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What's your reaction to Russia's President Putin accusing Poland of colluding with Hitler and anti-Semitism?

Putin is intentionally taking the words of ambassador Lipski out of context in order to construct a narrative of extensive Polish-German collusion and Polish support of anti-Semitic actions in Germany. By doing this, he overinflates the importance of Polish-German correspondence over the division of Czechoslovakia, and smears a dedicated patriot (who would later go to great lengths to fight the Nazis) with the slander of antisemitism.Putin’s claim that Lipski was “anti-Semitic scum”, can be easily disproven by checking the rest of the notes documenting his diplomatic career, in which he states that the Polish government aimed to defend the rights of Jews of Polish citizenship in Germany, and had taken multiple actions towards that aim.The controversial quote cited by Putin did not condone any genocide or even systematic persecution of the Jews, but rather the drawing of plans that could facilitate a Jewish migration or resettlement (even resulting in the recreation of a Jewish state in Palestine, among other options, such as colonies in Africa). Lipski writes that the German Chancellor,“He (Hitler) has in mind an idea for settling the Jewish problem by way of emigration to the colonies in accordance with an understanding with Poland, Hungary, and possibly also Romania (at which point I told him that if he finds a solution we will erect him a beautiful monument in Warsaw).” (pg 411)Admittingly, when taken out of context, Lipski does seem like he is endorsing the persecution of Jews in Germany. However, when viewed alongside the economic and political situation of the Jews in Poland and elsewhere, one comes to a different conclusion. Under the quotation is an explanatory note clarifying the reasons behind his potential support for a resettlement plan.“Lest Lipski’s words be misinterpreted, we give the following facts:In 1937 there were about 3,350,000 Jews in Poland: most of them concentrated in the cities (Bialystok, 43% Jewish; Stanislawow, 41.4% Jewish; Warsaw, 30.1% Jewish) and small towns. The Jews living in rural areas made their living as agricultural brokers. However, as agricultural cooperatives developed in Poland, these middlemen were no longer needed and the Jews were deprived of this means of livelihood; they were left destitute and with no means of support.This had nothing to do with anti-Semitism; it was solely a natural economic development. The Jews in Poland, with their traditional clannishness, posed a serious problem in the overpopulated Polish state. The Polish government felt that a partial solution for this problem would be for them to emigrate, principally to Palestine.”The explanatory note goes on to explain that,“The matter was considered so serious that Polish delegates to the League of Nations, in October 1936, insisted that some immediate solution would have to be found, one possibility being the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine as a natural home for Jewish emigres. The Polish government further stressed that additional territories for emigres would have to be found to house the large number of Jews. Polish ambassadors discussed this matter in Paris, London, and Washington.It should be noted that during this same time the Polish government was giving financial aid to the Zionist organization of Vladimir Zabotynski; also, with the approval of Minister Beck and Marshal Smigly-Rydz, the Jewish Military Organization (Irgun Tsevai Lemni) was training hundreds of its instructors at secret military courses in Poland.” (pg 411)In the light of this historical background, it is difficult to jump to the conclusion that Lipski’s comment (in all likelihood made in jest) to “build a monument” was an endorsement of antisemitism. Poland, having the largest Jewish population in the world, was faced with the challenge of integrating a large and unassimilated population whose traditional economic niche in the Polish countryside was rapidly disappearing. As a result, the tensions between Poles and Jews in this period can be best understood as resulting from economic, social and political issues, rather than a form of traditional antisemitism. The overpopulation of the Jews in Poland, their increasing poverty resulting from a loss of business, and their competitive economic role with the non-Jewish Polish peasantry and middle class, presented a major problem. The problem was so important, that even some Zionist Jewish organizations supported a mass resettlement program.In Germany, Zionist organizations made an agreement with the Nazi government to facilitate the evacuation of around 60,000 Jews, known as the Havaara agreement. While I do not believe that this agreement should be seen as collaboration, it does demonstrates the willingness of some Zionist groups to consider and even participate in resettlement plans.In addition, Putin’s attempt to implicate Poland as being complicit in regards to the future extermination of the Jews is completely and utterly absurd. Almost nobody in Europe at this time believed that the Jews were going to be systematically eliminated or killed on a massive scale. Indeed the Nazis themselves did not formulate any definite plans charting out the systematic genocide of the Jews at this point. The Final Solution, which planned the industrial killing of millions of Jews in the camps, was drafted in 1942, not the 1930s.So, what about the portions of Lipski’s account where the Polish government seems to be supporting the rights of Jews in Germany, with Lipski’s approval? On pages 88 and 89 of Lipski’s account, we have the transcript of a letter written by Lipski in 1933 to then Polish ambassador to Germany Alfred Wysocki. The contents of the letter discuss the significance of the Polish-German non-aggression pact of 1933, and how it generally relates to Poland’s national security. Lipski then provides us with insight into official Polish policy towards the Jews and antisemitism in Germany. While for diplomatic reasons Lipski writes that the government suppressed several anti-Hitler demonstrations in Poland, the public protests of the Jews were to be permitted“We also stopped some anti-Chancellor demonstrations, for example, on the stage, in window displays, etc.., with one exception- when hostile anti-Hitler demonstrations came from or were performed by Jewish organizations.Similarly, if the German government were to launch a protest about the boycott of goods we would answer that, as long as the Reich’s hostile attitude towards the Jews prevails, the Polish government can do practically nothing.On the subject of the Jews, we have issues, as I have already advised you, instructions to our embassies and legations to act with considerable discretion to their propaganda action, not restraining it, however, in view of its importance in helping certain countries to ascertain and assume an attitude toward Germany.We are also supporting fully, with due precaution, any claims made by the Jews to the League of Nations dealing with the persecution of Jews in Germany.We do not plan to publish a white book at this time, although we are continuing to work on one.In this connection the Minister considers it most important that the Polish Legation in Berlin and the consulates under its supervision continue to give assistance to Polish citizens of Jewish ancestry living in the Reich, and that they should intervene, as they have been doing, at the central offices and with local authorities.On the other hand, we do not consider it advisable to give special publicity to this assistance. We possess proof that our efforts to defend Jews in Germany meet with favor for the Polish government in international Jewish circles. This is communicated, among others, from Vienna, America and England.The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be certainly informed without delay about all such steps taken by the Legation in Berlin and the consulates in Germany, in order to make them known to Jewish organizations.”This provides a very different picture of Lipski, who would become the future Polish ambassador to Germany. Indeed, here we see Lipski standing by the position of the then Polish government in defending the rights of Jews, particularly Jews of Polish citizenship, in Germany. While Lipski urges restraint, he also condones the protest of anti-Jewish actions in Germany, stands by the government position to recognize and support Jewish complaints to the League, and speaks extensively of collaboration between the Polish government and Jewish organizations.Indeed, lets keep in mind some of the later history of Lipski. After Poland fell in 1939, Lipski smuggled his way to France and joined the Polish armed forces in exile. He decided to enter combat duty at the age of 45, and in poor physical condition, which is a sign of great dedication to his country and a willingness to fight the Nazi Germans at every opportunity. He fought bravely during the battle of France, and later held an important position within the Polish Government in Exile in London. Despite his imperfections, to call this man a Nazi sympathizer and “anti-Semitic scum” is historical revisionism and constitutes liable.Alleged Polish-Nazi Collusion, and the Annexation of ZaolzieIn addition to accusations of antisemitism, Putin has accused Poland of directly facilitating the Second World War by colluding with the Nazis. Again, this is utterly false. Polish foreign policy aimed to establish a distance between the Germans and the Soviets. This distance could be assured, at least for a while, by signing non-aggression pacts with the two countries. While Soviet apologists magnify the significance of the Polish-German pact of 1934, they forget that Poland signed a Polish-Soviet pact two years earlier in 1932. The Poles were not aiming to establish themselves as the allies of either totalitarian state. Instead, pressured by its intermediary position between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, Polish foreign policy aimed at establishing balance. While the Germans and Soviets actively sought to disturb the order created by the treaty of Versaille, it was in Poland’s interests to maintain the order. Allying herself with either monster, was seen as the worst possible scenario.Pilsudski’s approach to diplomacy was best captured by a comment he made during a discussion with his staff in 1933,“It is Germanys dream to achieve cooperation with Russia, as it was in the times of Bismarck. The achievement of such cooperation would be our own downfall… How to work against it? Depending on the circumstances, either by frightening the weaker one or a relaxation of tensions. The game will be difficult, given the paralysis of will and shortsightedness of the West and the failure of my federative plans.”When Hitler came into power in 1933, Pilsudski was able to put pressure on the German Chancellor by making use of firm diplomacy and the dissemination of rumors that if provoked, Poland would launch an attack on Germany. While no specific documents or files prove that Pilsudski had a plan to attack Germany if Poland’s territorial integrity was threatened, there is good reason to believe that such a bold action would be consistent with the Polish Marshall’s character and previous martial decisions. The vague threat of war was what led Hitler and the Nazis to adopt a diplomatic and respectful tone towards the Poles, as Hitler recognized that Pilsudski was capable of humiliating him with a military defeat, thereby disrupting his rearming campaign. In the early 30s, Germany was by no means up to full military strength.Pilsudski also attempted to gauge the feelings of his allies, mainly the French, regarding the prospects of a defensive preemptive action against Nazi Germany. As the Germans initiated an open rearming program and withdrew from the Geneva Accords, the Poles every more urgently sought to determine the stance of their French allies. While the 1934 Polish-German fact is given a lot of attention, what is less known is that before signing the fact, the Polish government stalled in the hope of gaining assurance from the French that in case of a military conflict, France would take action against Germany. After receiving negative answers, the Poles decided to sign the pact with Germany. The motives behind the Polish move are best encapsulated in the words of Minister Beck,““Having verified that there existed a possibility of concluding a non-aggression pact which would give us at least a respite for living and working quietly and normally, it was with a sense of relief that we agreed to sign the pact.”Marshall Pilsudski, a perceptive leader and visionary, was able to see the handwriting on the wall. After signing the pact with Germany, Pilsudski announced to his staff that, “Having these two pacts, we are straddling two stools. This cannot last long. We have to know from which stool we will tumble first and when will that be.” During a 1933 vacation with his daughter Wanda, Pilsudski shockingly commented that, “Within ten years you will have a war. I shall be gone by then and you will loose that war.”Poland did not sign the pact out of allegiance with Germany. It signed the non-aggression pact in order to stall the inevitable. An ever more assertive and powerful Germany on her western border was a threat that could not be ignored. Stuck between two hostile states, Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, there was little Poland could do by itself to stall the Hitlerite threat. The inactivity of the western allies directly led to Poland having to compromise for its own survival.Germany did approach Pilsudski with several proposals outlining a joint war against the Soviet Union. Pilsudski refused these, firmly opposing submission to any foreign power. According to Peter Heatherington in his biography of Pilsudski,“In January 1935, Herman Goering visited Poland on a hunting trip and unofficially offered Pilsudski a secret anti-Russian alliance. Goering that the Marshall quickly dismissed the offer with a “stiffened gesture”, and explained that Poland was determined to conduct moderate policies toward its neighbors and had no wish to increase tensions. For the moment, Pilsudski was content to pursue the doctrine of “two enemies”, in which he would adhere to relatively friendly relations between Germany and Russia, but would refuse to ally with either.”After the death of Pilsudski in 1935, Poland was deprived of the only leader who had the skills and capability to protect her from internal and external turmoil. Once Pilsudski was gone, the difficult task of defending Poland from eastern and western incursions fell to his subordinates, such as Colonel Beck. For the most part, Beck tried to pursue Pilsudski’s policy of establishing a balance between the two aggressive neighbors, yet the situation by this time was getting out of control. British historian Norman Davies offers a balanced perspective of the crisis facing Beck during this difficult period,“In apportioning the blame for the final denouement of the pre-war crisis, the sins of Colonel Józef Beck, foreign minister from 1932 to 1939, have been specially exaggerated. To say he was guilty of ‘obscene obstinancy' or of ‘megalomania’ at once misrepresents the man and his motives and inflates the role of Polish diplomacy. Becks cardinal sin, like that of Piłsudski before him, was to march out of step with his would be allied patrons. In 1934, he considered the merits of a preemptive war against Hitler at a time when any such fighting talk was anathema in London or Paris. In 1937-38, he was thinking of protecting Poland's national interests in face of Nazi aggression at a time when Chamberlain and Daladier were seeking to appease Hitler at other people's expense. In 1939, he refused to make concessions to the Soviet Union, at a time when the appeasers were hoping they might be rescued from Hitler by the Red Army. Becks reluctance to trade Poland's freedom of action for doubtful advantages may have been inflexible, but was certainly even handed. He resisted the advances of Goering and Ribbentrop no less than those of Litvinov and Molotov.”The Polish seizure of the Zaolzie region of Czechoslovakia in 1938, is often used to accuse Poland of conspiring with Nazi Germany. While I believe that the decision to seize the region was ill advised and frankly stupid and pointless, it is absurd to claim that this action facilitated World War 2 and could in anyway compare to the Soviet-Nazi pact, which effectively partitioned all of Eastern and Central Europe.The Zaolzie region was mainly ethnically Polish in population, and many inhabitants supported a reunification with the Polish state. Indeed, Zaolzie was granted to Poland by treaty in 1920, and wrongfully seized from the Second Republic by the Czechoslovaks, as the Poles were engaged in a war with the Bolsheviks.In 1938, Poland moved in to seize the region, which constituted only a small sliver of the lands within the former Czechoslovakia. Indeed, the Polish government warned Beneš beforehand, and no fighting between the Polish and Czech troops occured. The trasition was very peaceful.This does not excuse the Polish action, which exposed Poland to international cricism and led it to make an embarrassing moral compromise in the face of Nazi aggression. However, what the Poles did in 1938 was essentially the same thing the Czechoslovaks did when they seized the region in 1920. And unlike the events of 1920, the events on 1938 within the context of Zaolzie cost no human lives whatsoever, and secured a majority ethnic Polish territory.However embarrassing and poor the Polish decision to enter Zaolzie was in 1938, it did not play a role in enabling Hitler's war machine. While a moral compromise, it did not constitute extensive collaboration or cooperation.The Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939 was what enabled Nazi Germany to conquer half of Europe and later launch an invasion within the Soviet Union itself. The agreement between Stalin and Hitler was not centered around minor border disputes. It was instead a complete redrawing of the maps of Eastern Europe, an essential partition. Poland was attacked on both sides, with Soviet troops also engaging in combat with Polish defenders and at times even cooperating with German forces. The Soviets and the Germans cooperated in exterminating the Polish elite, capturing Polish soldiers, and eliminating the Polish identity and culture. In the Soviet occupation zone, the NKVD would murder 150,000 people and would deport 1.7 million Polish citizens, mainly ethnic Poles, to the depths of the Soviet Union. Let us not forget that between 1937 and 1938, the Soviet union murder over 100,000 Soviet citizens of Polish ethnicity during the ‘Polish action’ of the Great Purge, simply because they were Polish.Let us not forget that Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia also fell to the Soviet ambitions, and were subject to bitter repressions and deportations. The Soviets were also aggressors in Finland.Indeed, the Soviet Union was the main trading partner of Germany, and supplied the German war machine with raw materials, oil, and other supplies. It was these very supplies that enabled the Germans to launch their attacks upon Western Europe in 1940 and later the Soviet Union itself in 1941. The Stalin directly enabled the Nazis. This is an undeniable fact.Some Soviet apologists may insist that the Soviets moved into eastern Poland in order to protected the Ruthenian population. But if a Soviet move to protect minorities in eastern Poland is justified, then it is hypocritical to accuse Poland of unique moral failure for protecting its Polish minority living in Zaolzie, 1938. Indeed, we know that the Soviet declaration of ‘protecting minorities’ was a mere pretext. The Soviet invasion of Eastern Poland represented collaboration with the Nazis to the highest degree.Of course, one must not discredit the enormous suffering of the Soviet people at the hands of the Nazi Germans. No one is accusing the bulk of the Belarusian, Ukrainian and Russian population that was a victim of both Nazi and Soviet oppression. The Nazi Germans murdered millions of Soviet Slavs during their invasion, as well as millions of Soviet Jews. The average Soviet soldier after 1941 was fighting against an invader displaying utmost barbarism. Russians should not take criticism of the Soviet Union, as a direct assault against their own identity.And about collaboration. In Poland, the Germans failed to establish quisling authorities and also were unable to recruit auxiliary forces and SS units from the Polish population. In the Soviet territories, the Germans were able to receive the aid of hundreds of thousands of collaborators, including many ethnic Russians. While Putin may like to accuse the nations of the intermarium in particular for collaborating with the Nazis, he should remember the many Russians who formed auxiliary forces and later SS units. These units committed horrible crimes in Belarus and Poland, killing both the Slavic and Jewish populations. The RONA Brigade for instance, wiped out scores of villages in Belarus before playing a murderous role during the Warsaw Uprising. Of course, one should not point a special finger at ethnic Russians, and I absolutely do not believe ethnic Russians were collectively collaborative, as Russians, along with other Slavic nationalities in the Soviet Union, played a major role in fighting against the Nazis and paid with millions of lives. However, for Russians to point their fingers at the Poles as examples of Nazi collaborators, even though Poland was historically a nation that was least collaborative in Europe and also suffered from Nazi German genocide, is very hypocritical.In light of these facts, Putin’s accusations come across not only as a direct manipulation, but also extremely hypocritical. Putin is resorting to historical revisionism in an attempt to isolate the nations of Central Europe and bring them under his influence. He is also assuming the role as a great restorer of the Russian lands, and feels that he must redeem the Soviet past as a part of this image. While the accusations coming from the Kremlin are aggravating for Poles, they are hardly surprising.Peace to all:)Sources:Diplomat In Berlin 1933 — 1939 : Lipski, Józef : Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming : Internet ArchiveAmazon.com: Unvanquished: Joseph Pilsudski, Resurrected Poland, and the Struggle for Eastern Europe (9780983656319): Peter Hetherington: BooksAmazon.com: God's Playground: A History of Poland, Vol. 2: 1795 to the Present (9780231128193): Norman Davies: Books

Why is Pakistan complaining about Kashmir?

It was supposed to be a new world that Lord Mountbatten traversed in those last months of 1947 as British India’s last viceroy. The Indian subcontinent, so long the jewel in Great Britain’s imperial crown, had been born anew and transformed into two sovereign states. And yet, as he made his way from Delhi to Karachi, it must have occurred to Mountbatten how little things had actually changed. Decades of nationalist struggle, two world wars, a formal transfer of power and millions of deaths later, he still had to mediate between the leaders of the new subcontinent. They were still grappling with – and fighting over – a number of unanswered questions. Perched on the very top of those questions was the one of Kashmir.The British Raj in the Indian subcontinent had always been a highly complicated affair. To run an imperial enterprise spread over half a continent, the British authorities had to create and maintain several types of territorial arrangements, much like the Mughals before it. The British had to weave an intricate web of local collaborations that included a buffer zone between India and Afghanistan, hundreds of princely states of various sizes, that had a certain degree of legal and administrative autonomy from the Raj within their borders, and many directly administered provinces and territories. The decolonisation process spelled the unravelling of this web.The two new states – India and Pakistan – that emerged from the decolonisation process could not operate under the same legal, political and administrative paradigm which the British had. The geographical unity of the two states could only be maintained if they came up with new political and legal arrangements to integrate swathes of territory, both big and small, that once belonged to the princely states. In order to deal with this challenge, the two states embarked on projects to absorb such territories into their respective borders as quickly as possible. There was no universally acknowledged single instrument to achieve this. Both states used a similar repertoire of techniques — negotiating accession treaties, making deals with local elites and, in certain cases, sending in troops to snuff out opposition.The Kashmir crisis was born out of the discontents of the twin processes of decolonisation and territorial integration by India and Pakistan. Jammu and Kashmir was a princely state which the East India Company had annexed in 1846 and then transferred to Gulab Singh of the Dogra dynasty for a payment of 7,500,000 rupees. As the British exit from the subcontinent became apparent, the then ruler of Jammu and Kashmir, Hari Singh, wished to remain independent. This was obviously not going to be acceptable to either India or Pakistan. Four major rivers originate from the Himalayas located in Kashmir and it also shares a border with China — the two factors that make it a strategically crucial region. In other words it is a prized territory. Both states, therefore, formed strategies to lay claim to it.Delhi, September 27, 1947India’s deputy prime minister Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel received an urgent letter from Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru regarding the situation in Kashmir. Nehru was convinced that Pakistan was preparing to infiltrate the region and foster an insurgency. He also knew Maharaja Hari Singh’s forces could not do much to stop infiltration without help from India. More importantly, Nehru realised, Hari Singh’s regime could not be sustained if its own people went against it.Sheikh Abdullah headed the largest political party in Kashmir – the National Conference – but he was a staunch opponent of the Dogra dynasty. He had initiated a “Quit Kashmir” movement before the British left India in 1947 and, hence, was imprisoned in May 1946. Nehru wanted him freed. He noted in his letter that Sheikh Abdullah was eager not to join Pakistan. His opposition to Hari Singh, therefore, was not tantamount to support for accession to Pakistan. If the Indian government could work out a rapprochement between Hari Singh and Sheikh Abdullah, Nehru suggested to Patel, Kashmir’s accession to India would become easier.“It seems to me urgently necessary, therefore, that the accession to the Indian Union should take place early. It is equally clear to me that this can only take place with some measure of success after there is peace between the Maharaja and the National Conference and they co-operate together to meet the situation,” Nehru wrote. “…Abdullah is very anxious to keep out of Pakistan and relies upon us a great deal for advice.” But, at the same time, he “cannot carry his people with him unless he has something definite to place before them. What this can be in the circumstances I cannot define precisely at the present moment. But the main thing is that the Maharaja should try to gain the goodwill and cooperation of Abdullah,” Nehru added. “It would be a tragedy if the National Conference remains passive owing to frustration and lack of opportunity.”Nehru’s predictions about a likely infiltration into Kashmir were proven true. By October 1947, tribal militias from Murree, Hazara and parts of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Fata) raided the valley through the Poonch area and began a widespread campaign to destabilise the Maharaja’s regime. The Maharaja looked to India for help which he got only after promising to sign an instrument of accession in favour of New Delhi.Writing to British Prime Minister Clement Attlee, Nehru argued that the Indian intervention in Kashmir was a response to an urgent appeal from the government of Jammu and Kashmir for help against tribal invaders who, he claimed, were aided and abetted by the Pakistani government.Pakistan denied any involvement. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan insisted the actions by the tribesmen were an almost instinctive response to the atrocities being committed against Muslims in Kashmir. In his correspondence with Nehru, he argued that the tribesmen were helped by local Kashmiri Muslims who sought liberation. Liaquat Ali Khan also pointed out that the government in Kashmir had manipulated the situation in order to accede to India against the wishes of its own people. For Governor General Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the accession was nothing short of a coup d’etat.A different story hid behind these public statements. On November 1, 1947, Mountbatten and his chief of staff, Lord Ismay, travelled to Lahore and met separately with both Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan. When he recorded the daily proceedings in his notebook, Mountbatten could not help but say the tribesmen had been acting on the express and direct command of the Pakistani leadership. Implicitly, Jinnah accepted as much to Mountbatten. “When I asked him how the tribesmen were to be called off, he said that all he had to do was to give them an order to come out and to warn them that if they did not comply, he would send large forces along their lines of communication. In fact, if I was prepared to fly to Srinagar with him, he would guarantee that the business would be settled within 24 hours. I expressed mild astonishment at the degree of control that he appeared to exercise over the raiders,” Mountbatten wrote.Pakistani strategy was to create enough pressure on the Maharaja to abdicate, to then claim that the region should become a part of Pakistan because most people living in Jammu and Kashmir are Muslims. The Pakistani government knew only an indigenous revolt could preclude India from holding on to Kashmir. But therein lay Pakistan’s greatest challenge: The Muslim League had virtually no presence in the state of Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan had no guarantee that the people of Kashmir would overwhelmingly vote to be part of Pakistan.Pakistani leadership was aware of the problem which is why both Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan consistently rejected a plebiscite in Kashmir as long as Indian troops were there. “If the India Government [is] allowed to act…unfettered as [it pleases] by virtue of having already occupied Kashmir and landed their troops there, then, this El Dorado of plebiscite will prove a mirage,” read an official Pakistan statement. During negotiations with Mountbatten, Jinnah strongly objected to having a plebiscite even under the auspices of the UN, maintaining that the presence of Indian troops as well as Sheikh Abdullah’s tilt towards India would deter the average Muslim in Kashmir from voting for Pakistan. In a letter to Attlee, Liaquat Ali Khan described Sheikh Abdullah as a “quisling” and a “paid agent of the Congress for the last two decades”.In a December 1947 meeting with his Indian counterpart, Liaquat Ali Khan also questioned the efficacy of a voting process in Kashmir while it was under an India-sponsored administration. “…[T]he people of Kashmir were bound to vote, in the plebiscite, in favour of whatever administration was then in power. The Kashmiris were an illiterate and oppressed people, and they would be bound to favor the authority in possession. If an Englishman went as administrator, they would vote to join the United Kingdom,” he said.That not only the Maharaja but also the National Conference favoured India was the advantage Nehru wanted. In his correspondence with Indian politicians, he pointed out that any activity by Pakistan would look illegal and unacceptable after Kashmir had acceded to India. He was right. After the Maharaja acceded to India on October 26, 1947, New Delhi was successful in portraying to the rest of the world that Pakistan-supported militant activity was an act of belligerence. This would remain the thrust of India’s case against Pakistan for the times to come.The accession also formed the basis for a justification of India’s military presence in Kashmir. The Indian government argued it was well within its right to send troops to drive away outsiders from what it considered Indian territory. When Pakistan contended that it would only attempt to ensure the withdrawal of tribal militias if that coincided with a simultaneous withdrawal of Indian forces from Kashmir, the Indians simply refused, arguing that the presence of the two forces could not be treated the same way.By the end of 1947, India decided to apprise the world of what it called Pakistani intrusion in Kashmir. In a meeting with Mountbatten in December that year, Nehru suggested India should raise the issue at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “charging Pakistan with aggression and asking UNO [United Nations Organization] to call upon Pakistan to refrain from doing so”. If the Security Council failed to make Pakistan stop its “aggression”, he warned, “we would have to take action ourselves in such a manner as we thought fit to stop this aggression at the base.”When Mountbatten suggested that the “UNO [should] supervise and carry out a plebiscite as we had previously declared” once “law and order has been restored”, Nehru replied with a definitive no. When India had made a unilateral offer for a plebiscite after partition, he argued, Pakistan rejected it and instead chose to support chaos in the valley. It was that chaos that made the plebiscite unfeasible, he declared.Pakistan’s early policy in Kashmir obviously failed to result in any legitimacy for Pakistan’s claim. Within its borders, however, the Pakistani state was incredibly successful in cementing Kashmir as an invaluable, indispensable and eternal part of the Pakistani national imagination. Primarily, this was a function of fervent propaganda campaigns carried out by newspapers such as Dawn, Jang, Nawa-i-Waqt and Zamindar as well as through radio broadcasts and publishing special pamphlets, books and plays. Several films produced in this era also carried an explicit message that Kashmir belonged to Pakistan and it was incumbent on the Pakistani state and society to take necessary measures to realise its integration within Pakistan.Both Islamabad and New Delhi ceaselessly try to expunge from public imagination anything that questions, albeit remotely, their official narratives on Kashmir even when the two narratives sometimes are as divergent from truth as they are from each other.The overarching theme pervading this propaganda was the two-nation theory that Muslims were different from the Hindus and, therefore, the two cannot live together. Within a few short years after independence, the Pakistani media had convinced the citizenry that pursuing Kashmir through any means was not only legitimate, it was also noble.The argument was simple: Kashmir was a Muslim majority area and hence could not be ruled by Hindus. By promoting such a narrative, the Pakistani state ensured that the Kashmir question was enmeshed with the question of Pakistani identity and that both questions were framed in religious terms.This narrative, however, translated into little bargaining power during negotiations with India. Unsurprisingly, when Liaquat Ali Khan exchanged letters with Indian and British leaders, he seldom made a reference to Islam or jihad. His arguments, instead, rested entirely on the Kashmiris’ right to self-determine their political future. Pakistan posited that India had forcibly and undemocratically annexed Kashmir without taking the will of the people into account.In the age of decolonisation, self-determination was considered a universal right and carried far more weight than the two-nation theory. Highlighting its absence as the core reason for the problem in Kashmir, indeed, forced India on the defensive. On several occasions, Nehru had to give assurances that a plebiscite would eventually take place and that the mandate of the Kashmiri people will be respected.This apologetic Indian reaction convinced the Pakistani ruling elite that if it needed to force India to a negotiating table, it needed help — from powerful friends.New York, November 1952Sir Gladwyn Jebb, the British representative to the UN, handed a draft resolution on Kashmir to his Indian counterpart Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit who hurriedly wrote to Nehru, telling him that Britain and the United States were prepared to take the matter to the UNGA if India did not move within the next 30 days. A debate in the General Assembly and a possible resolution against India could be a national embarrassment, she said.Nehru was aghast. “Have the English learnt nothing at all during the last few years? I am not thinking so much of their draft resolution, although that is bad enough, but rather of the way they think they can bully us. If there is one thing that all the powers in the world cannot do, it is to bully us,” he wrote in his feverish reply to Pandit.Nehru’s frustration with Britain and the US had been growing for the past couple of years. He believed British and American patronage was the chief reason why Pakistan was being abrasive towards India. The Pakistani establishment, indeed, was seeking political and military support from the two countries in return for strategic loyalty. Quickly though, the Pakistani elite realised that its efforts would have to be directed mostly towards the US as Britain had little economic and political clout left in the post-World War II era. While the sun was setting on the British Empire, the American pursuit of hegemony in the postcolonial world had just begun.This period was also the beginning of the Cold War, the ideological conflict between the US and the Soviet Union that would last for the rest of the 20th century and engulf the entire world. Policymakers in the White House and the State Department were deeply anxious to enlarge the American sphere of influence to ensure that newly formed states did not gravitate towards the Soviet camp.The American reaction to the first phase of the Kashmir crisis was to impose an arms embargo on both Pakistan and India. But this policy had to change with the beginning of the 1950s. As the realities of the Cold War took centre stage, American policymakers aggressively pursued the policy of “containment” against the “communist virus” and they found in Pakistan a willing partner in their pursuit of this policy in the subcontinent.In 1950, Liaquat Ali Khan publicly admitted that Pakistan would “seize the opportunity eagerly” should the US decide to give it as much importance as it gave to Turkey. Keen on developing a stronghold in the Middle East, the Americans were planning a multilateral security arrangement among Iran, Iraq and Turkey, their allies in the region. Given its geographical proximity to the Middle East, Pakistan could be included in this collective.While Britain had reservations about including Pakistan in a Middle East collective and warned the Americans about the possible negative effects it might have on the relations between Washington and New Delhi, policymakers in the US remained determined to make Pakistan a client state. For its part, Pakistan received strong warnings from Moscow and Beijing against such an arrangement but the Pakistani establishment was adamant on securing military aid from the US.When American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles visited Pakistan in the summer of 1953, he was deeply heartened to see Pakistan’s enthusiasm to ally with his country. In December that year, American Vice President Richard Nixon visited the subcontinent and concluded that America needed to sacrifice a potential relationship with India for one with Pakistan. In 1954, Pakistan became part of the South East Asian Treaty Organization (Seato) that also included Australia, France, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, the UK and the US; in early 1955, it joined the Baghdad Pact along with Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Britain and the US.While the rebel in him might have been defiant, the politician in Nehru understood that these alliances had changed the power dynamics in South Asia. Equally importantly, the situation in Kashmir was changing and support for Pakistan was emerging among the Kashmiris. In 1953, Nehru acknowledged that a pro-Pakistan lobby was present in Kashmir valley alongside a pro-India one.A number of political actors, including Sheikh Abdullah – who, by then, had become the prime minister of Jammu and Kashmir – also started imagining a possibly independent Kashmir. He went to the extent of stating that his government was not bound by the accession treaty signed by the Maharaja. Many in India’s ruling Congress party, who considered him a friend, were shocked by the statement. New Delhi could simply not afford a popular challenge to the accession treaty. Sheikh Abdullah was, therefore, sentenced to 11 years in prison under what became the infamous “Kashmir conspiracy case”.All these developments forced Indian leaders to seek a lasting, internationally-recognised agreement over Kashmir. In May 1955, Nehru met with Pakistan’s Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra and his interior minister Iskander Mirza in Delhi. Senior Indian minister Maulana Abul Kalam Azad was also present during the talks which lasted for three consecutive days.Despite tumultuous relations between the two states, the air in the negotiation room was gracious, even hopeful. Nehru frankly admitted that the American military aid had changed security circumstances in the subcontinent since “it brought the prospect of world war to our door”. Bogra, however, assured his Indian counterpart that Pakistan desired nothing but friendliness with its neighbour to the east. At one point, he even said: “India [is] a big country, the big sister of Pakistan…India should, therefore, be generous and magnanimous”.While the two states were putting up a rare show of mutual understanding, the voice of the Kashmiris was conspicuously missing from their discussions. The real question being discussed was a partition of Kashmir. Before the Delhi meeting, Pakistan’s Governor General Malik Ghulam Muhammad had informally proposed that a large tract of land north of the Chenab River should be transferred to Pakistan and that Kashmir, as a whole, should come under some sort of a joint supervision by the two states.For Nehru, these proposals were “completely impractical”. The Indian side could never give up territory because the Indian constitution stipulated that the government in Delhi could not alter the boundaries of the state of Jammu and Kashmir without the consent of the state’s own legislature.While Bogra agreed that the Governor General’s proposals were unfeasible, he emphasised that he could not return to Pakistan empty-handed. “Something had to be done to make [the people of Pakistan] feel that they had gained something,” is what Bogra told Nehru who said India could transfer only the Poonch district to Pakistan. Bogra and Mirza sombrely announced that “if they accepted the Indian proposal, they would be blown sky-high in Pakistan”.Their concerns were not exaggerated. Many political and religious leaders in Pakistan were mobilising people for an Islamic war in Kashmir. On August 14, 1953, Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman, then governor of East Pakistan, exhorted the Pakistanis to “keep their swords shining and horses ready”. Feroz Khan Noon, the then chief minister of Punjab, said in a public meeting in Lahore, two days later, that the Indian government had gone “back on [the] international understanding between the two countries” by sending troops into “a predominantly Muslim country — Kashmir”.Such provocations, mirrored relentlessly by the Pakistani press and radio, could only lead to an atmosphere full of deep acrimony where conflict was celebrated and peace was mocked as a manifestation of weakness. In 1954, a pamphlet entitled Fatwa was published in Pakistan which contained virulently anti-India contents with reference to Kashmir. The Indian High Commission in Pakistan requested the Pakistani government to withdraw the pamphlet. The request was turned down.Also read: Enforced disappearances: The plight of Kashmir's 'half widows'In these politically charged circumstances, Bogra and Mirza could not make any concessions without risking the fall of their government. The same militaristic narrative that the Pakistani state was actively promoting, thus, circumscribed its negotiating power.When the two sides returned to the negotiating table the next day, Bogra produced a map of Jammu and Kashmir. It was divided into two parts: the Hindu areas which amounted to a few districts around Jammu were coloured yellow while the rest of the map was coloured green to indicate the Muslim majority areas. The Pakistani delegates suggested a “large area of the Jammu province including Poonch, Riyasi, Udhampur” could go to India along with the “possible transfer of Skardu to India”.Azad, at that point, stated that India could at best agree to concede some parts of Mirpur district alongside Poonch to Pakistan. For Nehru, the acceptance of Pakistani proposals was as good as an Indian “defeat and the dictation of terms” by Pakistan which, he said, no Indian government could accept. Mirza responded by stating that all he could do was report back to his government in Karachi. And on that inconclusive note, the negotiations ended.Although the talks achieved nothing, they clearly depicted that Kashmir had turned into a territorial dispute. The ultimate object on the negotiating table was a map — a cartographic representation of space bereft of people and their history, identities, voices and relationships. The Kashmiri ‘self’ – which Pakistan ostensibly wanted to guard under the banner of Islam and which India wanted to protect under its constitution – was actually considered wholly fluid and expendable, something that could be cut up by the two states wantonly. The important question was not whether to cut Kashmir or not — it was how to go about cutting it. And so it has remained since then.Karachi, February 8, 1963A young Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was hunched over a sprawling map of Kashmir, surrounded by the delegates he was leading as Pakistan’s foreign minister. They were in the middle of the third round of talks with their counterparts from India. The first two rounds had taken place in Rawalpindi and Delhi. The agenda was now a familiar one — the drawing of a boundary that could divide Kashmir between India and Pakistan.The Pakistani delegation was anxious. “We must draw lines on the map,” they insisted. As ever, it seemed an impossible exercise. Swaran Singh, India’s foreign minister and the head of the Indian delegation, drew a line on the map indicating his side’s “readiness to concede in favor of Pakistan the rich forest areas in the north, on both sides of the Kishenganga River”. He also suggested that India was ready to concede some more areas in the west and north of the Kashmir valley.The Pakistani negotiators appeared shocked at the meagreness of his offer. Bhutto prepared a counter offer — only Kathua, a district on the border with Punjab, and some adjoining areas from other districts would go to India while Pakistan would be entitled to all the others areas up to Ladakh in the north-east and including Srinagar, Jammu, Udhampur and Riyasi districts. The Indians immediately shot down these suggestions as “ridiculous”.The invasion by the “Azad Forces” led to massive retaliation by the Indian military not only against Pakistan but also within the state of Jammu and Kashmir. An intense military campaign was started to rid Kashmir of outside elements as well as any local pro-Pakistani activists.Bhutto perhaps believed that placing such a huge demand would compel the Indians to revise their original offer, convincing them to give up more territory. Singh, however, was determined not to cede anything more than he had offered. He said he was willing to accept an end to the talks, seeing little point in another round scheduled in Calcutta that March.The angst, the arguments and the outcome — nothing that happened in Karachi was unexpected but the world in which these talks took place was being critically transformed.In 1958, Field Marshal Ayub Khan launched a coup d’état against the civilian government and set himself in power as the Chief Martial Law Administrator of Pakistan. His martial law regime was bent upon consolidating the central authority in Pakistan, reigning in recalcitrant provinces and establishing its writ at all costs. And, despite all the trouble at home, Kashmir figured prominently in the military government’s imagination. Critical to this pursuit was the acquisition of military aid and international support against India. The US remained a crucial supporter in this regard and the Pakistani state continued to identify itself as a strategic ally of the West against the “menace of communism”. Relations between India and Pakistan also soured further under the martial law regime despite some high-level talks, including a one-on-one meeting between Nehru and Ayub Khan. By 1961, public confrontations between the two states peaked with accusations flying between them.That year also marked the inauguration of John F Kennedy as the 35th president of the United States. His administration was keen on a rapprochement with India. Pakistan, obviously uncomfortable with such a policy, realised it could not rely merely on the United States and needed to expand its international support base. The Soviet Union was across a vast ideological gulf from Pakistan and, more importantly, had very friendly relations with India. Pakistan, therefore, began courting the People’s Republic of China. Beginning with Nikita Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin’s legacy, China-Soviet relations had been rapidly worsening. By 1961, there was an official parting of ways. During this time, relations between China and India also experienced a sharp decline owing to a series of conflicts on the Himalayan border between the two countries. These conflicts eventually resulted in the 1962 Sino-Indian War.China’s anti-India stance as well as its victory in the 1962 war made China a possibly important ally for Pakistan. Internal correspondences among Indian officials in the early 1960s show their anxiety over a possible Pakistan-China secret deal and a possible Chinese involvement in Kashmir. Rajeshwar Dayal, India’s high commissioner in Pakistan, went to the extent of warning Ayub Khan against befriending China. “I warned the President [of Pakistan] that if China was no friend of ours, it was much less a friend of Pakistan’s. Bringing China into the Kashmir dispute would make the problem completely insoluble, for the Chinese would be playing only their own game.” He then reminded Ayub Khan of “his own views regarding China’s aggressiveness and expansionism” and his declaration in November, 1959, “that Pakistan would not take advantage of India’s difficulties with China”.Indian fears were confirmed when, during the very first round of Pakistan-India talks in early 1963, the Pakistani side announced having reached an agreement with China on Kashmir’s border with the Chinese region of Sinkiang (now spelled Xinjiang). The Indian delegation was shocked not only at the nature of the announcement but also over its odd timing.Tensions rose between India and Pakistan exponentially when the China Pakistan Boundary Agreement was officially signed on March 2, 1963. The agreement sought to “delimit and demarcate” the boundary between China’s Xinjiang region, and its proximate regions, which formed part of Kashmir under Pakistan’s control and resulted in the demarcation of a new international border and a territory exchange between Pakistan and China. As a result of these developments, China ended up controlling all of the present-day Xinjiang region.Through the agreement with China, Pakistan made two noteworthy gains. Firstly, it consolidated its relationship with China, signalling to both India and the United States that Pakistan had a powerful friend in the region. Secondly, by negotiating – and reaching an agreement – with China on a border in Kashmir, Pakistan was able to establish its sovereignty over those parts of Kashmir which it controlled. This was a major setback to Indian claims that the entirety of Kashmir was an indivisible whole and an unquestionable part of India. Once China established its writ over the areas it had received through the agreement with Pakistan, it became virtually impossible for India to reclaim them without going to war with China.Political leadership in India, therefore, was appalled by the Pak-China agreement and saw it as a proof of Pakistani insincerity. Almost immediately the matter was taken up in Lok Sabha, India’s lower house of parliament. Nehru told the parliamentarians that Pakistan’s official claims of having given up just over 2,000 square miles of territory to China were not correct. China, indeed, had gained control over 13,000 square miles — almost all those parts of Xinjiang region which during the British Raj in India had been included in Kashmir. This, he said, became possible because Pakistan had surrendered “that part of the Indian territory in Jammu and Kashmir which is under Pakistan’s illegal occupation”.Countering the speeches being made in the Indian parliament, Bhutto addressed Pakistan’s National Assembly and argued that the Indian attitude “confirms our genuine apprehensions that there has been no real desire on the part of India to reach an honourable and equitable settlement with us on Kashmir”.As the stalemate continued, the political situation within Pakistan was rapidly deteriorating. Indian intelligence concluded, and rightly so, that Ayub Khan’s regime found itself in hot waters. In a secret letter written to Commonwealth Secretary Y D Gundevia, India’s high commissioner in Pakistan, G Parthasarathy, quoted a highly credible Pakistani source – mentioned in the letter as Colonel Mohtarram – as saying that Ayub Khan was increasingly becoming unpopular among the masses as well as in the army. His unpopularity in the army could have been because of his corrupt dealings, his involvement in partisan politics and his ill treatment of senior officers. The Pakistani source believed an underground campaign against Ayub Khan was being run from England and was gaining strength. Given his desperate position within Pakistan, the source apprehended, Ayub Khan “might start the so-called ‘Jihad’ against India in the hope of consolidating his own position.” The Indians, the colonel suggested, “should therefore be prepared to meet such a situation”. He also warned that Pak-China relations were likely to deepen.These reports caused grave apprehensions in New Delhi. An unstable regime in Pakistan could create trouble in Kashmir, especially if there had been some secret arrangement between Pakistan and China. On July 24, 1963, Bhutto gave a long and fiery speech in the National Assembly and claimed that “an attack by India on Pakistan would involve the territorial integrity and security of the largest State in Asia”. This strengthened suspicions in New Delhi that a secret pact actually existed between China and Pakistan.Also read: Neelum Valley: The sapphire trailThe Indians took the matter to the Americans, raising alarm over how a Pak-China alliance could wreak havoc in Kashmir. The Americans, however, assured the Indians that they had been guaranteed by the Pakistanis that there was no secret deal between Pakistan and China.The American assurances did little to assuage Indian concerns. Over the course of the next year, relations between India and Pakistan plummeted even further. In early 1964, India redesignated the heads of state and government in Jammu and Kashmir as “governor” and “chief minister” – instead of Sadr-e-Riasat and Prime Minister – and called for the hoisting of the Indian flag on government buildings in the state instead of the state’s own flag. In September that year, Pakistan followed suit in its part of Kashmir by replacing the Azad Kashmir flag at the President’s House in Muzzafarabad with the Pakistani flag.Tensions burst forth in the summer of 1965 when guerrilla fighters – hailed as “mujahideen” in the Pakistani press – invaded Indian-controlled parts of Kashmir. According to Indian sources, “5,000 armed men, trained and supported by the Pakistani army had been sent in across the cease-fire line to commit arson and sabotage, to strike at our security forces and to incite the local people to rise against the Government”. Pakistan vehemently denied having designed the infiltration, arguing that the “Azad Forces” which had invaded the Indian-controlled part of Kashmir was an organic and indigenous response to the Indian occupation. Pakistan also maintained that Pakistani military action in support of the “Azad Forces” was only an act of self-defence undertaken after India had violated the ceasefire line.The UN, however, saw Pakistan as the aggressor and directed it to observe the ceasefire line and abide by the status quo. In a letter to the UN Secretary General, Ayub Khan refused to comply. “I fear that your present appeal will only serve to perpetrate that injustice by leaving the people of occupied Kashmir to the mercy of India. What is to become of the brave people of Kashmir who are fighting for their freedom? I cannot believe that it would be the intention of the United Nations to permit India to liquidate them and to consolidate its stranglehold over occupied Kashmir,” he wrote.The invasion by the “Azad Forces” led to massive retaliation by the Indian military not only against Pakistan but also within the state of Jammu and Kashmir. An intense military campaign was started to rid Kashmir of outside elements as well as any local pro-Pakistani activists. Regular Pakistani military units also entered the Indian-administered Kashmir, citing Indian atrocities there and as a declaration of support for the Kashmiri people. Concomitantly, India launched a full scale attack on Pakistan’s western border near Lahore and Sialkot. The Pakistani authorities were not expecting this attack.Pakistan immediately looked towards its allies, particularly the US and Britain, for help but the State Department did not find it prudent to support Pakistan. Ayub Khan invoked the assurances given by America in 1959, which made it incumbent on the US to provide support to Pakistan in the event of a war but the American government refused to entertain this plea and “did not accept Pakistani denials of infiltration across the ceasefire line”. Shortly thereafter the American government imposed a military embargo on both India and Pakistan.Pakistan vehemently protested against the embargo. In repeated discussions with the American ambassador to Pakistan as well as the British high commissioner, Bhutto pleaded for a re-evaluation of the policy. India, he argued, was still receiving aid from the Soviet Union whereas Pakistan was getting no arms since it relied solely on weapons from its Anglo-American allies. The embargo, thus, disproportionately affected Pakistan, greatly weakening its position. But all his pleas fell on deaf ears.Anglo-American indifference was not for want of sympathy for the Pakistani case. Indeed, the September 6, 1965, attack on Lahore and Sialkot had convinced many in London and Washington that, while Pakistan might have initiated the conflict, it was Indian belligerence which had exacerbated it. There was also some recognition that Pakistan would need some guarantee regarding the resolution of the Kashmir issue for it to agree to a ceasefire.The war, however, made it clear that India was far stronger militarily than Pakistan and was willing to hold onto Kashmir even at the cost of an indefinite war of attrition. And important international players knew this. On September 16, 1965, the British high commissioner in New Delhi wrote to the Commonwealth Relations Office in London asking for a reappraisal of British policy on Kashmir: “I feel it must be recognized that our historic policy of holding the balance between India and Pakistan no longer accords with the facts: By her action in August 1965, Pakistan in effect abandoned her attempt to secure a political and diplomatic solution of the Kashmir dispute in favour of a military solution. This has now probably failed. India appears from here to be on the way to achieving substantial military superiority over Pakistan through the attrition of Pakistan armour and aircraft. If that assessment proves to be correct, I am convinced that India would not submit to a political settlement at this stage which appeared to favour Pakistan’s claims.”After recognising India’s military superiority, he dwelt on the China connection. “If a political settlement enabled Kashmir to opt into Pakistan, Pakistan and China would then have a common land frontier of several hundred miles accessible by a main motor road within easy striking distance of one of the most thriving industrial areas of India, the Punjab … I do not believe that India could now accept the self-determination of an area which permitted Pakistan and China to develop direct land communications through Ladakh. Nor, as I see it, would this be in the interests of the West.”The prospects of a close Pak-China collaboration right next to India caused considerable anxiety within the Soviet Union too. Moscow, indeed, pressurised New Delhi to accept a ceasefire with Pakistan by raising the spectre of Chinese aggression.But its Western allies made it clear to Pakistani interlocutors that any secret Pak-China endeavour would lose Pakistan all Western support for its stance on Kashmir. The Pakistani government was, therefore, keen to dispel such misgivings. After meeting Ayub Khan, Iran’s ambassador to Pakistan told his British counterpart that the Field Marshal contemptuously dismissed the “possibility of Chinese intervention in [an] Indo-Pakistan war”. The Iranian ambassador quoted the Pakistani president as saying that “Pakistan would never be [a] Chinese satellite” even though it was “prepared if necessary to be [a] United States Satellite”. Ayub Khan also assured the Americans and the British that he had unofficially asked the Chinese to show restraint on the China-India border.Also read: Borders that separate: A daughter’s lamentOn September 19, 1965, however, China issued an official message to India, demanding that the, “Indian Government dismantle all its military works for aggression on the Chinese side of the China-Sikkim boundary or on [the] boundary itself before midnight of September 22, 1965.” China also demanded the return of four kidnapped Tibetan inhabitants, 800 sheep and 51 yaks alleged to be captured by Indian troops.The Indians responded to these Chinese demands with deep agitation. “…[T]he Government of India cannot but observe that China taking advantage of the present unfortunate conflict between India and Pakistan is concocting without any basis casus belli in order to commit aggression against India.” These protestations clearly suggested that India could not afford a simultaneous conflict with China and Pakistan.On September 22, 1965, Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri accepted an offer by Soviet President Kosygin to broker a ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan.Dhaka, December 16, 1971A defeated Amir Abdullah Niazi officially surrendered to his Indian counterpart General Aurora and in doing so announced the end of Pakistani sovereignty over what had been East Pakistan since 1947.India’s victory was complete. Militarily, the Indian army had enjoyed tremendous success and 93,000 Pakistani soldiers and officers were now in its custody. In the West, India had thwarted the Pakistan Army’s initial advances in Chhamb and other parts of Kashmir and, instead, occupied several territories in Pakistan including Thar.On the political front, India successfully dealt a debilitating blow to the religious basis of Pakistan as more Muslims lived in what became Bangladesh than in what remained of Pakistan. Internationally, too, New Delhi was hailed as a champion of democracy, freedom and humanitarianism that helped Bangladeshis get rid of an oppressive state.The cataclysmic events of 1971 were obviously incredibly significant. Equally noteworthy is what did not happen. India, for instance, did not try to take over the Pakistani-controlled part of Kashmir. The reason was American pressure on the Indian government to refrain from taking the war into Kashmir. The Americans argued that any Indian action in Kashmir could precipitate a much larger war involving China, the US and the Soviet Union. D P Dhar, chairman of India’s Policy and Planning committee and a key part of India’s diplomatic endeavours before, during and after the 1971 war, admitted that the American intervention had prevented India from making territorial gains on the western front.Washington, however, did nothing beyond making attempts to avoid a wider conflagration about Kashmir. It did not show any interests in intervening during the war on Pakistan’s behalf. China, too, stayed out of the war. Bhutto, then serving as the president of the truncated Pakistan, made a frank and candid admission of his country’s severely weakened position in a speech to the parliament on July 14, 1972: “Because circumstances were really impossible, India had all the cards in her hands and India is not a generous negotiator. They had Pakistani territory. They had East Pakistan separated from Pakistan. They had 93,000 prisoners of war. They had the threat of war trials and so they were sitting pretty, as the saying goes. What did we have in our hands? Riots, labour troubles and all sorts of internal dissensions … It was a nation completely demoralized, shattered.”The cataclysmic events of 1971 were obviously incredibly significant. Equally noteworthy is what did not happen. India, for instance, did not try to take over the Pakistani-controlled part of Kashmir. The reason was American pressure on the Indian government to refrain from taking the war into Kashmir.He was speaking immediately after the signing of the Simla Agreement.Earlier that year, Dhar met with the French foreign minister who asked him about the chance of a durable peace between India and Pakistan. Dhar was unequivocal. He said India wanted to sign a definitive peace agreement with Pakistan on all issues, including Kashmir. He made it clear to the French minister that “the package of peace related to overall settlement of all elements of tension and friction and that included Kashmir also”.Three days later, Dhar reiterated the centrality of the Kashmir issue to an enduring Pak-India peace during his meeting with Soviet President Kosygin. “…[I]n Kashmir we are faced with the question whether we leave this artificial line where trouble breaks out frequently or whether we should address ourselves to this problem also once and for all. Even if all other issues between the two countries are resolved but the Kashmir issue is allowed to fester like an open wound, there can be no hope of permanent peace in the sub-continent,” Dhar said.The war had drastically changed the power dynamics in the subcontinent and Indian leaders were eager to take advantage of the changes. “Our presentation (on Kashmir) … should bear the stamp of our new prestige and authority,” noted Dhar after his visits to France and the Soviet Union in February 1972. Indian diplomats insisted that the 1971 war rendered the 1949 ceasefire line in Kashmir obsolete. They knew they could make a beleaguered Pakistan agree to the new ceasefire line as a secure, inviolable international border.Pakistan, too, was acutely aware of the asymmetry of power. When the negotiation started on June 28, 1972, Pakistan’s newly appointed Foreign Minister Aziz Ahmed insisted that the peace agreement must demonstrate parity between the two sides. For any agreement to be accepted by the Pakistani public, he repeatedly argued, Pakistan must avoid giving the impression that it capitulated on the issue on Kashmir.But the Indian delegation was unflinching in its demand that the ceasefire line be turned into an international border and Pakistan cease insisting on the Kashmiris’ right to self-determination. Indira Gandhi and Dhar, who were heading the Indian delegation, implied that there could be no movement on the prisoners of war and the withdrawal of Indian troops from parts of Pakistan’s mainland unless Pakistan accepted the ceasefire line as the new border in Kashmir. With his “back against the wall,” Bhutto had little choice but to acquiesce, though he was successful in convincing the Indians that the ceasefire line should be called something short of an internationally recognised border. The final agreement thus read: “In Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the cease-fire of December 17, 1971 shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognized position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force in violation of this Line.”The Simla Agreement was transformative in two respects. Firstly, it laid down bilateralism as a principle underpinning all future negotiations between Islamabad and New Delhi. India has always resisted interference and mediation by other states as well as by the UN when it comes to discussing and settling disputes with Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan would often ask the international community to intervene. With the Simla Agreement, Pakistani efforts to involve the rest of the world in dispute resolution in the subcontinent would have only weak moral and legal authority, if any at all. At least this is how India has been interpreting the agreement since 1972. Secondly, the agreement prevented both India and Pakistan from interfering in the territories owned or controlled by the other side.Even though the Simla Agreement was put into effect, Dhar was not excited about its ability to maintain peace in the long run. What made him particularly pessimistic was the ever-present possibility of a military coup in Pakistan. Indeed, just five years after the agreement, Pakistan experienced its third coup, inaugurating the reign of the most protracted and arguably the most repressive martial law regime in the country — under General Ziaul Haq.Over the next decade, Pakistan became a crucial player in the America-led proxy war in Afghanistan. The Pakistan Army fostered, facilitated and trained Afghan mujahideen not just militarily but also ideologically. A generation of military officers and soldiers, working with these mujahideen, came of age espousing ideas for a global jihad in general and the one in Kashmir in particular. It was during this era that the Zia regime encouraged the massive growth of Islamic fundamentalist organisations within Pakistan and actively supported the emergence of militant outfits for guerrilla warfare in Afghanistan and Kashmir.In 1989, the Red Army began its historic retreat from Afghanistan, initiating the end of the Soviet Union and the Cold War. Emboldened by this victory, the Pakistani establishment cast its eyes on Kashmir, yet again.Srinagar, summer of 1989The sound of gunfire and explosives reverberated in the valley mingled with vociferous chants of ‘azadi’. Young men, their faces often covered, carried Kalashnikov rifles and roamed the streets of Indian-administered Kashmir, demanding freedom from New Delhi.The roots of the 1989 insurgency in Kashmir lay in a highly problematic history of electoral politics of Jammu and Kashmir. In 1987, Farooq Abdullah, son of Sheikh Abdullah and the leader of the National Conference, struck a deal with the Indian government led by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi for the resumption of the electoral process in Indian-administered Kashmir. The election that followed resulted in an easy victory for Farooq Abdullah. The only problem was that a large part of the Kashmiri population deemed the voting to be rigged. By 1989, a huge number of Kashmiri youth had risen in anger to protest against what they considered an unrepresentative government. Many of them soon joined an insurgency against the Indian state.India was quick to respond, deposing Farooq Abdullah, installing Jagmohan Malhotra as governor and deploying 700,000 military and paramilitary soldiers in Kashmir to counter the insurgency. The insurgents received immense support – militarily, diplomatically and financially – from Pakistan. The Pakistani military, particularly the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), was eager to take advantage of anti-Indian sentiments within Kashmir. Jihadi outfits, including the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LT), Hizbul Mujahideen and Harkat-ul-Ansar, were propped up to recruit young Kashmiri men, bring them into Pakistan for training and then send them back into Indian-administered Kashmir.A generation of military officers and soldiers, working with these mujahideen, came of age espousing ideas for a global jihad in general and the one in Kashmir in particular.These developments were taking place as democracy returned to Pakistan in 1988 after an 11-year hiatus and Benazir Bhutto became prime minister. But even though she headed a civilian government, the military establishment tenaciously held on to its influence, particularly on subjects such as Kashmir. Managing relations with India, thus, became a reflection of the conflicting tendencies in Pakistani politics. While the civilian government claimed to work towards a diplomatic solution to the Kashmir issue, the military ardently supported jihadist outfits. This was not lost on the Indian government which rightly considered Benazir Bhutto’s government vulnerable to pressure from the military.It was only in January 1994 that the two sides finally agreed to resume their formal dialogue process as Pakistan’s foreign secretary presented a series of non-papers – so called because the positions stated therein are not considered official – to his Indian counterpart. These non-papers proposed “measures required to create a propitious climate for peaceful resolution of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute and other issues”. These measures ranged from finding the modalities for the holding of a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir to the resolution of other territorial conflicts such as Siachen and Sir Creek.The Indian reply was dismissive: “India categorically states once again that Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India. The question or the need for conducting any plebiscite in any part of India including in the State of Jammu and Kashmir simply does not arise.” The Indian side also claimed that Pakistan had only restated its preconditions for talks through the non-papers. The stalemate thus persisted.In 1996, Farooq Abdullah once again formed a government in Indian-administered Kashmir with support from Congress. Meanwhile in Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto’s second government was toppled and Nawaz Sharif became prime minister, for the second time, in 1997. Amid all these changes, relations between India and Pakistan were following what by then had become a familiar pattern: talk of peace ran parallel to talk of war.This pattern continued when Sharif met his Indian counterpart Atal Bihari Vajpayee in September 1998 in New York on the sidelines of the UNGA. The two sides reaffirmed their commitment to bilateral dialogue during the meeting. But when, a few days later, Sharif supported Kashmir’s right to independence during his address at the UN, his remarks elicited strong objections from New Delhi.His address marked two critical changes. For the first time, Pakistan supported a “third option” — of letting Kashmir become an independent state if it did not want to remain a part of India but also did not want to join Pakistan. As late as 1995, Benazir Bhutto had rejected the third option, arguing that “it would mean the balkanization of both India and Pakistan, which was not in their interest”.Secondly, both India and Pakistan became nuclear states by 1998 and their nuclear capabilities meant that the next war could lead to an unprecedented degree of destruction. The age-old question of Kashmir thus operated in a drastically new paradigm – to put it in the words of some American pundits and officials, the dispute over Kashmir became the world’s most dangerous nuclear flashpoint.It was only after many years that India was willing to come back to the negotiating table. In a historic moment, Prime Minister Vajpayee travelled by bus to Lahore. The world applauded what appeared to be a significant breakthrough. But in the ultimate manifestation of Pakistan’s paradoxical and often parallel policies, the Pakistan Army started sending troops into Kargil on the Indian-controlled side of Kashmir, leading to the fourth India-Pakistan war.The Kargil War was envisioned as a covert operation; which is why Pakistan initially stressed that an Indian assault was aimed at the Kashmiri mujahideen and that Pakistan had sent its troops to the border only in self-defence. But the massive retaliation by India – known as Operation Vijay – compelled Pakistan to seek American mediation for an immediate ceasefire. This showed India that it could neutralise a military attack by Pakistan, the latter’s nuclear capability notwithstanding.Washington, February 2003The American Secretary of State Colin Powell did not seem happy. In a meeting with Khurshid Kasuri, Pakistan’s foreign minister, he expressed concern over the continued infiltration across the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir. Summer was around the corner which would make movement across the LoC easier, pushing Pakistan and India towards the brink of another violent conflict. “We would have a real mess on our hands,” Powell told Kasuri. India and Pakistan, he insisted, would have to take “difficult decisions” were they to avoid war.The American concerns were well founded. Pakistan and India had been on the precipice of a war in 2001/2002 following a terrorist attack on the Indian parliament. While the US had strengthened its relationship with India tremendously over the 1990s, a post-9/11 Pakistan was once again required as a key strategic ally in the War on Terror. America’s strategic interests in South Asia and the Middle East dictated that Washington did whatever it could to keep both India and Pakistan on its side and stop them from engaging in a war. Condoleezza Rice, Powell’s successor as the Secretary of State, informed Kasuri that “American regional interests were linked to stability in South Asia”.In his recently published memoir, Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove, Kasuri credits the Bush administration with facilitating the peace process between India and Pakistan. Pressure from the US, Kasuri reveals, compelled President Pervez Musharraf to reign in a hawkish policy towards India and create conditions conducive for something extraordinary — a chance to settle the Kashmir dispute for all times to come.Beginning in June 2004, India and Pakistan resumed their Composite Dialogue — a process of negotiations that requires simultaneous progress on eight contentious subjects including Kashmir, terrorism, water sharing, nuclear weapons and territorial disputes. In September that year, the two sides decided to set up a mechanism for holding backchannel negotiations on Kashmir. Over the next couple of years, serving and former diplomats and officials from the two countries would hold secret meetings to come up with a formula for a negotiated settlement of the conflict. Publically, too, the two governments sought to mend relations and appeared happy with the progress they were making.Manmohan Singh, who became India’s prime minister in 2004, however, made it clear to Pakistan that the border in Kashmir could not be redrawn. It could be allowed to become “irrelevant”, though, by letting the Kashmiris travel across it with ease. This eventually led to the historic opening of the Muzaffarabad-Srinagar Bus Service in April 2005.Meanwhile, local and foreign interlocutors agreed that Pakistan’s overtures for peace could only amount to something if its establishment agreed to unravel the infrastructure it had so meticulously constructed over the past decade and a half for an insurgency in Kashmir. Murmurs in 2005 and 2006 within Islamabad’s most powerful circles suggested that Musharraf was indeed considering that. While active infiltration into Kashmir decreased during and after those years, terrorist incidents elsewhere in India, such as the serial train bombings in Mumbai in July 2006, still haunted the bilateral negotiations. The terrorist attack which claimed over 200 lives led to severe criticism of Pakistan, and public support in India for the dialogue process plummeted rapidly. Pakistan’s official denial of any involvement in the attack as well as Musharraf’s insistence that Pakistan was no longer supporting terrorist outfits creating trouble in India did little to improve the situation.This is how an official Indian spokesman summed up the situation: “If Pakistan really wants to convince the people of India that we are working against terrorism then it can take some action immediately. For example, the self-styled chief of Hizbul Mujahideen, Syed Salahuddin … should be arrested and handed over to India.” The spokesman also called for an action against Jamaatud Dawa. “Instead of their saying that Jamaat-ud-Dawa is being kept under close watch, the organization should be banned and its leader should be arrested.” A few months later, Musharraf met Singh in Havana and the two sides agreed to set up a joint antiterror mechanism.In December 2006, Musharraf announced something unprecedented. Pakistan, he said, was willing to give up its claim on Kashmir should India agree to his four-point proposal which suggested that: (a) borders between Pakistan and India remain the same; (b) Kashmir be given autonomy but not independence; (c) a steady withdrawal of troops take place from both Indian and Pakistani administered parts of Kashmir and (d) a joint supervision mechanism be set up with representatives from India, Pakistan and Kashmir to ensure a smooth implementation of these proposals. Pakistan said it was even ready to take back its demand for a plebiscite if India was willing to negotiate on the proposals.It remains a matter of conjecture if Musharraf was truly committed to a peace deal but the undemocratic nature of his regime allowed him to exhibit flexibility that a civilian government could not afford. At one stage, a bilateral agreement appeared extremely possible. “We were down to the commas,” Kasuri later told Steve Coll of the New York Times. While Pakistan insisted it had to take into account Kashmiris’ sentiment, the conspicuous absence of any Kashmiri representation in the process was hard to miss. After 60 years of going through political suppression, geographical and social divisions and wars, the Kashmiris were still largely absent from a negotiation table laid down to decide their destiny.It would appear that Pakistan and India were on the precipice of a “deal on Kashmir” when the peace process was thwarted by the political turmoil that engulfed Pakistan in 2007 and continued well into 2008.On November 26, 2008, 10 young men launched a massive terrorist attack in Mumbai, leading to the killing of 164 people over a period of three days. India later claimed the attackers were members of the Pakistan-based LT. The attack would extinguish the prospects of an India-Pakistan peace for many years to come.Epilogue: Lahore, 2015While driving on The Mall, one is likely to spot autorickshaws carrying a certain poster on their backs proclaiming that Pakistan has the right to get Kashmir back from India. The poster also exhorts: “Pakistan can only survive if it keeps its ideology intact.” Together, the two slogans have long served as the bedrock of a state-driven national narrative that sees Islam and Kashmir as its twin foundational pillars.The pursuit of Kashmir remains embedded in popular and official imagination as strongly as the perception that a nuclear Pakistan has a special status within the Muslim countries. Both these views were manifest – and with a lot of celebratory chest thumping – as Pakistan commemorated the 50th anniversary of the 1965 War with India – a war that Pakistan still claims it won. General Raheel Sharif, Chief of the Army Staff and arguably the most powerful man in the country, partook in the celebrations, announcing that “Kashmir remains the unfinished business of partition”.Across the LoC, India’s grip on Kashmir has never been stronger. With half a million soldiers stationed there, Kashmir is the most densely militarised area in the world. And enjoying an across-the-board political support for counterinsurgency measures, Indian governments of different ideological persuasions have felt no qualms in perpetuating a reign of terror against the Kashmiri civilians found protesting on the streets.Chauvinistic and jingoistic rhetoric and policies prevail in both India and Pakistan as far as their stances on Kashmir are concerned. The two governments keep assuring their electorate of the legitimacy of their position as well as their preparedness for war.The rest of the world, meanwhile, remains a faithful, but passive, audience to a Kashmiri spectacle, in which the same characters are condemned to perform the same acts with the same tragic outcomes.

The year is 1933 and you are the Führer, war in 1939 is inevitable. What changes in diplomacy and military strategy could cause the Axis Powers to win the war?

January 30, 1933I am appointed Reichskanzler of Germany by Reichspräsident Paul von Hindenburg, and immediately set out to create a new political cabinet. Appointing key figures such as Joseph Goebbels as Minister of Propaganda and other positions. With my ascension to power, I set forth to put my Four Year Plan into action, to get our nation back to full employment and out of the depression.· Nationalization of German industries·Nationalization of the Reichsbank; eliminating the use of credit and banning of usury· Reduce unemployment· Return of agricultural lands to peasants· Increase of synthetic fiber production· Undertake public works projects: Construction of new and modern schools, hospitals, factories, bridges, dams etc.· Development of Health and Fitness programs for the youth, free Healthcare for citizens· Introduction of laws for the Protection and preservation of nature and wildlife· Increase of automobile production· Initiate numerous building and architectural projects· Development of an Autobahn road networks and advanced railway systemsThe effects are felt almost immediately, as the nation’s economy begins to grow and recover from the depression at an exponential rate. I spend my first year in office consolidating power, using intimidation, eliminating all opposing political parties, banning trade unions and establishing the Geheime Staatspolizei (Gestapo).With the infamous Reichstag Fire in February, the new German parliament is forced to pass a series of contingency plans and grant me emergency powers in a new law called the Enabling Act. This act allows the government to carry out the necessary procedures to secure German interests, such as the burning of Communist books, sending criminals and political opponents to re-education camps, and the banning of all other political parties and trade unions, effectively transforming Germany into a totalitarian state.Meanwhile , life for the average German is considerably better than before, the German people are united and the tensions between wealthy and poor are virtually eliminated. For the younger citizens, a youth wing of NSDAP is created, the “Hitler Youth”. In order for them to gain greater appreciation for their country, youth hostels are built all across the nation, enabling the youth to hike from one beautiful town to another seeing their fatherland with every effort being made to strengthen their minds and bodies. My Four Year Plan oversees great public works projects across the nation, creating new employment opportunities for the mass millions; building new bridges, hydroelectric dams, canals and roads where there are none. All while ensuring that these projects do not unnecessarily destroy the German landscape or wildlife habitats and forests.In July 1936, a civil war erupts in Spain between the socialist Second Spanish Republic and General Francisco Franco and his traditionalist Spanish nationalists. Almost immediately, I declare my support for the nationalists, issuing the creation of an expeditionary force called the Condor Legion, alongside the Kingdom of Italy’s Corpo Truppe Volontarie Legion and the Portuguese Republic’s Viriantos. The battlegrounds of Spain are also used as testing grounds for new lines of weapons, planes and armor. Under the leadership of three of the most prominent military leaders, German/Nationalist forces are able to decisively defeat Republican forces and draw ever closer towards Barcelona and Madrid.August 1, 1936 - The Berlin Summer OlympicsTo celebrate this historic event, I personally visit in the Olympiastadion to an enthusiastic crowd, in my own VIP box as I open the historic Olympic Games. As many as 348 of Germany’s finest athletes showcase their skills throughout the event, often competing with the U.S. and other nations. By the end of the Summer Olympic Games, the German Reich emerges in 1st with 89 Medals, with the United States coming in 2nd with 56. Calling it a great victory for National Socialism.Later during a state visit to Berlin, I greet Italian Prime Minister and Il Duce of Fascism Benito Mussolini, to discuss the formation of a new axis of power in Europe known as the Rome-Berlin Axis. As well as the increasing threat of the Third Communist International (Comintern) and our efforts to contain Bolshevik influence, signing a treaty known as the Anti-Comintern Pact along with the Empire of Japan and other countries.In 1938, the German Reich annexes Austria in the Anschluss along with the German speaking Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia. I along with Il Duce, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and French President Édouard Daladier meet in the city of Munich, Bavaria to discuss peace talks. I explain that our recent expansion into surrounding regions is aimed solely at uniting all German-speaking peoples into a Greater German Reich, and promise that the Sudetenland which contains three million ethnic Germans, will be my last territorial demand. Accepting my claims for German-speaking territories and hoping to maintain peace, Chamberlain and Daladier sign the Munich Pact with Mussolini acting as mediator. The event is portrayed as a yet another great victory without a battle, what Prime Minister Chamberlain refers to as “peace in our time”.By early-1939, peace reigns in Europe, in both the German Reich and Kingdom of Italy, our economies continue to prosper reaching full-employment and support for the National Socialist/Fascist governments are at an all-time high. The peace however, is short-lived, as we receive reports that as many as 60,000 ethnic Germans have been brutally murdered by the Poles. Once again, I demand that the Polish Republic cede the port city of Danzig to East Prussia in order to link up with the rest of Germany. This time however, there is no meeting in Munich, Britain and France side with Poland and strongly demand that Germany back down from its demands, claiming they are willing and ready to support Poland militarily should Germany invade.German and Italian delegates meet once more in Berlin, to sign a Pact of Friendship and Alliance known as the Pact of Steel. Later, German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop is sent to Moscow where he along with Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov sign the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in August, a move of brilliant cunning and a complete surprise to the world. Up to the last moment, we continue attempting to convince the western powers to renew negotiations in order to solve the Danzig question peacefully and avert another unnecessary war.September 1, 1939With all attempts of negotiations with Poland having failed, the German Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS push aside the Polish frontier barriers, and mobile forces race forward. On September 3rd, Great Britain and France declare war on Germany, honoring their promise to stand by Poland. The German Luftwaffe along with new Panzer divisions break through Polish defenses and strike deep, cutting communications and spreading confusion in a revolutionary new war tactic called Blitzkrieg. Enemy strongpoints are bypassed, left for the following infantry to mop up. By September 8th, German armies reach the outskirts of Warsaw and on the 17th, German forces reach the city of Brest-Litovsk. On the same day, the Soviet Union invades eastern Poland in accordance with our Non-Aggression Pact. Upon reaching Warsaw, we offer the Polish government to surrender and cease hostilities, they refuse, so the full fury of the German war machine is turned on them. On September 27th, the Polish government in Warsaw finally surrenders after 29 days of fighting.Within a month, the Polish aggressor is defeated and the massacres have ended. Once again we send more offers to end hostilities and return to 1939 borders excluding West Prussia and Danzig which are formerly German cultivated and with a sizable German population (Danzig). Other than low-scale British and German maneuvers in Norway and Denmark, the great bloodbath known as World War II has not yet begun and can still be avoided.However, the Allies ignore our numerous pleas for peace and for the next eight months, all is eerily quiet in the west. Suddenly our forces intercept an allied message in which we learn that Britain and France are plotting Scandinavian-based maneuvers and are deploying a massive mechanized fighting force in Northern France, in anticipation of invading Germany via, Belgium and Holland, sometime in the spring of 1940. The tiny states of Belgium and The Netherlands (members of the globalist League of Nations) claim to be “neutral”. In reality, under the pressure and influence of the mighty British & French empires (also members of the League of Nations), the two mini-states have been assisting the Allies in their preparation for an attack upon Germany. Which had quit the League of Nations in 1933. Determined to beat the western Allies to the punch, Germany has no choice but to go on the offensive, therefore my generals and I prepare plans to make the first decisive move.Our sights first turn towards Scandinavia. The German war machine relies on iron ore from Sweden. In the winter months, the only way this valuable resource could get to Germany, is by the Norwegian port of Narvik. We know that if the allies landed in Norway, this vital supply could be cut-off, so I order plans be prepared for an invasion of Norway. Denmark which is in the way, will also have to be seized in order to counter possible allied incursions.The Norway Theatre heats up on February 16, 1940 as British destroyer HMS Cossack boards the German transport/supply ship Altmark in a Norwegian fjord to release prisoners. On April 9th, German troops begin landing at five ports: Oslo, Kristiansand, Bergen, Trondheim and Narvik. At the same time, men of our newly formed Fallschirmjäger seize Stavanger and Oslo airfields, the Norwegian defenders are swiftly overwhelmed as are the Danes, German forces occupy Denmark in less than 24 hours in what will become known as Operation Weserübung. With our supplies of iron ore secured and minor allied incursions brushed aside, we continue to make plans for our next major blitzkrieg.May 10, 1940Winston Churchill is appointed Prime Minister of Great Britain. That same day at dawn, a whole German airborne division parachutes into Holland to seize bridges and airfields. Simultaneously, the massive Belgian fortress of Eben Emael is assaulted, paratroop engineers are dropped on top by swooping German gliders who swiftly silence its guns. Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe attacks Dutch and Belgian airbases and frontier barriers are pushed aside. German Army Group B under Generalfeldmarschall Fedor von Bock, drives into Holland and Belgium. As planned, the French and British armies along the Belgian border move forward to their new defensive line along the Dyle and Meuse Rivers. Meanwhile, Army Group A which consists mostly of panzers, after brushing aside the Belgian frontier troops, begin driving through the hills and woods of the Ardennes forest to their south. Within days, the Dutch capitulate after several bombing raids on major port cities, then comes the hammer, the thing that British and French planners thought impossible happens: German panzers are through the Ardennes and reach the river Meuse by May 12th. Among the first to arrive at Sedan, well north of the Maginot Line are the men of the 19th Panzer Corpscommanded by Generaloberst Heinz Guderian fresh from the triumphs of Poland, who pushes on, not even waiting for his own infantry to catch up. The next day, assault troops cross the river Meuse, engineers begin building bridges for the armor while under heavy French fire.On May 14th, the panzers begin crossing, that evening Generaloberst Guderian’s bridgehead is eight miles deep, the French troops stuck in the Maginot Line are too immobile to intervene. Allied bombers make disparaging attempts to destroy the German bridges but most are shot down. All the while, German artillery pounds the French defenses while our Junkers Ju-87 Stuka dive bombers scream in. Just three days after the attack is launched, the French defenders around Sedan break, the panzers begin racing westwards. By nightfall, they advance more than 40 miles behind the northern group of allied armies. By May 19th, after brushing off several allied attempts to counterattack, Generaloberst Guderian’s lead units pass Peronne, on the 20th, in an extraordinary 56-mile dash, Amiens is taken by lunchtime, Abbeville just 14 miles from the English Channel is seized by 9:00 that evening, and at midnight a battalion of the 2nd Panzer Division reaches the coast at Noyelles splitting the Allied front in two.On May 21st, two Allied armored battalions prepare to launch an attack just south of our positions. Our forces have little trouble in repulsing the attack, after a series of crushing defeats, the British Expeditionary Force is pushed back to the ports of Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkirk, trapping them. By May 25th, the situation of the British Expeditionary Force and the French 1st Army is desperate, the port of Boulogne has been overrun and German troops have isolated Calais and the British have been forced back to the port of Dunkirk. Despite wanting to make one final assault to destroy the allied forces believing this could be our only chance to do so, I along with the OKH are fully aware that our panzer crews are exhausted, and our machines need urgent repairs. For two days, the offensive is halted thereby allowing the B.E.F. to evacuate by sea. Even so, the British have lost most of their heavy weapons leaving France to fend for herself.At 4:00a.m. on June 5th, a short German bombardment begins the final destruction of France. Assault troops cross the Somme and Aisne rivers. At first French resistance is fierce and our troops struggle to break out of their bridgeheads but once again, the Luftwaffe helps crush their defenses. Soon the panzers push south and by the 9th they reach the river Seine with the infantry only a few hours behind. Once across the river, the Germans span out into the interior of the country and on the 14th the Wehrmacht triumphantly enters Paris. The city which had eluded the Kaiser in 1914.Discouraged by his cabinet's hostile reaction to a British proposal to unite France and Britain to avoid defeat, and believing that his ministers no longer support him, Prime Minister Paul Reynaud resigns on June 16th. He is succeeded by Marshal of France Philippe Pétain, who delivers a radio address to the French people announcing his intention to ask for an armistice with Germany. When I receive word from the French government that they wished to negotiate an armistice, I’m elated and select the Forest of Compiègne as the site for the negotiations.Compiègne had been the site of the 1918 Armistice, which ended the First World War with a humiliating defeat for Germany; I view the choice of location as a supreme moment of revenge for Germany over France.The German preemptive strike across Holland and Belgium, as well as the earlier occupation of parts of Denmark and Norway in April, have denied the Allies of the opportunity to encircle Germany before invading it.After hearing the news of the French surrender and armistice, we send our most generous offer of peace to the British government in which Britain’s independence is guaranteed and will be allowed to keep its empire, in exchange for a freehand in Europe in order to concentrate our forces on a far greater threat in the east. Prime Minister Churchill declares he will have none of it and makes his famous “Never Surrender” speech to the House of Commons, vowing to continue the war in any way possible. Seeing that he won’t accept any form of peace, we are again forced to allow the Luftwaffe to begin attacks on the British homeland, but I order them to strictly focus on military targets: radar stations, airfields, factories etc. and engage the Royal Air Force clearing the skies in preparation for a proposed invasion of Great Britain, but only to be carried out as a last resort.On June 10, 1940 the Kingdom of Italy under Il Duce Benito Mussolini issues a Declaration of War against Great Britain and France. Upon hearing this and looking to use Italy’s position to our advantage, I request an audience with Il Duce, the Royal Italian Military and Italian Defense Ministries in order to discuss how we can achieve a quick victory or at least an advantage over Great Britain and her allies. After carefully studying the strengths and weaknesses of the British Commonwealth of Nations, eventually it is agreed that the only way to gain superiority over the British in North Africa, is to cut-off the Allied routes in the Mediterranean by occupying the island of Malta, thus allowing faster and more efficient supply lines to the Italian forces without having to cross all of Libya. Especially since we are informed by reconnaissance reports that the British garrison on the island is weak. Over the next several days, we devise plans for an invasion of Malta, with the future of our nations at stake, we plan the attack with great care.June 15, 1940 - Operazione C3In the early morning, in a spectacular action, Italian paratroopers launch themselves on Malta covered by the Regia Marina and Regia Aeronautica who bomb and strafe enemy strongholds. Meanwhile, Royal Italian Marines land on different parts of the island. The British are caught completely by surprise and scramble to man their anti-aircraft and coastal guns. Italian paratroops and marines continue their advance forward and swiftly capture key points around the island, silencing the British guns and taking many prisoner.Overall the resistance of the British garrison is formidable but despite this, they are finally overwhelmed. Within a matter of moments, the banner of the Kingdom of Italy is raised triumphantly over the Maltese capital of Valletta.Following this victory, we deploy Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel along with a German Expeditionary Force designated as the Afrika Korps to Italian Libya. With Malta in Italian hands, we are able to better supply our forces in Libya in order to prepare them for the war ahead. With the capture of British Somaliland shortly after, the Italians have effectively secured the Horn of Africa. Knowing that the Suez Canal will need to be taken in order to further capitalize on our victories, the Italian Supreme Command and the OKH determine that it will first need to be isolated before we can seize it. One way to achieve this is through a joint invasion of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, which according to reconnaissance reports, is garrisoned by about 9,000 British troops as well as 8,500 soldiers in Kenya. Opposing them, are 90,000 soldiers in Italian East Africa along with 200,000 Royal Corps Colonial Troops. In order to retain our advantage and counting on superiority in numbers, Italian forces will need to move swiftly before the British can reinforce these areas.June 22, 1940 - Army Group East Africa under the command of Prince Amedeo, Duke of Aosta crosses the border into Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Simultaneously, soldiers from Army Group Libya invade from the north, increasing pressure on the British garrison in Sudan. As a precautionary measure, the Italians maintain a strong presence along the Egyptian and Kenyan borders to deter any British attempt to counterattack or aid their forces in Sudan. Fighting a two-front war, facing continuous bombing raids from the Regia Aeronautica, Italian infantry and tank divisions constantly harassing British positions, Italian forces eventually break through their defenses and reach the Nile river. Effectively splitting Sudan in two, and beginning a race towards Khartoum. Meanwhile in the east, Italian Milizia Coloniale and local Askari forces seize the vital port city of Port Sudan. Once the Italian armies reach Khartoum, we send a telegram to the remaining British forces stating that since they are surrounded and there is only one way to save themselves, an honorable surrender. Promising that as long as they cooperate, no harm will come to them. Within moments, the British reject our request, leaving them no choice but to unleash the full might of the Italian Armed Forces upon the British, and despite heavy casualties, Khartoum along with the whole of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan falls.Having conquered Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and linked up our two colonies in Africa, the Italian Empire has successfully isolated the Suez Canal by land and we make preparations for an offensive codenamed: Operazione E. With an increased amount of supplies coming from the mainland along with captured British equipment, we take a moment to replenish our exhausted soldiers and tend to the wounded. After our previous victories, we come to the conclusion that since the Suez Canal is vital to the British Empire, they will spare no expenses in defending it and diverting troops from their overseas colonies to Egypt.Not wanting our forces to invade just yet, we seek to exploit every possible British weakness possible. Il Duce instructs Italian Foreign Minister and his son-in-law, Count Galeazzo Ciano to make contact with the Arab governments hostile to the British in view of an attack over the Sinai. Within a week, citizens of the British mandate of Palestine, Transjordan and Kuwait rise in defiance against the British, demanding independence. The unexpected Arab revolts add pressure on the British, forcing them to divert manpower and resources away from vital areas.July 1, 1940 - Operazione ESeizing the moment, with numerical superior and with our armies well-trained, equipped and battle-hardened, Army Group Libya under Marshal Italo Balbo storms through the border and invades the Kingdom of Egypt.Within the first few days, the North African Campaign is excellent, Italian East African armies are following the Nile River and racing towards Cairo from the south. Meanwhile from the west, the increased amount of supplies and better support from the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica allow Axis forces to break through British defenses and spread in Egypt capturing El Alamein and Alexandria in quick succession. The Egyptian population welcomes the Italo-Germans as liberators and enters in revolt against the British, the allied forces begin to withdraw disorderly behind the Suez Canal and by July 18th, Generalfeldmarschall Rommel captures Cairo. The British manage to organize a defensive line along the Suez Canal. Not wanting to waste any time which could award Britain with new allies or tactics, I order German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop while the Fascist government orders Count Ciano to make contact with the Arab governments hostile to the British in view of an attack over the Sinai.Following the liberation of Cairo, a pro-Axis government is installed in the Kingdom of Egypt. In cooperation with the Italian government, the German Foreign Ministry sends peace proposals to Britain in hopes of reaching a diplomatic solution and a cessation to hostilities. After being informed about the loss of North Africa and the Suez Canal, Prime Minister Winston Churchill describes the event as “The worst disaster and largest capitulation in British history.” The news sends shockwaves throughout the British government and military, who seek to cover it up. Even though some British officials consider the idea of armistice, despite everything, Prime Minister Churchill rejects any/all calls for peace and vows to continue the war in whatever way possible, while continuing to pressure the United States to enter the war.With the Suez Canal in Axis hands, we’ve effectively split the British Empire in two with British troops and supplies being forced to travel around the Cape of Good Hope which takes much longer to reach the British Isles, this also renders any British attempt to reinforce the Middle East extremely difficult if not impossible. While our forces take time to consolidate their holdings, we continue launching bombing raids on British positions in the Middle East. Meanwhile in Europe, I meet with the Italian government to discuss the possibility of capturing the last British stronghold in the Mediterranean, the strait of Gibraltar in hopes of using the Regia Marina in the Atlantic. Simultaneously, we send Foreign Ministers von Ribbentrop and Count Ciano to Turkey in order to convince them to join the war on the side of the Axis. While we await a response from the Turkish government, I request a meeting with Il Duce in which I ask for him to accompany me to meet with Generalissimo Francisco Franco of Spain as we both know the Spanish Caudillo personally and would maximize our chances of victory in the Mediterranean.Shortly after, Il Duce and I meet with Generalissimo Franco in Hendaye, France in which we demand the passage of our troops through Spanish territory, and for Spanish involvement in the war. The Spanish Dictator is forced to accept and promises Spanish aid to the Axis. With Spain now on board, a coordinated attack plan is drafted code-named: Operation Felix. Several Axis divisions march through Spain and take ready positions.August 24, 1940 - Operation FelixAs many as 32 well-equipped divisions from the German Wehrmacht and Royal Italian Army smash through British defenses and advance south. Coordinated attacks from the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica from the air along with the Kriegsmarine and Regia Marina from both sides of the sea, allow for easier advances from the north with Fallschirmjäger and Paracadutisti spreading more confusion and chaos within enemy lines. After a tremendous battle that lasts several days with heavy casualties on both sides, Gibraltar finally falls. The banners of Germany and Italy are raised together above the fortresses of the city, serving a propaganda. With Gibraltar now in Axis hands, the Regia Marina is deployed into the Atlantic Ocean in order to further harass British supply convoys coming from South Africa alongside the German Kriegsmarine. The fall of Gibraltar also marks the end of British power in the Mediterranean Sea and signals the coming of new era of Italian dominance and the return of Mare Nostrum.With the entire Mediterranean Sea under Axis control, and despite earlier rejections, we send more peace proposals to Britain, calling to end the war now before any more military or civilian blood is spilled. Again Churchill refuses, announcing to the British people: “No matter how long it takes, no matter how much we suffer, we will fight to the very last Briton!” The news of the Axis conquest of the Mediterranean reaches America alerting the U.S. government. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt orders an increase of Lend-Lease shipments to Britain and goes as far as lending more American naval vessels to Britain in hopes of keeping them in the fight. President Roosevelt without a doubt wishes to enter the war, but understands that 76% of the American people still support neutrality and a declaration of war will be met with serious backlash from the general public, particularly from the America First Committee led by American aviator Charles Lindbergh.Knowing that Churchill will not accept any form of peace and growing concerned about the possibility of American involvement, we are once again forced to go on the offensive. While the Battle of Britain rages on with the Luftwaffe and the Corpo Aereo Italiano engaging in spectacular dogfights against the Royal Air Force in preparation for Operation Sealion, we make plans for our own offensive this time, to push the British out of the entire Eurasian continent permanently. On September 15, 1940 Operazione Libertà Araba the invasion of the Middle East is launched with the intent on capturing the British oil fields while liberating the Arab peoples in the process. Preceded by an intense artillery fire, Axis troops break through incomplete British defenses in the Sinai and enter Palestine. Soon after, we receive word that Turkish government agrees to join the war in exchange for our assurances that Turkish sovereignty will be guaranteed and that Turkey be granted equal status following an Axis victory. Another pro-Axis revolt in Iraq pushes the British out of Baghdad. The revolt in Iraq and the unexpected move of Turkey make the British position in the Middle East unsustainable, the British quickly withdraw from the area to at least try to keep the southern Arabian peninsula, while the oilfields are reached within a matter of weeks. Throughout the Middle East the Italo-Germans are greeted by native populace as liberators, with some even volunteering to join our heroic struggle.Seizing the opportunity, I instruct the Axis forces to allow the Arab populations to enlist into the military as I believe that they can offer limitless potential if trained properly. Upon arrival to the oilfields, we discover that many of them are either heavily damaged or destroyed. Not wanting for our oil supplies to be compromised, Axis engineers work tirelessly day and night to get the oilfields back online and continue production. With Britain’s oversea assets in shambles and her lifelines cut, we know that Britain’s days are numbered.African/Arab Volunteers of the “Legion Freies Arabien” (Free Arabia Legion)By early 1941, with attrition being heavily felt and after the military disasters of 1940, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is left with no choice but to ask for an armistice with the German Reich and the Kingdom of Italy. With his country in shambles and no effective way of continuing the war, Winston Churchill resigns in disgrace, after a vote-of-no-confidence succeeds. Edward Wood, Lord Halifax becomes the new Prime Minister of Great Britain and signs the armistice, restoring peace in western Europe. With the war against Great Britain finally over, both the German and Italian governments are now able to fully concentrate on the battle we believe will eventually determine the final outcome of this war. Maintaining close contact with the Germans, we take the next few months to rebuild our war torn lands and build up strength for what will be our greatest challenge.After issuing Führer Directive No. 21 on December 18th, 1940 - I immediately order the German government to make contact with the Japanese Empire. Once contact is made and a conference is scheduled in Berlin on February 21, 1941 I meet with Japanese Foreign Minister Yōsuke Matsuoka, informing him that Imperial High Command will need to make plans to aid us in our preemptive strike against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.Upon returning to Japan and informing the Imperial government of our intentions, all members of the Imperial High Command are shocked. The Imperial Japanese government responds by stating that the Japanese Empire would be destroyed if they attacked Russia now as they’re not fully prepared for such a plan. A recent oil embargo from the United States has put a strain on their resources and their war effort against the Republic of China, a clear act of war by America. Understanding this, I explain that in order for our nations and the world as a whole to survive, we will need to make plans for a coordinated attack. Warning them that if Germany falls, Japan will be the Soviet Union’s next target. Convincing them that the U.S.S.R. is far more dangerous than the United States, promising to help them with America later on. Understanding the danger of the U.S.S.R. Imperial High Command reluctantly agrees for a coordinated attack. In order to properly carry out an invasion, we increase reconnaissance missions over Soviet territory. By carefully studying aerial photographs and maps, we identify potential targets, hazards, and exchange vital information and equipment in exchange for goods and raw materials. The benefits are great: new airplane blueprints, radar detectors and Enigma coding machines. These advanced technologies will help us counter the industrial capacity of the Soviet Union.I along with Germany’s finest generals feverishly draft plans for the invasion of the Soviet Union codenamed: Operation Barbarossa. Every detail must be anticipated, a slip now might wreck the whole timetable of the operation and our chances of a swift crushing victory. The plan calls for four simultaneous thrusts: Army Group North commanded by Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm von Leeb, is to overrun the Baltics states and seize Leningrad, Army Group Centre commanded by Generalfeldmarschall Fedor von Bock, is to advance to Moscow, Army Group South led by Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt, is to liberate and occupy the Ukraine, and Army Groups A & B will overrun the Caucasus and seize Stalingrad. Three months of final preparation go into these plans, three months to determine the history of 1,000 years.In early May 1941, before the invasion can commence, we receive news that the Yugoslav government sympathetic to Germany, has been overthrown by pro-British/anti-Axis forces. Its southern neighbor Greece is also anti-Axis. Not wanting to allow our southern flank to be threatened, I order the Wehrmacht along with Italian forces to attack the two countries and secure the Balkans. As Italian forces in Albania prepare to cross into Greece, in order to better understand and defeat our new enemy, I advise them to order an increase on reconnaissance in order to identify potential enemy strongholds, as well as choke-points and other geographic features they could use to their advantage. Once every potential problem has been addressed and accounted for, with the Italian armies outmatching the Greeks in numbers and quality of troops, they make final preparations for their invasion of Greece. The Italians first send the Regia Aeronautica to soften up defenses and create confusion while infantry and armored divisions cross the border seizing vital areas and capturing many Greek armies. Wanting our forces to share this victory, I send several infantry and panzer divisions to further strengthen the offensive in Greece. With German aid, Athens falls in just two weeks and we invade and occupy strategic Greek islands such as Crete while installing a new pro-Axis government called the Hellenic State. Soon after from all sides, we launch a subsequent invasion of Yugoslavia, with Belgrade falling in a matter of weeks.Although the Balkan campaign ends in another Axis victory, is postpones our planned date for Operation Barbarossa by more than six weeks. Forcing us to reschedule the invasion for the summer. Although the invasion is postponed, this gives us more time to further prepare our strength for what could be our greatest challenge.June 22, 1941At 3:15a.m. German artillery battalions open fire upon Soviet positions all along the eastern frontier, catching Soviet armies’ off-guard. Bewildered Soviet troops scramble to man their defenses but are soon either captured or destroyed by heavy German artillery bombardments. At dawn, from the Baltic to the Black Sea, from Eastern Europe to the Caucasus, thousands of Messerschmitt Bf-109s, Bf-110s, and Focke-Wulf Fw-190 fighters along with thousands of Heinkel He-111s, Dornier Do-17s & Junkers Ju-87 Stuka bombers soar across Soviet territory attacking strategic areas such as fortifications, military barracks and airfields. Simultaneously, as many as four German Army Groups along with millions of volunteers from Europe and around the globe all joining our fight against the Bolshevik menace, cross the border into the Soviet Union, quickly overwhelming entire Soviet armies. The German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact is officially over, Operation Barbarossa has begun.That same day in the Far-East at 4:00a.m. From the waters of the Sea of Japan, the Imperial Japanese Navy from their aircraft carriers and battleships open fire and begin bombarding Soviet coastal cities such as Vladivostok and Yakutsk and launch their Kaigun Tokubetsu Rikusentai (Special Naval Landing Forces) to capture vital ports and establish beachheads. The Soviet Far-Eastern armies are caught completely off-guard as they were expecting the Japanese to turn their attention towards the United States. Even still, the Soviets scramble to man their heavy coastal guns and open fire upon Japanese ships. From the Japanese aircraft carriers, hundreds of Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighters along with hordes of Mitsubishi Ki-51 & Ki-21s as well as Kawasaki Ki-48s & Nakajima Ki-49 Donryu bombers soar across the Far-East attacking strategic railways, airfields, industrial centers, and military installations. At dawn, three Imperial Japanese Army Groups led by the mighty Kwantung Army, cross into communist territory from Manchukuo and Mengjiang. Japanese mechanized divisions are able to quickly overrun and inflict heavy casualties on the Red Army, the Japanese offensive drives towards the west in an attempt to reach Lake Baikal beginning their own invasion codenamed: Operation Kantokuen.Brutal battles rage all across the European and Far-Eastern theaters, the Luftwaffe/IJA Air Forces engage the Red Air Force in spectacular dogfights in an attempt to achieve air superiority. Throughout the course of a few days to weeks, German armies thrust deep into Soviet territory. Ill coordinated Soviet counterattacks are swiftly brushed aside resulting in the capture of tens of thousands of Soviet soldiers. By June 29th, seven days after the start of the assault, two panzer thrusts meet up near Minsk, surrounding huge pockets of Soviet troops. As the follow-up infantry arrive, more than 300,000 prisoners are taken into captivity.The deeper we advance into the Soviet Union, the more we often find ourselves being welcomed as liberators particularly in the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and the Baltic states, where anti-Soviet feelings are widespread. Meanwhile in Moscow, Soviet Dictator Joseph Stalin is informed about the Axis invasion from both East and West. Upon hearing the news, he falls into a state of shock and disbelief, almost suffering a near breakdown as the day he has feared for so long has finally arrived. He remains silent for more than a week. Red Army High Command (STAVKA) is now caught in a conundrum: Fight a two-front war and risk losing more ground, or concentrate the majority of the Red Army on fending off one enemy first. Not until July 3rd, does Stalin appeal to his people’s patriotism in an effort to save the Motherland. Shaken but determined, Stalin orders his generals to concentrate the majority of their forces on the Germans and divert a large portion of the Red Army to the Caucasus in order to halt the German-Turkish forces from seizing the vital Soviet oilfields and a smaller force to the Far-East to halt and push back the Japanese.As June turns to July, the German Blitzkrieg slashes deeper into Soviet territory. It’s beginning to look as if nothing can stop us, as more battles are being won and more prisoners are being taken. In mid-July following the capture of Minsk along with 300,000 Soviet prisoners, several panzer commanders in particular Generaloberst Heinz Guderian, beg to be allowed to race on. Operation Barbarossa is working like clockwork. Within a week, panzers reach the city of Smolensk, deep inside Russia and only a couple hundred miles from Moscow. On July 18th, a panzer pincer movement meets to the east of Smolensk trapping another 310,000 of Marshal of the Soviet Union Semyon Timosheko’s troops. After which, I order a brief pause to allow the rest of the army to catch up. Though our tanks can move at spectacular speeds, most of the army still has to walk or rely on horse drawn transport. But it still only takes them five days before they arrive and begin mopping up, the operation is completed in just nine more days. Vast columns of Soviet prisoners begin trudging west to captivity.With all the captured enemy soldiers, many German officials wonder exactly what we’ll do with all of them. While most believe and agree that they should all be used for compulsory labor to strengthen the German war machine, others like myself disagree and offer an alternative solution. Looking to use their numbers and familiarity of the lands to our advantage, I instruct all Axis forces to attempt to convince captured soldiers that their leader Joseph Stalin has simply been using them as mere pawns. Explaining to them that the Bolsheviks never aimed at serving the interests of Russia or any other country. Communism does not limit itself to acquire chunks of territories, but aims at total world domination. Explaining that Stalin has been using all of them as cannon fodder only for his regime to survive, we even go as far as displaying all the horrors Stalin had committed in the name of Communism to the Soviet people. Eventually, the people realize what they have gotten themselves into and gradually begin siding with us, with many people of various ethnic backgrounds asking to be allowed to form their own Wehrmacht/Waffen-SS regiments. Seizing the moment, I instruct the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS to re-arm captured soldiers and if necessary train them, creating new Russian, Armenian, Ukrainian and numerous other anti-Communist armies, while civilians serve as compulsory labor in factories or serve as medics or other professions. As time passes, more and more Russian soldiers and citizens rally to our cause while similar instructions are advised to the Japanese in the Far-East.Soldiers of ROA, (Russian liberation Army)With the fall of Smolensk, Moscow is now only 200 miles away, and the road lay open. With our previous successes, it seems certain it will fall by the end of the summer, as planned. But elsewhere, the German advance is finding the going more difficult. The Red Army is counterattacking more effectively and by mid-July, the German-Turkish offensive in the Caucasus has been bogged down. Meanwhile to its north, Army Group South is still more than 50 miles from Kiev. On a visit to the front, I’m informed about our current situation.“Mein Führer, at the conclusion of the Battle of Smolensk, Army Group Centre has destroyed the bulk of the Soviet forces between it and the vital railway and industrial hub of Moscow. Which along with the pummeling of the Soviet Southern Front earlier on, renders the Soviets incapable of stopping an Unternehmen Taifun launched no later than the end of August, the success of which would allow a southern turn and the seizure of Kiev before the end of the campaigning season.”Making the connections, and looking to end the war as quickly as possible, I decide to take a gamble and capitalize on his victory at Smolensk. Allowing Army Group Centre to continue its advance towards Moscow. This decision is further reinforced upon receiving information that the Soviets have evacuated their government to Kuybyshev along with as many as 2,500 factories and 17 million Soviet citizens to Siberia. These factories still have to be assembled, and natural resources have to be acquired, 70% of Soviet industrial power, while the remaining 30% of Soviet industries are located in or around Moscow.I order all German/Axis personnel to push forward towards their objectives with lightning speed. Knowing full-well that everything produced in Russia passes through Moscow via transport lines, if we allow the Soviets to reassemble their factories, our offensive would be in serious danger of failure. But if we were to capture the Soviet capital, we would effectively cut-off Soviet transport and supply lines.Yet the closer we get to the Soviet capital, there are already worrying signs that the Red Army is not going to be the pushover we had been expecting. Soviet manpower seems endless, with recent reports revealing that more than 16 million troops are now mobilized ¾ of which are facing us, and the Red Army now has some formidable new weapons. In particular a new tank, the 37 ton T-34 which is faster and better cross-country than the PzKpfw IV. Yet for many as the blitzkrieg continues, it is easy to miss the warning signs. Soon after, we receive reports that Army Groups A & B in the Caucasus have been reinforced by the battle-hardened Africa Korps, along with Italian divisions, and thousands of volunteers from Africa and the Middle East.With superior numbers combined with clever tactics and strategies of Generalfeldmarschall Rommel, Axis forces are able to break through Soviet defenses and reach the oilfields of Baku. Upon arrival, they discover that most of the oil wells have been disabled or destroyed, but like in the Middle East, German engineers begin working to repair or rebuild the oil wells while the rest of the army pushes north towards Stalingrad. The loss of the oilfields is a serious blow to Soviet industrial power, as Soviet oil production falls to 12% of the 1939 production level (from 32,168,000 tons to 3,901,000 tons). By July 25th, Army Group North surrounds the city of Leningrad, immediately cutting it off from the rest of the Soviet Union. The city is besieged, despite the temptation, I decide not to storm the city and instead instruct the German troops to settle down and starve it into surrender. Conditions in the city become dire, the only link to the rest of the Soviet Union is across Lake Ladoga to the east, but only a small amount of food can come in by water.Meanwhile, Army Group Centre now prepares for the final assault on Moscow. Generaloberst Guderian’s panzers now repaired, refueled and rearmed, lead the armored blitzkrieg while I lead the infantry. German forces have a 2:1 superiority in tanks and men at the front and 3:1 in aircraft. The assault starts on August 1, 1941. Once again Generaloberst Guderian’s panzers slash deep through the Red Army. By the 8th, yet more Soviet troops are surrounded, but Stalin is determined to defend Moscow to the last, he appoints General Georgy Zhukov to organize the defense of the city. The people of Moscow are mobilized to dig a series of defensive lines.In the Far-East, after a series of costly battles, Imperial Japanese forces break through Soviet lines reaching Lake Baikal and successfully occupy the whole of Mongolia. This is made possible with the aid of collaborative Russian and Mongolian citizens who’ve become disillusioned with Communism, as well as many Soviet divisions having been diverted westward to counter our advances. Although Japanese generals wish to continue the offensive, shortages on vital supplies in particular oil, causes further major assaults to be delayed or cancelled. Instead, the Japanese dig-in and set up defensive positions.On August 12th, I launch Operation Typhoon, the final drive along the route to Moscow. 14 German tank and 74 infantry divisions a total of 1,929,406 officers and men, take part in the offensive. Stalin has good cause for panic now, facing a disaster which might sweep away the whole Soviet Union, he has one last hope that the weather will save them. By mid-August, lack of paved roads and increasingly stubborn Soviet resistance, leads to Army group Centre still being some 50 miles short of Moscow. Angered by these delays, I order the Luftwaffe to bomb and strafe any/all Soviet positions around Moscow and for the panzers to charge forward clearing the way for our infantry. By August 15th, our Caucasian troops capture the port city of Astrakhan at the mouth of the river Volga, Stalingrad follows soon after. On the Moscow Front, Army Group Centre now begins its final push to capture the Soviet capital.On August 16th, the leading units are just 19 miles from Red Square, some reconnaissance patrols claim they can see the golden domes of the Kremlin glinting in the distance. The generals realize we must act swiftly before Russia’s infamous Rasputitsa, severely hampers our offensive. To soften up defenses, German artillery battalions open fire upon Soviet positions, the first German shells strike at or around Red Square, while the Luftwaffe engages the remnants of the Red Air Forceover Moscow. With German morale at its peak and with a determined battle cry of “Deutschland über alles”, German panzers race forward at full speed while Axis infantry units follow closely behind, engaging the cities defenders in brutal hand-to-hand combat.The Soviets attempt several well-prepared counterattacks and while some are successful, they’re simply outmatched and outgunned and are eventually pushed back. More prisoners are taken, however, we notice that unlike before, these prisoners are younger than most and are members of a recently formed People’s Militia. Many are as young as the age of 17, a sign that the Soviets are getting desperate and are willing to use anything and anyone to defend their capital. Another thing we notice is that there are far less tanks and aircraft than we anticipated, a sign that our recent capture of Soviet oilfields is taking its toll. After three days of hard fighting, our forces finally break through the last of their defensive lines and by August 20th, German armies reach the outer workings of Moscow. Now it is street fighting, house by house, building by building. Everyone a natural redoubt for desperate defenders. Casualties mount, resistance stiffens, but the German armies cannot be halted now. Within hours, German attacks force the remaining resistance to retreat further into the city. German forces follow, and soon stumble upon a well-fortified capital. The Soviets spared no expense in setting up defenses. Determined to end this war here and now, I call for every German/Axis soldier, to fight like they’ve never fought before for Europe and the Fatherland.Later as Axis forces converge on the center of Moscow, the fighting embraces everything and everyone in the battlefield. Military and civilian casualties continue to rise while the Luftwaffe pounds the city to rubble. Eventually, no longer able to bear such losses, several Soviet officers and generals within the city, either surrender or commit suicide. Unable to bear the idea of a German victory, while others continue to fight valiantly alongside their soldiers.After three days of intense battle, the last desperate resistance in Moscow collapses. German PzKpfw IV tanks roar into Red Square and turn on the Kremlin, providing cover fire for Elite European Waffen-SS divisions who assault the Kremlin with flame throwers and frag grenades. The desperate defenders hold out for one heroic hour in savage hand-to-hand fighting, entering room after room and clearing them of Red Army soldiers. Breaking out into the shell torn roof, German troops raise the Hakenkreuz banner over the Kremlin. German soldiers break out in a thunderous cheer and some perform the Roman salute which is captured on film by Axis war correspondents - invaluable propaganda. Fighting continues in several isolated pockets. General Georgy Zhukov is killed in one of the last pockets of resistance. Joseph Stalin is soon found hiding within his secret bunker in a state of depression attempting to commit suicide. Through quick action, he is quickly apprehended and transported to the remains of the captured Kremlin by the triumphant Gestapo. Following the fall of Moscow, Army Group Centre turns now south towards Kiev. Within two days upon arrival, I along with the assistance of Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Manstein successfully draw Kiev’s defenders out into the open where they are decimated. Two more soviet armies are utterly destroyed, more than 665,000 of Marshal of the Soviet Union Semyon Budyonny’s men are killed or captured with Kiev being taken on August 30th.With his country in ruins and no effective way of continuing the war, Joseph Stalin is left with no other alternative and surrenders unconditionally to the Axis Powers on September 1, 1941 with the remnants of the Soviet government in Kuybyshev following soon after.Upon hearing of the Soviet Union’s surrender, I hold a massive rally in the Kroll Opera House (temporary Reichstag), where I makes a jubilant speech which is broadcast on radios throughout Europe and around the world where I announce the fall of Moscow and rejoice in the immense defeat of the Soviet Union. Predicting that the whole rotten Bolshevik house of cards will come tumbling down. My speech ends with a solemn “Gott ist mit uns - Amen.” The crowd replies with enthusiastic “Sieg Heil” for fifteen minutes.With the whole of continental Europe liberated, the victorious German/Axis armies return to Germany to a hero’s welcome and with a new sense of pride and honor the likes of which the world has never seen before. With the Axis Powers victorious, and following the Declaration of a new United Europe, I have fulfilled my promise of victory for Germany and have succeeded in creating a Greater German Reich. In the years following the war, I continue to lead the United Europe and post-war world into a new era. An era of order, peace and prosperity that will last for 1,000 years, if not forever.

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