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Out of three questions, first two questions are answered here Surbhi Tripathi's answer to What is the Nipah virus, and how is it transmitted?The last question which is most important one to answer is about government's measures on NiV. As India is one of the member state of World Health Organisation so the preparedness for NiV is recommended by WHO will be apt to apply in India:Surveillance, Prevention and Control ofNipah Virus Infection: A Practical HandbookPage No. 18–354. OUTBREAK OR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE FOR NiV4.1. PreparednessPreparedness in terms of technical and logistical management of a Nipah outbreak is essential in countries with recurrent outbreaks. The best response to a Nipah outbreak is being able to detect cases as early as possible and prevent further infections.4.1.1. Enhancing surveillance during the NiV transmission seasonSurveillance should be intensified during the Nipah season from January through May, when most Nipah outbreaks have been identified. This will increase the possibility of identifying NiV infection and understanding the characteristics of the virus. Blood, CSF, urine and throat swabs are collected from suspected patients and sent to the reference laboratories.4.1.2. Awareness building in hospitals and raising community awareness• Encourage and train health-care workers to maintain standard infection control precautions, e.g., personal hygiene, use of personal protective equipment(PPE), and manage encephalitis or neurological patients appropriately.• Disseminate information to communities through multimedia, leaflets, posters and meetings (group, community and market) encouraging people:o to stop consumption of raw date palm sap;o not to eat fruit partially eaten by bats;o cover the mouth and nose while caring for unconscious patients;o wash hands with soap and water before and after feeding and taking care of patients.4.1.3. Infection control in health-care settings should be in place• Implement standard infection control precautions.• Acquire and maintain PPE stock and other equipment needed in epidemiological investigations and outbreak response.4.1.4. Planning for outbreak response: some major components4.1.4.1. Formation of a multisectoral team 20Since NiV infection is a zoonosis and outbreaks may be associated with multiple factors such as animal reservoirs, sociocultural practices, food habits and possible human-to-human transmission, a multidisciplinary team is needed, and preparation should be done for pre-outbreak, outbreak and post-outbreak phases.A multisectoral team should be built up at national and local levels for the monitoring, evaluation and response to unusual acute public health events and outbreak response, including Nipah outbreaks. The team should have a holistic, multidisciplinary approach consisting of public health personnel, clinicians and laboratory personnel. The multisectoral team may consist of the following professionals (depending on the evolving and country-specific situation) who would bring relevant expertise in outbreak investigation and response:• epidemiologist• microbiologist• anthropologist and/or social scientist• veterinarian• ecologist.National or subnational level – Rapid Response Team (NRRT): The NRRT should be assigned from institutes at the national/provincial level and partner institutes.District/provincial level – District Rapid Response Team (DRRT): The DRRT consists of the head of health services at the district/provincial level and clinical and laboratory expertise, and other expertise from the public health department.4.1.4.2. Evaluate and ensure the supplies for sample collection, storage and shipment of samples:• Assess PPE in stock;• Assess sample collection instruments;• Assess sample storage capacity in the laboratory;• Evaluate laboratory capacity for NiV testing (e.g., biosafety, quality, skills, human resources and consumables for NiV virus testing);• Evaluate hospital capacities for isolation facilities and ability to treat Nipah patients in Nipah-prone areas.4.2. Alert and outbreak investigationThe outbreak investigation should lead to formulation of an appropriate public health intervention as soon as the source and mode of transmission are known. In the meantime, control measures mitigating known risk factors should be implemented as soon as NiV transmission is suspected.4.2.1. Investigation of a suspected case or cluster of suspect cases:4.2.1.1. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for sample collection and transportation in place:• Surveillance physician will take verbal consent from patient or patient’s family member;• Collect 5 ml venous blood;• If possible, collect 3 ml extra-CSF when appropriate;• Aliquot 1 ml serum and 1 ml CSF samples in 1.8 ml cryovial tube. Try to aliquot serum and CSF samples in three cryovial tubes;• Label the cryovial tube with: type of samples (serum/CSF), patient name and identification number, and date of sample collection;• Store the serum and CSF samples in liquid nitrogen if possible, or −20°C freezer for short-term storage if liquid nitrogen is not available;• Ship samples in liquid nitrogen tank or ice pack to assigned centre for laboratory diagnosis;• Store samples in −70°C freezer for longer-term storage;• A list of potential national or international reference laboratories should be pre-established. There can be several for different purposes: a frontline laboratory would be the WHO Collaborating Centre for laboratory diagnosis of viral diseases with BSL 3 or BSL 4 facilities (see list of WHO Collaborating Centres and other institutions for laboratory diagnosis, surveillance and response in Appendix 4).4.2.1.2. Templates of data collection instruments pre-developed and in place for quick useThese templates should include the following:• line listing of all cases;• case reporting form;• questionnaire for case-control studies or other relevant studies;• forms for sample collection.4.2.1.3. SOP for activating and conducting outbreak investigation teamsThis SOP is commonly country-specific as the process relies on the administrative structures and capacity or resources of a given country. Therefore a country-based manual or protocol for outbreak investigations should be in place in at-risk countries forNipah outbreaks. A more generalized national SOP manual for all emerging or re-emerging infectious diseases of international concern could be developed focusing on a mechanism of response and roles and responsibilities of different parties.The following are some of the key components to prepare a team for outbreak investigation:1) National or Subnational Rapid Response Team (RRT) Should an outbreak of NiV virus disease be suspected and/or reported, the National RRT should be activated and should meet together to:(1) Plan and conduct the investigation;(2) Request further technical support if needed (e.g., further analysis and interpretation, risk communication, initiate control).2) Administrative SOP for field work in place: administrative clearance, organize supplies, travel arrangements:• approval/permission from competent authority;• arrangement for accommodation;• arrangement for security, if needed;• arrange vehicle;• supplies:o medicineso sample collection instrumentso PPEo disinfectants, hand sanitizero basic medical and investigation equipment, e.g., stethoscope, thermometer, GPS instrument, etc.3) SOP for rapid mobilization of additional or experts teamsIf the NiV outbreak is confirmed, an experienced Nipah outbreak investigation team comprising an epidemiologist, clinician, veterinarian and anthropologist or social scientist can move to the field within 24 hours of outbreak reporting.4.2. 1.4. Nipah outbreak investigationThe overall objective of investigating Nipah outbreaks is to control the outbreak and prevent future outbreaks. Any Nipah (or suspicion of) outbreaks should be investigated as the disease is of public health concern with potentially devastating consequences.The specific objectives include the following:• to determine the extent of the outbreak;• to characterize the populations at greatest risk and to identify specific risk factors;• to provide practical recommendations to strengthen control and prevention measures.Key steps when conducting Nipah outbreak investigationStep 1: Activate preparation plan for outbreak investigation (details above).Step 2: Confirm the outbreak.One of the first tasks of the initial investigation team is to verify that a suspected cluster of cases is indeed a real outbreak with common cause. Some will be unrelated cases of the same disease, and others will turn out to be real cases of AES or ALRI but of unrelated diseases. This step consists of confirming the diagnosis through visiting the outbreak affected areas to (1) examine the patients and/or review the medical charts to describe and understand the clinical presentation; (2) collect blood, CSF and throat swab samples at the time of admission/ first contact, and follow-up serum samples 2 weeks after the onset of illness for testing.A Nipah outbreak is defined as the identification of at least one laboratory-confirmed case.Step 3: Define and identify cases.The investigators should develop or adapt standardized case definitions appropriate to the outbreak context (see details in standard case definitions). Testing for NiV infection should be performed when there are: (i) clusters of AES due to an unknown agent or (ii) patients with AES due to an unknown agent living in or near NiV zones.Patients with AES should also be tested for NiV infection when they are exposed to a cluster of unexplained neurological/pulmonary illness in animals, such as horses and pigs.Step 4: Case-findingIn many outbreaks, including Nipah outbreaks, the first cases that are recognized are usually a small proportion of the total number. Retrospective and prospective case-findings are crucial to determine the true magnitude and geographical extent of the outbreak.Active case-finding should be conducted:Among close contacts:• A close contact is defined as “a patient or the person who came in contact with a Nipah case (confirmed or probable cases) AND stayed in the room or veranda or vehicle for at least 15 minutes”.• Record contacts for potential follow-up if need be. They are to be followed up in case of occurrence of illness (up to 18 days). Serum specimens should be collected in case of symptom onseto in high-risk groups or in groups exposed to the sourceo through enhancing surveillance in the outbreak area and the at-risk areas for case-finding in the communityStep 5: Evaluate the outbreak in relation to ‘time, place and person’• establish a line-list of current and previous cases;• draw an epidemic curve;• analyse and interpret the data to identify potential sources of transmission.Step 6: Develop and evaluate hypothesesOnce step 5 has been done, investigators should have some hypotheses regarding the source and/or mode of transmission and the exposures that caused the disease. These hypotheses should be compared with established facts.Step 7: Refine hypotheses and carry out additional studiesIf step 6 is not conclusive, these hypotheses can be refined to look for new modes or vehicles of transmission and be evaluated through conducting case–control studies.Step 8: Implement control and prevention measures (see response section below)Step 9: Communicate findings and information about risks (i.e., outbreak report)• Develop an outbreak report and disseminate to concerned authorities.• Learning from the outbreak includes detailing:o new findingso major limitations during outbreak investigation• Resume the activities of pre-outbreak phase.4.3. Additional considerations with respect to Nipah outbreaksWhen the Nipah outbreak is confirmed, the investigation team needs to:• Immediately inform the local, regional and national authorities.• Inform the partners/stakeholders (notably those involved at local level): treating hospitals, patients’ relatives.• Declare the Nipah outbreak to WHO under the International HealthRegulation 2005 (IHR) via National IHR focal points (see detail below in the response section).Notification and assessment of Nipah outbreak and/or cases to WHO should be based on the following four criteria described in Annex II of IHR 2005. A "yes" to any of the four criteria would lead to notifying WHO under Article 6 of the IHR.• Is the public health impact of the Nipah outbreak and/or cases serious?• Are the Nipah outbreak and/or cases unusual or unexpected?• Is there a significant risk of international spread?• Is there a significant risk of international travel or trade restrictions?4.3.1. Conduct rapid risk assessmentSome of the major risk assessment questions should include the following:• What is the risk of occurrence of further cases from the detected outbreak?• What is the risk of spread of the infection?• What is the risk of major impact of the current outbreak on the health-care system?4.3.2. Evaluate the impact of control measuresEach outbreak should be thoroughly investigated, and lessons learnt from each outbreak should be evaluated and documented so that control measures can be reviewed and modified as required.4.3. 3. Develop further research with the objective of identifying determinants of infection or severity and determining modes and dynamics of infectionThe populations to be investigated would be those exposed to NiV:4.3.3.1. Health-care workers (HCWs)There is evidence of nosocomial transmission in India and Bangladesh, and one nurse was positive to Nipah IgM antibody in Malaysia (3, 4). HCWs are to be trained for infection control and prevention (see below). Surveillance should be in place to detect any suspected cases among HCWs. In addition, a study should be conducted to identify asymptomaticcases among HCWs who provided service to Nipah patients. Among these, positive cases should be subsequently compared with negative ones to determine risk factors for infection and understand the dynamics of transmission. Some components of the study could include:• Make a list of HCWs who provided care to Nipah patients.• Take consent from HCWs.• Interview at-risk HCWs using an exposure questionnaire, about 3 weeks after the last exposure to NiV-infected patients.• Collect 5 ml of blood for serology testing about 3 weeks after the last exposure to NiV-infected patients.4.3.3.2. Communities potentially exposed to NiVThe investigation should encourage involvement of multidisciplinary and multisectoral team using a one-health approach. For instance, investigators should have the support of microbiologists and their laboratories to conduct community-based seroprevalence surveys (detection of recent antibody response) to determine the extent of the outbreak via detecting subclinical and/or asymptomatic cases. Asymptomatic cases could be further compared with controls to identify risk factors for infection.Anthropologists or other social scientists with extensive community-based experience could help propose additional behaviour risk factors to be tested in a case–control study. Anthropologists should work with communication/health promotion specialists to develop communication messages combining both local explanatory models and biomedical models using local terms and languages, and deliver the message in such a way that it is meaningful to the community.Veterinarians and eco-health specialists should join the investigation to conduct studies collecting specimens from animals and the environment in the outbreak settings.Zoonotic and environmental investigations during an NiV outbreak primarily aim to determine the primary reservoir, likely source of the virus, route of transmission and the extent of the spread of the virus in animals. Georeferenced positive specimens could be analysed with positive human cases to better understand the dynamics of transmission.4.4. ResponseAs soon as a Nipah outbreak is confirmed, national authorities should implement control measures based on known risk factors. The interventions should be based on a multisectoral approach and include/understand the following strategic objectives:1. Establishment of a coordination committee for outbreak prevention, and control activities and resources mobilization; the role of this committee is to ensure the general coordination of operations. It must clearly define the responsibilities of the various teams and the route of information during outbreak response operations.2. Setting up partnerships with the media to ensure media monitoring and better risk communication.3. Formation of a referral system with the principal objective of easing transfer of cases to the appropriate case-management health-care settings.a. Active detection for new Nipah cases and their transfer to the case-management ward.b. Follow up all contacts during 18 days after their last unprotected exposure to Nipah patient(s) or infected animal or tissue (e.g., laboratory) and their transfer to the case-management ward if they fall sick.4. Set up a social mobilization and medical education programme whose principal role is to inform the public and promote practices that decrease community transmission of the disease.5. At the foci zone, the medical team should ensure safe case management of Nipah patients by complying with the following guidelines:a. Respect patients and their families’ dignity and rights, in particular their right for information on disease and treatment,b. Set up a specific Nipah case-management ward that ensures biosafety of in-patient care,c. Set up infection prevention and control measures for safe patient care,d. Organize the safe transport of patients from their residence to the ward,e. The express consent of patients is necessary for any hospitalization. In the event of patient’s refusal to be hospitalized, the medical team should organize, temporarily, a patient’s care at home with his/her family support.f. Organize safe burials while respecting the funeral ceremony,g. Set up psychosocial support (patients, family, HCWs).6. Outside the foci zone, to prevent secondary foci, the medical team should reinforce standard infection prevention and control measures in health care in all health centres of the affected district and all hospitals catering to the outbreak zone.7. Establishment of links with the animal health sector to:a. Continue monitoring the cause of disease and death in domestic animals and wildlife.b. Test samples and alert public health authorities as needed.c. Control slaughtering/butchering activities of domestic animals and wildlife, at home, and in markets and slaughterhouses.8. Media and communicationa. Designate a spokesperson in the outbreak team.b. Designate a spokesperson at the national level who communicates with national media.c. Regularly update reports to be sent to assigned authority.d. Conduct regular meetings with press and community.e. Distribute information, education and communication material.4.5. In the aftermath of the outbreak (evaluation)4.5.1. Declare the end of the outbreakThe health ministry declares the end of the outbreak. The date of outbreak end is equal to twice the mean incubation period for Nipah counted from the last infectious contact with a confirmed or probable case.The national authorities should use the announcement of the end of the outbreak to acknowledge national and international field teams as well as the media. They should also formally present their solidarity and their empathy to the victims, their families and the affected populations.4.5.2. Writing a final report of the outbreak control activitiesThe report objective is to describe the activities undertaken during the epidemic as well as constraints and difficulties encountered. It should include technical aspects (final epidemiological analysis, clinical investigations, etc.), as well as administrative and financial aspects. The report should be published to achieve wider dissemination of findings and lessons learnt.4.5.3. Archive outbreak documents and files• Gather all the reports, files, photographs, videos and other documents related to the outbreak management.• Store all the documents in a place accessible for their later use.4.5.4. Evaluate the management of the outbreakThe evaluation of the management of the outbreak response will review the performance of the various components of the strategy: coordination, relationship to the media, surveillance system, social mobilization programme, clinical management and logistics.The aim of the evaluation is to determine lessons learnt to improve the future management of epidemics. This evaluation should be led by a team comprising national and technical partners.4.5.5. To resume activities of the pre-outbreak period

The answer requires some detailed analysis:(1)The Amendment to Prevention of Corruption Act were made in July 2018, which has substituted Section 13(1). Now, ‘criminal misconduct’ is restricted to the following 2 offences: (i) dishonest or fraudulent misappropriation or otherwise conversion of any property entrusted to a public servant or any property under his control as a public servant or allows any other person so to do; or (ii) if the public servant intentionally enriches himself illicitly during the period of his office.(2)This means that in the Rafale case, corruption can be proved only if (i) there is personal gratification or quid pro quo or money trail of bribe given to PM Modi or to others or (ii) The procedure laid down in the Defence Procurement Procedure- DPP 2013 were dishonestly or fraudulently violated causing loss to the nation.-As regards (i) above, there is no evidence whatsoever that has emerged so far. Not even a hint of it. Please remember that in the Bofors scam or in Augusta Westland Scam, these were triggered only after the evidence of money payment emerged from outside India. In Rafale, in spite of so much digging there no evidence at all.-As regards (ii) above, I would like to quote three sections of DPP-2013:Inter Government Agreement-71. There may be occasions when procurements would have to be done from friendly foreign countries which may be necessitated due to geo-strategic advantages that are likely to accrue to our country. Such procurements would not classically follow the Standard Procurement Procedure and the Standard Contract Document but would be based on mutually agreed provisions by the Governments of both the countries. Such procurements will be done based on an Inter Governmental Agreement after clearance from CFA. The following cases would fall under the preview of this provision:-(a) There are occasions when equipment of proven technology and capabilities belonging to a friendly foreign country is identified by our Armed Forces while participating in joint international exercises. Such equipment can be procured from that country which may provide the same, ex their stocks or by using Standard Contracting Procedure as existing in that country. In case of multiple choices, a delegation may be deputed to select the one, which best meets the operational requirements.-(b) There may be cases where a very large value weapon system / platform, which was in service in a friendly foreign country, is available for transfer or sale. Such procurements would normally be at a much lesser cost than the cost of the original platform/ weapon system mainly due to its present condition. In such cases, a composite delegation would be deputed to ascertain its acceptability in its present condition. The cost of its acquisition and its repairs / modifications would be negotiated based on Inter-Governmental Agreement.--(c) In certain cases, there may be a requirement of procuring a specific state-of-the art equipment/ platform, however, the Government of the OEM’s country might have imposed restriction on its sale and thus the equipment cannot be evaluated on ‘No Cost No Commitment’ basis. Such equipment may be obtained on lease for a specific period by signing an Inter-Governmental Agreement before a decision is taken for its purchase.As per the contention made by the petitioners in the Supreme Court, the Rafale IGA doesn’t fit in any of the three types (a), (b), (c) above. This was not accepted by the SC in its verdict dated 14-12-2018, wherein the court had concluded that ‘ broadly the processes have been followed’. Now a review petition is under consideration of the Apex Court, wherein the petitioners have submitted three documents, allegedly stolen from government records. These documents reflect that:(i) Sovereign Guarantee was not obtained, instead letter of comfort was obtained.(ii) Integrity and many other standard clauses were omitted.(iii) Escrow arrangement was not insisted upon, though advised by financial consultant.(iv) Some relaxation in Offset penalties norms have been given, as well as offset is spread unevenly to make substantial fulfillment only in the fag-end of the offset period. i.e. in the 5th, 6th and 7th year.(v) According to the dissent note submitted by three out of seven members of the Indian Negotiation Team. If we consider the cost of commission on Bank guarantees waived, the price of this deal becomes costlier than the aligned bid price of 2007.I cannot pre-judge the SC’s order in the review-petition. But definitely it will depend on its interpretation of section 71 above. If it is found that the Rafale IGA satisfies section 71, then there can be no violation of the procedure, as the section states “Such procurements would not classically follow the Standard Procurement Procedure and the Standard Contract Document but would be based on mutually agreed provisions by the Governments of both the countries.”I also reproduce following sections:73. In certain acquisition cases, imperatives of strategic partnerships or major diplomatic, political, economic, technological or military benefits deriving from a particular procurement may be the principal factor determining the choice of a specific platform or equipment on a single vendor basis. These considerations may also dictate the selection of particular equipment offered by a vendor not necessarily the lowest bidder (L1). Decisions on all such acquisitions would be taken by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) on the recommendations of the DPB.75. Any deviation from the prescribed procedure will be put up to DAC through DPB for approval(The Defence Acquisition Council, headed by the Defence Minister has wide powers to approve deviations from the laid down procedure).I may add that if approval of CCS was obtained, then even the contention of having agreed to higher pricing would not hold water. Even L-1 is not necessary, so the allegations of price variation will not make any difference. Please note that the CCS has taken the decision only after recommendations were received from the DPB in due course. Even after that, an adverse view is taken by the Court, then all the members of CCS will have to be held guilty, not just the Prime Minister. These will include: (i) Home Minster (ii) Minister of External Affairs (iii) Defence Minister (now expired) (iv) Finance Minister.My guess is that the SC may not find any substance in the allegation that laid down procedure was dishonestly and fraudulently violated, as enough flexibility is furnished in the DPP. Why is this flexibility? The answer is provided by Apex court itself in its above referred judgment by quoting following sections from the DPP:“Defence acquisition is not a standard open market commercial form of procurement and has certain unique features such as supplier constraints, technological complexity, foreign suppliers, high cost of foreign exchange implications and geo-political ramifications. As a result, decision making pertaining to defence procurement remains unique and complex.”“Defence procurement involves long gestation period and delay in procurement will impact the preparedness of our forces. The needs of the armed forces being non-negotiable and and uncompromising aspect, flexibility in defence procurement is required, which has already been provisioned for.”Quite true that it doesn’t mean that flagrant and blatant deviations from the laid down procedure should be freely allowed. DPP 2013 says :“Defence Acquisition is a complex decision-making process that needs to balance the competing requirements of expeditious procurement, development of an indigenous defence sector and conformity to the highest standards of transparency, probity and public accountability.”One has to understand that defence acquisition is a dynamic process. What was true in 2007 cannot remain static in 2016, when the IGA was signed. I am sure the Apex Court will take into account the above factors and will not take a rigid view. The following points are briefly stated below, which the readers should take into account:·The earlier bidding process, which commenced in 2007, was totally corrupted. The CAG Report states that “the DA’s price bid was non-compliant as it was incomplete and was not in prescribed format. The L-1 committee filled up incomplete entries by culling out figures given elsewhere under different headings of the price bid.” The report categorically states that Rafale maker Dassault Aviation (DA) did not fulfill request from proposal (FRP) requirements at the stage of technical evaluation committee with respect to air staff qualitative requirements, warranty clauses and an option clause. “The proposal of the vendor should have been rejected at the TEC stage itself”, the CAG said. The proposal of the competitor, Aeronautic Defence and Space Company makers of Eurofighter planes was also non-compliant of the FRP. Thus an absurd scenario had emerged that proposal of no bidder was compliant!·In the earlier bid there was no clarity regarding who would assume responsibility of the quality of production to be made at HAL, India. DA simply refused to assume responsibility. This made the earlier bid simply untenable.·Furthermore, HAL’s quotation of man hours at a factor of 2.7 to DA significantly increased the cost of Rafale jets and DA was no longer L-1 bidder.·The FRP was cancelled in 2015. As such the concept of L-1 had no relevance. The procurement could have been only made through the IGA route. The Euro-fighter was not eligible for IGA as it is made by consortium of many nations. Who would have signed the IBA?·Sovereign Guarantee, Integrity clauses and offset have been given a miss several times, while making acquisitions from Russia or USA. For example for acquiring S-400 Anti-missile defence system for Rs.40,000/- from Russia in 2018, there is no sovereign guarantee, no offset, no integrity clauses, no protests, no scam allegations, no petitions!!!·Normal offset requirement is 30%, as against in Rafale deal, higher offset @ 50% is kept.·So far as the offset issue is concerned, it is non-existent. The Supreme Court in its above referred judgment has categorically stated as under: “Thus the commercial arrangement (between Dassualt and Reliance Infrastructure), in our view, does not assign any role to the Indian Government, at this stage, with respect to the engagement of the IOP. Such matter is seemingly left to the commercial decision of Dassualt. That is the reason why it has been stated that the role of the Indian Government would start only when the vendor/OEM would submit a formal proposal in the prescribed manner, indicating details of IOPs and products for offset discharge.” Thus what exists as on now, is just a joint venture company between the two groups. The linking of the JV with offset arrangement is yet to materialize. This will happen when Dassualt submits its offset plan. As reported by Dassualt , the JV in Nagpur is engaged in manufacture of components of Falcon planes meant for civil aviation . Dassualt’s investment in the venture is not likely to exceed Rs.900 crore, i.e. just 3% of the total offset amount. The lion’s share is likely to go to DRDO for its Kaveri project for design of Tejas engines. Obviously, Reliance is not the only Indian Offset Partner (IOP). There will be at least 70 or more. None of them will manufacture Rafale planes. These will be made only in France. Section 3.1 Appendix D, DPP 2013 provides for many types of offsets in sub-paras (3)(1)(a), (b),(c),(d),(e) and (f). This involves direct offset – i.e. co-production and transfer of technology as well as indirect offset- i.e. investment or export contracts of products/activities that have nothing to do with activity pertaining to the contracted deal. The last two (e) & (f) pertain to investment in R&D activities of DRDO. Thus the freedom is with OEM to decide which method to opt for. As per para 8.11 of Appendix D: “ In exceptional cases, DOMW may recommend change in offset partner or offset component on being convinced that the change is necessary to enable the vendor to fulfil offset obligations.”. Thus Dassualt is free to change Reliance if Reliance is not able to bring in required matching investment! This is the most likely scenario taking into account the weakened financial position of ADAG group.·As far as pricing is concerned, CAG has already opined that the present deal is 2.86% cheaper than the earlier deal. As Bank guarantees are not required, the cost thereof is saved. But, this cost, which was to borne by Dassualt, was not part of the pricing. Hence it will not impact the 2.86% calculations of the CAG. Yes, if the saved cost, which cannot be exactly quantified, had been shared with India, it would further improved the ratio of 2.86%.·Had the deal been signed in 2012 itself, there would have been no complications. Subsequently, DA received big orders from Qatar, Egypt and home country France. The demand supply equation underwent drastic reversal. France said no to everything we asked for. What alternative we had in 2015? Should Modi have blamed the UPA-II government, published a white paper and opened a re-bidding process. It was the safest route. A.K. Antony would have liked it very much, notwithstanding delay of another decade. But Modi chose another path. He gave whatever IAF wanted, even though it meant scam allegations, criticism court cases etc. should he be imprisoned for his courageous decision? If heads of the nations are punished based on such meager considerations, this would send wrong messages to our future governments and future defence acquisitions will be adversely impacted.