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Short answer:Long answer:Stalin is a decidedly controversial character, and in the West he is decidedly hated.Because?Well because Stalin is the one who made the USSR a superpower capable of challenging the USA, the leading power of the capitalist world, and given that the USA, in addition to trying to destroy the USSR, and what better way is to make propaganda against the greats of communism.For example, have you ever heard about Operation Mockingbird?In this case I think it is enough to talk about Stalin, first I would like to talk about the economic results.AGRICULTURE:Co-operative farming and use of modern technology allowed the cultivation of previously unused land. Area under crops increased both compared to the last Czarist census of 1913 and the NEP figures. The bad weather of 1932-33 caused a temporary decrease:The trend of fast growth continued and intensified during the Second Five-Year Plan:Most of the land was cultivated by Collective Farmers while the remaining land was cultivated by private farmers and the State Sector:The Collective Farm Movement that had existed in Russia since at least 1905 gained new energy after the October Revolution and fastened it’s pace even more during the NEP. In 1928 it became an official government campaign and reached a tremendous speed. The rate of collectivization in 1930-32 was blindingly fast, even too fast. Stalin said the Collective Farm Activists were being “Dizzy With Success”. In 1933-38 the speed was reduced to a more manageable rate:The amount of food crops produced increased tremendously during both Five-Year Plans as did the production of industrial crops. Notice the fluctuation in the level of sugar-beet farming: The 1929 figure represents the aftermath of the devastating Civil War that destroyed the economy, production increased massively in 1930. In 1931-32 the sugar-beet sector was reorganized which also caused a temporary reduction. In 1933 production began to increase yet again:During the Second Five-Year Plan the growth continued at a more consistent rate. At first glance you might think the production of grain actually didn’t increase much however this is not true: the production of grain increased from 1929 and from 1933 figures which were lower then the 1913 pre-War numbers. Secondly although grain production was only 118,6% of the pre-War figures it was achieved with a vastly smaller proportional work force. During the 1930s the USSR had gone from an agrarian country to an industrial country. Millions of people had moved from the countryside to the cities and an increasing amount of farmland had been harnessed for farming industrial crops. Despite all of this food production was greater then ever before!“A peasant population rising from 120.7 to 132 million people between 1926 and 1940 was able to feed an urban population that increased from 26.3 to 61 million in the same period.” ~Ludo Martens (Another View of Stalin)The amount of livestock decreased during the First Five-Year Plan. The reasons were twofold:1) The sabotage by Kulaks and the Middle Peasants under Kulak influence. Almost all draft animals used to be owned by Kulaks. This allowed them to kill such a high number of them. (The idea that killing of animals was widespread among poor peasants is a myth, since the poor peasants typically owned no animals at all.) This caused serious economic damage to the USSR.2) The breeding of animals was done almost exclusively by the Kulaks. It took several years for the Kulak animal breeding to be replaced by Collective Farm animal breeding since during the First Five-Year Plan most Collectives focused on crop production:During the Second Five-Year Plan the number of livestock increased as animal breeding was taken over by Collective Farmers. The number of horses increased less then other animals because draft horses were being replaced by tractors more and more:The development of industry, construction of machine building plants greatly benefited agriculture. The number of tractors used by peasants went from basically nothing to tens and hundreds of thousands. The Soviet State setup Machine and Tractor Stations (MTS) which supplied the Collective Farmers with machinery:As new tractor plants were built the amount of tractors also increased in State Sector Farms:MTSs:Amount of tractors used doubled during the Second Five-Year Plan:During the Second Five-Year Plan the amount of combines grew by 600%. Amount of lorries by more then 700%, cars by 240% and other vehicles by around 150%:INDUSTRY:The 1930s Great Depression devastated the economies of the Capitalist countries but had little impact on the economically blockaded Socialist Soviet Union. On the contrary the USSR was developing at a staggering rate due to it’s policy of industrialization. Soviet GDP growth at the time was fastest in the world:The growth was biggest in the industrial sector. While the Capitalist economies stagnated and collapsed the USSR’s output more then tripled that of the Russian Empire, UK, USA, Germany and France:The USSR’s industrial output doubled between 1929-1933!During the First and Second Five-Year Plans (1928-1938) the industrial output of the USSR more then quadrupled! During this time Capitalist countries had only negligible growth:Industrial output by sectors. The bulk was State Industry but a substantial chunk belonged to worker Co-ops and a small amount to remaining private producers and foreign corporations with trade deals with the Soviet government:By the end of the First Five-Year Plan big industry had become 70% of the GDP. The USSR had become an industrial nation!Machine and Factory Building compared to Consumer Goods production at the end of the First Five-Year Plan. Construction of machines doubled while production of consumer goods increased by 60%:While in the Russian Empire most industry was involved in raw materials (mining and especially cotton) in the USSR Machine Building became the leading branch of industry:TRADE & FREIGHT:National trade. Steady increase in the sale of consumer goods, commercial products, trade among collectives, co-ops and State enterprises:Freight traffic increased together with increased trade and as a result of the building of new roads, railways and channels:EDUCATION & CULTURAL LEVEL:According to the last Czarist census of 1897 literate people made up 28,4% of the population while only 13% of women were literate. Among the rural population the number was only 19%. It is estimated that in 1917 around 30% of the population was literate but during the civil war the number decreased.In 1919 the Bolsheviks began the literacy campaign Likbez. In 1926 51% of the population were literate. By the end of the Second Five-Year Plan male literacy was 90.8% and female literacy 72.5%.Amount of elementary schools increased by four thousand between 1933-1939. Amount of secondary schools doubled. The number of public libraries, worker clubs and cinemas also increased. Before the industrialization & electrification campaign most people had never seen movies or had access to a library. In fact most people couldn’t even read.The number of schools quadrupled as 16,000 were built between 1933-38!The amount of people graduating from the new Soviet Higher Educational Institutions doubled between 1933-1938:HEALTHCARE & LIFE EXPECTANCYIn the 1937 Soviet Constitution healthcare was guaranteed as a human right.According to the 1913 Czarist census life expectancy among the population was 32.3 years. By 1958 the life expectancy had doubled to 68.6 years.After 1937 life expectancy increased rapidly:Its quite dramatic that the Russian life expectancy has not really increased after the dissolution of the USSR! In the mid-late 90s it actually decreased. In 2012 Russian life expectancy was 69 years:SOURCES:LiteracyRussian imperial census (Russian Empire Census - Wikipedia)Russia U.S.S.R.: A Complete Handbook New York: William Farquhar Payson. 1933. p. 665.Stalin’s peasants New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 225-6 & fn. 78 p. 363.GDPThe Russian Federation Before and After the Soviet Union, Alexey Shumkovhttp://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/The-Russian-Federation-Before-and-After-the-Soviet-Union-15077http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/Historical_Statistics/horizontal-file_02-2010.xlsOfficial data of soviet statistical bureau available hereReport to the Seventeenth Party Congress on the Work of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.)Soviet Russia: Anatomy of a Social HistoryReport on the Work of the Central Committee to the Eighteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.)Life expectancyОжидаемая продолжительность жизни при рожденииDemographics of RussiaDire Demographic Trends Cast A Shadow on Russia's FutureIn addition to this I add:This is about the whole USSR.And this’s about just Russia.Why was Soviet medical care among the best in the world?http://ciml.250x.com/archive/ussr/english/1951_social_insurance_in_the_ussr.pdf (http://ciml.250x.com/archive/ussr/english/1951_social_insurance_in_the_ussr.pdf)Health Care in the Soviet UnionThe Work of the Public Health Authorities in Soviet RussiaAMERICAN AND SOVIET CITIZENS EAT ABOUT THE SAME AMOUNT OF FOOD EACH DAY BUTThis is the GDP growth in Europe according to the economic historian Paul Bairoch: List of regions by past GDP (PPP) - WikipediaAs you can see in the period between 1925 and 1938, while the largest European countries grew by a maximum of a quarter, the USSR went from 32 billion to almost 76 billion, thus exceeding 200% growth.According to the IMF and CIA the Soviet Union grew faster than the USA.Economy of the Soviet Union - Wikipediahttps://mltheory.files.wordpress.com/2017/06/austin-murphy-the-triumph-of-evil.pdfFor the data of the IMF go at page 60 of the last document.So in a nutshell Stalin in 20 years transformed an agricultural country into a world superpower, with excellent services and quality of life not yet exceeded according to the Russian citizens themselves.75% of Russians Say Soviet Union Was Greatest Time in Country’s History – Poll - The Moscow TimesBut now we need to talk about the propaganda aimed at Stalin.According to many Stalin was a murderous tyrant who killed 20 million people, well it is false, simply false, even just looking at the population growth you can understand that it is nonsense, only with WW2 there was a demographic decline.Demographics of the Soviet Union - WikipediaThis myth was invented by the English "historian" Robert Conquest who was paid by the IRD to do anti-Communist propaganda, he himself was not a historian, and used far right sources in his books.“Sometimes, the “scholarship” had been more than simply careless. Recent investigations of British intelligence activities (following in the wake of U.S. post-Watergate revelations), suggest that Robert Conquest, author of the highly influential Great Terror, accepted payment from British intelligence agencies for consciously falsifying information about the Soviet Union. Consequently, the works of such an individual can hardly be considered valid scholarly works by his peers in the Western academic community.”- Arch Getty, “The Great Purges Reconsidered,” Ph.D. dissertation, Boston College, 1979, p. 48.“As a graduate student from 1965-69 I opposed the US war in Vietnam. At one point somebody told me that the Vietnamese communists could not be the “good guys”, because they were all “Stalinists”, and “Stalin had killed millions of innocent people.”I remembered this remark. It was probably the reason that in the early 1970s I read the first edition of Robert Conquest’s book The Great Terror when it was published. I was shaken by what I read!I should add that I could read the Russian language since I had already been studying Russian literature since High School. So, I studied Conquest’s book very carefully. Apparently, no one else had ever done this!I discovered Conquest was dishonest in his use of sources. His footnotes did not support his anti-Stalin conclusions! Basically, he used any source that was hostile to Stalin, regardless of whether it was reliable or not.”- Grover Furr: The Sixty-One Untruths of Nikita Khrushchev“Conquest’s The Great Terror has lots of footnotes, which are intended to fool the educated but naive reader. But those same footnotes made it possible for me to discover that Conquest used phony evidence and never proved any of his anticommunist, anti-Stalin claims.”-Grover Furr: Response to the Death of Robert ConquestRobert Conquest - WikipediaRobert Conquest dies – but his lies live on!So let’s debunk the myths around Stalin.HolodomorThe Holodomor was not caused by Stalin, that is a lie created by Joseph Goebbels, Third Reich propaganda minister.“It is a matter of some significance that Cardinal Innitzer’s allegations of famine-genocide were widely promoted throughout the 1930s, not only by Hitler’s chief propagandist Goebbels, but also by American Fascists as well.It will be recalled that Hearst kicked off his famine campaign with a radio broadcast based mainly on material from Cardinal Innitzer’s “aid committee.” In Organized Anti-Semitism in America, the 1941 book exposing Nazi groups and activities in the pre-war United States, Donald Strong notes that American fascist leader Father Coughlin used Nazi propaganda material extensively. This included Nazi charges of “atrocities by Jew Communists” and verbatim portions of a Goebbels speech referring to Innitzer’s “appeal of July 1934, that millions of people were dying of hunger throughout the Soviet Union.”-Tottle, Douglas -Fraud, Famine, and Fascism. Toronto: Progress Books,1987, p. 49-51Holodomor was caused by the Kulakis, the climate, the Golden Blockade (western economic block) and various diseases.“During the 1932 harvest season Soviet agriculture experienced a crisis. Natural disasters, especially plant diseases spread and intensified by wet weather in mid-1932, drastically reduced crop yields. OGPU reports, anecdotal as they are, indicate widespread peasant opposition to the kolkhoz system.These documents contain numerous reports of kolkhozniki, faced with starvation, mismanagement and abuse by kolkhoz officials and others, and desperate conditions: dying horses, idle tractors, infested crops, and incitement by itinerant people. Peasants’ responses varied: some applied to withdraw from their farms, some left for paid work outside, some worked sloppily, intentionally leaving grain on the fields while harvesting to glean later for themselves.”-Tauger, Mark. “Soviet Peasants and Collectivization, 1930-39: Resistance and Adaptation.” In Rural Adaptation in Russia by Stephen Wegren, Routledge, New York, NY, 2005, Chapter 3, p. 81.Holodomor Hoax: West's 'Golden Embargo' and Soviet Famine of 1932-33.In 1922, at the Genoa Conference[1] the new Gold Exchange Standard[2] was introduced. Since the end of 1922 the Soviet Union was issuing the golden chervonets – a new Soviet currency fully covered by the golden reserves and convertible to gold. In 1923 the Soviet chervonets was one of the most stable and secured currencies of the world. It represented a clear and present danger for emerging financial epicentre – the United States of America.In 1924 the Soviet chervonets was replaced by a softer rouble without golden equivalent. This diminshed the menace to the US dollar and British pound. In return Soviet Union was recognized by the UK, France, Norway, Austria, Greece, Sweden, Denmark, China, Japan, Mexico and other capitalist countries.In 1925 the Soviet leadership decided to accelerate industrialization of the country because, although they had surpassed Tsarist Russia in industrial output (superceding the production of 1913), they were nowhere near any of the previously mentioned countries in terms of developement.However this was not something the West liked and in 1925 a so-called "golden blockade" was imposed on the USSR: the Western powers refused to accept gold as payment for industrial equipment they delivered to Russia. They demanded that the Soviet government pay for the equipment in timber, oil and grain. These sanctions were not removed the following years.In 1929 the US bankers lack of regulation initiated the Great Depression, ushering in a period of international currency instability. In 1931 Germany and Austria failed to repay the foreign debt and stop exchanging marks into gold, thus abolishing Gold Exchange Standard. By the autumn 1931 the UK suspended the gold exchange as well. This seems unrelated until the further actions that followed are taken into account:With this economic crisis at hand it would be the logical and natural move to lift the golden blockade of Soviet Union at that time, thus allowing Soviet gold to relieve the suffocating Western economies. But the decision taken was the absolute reverse, not only did they leave the gold blockade of the USSR in force, but also imposed a severe trade embargo on the majority of Soviet export. Such embargos were further introduced throughout the 30s such as in April 17, 1933, when the British government introduced embargo: Russian Goods (Import Prohibition) Act 1933 .[3]Stalin needed to industrialize the USSR as fast as possible to be ready for a potential war, but had to import the necessary materials from the west. (WWII) The west imposed a "golden blockade" on the USSR, whereby the Western powers refused to accept gold as payment for industrial equipment they delivered to Russia. They demanded that the Soviet government pay for the equipment in timber, oil and grain. These sanctions were not removed the following years, and was a major reason as to the extremity of the Famine. The leadership of the USSR was forced to play by the wests rules.In April 17, 1933, the British government declared an embargo on up to 80% of USSR’s exports.During this time, the Great Depression began. In the US ,in response to the overproduction of grain, in particular, the government destroyed grain in large quantities, and immediately took grain from the USSR in payment for its machines instead of gold, oil and other much more necessary raw materials. Roosevelt, continued the policy of destroying agricultural products and reducing crop areas in order to raise prices to lower the severity of the depression:“Probably most deaths in 1933 were due to epidemics of typhus, typhoid fever, and dysentery. Waterborne diseases were frequent in Makeyevka; I narrowly survived an attack of typhus fever. “- Blumenfeld, Hans. Life Begins at 65. Montreal, Canada: Harvest House, c1987, p. 153The kulak’s owned land and tools that they would rent out (at exorbitant prices) to peasants. Kulak’s were not peasants themselves. By being rich and land owning, they have very much moved outside of the peasant class.The Kulaks were a rural bourgeoisie. They were very much like mafia bosses in the rural regions.They collected large amounts of cattle and wheat from peasants. Metayage essentially. They gave loans to villagers and then took back them with huge interest. If a person couldn't pay the kulaks, they would beat them, destroy their house, rape their daughters, make them work for free. Kulaks usually had 'podkulachniki', mafia soldiers, who helped them suppress peasants.And that’s what they did:“Their (kulak) opposition took the initial form of slaughtering their cattle and horses in preference to having them collectivized. The result was a grievous blow to Soviet agriculture, for most of the cattle and horses were owned by the kulaks. Between 1928 and 1933 the number of horses in the USSR declined from almost 30,000,000 to less than 15,000,000; of horned cattle from 70,000,000 (including 31,000,0000 cows) to 38,000,000 (including 20,000,000 cows); of sheep and goats from 147,000,000 to 50,000,000; and of hogs from 20,000,000 to 12,000,000.Soviet rural economy had not recovered from this staggering loss by 1941. […] Some [kulaks] murdered officials, set the torch to the property of the collectives, and even burned their own crops and seed grain. More refused to sow or reap, perhaps on the assumption that the authorities would make concessions and would in any case feed them.”- Frederick L. Schuman: Russia Since 1917: Four Decades of Soviet Politics“This frenetic race towards collectivization was accompanied by a `dekulakization' movement: kulaks were expropriated, sometimes exiled. What was happening was a new step in the fierce battle between poor peasants and rich peasants. For centuries, the poor had been systematically beaten and crushed when, out of sheer desperation, they dared revolt and rebel. But this time, for the first time, the legal force of the State was on their side. A student working in a kolkhoz in 1930 told the U.S. citizen Hindus:`This was war, and is war. The koolak had to be got out of the way as completely as an enemy at the front. He is the enemy at the front. He is the enemy of the kolkhoz.' -Ibid. , p. 173.Preobrazhensky, who had upheld Trotsky to the hilt, now enthusiastically supported the battle for collectivization:`The working masses in the countryside have been exploited for centuries. Now, after a chain of bloody defeats beginning with the peasant uprisings of the Middle Ages, their powerful movement for the first time in human history has a chance of victory.' . -Ibid. , p. 274.It should be said that the radicalism in the countryside was also stimulated by the general mobilization and agitation in the country undergoing industrialization.”-Ludo Martens: Another view of StalinHere you can see Russian peasants who find wheat stolen from kulaki.For more information, I recommend reading the books of Mark B Tauger, a historian specializing in famine.https://newcoldwar.org/wp-conten...https://www.newcoldwar.org/wp-co...The Great Famine-Genocide in Soviet Ukraine (Holodomor)I would also recommend Dougles Tottle's book Fraud, Famine, and Fascism which also exposes the origins of the famine-genocide myth that is now propogated by many Nazis.Stalin, due to the Western economic blockade, had to remove Ukraine from large amounts to help the worst affected territories.Agricultural Adjustment Act - WikipediaHowever Stalin helped Ukraine.№ 144. Decree of Politburo of the CC VCP(b) [Central Committee of the All‐Russian Communist Party] concerning foodstuff aid to the Ukrainian S.S.R. of June 16, 1932:a) To release to the Ukraine 2,000 tons of oats for food needs from the unused seed reserves;b) to release to the Ukraine ∼3,600,000 ℔ of corn for food of that released for sowing for the Odessa oblast' but not used for that purpose;c) to release ∼2,520,000 ℔ of grain for collective farms in the sugar‐beet regions of the Ukrainian S.S.R. for food needs;d) to release ∼8,280,000 ℔ of grain for collective farms in the sugar‐beet regions of the Ukrainian S.S.R. for food needs;e) to require comrade Chubar' to personally verify the fulfilling of the released grain for the sugar‐beet Soviet and collective farms, that it be used strictly for this purpose;f) to release ∼900,000 ℔ of grain for the sugar‐beet Soviet farms of the Central Black Earth Region for food needs in connection with the gathering of the harvest, first requiring comrade Vareikis to personally verify that the grain released is used for the assigned purpose;g) by the present decision to consider the question of food aid to sugar‐beet producing Soviet and collective farms closed.-Голод в СССР: 1929-июль 1932The Political Bureau believes that shortage of seed grain in Ukraine is many times worse than what was described in comrade Kosior’s telegram; therefore, the Political Bureau recommends the Central Committee of the Communist party of Ukraine to take all measures within its reach to prevent the threat of failing to sow [field crops] in Ukraine.Signed: Secretary of the Central Committee – J. STALINFrom the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation. Fond 3, Record Series 40, File 80, Page 58.Excerpt from the protocol number of the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist party (Bolsheviks) “Regarding Measures to Prevent Failure to Sow in Ukraine, March 16th, 1932.”Excerpt from the protocol number of the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist party (Bolsheviks) “Regarding Measures to Prevent Failure to Sow in Ukraine, March 16th, 1932."The Political Bureau believes that shortage of seed grain in Ukraine is many times worse than what was described in comrade Kosior’s telegram; therefore, the Political Bureau recommends the Central Committee of the Communist party of Ukraine to take all measures within its reach to prevent the threat of failing to sow [field crops] in Ukraine."Signed: Secretary of the Central Committee – J. STALINLetter to Joseph Stalin from Stanislaw Kosior, 1st secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine regarding the course and the perspectives of the sowing campaign in Ukraine, April 26th, 1932."There are also isolated cases of starvation, and even whole villages [starving]; however, this is only the result of bungling on the local level, deviations [from the party line], especially in regard of kolkhozes. All rumours about “famine” in Ukraine must be unconditionally rejected. The crucial help that was provided for Ukraine will give us the opportunity to eradicate all such outbreaks [of starvation]."Letter from Joseph Stalin to Stanislaw Kosior, 1st secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, April 26th, 1932."Comrade Kosior!You must read attached summaries. Judging by this information, it looks like the Soviet authority has ceased to exist in some areas of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Can this be true? Is the situation invillages in Ukraine this bad? Where are the operatives of the OGPU [Joint Main Political Directorate], what are they doing?Could you verify this information and inform the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist party about taken measures."Sincerely, J. StalinWelcome“In view of the importance of grain stocks to understanding the famine, we have searched Russian archives for evidence of Soviet planned and actual grain stocks in the early 1930s. Our main sources were the Politburo protocols, including the (“special files,” the highest secrecy level), and the papers of the agricultural collections committee Komzag, of the committee on commodity funds, and of Sovnarkom. The Sovnarkom records include telegrams and correspondence of Kuibyshev, who was head of Gosplan, head of Komzag and the committee on reserves, and one of the deputy chairs of Komzag at that time.We have not obtained access to the Politburo working papers in the Presidential Archive, to the files of the committee on reserves or to the relevant files in military archives. But we have found enough information to be confident that this very a high figure for grain stocks is wrong and that Stalin did not have under his control huge amounts of grain, which could easily have been used to eliminate the famine.”-Grain Stocks and the Famine of 1932-1933 by R. W. Davies, M. B. Tauger, S.G. Wheatcroft.Slavic Review, Volume 54, Issue 3 (Autumn, 1995), pp. 642-657.Soviet archives also show that Holodomor was natural.“Recent evidence has indicated that part of the cause of the famine was an exceptionally low harvest in 1932, much lower than incorrect Soviet methods of calculation had suggested. The documents included here or published elsewhere do not yet support the claim that the famine was deliberately produced by confiscating the harvest, or that it was directed especially against the peasants of the Ukraine.-Koenker and Bachman, Eds. Revelations from the Russian Archives. Washington: Library of Congress, 1997, p. 401And yes, the secret Soviet archives are reliable, historians use the Nazi secret archives to study the Holocaust.Here is a quote from the preface of R. W. Davies and Stephen G. Wheatcroft's collaborative work The Years of Hunger Soviet Agriculture 1931-1933"In our own work we, like V. P. Kozlov, have found no evidence that the Soviet authorities undertook a programme of genocide against Ukraine.It is also certain that the statements by Ukrainian politicians and publicists about the deaths from famine in Ukraine aregreatly exaggerated. A prominent Ukrainian historian, Stanislas Kul’chitskii, estimated deaths from famine in Ukraine at 3–3.5 million and Ukrainian demographers estimate that excess deaths in Ukraine in the whole period 1926–39 (most of them during the famine) amounted to 3 1⁄2million."Thesis also confirmed by the journalist Anna Louise Strong, who worked in Russia and China.Q: “Is it true that during 1932-33 several million people were allowed to starve to death in the Ukraine and North Caucasus because they were politically hostile to the Soviets?”A: “Not true. I visited several places in those regions during that period. There was a serious grain shortage in the 1932 harvest due chiefly to inefficiencies of the organizational period of the new large-scale mechanized farming among peasants unaccustomed to machines. To this was added sabotage by dispossessed kulaks, the leaving of the farms by 11 million workers who went to new industries, the cumulative effect of the world crisis in depressing the value of Soviet farm exports, and a drought in five basic grain regions in 1931.The harvest of 1932 was better than that of 1931 but was not all gathered; on account of overoptimistic promises from rural districts, Moscow discovered the actual situation only in December when a considerable amount of grain was under snow.”-Anna Louise Strong - Searching Out the Soviets. New Republic: August 7, 1935, p. 356Anna about the harvest of 1933.“The conquest of bread was achieved that summer, a victory snatched from a great disaster. The 1933 harvest surpassed that of 1930, which till then had held the record. This time, the new record was made not by a burst of half-organized enthusiasm, but by growing efficiency and permanent organization … This nationwide cooperation beat the 1934 drought, securing a total crop for the USSR equal to the all-time high of 1933.”-Anna Louise Strong- The Stalin Era. New York: Mainstream, 1956, p. 44-45The Holodomor Hoax: Joseph Stalin’s Crime That Never Took PlaceThis newspaper was published by Hearst as part of his deal with Goebbels to promote the Nazis. Hearst was also a Nazi supporter. The photos were found to be from other famines, one of them 10 years earlier. The “reporting” was fabrication. Other reporters that actually looked into it report that while there was a famine it was not intentional.“The CIA believed that Ukrainian nationalism could be used as an efficient cold war weapon.While the Ukrainian nationalists provided Washington with valuable information about its Cold War rivals, the CIA in return was placing the nationalist veterans into positions of influence and authority, helping them to create semi-academic institutions or academic positions in existing universities.By using these formal and informal academic networks, the Ukrainian nationalists had been disseminating anti-Russian propaganda, creating myths and re-writing history at the same time whitewashing the wartime crimes of OUN-UPA.“In 1987 the film “Harvest of Despair” was made. It was the beginning of the ‘Holodomor’ movement. The film was entirely funded by Ukrainian nationalists, mainly in Canada. A Canadian scholar, Douglas Tottle, exposed the fact that the film took photographs from the 1921-22 ‘Volga famine’ and used them to illustrate the 1932-33 famine. Tottle later wrote a book, ‘Fraud, Famine, and Fascism: The Ukrainian Genocide Myth from Hitler to Harvard,‘ about the phony ‘Holodomor’ issue,”Professor Furr elaborated. “https://mltheory.files.wordpress.com/2017/06/khrushchev-lied.pdf“In the last 15 years or so an enormous amount of new material on Stalin … has become available from Russian archives. I should make clear that as a historian I have a strong orientation to telling the truth about the past, no matter how uncomfortable or unpalatable the conclusions may be. … I don’t think there is a dilemma: you just tell the truth as you see it.(“Stalin’s Wars”, FPM February 12, 2007. At http://hnn.us/roundup/entries/35... )GulagLet’s start by saying that Solzhenitsyn wasn’t reliable.He was a neo nazi who hated Jewish and called Hitler a saviour.He wasn’t an historian, he didn’t have a single source, the conditions the gulags were better than what Solzhenitsyn said (even if they still sucked) even the CIA says so.“In her 1974 memoir, Sanya: My Life with Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn”…, she wrote that she was ”perplexed” that the West had accepted ”The Gulag Archipelago” as ”the solemn, ultimate truth,” saying its significance had been ”overestimated and wrongly appraised.”Pointing out that the book’s subtitle is ”An Experiment in Literary Investigation,” she said that her husband did not regard the work as ”historical research, or scientific research.”She contended that it was, rather, a collection of ”camp folklore,” containing ”raw material” which her husband was planning to use in his future productions.”Source: Natalya Reshetovskaya, 84, Is Dead; Solzhenitsyn's Wife Questioned 'Gulag' (Natalya Reshetovskaya, 84, Is Dead; Solzhenitsyn's Wife Questioned 'Gulag')https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80T00246A032000400001-1.pdf (https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80T00246A032000400001-1.pdf)And no, the gulags weren’t death camps, they were prisons, the mortality rate was far lower than the one under the Russian Empire.>The penal system administered by the NKVD (Peoples' Commissariat of Internal Affairs) in the 1930s had several components: prisons, labor camps, and labor colonies, as well as "special settlements" and various types of non-custodial supervision. Generally speaking, the first stop for an arrested person was a prison, where an investigation and interrogation led to conviction or, more rarely, release. After sentencing, most victims were sent to: one of the labor camps or colonies to serve their terms. In December 1940, the jails of the USSR had a theoretical prescribed capacity of 234,000, although they then held twice that number. Considering this-and comparing the levels of prison populations given in the Appendixes for the 1930s and 1940s one can assume that the size of the prison system was probably not much different in the 1930s.>Second, we find a system of labor camps. These were the terrible “hard regime” camps populated by dangerous common criminals, those important politicals the regime consigned to severe punishment, and, as a rule, by other people sentenced to more than three years of detention. On March 1, 1940, at the end of the Great Purges, there were 53 corrective labor camps (ispravitel’no-trudovye lageri: ITL) of the GULAG system holding some 1.3 million inmates. Most of the data cited in this article bear on the GULAG camps, some of which had a multitude of subdivisions spreading over vast territories and holding large numbers of people. BAMLAG, the largest camp in the period under review, held more than 260,000 inmates at the beginning of 1939, and SEVVOSTLAG (the notorious Kolyma complex) some 138,000.>Third came a network of 425 “corrective labor colonies” of varying types. These colonies were meant to confine prisoners serving short sentences, but this rule varied with time. The majority of these colonies were organized to produce for the economy and housed some 315,000 persons in 1940. They were nevertheless under the control of the NKVD and were managed-like the rest of the colony network-by its regional administrations. Additionally, there were 90 children’s homes under the auspices of the NKVD.>Fourth, there was the network of “special resettlements.” In the 1930s, these areas were populated largely by peasant families deported from the central districts as “kulaks” (well-to-do peasants) during the forced collectivization of the early 1930s. Few victims of the Great Purges of 1936-1939 were so exiled or put under other forms of non-custodial supervision: in 1937-1938, only 2.1 percent of all those sentenced on charges investigated by the political police fell into this category. This is why we will not treat exile extensively below.>Finally, there was a system of non-custodial “corrective work” (ispravitel’no-trudovye raboty), which included various penalties and fines. These were quite common throughout the 1930s-they constituted 48 percent of all court sentences in 1935-and the numbers of such convictions grew under the several laws on labor discipline passed on the eve of the war. Typically, such offenders were condemned to up to one year at “corrective labor,” the penalty consisting of work at the usual place of one’s employment, with up to 25 percent reduction of wage and loss of credit for this work toward the length of service that gave the right to social benefits (specific allocations, vacation, pension). More than 1.7 million persons received such a sentence in the course of 1940 and almost all of them worked in their usual jobs without deprivation of freedom. As with resettlements, this correctional system largely falls outside the scope of the Great Terror.Taken from this article which everyone should read if they want to know more about the Soviet Penal system.In particular, the Soviet archives indicate that the number of people in Soviet prisons, gulags, and labor camps in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s averaged about 2 million, of whom 20-40% were released each year, (Getty, Rittersporn, and Zemskov, 1993).An analysis (http://sovietinfo.tripod.com/GTY-Penal_System.pdf) by J Arch Getty, Gabor T Rittersporn and Viktor N Zemskov shows a death toll of slightly over a third of that amount. In regards to NKVD executions, Getty estimates slightly under 800,000 executions, however, this number is still heavily inflated and fails to account for commuted sentences and other factors, and according to Austin Murphy, this number can be reduced even further to just above 160,000.“Like the myths of millions of executions, the fairy tales that Stalin had tens of millions of people arrested and permanently thrown into prison or labor camps to die in the 1930-1953 interval (Conquest, 1990) appear to be untrue.In particular, the Soviet archives indicate that the number of people in Soviet prisons, gulags, and labor camps in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s averaged about 2 million, of whom 20-40% were released each year, (Getty, Rittersporn, and Zemskov, 1993). This average, which includes desperate World War II years, is similar to the number imprisoned in the USA in the 1990s (Catalinotto, 1998a) and is only slightly higher as a percentage of the population.It should also be noted that the annual death rate for the Soviet interned population was about 4%, which incorporates the effect of prisoner executions. Excluding the desperate World War II years, the death rate in the Soviet prisons, gulags, and labor camps was only 2.5%, which is even below that of the average "free" citizen in capitalist Russia under the czar in peacetime in 1913 (Wheatcroft, 1993).This finding is not very surprising, given that about 1/3 of the confined people were not even required to work (Bacon, 1994), and given that the maximum work week was 84 hours in even the harshest Soviet labor camps during the most desperate wartime years (Rummel, 1990). The latter maximum (and unusual) work week actually compares favorably to the 100-hour work weeks that existed even for "free" 6-year old children during peacetime in the capitalist industrial revolution (Marx and Engels, 1988b), although it may seem high compared to the 7-hour day worked by the typical Soviet citizen under Stalin (Davies, 1997).In addition, it should also be mentioned that most of the arrests under Stalin were motivated by an attempt to stamp out civil crimes such as banditry, theft, misuse of public office for personal gain, smuggling, and swindles, with less than 10% of the arrests during Stalin's rule being for political reasons or secret police matters (Getty, Ritterspom, and Zemskov, 1993). The Soviet archives reveal a great deal more political dissent permitted in Stalin's Soviet Union (including a widespread amount of criticism of individual government policies and local leaders) than is normally perceived in the West (Davies, 1997). Given that the regular police, the political or secret police, prison guards, some national guard troops, and firefighters (who were in the same ministry as the police) comprised scarcely 0.2% of the Soviet population under Stalin (Thurston, 1996), severe repression would have been impossible even if the Soviet Union had wanted to exercise it. In comparison, the USA today has many times more police as a percentage of the population (about 1%, not to mention prison guards, national guard troops, and firefighters included in the numbers used to compute the far smaller 0.2% ratio for the Soviet Union)."Source: https://mltheory.files.wordpress.com/2017/06/austin-murphy-the-triumph-of-evil.pdfAlso like 30% of the prisoners were relased each years.In particular, the Soviet archives indicate that the number of people in Soviet prisons, gulags, and labor camps in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s averaged about 2 million, of whom 20-40% were released each year, (Getty, Rittersporn, and Zemskov, 1993).Great PurgesNo, they weren’t. The opening of the Soviet Archives in the early 90’s has proven the Getty theory that the Great Purges were not Stalin just killing his enemies. Substantial evidence exists to show there were coups planned, there was sabotage, and former members of the White Army, kulaks, and Tsarists were working to overthrow the government.Getty talked about the Purges here: epdf.pub_origins-of-the-great-purges-the-soviet-communist-p.pdfSoviet workers vote for the Great Purges:Meanwhile, some members of the military were planning a coup d’etat against the government. Despite the fraud of the Dewey Commission (one of the leading officials resigned due to the sham nature of it), there were Trotskyist plans to cede land to Germany, engage in a palace coup against Stalin and the Communist Party.In fact, the workers voted for the Great Purges because they feared a German invasion. They voted for the Great Purges. The archives show that while there were real conspiracies, there was also great fear that permeated the entire society. James Harris, a historian, in his book “The Great Fear” looks at the Soviet archives. He was surprised to discover that Stalin and the other members of the government were not cynically engaged in the purges to eliminate Stalin’s political enemies. Not at all. In private Stalin was very serious about socialism and finding the enemies. Part of the reason was the methods used by the NKVD itself. Using Operation Trust materials the head of the NKVD estimated a certain number of traitors in the ranks. So the NKVD would go arrest someone and ask them questions, often using torture and not relenting until they “named names.” But people will say anything under torture, so they would name anyone. So then the NKVD would go arrest this person, and on and on. The first head of the NKVD, Iagoda, was fired because he didn’t arrest enough people. So then Yezhov was hired. Yezhov estimated there was a grand conspiracy that he believed was out there. This was partly from bad intelligence from his agents. So then he went out and started having hundreds of thousands arrested. They were summarily tried and executed. Somehow the Germans influenced Yezhov. Some believe they had information about him being a homosexual and engaging in homosexual acts. Others believe he was part of a very real conspiracy with the right wing opposition, wanting to bring mayhem to turn public opinion against the government to support a coup. Later the full range of his behavior was discovered and opposed, and he was fired, tried, and executed. The killings by the NKVD under Beria then fell down to 1%. About 680,000 people were tried and executed in total. 28,000 were sent to prison.Professor Harris discusses the Great Fear, the intelligence and collection of it during the Great Purges:Operation Trust:Operation Trust (операция "Трест"[1]) was a counterintelligence operation of the State Political Directorate (GPU) of the Soviet Union. The operation, which ran from 1921 to 1926, set up a fake anti-Bolshevik resistance organization, "Monarchist Union of Central Russia", MUCR (Монархическое объединение Центральной России, МОЦР), in order to help the OGPU identify real monarchists and anti-Bolsheviks.The cover story used for discussion was to call the organization the Moscow Municipal Credit Association.The head of the MUCR was Alexander Yakushev (Александр Александрович Якушев), a former bureaucrat of the Ministry of Communications of Imperial Russia, who after the Russian Revolution joined the Narkomat of External Trade (Наркомат внешней торговли), when the Soviets began to allow the former specialists (called "spetsy", Russian: спецы) to resume the positions of their expertise. This position allowed him to travel abroad and contact Russian emigrants.MUCR kept the monarchist general Alexander Kutepov (Александр Кутепов) from active actions, as he was convinced to wait for the development of internal anti-Bolshevik forces. Kutepov had previously believed in militant action as a solution to the Soviet occupation, and had formed the "combat organization", a militant splinter from the Russian All-Military Union (Russian: Русский Обще-Воинский Союз, Russkiy ObshcheVoinskiy Soyuz) led by General Baron Pyotr Nikolayevich Wrangel.[2]Kutepov also created the Inner Line as a counter-intelligence organization to prevent Bolshevik penetrations. It caused the Cheka some problems but was not overly successful.Among the successes of Trust was the luring of Boris Savinkov and Sidney Reilly into the Soviet Union, where they were captured.Some modern researchers say that there are reasons to believe that both persons had doubts in MUCR, and they went into the Soviet Union for their own reasons, using MUCR as a pretext[citation needed].The Soviets did not organize Trust from scratch. The White Army had left sleeper agents, and there were also Royalist Russians who did not leave after the Civil War. These people cooperated to the point of having a loose organizational structure. When the OGPU discovered them, they did not liquidate them, but expanded the organization for their own use.Still another episode of the operation was an "illegal" trip (in fact, monitored by OGPU) of a notable émigré, Vasily Shulgin, into the Soviet Union. After his return he published a book "Three Capitals" with his impressions. In the book he wrote, in part, that contrary to his expectations, Russia was reviving, and the Bolsheviks would probably be removed from power.The one Western historian who had limited access to the Trust files, John Costello, reported that they comprised thirty-seven volumes and were such a bewildering welter of double-agents, changed code names, and interlocking deception operations with "the complexity of a symphonic score", that Russian historians from the Intelligence Service had difficulty separating fact from fantasy.Defector Vasili Mitrokhin reported that the Trust files were not housed at the SVR offices in Yasenevo, but were kept in the special archival collections (spetsfondi) of the FSB at the Lubyanka.[1]Historians Getty and Harris discuss the Great Purges:https://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furrg/research/yvs_jls2017.pdf (https://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furrg/research/yvs_jls2017.pdf)There was also Ezhov who wanted to destroy the USSR:Ezhov interrogation of April 26 1939 – ENGLISHThese three videos are masterpieces:Anti semitisimI don't know how this nonsense can exist, since both Lenin and Marx were Jews.However, these are some of Stalin's statements on anti-Semitism:"National and racial chauvinism is a vestige of the misanthropic customs characteristic of the period of cannibalism. Anti-semitism, as an extreme form of racial chauvinism, is the most dangerous vestige of cannibalism.Anti-semitism is of advantage to the exploiters as a lightning conductor that deflects the blows aimed by the working people at capitalism. Anti-semitism is dangerous for the working people as being a false path that leads them off the right road and lands them in the jungle.Hence Communists, as consistent internationalists, cannot but be irreconcilable, sworn enemies of anti-semitism. In the U.S.S.R. anti-semitism is punishable with the utmost severity of the law as a phenomenon deeply hostile to the Soviet system. Under U.S.S.R. law active anti-semites are liable to the death penalty."-Joseph Stalin: Anti-Semitism, Reply to an inquiry of the Jewish News Agency in the United States (1931)The USSR helped evacuate 1,750,000 Jews to escape the Nazis. Thats more than all other allied nations combined. Here are some passages from ‘The Soviets Expected It’ by Anna Louise Strong, explaining more about it.As for the "Doctor's plot", it didn't really have anything to do with Stalin.Grover Furr lays it out nicely in his book ‘Khrushchev Lied:The "Doctors' Plot" case had nothing to do with Stalin.Anti-Stalin researcher Gennadiy Kostyrchenko exposed the supposed "plan" to execute the Doctors and exile Soviet Jews in 2003, in an article titled "Deportatsiia -- Mistifikatsiia" in the Russian Jewish journal Lekhaim in September 2002.According to Stalin's daughter Svetlana Allilueva (Twenty Letters To A Friend, Letter 18) Stalin didn't believe the charges against the Doctors anyway.Kostyrchenko, and the far-right "Memorial" organization, published a book titled State Antisemitism in the USSR. But they don't have any examples of it during Stalin's time.Ginzburg claimed that the fact he was passed over for promotion in October 1947 was an example of "State anti-Semitism" and "an offensive against modern science."Ginzburg stated that after Stalin's death:“Everything in the country started to change very quickly, suffice to mention the rehabilitation of "the doctor killers" and the shooting up of Beriya, who was the head of the Soviet "atomic project" (by the way, he was a good organizer and probably not more of a bandit than all the rest).”Stalin demanded that anti-semitic material be removed from media surrounding the 'Doctor's Plot', (there is a chapter on this in the book ‘Khrushchev Lied‘ by Grover Furr) and wouldn't have allowed the Jewish Autonomous Oblast to exist.And he worked well with a lot of Jews in the CPSU, like Lazar Moiseyevich KaganovichDictatorHe just wasn’t, he couldn’t even chose the head of the NKVD and he asked to resign many times.Stalin’s Four Attempts at Resignation“When the question arose of removing Yezhov from his position at the NKVD, Stalin proposed the candidacy of Malenkov as the new Commissar of Internal Affairs. But the majority of the Politburo recommended Beria instead.”-Getty and Manning: Stalinist Terror p.38Here is an illustrative example of Stalin's administration, as described by Anna Louise Strong:"Let me give a brief example of how Stalin functions. I saw him preside at a small committee meeting, deciding a matter on which I had brought a complaint. He summoned to the office all the persons concerned in the matter, but when we arrived we found ourselves meeting not only with Stalin, but also with Voroshilov and Kaganovich. Stalin sat down, not at the head of the table, but informally placed where he could see the faces of all. He opened the talk with a plain, direct question, repeating the complaint in one sentence, and asking the man complained against ‘Why was it necessary to do this?’After this, he said less than anyone. An occasional phrase, a word without pressure, even his questions were less demands for answers than interjections guiding the speaker's thought. But how swiftly everything was revealed, all our hopes, egotisms, conflicts, all the things we had been doing to each other. The essential nature of men I had known for years, and of others I met for the first time, came out sharply, more clearly than I had ever seen them, yet without prejudice. Each of them had to cooperate, to be taken account of in a problem; the job we must do, and its direction became clear.I was hardly conscious of the part played by Stalin in helping us to reach a decision. I thought of him rather as someone superlatively easy to explain things to, who got one's meaning half through a sentence, and brought it all out very quickly. When everything became clear, and not a moment sooner or later, Stalin turned to the others 'Well?' A word from one, a phrase from another, together accomplished a sentence. Nods – it was unanimous. It seemed we had all decided, simultaneously, unanimously. That is Stalin's method and greatness. He is supreme analyst of situations, personalities, tendencies. Through his analysis he is supreme combiner of many wills.''-(Dictatorship and Democracy in the Soviet Union, by Anna Louise Strong, New York, 1931, p. 17.)This is a very good video about Democracy in the USSR with sources:The USSR didn’t lose against Nazis because of Land LeaseNo, it’s false.As historian Carl Hamilton says:Lend-lease was helpful, mostly because it took the pressure off certain industries. Most importantly it provided the USSR with the majority of new trucks during WW2. However, the importance of the lend-lease is often pretty overstated, for 2 reasons.The first reason is that the vast majority of lend-lease delivered to the USSR didn’t arrive until much later in the war, mostly in 1943–1944. Where the USSR had basically already defeated the Germans anyway. The time that lend-lease was most needed which was in 1941–1942, the USSR received very little of it.The British lend-lease in my opinion was probably more important to the USSR, than the American, since it arrived when they needed it the most.The second reason is that the US lend-lease in comparison to Soviet production was not that much. Certain people have said before that the Soviets couldn’t do anything without it. But this is not true. If the USSR had not received trucks, they would simply have had more industry making trucks, and less industry making something else. To put it into perspective, let me show you just how much the US lend-lease was worth compared to the Soviet production:You can ask yourself how different the eastern front would have been if they had had 2.2% less material. Probably worse. Maybe it would have taken longer. Probably would not have changed the outcome to be honest. The graph includes pre-war material production as well.It should also be noted that the UK received more than twice as much lend-lease as the Soviets, while fielding an army that was a tiny fraction the size. Yet this is rarely discussed compared to Soviet lend-lease. If anyone is interested, you can ask in the comments about particular shipments of lend-lease to the USSR, as I can tell you the exact number of army related items shipped to the USSR at any point.[Edit] My view in this answer and comments post is primarily based on the following documents, for those interested in open source available reading:The United States Army in World War 2 (1952) - “STATISTICS - Lend lease”Mark Harrison “Resource mobilization for World War II” - University of WarwickNikolay Ryzhkov & Georgy Kumanev “Food and other strategic deliveries to the Soviet Union under the Lend-Lease Act, 1941-1945”“Production of Locomotives and rolling stock in the USSR and the European satellites” 1953 CIA historical ArchivesTaken by Carl Hamilton's answer to Just how important were supplies from the United States to the U.S.S.R.'s war effort in WW2? What would the Eastern Front have been like without them?Cult of personalityAgain, false.“I am absolutely against the publication of "Stories of the childhood of Stalin."The book abounds with a mass of inexactitudes of fact, of alterations, of exaggerations and of unmerited praise. Some amateur writers, scribblers, (perhaps honest scribblers) and some adulators have led the author astray. It is a shame for the author, but a fact remains a fact.But this is not the important thing. The important thing resides in the fact that the book has a tendency to engrave on the minds of Soviet children (and people in general) the personality cult of leaders, of infallible heroes. This is dangerous and detrimental.The theory of "heroes" and the "crowd" is not a Bolshevik, but a Social-Revolutionary theory. The heroes make the people, transform them from a crowd into people, thus say the Social-Revolutionaries.The people make the heroes, thus reply the Bolsheviks to the Social-Revolutionaries. The book carries water to the windmill of the Social-Revolutionaries. No matter which book it is that brings the water to the windmill of the Social-Revolutionaries, this book is going to drown in our common, Bolshevik cause.I suggest we burn this book.”-Joseph Stalin: Letter on Publications for Children Directed to the Central Committee of the All Union Communist YouthThe method of combating tsardom chosen by the Narodniks, namely, by the assassination of individuals, by individual terrorism, was wrong and detrimental to the revolution. The policy of individual terrorism was based on the erroneous Narodnik theory of active "heroes" and a passive "mob," which awaited exploits from the "heroes."This false theory maintained that it is only outstanding individuals who make history, while the masses, the people, the class, the "mob," as the Narodnik writers contemptuously called them, are incapable of conscious, organized activity and can only blindly follow the "heroes." For this reason the Narodniks abandoned mass revolutionary work among the peasantry and the working class and changed to individual terrorism. They induced one of the most prominent revolutionaries of the time, Stepan Khalturin, to give up his work of organizing a revolutionary workers' union and to devote himself entirely to terrorism.By these assassinations of individual representatives of the class of exploiters, assassinations that were of no benefit to the revolution, the Narodniks diverted the attention of the working people from the struggle against that class as a whole. They hampered the development of the revolutionary initiative and activity of the working class and the peasantry.”I reccomend-Joseph Stalin: History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)Stalin, when given the highest ranking military title, opposed it, and even asked Chruchill to still refer to him only as a Marshal:Generalissimus of the Soviet Union“This military rank was specifically created for Joseph Stalin. However, according to Stalin biographer Robert Service, Stalin regretted allowing himself the ostentatious military title, and asked Winston Churchill to continue to refer to him as a marshal instead.[1] Stalin also rejected any kind of distinctions between his military rank and the other Soviet marshals, and kept using the original Marshal of the Soviet Union insignia and uniform like the other Soviet marshals.”DeportationI reccomend Deportation of ethnic minoritiesMolotov RibbentropEvery European country had made alliances with Hitler, and it was Westerners who allowed Germany to invade Czechoslovakia and Austria.Stalin 'planned to send a million troops to stop Hitler if Britain and France agreed pact'Thank you if you read it all!Footnotes[1] Genoa Conference (1922) - Wikipedia[2] Gold standard - Wikipedia[3] PROHIBITED IMPORTS. - (British Official Wireless.) LONDON, April 19. - The Sydney Morning Herald (NSW : 1842 - 1954) - 21 Apr 1933