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Are the Republicans "The party of No!"?Are the Democrats the party of "It's Bush's fault."?Let's examine that and where that answer takes us.PROLOGUEThere is a Presidential election in 2016, and it is not too early to start thinking about what is happening today. A full throated debate that will begin early in 2014. The Congressional mid-terms occur 04 Nov 2014. Republicans need to prepare. America needs to decide. Maintain course or make an adjustment. Both sides of this debate have their reasons for staying the course or making a hard turn.This map shows the Senate by party and by state. PPACA was passed under some chicanery by the Senate Democrats, with no Republicans voting in the affirmative. More on that in a moment. This type of legislation has been pushed by Republicans in some form, notably Rommey Care in Massachusetts, and in more dynamic forms by Democrats, for over the last 75 years. Since the New Deal under FDR.•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••The bill sent to the Senate, by the House, had the original House language in the bill gutted. The Senate had the language replaced and sent back to the House. All spending must originate in the House, and this bill fundamentally violates the Constitution."A challenge filed by the Pacific Legal Foundation contends that the Affordable Care Act is unconstitutional because the bill originated in the Senate, not the House. Under the Origination Clause of the Constitution, all bills raising revenue must begin in the House.The Supreme Court upheld most provisions of the act in June, but Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. took pains in the majority opinion to define Obamacare as a federal tax, not a mandate. That was when the Sacramento, Calif.-based foundation’s attorneys had their “aha” moment.“The court there quite explicitly says, ‘This is not a law passed under the Commerce Clause; this is just a tax,’” foundation attorney Timothy Sandefur said at a Cato Institute forum on legal challenges to the health care act. “Well, then the Origination Clause ought to apply. The courts should not be out there carving in new exceptions to the Origination Clause.”http://www.freerepublic.com/focu...http://cookpolitical.com/file/20...•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••Here is some Senate math on the seats as the 2014 mid-term elections approach.House seats in play:http://www.centerforpolitics.org...Senate seats in playhttp://rothenbergpoliticalreport...•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••15 Democrat Senate seats (*) are competitive, and 2 Republican(**) seats are competitive.(*) Oregon,(*) Alaska,(*) Hawaii,(*) Montana,(*) Colorado,(*) Minnesota,(*) South Dakota,(*) Iowa,(*) Missouri,(*) Louisiana,(*) Michigan,(*) West Virginia,(**) Kentucky(**) Georgia(*) North Carolina,(*) New Hampshire,(*) Massachusetts,http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/U...CHAPTER ONEThe debate on who should be elected, and how to secure a dominate party to ease this country away from the Progressive movement that has been underway since 20 Jan 2009, needs to begin yesterday!Will the Republican's blame Obama, since the Democrats can't blame Bush anymore in 2014? Will the Democrats be blamed for the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, since "the bloom was off this rose" before it was jammed down our throats? The Republicans will be blamed for not helping fix something they vehemently disagreed with, never voted for, and tried to compromise on or defeat, but were rebuffed at every opportunity. It was going to be the Progressive's moment, finally, after scores of years. Generations of effort. Now was the chance, with a "Manchurian Candidate" to have a true "Mission Accomplished" moment!What will be the key issues after all the finger pointing is dismissed by both parties, and the media ignores the entire story as Republican obstruction?It should be the economy. It should be jobs. It should be energy; finally—no more "put on a sweater (Jimmy Carter) turn down the thermostat policy", for energy independence. We have the energy, we just have too many modern day "Luddites" who are afraid their "save the planet" jobs and the Earth will be destroyed. We will only be able to "save the planet" when we restore science and remove politics from the debate. Until then, the hateful ads that depict Santa as being melted out of the North Pole, and thus no more Christmas for the kids, is deplorable. This does nothing to advance the Environmentalist's cause.There should be a debate on privacy and the 4th Amendment. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."It should be about the separation of powers, the "take care clause" in Article 2, Section 1, Paragraph 7"Before he enter on the execution of his office, he shall take the following oath or affirmation: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.""There has been an erosion of the separation of powers under the current administration, and were outline in a Dec.4, 2013 House Judiciary hearing. See below for additional statements from that hearing.Statement of Judiciary Committee Chairman Bob GoodlatteFull Committee Hearing “The President’s Constitutional Duty to Faithfully Execute the Laws”Chairman Goodlatte: Today’s hearing is about the President’s role in our constitutional system.Our system of government is a tripartite one, with each branch having certain defined functions delegated to it by the Constitution. The President is charged with executing the laws; the Congress with writing the laws; and the Judiciary with interpreting them.The Obama Administration, however, has ignored the Constitution’s carefully balanced separation of powers and unilaterally granted itself the extra-constitutional authority to amend the laws and to waive or suspend their enforcement.This raw assertion of authority goes well beyond the “executive power” granted to the President and specifically violates the Constitution’s command that the President is to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”The President’s encroachment into Congress’s sphere of power is not a transgression that should be taken lightly. As English historian Edward Gibbon famously observed regarding the fall of the Roman Empire, “the principles of a free constitution are irrevocably lost, when the legislative power is dominated by the executive.” Although the President’s actions may not yet amount to the executive’s powers overtaking the legislative power, they are certainly undermining the rule of law that is at the center of our constitutional design.From Obamacare to immigration, the current administration is picking and choosing which laws to enforce. But the Constitution does not confer upon the President the “executive authority” to disregard the separation of powers by unilaterally waiving, suspending, or revising the laws. It is a bedrock principle of constitutional law that the President must “faithfully execute” Acts of Congress. The President cannot refuse to enforce a law simply because he dislikes it.Certainly, presidents have from time to time made broad claims of executive power. However, assertions of executive authority have traditionally been limited to the area in which presidential powers are at their strongest—foreign affairs.The Obama Administration though has been equally assertive in the realm of domestic policy, routinely making end runs around Congress through broad claims of prosecutorial discretion and regulatory actions that push executive power beyond all limits. Indeed, President Obama is the first President since Richard Nixon to ignore a duly-enacted law simply because he disagrees with it.In place of the checks and balances established by the Constitution, President Obama has proclaimed that “I refuse to take ‘no’ for an answer” and that “where [Congress] won’t act, I will.” Throughout the Obama presidency we have seen a pattern: President Obama circumvents Congress when he doesn’t get his way.For instance, while Congress is currently debating how to reform our immigration laws, the President effectively enacted the DREAM Act himself by ordering immigration officials to stop enforcing the immigration laws against certain unlawful immigrants. When he couldn’t get his preferred changes to the No Child Left Behind education law, he unilaterally waived its testing accountability provisions. When he objected to the work requirements in the bipartisan welfare reform law, he granted waivers that are specifically forbidden by the statutory text. Instead of working with Congress to amend federal drug enforcement policy, he’s instructed prosecutors to stop enforcing certain drug laws in certain states and mandatory minimum sentences for certain offenses.And, most notably, the President has—without statutory authorization—waived, suspended, and amended several major provisions of his health care law. These unlawful modifications to Obamacare include: delaying for one year Obamacare’s employer mandate; instructing States that they are free to ignore the law’s clear language regarding which existing health care plans may be grandfathered; and promulgating an IRS rule that allows for the distribution of billions of dollars in Obamacare subsidies that Congress never authorized.The House has acted to validate retroactively some of the President’s illegal Obamacare modifications. However, rather than embrace these legislative fixes, the President’s response has been to threaten to veto the House passed measures.The President’s far-reaching claims of executive power, if left unchecked, will vest the President with broad domestic policy authority that the Constitution does not grant him.Those in the President’s political party have been largely silent in the face of this dangerous expansion of executive power. But what would they say if a president effectively repealed the environmental laws by refusing to sue polluters or the labor laws by refusing to fine violators?What if a president wanted tax cuts that Congress would not enact? Could he instruct the IRS to decline to enforce the income tax laws? President George H. W. Bush proposed, unsuccessfully, a reduction in the capital gains rate. Should he have instead simply instructed the IRS not to tax capital gains at a rate greater than 10 percent?The point is not what you think of any of President Obama’s individual policy decisions. The point is that the President may not—consistent with the command that he faithfully execute the laws—unilaterally amend, waive, or suspend the law.We must resist the President’s deliberate pattern of circumventing the legislative branch in favor of administrative decision making.We cannot allow the separation of powers enshrined in our Constitution to be abandoned in favor of an undue concentration of power in the executive branch. As James Madison warned centuries ago in Federalist 47, “the accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary, in the same hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”http://judiciary.house.gov/heari...Written Statement Jonathan Turley,Shapiro Professor of Public Interest Law George Washington University"The President's Constitutional Duty to Faithfully Execute the Laws" Committee on the Judiciary United States House of Representatives 2141 Rayburn House Office Building December 3, 2013http://judiciary.house.gov/heari...Two recent rulings from a District Judge lay a heavy emphasis on these complaints above. They go directly to the encroachment of a President on the separation of powers, and diminish our freedoms.Judges rulings against OBAMAJudge orders Obama foreign aid order releasedRejecting one of the Obama White House's most aggressive attempts to preserve executive branch secrecy, a federal judge Tuesday ordered the disclosure of a government-wide foreign-aid directive President Barack Obama signed in 2010 but refused to make public.The Justice Department asserted that the Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development was covered by executive privilege, even though it is unclassified and reflected standing guidance to agencies rather than advice given to the president.Acting on a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit brought by the Center for Effective Government, U.S. District Court Judge Ellen Huvelle concluded that the presidential order is not properly within the bounds of the so-called "presidential communications privilege." The judge went further, calling "troubling" the sweeping nature of the government's argument's in the case."This is not a case involving 'a quintessential and nondelegable Presidential power' — such as appointment and removal of Executive Branch officials...where separation of powers concerns are at their highest. Instead, the development and enactment of foreign development policy can be and is “exercised or performed without the President’s direct involvement," Huvelle wrote in her opinion.Huvelle noted that she ordered the document delivered to her under seal last month and said she disagreed with the government's contention that the order is "'revelatory of the President's deliberations' such that its public disclosure would undermine future decision-making." She also found that "'the President's ability to communicate his [final] decisions privately' ... is not implicated, since the [order] was distributed far beyond the President’s close advisers and its substance was widely discussed by the President in the media.""Here there is no evidence that the [directive] was intended to be, or has been treated as, a confidential presidential communication," wrote Huvelle, a Clinton appointee.The Obama Administration argued that the distribution of the document was restricted to those with a "need to know," but the judge dismissed that contention as "amorphous.""The government has not, even after plaintiff raised the issue...defined what 'need to know' means," Huvelle wrote.The judge also suggested the administration had lost sight of the purposes of the Freedom of Information Act and transparency itself."The government appears to adopt the cavalier attitude that the President should be permitted to convey orders throughout the Executive Branch without public oversight ... to engage in what is in effect governance by 'secret law,'" Huvelle said.The White House referred a request for comment on the ruling to the Justice Department, which did not immediately respond to a query about the case.http://www.politico.com/blogs/un...•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••Judge: NSA phone program likely unconstitutionalThe ruling is the first significant legal setback for the NSA’s surveillance program.A federal judge ruled Monday that the National Security Agency program which collects information on nearly all telephone calls made to, from or within the United States is likely unconstitutional.U.S. District Court Judge Richard Leon found that the program appears to violate the Fourth Amendment ban on unreasonable searches and seizures. He also said the Justice Department had failed to demonstrate that collecting the information had helped to head off terrorist attacks.Acting on a lawsuit brought by conservative legal activist Larry Klayman, Leon issued a preliminary injunction barring the NSA from collecting so-called metadata pertaining to the Verizon accounts of Klayman and one of his clients. However, the judge stayed the order to allow for an appeal.“I cannot imagine a more ‘indiscriminate’ and ‘arbitrary invasion’ than this systematic and high-tech collection and retention of personal data on virtually every single citizen for purposes of querying it and analyzing it without judicial approval,” wrote Leon, an appointee of President George W. Bush.The preliminary injunction Leon granted Monday does not require him to make a definitive ruling on the constitutional questions in the case, but does take account of which side he believes is more likely to prevail.Leon’s 68-page opinion is the first significant legal setback for the NSA’s surveillance program since it was disclosed in June in news stories based on leaks from former NSA contractor Edward Snowden. For seven years, the metadata program has been approved repeatedly by numerous judges on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and found constitutional by at least one judge sitting in a criminal case.The Justice Department persuaded those courts that the collection of information on the time and length of calls, as well as the numbers called, did not amount to a search under the Fourth Amendment because that information is routinely available to telephone companies for billing purposes and is shared with those firms voluntarily.Government lawyers and the judges who found the NSA program legal pointed to a 1979 Supreme Court ruling, Smith v. Maryland, which found no search warrant was needed by police to install a device which recorded the numbers dialed on a particular phone line.But Leon said the three-decade-old precedent was not applicable to a program like the NSA’s because of its sophistication and because telephone use has become far more intense in recent years.“The ubiquity of phones has dramatically altered the quantity of information that is now available and, more importantly, what that information can tell the Government about people’s lives,” the judge wrote. “I cannot possibly navigate these uncharted Fourth Amendment waters using as my North Star a case that predates the rise of cell phones.”The judge went on to conclude that the searches involved in the NSA metadata program were likely not permissible under the Fourth Amendment in part because there was little evidence the program has actually prevented terrorism.“I have significant doubts about the efficacy of the metadata collection program as a means of conducting time-sensitive investigations in cases involving imminent threats of terrorism,” Leon wrote. “The government does not cite a single instance in which analysis of the NSA’s bulk metadata collection actually stopped an imminent attack, or otherwise aided the Government in achieving any objective that was time-sensitive in nature.”Edward Snowden himself praised the decision.“I acted on my belief that the NSA’s mass surveillance programs would not withstand a constitutional challenge, and that the American public deserved a chance to see these issues determined by open courts. Today, a secret program authorized by a secret court was, when exposed to the light of day, found to violate Americans’ rights. It is the first of many.”The judge’s ruling was issued just before White House press secretary Jay Carney took the podium for the daily press briefing. Carney said he was unaware of the decision and he referred inquiries to the Justice Department.“We are reviewing the court’s decision,” DOJ spokesman Andrew Ames said.Similar lawsuits challenging the program are pending in at least three other federal courts around the country. In addition, criminal defendants are beginning to challenge the program after the Justice Department disclosed it had played a role in investigating their cases.Critics of the NSA program leapt on Leon’s decision as evidence that the legal foundation of the surveillance effort is deeply flawed.“The ruling underscores what I have argued for years: The bulk collection of Americans’ phone records conflicts with Americans’ privacy rights under the U.S. Constitution and has failed to make us safer,” Sen. Mark Udall (D-Colo.) said in a statement urging passage of legislation ending the so-called bulk collection program. “We can protect our national security without trampling our constitutional liberties,” he added.At a hearing last month, Leon said he knew that his decision would be far from the last word on the issue, which is almost certain to wind up at the Supreme Court.However, he added some flair to his opinion Monday, referring at one point to the Beatles and at another to Federalist Papers author James Madison, who later became president.“Surely, such a program infringes on ‘that degree of privacy’ that the Founders enshrined in the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, I have little doubt that the author of our Constitution, James Madison, who cautioned us to beware ‘the abridgement of freedom of the people by gradual and silent encroachments by those in power’ would be aghast,” the judge wrote.http://www.politico.com/story/20...There is little doubt that the public's appetite for this level of overreach will help the Democrats position in the next two election cycles ('14 and '16), and this is central to this discussion here.CHAPTER TWOVarious other "phony scandals" according to President Obama that the American public is not buying.(1) Obama, without Congressional approval or consideration, unilaterally chose to specifically violate the oath of office (see quoted above) and by deferring the implementation of the ACA for the employer mandate did extend it by one year. This is a clear violation of the constitution.(2) The President did not seek Congressional approval to invade and subsequently overthrow the President of Libya.(3) CENSUS.gov Mess in 2012 where election was influencedByron's Blog: Which are the phony Obama scandals, and how do we know which is which?(4) IRS.gov Mess in 2014 where TEA Party was blocked from approvals.Malik Obama: The IRS and Health CareLois Lerner: Tom Byron's answer to The White House: What are examples of US administration officials having been rewarded in spite of their incompetence?(5) Healthcare.gov Mess since 2010Mandate or pay fine? NoKeep your doctor? NoKeep your insurance? NoKeep your hospital? NoKeep you drug plan? NoHigh deductibles? YesHigh policy premiums? YesCHAPTER THREERepublican alternatives that aren't anywhere nearly as many pages, nor as complex or intrusive as ACA:http://rsc.scalise.house.gov/upl...And also we have over 100 members of Congress now (Nov. 2013) that have co-sponsored it. And we had medical doctors who serve in Congress, like Dr. Phil Roe, help write this bill. This is a bill based on putting patients back in charge of their health care and lowering the cost and getting government out of health care decisions.http://m.cnsnews.com/news/articl...John Podesta will help Obama extend the President's executive power. Congress will become even more irrelevant.Why didn't Obama know about various issues? Podesta will help clear this problem by advising the Chief of Staff for Obama. No more secrets will be kept from the President!KEILAR: Obama was unable to. And with the window closing on his chance for second term achievements, Democratic sources tell CNN Podesta's expertise is much needed.As President Clinton's disciplined chief of staff, Podesta guided that White House through a sex scandal, impeachment and a war in Kosovo. He was known for cracking the whip, one former Clinton colleague telling CNN his co-workers made him a name plate. On one side, "John D. Podesta."http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANS...CHAPTER FOURBlacks used to be Republicans, but in the years since FDR, they have, sadly, become a group of voters the Democrats have exploited. If you are a Conservative Black in America, you get the full wrath of of the left. You get audited if you speak out (Dr. Ben Carson). http://touch.baltimoresun.com/#s...Additional reading on this topic.http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu...Compare the rhetoric of these politically active individuals and how the media treats them:Alan West v. Al SharptonJC Watts v. Jessie JacksonCondie Rice v. Sheila Jackson LeeREPUBLICANS NEED ANOTHER MARGARET THATCHER OR MAYBE ANOTHER RONALD REAGAN.

Definitely Brown v. Board of Education(1954). This is the case that ruled segregation in public places, especially public school, violates the 14th amendment. It is such a good case, that I respected Thurgood Marshall very much. Here is ruling and notes for the whole case:Segregation of white and Negro children in the public schools of a State solely on the basis of race, pursuant to state laws permitting or requiring such segregation, denies to Negro children the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment - even though the physical facilities and other "tangible" factors of white and Negro schools may be equal. Pp. 486-496.[ Footnote * ] Together with No. 2, Briggs et al. v. Elliott et al., on appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina, argued December 9-10, 1952, reargued December 7-8, 1953; No. 4, Davis et al. v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, Virginia, et al., on appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, argued December 10, 1952, reargued December 7-8, 1953; and No. 10, Gebhart et al. v. Belton et al., on certiorari to the Supreme Court of Delaware, argued December 11, 1952, reargued December 9, 1953.Robert L. Carter argued the cause for appellants in No. 1 on the original argument and on the reargument. Thurgood Marshall argued the cause for appellants in No. 2 on the original argument and Spottswood W. Robinson, III, for appellants in No. 4 on the original argument, and both argued the causes for appellants in Nos. 2 and 4 on the reargument. Louis L. Redding and Jack Greenberg argued the cause for respondents in No. 10 on the original argument and Jack Greenberg and Thurgood Marshall on the reargument.On the briefs were Robert L. Carter, Thurgood Marshall, Spottswood W. Robinson, III, Louis L. Redding, Jack Greenberg, George E. C. Hayes, William R. Ming, Jr., Constance Baker Motley, James M. Nabrit, Jr., Charles S. Scott, Frank D. Reeves, Harold R. Boulware and Oliver W. Hill for appellants in Nos. 1, 2 and 4 and respondents in No. 10; George M. Johnson for appellants in Nos. 1, 2 and 4; and Loren Miller for appellants in Nos. 2 and 4. Arthur D. Shores and A. T. Walden were on the Statement as to Jurisdiction and a brief opposing a Motion to Dismiss or Affirm in No. 2.Paul E. Wilson, Assistant Attorney General of Kansas, argued the cause for appellees in No. 1 on the original argument and on the reargument. With him on the briefs was Harold R. Fatzer, Attorney General.John W. Davis argued the cause for appellees in No. 2 on the original argument and for appellees in Nos. 2 and 4 on the reargument. With him on the briefs in No. 2 were T. C. Callison, Attorney General of South Carolina, Robert McC. Figg, Jr., S. E. Rogers, William R. Meagher and Taggart Whipple.[347 U.S. 483, 485]J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., Attorney General of Virginia, and T. Justin Moore argued the cause for appellees in No. 4 on the original argument and for appellees in Nos. 2 and 4 on the reargument. On the briefs in No. 4 were J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., Attorney General, and Henry T. Wickham, Special Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Virginia, and T. Justin Moore, Archibald G. Robertson, John W. Riely and T. Justin Moore, Jr. for the Prince Edward County School Authorities, appellees.H. Albert Young, Attorney General of Delaware, argued the cause for petitioners in No. 10 on the original argument and on the reargument. With him on the briefs was Louis J. Finger, Special Deputy Attorney General.By special leave of Court, Assistant Attorney General Rankin argued the cause for the United States on the reargument, as amicus curiae, urging reversal in Nos. 1, 2 and 4 and affirmance in No. 10. With him on the brief were Attorney General Brownell, Philip Elman, Leon Ulman, William J. Lamont and M. Magdelena Schoch. James P. McGranery, then Attorney General, and Philip Elman filed a brief for the United States on the original argument, as amicus curiae, urging reversal in Nos. 1, 2 and 4 and affirmance in No. 10.Briefs of amici curiae supporting appellants in No. 1 were filed by Shad Polier, Will Maslow and Joseph B. Robison for the American Jewish Congress; by Edwin J. Lukas, Arnold Forster, Arthur Garfield Hays, Frank E. Karelsen, Leonard Haas, Saburo Kido and Theodore Leskes for the American Civil Liberties Union et al.; and by John Ligtenberg and Selma M. Borchardt for the American Federation of Teachers. Briefs of amici curiae supporting appellants in No. 1 and respondents in No. 10 were filed by Arthur J. Goldberg and Thomas E. Harris[347 U.S. 483, 486]for the Congress of Industrial Organizations and by Phineas Indritz for the American Veterans Committee, Inc.MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.These cases come to us from the States of Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. They are premised on different facts and different local conditions, but a common legal question justifies their consideration together in this consolidated opinion. 1[347 U.S. 483, 487]In each of the cases, minors of the Negro race, through their legal representatives, seek the aid of the courts in obtaining admission to the public schools of their community on a nonsegregated basis. In each instance,[347 U.S. 483, 488]they had been denied admission to schools attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to race. This segregation was alleged to deprive the plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. In each of the cases other than the Delaware case, a three-judge federal district court denied relief to the plaintiffs on the so-called "separate but equal" doctrine announced by this Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 . Under that doctrine, equality of treatment is accorded when the races are provided substantially equal facilities, even though these facilities be separate. In the Delaware case, the Supreme Court of Delaware adhered to that doctrine, but ordered that the plaintiffs be admitted to the white schools because of their superiority to the Negro schools.The plaintiffs contend that segregated public schools are not "equal" and cannot be made "equal," and that hence they are deprived of the equal protection of the laws. Because of the obvious importance of the question presented, the Court took jurisdiction. 2 Argument was heard in the 1952 Term, and reargument was heard this Term on certain questions propounded by the Court. 3[347 U.S. 483, 489]Reargument was largely devoted to the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. It covered exhaustively consideration of the Amendment in Congress, ratification by the states, then existing practices in racial segregation, and the views of proponents and opponents of the Amendment. This discussion and our own investigation convince us that, although these sources cast some light, it is not enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced. At best, they are inconclusive. The most avid proponents of the post-War Amendments undoubtedly intended them to remove all legal distinctions among "all persons born or naturalized in the United States." Their opponents, just as certainly, were antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of the Amendments and wished them to have the most limited effect. What others in Congress and the state legislatures had in mind cannot be determined with any degree of certainty.An additional reason for the inconclusive nature of the Amendment's history, with respect to segregated schools, is the status of public education at that time. 4 In the South, the movement toward free common schools, supported[347 U.S. 483, 490]by general taxation, had not yet taken hold. Education of white children was largely in the hands of private groups. Education of Negroes was almost nonexistent, and practically all of the race were illiterate. In fact, any education of Negroes was forbidden by law in some states. Today, in contrast, many Negroes have achieved outstanding success in the arts and sciences as well as in the business and professional world. It is true that public school education at the time of the Amendment had advanced further in the North, but the effect of the Amendment on Northern States was generally ignored in the congressional debates. Even in the North, the conditions of public education did not approximate those existing today. The curriculum was usually rudimentary; ungraded schools were common in rural areas; the school term was but three months a year in many states; and compulsory school attendance was virtually unknown. As a consequence, it is not surprising that there should be so little in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment relating to its intended effect on public education.In the first cases in this Court construing the Fourteenth Amendment, decided shortly after its adoption, the Court interpreted it as proscribing all state-imposed discriminations against the Negro race. 5 The doctrine of[347 U.S. 483, 491]"separate but equal" did not make its appearance in this Court until 1896 in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson, supra, involving not education but transportation. 6 American courts have since labored with the doctrine for over half a century. In this Court, there have been six cases involving the "separate but equal" doctrine in the field of public education. 7 In Cumming v. County Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528 , and Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 , the validity of the doctrine itself was not challenged. 8 In more recent cases, all on the graduate school[347 U.S. 483, 492]level, inequality was found in that specific benefits enjoyed by white students were denied to Negro students of the same educational qualifications. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 ; Sipuel v. Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 ; Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 ; McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 . In none of these cases was it necessary to re-examine the doctrine to grant relief to the Negro plaintiff. And in Sweatt v. Painter, supra, the Court expressly reserved decision on the question whether Plessy v. Ferguson should be held inapplicable to public education.In the instant cases, that question is directly presented. Here, unlike Sweatt v. Painter, there are findings below that the Negro and white schools involved have been equalized, or are being equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other "tangible" factors. 9 Our decision, therefore, cannot turn on merely a comparison of these tangible factors in the Negro and white schools involved in each of the cases. We must look instead to the effect of segregation itself on public education.In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout[347 U.S. 483, 493]the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.We come then to the question presented: Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other "tangible" factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does.In Sweatt v. Painter, supra, in finding that a segregated law school for Negroes could not provide them equal educational opportunities, this Court relied in large part on "those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law school." In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, supra, the Court, in requiring that a Negro admitted to a white graduate school be treated like all other students, again resorted to intangible considerations: ". . . his ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession."[347 U.S. 483, 494]Such considerations apply with added force to children in grade and high schools. To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. The effect of this separation on their educational opportunities was well stated by a finding in the Kansas case by a court which nevertheless felt compelled to rule against the Negro plaintiffs:Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority. 11 Any language[347 U.S. 483, 495]in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This disposition makes unnecessary any discussion whether such segregation also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 12Because these are class actions, because of the wide applicability of this decision, and because of the great variety of local conditions, the formulation of decrees in these cases presents problems of considerable complexity. On reargument, the consideration of appropriate relief was necessarily subordinated to the primary question - the constitutionality of segregation in public education. We have now announced that such segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the laws. In order that we may have the full assistance of the parties in formulating decrees, the cases will be restored to the docket, and the parties are requested to present further argument on Questions 4 and 5 previously propounded by the Court for the reargument this Term. 13 The Attorney General[347 U.S. 483, 496]of the United States is again invited to participate. The Attorneys General of the states requiring or permitting segregation in public education will also be permitted to appear as amici curiae upon request to do so by September 15, 1954, and submission of briefs by October 1, 1954. 14Footnotes[ Footnote 1 ] In the Kansas case, Brown v. Board of Education, the plaintiffs are Negro children of elementary school age residing in Topeka. They brought this action in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas to enjoin enforcement of a Kansas statute which permits, but does not require, cities of more than 15,000 population to maintain separate school facilities for Negro and white students. Kan. Gen. Stat. 72-1724 (1949). Pursuant to that authority, the Topeka Board of Education elected to establish segregated elementary schools. Other public schools in the community, however, are operated on a nonsegregated basis. The three-judge District Court, convened under 28 U.S.C. 2281 and 2284, found that segregation in public education has a detrimental effect upon Negro children, but denied relief on the ground that the Negro and white schools were substantially equal with respect to buildings, transportation, curricula, and educational qualifications of teachers. 98 F. Supp. 797. The case is here on direct appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1253. In the South Carolina case, Briggs v. Elliott, the plaintiffs are Negro children of both elementary and high school age residing in Clarendon County. They brought this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina to enjoin enforcement of provisions in the state constitution and statutory code which require the segregation of Negroes and whites in public schools. S. C. Const., Art. XI, 7; S. C. Code 5377 (1942). The three-judge District Court, convened under 28 U.S.C. 2281 and 2284, denied the requested relief. The court found that the Negro schools were inferior to the white schools and ordered the defendants to begin immediately to equalize the facilities. But the court sustained the validity of the contested provisions and denied the plaintiffs admission[347 U.S. 483, 487]to the white schools during the equalization program. 98 F. Supp. 529. This Court vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded the case for the purpose of obtaining the court's views on a report filed by the defendants concerning the progress made in the equalization program. 342 U.S. 350 . On remand, the District Court found that substantial equality had been achieved except for buildings and that the defendants were proceeding to rectify this inequality as well. 103 F. Supp. 920. The case is again here on direct appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1253. In the Virginia case, Davis v. County School Board, the plaintiffs are Negro children of high school age residing in Prince Edward county. They brought this action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to enjoin enforcement of provisions in the state constitution and statutory code which require the segregation of Negroes and whites in public schools. Va. Const., 140; Va. Code 22-221 (1950). The three-judge District Court, convened under 28 U.S.C. 2281 and 2284, denied the requested relief. The court found the Negro school inferior in physical plant, curricula, and transportation, and ordered the defendants forthwith to provide substantially equal curricula and transportation and to "proceed with all reasonable diligence and dispatch to remove" the inequality in physical plant. But, as in the South Carolina case, the court sustained the validity of the contested provisions and denied the plaintiffs admission to the white schools during the equalization program. 103 F. Supp. 337. The case is here on direct appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1253. In the Delaware case, Gebhart v. Belton, the plaintiffs are Negro children of both elementary and high school age residing in New Castle County. They brought this action in the Delaware Court of Chancery to enjoin enforcement of provisions in the state constitution and statutory code which require the segregation of Negroes and whites in public schools. Del. Const., Art. X, 2; Del. Rev. Code 2631 (1935). The Chancellor gave judgment for the plaintiffs and ordered their immediate admission to schools previously attended only by white children, on the ground that the Negro schools were inferior with respect to teacher training, pupil-teacher ratio, extracurricular activities, physical plant, and time and distance involved[347 U.S. 483, 488]in travel. 87 A. 2d 862. The Chancellor also found that segregation itself results in an inferior education for Negro children (see note 10, infra), but did not rest his decision on that ground. Id., at 865. The Chancellor's decree was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Delaware, which intimated, however, that the defendants might be able to obtain a modification of the decree after equalization of the Negro and white schools had been accomplished. 91 A. 2d 137, 152. The defendants, contending only that the Delaware courts had erred in ordering the immediate admission of the Negro plaintiffs to the white schools, applied to this Court for certiorari. The writ was granted, 344 U.S. 891 . The plaintiffs, who were successful below, did not submit a cross-petition.[ Footnote 2 ] 344 U.S. 1, 141 , 891.[ Footnote 3 ] 345 U.S. 972 . The Attorney General of the United States participated both Terms as amicus curiae.[ Footnote 4 ] For a general study of the development of public education prior to the Amendment, see Butts and Cremin, A History of Education in American Culture (1953), Pts. I, II; Cubberley, Public Education in the United States (1934 ed.), cc. II-XII. School practices current at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment are described in Butts and Cremin, supra, at 269-275; Cubberley, supra, at 288-339, 408-431; Knight, Public Education in the South (1922), cc. VIII, IX. See also H. Ex. Doc. No. 315, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. (1871). Although the demand for free public schools followed substantially the same pattern in both the North and the South, the development in the South did not begin to gain momentum until about 1850, some twenty years after that in the North. The reasons for the somewhat slower development in the South (e. g., the rural character of the South and the different regional attitudes toward state assistance) are well explained in Cubberley, supra, at 408-423. In the country as a whole, but particularly in the South, the War[347 U.S. 483, 490]virtually stopped all progress in public education. Id., at 427-428. The low status of Negro education in all sections of the country, both before and immediately after the War, is described in Beale, A History of Freedom of Teaching in American Schools (1941), 112-132, 175-195. Compulsory school attendance laws were not generally adopted until after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, and it was not until 1918 that such laws were in force in all the states. Cubberley, supra, at 563-565.[ Footnote 5 ] Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 67-72 (1873); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307 -308 (1880): "It ordains that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. What is this but[347 U.S. 483, 491]declaring that the law in the States shall be the same for the black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States, and, in regard to the colored race, for whose protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be made against them by law because of their color? The words of the amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but they contain a necessary implication of a positive immunity, or right, most valuable to the colored race, - the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored, - exemption from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards reducing them to the condition of a subject race." See also Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 344 -345 (1880).[ Footnote 6 ] The doctrine apparently originated in Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. 198, 206 (1850), upholding school segregation against attack as being violative of a state constitutional guarantee of equality. Segregation in Boston public schools was eliminated in 1855. Mass. Acts 1855, c. 256. But elsewhere in the North segregation in public education has persisted in some communities until recent years. It is apparent that such segregation has long been a nationwide problem, not merely one of sectional concern.[ Footnote 7 ] See also Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908).[ Footnote 8 ] In the Cumming case, Negro taxpayers sought an injunction requiring the defendant school board to discontinue the operation of a high school for white children until the board resumed operation of a high school for Negro children. Similarly, in the Gong Lum case, the plaintiff, a child of Chinese descent, contended only that state authorities had misapplied the doctrine by classifying him with Negro children and requiring him to attend a Negro school.[ Footnote 9 ] In the Kansas case, the court below found substantial equality as to all such factors. 98 F. Supp. 797, 798. In the South Carolina case, the court below found that the defendants were proceeding "promptly and in good faith to comply with the court's decree." 103 F. Supp. 920, 921. In the Virginia case, the court below noted that the equalization program was already "afoot and progressing" (103 F. Supp. 337, 341); since then, we have been advised, in the Virginia Attorney General's brief on reargument, that the program has now been completed. In the Delaware case, the court below similarly noted that the state's equalization program was well under way. 91 A. 2d 137, 149.[ Footnote 10 ] A similar finding was made in the Delaware case: "I conclude from the testimony that in our Delaware society, State-imposed segregation in education itself results in the Negro children, as a class, receiving educational opportunities which are substantially inferior to those available to white children otherwise similarly situated." 87 A. 2d 862, 865.[ Footnote 11 ] K. B. Clark, Effect of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality Development (Midcentury White House Conference on Children and Youth, 1950); Witmer and Kotinsky, Personality in the Making (1952), c. VI; Deutscher and Chein, The Psychological Effects of Enforced Segregation: A Survey of Social Science Opinion, 26 J. Psychol. 259 (1948); Chein, What are the Psychological Effects of[347 U.S. 483, 495]Segregation Under Conditions of Equal Facilities?, 3 Int. J. Opinion and Attitude Res. 229 (1949); Brameld, Educational Costs, in Discrimination and National Welfare (MacIver, ed., (1949), 44-48; Frazier, The Negro in the United States (1949), 674-681. And see generally Myrdal, An American Dilemma (1944).[ Footnote 12 ] See Bolling v. Sharpe, post, p. 497, concerning the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.[ Footnote 13 ] "4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in public schools violates the Fourteenth Amendment "(a) would a decree necessarily follow providing that, within the[347 U.S. 483, 496]limits set by normal geographic school districting, Negro children should forthwith be admitted to schools of their choice, or "(b) may this Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, permit an effective gradual adjustment to be brought about from existing segregated systems to a system not based on color distinctions? "5. On the assumption on which questions 4 (a) and (b) are based, and assuming further that this Court will exercise its equity powers to the end described in question 4 (b), "(a) should this Court formulate detailed decrees in these cases; "(b) if so, what specific issues should the decrees reach; "(c) should this Court appoint a special master to hear evidence with a view to recommending specific terms for such decrees; "(d) should this Court remand to the courts of first instance with directions to frame decrees in these cases, and if so what general directions should the decrees of this Court include and what procedures should the courts of first instance follow in arriving at the specific terms of more detailed decrees?"[ Footnote 14 ] See Rule 42, Revised Rules of this Court (effective July 1, 1954).[347 U.S. 483, 497]Credit to FindlawFindLaw's United States Supreme Court case and opinions.