification of an emergency proclamation,(c) Making any change in the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High Courts, and(d) Making any change in the qualifications for the membership of the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha.8. Two Special Powers of Rajya Sabha. The Rajya Sabha enjoys two exclusive powers:(i) The Power to declare a subject of State List as a subject of National Importance:The Rajya Sabha can pass a resolution by 2/3rd majority of its members for declaring a State List subject as a subject of national importance. Such a resolution empowers the Union Parliament to legislate on such a state subject for a period of one year. Such resolutions can be repeatedly passed by the Rajya Sabha.(ii) Power in respect of Creation or Abolition of an All India Service:The Rajya Sabha has the power to create one or more new All India Services. It can do so by passing a resolution supported by 2/3rd majority on the plea of national interest. In a similar way, the Rajya Sabha can disband an existing All India Service.Position of the Rajya Sabha:A study of the powers of the Rajya Sabha leads us to the conclusion that it is neither a very weak house like the British House of Lords nor a very powerful house as the American Senate. Its position is somewhat mid-way between the two. It has been less powerful than Lok Sabha but it has been not a very weak or insignificant House. Since 1950, the Rajya Sabha has been using its powers and functions in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and performing its due role as the second House of Union Parliament.