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There is a big difference.Executive privilege, though it doesn’t appear in the Constitution or any federal statue, is an actual privilege courts have recognized as protecting some presidential and executive branch communications in certain circumstances. Arguably, it can be traced back to the very first presidency.Conversely…“Presidential adviser absolute immunity from subpoenas” doesn’t exist.They made it up.No provision in the U.S. Constitution says it’s a thing.No federal or state law says it’s a thing.No court has ever said it’s a thing.Not even if you put the words in a different order.Not even if you say it confidently, or loudly, or with a really serious face.Not even if you get indignant about it.It still doesn’t suddenly exist.It’s a brand new claim that would represent an enormous increase in presidential power, completely undermining the system of checks and balances set up by our Constitution.The administration has lost recent court battles claiming immense new power; that they don’t need to cooperate with Congressional subpoenas, nor do third parties, and that Congress has no right to investigate corruption in the executive branch. They’ve been making bold assertions about limitations of Congressional powers and blanket refusals to cooperate that are basically unprecedented.John Yoo was the deputy assistant US attorney general in the George W. Bush DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel, and is famous (or perhaps infamous) for having one of the most expansive views of executive power of anyone, yet even he says the Trump administration is going way beyond historical precedent:The thing that’s unusual is the blanket refusal. It would be extraordinary if the president actually were to try to stop all congressional testimony on subpoenaed issues. That would actually be unprecedented if it were a complete ban.[1]The court ultimately slapped down the Trump team’s weak arguments. It was a 41 page ruling that utterly dismantled their assertions, containing fun phrases like, “flies in the face of decades of legislation covering the President.” It’s not precisely the same issue so I won’t get too deeply into it, but it’s instructive that their brazen claim that Congress couldn’t even investigate the president for unlawful conduct was declared unfathomable:It is simply not fathomable that a Constitution that grants Congress the power to remove a President for reasons including criminal behavior would deny Congress the power to investigate him for unlawful conduct—past or present—even without formally opening an impeachment inquiry.[2]This should give you a sense of where things are headed when the administration starts making up new legal concepts like “presidential adviser absolute immunity” or whatever they’re calling it. It’s about as real as “double secret probation.”[3]Back to executive privilege:As George Mason University professor Mark Rozell explained in a 1999 article for the Minnesota Law Review, executive privilege is “the right of the President and high-level executive branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public.” This power can be used in two circumstances: “(1) certain national security needs and (2) protecting the privacy of White House deliberations when it is in the public interest to do so.” The second part is especially valuable, as it allows presidential advisors to freely speak their minds without the threat of a subpoena.[4]To home in a little more on the point, executive privilege is a thing that exists, but it has limits. The issue is far more complicated than we have time or space for here, and I don’t claim to be an expert by any means, but it’s worth looking at one of the most important cases on the topic for a taste of its limits. For that, we turn to Richard Nixon’s fight with Congress during the Watergate investigation:When Congress sought to obtain White House tapes containing Oval Office conversations, Nixon refused to turn them over, claiming that the tapes were subject to absolute executive privilege and asserting that the judiciary had no authority to order their production or inspection. Eventually the dispute reached the Supreme Court, where, in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S. Ct. 3090, 41L. Ed. 2d 1039 (1974), the Court ruled against Nixon.While acknowledging the importance of the president's claims, the Court stated that "neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances."In its opinion, therefore, the Court explicitly recognized the president's authority to assert executive privilege but ruled that the use of executive privilege is limited, not absolute. Furthermore, the Court maintained that the judiciary, not the president, has the power to determine the applicability of executive privilege. [5][6]Above I put the most relevant part in bold. Nixon’s absolute immunity claim did not even hold up for himself, the president, so clearly subordinate advisers don’t have “absolute” immunity, either.Executive privilege is a real thing, derived from the two elements referenced above, the doctrine of separation of powers and the need for confidentiality of high level communications. However, those underpinnings of executive privilege are clearly not absolute, especially when it comes to investigating possible criminal activity.We could stop there but let’s take note of another example, one that is both more recent and one where the political parties were reversed: Bill Clinton.Executive branch officials under presidents William Jefferson Clinton and George W. Bush have sought to limit dissemination of information through executive privilege, though these efforts were often unsuccessful. When Clinton was investigated by Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr about whether Clinton lied in a deposition regarding an affair with a former White House intern, Starr subpoenaed Secret Service agents to testify before a Grand Jury about Clinton's actions. Several agents refused to testify. This forced Starr to file a motion in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to compel their testimony. The agents asserted they were protected by a "protective function" privilege that allowed them to conceal what they observe in the protection of the president.U.S. District Judge Norma Holloway Johnson declined to recognize the privilege, holding that there was no support for it in the U.S. Constitution, federal statute, or the Common Law. Johnson cited federal statutes that require the president to accept Secret Service protection and require executive branch personnel, which includes Secret Service agents, to report criminal activity that they observe. The absence of a protective function privilege in those statutes suggested that Congress did not intend to create one.[7]In this case, we once again see there’s no absolute immunity for people working in close proximity to the president, nor can people simply assert privileges that have never been mentioned before and assume they’ll hold up.An agent isn’t the same as an adviser, but it’s yet another example that executive privilege has its limits and presidents don’t just get to snap their fingers and invent new immunities to protect themselves from any and all investigation.The closest the courts ever came to ruling on whether an adviser would have to testify was only about a decade ago, and it didn’t go well for the Bush administration:Notwithstanding the length and breadth of executive branch practice, however, the only judge to have addressed the issue of “testimonial immunity”—Judge John D. Bates of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia—roundly rejected the theory as “without any support in case law.”[8][9]Yet another contrived executive branch immunity—this one pretty close to what Trump’s lawyers are claiming—shot down by the courts.As Judge Mehta recently stated in his ruling against the Trump administration, citing both the Nixon and Clinton cases, among others, “Congress plainly views itself as having sweeping authority to investigate illegal conduct of a President, before and after taking office. This court is not prepared to roll back the tide of history.”[10]For more answers like this, check out: Political Clarity, Demystifying U.S. Politics.Footnotes[1] Clash Between Trump and House Democrats Poses Threat to Constitutional Order[2] Judge Mehta’s Ruling in the Mazars Case: A Swift Victory for Congress[3] Double Secret Probation - Animal House[4] When Presidents use executive privilege[5] executive privilege[6] United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S. Ct. 3090, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1039, 1974 U.S. LEXIS 93 – CourtListener.com[7] executive privilege[8] Judge Mehta’s Ruling in the Mazars Case: A Swift Victory for Congress[9] COMMITTEE ON JUD., US HOUSE OF REPRES. v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53 – CourtListener.com[10] Judge Mehta’s Ruling in the Mazars Case: A Swift Victory for Congress

It can vary. Even in the same case, you can go from hundreds of thousands of dollars to nothing in the blink of an eye.I’m going to quote myself from here:Stephen Rigg's answer to Can I sue the police for legal fees if I beat a DUI on a technicality?Sure. But it’s a bad idea and you’re probably going to ruin it for yourself. Let me tell you what happened to someone who did this and won: they got greedy and lost anyway.Mallette v. Moorer, No. 2083 SEPT.TERM 2014, 2016 WL 1463049 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Apr. 13, 2016).On the Fourth of July, back in 2011, Mr. Mallette was driving home when, he claims, entirely sober, he saw a group of Baltimore City police beating an unarmed man. Mallette, 2016 WL 1463049, at *1. The police denied they beat anyone, and it appears that they let anyone they were dealing with go, because no one but Mr. Mallette would wind up being arrested. Id.* Mr. Mallette pulled over to film the police. Id. According to Mr. Mallette, before he could get out of his car, or get out his iPhone, two officers, including Officer Moorer. Id.The two disagreed on what happened next:According to Mr. Mallette, the police, who didn’t want him to film the assault, roughly detained him and left him on the sidewalk for quite some time. Id.According to Officer Moorer, Mr. Mallette hadn’t actually parked, but was instead blocking traffic, which is why the officers approached him in the first place. Id. at *2. Once the officers approached Mr. Mallette, they immediately noticed he was drunk as all get-out and saw opened alcohol containers in the car. Id.I liked this case. I got to write a footnote describing 99 Bananas. Id. at *2 n.2.Mr. Mallette continuously maintained that the alcohol was unopened, and that he hadn’t had any alcohol that day. Id. at *2.After a brief roadside sobriety test, the exact nature of which was disputed, the police called for a van, and Mr. Mallette was taken to the station. Id.Almost three hours after he had been arrested, Mr. Mallette was given a blood-alcohol test. Id. Mr. Mallette registered a .16, twice the legal driving limit. Id.In Maryland, a blood-alcohol test must be taken within two hours of an arrest to be automatically admissible in court. See Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Pro. §10–303(a). If the test isn’t taken within that time, you’d need the technician who took the test to testify, among other things.The State didn’t do that. Mr. Mallette got a good lawyer and moved to exclude the test results. Mallette, 2016 WL 1463049, at *2. Mr. Mallette was acquitted, and the State dropped the rest of the charges. Id. So far, so good. The State didn’t follow the rules, so it couldn’t prove its case.Then things went off the rails.Mr. Mallette turned around and sued Officer Moorer for malicious prosecution, asking for payment for a few items he claimed had gone missing and $100,000 in damages for his pain and suffering (and another half-million in punitive damages that was dismissed before the jury deliberated). Mallette, 2016 ML 1463049, at *2.The jury heard about the alcohol test, but was told that they couldn’t use it to conclude that Mr. Mallette had been driving while intoxicated. Id. at *3.The jury awarded Mr. Mallette $1,000 for the missing items and $170,000 for his pain and suffering. Id. Mr. Mallette had only asked for $100,000 maximum for his pain and suffering. Id.Mr. Mallette asked to amend his Complaint, to ask for the extra money. Id. The Court disagreed, saying that the verdict was unreasonably excessive. Id.The Court gave Mr. Mallette a choice, accept a reduced award (called a “remittitur”) of $30,000, or do a new trial on damages alone. Id.Mr. Mallette, presumably with cartoon dollar signs in his eyes, decided to roll the dice with a new trial. Id. Pictured:That jury gave him zero dollars for his pain and suffering. Id.That judgment was upheld on appeal. Id. at *8.The LessonI suppose the lesson here is that if you win on a technicality, and try to exploit it, no one is going to feel bad for you when you lose on a technicality later. These “technicalities” play an important role in our system. They’re rules to keep the government honest, and to ensure that the State proves its burden.But they are meant to be shields, not swords. Don’t expect the courts to help you secure a windfall from the State’s mistake.And, seriously, don’t drink and drive.*“Id.” is just fancy lawyer talk for “the same citation from last time.”

These are often set by statute.Following is a summary discussion of multiple sates that is on an official Connecticut dot gov site. There is more than I have posted here and I encourage you to review the article. This was written by George Coppolo, Chief Attorney in 2003. It is consistent with what I know now but a Google search for your particular state will confirm.MEDICAL MALPRACTICE-ATTORNEYS’ FEESMalpractice Attorney’s FeesStateAttorneys' FeesCaliforniaSliding scale fees may not exceed 40% of the $ 50,000, 1/3 of the next $ 50,000, 25% of the next $ 500,000, and 15% of damages exceeding $ 600,000. (Bus. & Prof. §6146)ConnecticutSliding scale fees may not exceed: one third of first $ 300,00; 25% of next $ 300,000; 20% of next $ 300,000; 15% of next $ 300,000; and 10% of damages exceeding $ 1. 2 million. (CGS §52. 251c)DelawareSliding scale fees may not exceed: 35% of first $ 100,000; 25% of next $ 100,000; and 10% of damages exceeding $ 200,000. (Del. Code Ann Tit . 18 §. 6865)FloridaSeparate sliding scales for cases settling before filing an answer or appointing an arbitrator, cases settling before or after going to trial, and cases in which liability is admitted and only damages contested; 5% extra for cases appealed (See note below. ) * (Atty. Conduct Reg. 4-1. 5(f)(40(b))IllinoisSliding scale fees may not exceed one third of first $ 150,000; 25% of next $ 850,000, and 20% of damages exceeding $ 1 million. (Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. §110. 2. 1114) Attorney may apply to the court for additional compensation under certain circumstances. (§735. 5/2. 111 4)IndianaPlaintiff's attorney fees may not exceed 15% of any award that is made from Patient’s Compensation Fund (covers portion of an award that exceeds $ 100,000). (Ind Code Ann. §16. 9(5). 51)MaineSliding scale fees may not exceed: one third of first $ 100,000; 25% of next $ 100,000, and 20% of damages that exceed $ 200,000; for purpose of rule, future damages are to be reduced to lump-sum value. (Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. §24. 2961)MassachusettsSliding scale fees may not exceed: 40% of first $ 150,000, 33. 33% of next $ 150,000, 30% of next $ 200,000 and 25% of damages that exceed $ 500,000; further limits if claimants recovery insufficient to pay medical expenses. (Mass. Ann. Laws Chap. 231. § 601)MichiganMaximum contingency fee for a personal injury action is one third of the amount recovered. (Mich. Court Rules 8. 121(b))New JerseySliding scale fees may not exceed one third of first $ 500,000, 30% of second $ 500,000, 25% of third $ 500,000 and 20% of fourth $ 500,000; and amounts the court approves for damages that exceed $ 2,000,000; 25% cap for a minor or an incompetent plaintiff for a pretrial settlement. (Court Rules §1: 2107)New YorkSliding scale fees may not exceed 30% of first $ 250,000, 25% of second $ 250,000, 20% of next $ 500,000, 15% of next $ 250,000 and 10% over $ 1. 25 million. (N. Y. Jud. §474a) The court may allow higher fees upon application of the claimant or his attorney.OklahomaFee may not exceed 50% of net judgment. (§5. 7)TennesseeFee may not exceed one third of recovery (Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-120)UtahContingency fee may not exceed third of award. (§78. 14. 7(5))WisconsinSliding scale may not exceed: third of first $ 1 million or 25% or first $ 1 million recovered if liability is stipulated within 180 days, and not later than 60 days before the first day of trial, and 20% of any amount exceeding $ 1 million. But court may approve higher limit in exceptional circumstances. (§655. 013)WyomingWhere recover is $ 1 million or less: third if claim settled within 60 days after filing, or 40% if settled after 60 days or judgment is entered; 30% over $ 1 million. But parties may agree to pay more. (Ct. Rules, Contingent Fee R. 5)* Note on Attorneys’ Fees Florida:The Supreme Court of Florida has declared that attorneys' fees in excess of the following amounts are presumed unreasonable:The Court allow an extra 5 percent over what is otherwise allowed In cases that are appealed (Fl. Atty. Conduct Reg. 4-1. 5(f)(4)(B) (West Supp. 1998)).Following in Table 2 is a comparison of state laws or court rules that either allow or require a court to approve attorney fees in malpractice cases. Each of these statutes or rules, other than Iowa’s, applies to defendants as well as to plaintiffs.(You will need to follow teh link to see this part)