Operations Section Chief: Fill & Download for Free

Both in Germany and in Kuwait, our section chief would sometimes instruct one of the guys in our section (Artillery, in Infantry would be squad/fire team) to be the gunner. If the gunner sucked in training, he’d be swapped out. Sometimes we’d all cycle through so we had experience being up in the cupola while driving, etc. However once we got into country, it was ,like others have mentioned, pretty much the same people. When we’d get a mission to roll outside the wire, one guy would always drive, one guy would gun, the Sergeant would ride in the passenger seat manning the radio and BFT, and the other guy two guys would sit in the rear.When my tour was up, we started seeing some of the infantry units coming into country use remote control guns, where the gunner would sit in the back seat, and use a joystick/monitor to aim the gun. Gun looked like this:The operator's station looked something like thisMe personally? I would rather be in the gunners spot. You get some awesome scenery and at least you get some wind to cool you off, sitting in the back, especially in up-armored humvees, sucks…it’s hot as hell.(Personal shot while out on a mission in Iraq)

While serving in the artillery in Vietnam, our battery was given a fire mission. We were ranged around the top of a hill, with the Tactical Operations Center (TOC-or fire control) on the top of the hill. As a result, I could only see my howitzer, the one on the right, and the one on the left; the others were hidden by the curve of the hill.We received our fire directions, prepared and aimed our guns, and waited for the order to fire. Since this was a time-on-target mission, with several batteries all aiming at the same point, and with all the rounds carefully timed to arrived virtually at the same time, extreme precision was needed.I looked at the piece to my right; it appeared that the muzzle of that howitzer was parallel to mine. I looked to my left; that muzzle seemed to be elevated more than mine—it was aiming at a slightly higher vertical angle. That seemed wrong; was I in error, or were they?I checked the announced elevation: I had heard it right. I checked the elevation I had set: it was correct. I checked the level bubbles of my sight: they were between the lines. I even had the elevation rechecked by our telephone man, then I check the actual angle of the breech block with my gunner’s quadrant. I was correct.I called, “Check fire. Elevation error on number 2.” (My section was number 1.)The Chief of Smoke (an E7 Sergeant First Class) and our battery XO (a lieutenant) came out of the TOC, looked down on our guns from the top of the hill, and declared there was no error, and commanded, “End check fire.”But number 2 was still incorrect. The members of my section all agreed that our tubes were not parallel, with no. 2 at a higher elevation than mine. Again I called, “Check fire. Elevation error in number 2.”Again the SFC and the 1LT came out, looked down on the battery from above, said everything looked OK to them and ended the check fire.I once again called check fire. I knew I might get busted or relieved if I were wrong, but I did not want a friendly fire incident on my conscience.Once again the SFC and the 1LT came out and looked down on number 2 and could see no error. Neither of them came down to the gun pit to check, nor did the section chief of number 2, though I had yelled over to him to check his elevation. The 1LT ordered the check fire to end, then said, “Sergeant Wayne, do not call check fire again.”I told my commo man to write that order down, with the date and time it was given, and sign that it was correct. I also signed it. The men on my gun also signed it without being asked. I did not call check fire again.We fired the mission. Number 2 fired out.After about 2 minutes, we got a call from division artillery that all gun pits and TOCs were to be evacuated and locked down. No one was to put a hand on a gun or do anything to the records in the gun pits or the Fire Direction Center. We were to go to the mess hall and stay there until we were released. This applied to every battery or piece that had fired on that fire mission.It did not take the division long to figure out where the errant shot had come from. There were only 3 155mm artillery pieces participating in the mission, and it was easy to determine that the errant shell was a 155mm shell, for the “splash” (explosion) was too big for a 105mm howitzer, and too small for an 8-inch howitzer.The commanding general, the Division artillery commander, and a horde of MP’s came to our firebase. They swarmed over our three pieces.After a while, the order came, “Sergeant Wayne and Spec 4 A_______ (my commo man), report to the TOC.” We went in, shaking in our boots.The general showed our commo record book and said to my commo man, “Did you write this?”“Yes, sir. SGT Wayne told me to, and to list the time and date.”“Is it a correct report?”“Yes, sir.”“Did you hear the officer order SGT Wayne not to call check fire?”“Yes, sir.”“Had SGT Wayne called check fire before?”“Yes, sir. Twice before.”“Very well, specialist. Return to your hooch. Do not discuss this with anyone until I give you permission.”Then he called me. He asked me to tell him, to the best of my recollection, what had happened that led me to have this order recorded. I told him what I have told you, including the means I had taken to verify that my observation was correct before calling check fire. He dismissed me without comment, and told me to go to my hooch and not talk to anyone about the incident. I did so. After a while, all the other men of my section came to the hooch, saying they had been asked about the incident.Subsequently, the general and the colonel departed, carrying with them the 1LT, the SFC, and the section chief of number 2 howitzer. Since our Battery Commander was on R&R, the command of the battery fell on our 2LT for a few days until the captain got back, during which we were given no fire missions. There was a lot of buzz about firing out, the men who had been taken away, and whether there would be a court martial.When the CPT got back, we were given repeated and detailed training on how to aim, fire, and maintain our guns, with special emphasis on the importance of getting our elevation and deflection (horizontal movement of the barrel) exactly correct, how to check it, and what to do if we saw that our gun, or any other gun appeared to be aimed incorrectly.About two weeks later, the CPT came to our gun pit, assembled us, and read a letter of commendation to me for “superior performance of his duty in seeking to assure the accuracy and safety of fire of Bravo Battery, 2/11 Arty.” We asked the CPT if there were going to be any courts-martial, but he told us no. The round that had fired out had hit an empty area of jungle, hurting neither our personnel nor any civilian Vietnamese, meaning there was no need for a court martial, so the matter had been handled “administratively.” We never saw the 1LT, the SFC, or the number 2 section chief again.

I will preface this answer with a disclaimer. I served in the US Army (Infantry ) 20+ years as an enlisted man,For veterans reading this, In order to keep this as short as possible I may have omitted areas of special intrest.Let me explain to you civilians out there. In the US Army there are two different worlds. It may be comparable to the operational structure of a large company or business. In a business you might have a CEO, CFO, HRO, Board of Directors, Office managers, Presidents, Vice Presidents (multiple vice presidents) all of these people are the management team. This may be comparable to the Officer corps (ARMY) the other half of the equation is the labor force. The people who actually make things happen, the copy boy, the young lady who works in the company mail room, the receptionist, the people who preform hours of data entry, the constant reports, the lower level supervisors, the mid level supervisors.You see, in the Army, Officers are management, they are responsible for planning (with input from specialized enlisted personal) establishing training plans and time lines.The enlisted is essentially split into two different areas of operation. the lower enlisted, (E-1 thru E-4) Private, PFC, Specialist/Corporal. These individuals are the primary labor force. Their first line supervisors are (E-5 and E-6) Sgt. and SSG are mid grade NCO’s (non commissioned officers) they directly supervise/manage/train/mentor/counsel/guide and enforce the Army rules handed down by the Officers. These first line leaders are directly responsible for the health and welfare of the lower enlisted (labor )The other half of the enlisted ranks is made up of what is known as “Senior NCO’s” (E-7, E-8, E-9) SFC, Master Sgt./1sg, SMG/CSM. these senior NCO’s are what make the Army function. From Platoon Sgt. to administrative Section chief. Master Sgt. and 1SG (First Sgt/first shirt/Top) and the many different positions SMG, and Command Sgt. Major (Battalion, Regimental, Brigade, Division, Corps, etc, etc, etc.)So as you can see, A Sgt. Major is an enlisted man. His rank is not comparable to an Officer. His experience is invaluable, and his authority within his unit is supported by and in direct relation to the unit commander (O-5/LTC - O-6/COL, and on up the chain)The answer to your question is somewhat complicated, especially if you haven’t lived the dream, endured the hardship, embraced the suck, and Bonded with Brothers.