V Zone Building Design Construction Certificate: Fill & Download for Free

The proper name is an elevation certificate. It is a FEMA form that is used to determine flood insurance rates through the National Flood Insurance Company. It is also used in part to determine compliance with flood zone construction requirements. The elevation certificate can be found at National Flood Insurance Program Elevation Certificate and Instructions. In most cases, you need a licensed surveyor or engineer to fill it out.The form has seven parts.Part A is where information about the property is filled out, including its owner, location, type of building (elevated with flood vents, basement, slab on grade, etc), square footage of the building and information about flood vents if they are part of the building foundation.Part B has information about the flood map, the base flood elevation (Elevation of a flood that has a one percent annual probability of occurring, sometimes called the 100-year flood elevation), and whether the structure is located in a coastal protected area.Part C has all of the key elevations where a survey is required. This includes the elevation of the lowest floor, including any basement, the next higher floor, the bottom of the lowest supporting structural member in coastal V zones, the floor elevation of any attached garage, the lowest elevation of any building machinery such as a furnace or water heater, the highest and lowest ground elevation touching the house, and the lowest elevation of the ground touching any attached deck or stairs.Part D is for the professional seal and certification by the engineer, surveyor or architect filling out the form, including an area for comments. Note that I recommend that a surveyor be used and that you ask the surveyor if they’ve filled out elevation certificates before.Part E is for cases in which there is no flood elevation on the map. In that case the home owner may fill it out them self since it simply requires measurements above or below ground.Part F if for the property owner or their representative to fill out if Part E is used.Part G is an optional section should the local municipality fill out the certificate or use it for local permitting purposes.An elevation certificate is required for homes to be properly rated. The higher your bottom floor, the cheaper will be your flood insurance premium. The lowest floor is not necessarily the bottom floor, though if there is a below grade basement, then the basement floor is the bottom floor. If the house is raised on a crawlspace or full story foundation with flood vents that meet FEMA standards, then the bottom floor is the living floor above that crawlspace or vented full story.If your house was built before the first flood map for your municipality was published, usually about 1980 but the date varies, then you can get flood insurance without an elevation certificate. That will be a pre-FIRM rate. FIRM stands for Flood Insurance Rate Map, which is what FEMA calls its flood maps. Flood insurance rates for those older buildings constructed before there were floodplain design standards are subsidized, but are moving towards a full risk rate. Eventually you will need an elevation certificate to get an accurate rate as the pre-FIRM rates go up.

You may mean an elevation certificate. An elevation certificate it a FEMA form in which a surveyor fills out information about the flood elevation from the FEMA Flood Insurance Rate Map, and also adds information about the type of construction, the existence, number, and dimensions of any flood vents, and various surveyed elevations, including the lowest floor (including basement), the next highest floor, the highest and lowest ground elevations adjacent to the structure, the elevation of an attached garage floor (if there is an attached garage), and the elevation of the lowest supporting horizontal beam supporting a building if it is a coastal area subject to wave velocities (V zone). A properly filled out elevation certificate is often required by the local municipality to determine if the building meets flood design standards, and is used by the National Flood Insurance Program to determine flood insurance premiums.A separate form is a floodproofing certificate. Floodplain design standards allow a non-residential building to be floodproofed as an alternative to elevating the building. If the owner chooses that option, a floodproofing certificate is required for flood insurance purposes, and often for local compliance purposes, to document that the building meets all design and operation standards to be completely floodproofed, including non-permeable to flood waters and resistant to the pressures of floodwaters. Those pressures include hydrostatic forces, which is the pressure of standing water against a structure; hydrodynamic forces, which is the force presented by moving water; and buoyancy, which is the force of water pushing up on a watertight structure. Think of a boat floating on a body of water. The boat is relative water-tight. It sinks into the water based on the weight of the boat and its cargo but the air in the boat, as well as the buoyancy of wood if that is a primary material, keeps the boat on the surface. Similarly, a water-tight building will float if it is insufficiently anchored and if the water is deep enough.

The Indian Navy has been battle-tested once before, in 1971. When comparing with the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) it is important to look not just at the number of capital ships and submarines but also at the rotary and fixed wing platforms, sensors, missile systems (air defence, cruise, anti ship & ballistic), satellites, fleet support vessels, bases and collaboration with foreign navies. The Chinese leadership since the turn of this century has been focusing on making the PLA, traditionally a land warfare oriented and ground forces dominated organization to one capable of undertaking operations across all domains i.e., developing multi-spectrum capability and becoming an expeditionary force. From being a more than 2 million strong force at the beginning of the century the People's Liberation Army Ground Force in 2020 has around 9,75,000 personnel with emphasis on transforming into a force capable of joint operations with other branches of the PLA and fighting and winning a swift war under informatized/intelligentized conditions. The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) on the other hand has not seen any cuts in it share of the budget or personnel. On the contrary it is gradually becoming the principal element of the People's Republic of China's (PRC) military power.The primary area of operations of the IN is the Indian Ocean Region i.e., the region from the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Aden in the west to the Strait of Malacca in the East while the east coast of Africa too falls within the Indian maritime area of interest. A secondary maritime area of deployment is the South China Sea and the Western Pacific in conjunction with other regional powers like Vietnam, Indonesia, South Korea and Japan and Australia. India and Vietnam signed an agreement in 2010 which gave Indian Navy ships access to based in Vietnam and an arrangement for logistics support. Indian has access to Vietnam's strategic Nha Trang naval base. In 2018 India and Singapore signed a naval logistics support agreement and the former also gained access to the Changi naval base near the Strait of Malacca. India is also co-developing the Sabang Port in Aceh Province of Indonesia as part of the strategic partnership between the two countries. Other than these partnerships India has also signed reciprocal logistics support agreement with the United States and France granting it access to the French base in Djibouti, where the PLAN also operates a base since 2017. The Indian Navy reportedly also has a radar and surveillance station in Madagascar and is also developing the Agalega island of Mauritius and Assumption island of Seychelles to serve as outposts in the IOR, although the Seychelles project seems to have run into some trouble owing to the island nation's legislature not ratifying it.The primary concern for the Indian naval establishment is the unprecedented pace of Chinese naval build up, it's gradual but still ongoing transition into a Blue water Navy and it's forays into the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and the frequency and quantum of deployment has only increased in recent times. The PLAN first started deploying into the IOR around 2008 with conduct of anti-piracy operations being the stated objective. Since then however the PLAN has also deployed submarines into the region. The 2014 docking of a Chinese submarine at the Colombo Port generated great consternation in New Delhi. The presence of PLAN Type 093 Shang class nuclear attack submarine (SSN) in the IOR in 2013 is believed to have dawned on the national security establishment the vulnerability of the slower Arihant class SSBN to such boats. This led to the kickstarting in 2015 of the Indian Navy SSN programme to build six nuclear attack submarine, something that had been put in the backburner almost a decade ago owing to the paucity of funds and focus on the construction of the nuclear ballistic missile submarines as part of the nuclear triad assured second capability. It is pertinent to keep in mind that original Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) project envisioned the indigenous construction of nuclear attack submarines. However post the 1998 Pokhran-II nuclear tests and India's adoption of no first use nuclear doctrine the emphasis was shifted to SSBN, but based on the same design. This approach is not dissimilar to what the Chinese did with their first Type 092 SSBN that entered service in the late 1980s. It's design was based on the Type 091 Han class SSN that entered service in 1974–75 becoming Asia's first indigeneously built nuclear boats (not counting the Soviet Union since it's primary orientation was towards Europe). The Type 092 Xia class served as a testbed and technology demonstrator for future SSBN development and the next batch of SSBN belonging to the Type 094 Jin class entered service only in the first decade of the 21st century, completing the PRC's nuclear triad. US sources estimate that right Jin class boats would be in service by 2020. The PLAN reportedly also has six to nine Shang class boats in service along with atleast three older Han class. In the pipeline are plans to construct five newer Type 095 Sui class nuclear attack boats and the Type 096 nuclear ballistic missile boats.Successive Chinese boats have displayed improved acoustic signature, reduction in noise level and propulsion. All these point towards China having achieved 'continous deterrence at sea' in this decade itself. Continuous deterrence at sea concept differs from single submarine deterrence patrol in that the former requires multiple submarines and at no time is any leg of the triad not functional. Of course whether the PLAN has achieved effective sea based nuclear deterrence against the United States is not yet confirmed. The JL-2 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) is said to have a maximum range of 7000 km and upwards. Whether the Type 094 is stelathy enough to evade the sensors and anti-submarine warfare capabilities of the US Navy and go beyond Chinese littoral waters to a location that would bring US population and industrial centers in it's missile range is not yet clear. Maybe that's the reason they are working on the newer Type 096 SSBN. However from their littoral waters the PLAN can strike targets anywhere in the Indian landmass. The PLAN attack submarines of Type 093G class (three are being upgraded) are said to be able to launch YJ-18 and CJ-10 anti-ship and land attack cruise missile from their VLS. On the higher side the number of such cruise missiles onboard a single boat can reach twelve. The CJ-10 reportedly had a range of 1500 (US estimate) to 2000 (Chinese sources) km and can carry a nuclear warhead. The PLAN nuclear submarine programme at this moment is well ahead of it's Indian counterpart. India's first SSBN INS Arihant was commissioned in 2016 and conducted it's first deterrence patrol in late 2018. The second boat INS Arighat is to be commissioned in 2020–21 while the larger S4 and S4* are under construction, with the hulls having been already supplied by L&T. The later two boats would be able to carry eight 3500 km range K4 SLBM or twenty four 750 km range K15 SLBM. As of now the Arihant is only equipped with the K15. The K4 was tested successfully in January 2020 and is now ready for serial production. The follow-on class of the Arihant boats, now simply known as the S5 class will be larger and carry 12–16 long range SLBM, the 5000 km range K5 or the 8000 km range K6 with Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) capability. The S5 class, three of which are to be built is still in the drawing board and won't ‘probably’ be inducted even in the next decade. The existence of the SSN programme was publicly acknowledged by the Navy Chief only in 2017. Another area of concern for India is the transfer of submarine launched nuclear capable cruise missile capability by China to Pakistan. The Chinese are constructing eight AIP-equipped Type 041 Yuan class diesel electric submarines for the Pakistani Navy with four boats to be delivered by 2023 while four are to be constructed in that country via Transfer of Technology (ToT) and delivered by 2028. The PN is working on a submarine launched variant of the 450 km range Babur-III cruise missile with a nuclear warhead thus a sea-based deterrence leg at a lower cost. Chinese assistance to this project cannot be ruled out as it is line with the Chinese strategy of helping Pakistan maintain some semblance of parity and military power balance with India in order to keep the later embroiled in a South Asian rivalry so that it won't emerge as a strategic rival and combative power to China. Whether the strategy has yielded the desired result is another issue but the Chinese are likely to continue with this proxy encirclement and engagement game. Another example of this strategy is the Chinese assistance to the Paksiatni 'Ababeel' MIRV project (not yet operational) apparantly as a counter to India's Agni-V and Agni-VI nuclear capable ballistic missile which can strike large population centres in mainland China.The PLAN conventional attack submarine arm too is not only quantitatively but also qualitatively superior to the Indian submarine arm. It has over 20 Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) capable Type 041 Yuan class boats, 13 Type 039 Song class boats, 12 Russian origin Kilo class (Type 877EKM) boats and around 13 Type 035 Ming class boats in service. The Ming class boats were based on the design of the Soviet Romeo class boats which which were licensed built in China as Type 033 class with reduced noise levels and indigeneous sonars. Around 80 such Type 033 boats were built by the Chinese starting 1963 and many were exported. The most recent export of Ming class submarines was to Bangladesh which acquired two of them and Thailand too has placed orders for three boats. In comparison to sound 55 operational Chinese subs presently India has eight Kilo class submarines, four HDW 209 class submarines and two Scorpene class submarines. Four Scorpene submarines are in the pipeline and all six are set to be in service by 2023–24. Project P75I to build six AIP and Brahmos launch capable boats has remained confined to the files for more than twelve years now. The Request For Proposal (RFP) is yet to be issued. So there's little chance of them getting inducted even in the next decade and we don't know what effect the COVID 19 pandemic will have on our defence procurement. Recently there has been an offer made by Rosoboronexport of Russia to sell three old Kilo class hulls to India as a part of a 1.8 billion USD deal to upgrade three in service Kilos. The mothballed hulls, 30 years old will have to refurbished and fitted with the necessary equipment before being delivered to the Navy. As of now two Kilo class boats, one each at a Russian shipyard and Hindustan Shipyard Limited (HSL) have undergone a second Mid Life Certification and Upgrade (MLCU) while a third is in Russia undergoing a similar procedure. One boat after MLCU has been given to the Myanmar Navy. Two other boats are to be upgraded at an Indian shipyard, probably one of L&T's or Naval Dockyard Mumbai with Russian technical assistance. Two older HDW 209 boats too are to be upgraded in India with technical assistance from Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems (TKMS). So more than 50 years after acquiring it's first submarine and despite carrying out maintenance, repair and overhaul work in the boats with Russian assistance since the 1970s India's naval establishment and domestic shipyards are still dependent on their foreign partners for carry out upgrade certification work, leading to frequent cost and time overruns in such projects. India has also operated nuclear attack submarine on lease from Russia. First from 1987–1991 and the present Akula class SSN INS Chakra since 2012.The Chinese submarine arm although much larger than it's Indian counterpart does not actually project a complete picture of the net assessment of the two forces. China views the United States as it's principal rival and with it's stated objective of being able to win wars globally by 2050 it is imperative for then that the US be toppled as the most powerful country on earth. As of now China is struggling to completely impose it's will even in it's neighbourhood and it's military is still technologically distinctly inferior to that of the United States'. So it is highly unlikely that the entire force of the PLAN could in any circumstance brought to bear upon the Indian forces. Presently as per the Indian Navy at any time there is only a single PLAN submarine in the Indian Ocean. The total quantum of deployment in the region remains between 8 and 10 assets. That even with such a miniscule force they are able to occupy the most prominent position in the strategic calculus of the Indian establishment and the nation at large is testament to the overbearing influence of the Chinese on the psyche of the nation's around them and it's ever increasing hard power. There have been reports of Chinese ships entering India's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as confirmed by the Navy Chief in the 2020 Raisina Dialogue and the recent reports of Chinese submarines deploying hydrographic survey vessels to map the Indian Ocean seabed even in India's littoral waters is a grave concern and an indicator of future Chinese designs.Deploying ships in the high seas also require the ability of the Navy to sustain and replenish them. The question is, can the PLAN at this point in time sustain large scale deployments to the IOR. It has a base in Djibouti and it can resupply it's ships at the Paksiatni naval base of Karachi and ‘maybe’ in Gwadar in the future, but in the case of a naval conflict the later is too close to India and moreover despite all the rhetoric it is in no way certain that in the event of a India-China conflict Pakistan would automatically join the war on the Chinese side, because that would leave it vulnerable to Indian aggression. India's Andaman & Nicobar islands, it's so called 'iron-chain' counter to the Chinese 'String of Pearls' strategy, would facilitate easy monitoring and interdiction of Chinese vessels coming through the Malacca Straits. The PLAN can divert it's assets through the Lombock and Sunda Straits turning this into a naval tracking and hunting game. Of course such a scenario assumes everything else to be static but that won't happen in reality. A naval conflict lies further up the escalation ladder and it means a land war across the Himalayas and air war over it has already begun. This could throw the entire post WWII international order into chaos and there is a distinct possibility that such conflict, if it is a prolonged one, is not going to remain solely a India-China conflict. However if the air-land war remains at a level somewhat lower than a full scale naval battle in the IOR and South China Sea in the escalation ladder the navies would still be in stand-off but not at war. A high intensity naval conflict would however also leave Chinese merchant vessels and oil supplies vulnerable to attack by the Indian Navy and vice versa to some extent. Of course if Pakistan decides to join the war on the Chinese side than the position of the Sino-Pak alliance at sea shall be marginally better off but the balance would still be in favour of India unless of course China can somehow deploy the bulk of it's forces to the IOR. In a conflict with a Sino-Pak alliance the service worse off won't be the Navy but the Air Force owing to the interoperability of it's adversaries, China's investment in long range radar and electronic warfare (areas in which it also assists Pakistan), it's own squadron strength and the wartime maintenance and serviceability of it's diverse inventory. An example of interoperability between these two forces is the same 450–500 km detection range L-band radars stationed in Mianwali air base and Kargilik in Sinkiang providing complementary radar coverage of North-West India. It's not a panacea for the tactical superiority IAF but such interoperability is a force multiplier. The regular Shaheen exercises have also helped the PAF gain valuable first hand info on the performance of the Flankers (Su 27, Su 30MKK, Su 30MK2, J11 and J16) which form the bulk of the PLAAF fleet.The Indian Navy fares slightly better in the surface domain as compared to the sub-surface domain. The PLAN maintains a large numerical superiority but the technology gap is not as stark as in the case of submarines. India was the first country in Asia to own and operate aircraft carriers. Presently it has one refurbished Kiev class aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya and one another carrier, first to be built indigeneously, INS Vikrant at Cochin Shipyard Limited (CSL) to be inducted by 2021. The plans for a follow on larger carrier INS Vishal are still in the design phase with a recent statement by the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) which said that the carrier is not a procurement priority as of now and the focus should instead be on submarines has put a question mark over the future viability of the project. Prioritisation of defence spending by the forces is a part of the CDS' charter of responsibilities and it quite likely that his view shall prevail. That would signal a shift in the traditional Indian Naval doctrine from sea control to sed denial. Prior to the advent of the carrier groups sea control was exercised by large capital ships such as battle cruisers and destroyers but with advancements in naval aviation technology Battle Group centered on an aircraft carrier became the primary sea control tool. A CBG consists of destroyers, guided missile frigates and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) corvettes. Probably the CDS views that in light of the rapidly expanding PLAN fleet it would be more prudent to invest the Navy's limited budget in sea denial capabilities instead of expensive projects like aircraft carrier construction and it's associated assets. However all the submarine projects in progress or under consideration were planned prior to the appointment of the CDS. So either the projects were planned without taking into consideration the budgetary restrictions of the Navy or the CDS wants to prioritise naval spending in a manner that is not acceptable to the service itself and it's doctrine. The Navy however is unrelenting in it's push for a third carrier. Even after the CDS' statement the Chief of Naval Staff (CNS) came out in public stating that a third carrier is an absolute necessity for the Navy and there can be no compromise on that regard. After the service was forced to revise the number of assets as laid down by the Maritime Capability Perspective Plan 2012–2027 the Navy categorically stated that there can be no compromise on the acquisition of the INS Vishal. The Navy plans to deploy one carrier each under the western and eastern naval command with one undergoing repair and refit and ready for rotation. The MCPP revision necessitated by the decrease in the service's share of the national defence budget from 18% in 2012 to 13% in 2019 reduced the number of ships from 198 to 175 along with reduction in helicopter and other assets such as the Poseidon P-8I maritime surveillance aircraft and all this at a time when the PLAN on the basis of the number of vessels (not tonnage) has overtaken the USN as the largest maritime force in the world. The former has more than 300 vessels compared to around 290 of the USN. The Chinese shipbuilding industry which is already the largest in the world has allowed the PLAN to leverage the infrastructure, skill and technology in commercial shipbuilding to massively expand it's fleet and also modernize it. A RAND study suggests that in 1996 the PLAN only had 56 ships and only a few of them possessed air defence missiles. This would mean a naval expansion by more than five times in less than 25 years. The PLAN always had a large submarine fleet but the current fleet is much more technologically advanced. The Indian Navy currently has between 130 and 140 ships and the Naval chief stated that 50 ships & submarines and 36 aircraft are on order, and Acceptance of Necessity (AON) has been obtained to initiate procurement of 41 more ships, 6 (down from 10) P8I Long Range Maritime Reconnaissance aircraft (in addition to eight in service and four on order) and 34 helicopters (probably 24 Sikorsky MH 60R mulirole helicopters and 10 Kamov Ka-31 AEW). The ships under construction include the seven P17A Shivalik class frigates, four P15B Visakhapatnam class destroyers etc. Deal for four Russian Grigorovich class frigates (2+2) has also been signed. Some of the new inductions would only come in as replacement of decommissioned older vessels. A hydrographic survey ship is under construction at Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers shipyard in Kolkata and three more are planned. The Navy operates one US amphibious transport dock, renamed INS Jalshawa. However plans for the construction of four Landing Helicopter Docks, a must for expeditionary capability have been pending since 2006. The Navy however does have a few older Landing Ship Tank (LST) and the latest Mk IV Landing Utility Craft. Recently a contract for five fleet support vessel construction was given to a consortium of HSL and strangely enough, Turkish shipyard, TAIS. In a similar time frame the PLAN is slated to have around 430 ships and 100 submarines.The induction of capital ships like destroyers and frigates also require necessitate the acquisition of helicopters which serve as their long range reconnaissance and surveillance platforms.The utility helicopter fleet of the Navy is made up of the vintage Cheetah LUH and the Sea King. The Navy has 14 operational Kamov Ka 31 AEW helicopters and maybe about four operational Sea King helicopters. The number of helicopters on paper might be larger but the unavailability of spares has led to cannibalization of some units. For e.g., of the ten Ka 28 helicopters, only four were operational while the others were cannibalized for spares. In 2016 a ₹ 2000 core contract was signed with Russia for the upgrade all ten helicopters. The Navy also has some (eight with sixteen on order) HAL Dhruv utility helicopters on order. Long term requirements for the force can be gauged from the tender for 111 Naval Light Utility Helicopters and 123 Naval Multi Role Helicopters. There are however six squadrons of Dornier Do-228 maritime surveillance aircraft in service. The Navy's sole operational aircraft carrier can carry upto 30 MiG 29K fighter and the force currently has 44 MiGs. Once the Vikrant is in service these assets would have to be shared among the two carriers and this would require a very high serviceability rate which has never been a area of strength for the fighters. The acquisition of 57 Twin Engine Deck Based Fighter Aircraft (TEDBF) is in it's earliest stage. The PLAN in comparison has hundreds of older Harbin Z8 (license built version of French Aerospatiale AS321 Super Felon) medium lift and Z9 (Eurocopter AS365 Daphne) utility helicopters. The Z8 copters shall be gradually replaced by the Changhe Z18. The PLAN has forayed into the field of naval aviation only in this decade. Their first aircraft carrier was a refurbished Kuznetsov class from Ukraine and a second domestically built carrier, the Shangdong too is in service. A third CATOBAR capable carrier is under construction at Shanghai while there are plans for a fourth. In the long run they might acquire as many as 10 carriers, although Chinese sources only talk about six by 2035 with four nuclear powered ones. The primary deck based aviation aircraft for the PLAN is the J15 which is a reverse engineered variant of the Su 33. The Chinese had acquired a prototype from Ukraine in 2001. The Russians rightly fearing Chinese intentions of reverse engineering their design refused to sell it to them. As of now the weight of the J15 and the STOBAR carriers in service limit the PLAN's carrier based aviation capability. Future Chinese carriers would field the Chengdu J20 carrier-based variant.The most prominent PLAN capital ship in the forseeable future is the Type 055 Renhai class battle cruiser/heavy destroyer. Eight such ships currently under construction. There are around 11 Type 052D Luyang-III class destroyer in device and another 9 under construction. In the frigate department the PLAN has 28 Type 054A Jinkai-II class ships in service while since 2013 it has inducted 41 Type 056 corvettes in service along with Type 056A ASW corvettes with active towed sonar array. The primary supply and replenishment ships of the Navy seems to be the Type 903/903A vessels. Around 10 of them are in service and more are being built. Apart from these the PLAN also has many older variant of destroyers and frigates in service. Since it started it's naval build up in the the 1990s it has launched many different class of destroyers and frigates. This approach seems similar to the Russian approach of induction a platform and then subsequently upgrading it better sensors, weapons systems and propulsion. Any deficiencies in the previous design borne out by active service can be rectified in subsequent upgrades and redesigns and the lessons learnt can also be utilized in the design of modern systems. So none of the assets fielded by PLAN as of now incorporate any quantum leap in technology or any hitherto unknown technology but are large and more numerous than their western counterparts. This is not to say that the PLAN is not a world class navy, it is, but compared to smaller navies like the Royal Navy or the French Navy it's power projection capabilities are quite limited and it also does not possess demonstrated capability in the field of cruise missiles, stealth frigate design etc. Chinese developed radars and engines are have high maintenance requirements and sometimes might not meet their advertised performance parameters. China however is investing heavily in the field of Laser and High Powered Microwave weapons, hypersonic missiles (DF-17) electronic warfare, anti-satellite capability (both Kinetic & Directed Energy), artificial intelligence, unmanned combat drones and underwater unmanned vehicle. China is already a world leader in commercial drones and is also making strides in military drone technology, both reconnaissance and combat. The PLAN has also been investing heavily in the construction of Amphibious Transport Docks and Landing Helicopter Dock. The most prominent them being the Type 075 Landing Helicopter Dock, two of which are under construction. It can reportedly carry around 30 helicopters. There are also five latest Type 071 Yuzhao class ATDs in service which can accommodate over five hundred troops. There are also plans to raise a 100,000 marine force. All these point towards the acquiring of expeditionary capabilities, not just for an operation across the Taiwan Strait but also in line with becoming a global military power by 2050.The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) in 2013 launched the nation's first dedicated military communication satellite GSAT-7 for the Navy. The satellite provides coverage over a wide area in the Indian Ocean Region. Another satellite GSAT-7A was launched as a dedicated asset for the Air Force and the Army. The 2019 Shakti ASAT weapon test might have been a milestone as far as Indian military capability is concerned but the Chinese are well ahead in this field too. Their ASAT capabilities are multi-dimensional ranging from land based kinetic ASAT to airborne and seaborne kinetic ASAT to stationing of killer satellites in orbit (for e.g., one with a robotic arm which can be used to knock another satellite of it's orbit), laser ASAT weapons, Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons or disruption of satellite communication (electronic warfare). India is aware of these PLA advancements and strategies and deterrence capabilities should be developed to counter them. The Chinese also have a much larger constellation of military communication, SIGNIT & geo-imaging satellites. It's Yaogan Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), Electro-Optical and ocean SIGNIT capable constellation consists of 40–50 such satellites which also provide military communication services. The Yaogan 30 constellation alone has 18 satellites on a single orbital plane thereby providing higher revisit rates for a target area. Then there are the Gaofeng earth-imaging satellites which are not dedicated military satellites but they can be used for ocean surveillance purposes. The Beidou constellation provides global coverage. Interestingly apart from the Chinese military the Pakistani Armed Forces are the only users granted access to the navigation system for military usage i.e., it can be used to guide Pakistani missiles, aircrafts, ships and precision guided long range munitions. A satellite launched for Pakistan by China in 2018 from the Taiyuan Launch Centre called the Pakistan Remote Sensing Satellite (PNSS) [along with another satellite known as the P-Technology Evaluation Satellite (TES)] is believed to be an X-band radar imaging satellite could be an Yaogan. The Indian Armed Forces and the civilian space department are yet to substantially leverage India's considerable expertise in remote sensing for military purpose. The establishment of a tri-service Defense Space Agency (DSA) under the Air Force seems to be a step in the right direction. Along with the DSA, a Defense Cyber Agency (DSA) headed by the Navy and an Armed Forces Special Operations Division (AFSOD) under the Army became operational on November, 2019. These steps are in accordance with the recommendations of the Naresh Chandra Committee report submitted to the Prime Minister in 2013. The report had actually suggested setting up dedicated commands. Hopefully the formation of these agencies is the first step towards that objective.Agencies take shape for special operations, space, cyber war.The 2019 People's Liberation Army (PLA) defence white paper calls for the force to protect not just the physical frontiers of China but also the interest frontiers which can be read as securing resources, protecting investments such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure and Chinese citizens working in the concerned countries, sea-lanes of communication, allies and even intervention. In any such expeditionary set up the Navy by default becomes the lynchpin and pivot. The 2015 military reforms of the PLA led to the creation of integrated theatre commands. The theatre commands however would function operationally only in the case of a land conflict along it's borders or a sea-air conflict in the Chinese littoral. In case the PLAN mangages to break free of it's strategic encirclement by the US and it's allies and become a global force it would have remain operationally independent of the theatre command structure. Military reforms have also been on the agenda of the government in India and the creation of the CDS is the most prominent step taken by the government till date. It is too early to comment on any would be reforms but one that concerns the Navy is establishment of a Peninsular. The structure and responsibility of the command is not known but any move to make the Navy doctrinally and capability-wise too defensive and the armed forces land-centric has to weighed in carefully for it’s own set of pros and cons. The CDS had suggested that the Peninsular Command (now renamed as Maritime Command) which should start functioning by 2021–22 will have the entire IOR as it's maritime area of responsibility.How is China modernizing its navy? | ChinaPower Project