This Agreement Made And Entered Into This: Fill & Download for Free

To better understand, one has to go back to final years of the Knights Hospitallers of Malta. The population of Malta was about 100,000, and made up of people coming mainly from Sicily, but also with an influx of Spanish, Italians and some Greek. Italian was official language, of the law courts and that of educated classes. However, the populace still hung to to Maltese - a siculo-arabic derivative.Malta had the misfortune of being invaded by Napoleon in 1798. The Maltese were so pissed-off by the French, that within less than three months they rebelled. The French retreated within our massive fortifications, - built as a defense against the Turks and Barbary Pirates - and a two year stalemate followed. The Maltese being too weak to assault the fortifications, the French being too weak to control the countryside and the old capital. During this period Malta lost 10% of its population. Nonetheless, they democratically elected representatives, who would drew up a progressive constitution based on American and French experiences,With the help of the British and Portuguese Navies, the French were blockaded, so without supplies and reinforcements, they had little choice but to surrender.It is here that our desire to take control of our affaires. The Maltese representative, had naively entered into a defense agreement with the English, believing that they would honour our independence. But the English did exactly as Hitler was do with the agreement signed with Neville Chamberlain 138 years later. They tore it up.Although, at first the English did not interfere much with our Law Courts and education, which were both conducted in Italian, they only made half hearted attempts to allow self -government, so in 1880 what was to become the present day Nationalist Party was formed. It fought to prevent being assimilated with the British, for home rule and for Domium status. Malta achieved independence in 1964 by the Nationalist Party.So the short answer is that we are neither British or felt British, at least the majority of the Maltese.

Putin is intentionally taking the words of ambassador Lipski out of context in order to construct a narrative of extensive Polish-German collusion and Polish support of anti-Semitic actions in Germany. By doing this, he overinflates the importance of Polish-German correspondence over the division of Czechoslovakia, and smears a dedicated patriot (who would later go to great lengths to fight the Nazis) with the slander of antisemitism.Putin’s claim that Lipski was “anti-Semitic scum”, can be easily disproven by checking the rest of the notes documenting his diplomatic career, in which he states that the Polish government aimed to defend the rights of Jews of Polish citizenship in Germany, and had taken multiple actions towards that aim.The controversial quote cited by Putin did not condone any genocide or even systematic persecution of the Jews, but rather the drawing of plans that could facilitate a Jewish migration or resettlement (even resulting in the recreation of a Jewish state in Palestine, among other options, such as colonies in Africa). Lipski writes that the German Chancellor,“He (Hitler) has in mind an idea for settling the Jewish problem by way of emigration to the colonies in accordance with an understanding with Poland, Hungary, and possibly also Romania (at which point I told him that if he finds a solution we will erect him a beautiful monument in Warsaw).” (pg 411)Admittingly, when taken out of context, Lipski does seem like he is endorsing the persecution of Jews in Germany. However, when viewed alongside the economic and political situation of the Jews in Poland and elsewhere, one comes to a different conclusion. Under the quotation is an explanatory note clarifying the reasons behind his potential support for a resettlement plan.“Lest Lipski’s words be misinterpreted, we give the following facts:In 1937 there were about 3,350,000 Jews in Poland: most of them concentrated in the cities (Bialystok, 43% Jewish; Stanislawow, 41.4% Jewish; Warsaw, 30.1% Jewish) and small towns. The Jews living in rural areas made their living as agricultural brokers. However, as agricultural cooperatives developed in Poland, these middlemen were no longer needed and the Jews were deprived of this means of livelihood; they were left destitute and with no means of support.This had nothing to do with anti-Semitism; it was solely a natural economic development. The Jews in Poland, with their traditional clannishness, posed a serious problem in the overpopulated Polish state. The Polish government felt that a partial solution for this problem would be for them to emigrate, principally to Palestine.”The explanatory note goes on to explain that,“The matter was considered so serious that Polish delegates to the League of Nations, in October 1936, insisted that some immediate solution would have to be found, one possibility being the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine as a natural home for Jewish emigres. The Polish government further stressed that additional territories for emigres would have to be found to house the large number of Jews. Polish ambassadors discussed this matter in Paris, London, and Washington.It should be noted that during this same time the Polish government was giving financial aid to the Zionist organization of Vladimir Zabotynski; also, with the approval of Minister Beck and Marshal Smigly-Rydz, the Jewish Military Organization (Irgun Tsevai Lemni) was training hundreds of its instructors at secret military courses in Poland.” (pg 411)In the light of this historical background, it is difficult to jump to the conclusion that Lipski’s comment (in all likelihood made in jest) to “build a monument” was an endorsement of antisemitism. Poland, having the largest Jewish population in the world, was faced with the challenge of integrating a large and unassimilated population whose traditional economic niche in the Polish countryside was rapidly disappearing. As a result, the tensions between Poles and Jews in this period can be best understood as resulting from economic, social and political issues, rather than a form of traditional antisemitism. The overpopulation of the Jews in Poland, their increasing poverty resulting from a loss of business, and their competitive economic role with the non-Jewish Polish peasantry and middle class, presented a major problem. The problem was so important, that even some Zionist Jewish organizations supported a mass resettlement program.In Germany, Zionist organizations made an agreement with the Nazi government to facilitate the evacuation of around 60,000 Jews, known as the Havaara agreement. While I do not believe that this agreement should be seen as collaboration, it does demonstrates the willingness of some Zionist groups to consider and even participate in resettlement plans.In addition, Putin’s attempt to implicate Poland as being complicit in regards to the future extermination of the Jews is completely and utterly absurd. Almost nobody in Europe at this time believed that the Jews were going to be systematically eliminated or killed on a massive scale. Indeed the Nazis themselves did not formulate any definite plans charting out the systematic genocide of the Jews at this point. The Final Solution, which planned the industrial killing of millions of Jews in the camps, was drafted in 1942, not the 1930s.So, what about the portions of Lipski’s account where the Polish government seems to be supporting the rights of Jews in Germany, with Lipski’s approval? On pages 88 and 89 of Lipski’s account, we have the transcript of a letter written by Lipski in 1933 to then Polish ambassador to Germany Alfred Wysocki. The contents of the letter discuss the significance of the Polish-German non-aggression pact of 1933, and how it generally relates to Poland’s national security. Lipski then provides us with insight into official Polish policy towards the Jews and antisemitism in Germany. While for diplomatic reasons Lipski writes that the government suppressed several anti-Hitler demonstrations in Poland, the public protests of the Jews were to be permitted“We also stopped some anti-Chancellor demonstrations, for example, on the stage, in window displays, etc.., with one exception- when hostile anti-Hitler demonstrations came from or were performed by Jewish organizations.Similarly, if the German government were to launch a protest about the boycott of goods we would answer that, as long as the Reich’s hostile attitude towards the Jews prevails, the Polish government can do practically nothing.On the subject of the Jews, we have issues, as I have already advised you, instructions to our embassies and legations to act with considerable discretion to their propaganda action, not restraining it, however, in view of its importance in helping certain countries to ascertain and assume an attitude toward Germany.We are also supporting fully, with due precaution, any claims made by the Jews to the League of Nations dealing with the persecution of Jews in Germany.We do not plan to publish a white book at this time, although we are continuing to work on one.In this connection the Minister considers it most important that the Polish Legation in Berlin and the consulates under its supervision continue to give assistance to Polish citizens of Jewish ancestry living in the Reich, and that they should intervene, as they have been doing, at the central offices and with local authorities.On the other hand, we do not consider it advisable to give special publicity to this assistance. We possess proof that our efforts to defend Jews in Germany meet with favor for the Polish government in international Jewish circles. This is communicated, among others, from Vienna, America and England.The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be certainly informed without delay about all such steps taken by the Legation in Berlin and the consulates in Germany, in order to make them known to Jewish organizations.”This provides a very different picture of Lipski, who would become the future Polish ambassador to Germany. Indeed, here we see Lipski standing by the position of the then Polish government in defending the rights of Jews, particularly Jews of Polish citizenship, in Germany. While Lipski urges restraint, he also condones the protest of anti-Jewish actions in Germany, stands by the government position to recognize and support Jewish complaints to the League, and speaks extensively of collaboration between the Polish government and Jewish organizations.Indeed, lets keep in mind some of the later history of Lipski. After Poland fell in 1939, Lipski smuggled his way to France and joined the Polish armed forces in exile. He decided to enter combat duty at the age of 45, and in poor physical condition, which is a sign of great dedication to his country and a willingness to fight the Nazi Germans at every opportunity. He fought bravely during the battle of France, and later held an important position within the Polish Government in Exile in London. Despite his imperfections, to call this man a Nazi sympathizer and “anti-Semitic scum” is historical revisionism and constitutes liable.Alleged Polish-Nazi Collusion, and the Annexation of ZaolzieIn addition to accusations of antisemitism, Putin has accused Poland of directly facilitating the Second World War by colluding with the Nazis. Again, this is utterly false. Polish foreign policy aimed to establish a distance between the Germans and the Soviets. This distance could be assured, at least for a while, by signing non-aggression pacts with the two countries. While Soviet apologists magnify the significance of the Polish-German pact of 1934, they forget that Poland signed a Polish-Soviet pact two years earlier in 1932. The Poles were not aiming to establish themselves as the allies of either totalitarian state. Instead, pressured by its intermediary position between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, Polish foreign policy aimed at establishing balance. While the Germans and Soviets actively sought to disturb the order created by the treaty of Versaille, it was in Poland’s interests to maintain the order. Allying herself with either monster, was seen as the worst possible scenario.Pilsudski’s approach to diplomacy was best captured by a comment he made during a discussion with his staff in 1933,“It is Germanys dream to achieve cooperation with Russia, as it was in the times of Bismarck. The achievement of such cooperation would be our own downfall… How to work against it? Depending on the circumstances, either by frightening the weaker one or a relaxation of tensions. The game will be difficult, given the paralysis of will and shortsightedness of the West and the failure of my federative plans.”When Hitler came into power in 1933, Pilsudski was able to put pressure on the German Chancellor by making use of firm diplomacy and the dissemination of rumors that if provoked, Poland would launch an attack on Germany. While no specific documents or files prove that Pilsudski had a plan to attack Germany if Poland’s territorial integrity was threatened, there is good reason to believe that such a bold action would be consistent with the Polish Marshall’s character and previous martial decisions. The vague threat of war was what led Hitler and the Nazis to adopt a diplomatic and respectful tone towards the Poles, as Hitler recognized that Pilsudski was capable of humiliating him with a military defeat, thereby disrupting his rearming campaign. In the early 30s, Germany was by no means up to full military strength.Pilsudski also attempted to gauge the feelings of his allies, mainly the French, regarding the prospects of a defensive preemptive action against Nazi Germany. As the Germans initiated an open rearming program and withdrew from the Geneva Accords, the Poles every more urgently sought to determine the stance of their French allies. While the 1934 Polish-German fact is given a lot of attention, what is less known is that before signing the fact, the Polish government stalled in the hope of gaining assurance from the French that in case of a military conflict, France would take action against Germany. After receiving negative answers, the Poles decided to sign the pact with Germany. The motives behind the Polish move are best encapsulated in the words of Minister Beck,““Having verified that there existed a possibility of concluding a non-aggression pact which would give us at least a respite for living and working quietly and normally, it was with a sense of relief that we agreed to sign the pact.”Marshall Pilsudski, a perceptive leader and visionary, was able to see the handwriting on the wall. After signing the pact with Germany, Pilsudski announced to his staff that, “Having these two pacts, we are straddling two stools. This cannot last long. We have to know from which stool we will tumble first and when will that be.” During a 1933 vacation with his daughter Wanda, Pilsudski shockingly commented that, “Within ten years you will have a war. I shall be gone by then and you will loose that war.”Poland did not sign the pact out of allegiance with Germany. It signed the non-aggression pact in order to stall the inevitable. An ever more assertive and powerful Germany on her western border was a threat that could not be ignored. Stuck between two hostile states, Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, there was little Poland could do by itself to stall the Hitlerite threat. The inactivity of the western allies directly led to Poland having to compromise for its own survival.Germany did approach Pilsudski with several proposals outlining a joint war against the Soviet Union. Pilsudski refused these, firmly opposing submission to any foreign power. According to Peter Heatherington in his biography of Pilsudski,“In January 1935, Herman Goering visited Poland on a hunting trip and unofficially offered Pilsudski a secret anti-Russian alliance. Goering that the Marshall quickly dismissed the offer with a “stiffened gesture”, and explained that Poland was determined to conduct moderate policies toward its neighbors and had no wish to increase tensions. For the moment, Pilsudski was content to pursue the doctrine of “two enemies”, in which he would adhere to relatively friendly relations between Germany and Russia, but would refuse to ally with either.”After the death of Pilsudski in 1935, Poland was deprived of the only leader who had the skills and capability to protect her from internal and external turmoil. Once Pilsudski was gone, the difficult task of defending Poland from eastern and western incursions fell to his subordinates, such as Colonel Beck. For the most part, Beck tried to pursue Pilsudski’s policy of establishing a balance between the two aggressive neighbors, yet the situation by this time was getting out of control. British historian Norman Davies offers a balanced perspective of the crisis facing Beck during this difficult period,“In apportioning the blame for the final denouement of the pre-war crisis, the sins of Colonel Józef Beck, foreign minister from 1932 to 1939, have been specially exaggerated. To say he was guilty of ‘obscene obstinancy' or of ‘megalomania’ at once misrepresents the man and his motives and inflates the role of Polish diplomacy. Becks cardinal sin, like that of Piłsudski before him, was to march out of step with his would be allied patrons. In 1934, he considered the merits of a preemptive war against Hitler at a time when any such fighting talk was anathema in London or Paris. In 1937-38, he was thinking of protecting Poland's national interests in face of Nazi aggression at a time when Chamberlain and Daladier were seeking to appease Hitler at other people's expense. In 1939, he refused to make concessions to the Soviet Union, at a time when the appeasers were hoping they might be rescued from Hitler by the Red Army. Becks reluctance to trade Poland's freedom of action for doubtful advantages may have been inflexible, but was certainly even handed. He resisted the advances of Goering and Ribbentrop no less than those of Litvinov and Molotov.”The Polish seizure of the Zaolzie region of Czechoslovakia in 1938, is often used to accuse Poland of conspiring with Nazi Germany. While I believe that the decision to seize the region was ill advised and frankly stupid and pointless, it is absurd to claim that this action facilitated World War 2 and could in anyway compare to the Soviet-Nazi pact, which effectively partitioned all of Eastern and Central Europe.The Zaolzie region was mainly ethnically Polish in population, and many inhabitants supported a reunification with the Polish state. Indeed, Zaolzie was granted to Poland by treaty in 1920, and wrongfully seized from the Second Republic by the Czechoslovaks, as the Poles were engaged in a war with the Bolsheviks.In 1938, Poland moved in to seize the region, which constituted only a small sliver of the lands within the former Czechoslovakia. Indeed, the Polish government warned Beneš beforehand, and no fighting between the Polish and Czech troops occured. The trasition was very peaceful.This does not excuse the Polish action, which exposed Poland to international cricism and led it to make an embarrassing moral compromise in the face of Nazi aggression. However, what the Poles did in 1938 was essentially the same thing the Czechoslovaks did when they seized the region in 1920. And unlike the events of 1920, the events on 1938 within the context of Zaolzie cost no human lives whatsoever, and secured a majority ethnic Polish territory.However embarrassing and poor the Polish decision to enter Zaolzie was in 1938, it did not play a role in enabling Hitler's war machine. While a moral compromise, it did not constitute extensive collaboration or cooperation.The Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939 was what enabled Nazi Germany to conquer half of Europe and later launch an invasion within the Soviet Union itself. The agreement between Stalin and Hitler was not centered around minor border disputes. It was instead a complete redrawing of the maps of Eastern Europe, an essential partition. Poland was attacked on both sides, with Soviet troops also engaging in combat with Polish defenders and at times even cooperating with German forces. The Soviets and the Germans cooperated in exterminating the Polish elite, capturing Polish soldiers, and eliminating the Polish identity and culture. In the Soviet occupation zone, the NKVD would murder 150,000 people and would deport 1.7 million Polish citizens, mainly ethnic Poles, to the depths of the Soviet Union. Let us not forget that between 1937 and 1938, the Soviet union murder over 100,000 Soviet citizens of Polish ethnicity during the ‘Polish action’ of the Great Purge, simply because they were Polish.Let us not forget that Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia also fell to the Soviet ambitions, and were subject to bitter repressions and deportations. The Soviets were also aggressors in Finland.Indeed, the Soviet Union was the main trading partner of Germany, and supplied the German war machine with raw materials, oil, and other supplies. It was these very supplies that enabled the Germans to launch their attacks upon Western Europe in 1940 and later the Soviet Union itself in 1941. The Stalin directly enabled the Nazis. This is an undeniable fact.Some Soviet apologists may insist that the Soviets moved into eastern Poland in order to protected the Ruthenian population. But if a Soviet move to protect minorities in eastern Poland is justified, then it is hypocritical to accuse Poland of unique moral failure for protecting its Polish minority living in Zaolzie, 1938. Indeed, we know that the Soviet declaration of ‘protecting minorities’ was a mere pretext. The Soviet invasion of Eastern Poland represented collaboration with the Nazis to the highest degree.Of course, one must not discredit the enormous suffering of the Soviet people at the hands of the Nazi Germans. No one is accusing the bulk of the Belarusian, Ukrainian and Russian population that was a victim of both Nazi and Soviet oppression. The Nazi Germans murdered millions of Soviet Slavs during their invasion, as well as millions of Soviet Jews. The average Soviet soldier after 1941 was fighting against an invader displaying utmost barbarism. Russians should not take criticism of the Soviet Union, as a direct assault against their own identity.And about collaboration. In Poland, the Germans failed to establish quisling authorities and also were unable to recruit auxiliary forces and SS units from the Polish population. In the Soviet territories, the Germans were able to receive the aid of hundreds of thousands of collaborators, including many ethnic Russians. While Putin may like to accuse the nations of the intermarium in particular for collaborating with the Nazis, he should remember the many Russians who formed auxiliary forces and later SS units. These units committed horrible crimes in Belarus and Poland, killing both the Slavic and Jewish populations. The RONA Brigade for instance, wiped out scores of villages in Belarus before playing a murderous role during the Warsaw Uprising. Of course, one should not point a special finger at ethnic Russians, and I absolutely do not believe ethnic Russians were collectively collaborative, as Russians, along with other Slavic nationalities in the Soviet Union, played a major role in fighting against the Nazis and paid with millions of lives. However, for Russians to point their fingers at the Poles as examples of Nazi collaborators, even though Poland was historically a nation that was least collaborative in Europe and also suffered from Nazi German genocide, is very hypocritical.In light of these facts, Putin’s accusations come across not only as a direct manipulation, but also extremely hypocritical. Putin is resorting to historical revisionism in an attempt to isolate the nations of Central Europe and bring them under his influence. He is also assuming the role as a great restorer of the Russian lands, and feels that he must redeem the Soviet past as a part of this image. While the accusations coming from the Kremlin are aggravating for Poles, they are hardly surprising.Peace to all:)Sources:Diplomat In Berlin 1933 — 1939 : Lipski, Józef : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet ArchiveAmazon.com: Unvanquished: Joseph Pilsudski, Resurrected Poland, and the Struggle for Eastern Europe (9780983656319): Peter Hetherington: BooksAmazon.com: God's Playground: A History of Poland, Vol. 2: 1795 to the Present (9780231128193): Norman Davies: Books

Q. Did the Vietnamese really defeat the Japanese in Vietnam during WW2 or did the Japanese simply leave after the announcement of surrender?A. Quite a few stayed behind rather than go back to their defeated homeland. Some evaded trial for war crimes. All were welcome by General Võ Nguyên Giáp (victory at any cost), who arranged for them to receive Vietnamese citizenship and false identification papers. Many joined the Viet Minh, led troops and rose as high as colonel. Early major battles inflicted high French casualties. Many taught at the Quảng Ngãi Military Academy. A few stayed in Vietnam as late as the 1970’s.Which Japanese military officers helped Ho Chi Minh?After the Armistice that ended the Pacific War, some tens of thousands of Japanese veterans remained in Vietnam, with more in nearby regions. They were actively courted by the Viet Minh, who needed their experience and expertise in the looming war with France. Some 1000 Japanese military personnel thus found themselves on the Vietnamese side, including 47 former Kempetai members and/or 46 officers.Most of the officers who stayed served as military instructors for the Viet Minh forces, most notably at the Quảng Ngãi Military Academy. They imparted modern military science and training on their students. There were necessary conventional military knowledge such as how to conduct assaults, night attacks, company/battalion level exercises, commanding, tactics, navigation, communications and movements. In addition, they taught them how to fight against a superior enemy through sabotage, ambushes and raids. A few led Vietnamese forces into combat.Kenpei officers aboard a train in 1935.Those who belonged to the Kenpeitai were wanted by the allies. France primarily wanted to deprive the Vietnamese of Japanese military training and assistance. Beginning in 1951, these soldiers began to be repatriated.Lieutenant Colonel Mukaiyama, a staff officer in the 38th Army who became a technical advisor to the Vietnamese; killed in combat in 1946. Leader of Japanese forces in Vietnam, and ranked as a full colonel.Major Ishii Takuo, a staff officer in the 55th Division who had commanded a squadron of its cavalry regiment. The youngest major in the Imperial Arm, he led a number of volunteers to the Vietnamese cause, becoming a colonel and military advisor to General Nguyễn Sơn. He headed the Quảng Ngãi Military Academy before founding the Tuy Hòa Military Academy, and was killed by a land mine in 1950.Major Kanetoshi Toshihide, served with Major Igari in the 2nd Division and followed him to join the Viet Minh; he became Chief of Staff for General Nguyễn Giác Ngộ.Major Igawa Sei, a staff officer in the 34th Independent Mixed Brigade; he joined Viet Minh forces, and was killed in action in 1946. He conceived the idea of establishing the Quảng Ngãi Military Academy.Lieutenant Igari Kazumasa, commander of an infantry company in the 2nd Division's 29th Infantry Regiment; he became an instructor at the Quảng Ngãi Military Academy.Lieutenant Kamo Tokuji, a platoon leader under Lietuenant Igari; he also became an instructor at the Quảng Ngãi Military Academy.2nd Lieutenant Tanimoto Kikuo, an intelligence officer who was to remain behind in Indonesia, but linked up with the 34th Brigade to get home, only to end up an instructor at the Quảng Ngãi Military Academy until 1954.2nd Lieutenant Nakahara Mitsunobu, an intelligence officer of the 34th Independent Mixed Brigade; became a decorated Viet Minh soldier, and later an instructor at the Quảng Ngãi Military Academy.Japanese Occupation of VietnamVietnam - WWII and Japanese Occupation (globalsecurity.org)Japanese soldiers serving with the Viet Minh (warbirdforum.com)JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF VIETNAM (alphahistory.com)1. In September 1940 Vietnam was occupied by Japanese forces, which were expanding throughout south-east Asia and seeking greater control over China’s southern borders.2. Japan’s vision was that Asian nations like Vietnam be absorbed into its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, a confederation free of Western influence or control.3. For much of World War II, the Japanese allowed the French colonial government to continue ruling Vietnam. Japan lacked the men for a full scale occupation of Vietnam.4. In March 1945 the Japanese, then in retreat from south-east Asia, abruptly ended French rule and seized control of Vietnam, installing Emperor Bao Dai as a puppet ruler.5. With French control ended and the Japanese distracted, Ho Chi Minh and the nationalist Viet Minh flourished, gaining numbers and seizing control of parts of north-western Vietnam. Japan’s defeat in August 1945 then raised the question of who would rule post-war Vietnam.Japanese troops enjoying leave in Saigon during World War II.The Japanese occupied Vietnam in September 1940 and remained there until the end of World War II (August 1945). The pretext for the invasion was Japan’s ongoing war with China, which began in 1937. By occupying Vietnam, Tokyo hoped to close off China’s southern border and halt its supply of weapons and materials. The occupation of Vietnam also fit into Japan’s long term imperial plans. Japanese leaders, driven by militarism and hungry for profit, dreamed of creating what they called a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, an economic coalition of Asian nations. Together these Asian countries would expel Western imperialists and capitalists, then share trade, resources and commodities between themselves. In reality, the Co-prosperity Sphere would be a quasi-empire, run from Tokyo for the benefit of Japan, its government and its corporations. Countries like China, Korea and Vietnam would be transformed into vassal states ruled by puppet governments. They would provide cheap land, labor and resources for Japanese industries. It was Japanese imperialism cloaked in a veil of Asian nationalism.From early 1940 Tokyo began pressuring French colonial administrators in Vietnam, demanding that Japanese soldiers be allowed into the country to secure the Chinese border. These requests were refused. In May 1940 soldiers from Nazi Germany invaded France; within a month the French government had surrendered and signed an armistice with Berlin. The French surrender at home weakened the French colonial government in Vietnam, which had little option but to concede to Japanese demands. An agreement signed in June 1940 allowed Japanese troops to control the northern border between Vietnam and China. Another signed in August acknowledged Japan’s rights and interests in south-east Asia. On September 20th the French governor general, Jean Decoux, signed an agreement with Tokyo giving the Japanese access to Haiphong harbor and allowing the placement of up to 6,000 troops in northern Vietnam. But the Japanese, dissatisfied with this agreement, broke it the following day. By midnight on September 22nd a Japanese invasion of Vietnam was underway.Jean Decoux, French governor of Vietnam during World War IIJapanese forces took just a week to secure control of Vietnam. By October there were around 10,000 Japanese soldiers stationed there, mainly around the ports, airfields and important industrial centers. For most of their occupation the Japanese left the French colonial government in place – though its authority was greatly diminished. This tactic contradicted Tokyo’s policy of “Asia for Asians” – but Japan could not spare the men for a full scale occupation of Vietnam. Instead, they preferred to leave the French in charge and develop Vietnam as a client state. This allowed Tokyo to ‘use’ Vietnam for its own ends without deploying large numbers of soldiers there (at no point did Japanese troop numbers in Vietnam exceed 35,000 men). Between 1941 and 1945 the French administration in Vietnam, led by Decoux, engaged in ‘co-existence’ with the Japanese. In May 1941 Decoux granted Japan ‘most favoured nation’ status, meaning the bulk of Vietnamese exports were allocated to Tokyo at low prices. Later, Japanese troops were given unrestricted access to Vietnam’s roads, rail network and ports. This allowed them to use Vietnam both as a thoroughfare for the conquest of Thailand and Burma, and a staging point for attacks further south.A French poster critical of Japanese imperialism in IndochinaThe Vietnamese people had mixed feelings about this dual imperialism. Some welcomed the arrival of the Japanese: they believed an Asian colonial power was preferable to Westerners. Two notable Vietnamese religious groups, Cao Dai and Hoa Hao, openly collaborated with the Japanese. Others, however, considered the Japanese to be no different to the French, just another troupe of foreign imperialists. The Japanese made an effort to win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese – a policy that differed from their brutality and oppression in China. Propaganda told the Vietnamese that the Japanese were in their country as “liberators” rather than conquerors. Japanese language courses were organised in large cities; Japanese films, literature and poetry were translated into local languages. The Vietnamese people were told how Japan’s military supremacy was slowly driving the white imperialists out of Asia. But while some Vietnamese drew closer to the Japanese, most believed Japanese imperialism would be the same, or even worse, than that of the French. One peasant told his neighbors that “The Japanese are a hundred times crueler than the French. Even a worm or a cricket could not live under their brutal violence”.The Japanese presence in Vietnam also attracted foreign attention, particularly from the United States. In 1940 America was not yet at war with Japan but it was nevertheless working to restrict Japanese expansion. The US also wanted to protect its imports of raw rubber, half of which came from Vietnam. At first Washington backed the French colonial regime in Vietnam, hoping it would resist Japanese overtures. But when the French caved in to Japanese demands, the US changed tack. By 1943 president Roosevelt was openly talking of Vietnamese independence. By 1944, Washington was much more interested in the situation in Indochina. The Americans opened a military station at Kunming in southern China, while American advisers and Office of Strategic Services (OSS) agents supported both the Chinese Guomindang and Vietnamese resistance groups. The Americans worked closely with Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh, who supplied the US military with information about Japanese troop numbers and movements. It was more a working relationship than an alliance, however it gave Ho Chi Minh hope that Washington might later support Vietnamese independence, once the war had ended.By the start of 1945 the war was going poorly for Japan.Having surrendered the Philippines, the Japanese were in retreat across south-east Asia, relinquishing captured territory and incurring heavy losses. Tokyo had previously identified Vietnam as a fallback position for retreating Japanese troops, since it could be more easily occupied, secured and defended. In March 1945 the Japanese occupation force, claiming that French colonists were assisting the Allies, withdrew their support for the colonial regime. The French were removed from power in Vietnam; every French colonial official or military officer was arrested and locked up; all French soldiers were disarmed. Shutting down colonial authority in Indochina only benefited the Viet Minh, however, which flourished without pressure from French troops. The Japanese invited emperor Bao Dai to declare Vietnamese independence and handed him the reins of power, though both were only nominal. From March 1945 Vietnam became a member state of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, in effect a Japanese colony run by a puppet government.Ho Chi Minh with US officers and agents during World War IIHo Chi Minh declared the Japanese the “number one enemy” but resisted calls for a major Viet Minh campaign against them. Knowing the Japanese were in retreat, and that a major Allied attack was imminent, Ho preferred to wait. By June 1945 he felt strong enough to establish a Viet Minh-controlled zone in north-western Vietnam. This region was remote and had no strategic significance to the Japanese, so they did not launch any major campaigns against it. Through the middle of 1945 the Viet Minh busied itself with organisation, propaganda and recruiting. Ho Chi Minh also had to deal with food shortages and famine, which were widespread in the north. The Viet Minh movement consolidated its hold in the north and began to spread into central Vietnam, gaining 100,000 new recruits. By the start of August 1945 the Japanese were on the verge of defeat and the resistance movement was stronger than ever. Viet Minh cadres began seizing control of Japanese-held villages and towns. In early August the US dropped atomic weapons on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, attacks that led to the Japanese surrender. Yet another foreign power had occupied Vietnam, only to be defeated. As the Japanese mobilized to leave Vietnam, its people wondered who their new rulers might be.J. Llewellyn et al, “The Japanese occupation of Vietnam”, Alpha History.Vietnam - WWII and Japanese Occupation (globalsecurity.org)The signing of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact (Nazi-Soviet Non-Agression pact) in August 1939, caused France immediately to ban the French Communist Party and, soon afterwards, to declare illegal all Vietnamese political parties including the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP). The colonial authorities began a crack down on communists, arresting an estimated 2,000 and closing down all communist and radical journals. The party consequently was forced to shift its activities to the countryside, where French control was weaker--a move that was to benefit the communists in the long run. In November the ICP Central Committee held its Sixth Plenum with the goal of mapping out a new united front strategy, the chief task of which was national liberation. According to the new strategy, support would now be welcomed from the middle class and even the landlord class, although the foundation of the party continued to be the proletarian-peasant alliance.With the outbreak of World War II, France was compelled to withdraw her best troops from Indochina in order to use them in the European theater. The result was that Indochina — particularly after France’s defeat in June 1940 — was left wide open to ever increasing Japanese pressures. As France collapsed, it was not as a casual onlooker that Japan viewed the debacle. Japan saw (with the clarity of insight of an Al Capone) that French Indo-China would need “protection” if it were to remain secure against the designs of unprincipled foreign powers who might seek to take advantage of France’s plight.Zealously intent on her professed role of protector of the weak, she brushed aside the feebly conventional protests of the Vichy-appointed Governor General (Vice-Admiral Jean DeCoux) and began pouring in “protection” in the form of Japanese troops—to the eventual total of seventy thousand. Japan demanded that the French colonial government close the Hanoi-Kunming railway to shipments of war-related goods to China. The Japanese, in particular, sought to obtain control of the Haiphong—Yunnan railroad in order to attack Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s main supply bases around Kunming. Indeed the armistice with Germany had hardly been signed before a Japanese military mission under General Nishihara appeared in Hanoi.In an agreement with the Vichy government in France in August 1940, Japan formally recognized French sovereignty in Indochina in return for access to military facilities, transit rights, and the right to station occupation troops in Tonkin. On 30 August 1940, Japan began to occupy a transit base at Haipbong and all major airfields of Tonkin. On 22 September 1940, however, Japanese troops invaded from China, seizing the Vietnamese border towns of Đồng Đăng and Lạng Sơn. As the French retreated southward, the Japanese encouraged Vietnamese troops to support the invasion. The communists in the Bac Son district border area moved to take advantage of the situation, organizing self-defense units and establishing a revolutionary administration. The French protested to the Japanese, however, and a cease-fire was arranged whereby the French forces returned to their posts and promptly put down all insurrection. Most of the communist forces in Tonkin were able to retreat to the mountains. In similar short-lived uprisings that took place in the Plain of Reeds (Đồng Tháp Mười) area of Cochinchina, however, the communist rebel forces had nowhere to retreat and most were destroyed by the French.Japanese Imperial Army soldiers advance to Lạng Sơn, in September 1940On 29 July 1941, Japan, further occupied naval and air bases at Saigon and Tourane, and shortly after Pearl Harbor, Indochina was in fact as much a Japanese-occupied territory as any of the other southeast Asian countries which were overrun by the Japanese forces. The only difference being that the French still maintained their internal administration and lightly-armed military forces. It is estimated that the total French military forces available in Indochina did not exceed 15,000 men.Japanese troops enter Saigon on bicycleEven during the Japanese occupation of Viet Nam during World War II, both the Nationalists and Communists focused on building their own separate underground intelligence and guerrilla networks. The Vietminh, which was short for Việt Nam Độc lập Đồng minh Hội, or Vietnamese League for Independence, was founded in May 1941. It was technically an umbrella organization under which nationalist, socialist, peasant, student, and other organizations combined to fight the Japanese, who had taken control of the country from its colonial overlords, the French. In reality, the Vietminh were led by a small handful of Communists, two of whom would figure prominently in America’s war in Vietnam. The first was Võ Nguyên Giáp, one of the principal founders of the Vietminh and leader of its tiny military force. The other was Ho Chi Minh.Nguyen-Ai-Quoc (the later known as Ho Chi Minh) speaking at the foundational congress of the French Communist Party in December 1920. Michael GoebelWhile in China early in World War II, Ho was imprisoned by the Kuomintang for his affiliation with the Communists. In 1943 the Nationalists released Ho to return to Vietnam with the expectation that he would foment trouble against the Japanese and send intelligence reports from Vietnam. Ho's return to Vietnam, under Chinese auspices, bore a remarkable similarity to Lenin's sealed-train ride under German auspices to Russia during the Great War. The Americans liked Ho and the Vietminh and were impressed by their enthusiasm and ability to learn quickly. They knew Ho was a Communist, but this was not an issue at the time because the United States was allied with the Communist Soviet Union in the war against Germany. If one could accept Joseph Stalin as an ally, then Ho was not a problem.The Americans also knew that Ho was first and foremost a nationalist, dedicated to freeing his country from all foreign control. During the war, that meant fighting the Japanese; after the war, it would be the French if they chose to try to reassert colonial control over Vietnam. Ho’s anti-Japanese resistance fighters helped to rescue downed American pilots and furnished information on Japanese forces in Indochina. On 10 August 1944 the Viet Minh (Viet Nam Independence League) called on the Vietnamese people to take up arms and contribute money to buy weapons to fight against Japanese occupation. Ho and Giap were simultaneously fighting the Japanese, while slowly extending Vietminh political control over much of northern Vietnam. Though he did make trouble for the Japanese, Ho's primary purpose was to organize the Vietminh to seize power in Vietnam after the departure of the Japanese, an aim he successfully achieved.Võ Nguyên Giáp (left) together with Viet Minh forces in the jungle near Kao Bak Lang in 1944.Backed (and confronted) by Japanese "protection", the Vichy-appointed Governor General Vice-Admiral Jean DeCoux maintained for four and a half years an outward semblance of French sovereignty; presenting to the world the seeming anomaly of a colony surviving the downfall of its mother country. By early March 1945, however, the disastrous course of the war made it necessary for Japan to revise her plans. The new government in France had been singularly unappreciative of the trouble Japan had gone to in providing protection for Indo-China; and the presence of the existing French Indo-Chinese Army under General Alessandri (15,000 French & 35,000 natives) might prove more than embarrassing to the Japanese in the event of an Allied landing. In view of this situation Japan decided to ring down the curtain on Act I of the Indo-China farce and shift the props in preparation for the next scene—in which (coached by her far-seeing empire-builders) she would play her best loved role, “The Emancipator.”With the war situation turning to the advantage of the Allies, the Japanese decided to eliminate the slight threat to their communications lines which the small colonial army represented, and on 9 March 1945, Japanese troops and secret police wiped out all French resistance. Only a few units succeeded in escaping the Japanese and succeeded in fighting their way through the jungle into Free China. Among these units was a task force of a few thousand men under the command of Generals Sabatier and Alessandri. At the same time, all French administrators and civil servants, as well as most of the white or Eurasian civilian population, were imprisoned in various internment camps. Some of these internment camps achieved a notoriety in the Far East comparable to that of Dachau and Buchenwald in Europe. In less than two months all resistance had ended, except for the desultory efforts by remnants under General Alessandri, and a military regime was established, with the Japanese Ambassador and six Consuls General serving as “advisors” to the Japanese Army.Japanese capture of HanoiWhile the Japanese eliminated the French, the various nationalist and Communist groups began to reorganize themselves in order to take over as rapidly as possible whatever regions the Japanese did not occupy. Soon, such groups controlled seven provinces in Upper Tonkin as well as large tracts of land in Annam. The elimination of the French brought about a complete breakdown of Allied intelligence which, hitherto had mainly relied upon its French contacts and this factor favored the activities of these groups. The new situation resulted in contacts between the gurerrillas and OSS as well as Chinese Nationalist intelligence groups. Many new weapons (bazookas, submachine guns) as well as radio sets and instructors were parachuted to them so that certain of the guerrilla units soon gained an appreciable amount of combat strength and efficiency. No distinction was made as to whether the groups in question were subordinated to a recognized liberation movement or whether they pursued aims of their own or of a particular political party. As it happens, it was the Communist groups under their Moscow-trained leader Ho Chi Minh which possessed not only the necessary strength but also the adequate purposeful leadership necessary to exploit the existing situation to the fullest.Eager to play to an appreciative audience (before the Allies might arrive) her role espousing the cause of freedom, Japan by mid-March 1945 had set upon gilded if unstable thrones the Kings of Cambodia, Luang Prabang (Laos) and the Emperor of Annam, and in her solicitude for these heretofore-oppressed peoples, offered counsel and guidance to the carefully selected government Cabinets. Japan’s actors however, proved more eager than artful, and their performance was disturbed by increasingly rude heckling of the Etsumei (Annamese Independence League). This anti-French organization (ignored by the Japanese in forming the Annamese Cabinet) had waited long years for independence and was to be neither deceived nor appeased now by the Japanese counterfeit. (Apparently deluded themselves, the Japanese reported aggrievedly to Tokyo that “the Anmanese have gone so far as to question Japan’s real motives.”)The Annamese Emperor, Bao Dai (who, the Japanese learned to their dismay, was “not nearly as weak-minded as the French had said”) recognized the importance of political harmony, and proceeded to reorganize his Cabinet to include some members of the Etsumei. The latter, however, were not to be thus easily stilled, and in addition to demands for lower taxes, release of Japanese Army rice for civilian consumption, etc., began clamoring for extension of Annamese sovereignty to the long-claimed States of Tonkin and Cochin-China. By July (1945) popular support for this last issue had become so strong that the Cabinet threatened to resign, being dissuaded only by a Japanese promise to “restore” the desired areas to Annam by September 1945.A further cause of Etsumei dissatisfaction and no little suspicion, was the return from Tokyo (after many years of exile for anti-French activities) of pro-Japanese Prince Cuong De. It was feared that the Japanese (in an effort to rectify their mistake in crowning Bao Dai), intended to install Cuong De as Emperor. The Japanese Army, ever disdainful of the Japanese Foreign Office and uninterested in these endless political artifices, saw in the Etsumei’s defiant attitude an affront to its dignity, and began making large-scale arrests. The Etsumei thereupon adopted a more aggressive attitude and, after a series of minor incidents, seized arms and ammunition from Emperor Bao Dai’s native Security Units (who had been armed by the Japanese). Thus equipped, the Etsumei on 24 July made what appears to have been a fairly large-scale surprise attack on Japanese troops in Tonkin, with resultant casualties to both sides. Before the Japanese Army could carry out extensive punitive measures against the Etsumei, rumors of Japan’s acceptance of the Potsdam Ultimatum began to spread amongst the Army officials.On 6 August 1945 the first atom bomb gave the signal of the beginning of the end of Japan’s military might. On the following day, Ho Chi Minh’s guerrillas became the “Vietnam Liberation Army,” a shadow government, called the "Vietnam People’s Liberation Committee" was set up during the following days. On 15 August 1945 Japan accepted the Allies' terms of unconditional surrender, ending World War II. That same day, the National Insurrection Committee called on all Vietnamese people to rise up against Japanese occupation. Vietnamese revolutionary forces rise up against Japanese occupation in World War II and seize power in the provincial capitals of Bac Giang, Hai Duong, Ha Tinh, Quang Nam, and My Tho provinces. From August 14 to 18, the general insurrection, later known as the August Revolution, spread to rural areas in the north, most of Central Viet Nam and parts of the south, to be crowned with complete victory on 19 August 1945.Ho Chi Minh and Emperor Bao DaiBy 20 August 1945, the Vietminh solidly held the whole north of Vietnam (as the three coastal territories of Indochina collectively was now called) while the Japanese quietly abandoned their puppets to shift for themselves. On 25 August 1945 Bảo Đại abdicated; his Cabinet resigned and the Etsumei established the “Provisional Government of the Viet Nam Republic” headed by President Ho Chi Minh.” After Bao Dai’s abdication he became an advisor to the Provisional Government, living in Hanoi under the assumed name of Prince Eisui.On 25 August, a "Provisional Executive Committee for South Vietnam,” including seven Communists among its nine members, took control of Saigon. Within a fortnight after Hiroshima, the red flag of the Vietminh flew over all of Vietnam. In the wake of the Japanese surrender, Ho Chi Minh took advantage of the facility vacuum and proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. On Sept 2nd, 1945, President Ho Chi Minh read the Independence Manifesto declaring the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam at Ba Dinh Square. The election held under Vietminh auspices during January 1946 brought an overwhelming victory to the Vietminh.US Army officers stood at Ho’s side in August 1945 as he basked in the short-lived satisfaction of declaring Vietnam’s independence. American support for Ho was illusionary. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had opposed returning Vietnam to French colonial rule, but he did not necessarily support independence for Vietnam; he had suggested a United Nations protectorate, or even temporary control by China. When Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945, so did any resolve by the US government to prevent a French return to Vietnam. His successor, Harry S. Truman, was more concerned with stability in a postwar Europe than with dismantling French colonial rule in Indochina.The victorious allied forces determined that the Nationalist Chinese would occupy North Vietnam and the British the south. The frequently witnessed Chinese-Vietnamese drama -- in which China seeks to control Vietnam while the Vietnamese maneuver to rid themselves of that control -- was re-enacted in 1945-1946. In accordance with an Allied agreement made at Potsdam, Chinese Nationalist forces entered Tonkin, in North Vietnam, after the Japanese defeat, supposedly to disarm the Japanese in the territory south to the 16th parallel. The Nationalists sent a force of some 180,000 men under General Lu Han, their wives and children, a band of porters, and few supplies. They selected the best living quarters, lived off the land, looted, and blackmarketed. They liquidated locally at a handsome profit the weapons, ammunition, and equipment seized from the surrendered Japanese. Purchase of some of these stocks by the Vietminh helped arm them for future hostilities.Ho Chi Minh, who had created the Vietminh guerrilla force to combat the Japanese, correctly perceived that a Chinese presence in Vietnam’s heartland posed a significant threat. Though the Japanese invasion had ended practically a century of oppressive colonial rule by France, he had no hesitation in making a case of the hated French to take over North Vietnam for yet another 5 years. When challenged to justify such seemingly perverse behavior, he famously replied “Higher to smell French shit for the subsequent five years than eat Chinese shit for the remainder of my life”.French reasserted controlThe French, too, had an obvious interest in Chinese withdrawal from Vietnam. The latter therefore were in a position to extract important concessions from the French. In exchange for their departure by March 31, 1946, the Chinese gained the French renunciation of extraterritorial rights and concessions in China. Although his analysis of the comparative strengths of the French and Chinese was precise, he misjudged the timing. The French predictably reneged on the deal and, with British assist, attempted to re-colonize Vietnam. It took an additional nine years of bitter preventing till the Vietnamese victory at Dien Bien Phu finally drove the colonialists out of the country.Col. Christian de Castries, French commander at Điện Biên PhủChinese Communist support for the Vietminh against the French between 1946 and 1954, though estimated at less than 20 percent of Vietminh supplies (and perhaps one-ninth of the amount contributed by the United States to the French war effort), contributed significantly to the Vietminh success. Whether Chinese assistance, tangible or intangible, was indispensable to the Vietminh victory is impossible to judge.First Indochina War - WikipediaClockwise from top: After the fall of Dien Bien Phu supporting laotian troops fall back across the Mekong River into Laos; French Marine commandos wade ashore off the Annam coast in July 1950; M24 Chaffee American light tank used by French in Vietnam; Geneva Conference in 21 July 1954; A Grumman F6F-5 Hellcat from Escadrille 1F prepares to land on the French carrier Arromanches (R95) operating in the Gulf of Tonkin.Japanese soldiers serving with the Viet Minh (warbirdforum.com)This subject began to fascinate me when I read that the Japanese genius and war criminal Colonel Tsuji Masanobu spent his last years in Vietnam, helping defeat the Americans. Finally someone did serious research into the subject: As a French scholar, using French archives, Christopher Goscha concentrated on the years 1945-1950, and there is of course no proof that any of the individuals he mentions were still serving with the North Vietnamese or Viet Cong during the "American War." What follows is condensed, with Prof. Goscha's permission, from his article "Belated Asian Allies," which appeared in A Companion to the Vietnam War, edited by Young & Buzzanco and published by Blackwell in 2002.Masanobu Tsuji - WikipediaBelated Asian AlliesGoscha estimates that perhaps 5,000 Japanese stayed behind in Vietnam in the fall of 1945. (The translator renders their status as "deserters," but I don't think that's honest. How can you desert from an army that has surrendered?) Famously able to subordinate the means to the end, the Communists naturally put them to use in their war against the French. As Goscha points out, the Viet Minh had very little experience in warfare or government, as opposed to guerilla resistance of the sort they had used against the occupying Japanese. They would have been glad of the expertise available in the left-behind Japanese population, both military and civilian.Vietnam was divided at the 16th parallel by the victorious Allies, with the Chinese occupying the north and the British occupying the south. The Chinese gave the Viet Minh considerable freedom of action, while the British brought in French troops to relieve them of the burden of occupation; the French of course moved quickly to put down any independence movement.The first Japanese aid came in the form of arms: in the north, Vo Nguyen Giap equipped his troops with French weapons that the Japanese had issued to its puppet Indochinese Guard. Japanese weapons made their way into the black market soon after the surrender. It wasn't long before Japanese soldiers and officers also became available: there was no immediate way home for these men, even if they wanted to go. They hadn't been defeated in the field; they couldn't understand why the Emperor had ended the war; they had nothing to greet them at home but shame and desolation. Many had Vietnamese wives or girlfriends. When the war ended, they thought of themselves in the tradition of the Rōnin or leaderless samurai warriors. Like the ronin, they simply gravitated toward whatever employer was willing to hire them.And the Viet Minh wanted them, the officers and NCOs particularly, as training cadres. In September 1945, there were about 50,000 Japanese soldiers and civilians in northern Vietnam; by December 1946, about 32,000 had been repatriated and 3,000 escaped to the island of Hainan, leaving 15,000 still in the country. Perhaps a third of these, Goscha believes, may have joined the Viet Minh as cadre, combat troops, or civilian experts. In the British-occupied south, with the French returning and pressing the Viet Minh hard, a much larger proportion of the Japanese garrison was repatriated; Goscha estimates that only a few thousand remained in the summer of 1946, and that perhaps only a few hundred actually joined the Communist forces. (Apparently a larger number simply melted into the population as farmers and shop-keepers.)In Thai Nguyen province, the Japanese apparently ran an arms factory. In Hanoi, a western-educated Japanese scholar named Kiyoshi Komatsu directed the Viet Minh's "International Committee for the Aid and Support of the Government of the DRV." In Quang Ngai, a Viet Minh officers' school had six Japanese officers on the faculty; in southern Trung Bo province, 36 out of 50 military instructors were Japanese. Major Ishii Takuo, a young officer of the 55th Division in Burma, deserted in Cambodia in December 1945 with several comrades and made his way to Vietnam, where he became a colonel in the Viet Minh, provisional head of the Quang Ngai military academy, and later "chief advisor" to Communist guerrillas in the south. Some specialists, including doctors and ordnance experts, were forced to work for the Viet Minh against their will. The French identified eleven Japanese nurses and two doctors working for the Viet Minh in northern Vietnam in 1951."One of the results of the Japanese presence in the Viet Minh army was an increase in French losses at the beginning of the war," Goscha writes. During the first battles in the north, Japanese soldiers served in the front lines. In Hue in 1947, the French reported battling a Japanese assault force of 150 men. Also in 1947, Colonel Ishii helped set up an ambush that killed upwards of 70 French soldiers.Koshiro Iwai led Vietnamese units into battle and led commando raids behind French lines; by 1949 he was a Viet Minh battalion deputy commander. Later he became a planner for the 174th Regiment, helping the Viet Minh to employ their newly acquired Chinese cannon.In 1951, the Viet Minh began to repatriate their Japanese (and European) helpers via China and Eastern Europe. After the Geneva Accords of 1954, which divided Vietnam into two halves, 71 Japanese left the Viet Minh and went home, and others returned over the years. "A handful would remain in Vietnam well into the 1970s," Goscha writes. "Others would never return." This doesn't necessarily mean they helped in the war against the Americans; more likely, these stay-behinds had simply gone native.The 1954 Geneva ConferenceSupporting information[Here's another discussion of the same question, by George Moore, which appeared on the moderated Vietnam War newsgroup several years ago. -- DF]A number of years ago, there was some discussion [here] about the Imperial Japanese soldiers who, in 1945 and 1946, volunteered to serve with the Viet Minh in exchange for protection from World War II era Allied war crime tribunals. Cecil B Currey's new book Victory At Any Cost: The Genius of Vietnam's General Vo Nguyen Giap reviews the subject. Below are some notes about it for any student who wants to look into it. Most critically, it should be easy these days to get a copy of the original American DIA report about it. See below. With a copy of that report in hand, a most interesting article could be written about a long forgotten subject.See page 125, where it is a question of Viet Minh repression of opposition groups just after the Chinese Kuomintang armies pulled out of Hanoi and northern Vietnam in June of 1946:"In this activity, Giap had the help not only of his regular Viet Minh cadres but of another special unit as well. In 1945, Giap had enlisted 1,500 fanatically "antiwhite" Japanese military personnel who offered their services to him following Japan's surrender to the Allies. For them it was more attractive than the idea of returning to a defeated and occupied homeland. These soldiers were led by 230 noncommissioned officers and forty-seven gendarmes of the once dreaded Japanese Kempetai, all of whom were wanted for questioning by the Allies on charges of suspected war crimes. The entire group was commanded by Colonel Mukayama from the general staff of the 38th Imperial Army. Giap arranged for them all to receive Vietnamese citizenship and false identification papers. Mukayama became one of Giap's firm supporters and willingly served him when called upon, as he was in this instance, to attack opponents of the Viet Minh regime."Unfortunately, the footnote to this text points only to the words "DIA Document". It does not matter however, because there is the name Colonel Mukayama. A search of old DIA documents for this name will certainly yield the original DIA report on the subject. It would have been written in 1945 or 1946.On page 166 of this same book [Curry's book] is the note that "Colonel Mukayama was killed in December of 1947 at Cho Chu during a battle with French paratroopers."Index of the classic 1952 book from Philippe Devillers Histoire du Vietnam de 1940 a 1952 yields the name Mukaiyama. Devillers has him listed as a Lieutenant Colonel. ""In the spring and summer (1946), preparations in the "chien khu" intensified. Japanese technicians and specialists offered their services to the Viet Minh as technical consultants and as instructors. In this group of fanatically anti white Japanese officers who offered their services to the Viet Minh government after the capitulation in Tokyo, was, for example, Lieutenant Colonel Mukaiyama, from the General Staff of the Imperial Japanese 38th Army.""Another angle on the subject is in a relatively new book by Professor [Jacques] Valette: La Guerre d'Indochine, 1945-1954. He reviewed the role of the Japanese: "Japanese deserters put themselves at the service of the Viet Minh, many of them coming from the Kempetai. The French services tended to over estimate their numbers: `army of 10,000 Japanese' near Hue, '7,000 Japanese' between Nam Dinh and Quinhon, in Tonkin, `7,000 above all in the provinces of Backan, Vietri and Lang Son'. In the spring of 1946, the French services revised their estimate: 2,000 Japanese were serving in armed Viet Minh groups. As for the Chinese, they were indifferent to the problem; their Japanese prisoners were hired and given civilian clothing because of their technical capabilities."Needless to say, Backan, usually spelled Bac Kan or Bac Can, Vietri and Lang Son were Viet Minh controlled areas at the time. It was the first Viet Minh "liberated" zone.The footnote for this text reads: "Note about the situation in the Hue region. Non dated and not signed - established for the services of the DGER in 1946. Private archives."What this means is that the note is now in the possession of Professor Valette. As of 1994, he was a Professor at the University of Poitiers in France and the President of the Indochinese War Commission at the Institute of Contemporary Conflicts. He is also the author of a book on Japanese French relations in Vietnam between 1940 and 1945.DGER is the acronym for one of the World War II era military intelligence services, Direction des Etudes et de la Recherche, which was later combined into the SDECE. Some explanation about it is on the web page. Most of their old Indochina related documents are available to the public at the main French Indochina archive in Aix-en-Provence in southern France. This archive, long used by many students, now has a web page.Which Japanese military officers helped Ho Chi Minh? (historystackexchange.com)Sources:Goscha, Christopher E. "Belated Asian Allies: The Technical and Military Contributions of Japanese Deserters,(1945-50)." A Companion to the Vietnam War (2002): 37-64.Goscha, Christopher E. "Building force: Asian origins of twentieth-century military science in Vietnam (1905–54)." Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 34.03 (2003): 535-560.Spector, Ronald. In the ruins of empire: The Japanese surrender and the battle for postwar Asia. Random House LLC, 2008.Kamo, Tokuji. Kwangai Rikugun Shikan Gakkō: Betonamu No Senshi O Hagukumi Tomoni Tatakatta Kunenkan. Tōkyō: Akatsukiinshokan, 2008.Ikawa, Azuhisa "ベトナム独立戦争参加日本人の事跡に基づく日越のあり方に関する研究", 東京財団研究報告 (2005)