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Life is easier with a little free income every month. Many people talk about selling products on Amazon, and that's great. But it's not ‘free’ income. And by free, I mean you don't have to work for it every month. You can still work a regular job and still have free side money without the ‘hustle’ part.3 ideas that really do work. Just a little effort to set them up.a) Invest in peer-to-peer lending. You can realistically earn 10% return or more. Your money is broken into small loans and combined with the money of other investors. So if one loan goes bad, it only cost you maybe $25. But most loans don't go bad. Check out Prosper and LendingClub.B) Invest in commercial projects. Sounds complicated, and it used to be. But with new sites like Fundrise, RealyMogul, and RealtyShares, you can invest as little as $1k, and again, earn as much as 10%. You become a part-owner of an office building or a condo development. But with none of the headaches of ownership. Just a check directly deposited into your bank account every quarter.c) Figure out how to turn 20% of your current residence into an Airbnb. The latter is an incredible way to get free money. There is admittedly some work involved in running an Airbnb rental, but the rewards vs the effort are extraordinary. Maybe you can live in a smaller footprint and free up space to make an extra $2k every month.Sure things have some risk profile, and you need to be willing to accept that. But here is the key thing. If you can earn 10%, you need to think this way: every time you spend $100, you are losing the opportunity to make $10/yr for the rest of your life.You can start small, and put just $5,000 into one of these investments - and generate $500/yr. That may be only amount to $40/mo, but now all your Starbucks coffees are paid for. Or better yet, save that Starbucks money and also turn that into free monthly cash. And pretty soon, you're building a machine.It all starts with thinking every time you spend money. Buy that new car for $40K or a buy a used one for $20K? Do the latter and turn the remaining $20k into $2k/yr for life.

The answer is crystal clear to those with a sense of economics but our political position makes it difficult to take a fair stance. There is also the dilemma of short term populism of politics vs the long term prosperity of nation. What is good for India ? I shall explain.While media today is ripe with debates on the subject, political positions make it difficult for truth to come out on TV channels. We can however look at some data & past chronology that will make it very obvious why Urjit Patel resigned. I start with the loan growth in India since early 2000 onwards till date.If you notice, the maximum loan growth happened between 2002 to 2008 by when the global ,meltdown hit us. But since we were not beaten much by the subprime derivatives in US, Manmohan govt started to give a booster dose to our economy by increasing the lending.Now here we saw the world having a lending freeze but India & China went on with the classic economics of lending their way out to glory. So all the infra companies got most of their corporate loans during that time. GMR, GVK, Lanco, Jaypee, Essar, Adani, Kingfisher (of course) amongst others. The result, India was able to create a feeling of “isolation from global crisis” although at the cost of high inflation. Same with China who managed to very quickly get on course for another round of growth after 2008.All this worked fine for both countries for some time, except for one critical element that makes sustainability of such stimulus difficult. India is not China !Chinese govt pretty much “manages” all institutions including the banking system. But love it or hate it, India is no China.Look at how the events unfolded here thru some headlines. For long the banks were “restructuring” the loans (just an euphemism for bad loans). In certain cases, they were lending more to the same entity for them to pay interest back to the bank. (Imaging you asking bank for more loan so that you can pay your EMI !!)Enter Raghuram Rajan as Governor RBI in Sept 2013:When Rajan took the helm in September 2013, the economy was declining at an annualized rate of 2 percent on quarter, consumer prices were soaring 9.8 percent,Rajan asked banks, whose lending decisions have been partly influenced by politics, to clean up their books. He has also been an outspoken critic of the government's management of social issues, particularly crony capitalism, corrupt police, and religious violence.Things changed drastically when RBI forced an asset quality review (AQR)in the second half of 2015. While total share of bad loans have continued to increase at the same pace, most restructured loans joined the category of NPAs.The former RBI chief is learnt to have said that banks extended more loans to prevent 'zombie' loans from turning non-performing assets. Ideally, projects should be restructured at such times, with banks writing down bank debt that is uncollectable, and promoters bringing in more equity, under the threat that they would otherwise lose their project. Unfortunately, until the Bankruptcy Code was enacted, bankers had little ability to threaten promoters (see later), even incompetent or unscrupulous ones, with loss of their projectRajan was single handedly responsible for acknowledgement of the huge NPAs in Indian banks & the window dressing that was going on. With that coming to an end with RBI scrutiny of books & classification of NPA norms, the NPAs showed the steady rise to a more accurate level.With that high level of NPAs, the banks started facing trouble in lending. As a result, the overall lending growth came falling to even negative levels for the corporate side. Voices of sacking rajan became pronounced as he was being blamed for “low Indian growth rates” by “suffocating the lending with high interest rates”.In May, Swamy urged Modi to sack Rajan, stating that high rates had resulted in a "collapse of industry and rise of unemployment in the economy." Rajan's foreign-educated background also became an issue.The following narrative from Hindustan Times summarises the story well.What is special about India’s banking crisis then? It is the disproportionate concentration of bad loans in the government owned banking system. Gross NPAs as percentage of total advances stood at 13.5% for Public Sector Banks (PSBs) in September 2017. The figures are less than 4% for foreign and private banks. To be sure, one could argue that higher levels of NPAs in PSBs are due to their overall dominance in India’s banking industry (60-70%). Comparing relative share of NPAs can take care of this mismatch. Relative share of NPAs in PSBs can calculated by dividing the share of PSB’s NPAs in total NPAs by share of PSB’s advances in total advances in the banking sector. This exercise shows that PSBs have had a major role in creation of India’s present banking crisis.The PSU banks were so much trouble that RBI made the statement below in one of its reports in Dec 2017:RBI’s December 2017 Financial Stability Report (FSR) says that “there will be a complete erosion of the profits of the banking sector under the scenario of a default by the topmost 3 borrowers of each bank”.PCA framework applies on banks whose capital slips below the minimum regulatory threshold of 9 per cent. These PCA banks have been starving for funds for long because of inadequate capital as government finances are too tight. These banks are not in a position to raise capital on their own.Enter Urjit Patel in Sept 2016:Thought of as a Modi govt appointee, Patel was seen to be more “accommodating” towards govt agenda of higher fiscal spending supported by exponential loan growth through PSU banks. His silence didn’t reveal much during the initial demonetization days wherein he seemed to be a tacit supporter of Modi agenda. The media however was reading it all wrong for a media shy governor.Urjit kept on surprising the govt with new data that led to the day of his resignation. Let us see some headlines of his tenure that will indicate the direction of events:He further revised the PCA norms that led to more banks slipping into the ambit. By mid 2018, 11 PSU banks were under PCA which meant that there were “dead” for borrowers as they were NOT ALLOWED to lend.The revised PCA Framework was issued on 13 April 2017 and was implemented as on 31 March 2017. As per the revised PCA guidelines released last year, if a bank enters 'Risk Threshold 3', it may be a candidate for amalgamation, reconstruction or even be wound up.And the bad news did not stop at 11 only.The Economic Times reported on 26 October that RBI has rejected the government’s proposal to ease the PCA norms for banks at its board meeting.The PCA framework puts restrictions on weaker banks on many aspects, including fresh lending and expansion, and salary hikes among others. Of the 21 state-owned banks, as many as 11 are under the PCA framework now and these banks’ NPAs hover in high double-digits, with that of IDBI Bank being the highest at close to 33% in the September 2018 quarter.The 11 banks under the PCA are Allahabad Bank, United Bank of India, Corporation Bank, IDBI Bank, Uco Bank, Bank of India, Central Bank of India, Indian Overseas Bank, Oriental Bank of Commerce, Dena Bank and Bank of Maharashtra. These banks together control over 20% of the credit market.If the Reserve Bank of India imposes restrictions on these new lenders in the next one month, it will bring the number of state-run banks under the PCA framework to 17.The FINAL LAP in 2018 : We all know the much hyped & stormy RBI board meet in november wherein many of us for the first time got to know that there is a RBI board that may be able to dictate terms to the governor as per the Govt command.This is what happened on this critical issue of PCA norms on Nov 19th.At the November 19 RBI stormy board meeting, the board decided to refer the issue of relaxing PCA framework for weaker banks to the Board for Financial Supervision (BFS) of the central bank.The poll-bound government feels that putting as many as half of its banks in PCA is preventing credit flow to the critical MSME sector which is highly labour intensive. That means loss of votes.This is super critical. I come back to where we started. Remember, govt wants the bank lending to increase without bounds as it creates short term “bubbles” even at the cost of high inflation. But who cares of inflation when the reckless lending creates it own flow & people get a deceived sense of increased earnings ?That’s what happened between 2004 to 08. Nobody complained of high inflation then as the incomes were going up. And who thinks of the long term ? Not the governments at least. When 2019 is looming & 50% of PSU banks can’t lend money, who will finance the elections? Certainly not the farmers. ( Farmers also want loan waivers which means more lending down the drain for banks! ) I don’t blame the govt at all. Across the nation, people want more liberal loans & create an asset bubble. Govt just accommodates to people’s wishes at the cost of long term damage. All popular govts do that, in developing nations in particular. Plus elections need financing. Middle class needs home loans & farmers need waivers as well.The writing was on the wall. Either the governor agrees to the “board” & allows the reckless lending to start again. Or keep his integrity & move on.What he did speaks a lot about his character. Silence speaks louder than words.Salutes !Edit: Many of you have also pointed to the govt raiding the RBI deposits of Rs 3.60 lac crore appx. I agree in part. However all that was be the plan B. Remember that the RBI money anyways “belongs to the nation” & after agreed buffer that RBI needs, that kitty has to reach the government. RBI can’t sit on profits for too long. It is better that money be utilised for the nation. In absence of RBI allowing PSU banks to lend, govt thought why not claim the money that “duly belongs to the govt” in an election year. This amount can wipe off the fiscal deficit & give additional room for the public spending. You know what public spending results in - More votes !Meanwhile, this is what the “Fitch rating agency” has to say about Urjit’s departure.Rating agency Fitch on Wednesday said Urjit Patel’s resignation highlighted risks to policy priorities. The government has unsuccessfully pushed the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) to relax prompt corrective action (PCA) thresholds to allow some troubled banks to step up lending. Increased government influence on the central bank could undermine the progress of the RBI’s efforts to address bad loan problems, it added.On the same lines, this is what the Economic times reported:The government wanted the RBI to relax the prompt corrective action (PCA) framework under which as many as 11 public sector banks are placed now due to enormous stressed assets. The government says the stringent norms hurt credit growth. The government had sought a special refinance window for mutual funds, NBFCs and housing finance companies; a facility for banks to raise $30 billion overseas; a relaxation in the limits on corporate bonds for foreign portfolio investors; and easier mandatory hedging requirements for infrastructure loans of less than 10 years. In the interest of long-term financial health of the country, the RBI does not want to ease controls to help government achieve short-term goals of economic growth.That leaves nothing to read between the lines.Edits in June 2019: New regime under Shaktikanta Das is in action for some time now. It is very silent as some would say. But actions speak louder than words. Let’s examine what the new dispensation has done in this short time frame:Dilution Of Prompt Corrective Action Norms : Eleven government owned banks and one private bank was under the PCA framework when Patel exited the RBI. Till now, over 6 of them have come out of the PCA . These include Bank Of India, Bank of Maharashtra, Oriental bank of commerce, Allahabad bank, Corporation bank & Dhanalaxmi Bank. Insiders know that not all requirements of coming out of PCA were met. Positive return on assets for instance was one. Now all these banks are free to re-start their lending practices as they like. Has anything changes in these banks since last restrictions ? Your guess is as good as mine.Deferral of Indian Accounting standards IndAS for bad debt: Indian accounting standards) were to come into play starting April 2019. This would have put in place a very conservative approach to bad debt accounting. These regulations have been deferred now, till further notice (not sure from whom ?)Implementation of external benchmark for home loans: The demand for a standard external benchmark has been opposed by banks widely as it reduces their discretion to price home loans almost at will based on some internal calculations. That is why you see the loan rates rise more easily than they fall. External benchmark would have brought in this transparency & removed discretion of banks. this again is deferred . You guessed it - “till further notice”.Changes to stressed assets rules (bad debt): Last week, RBI notified new rules regarding stressed assets classification. Earlier, bad debt had to be recognized as such even on one day delay of payment beyond 180 days. Now, the banks get “30 days more” to “figure out the best way forward”. Interesting, isn’t it ? Not only this, the asset can not be claimed as standard & come out of bad debt bucket when 10% of the outstanding amount is paid. Earlier, this limit was 20%. Wow - what’s coming next ? a 5% payment limit ? Or may be an asset can come out or stressed list even when the debtor “promises to pay” in future ? Possible, I think, don’t you ?Let’s see how the industry is reacting to these moves by the NEW RBI:The new guidelines considered and accepted many of the suggestions that the bankers had presented to the RBI in April, Rajnish Kumar, chairman, SBI said on MondaySo RBI accepts all most recommendations from the bankers. Wasn’t the regulator expected to regulate the banks rather than accepting “many of their suggestions?” What about one suggestion from the consumers ?“The revised prudential framework for resolution of stressed assets announced on Friday strikes a fine balance between tight regulatory timelines mandated previously for resolving stressed assets, and inordinate delays that occurred in the past when resolving and provisioning for such assets,” said rating agency CRISIL in a note on Monday.I love these credit rating folks. They are the same guys who rated DHFL as “A4+” & investment grade. Just days later, AFTER the default, the rating was downgraded as “default”. Can anything be more stupid than this ? We need the ratings to tell us the probability of default BEFORE the event. After the default, I know it is junk. Why oblige with your rating downgrades ?The saga continues. More on this as we move along.Feel free to mail or write to me on twitterHonest - Unbiased - Simplified, as always.Pls also read:Anurag Singh's answer to Is the Nationalization of banks at the root of the present banking crisis in India? Should Indian banks be privatized?References:Provision coverage ratio declines sharply for most public sector banksRBI vs Government: A timeline of events leading to Urjit Patel’s sudden resignationAll isn’t lost for banks under PCA as their retail loan pie jumps 400 bps to 19%6 more state-run banks may come under PCAAfter Dena Bank, RBI may put restrictions on 2 more lenders under PCAPace of credit growth more than doublesBig borrowing, bad debt: How India’s banking sector landed in the current crisisIndia’s Bad Loans: Here is the list of 12 companies constituting 25% of total NPAsUrjit Patel’s resignation highlights risks to policy priorities: FitchHere's what could have led to RBI Governor Urjit Patel's exitSix Months Under RBI Governor Shaktikanta Das Leaves Bankers Breathing Easier

It depends on who is increasing the money supply; and which money supply you’re referring to: the cash money supply or the deposit account money supply.Commercial banks’ reserve account balances in their central bank reserve accounts are the commercial banks’ money assets that they use to pay their money liabilities — their deposit liabilities. Reserves are not part of the economy’s “spendable-earnable” money supply.Governments print the cash money supply, but governments don’t spend the money they print. Governments sell the printed banknote to the central bank, who sells them to commercial banks, who sell them to you. You buy cash from your commercial bank, and pay with a debit to your deposit account balance. Your bank buys cash from the central bank, and pays with a debit to its reserve account balance. The central bank buys banknotes and coins from the government Printer and Mint, and pays by typing a spendable credit in the government’s central bank account.The cash money supply is not supply-driven: governments don’t print money and spend it into the economy.The cash money supply is demand-driven. When people are converting more of their deposit account credit balances into cash withdrawals from their commercial bank deposit accounts and holding more of their financial wealth outside the banking system in the form of cash money: commercial banks buy more cash from the central bank, who orders more banknotes and coins from the government Printer and Mint.The Weimar and Zimbabwe hyperinflations happened when governments who owed debt in foreign currencies tried to print their own money and exchange it for the foreign currency they owed, to pay their debts by printing and exchanging currencies. The fx value of the printed currencies plummeted, which made paying for imports hyper-expensive. Those are anomalies.Most money is created by commercial banks.Commercial banks do not actually create “money”. They create credit-debt: bank deposits — deposit account balances in bank accounts.A customer’s deposit account balance is the customer’s money asset (credit) that is owed as the bank’s money liability (debt). “Credit-debt”. A deposit account balance is a “credit-debt” instrument. A customer’s deposit account credit balance is the bank’s deposit liability debt balance.Banks deposit liability debts are payable, ultimately, in government-printed, central bank-issued cash money. Banks pay their debts in cash when you make cash withdrawals, and your bank “debits” your deposit account credit balance. The debit “reduces” your deposit account credit balance, which simultaneously reduces your bank’s deposit liability debt balance: because your credit balance and your bank’s debt balance are “the same thing” — as seen from opposite perspectives on opposite sides of the bank’s creditor-assets/debtor-liabilities balance sheet.A debtor’s interest-paying loan account debt balance or bond debt is the bank’s interest-earning asset.Banks issue deposit liabilities (spendable, cashable deposit account credit balances in debtors’ bank deposit accounts) to purchase earning assets (the debtor’s new interest-paying loan account debt balance or bond debt).Bank deposits — deposit account balances in bank accounts — are credit-debt instruments that commercial banks create to “fund” their bank loans and bond purchases.Banks create spendable credit in debtors’ deposit accounts, to “pay for” the banks’ purchases of the debtors’ new interest-bearing loan account debt balances and bond debts.Debtors spend their new deposit account credits by check, direct deposit, etc; paid into payee bank deposit accounts within the central/commercial bank-operated payments system of debiting payer account balances and crediting payee account balances.That’s where the deposit account money supply “comes from”, in the first place.It is created in debtors’ deposit accounts. Debtors spend it: pay it to payees. Payees re-spend some of it, paid to the next payees. Eventually somebody paid some of it to you, who now has a deposit account balance in your payee bank deposit account.No matter who has been paid it and who now has it: debtors owe ALL of the deposit account money supply back to their creditor-banks, as payment of their unpaid — but still owing — loan account debt balances and bond debts.When debtors pay the deposit account credit balances into the loan account debt balances, both account balances are “extinguished” (cancelled out) bank to their original $0/$0 condition.“Making” banks loads adds to the deposit account money supply and adds to the loan account debt.“Repaying” bank loans extinguishes the deposit account money supply and the loan account debt.Aside from the $trillions of deposit account balances commercial banks create in government’s deposit accounts to “pay for” the banks’ purchases of the government’s new interest-bearing bond debts: most bank credit is created to finance private debtors’ purchases of mortgageable assets like stocks (in the 1920s) and real estate (in the 2000s).Creating the buy-money in debtors’ deposit accounts enables asset owners to sell their stocks and real estate to the debtors at inflated prices. Asset sellers are paid all the new deposit account balances, which they now have in their bank deposit accounts. Which are their banks’ deposit liability debts.Bank credit-debt expansion inflates asset prices; and adds $trillions of new deposit account ‘money’ into asset-sellers’ bank deposit accounts.When debtors and their creditor-banks stop adding new deposit account buy-money into the assets-for-sale market, the sellable price of the assets (stocks or real estate) deflates.The cash money supply is small (about 3% of the total money supply) and fairly stable. It is not the cash money supply that inflates and deflates.The deposit account money supply is about 97% of the total money supply. It is the deposit account money supply that inflates rapidly during periods of credit-fueled asset price inflation and spending-driven economic prosperity; which are followed by periods of debt-deflation depression.The debt doesn’t deflate by debtors’ earning back the $trillions of deposit account credit balances and extinguishing the credit balances to extinguish their loan account debt balances.The debt deflates when millions of mortgage debtors default on $trillions of mortgage loans, which makes $trillions of the banks’ earning assets uncollectable: “loan losses”.The banks’ earning assets are “secured” by the sellable price of the mortgaged collateral assets: the price deflated real estate.Banks’ collectable earning assets and sellable collateral assets have deflated by $trillions.But banks’ payable-in-cash deposit liability debts — the real estate sellers’ $trillions of deposit account credit balances — have not deflated.The banks are trillions-below-$0 insolvent.After the credit-inflated 1920s stock price bubble peaked and deflated, margin debtors and their creditor-banks suffered bankrupting $billions of asset losses.In the 1930s, bankruptcy Trustees wrote of $billions of people’s and business’s deposit account balances in 1000s of bankrupt banks as the unpayable deposit liability debts of bankrupt debtor-banks who could not pay the money they owed to their “unsecured” creditors — their deposit account customers.After the credit-inflated 2000s real estate price bubble peaked and deflated, mortgage debtors and their creditor-banks suffered bankrupting $trillions of asset losses.But ownership of the banking system has been consolidated into the hands of far fewer and far bigger banks who are too intertwined to fail individually (and bound into derivative creditor-debtor counterparty relationships with shadow banks).So solvency will be restored to the banks’ $trillions-below-$0 insolvent balance sheets by “bailing-in” $trillions of our deposit account balances, so the banks can write off their loan losses with our bailed-in loan loss capital.Whether your deposit account balance is written off by bankruptcy Trustees or bailed-in by bank regulators makes no diefference to you. Either way, your ‘money in the bank’ (which is not actually money), is gone, forever.So that’s what happens with “uncontrolled growth” in the deposit account money supply. It ends with mass extinction of our ‘money in the bank’. Which is not actually “money”. it is credit-debt. But at least it “worked” like money, as long as the banks that issued the deposit liabilities remained liquid and solvent so they could “pay” the money they “owed” to us — their deposit account creditors. Most of whom innocently but mistakenly believe they have “money” in their bank accounts.