Senior Week 2009 - Bryant - Bryant University: Fill & Download for Free

The baby-faced man, Martin Bryant, mass murderer who massacred many innocent souls, including children, in cold blood, at Port Arthur, Tasmania, while they went about their lives not knowing that day would be their last.Yes, Martin Bryant is alive but buried in a maximum security prison if I remember correctly in solitary confinement.I provide an article on the Port Arthur massacre a story that must be told, not buried (smh.com.au) which available on this link.“More than a decade has passed since we spent two years delving backwards over five generations – and across two hemispheres – to attempt to unravel the complete and complex story of Martin Bryant, the blond, blue-eyed angelic boy who slipped into the world in 1967 and, 29 years later, would kill 35 people in cold blood.Our book, Born or Bred: the making of a mass murderer, was published in 2009 by Fairfax Books after two Australian publishers decided that while the story deserved telling, the subject matter was still too hot to handle. Not much has changed. The news this week that Snowtown director Justin Kurzel is making Bryant the subject of his new movie quickly prompted a Twitter discussion about whether Australia needs this film, which was immediately labelled controversial.Port Arthur killer Martin Bryant.CREDIT: SMH ARCHIVETasmania, indeed most of the nation, responded to the horror of Port Arthur by burying it and shutting it down. Martin Bryant pleaded guilty and so was never tried. It was unlike Norway, which placed Anders Behring Breivik, killer of 77 young people in 2016, in the dock in a court to be seen and heard by the nation. Bryant was sentenced to many lifetimes in prison and Australia chose never to forgive but did its very best to forget.We researched the Bryant family’s history on both sides, right back into their English origins. We spoke to his psychiatrists, his lawyer, neighbours, family and friends along with many others who knew him in an effort to piece together the story of the eccentric and disparate characters whose lives briefly intersected with his. And we were supported in our efforts by experts in adolescence, including Patrick McGorry, a professor of youth mental health at the University of Melbourne and an expert known globally for his advocacy of early intervention and youth mental health services.Martin Bryant’s crime was at the time the world's worst killing spree by a lone, civilian gunman. It horrified and changed Australia – and its gun laws – forever. And yet legal records of the crime were sealed and remain under lock and key after the Tasmanian government passed legislation to block the dissemination of information about Bryant. And year after year, as American schools and colleges were ravaged by guns fired by angry, lonely, disturbed young men, the inevitable media discussion of Australia’s pioneering reform of firearms legislation was rolled out but a detailed discussion of why it had occurred was glossed over.The mantra we heard at the time was that this was a horror story that had to be buried and forgotten but it never made sense to us: an analysis of history shows terrible events such as war and violence have long been revisited by art in all its forms: painting, literature, cinema. If we bury and simply forget, we cannot learn.The ruins of the Broad Arrow cafe at Port Arthur have been turned into a memorial garden and pool to remember the 35 people killed there on April 28 1996.CREDIT:JOHN WOUDSTRADuring our research, we discovered that Bryant had been flagged for health intervention as a very young child after exhibiting dangerous cruelty and tell-tale behaviours for many years but falling through the cracks of adolescent services at exactly the time that his family most needed help.We believed then – and still argue fervently now – that there are still lessons to be learnt about what happened in the lead up to that sunny Sunday when Bryant loaded the boot of his yellow Volvo with guns and ammunition and returned to the scene of many idyllic childhood summers – Tasmania's historic Port Arthur settlement.This was a young man who was blessed with striking surfie hair and mesmeric eyes but whose strange and discomfiting mannerisms, speech and demeanour made people uncomfortable and led to an adolescence and youth characterised by great loneliness. And yet we learnt that before he set out on his terrible killing spree, which would not only end the lives of 35 people but injure another 21, he himself had made a tragic, last-minute attempt to turn back. Our book asked then if the Port Arthur massacre could have been prevented and argued why it could happen again.We hope the film is more than just a re-telling of violence because this is a tragic, human story too. If the film manages to widen understanding of the kind of brain development and psychiatric issues that can lead to such catastrophic disasters – and bring them to new audiences – then we wish the filmmakers all the very best.”Robert Wainwright and Paola Totaro wrote Born or Bred: the making of a mass murderer and are former Sydney Morning Herald journalists.SMH article courtesy of Paola TotaroPaola Totaro is a freelance journalist based in London. She was previously the Herald's Europe correspondent and before her posting held some of the paper's most senior positions including editing News Review, heading the Herald's State Political Bureau and leading the Education and Urban Affairs teams.

As a member of the Glenn Miller Birthplace Society, I'm posting a moderately-detailed synopsis of the most recent findings re his disappearance.Back in 2009 Glenn’s son Steve asked historian Dennis Spragg, senior consultant at the University of Colorado’s Glenn Miller Archives, to open a new investigation into the events of December 15, 1944. While what was found doesn’t - and can’t - pin down the plane’s final minutes, it does make the dropped-bomb hypothesis far less probable than had been thought. It also adds new insights into possible causes and events leading up to the crash.The key piece of evidence that the GMA investigation found positively places the UC-64 too far from the bomb-drop zone to have been hit by the returning RAF Lancaster bombers. A logbook kept by a coast spotter who’d been stationed along the southeastern coast of England included the positive sighting of a UC-64 transport heading out over the Channel on the afternoon of December 15. Not only were the report's time and location consistent with those expected if the plane had been on the primary SHAEF shuttle route from Twinwood to Villacoublay, Miller’s was the only UC-64 known to be operating in that part of the country that day. Granted that without highly-specific evidence like a serial number the identification can’t be ironclad, but the matches are so strong it’s almost certain the spotter was the last person on the ground to have seen Maj. Miller.The spotter's report therefore makes it extremely unlikely the plane seen by RAF navigator Fred Shaw was the doomed UC-64. The Norseman couldn’t have reached the bombers' drop zone at the time reported in Shaw's log even if the pilot, Flight Officer J. S. Morgan, had drifted off course let alone intentionally turned north.That however doesn’t answer just what plane Shaw did see, something that may never be known. It’s important to put his observation in context: The Lancasters were at an altitude of about 5000 ft / 1500 m while small, single-engine craft were normally operated roughly one-tenth as high. At that separation a UC-64's 15.7 m wingspan would appear to be only a couple of inches long and its fuselage even tinier, making it essentially impossible to identify by type. Indeed, the crew only reported the craft as a "kite", slang for any small unidentifiable airplane. In spite of all the news at the time and years of ongoing speculation about Miller's fate, no one even made a connection to the missing UC-64 until the 1980s - and much of what was written was along the lines of "A small plane was hit by dropped bombs. It was December 15. Ergo, the plane must have been the one carrying Glenn Miller."So what IS known about the crash? The GMA investigation drew on a large number of primary sources including documents that had been unexamined since 1945. What emerged about December 15 was described by Dennis Spragg as "a toxic combination [including] pilot disorientation, mechanical failure and weather" that led to catastrophe. These major topics coalesced:Mechanical FailureIn its civilian form the Noorduyn Norseman was a rugged plane designed for use in the Canadian bush country. Its ability to operate on short unimproved airstrips led the Allies to use the military version, designated UC-64, in much the same role as that later taken on by helicopters.As other posters have noted, the military version was equipped with type of fuel system that turned out to have problems with icing, even in temperatures that were benign compared to those in which the Canadian versions operated. The same type of system was also used on certain other AAF craft. Enough were affected that the USAAF had an ongoing program to permanently address the issue. However, priority obviously was given to war-critical units while others - including small transports like a UC-64 - were simply patched in place.Maintenance records for Miller’s UC-64 revealed a particularly troubled repair record. It’s not known whether F/O Morgan knew about the plane's history, but in hindsight that history should have been a large red flag for someone in the chain of approvals. If not Morgan, certainly the repair crew or the inspector(s) who signed off for the patches should have grounded the plane.Thus Possibility 1: The UC-64's fuel system failed due to ice buildup. In the absence of modern electronic navigation equipment pilots typically flew small craft low over water to help maintain their bearings. If the plane had lost power F/O Morgan would have had no more than 8 to 10 seconds before the plane hit the water, too little time to recover.Weather / pilot trainingDuring the second week of December that section of Western Europe had been experiencing some of the worst weather in recent memory. It was bad enough that the USAAF had suspended all non-essential flights for days, including any scheduled shuttles that Maj. Miller could have taken to Paris in preparation for the rest of the orchestra’s transfer on December 18. When LTC Baessell decided to make the trip anyway and offered Miller a ride, he took him up on the offer [more below].What none of the three officers apparently knew was that even though skies were clearing over Twinwood, yet more storms and low clouds were closing in along the coast of France along the route to the Villacoublay destination. F/O Morgan had made the trip many times in the past but not in bad weather because he wasn’t trained for for instrument-only navigation. If they’d become enveloped in clouds it would have been difficult or impossible for him to navigate safely.Thus Possibility 2: F/O Morgan found himself unable to see the horizon or water's surface and flew directly into the ocean. That situation's a form of disorientation known as "loss of situational awareness". It’s thought that JFK Jr. and possibly Kobe Bryant's pilot may have experienced similar losses before their fatal accidents.In either situation a water ditching would have been impossible. Despite (or perhaps from) its long use in Canada, Norseman planes were known to be death traps in the event of an emergency water landing. As soon as their fixed landing gear hit water the sudden increase in drag would either cause the plane to cartwheel or rip apart its fuselage. Indeed, as of 1944 no Norseman or UC-64 had been successfully ditched (Spragg, p. 241). It’s unknown why the AAF felt non-pontoon models could safely operate over open expanses like the Channel. While no crashes had happened (yet) on the Channel routes, civilian-model Norsemans had been involved in fatal water crashes in Canada.Finally: Why did the flight happen at all?Spragg tried to get inside the heads of the three officers in an effort reconstruct their actions leading up to the flight.LTC Norman Baessell:The findings confirmed and expanded on the widely-held opinion that LTC Baessell, who set up the flight, was by far the most culpable party. Baessell was by many accounts a competent officer, but also had a reputation as a rogue who enjoyed the good life, and was fond of "pushing the envelope" and cutting corners to get what he wanted.Exactly why he decided to travel that day is unclear. According to some reports he wanted to visit Paris to replenish his wine supply, while others have suggested more-nefarious intent. In any case Spragg recounts that he violated multiple regulations by, among other things, failing to get clearance for the flight from his CO (commanding officer) and authorizing the flight himself rather than going through normal approval channels. As the most-senior officer he was derelict in his duty to consider the safety of the other two men and for endangering the life of an officer who held official special status within the AAF.Finally, he made the crucial decision to order his pilot to leave the plane’s engine running during the stop at Twinwood. As such it was considered to be an informal stop that didn’t require filing full paperwork with ground personnel. In addition to raising questions about just why Baessell wanted to exploit that loophole, it more critically left only a sparse paper trail that might be followed after the plane was reported missing.It was the opinion of the investigation that Baessell's actions were sufficiently reckless that, had he survived, he and his career would have suffered severe consequences.Flight Officer John Stuart Morgan:The pilot also came in for criticism, albeit with caveats. The WWII rank of Flight Officer occupied a narrow niche between enlisted personnel and commissioned officers. Despite being junior even to a second lieutenant - let alone a major and a lieutenant colonel - a flight officer was nonetheless fully responsible for his craft and the safety of his passengers. He had the right and the duty to override a decision by a more-senior officer if he felt that decision was dangerous.Given the day's bad weather and the plane’s spotty repair record Morgan could have legitimately refused to fly. However that day he wasn’t only carrying a determined officer who was several grades his senior and who he'd served for a long time. He was also transporting arguably the most famous popular musician of the time, the man who'd made many of the records a young guy like Morgan had probably bought and danced to. Add to this the fact that Morgan shared (emulated?) some of Baessell's personality traits. He was a decent pilot so far as he was trained, but tended to push beyond his level of competence.Morgan may have been intimidated by Baessell, awed by Miller, overconfident, or any/all of those.Major Alton Glenn Miller:I admit to being surprised by the extent to which the investigation faulted Miller as well as Baessell and Morgan.What's known is that he was under significant mental and physical stress in the time leading up to December 15.First, his longstanding sinus problems were being severely aggravated by cold, damp weather and his nicotine habit. In the absence of the modern range of antibiotics and other treatments he had to ride out the illnesses and ended up being hospitalized more than once. His weight dropped noticeably (see photos) and his lung capacity was so restricted that he couldn’t play his horn anymore.Capt. Miller, shortly after joining the USAAFMaj. Miller, late 1944Second, as his responsibilities grew he found himself increasingly banging heads with the military's entrenched bureaucracy and being frustrated by wartime shortages. He was fighting everything from a general lack of resources to rivalries not just within the AAF but among the morale units of the American, British, and Canadian commands. (Simon, p. 390 ff.)The stress made him more and more depressed as well as personally reckless. At one point he told producer George Voutsas that he was convinced he wouldn’t survive the war. (Simon, p. 376) The formerly straight-arrow conductor continued his association with the flamboyant and roguish Baessell, and at one point made the cryptic comment to Ray McKinley that he had become "involved in things he was ashamed of".No one can ever know how much those changes affected his judgment on December 15. His anxiety over repeated travel delays and/or his fatalistic depression may have been the final straws. For whatever reason, he abandoned his normally deliberate and focused thinking and committed the same violations as Baessell: he failed to get clearance from his CO and agreed to a non-official flight. And it cost him - and the music world - dearly.In summary, the crash could in some way be compared to the events surrounding the Titanic disaster. If any one of a long series of bad decisions had gone the other way, events might have turned out very differently. If the pilot had spoken up, if whoever approved the plane's repairs had been more cautious, if LTC Baessell had been less arrogant, if Major Miller had been in better shape, if any of the three officers had gone "by the book", who knows how mid-century music might have developed.Sources:George T. Simon, Glenn Miller and his OrchestraDennis M. Spragg, Glenn Miller Declassified=================Addendum:The investigation also looked at the main conspiracy theories that grew up after the war. They found NO, repeat NO, evidence to support bu much to debunk assertions that Maj. Miller was acting as a covert agent, spoke fluent German - or any German, for that matter, or had died in a Nazi-operated Paris brothel. As juicy as those stories may be, they're only that: stories. He was a victim of bad maintenance, bad weather, bad piloting, and bad judgment; nothing more and nothing less.