Final Project Status Report Form - Asia-Pacific Partnership: Fill & Download for Free

India Has become more Expressive. Earlier, in previous decade we were perceived by Global leaders as Circus Lion, and, it’s not there fault, it was our foreign policy of keeping everyone happy, even the one’s who created problems for us and the one who backed it, i guess you got what i mean.This has CHANGED. Lion is out in open, and with roars crossing borders to declare to world about one’s territory.Protecting one’s national interest in world forum by being expressive is not being dominant in my view. being Vocal about terrorism and it’s manufacturers is not being dominant, giving world a new axis centered at South East Asia to work around, is not dominant. We just opened up, may be late, but at-least we did.India’s Foreign Policy has reached new heights even above the standards of the world. The message is out loud and open, Come work with us for better WORLD, but in case you wanna mess around with tricks, don’t forget India is where chess originated.As i always say in blogs, Its golden period for Indian Diplomacy, where globe understood the potential of India, and not only understood it, some even felt it too. India long under-rated potential is being fully explore now.More than Surgical Strikes i believe, it was Indian Diplomacy with increased the bounty. It’s India Policy Shift, and noise made by the attack, made it audible to every corner of the globe. This quantum shift in policy was need of the hour, for last decade, but better late then never. Its my strong believe that this period is golden period in Indian Diplomacy and India is en-cashing it at high interest. India’s Terror fight is now on global map, and at the same time, it was made more clear to world that differentiation of Good Terrorism and Bad Terrorism is void and Terrorism has to be dealt with, in it’s every form.Nations Visited by PM Narendra Modi during this current tenure, are the reason behind, India’s Policy shift was made aware, and every one was made part of it.Two years ago today, Narendra Modi took the oath of office as India’s 14th prime minister. Among his first decisions as head of government – in fact, it was set in motion even before the formal start of his tenure – was an unconventional act of diplomacy: inviting eight foreign leaders of neighbouring countries to attend his inauguration. While many commentators claimed before his election that Modi would be a nationalist hardliner, a foreign affairs novice, or simplymore of the same on external affairs, the prime minister instead proved more active and (perhaps less surprisingly) more pragmatic than many had expected. In two years, Modi has displayed an instinctive understanding of power in the conduct of world affairs, and he has also benefited from being less politically hamstrung than his predecessor Manmohan Singh, with whose worldview he in fact shares much in common.A highlight of Modi’s first year was his outreach to the United States. In September 2014, Washington rolled out the red carpet for a leader it had once publicly shunned, and Modi reciprocated by inviting Barack Obama to India’s Republic Day celebrations, a first for a U.S. president. But beyond normalising and enhancing relations with the US, Modi’s international priorities were quickly made evident. Within his first year, he embarked upon state visits to India’s immediate neighbourhood, three crucial Indian Ocean island countries, important Asia-Pacific powers (China, Japan, and Australia), and eventually Western Europe.Modi’s second year followed in much the same fashion, with a ground-breaking visit to Bangladesh, a swing through Central Asia, a long overdue visit to Afghanistan, and a renewed focus on the Middle East or West Asia. It also included a surprise stopover in Pakistan, a trip no Indian prime minister had managed since 2004. In addition, Modi has in his first two years played host in India to most of the world’s top leaders, including those of the United States, China, Russia, France, Japan, and Germany. He also hosted a landmark India-Africa Forum Summit last November that involved 41 heads of state and government.Despite this flurry of activity, several commentators have been left disappointed by Modi’s – and India’s – handling of international relations. My Brookings India colleague W.P.S. Sidhu has pointed to a lack of strategic vision, and describes Modi’s various foreign policy initiatives – such as Neighbourhood First and Act East – as “vacuous.” While commending the prime minister’s sound instincts, initiative, and energy, former foreign secretary Shyam Saran has lamented the lack of an overall national security strategy and criticised the priority granted showmanship over substance. Meanwhile, Rajesh Rajagopalan of Jawaharlal Nehru University has expressed disappointment with the lack of new ideas and synergy and his colleague Happymon Jacob has faulted New Delhi’s bullying and poor imagination for bad relations with its neighbours.Much of this criticism is perplexing. Ambiguity and deniability have value in foreign affairs. As a consequence, neither this Indian government nor any of its predecessors have ever explicitly spelled out their strategic intentions in a single document, although there are plenty of public statements that offer a good indication of the government’s outlook. These public articulations, combined with the nature, outcomes, and timings of Modi’s diplomatic activities, offer a clear picture of India’s priorities and strategic objectives. They are essentially five-fold:Prioritizing an integrated neighborhood; “Neighborhood First.”Leveraging international partnerships to promote India’s domestic development.Ensuring a stable and multi-polar balance of power in the Indo-Pacific; “Act East.”Dissuading Pakistan from supporting terrorism.Advancing Indian representation and leadership on matters of global governance.These are the yardsticks against which the international activities of this government – or, for that matter, any Indian government – should be measured. In each case, it is important to assess the progress made, the setbacks experienced, and the long-term or structural challenges that will continue to confront India.1. Neighbourhood First: Improving connectivity, mitigating nationalismThe approach called ‘Neighbourhood First’ – a phrase adopted by the Indian government – is meant to indicate four things. The first is New Delhi’s willingness to give political and diplomatic priority to its immediate neighbours and the Indian Ocean island states. The second is to provide neighbours with support, as needed, in the form of resources, equipment, and training. The third, and perhaps most important, is greater connectivity and integration, so as to improve the free flow of goods, people, energy, capital, and information. The fourth is to promote a model of India-led regionalism with which its neighbours are comfortable.The newfound diplomatic priority on the region is evident in Modi’s visits to all of India’s neighbours – barring The Maldives – as well as regular leadership meetings in India and on the sidelines of multilateral summits. India has also become more forthcoming in providing support and in capacity building, whether concluding its biggest ever defence saleto Mauritius, or in providing humanitarian assistance to Nepal or Sri Lanka. With Bangladesh, the completion of the Land Boundary Agreement, improvements in energy connectivity, and steps taken towards accessing the port of Chittagong have all been crucial developments that help to set a positive tone for a region long defined by cross-border suspicion and animosity. India’s focus on connectivity is also gradually extending outward, whether to Chabahar in Iran or Kaladan in Myanmar. Although India will continue investing in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) as an institutional vehicle, it has also expressed a willingness to develop issue-specific groupings that are not held hostage to consensus: a “SAARC minus X” approach. Two examples of this are the Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal (BBIN) grouping – meant to advance motor vehicle movement, water power management, and inter-grid connectivity – and the commonSAARC Satellite, which India has decided to proceed with despite Pakistan’s objections.These concerted efforts have so far had mixed results. Bangladesh and Bhutan have clearly been positive stories for India. Ties with Sri Lanka have proved a mixed bag, despite the electoral loss of former president Mahinda Rajapaksa, who had testy relations with New Delhi. However, President Maithripala Sirisena remains well-disposed and personally invested in better relations with India. The Maldives has proved more difficult. India has continuing concerns about the fate of former president Mohamed Nasheed, although several defence agreements were concluded during the visit to India of the incumbent Abdulla Yameen.The obvious regional outlier has been Nepal, which has been the most vexing foreign policy problem facing the Indian government over the past year. Despite considerable Indian assistance in the aftermath of last year’s devastating earthquake – that reportedly included over 1,700 tonnes of relief material and medical assistance to thousands – Nepal’s constitutional crisis severely set back relations. The crisis was not of India’s making – it was primarily the product ofdifferences between Nepal’s hill elites and the Madhesis – but New Delhi was confronted with a tough choice. Either it could have welcomed a flawed Nepal constitution, knowing that months – perhaps years – of Madhesi agitation would follow, risking escalation that could have damaged Indian interests. Or it had to take some form of action to urge Kathmandu to revisit the more contentious aspects of the constitution, risking the immense goodwill that it had built up over the previous year. After Indian diplomatic entreaties were dismissed, it opted for the latter. New Delhi was guilty of responding late to fast-moving developments, and despite successfully pressuring Kathmandu to amend some aspects of the contentious constitution, it has not been able to overcome continuing mistrust or resolve the remaining constitutional differences.With respect to all of its neighbours, including Nepal, India has taken concrete steps over the past two years to promote goodwill and deepen economic and social connectivity. But nationalist sentiments in all these countries – often directed against India as the region’s predominant power – will continue to present a challenge. Anti-Indian sentiments will also, paradoxically, drag India further into these countries’ domestic politics, suggesting that undulating highs and lows in its neighbourhood relationships will now be the norm. Furthermore, for all of India’s neighbours, China is now prepared to step in to provide financial, military, infrastructural, and even political assistance, and act as a potential alternative to India. This new development is something India will have to carefully monitor and appropriately respond to – as it has in recent years – particularly if Indian security interests are seriously compromised. As the status quo power in its neighbourhood, India will have to constantly play defence in its own backyard.2. Bridging diplomacy and developmentA second major objective of India’s foreign relations has been to leverage international partnerships to advance India’s domestic development. This includes improving technological access, sourcing capital, adopting best practices, gaining market access, and securing natural resources. In these respects, a truly accurate assessment will only be possible in the years to come, given the lag time between initial agreements and results. That being said, some of the short-term indicators show promising signs. Greenfield foreign direct investment (FDI) has already seen a jump – with India surpassing China – although how much of that can be attributed to diplomatic efforts is uncertain. Some new international collaborative efforts, such as Japan’s ridiculously low-cost loan for a high-speed rail line, have immense potential and, like high-profile Indian metro and airport projects in the recent past, might be replicable. The recently amended tax treaty with Mauritius is but one example of how diplomacy can be used to benefit both investors and the government, and potentially increase India’s tax base. The extension of lines of credit to Africa and Iran promises to increase business opportunities for Indian firms. And securing buy-in from major Silicon Valley corporations in increasing Internet access in India marks another effort at advancing national development.In this respect, however, the greatest challenge will be in tying international agreements to domestic agents of change, whether specific ministries, the private sector, or local actors. Securing international agreements is hard enough; using that to spur developments at home is an altogether more challenging proposition. Such complications are most obviously manifested in trade policy, which has more immediate implications for domestic constituencies, and in defence, where the government is struggling to balance the desire for defence indigenization, commercial viability, and an under-performing public sector-led defence industrial complex. The overall trajectory for India’s development is certainly positive, and the diplomatic momentum has clearly increased. But India still has a mountain to climb to fully harness external inputs to advance economically, socially, and technologically. This will be a decades-long project.3. Acting East as China risesWhen Modi rhetorically replaced two decades of India’s ‘Look East’ policy with ‘Act East,’ the purpose was to show greater intent in realising what had long been an aspiration for India: to become an integral part of Asia. The greater urgency implicit in the shift in terminology is largely an outgrowth of Indian concerns regarding China’s rise and the upsetting of Asia’s delicate balance of power. In addition to the development of military and dual use Chinese infrastructure in India’s neighbourhood and the Indian Ocean, India’s concerns are three-fold: the risk of Chinese assertiveness on the disputed border, the possibility of Chinese primacy in the Indo-Pacific region, and an uneven economic playing field.After an ill-timed Chinese incursion during Xi Jinping’s 2014 visit to India, the disputed Sino-Indian border has proved reasonably stable over the past year. China has remained preoccupied in more politically sensitive disputes over the Southand East China Seas with the likes of Vietnam, the Philippines, and Japan. India-China border negotiations have been continuing apace, but a breakthrough is highly unlikely. The development of border roads on India’s side remains an uphill task, as is preserving a military balance, particularly in terms of air superiority. The diplomatic conditions are currently favourable for India to retain its military advantage. But while progress on the border has been steady, it has also been slow.In terms of the broader strategic context in Asia, India’s ‘Act East’ policy has three distinct facets: institutional, commercial, and security-related. The first has largely been successful – mostly as by-product of two decades of Indian economic growth. Barring the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, India has integrated into Asia’s multilateral networks, most notably the apex East Asia Summit. However, the conclusion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, the largest trade pact in history, threatens to affect India’s commercial ambitions in the region, possiblycosting India as much as 0.1 percent of GDP. Unfortunately, the Indian response to the development of new trade blocs has too often been defensive. Rather than remain in denial, India will have to rethink how to adapt to the new trade order.Better trade with Southeast Asia will also require developing overland connectivity in India’s northeast, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. Expanding India’s port capacities and relaxing constraints on shipping are necessary first steps that are now being taken. But beyond institutional and commercial changes, the greatest departure over the past two years has been on the security side. Not only have India and the United States been able to articulate a Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region, but India has become far less reluctant to embrace “minilateral” or “plurilateral” security arrangements and political consultations. This includes effectively elevating the Malabar naval exercises into a trilateral India-U.S.-Japan initiative, and commencing an official India-Australia-Japan dialogue. Deepening security partnerships with other Indo-Pacific states that share India’s concerns remains a priority, but is also largely subject to their own vacillations and political processes.Finally, bilateral economic relations with China offer a contradictory picture. On the one hand, India seeks to be a beneficiary of China’s attempts at rebalancing its economy, and has become a destination for Chinese investment. The last two years saw a significant jump in Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI), from Rs. 767 crores in 2013-2014 to Rs. 3,066 crores a year later. In fact, those two years alone have accounted for over 70% of Chinese FDI ever into India. But China’s old economic habits are proving hard to kick. Barriers to entry for Indian software companies remain, even as China’s high tech sector comes into its own. And India shares continuing international concerns about China’s dumping of goods.To date, India’s Act East policy has added greater urgency to its earlier aspirations. Certain aspects, such as institutional participation have been more successful over the years, and others such as bilateral and ‘minilateral’ security cooperation have seen discrete recent improvements. India’s primary challenges will lie in preserving the military balance on the disputed border with China, and integrating itself into the region’s commercial networks. This will require placing a greater priority on improving border infrastructure, on overland connectivity to Southeast Asia via Bangladesh and India’s Northeast, on port and shipping infrastructure at home, and on developing an understanding of the implications of TPPfor India. Only then can India really come into its own as an Asian power.4. Pakistan: Engagement and isolationPakistan’s relative importance for India has waned significantly over the past two years. The development of nuclear weapons by both countries has ensured an uneasy peace, while Pakistan – despite Indian entreaties – has refused to open up economically. Terrorism by entities based in Pakistan, and supported by the country’s military and intelligence agencies, continues to be directed at India, although certain measures have helped reduced the number of infiltrations and severity of attacks. Nonetheless, Pakistan remains a political hot button issue, and India-Pakistan relations still dominatemedia coverage and political discourse.None of the last few Indian governments have been under any illusions about Pakistan. Terrorism emanating against India by entities based in Pakistan and supported by elements of the state remains a top priority; one need only look atevery recent statement made by India with Pakistan to see the prominence given to that issue. But India’s options are also limited. For all the talk about retaliating against Pakistan, particularly militarily, such steps risk an escalation to the nuclear level. Containing Pakistan is not a possibility either. India’s economy is not yet large enough, it is limited by geography, and Pakistan continues to find support in the Gulf, the United States, and China. Any suggestion of India’s responding “in the same coin” is also unnecessary; Pakistan is doing a perfectly good job destabilizing itself. Nor can Pakistan be ignored. Indian passiveness is exactly what Pakistan wants, for it would invite third-party intervention, something a rising sovereign India would naturally resent.After several attempts at setting the terms of engagement over the past two years, India has had to settle upon a two-track policy. The first is to continue keeping lines of engagement open, as long as terrorism tops the agenda and that dialogue isstrictly bilateral in nature. This has resulted in a peculiar ping-pong. Inviting Nawaz Sharif to Delhi in 2014 resulted in Pakistan trying to involve the Hurriyat, a coalition of Kashmiri separatists, and Pakistani shelling along the Line of Control with India. The 2015 Ufa Declaration was heavily criticized in Pakistan and led to Islamabad calling off the national security advisor talks under rather farcical circumstances. Modi’s Lahore stopover in December 2015 was followed soon after by the Pathankot attack. And the response to India allowing Pakistani investigators access to the Pathankot site was Pakistan producing an alleged Indian spy, whom India insists is an innocent former Navy officerkidnapped from Iran. The pattern is clear: India has repeatedly tried to renew talks in good faith, only for elements in Pakistan to make brazen attempts at sabotaging the process. While frustrating, the process has created considerablediplomatic space for India – much as Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s Lahore trip enabled a bolder response to Pakistan’s 1999 Kargil incursion. More importantly, India’s constant willingness to engage has kept the United States and others from interjecting themselves in the region.The government has not been content with simple bilateral engagement, but has also had to take countermeasures and steps to delegitimize state support for terrorism. New Delhi’s critical response to the U.S. decision to supply Pakistan with F-16s and prime ministerial visits to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Afghanistan have all been part of an attempt to isolate Pakistan, to slowly compel its deep state to reconsider its priorities. It is unrealistic to expect that the United States or Saudi Arabia will change their Pakistan policies overnight, but both now have the ability to ‘de-hyphenate’ their subcontinental relationships. Of greater concern in this respect is China’s decision to go forward with the ambitious, multi-billion dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. While India has expressed its concerns, dissuading Beijing from this path will be a severe challenge; after all, much of China’s historical support for Pakistan has been driven by its desire to balance against India.Modi’s efforts with Pakistan have not yet borne results. A stalemate continues. The only difference now is that India’s Pakistan policy has assumed a certain consistency and that it is playing the chessboard with white, rather than black, pieces, seizing control of the momentum and initiative. The process of both engaging and isolating Pakistan despite repeated provocations will be long, frustrating, and politically unpopular at home. But as long as domestic pressures can be navigated, India’s continuing bilateral engagement with Pakistan, its efforts at internationally isolating it, and its offering a viable alternative model of South Asian engagement remain the only real prospect for resolving the Pakistan problem on India’s terms.5. India as a leading power: Raising ambitionsIndia is rising in a world system that has been largely favourable to its rise, but one that India was not involved in creating.According to Modi, the present international environment represents a rare opportunity for India, which it must use to “position itself in a leading role, rather than just a balancing force, globally.” India is not yet fully in a position to lead, or set the rules of the international order, but it is taking steps to seek full membership of the most important global governance platforms. India is already a member of the G20, the East Asia Summit, and the BRICS coalition, a testament to its status as a large country with a fast-growing economy. New Delhi also naturally aspires for permanent membership on the UN Security Council. It has also been actively lobbying for full membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as well as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Missile Technology Control Regime. These efforts could bear fruit as early as 2016, although there has been opposition from China and – because of the Italian marines controversy – Italy. All the while, India has been trying to bolster its leadership credentials, whether through international relief efforts in Yemen and Libya, reminders of its history of UN peacekeeping, or the public reclamation of its contributions to the World Wars. The successful outcome of the COP21 climate summit in Paris and India’s constructive role have also gone some way towards shedding its reputation as a multilateral ‘naysayer’ and ‘obstructionist’.India has only just recently embarked upon institution building of its own. The International Solar Alliance represents one such effort, as do the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and BBIN. While India will continue to lobby consistently for inclusion in multilateral security institutions, its presence in the evolving international economic and trade order will still require a clearer articulation of its trade policy, one that gives greater priority to India’s concerns on services, intellectual property, and labour mobility. India has clearly expressed broad comfort with the international order and has actively been lobbying for a seat at the global high table. Learning to lead, however, will be harder. As the prime minister himself has noted, it will require a change in mindsets.Polarized perspectivesA broad overview of the Indian government’s foreign policy, particularly over the past year, ought to clearly show not just a strategic vision, but progress along every one of India’s major objectives. It also reveals some of the frustrations and structural limitations that confront the Indian government, and are likely to confront it for many years going forward. They include the twin spectres of nationalism and Chinese inroads in India’s neighbourhood, insufficient commercial integration with Southeast and East Asia, gaps between diplomatic efforts and agents of domestic implementation, political resistance to engagement with Pakistan, and relative inexperience with leading on matters of global governance. India clearly has to do a much better job remaining vigilant in its own neighbourhood, managing or proactively addressing the domestic political fallout of its Pakistan policy, and better coordinating external outcomes with internal development, all the while raising its ambitions and improving its ability to follow through.What ultimately matters in any assessment, however, is the broad direction or orientation of India’s international relations, and its implementation. This is often at odds with public discourse, which often views developments in isolation and sees facts being used to fit preconceptions. For the television media in particular, Pakistan bashing has become a full-time preoccupation. Of equal concern is the unnecessary polarisation of much of the foreign policy discourse. Politics ought to end at the water’s edge. Unfortunately, the last decade has witnessed more fractious and self-serving discourse on many areas in which there has in fact been remarkable continuity and consensus. The changing media environment is in part responsible for this, as is the behaviour of the opposition parties – both past and present. Evaluating India’s advancement of its international interests will require a clearer assessment of its objectives, the progress made, and India’s continuing limitations. That challenge will be all the more difficult in a fast-evolving and unpredictable world.At last, i believe, in countries perspective, being neutral or subtle, doesn’t put us on map, but being Expressive and Dominant, gives us the choice to shape our map.and India Has Chosen to be Expressive.Thank You.!Sources:-India’s Five Foreign Policy Goals: Great Strides, Steep ChallengesList of international prime ministerial trips made by Narendra Modi - WikipediaMinistry of External Affairs

Disclaimer: I’m Indonesian. I just started studying about security studies in last two years. This is just my 2 cent. Please correct me if there are some wrong fact.DefinitionDefense policy in my opinion is part of bigger national security policy who included Police force, Intelligence, Counter-terrorism, Maritime security, Cyber Security, Aviation Security, Transnational crime, disaster management, search and rescue, VIP security service, and not-so-new-concept human security (UNDP 1994 concept / Human security - Wikipedia).We can classified some topics of defense policy. I don’t want to discuss ongoing war/conflict/peace process (and analysis the actor like state/non-state or like terrorist/insurgence) in another area of the world (because that’s what they do usually in defense policy analysis) So in this writing, I just discussed 2 group issues domestically:Military posture (Force Structure, Capability, Deployment) including issues like military professionalism, doctrine, territorial force, alutsista (weapon system), defense industry, defense planning & budget, reserve command, veteran issues,Geopolitics / Strategic Environment (Balance Power, Counter Balancing Interest, Risk Assessment) including some issues like war and peace, maritime security, military strategy, military cooperation, doctrine about war, military deterrence. Sometimes, defense policy is intersect with Foreign Policy.Policy MakingIn policy making, there are hierarchy of law/regulation in defense policy.In strategic level there are Law 3/2002 (State Defense), Law 34/2004 (TNI), Law 16/2012 (Defense Industry), Law 15/2012 (Veteran of Republic of Indonesia), Law 56/1999 (Trained People), Law 27/1997 (Mobilization and Demobilization), Emergency Law 23 Prp/1959 (State of Emergency). In operational law there are Law 25/2014 (Military Discipline Law), Law 31/1997 (Military Courts), Books of Military Penal Law (KUHPMiliter), etc. Supposedly there are three more bill, such as Reserve Component Law (RUU Komponen Cadangan), National Security law (RUU Kamnas) and State Secret law (RUU Rahasia Negara), but because there are concern about human right abuses from NGO and academician at that time (until now) the progress has been stalled in parliament since 1999 until now.General policy about defense is generally defined by elected President at RPJMN (National Development 5-years Plan) and explicitly defined at President Regulation about General policy in defense for 5 years (Perpres Kebijakan Umum Pertahanan). All of that will implemented at Minister of Defense regulation about state defense implementation (Permenhan Penyelenggaran Pertahanan Negara) (for 5 years) and Defense White Paper (there are 2003, 2008, 2015 version) and will detailed at Minister of Defense regulation about defense policy at year X (Permenhan Kebijakan Pertahanan Negara tahun X). Budget, program, technology procurement will followed under that regulation. TNI then implemented government policy about defense into operational day-to-day basis.In organization and authority. Ministry of Defense (Kemhan) hold the authority to create defense policy and administration, not the TNI. TNI only followed regulation from Kemhan and order from commander-in-chief (President). President the only one who has authority to use of force, using TNI Commander. Chief of Staff (of Army, Navy, and Air Forces) have roles in preparing, developing and training the forces. Ministry of Defense has the authority to allocated the budget to TNI HQ and each Army, Navy, and Air Forces HQ.Why?In New Order, Commander of Armed Forces is also automatically Minister of Defense and Security. So he lead the Armed Forces (ABRI, at that time) also the civilian bureaucracy at Department of Defense and Security (Dephankam, at that time, now Kemhan). Because after reformation, aspiration from society is civil supremacy, remove dwi-fungsi and good governance (including split policy-making function, operational function and supervision function, and splitting Polri from ABRI) so Minister of Defense and Commander of TNI (not ABRI anymore) must be two different people. Also Minister of Defense also must be civilian and not ranking member/dual hatted with Commander.You can compare it with National Police, where TNI-Defense Ministry has doing a good job in governance, read my other answer here Someone anonymous's answer to How much power does the Indonesian National Police chief have?BackgroundDefense policy created by analyze our country position, characteristics and analyze threat to our country. If we want to use traditional approach (military aggression), threat to Indonesia mostly nothing. No other country want to invade us militarily, we have good cooperation to all country including to some “controversial country” like Iran or North Korea. Hm maybe not Israel. We also don’t have active war like US or in the Middle East. We also don’t have military bases overseas. So approach to our defense policy is different than the other country.But in Indonesia Defense Policy White Paper 2015 some of our concern:Strategic Regional Issues: China race with US (in economic, military, etc), US Policy to “rebalancing” Asia, South China Sea conflict, Border issues with ASEAN Country,Global Issues: Regional Conflict Issues like Middle East, Africa, Proxy war, Weapon of Mass Destruction, Global Terrorism, Spying, Transnational Crime, Cyber Crime,Non military issues: Climate Change & Natural Disaster, Food Security, Water Security and Energy Security, Health EpidemicNational Issues: Ideological, democratic building process, Impact of globalization (Global trade, Culture degradation), Domestic security (Separatism, Social Conflict)The RealityBut in mainstream media, what we found more in discussion is:Weapon System accident - which bad news, tears, and blame is a good news. Zero accident policy, increasing maintenance budget, good governance in military procurement (not only receiving gift/hibah from other country Dilema belanja senjata: baru, bekas atau rekondisi? / Komisi I DPR Minta Kemenhan tak Beli Alutsista Bekas | Republika Online / TNI Tidak Kapok Beli Hercules Bekas / Panglima Tegaskan Indonesia Tak Lagi Mau Terima Hibah Alutsista), parliamentary supervising, was neededBela Negara - I don’t said that this is bad policy. The reason is good Menhan Ungkap Alasan Pentingnya Kesadaran Bela Negara. UUD has mandated this also. Our doctrine system is also Sishanrata (Sistem pertahanan semesta - All out war). But creating draft/conscription-alike without legal policy at least at UU level (not only in Defense Minister Regulation/Permenhan) have tendency to abuse Human Right (you have right to choose) Program Bela Negara berpotensi Langgar HAM and tend to new order militarization or created new “preman” group like Pamswakarsa and Pemuda Pancasila to become paramilitary all-over-again (remember Latih FPI Bela Negara, Dandim Lebak Dicopot / Latih FPI Bela Negara, Menhan Akan Teliti Pencopotan Dandim Lebak / Kasus FPI latihan bela negara 'akibat ketidakjelasan konsep') I think this is an temporary win-win policy when the other solution (reserve component) and its legislative process (RUU) has been stalled since reformation (RUU Komponen Cadangan Sipil Dilatih Militer: dari Komponen Cadangan ke Bela Negara RUU Komponen Cadangan Terlalu Dipaksakan / RUU KOMPONEN CADANGAN PERTAHANAN NEGARA : Dilema Legislasi dan Kebutuhan Pertahanan ).Proxy war “campaign” Panglima TNI: "Proxy War" Mengancam Indonesia, maybe good that we building our security awareness, but it seems like have “tendency” to create scapegoat and conspiracy Politisi PDI-P Curigai Gatot Nurmantyo soal Pernyataan "Proxy War" / Jenderal Gatot dan Imajinasi Proxy War / Menhan Nilai LGBT Bagian dari "Proxy War" yang Harus Diwaspadai / Panglima TNI: Proxy War paling berbahaya adalah Narkoba / Panglima TNI ungkit Australia aktor proxy war lepasnya Timor Timur and lately it tends to create campaign material for one specific General political interest by “socializing” Proxy War to media, and “lecturing” every college/universityTNI involvement in Food security (Ketahanan Pangan), so they said TNI must help farmer to help government policy. Part of TNI reform recommendation is we have to dissolute territorial forces (Kodam, Korem, Koramil, Babinsa) Mestinya sudah tidak ada Babinsa because they are easily to sway politics in grass roots for President/ruling political party interest (remember this, fresh 2014 Babinsa arahkan hasil Pilpres 2014: Ini Komentar Kubu Prabowo, Jokowi, dan TNI AD / Panglima TNI : kasus Babinsa tidak terstruktur dan tidak sistematis / PILPRES 2014 : Dianggap Tak Netral, Babinsa dan Danramil Dihukum ) or right now, some of General political interest. Instead of Babinsa help farmer (which they don’t have the competency), we should allocate more budget to farmer facilitator more professionally. Mempertanyakan Pelibatan TNI Mengurusi Pangan For all sources that I follow, it seems that this is only General Gatot initiative only, not official strategic policy. Strategic policy like TNI mobilization/national resilience to some cause is should be the domain of President, Minstry of Defense, National Security Council (Wantannas) not TNI level. Jokowi must instructing the military that this program was not the TNI core competency.PKI and Communism ._. ah f for this one.Tendency for TNI to get back to practical politics and security policy (which is Polri and Defense Minister part). Dilatih Mahal Kok Cuma Jadi Tukang Parkir Example: TNI involved in counter-terrorism (TNI right now, legally could, but must 1) under political decision (President) 2) under command (BKO) from Polri, which they have ‘gengsi’ and of course, they want the counter-terrorism budget too) 3) they have different competency, doctrine (kill or to be killed), and paradigm (warfare vs law enforcement, human right) Kapolri: TNI Rentan Abuse of Power jika Diberi Peran Antiteror, General Gatot ask for political right for TNI in Election, his decision to break-up with Australia without consulting first with Foreign Minister and Defense Minister (because strategic military cooperation and bilateral relationship is not TNI domain) Who's the Indonesian army chief suspending military cooperation with Australia? / Apakah keberatan TNI terhadap materi pengajaran di Australia berlebihan? and many General Gatot ‘alleged’ political maneuver Panglima TNI yang Penuh Kontroversi dan Reformasi KeamananAbout TNI involvement in domestic political affair and civilian leadership and also about Non-War Military Operation (OMSP), read my other remarks here Someone anonymous's answer to Do Indonesia military still play huge influential role in the domestic affairs of Indonesia after the downfall of Suharto?What should we discuss more in public:At Strategic Level (Defense Ministry and Foreign Ministry domain or maybe at Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal and Security -Kemenkopolhukam)Minimum Essential Forces. SBY created this policy in last period (from 2007) and create phase to building and modernize our defense forces (until 2024). We should talk more about technological innovation in defense sector like Unmanned submarine project a test of Indonesia’s technological depth / KFX/IFX: South Korea and Indonesia’s Stealth Fighter including also deterrence effect to our neighbors and other player out there Incar Teknologi Jet Tempur, Indonesia Hendak Beri Efek Gentar/ TNI AL: Skuadron 100 Jadi Efek Gentar Bagi Penyusup RI/ Shukoi Su-35 Diharapkan Dapat Beri Efek Gentar Tinggi / Postur Pertahanan Berdaya Gentar Tinggi Indonesia 2017/ what should we discuss more as public are, is it enough? is it align with our threat analysis? is it stick to plan (MEF Phase 2?) are we proud with only “Minimum” (remember M words of MEF) requirement? Can our domestic strategic industry handle it or do we got the technology transfer process from that procurement? Pengelolaan Industri Strategis Indonesia - Wikipedia bahasa Indonesia, ensiklopedia bebas how much the budget? is it reused technology (hibah) or new? are the process is transparent and there are no corruption or kickback or no other motives? (remember Rolls Royce cases to bribe Garuda chairman?) are there any alternative? are we really need that? (need-driven-analysis) Are foreign country/private industries directed our defense policy by selling/give their weapon? (supplier-driven-factors) etc. In US and developed country, public called topics like this as “Military Industrial Complex” Maybe in Indonesia, we won’t reach that complex phase like US (directed the policy), but more concerned problem are “broker/calo/makelar” or intermediate people who have interest (procurement corruption). We have some cases here Siasat Dagang Makelar Senjata / Jokowi Larang Pengadaan Senjata TNI Lewat Broker / Jokowi Tekankan Kerja Sama "G to G" untuk Hindari Korupsi Alutsista and there you are here’s our champion (at 2015). Papa! Media Jepang Sebut Setya Novanto Ikut Lobi Pembelian Pesawat (here’s the original news Indonesia looks to buy US-2 amphibious aircraft from Japan in bid to show solidarity | The Japan Times) / TNI Bicara Soal Dugaan Lobi Pesawat Amfibi Jepang oleh Setya you see? although this is Setya Novanto we talk about, the issues were drown because defense issues are not sexy.Defense Budget. Talking MEF are not separated with defense budget. Defense budget in Indonesia is part of five organization (Defense Ministry, TNI HQ, and each Army, Navy, and Air Forces HQ) and allocated from Defense Ministry. Don’t forget also about our defense budget which doesn’t meet 2% GDP yet Anggaran Pertahanan Kecil, Sebuah Anomali Bagi Poros Maritim Dunia, even in 2014 and 2016 Jokowi cut the defense budget Luhut Sebut Penghematan Anggaran Juga Berdampak ke Pertahanan / Menkeu Potong APBN-P, DPR Tak Rela Anggaran Pertahanan Dipangkas, but we have to appreciate right now is on the right track Anggaran Kemhan Tahun 2017 Rp 108 Triliun, Tertinggi dalam 12 Tahun and don’t forget about transparency and corruption issues Kesejahteraan Prajurit dan Transparansi (which Agusta Westland AW101 Helicopter cases recently is only tip of the iceberg)Military deployment. In strategic level, there are something wrong with how (espescially Army) deploy its forces. Army focusing on Java, where the most populous people where, reserve command such as Kostrad is standby in Java and deployed elsewhere whenever it needed backup. To change that, army dislocation policy still happening until now Pasukan TNI akan disebar ke luar Jawa. At 2015, Wiranto (at that time, He is not the minister, yet) vocal about this issue too Kaji Ulang Gelar Pasukan TNI (read the history behind it) / After he joined the cabinet (again), President instructed Defense Ministry and Armed Forces to study about Wiranto proposal Paradigma Baru Gelar Pasukan, Presiden Jokowi Beri Waktu 1 Bulan Panglima TNI Lakukan Pendalaman/Country Border and Outer Island. There are two problem. One is dispute between neighboring country In foreign policy perspective. It is so hard Penyelesaian Batas Maritim Indonesia: Kenapa Sulit? / In term of military deployment, we have problem about hiring freeze/zero growth recruitment and lack of force in our border Jokowi Minta Pasukan TNI di Perbatasan Ditambah. Creating military installation in our outer island is a challenge too / TNI AU Siap Gelar Kekuatan di Pulau Terluar / TNI akan bangun pangkalan militer terpadu di Natuna / Setelah Natuna, TNI Bangun Pangkalan Militer di Morotai, and our legal policy is late (We just have Ministry of Fishery and Maritime Issues since Gusdur (2000), and Law 27/2007 about Coastal and Outer Island Management since 2007 (and its revision at 2014) and Law 43/2008 about State Territorial since 2008 (which regulated border management and governance, and Law 34/2014 about Maritime which regulated maritime management and governance), meanwhile problem will always arising/ Cegah Masuknya Militan ISIS, TNI dan Polri Perketat Pengamanan Perbatasan / Australia terobos perairan IndonesiaPapua. Yes I know that is a controversial issue and needed new thread only to discussed about this one. In my opinion, demilitarization and openness in Papua is needed with proportionally (Disclaimer: My stand is Papua is integral part of NKRI, final. But you have to open more dialog instead of massive military and paramilitary ‘brimob’ deployment to Papua Pemerintah Diminta Kaji Ulang Pelibatan TNI di Konflik Papua / DPR Papua tolak rencana pangkalan militer di Biak , you can’t just simplify “our President right now advance development in Papua” “nah, it just Jokowi opposition throwing issues near 2019” or showing Trans Papua development, etc ONLY but you have to find solution too about historical/political conflict in 1969 Referendum Pepera and Human Right abuse reconciliation Tim Terpadu Rekomendasikan Penyelesaian 11 Kasus HAM di Papua, it is the core of problem and solving it will have permanent effect. Just like 1965 historical crisis (my stand Someone anonymous's answer to Do you believe that the 30 September Movement 1965 was initiated by PKI (Indonesian Communist Party)?), it’s hard, So right now Central Government under Jokowi, like many other previous administration (Cases of SBY, Megawati, and Gusdur Traktat Lombok yang meredam separatisme Papua) is just sweeping the problem under the rug “meredam masalah” changing attention and direct agenda setting, and seems to simplify to only economical and election problem Upaya Pemerintah Selesaikan Konflik di Papua Dinilai Belum Sentuh Akar Masalah / Redam Kelompok Separatis, Sejumlah Tokoh di Papua Diajak Dialog). Aceh cases handling with GAM is the good example to follow.United Nation Peacekeeping force. We have to appreciate that the number of peacekeeping forces is good since then. The question left are our current deployment aligned with our foreign policy? What is the evaluation? Is it enough to our contribution to peace-making to the world?Regional Security Architecture (ASEAN Marty Natalegawa says ASEAN at risk of being 'torn apart', as China gains upper hand / Is Jokowi Turning His Back on ASEAN? / How should Indonesia engage a hegemonic China?: The Jakarta Post, IORA, SCS issues (later discussed), FDA issues, USA-Asia re-balancing strategy (the latest, U.S. Marines arrive in Darwin for Australia, China exercises / Can the U.S. Pivot Back to Asia?), Asia Pacific security issues like North Korea and now look how China right now shape our Asia Pacific What Does China's 'New Asian Security Concept' Mean for the US? / ‘One Belt and One Road’: Connecting China and the world). We should keep SBY policy “Thousands Friends, Zero Enemy” legacy (Jokowi Signals Break With 'Thousand Friends' Foreign Policy / Insight: Jokowi's foreign policy: Assertive or nationalistic?/ read this as comparison Indonesia: “A Thousand Friends,” But No BFF) and Marty Natalegawa (Former Foreign Minister of SBY) “dynamic equilibrium” concept (Dynamic Equilibrium: Indonesia’s Blueprint for a 21st Century Asia Pacific / Telaah Doktrin Natalegawa “Dynamic Equilibrium” terhadap Kepentingan Ekonomi Indonesia: Studi Kasus Keketuaan Indonesia di ASEAN tahun 2011/ Indonesia’s foreign relations: policy shaped by the ideal of ‘dynamic equilibrium’ ) to involve in many (at least, regional) issues like nuclear crisis in Korean peninsula RI-ASEAN siap jadi negosiator krisis nuklir Korea Utara/ (which Indonesia has good relation with both of country). / Indonesia, South Korea Upgrade Strategic Partnership and the latest Myanmar-Rakhine crisis Rohingya Crisis: A Major Threat to Myanmar Transition and Regional Stability (I appreciate FM Retno Marsudi moves)Continuing Security Sector Reform (SSR) - such as regulate intelligence reform (Example: BAIS should in Defense Ministry level, not TNI. TNI only need tactical and warfare intelligence (intel tempur, only at Asintel & Kotama level), not strategic intelligence like BAIS (which contain also strategic issues analysis -which is domain of Ministry- and it has Defense Attache). The issue was pop up in public discussion two years ago when Ryamizard Ryacudu propose to create defense intelligence agency (like DIA in US DoD, not under Chief of Staff) Imparsial: Lebih Baik BAIS di Bawah Kemhan Dibanding Buat Lembaga Intelijen Baru / Badan Intelijen Strategis TNI dan Kemhan Putus Hubungan , another one is interception law Mendamaikan Pengaturan Hukum Penyadapan di Indonesia / Penyadapan oleh KPK, Polri, dan Kejaksaan Dapat Melanggar Hak Privasi (which is a mandate from Constitutional Court since 2010) should be discussed in parliament immediately/but not until now) another one is highly controversial National Security Law Draft (which has discussed since 2005 and keep stalled in parliament until now). National Security Law must include policy about state of emergency (because our current law last updated in 1959 / Perjalanan RUU PKB: Fenomena RUU Paling Berdarah dalam Sejarah Indonesia / Pemerintah Tunda UU PKB, Usulkan RUU Keadaan Darurat / 25 LSM Tolak Pemberlakuan UU PKB, and still being used in Aceh martial law 2004 which causing many human right abuses / Darurat Militer, Nestapa Rakyat Aceh / Refleksi 13 tahun Darurat Militer Aceh ) how TNI being deployed to help Police force in term of domestic security (tugas perbantuan Kompolnas: Perlu UU Perbantuan untuk Pelibatan TNI Tangani Terorisme / Indonesia Butuh RUU Tugas Perbantuan Dibanding RUU Kamnas / Sipil memaksa militer menjadi pemimpin | merdeka.com / Wewenang Polisi Dipereteli / Indonesia satu-satunya negara tanpa UU Keamanan Nasional ) and how to make National Security Council more efficient and useful (have authority, at least Perkuat Bela Negara, Wiranto Ubah Fungsi Wantannas / Menhan: Bela Negara Bukan Tugas Wantanas / Cegah Tumpang Tindih, Bela Negara Akan Diurus Wantannas / Laksda TNI (Purn) Christina M Rantetana: Dekin Layaknya Wantanas, Kenapa mau Dibubarkan?).Maritime Security. Maritime security is not about illegal unreported, unregulated fishing ONLY, but we have to appreciate Minister Susi Pudjiastuti move, although it is not the strategic problem compare to the other one (although in this case we have to discuss more objective about the substance in this statement Komisioner Komnas HAM Sindir Menteri Susi: Orang Bodoh Juga Bisa Tenggelamkan Kapal not the statement “Stupid” it self).South China Sea. High tension in our front-yard (read this report Countering-Coercion Asia) / Counter-Coercion Series: China-Vietnam Oil Rig Standoff | Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative / Chinese carrier enters South China Sea amid renewed tension / China installs weapons systems on artificial islands: U.S. think tank / A Freedom of Navigation Primer for the Spratly Islands | Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative / Freedom of Navigation Operations in the South China Sea Aren't Enough Jokowi seems doesn’t have a plan (we can’t understand of his policy/statement about this issues) or maybe doesn’t care about South China Sea Indonesia South China Sea: Going it Alone / The main actor in foreign policy: Is he interested? . All only we have is gesture and show off when he boarding at Natuna in KRI (read my stands against 9 dash line here Someone anonymous's answer to Will Indonesia lose its neutrality on South China Sea after the rising tension in Natuna island? / Someone anonymous's answer to Would USA take such similar aggressive action against Indonesia if they have bitter dispute with Philippine or Vietnam?). We have also to talk about ASEAN failure to reach agreement and issue joint communique about SCS (when China dominance over ASEAN country economy (including Indonesia) break the ASEAN unity about that issues). Sudah Tak Satu Suara, Indonesia Disarankan Keluar dari ASEANSectoral Ego. Don’t forget about ego conflict between civilian agency in maritime security (Bakamla under President, KPLP/Coast Guard under Transporation Ministry, Marine Police (Polair) under Polri/National Police, Fishery Surveillance Ship under KKP/Fishery Ministry, and don’t forget the other agency like Custom and Excise (Ditjen Bea Cukai), Search and Resque Agency (Basarnas) and Immigration (Ditjen Imigrasi) which each of one has its own patrol ship) Tumpang Tindih Aturan Penegakan Hukum Maritim / Mantan Kabais TNI: Bakamla Bertentangan dengan Visi Jokowi / another perspective Syahrin Abdurrahman: Tidak Ada Tumpang Tindih Kewenangan Menjaga Laut / Ide Jonan Membentuk Ditjen Penjagaan Laut & Pantai Dikritik.Projecting Power. Jokowi also doesn’t seem to know how to project our Navy and Air Forces (is it green water Navy? brown water Navy? blue water Navy? ‘Blue-Water’ Navies in the Indian Ocean Region / Indonesia Harus Miliki "Blue Water Navy" / KASAL: Indonesia butuh Green Water Navy and the air force power Jelang HUT TNI AU, Poros Maritim Dunia Jokowi Dipertanyakan ). For instance, choosing Army (again!), breaking the rotation tradition, instead of Navy/Air Forces in 2015 when choosing TNI Commander What Does Indonesia’s New Military Chief Pick Mean? . For comparison, look at this one Chinese Power Projection Capabilities in the South China Sea | Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative or you can read this one at China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for CongressGlobal Maritime Fulcrum. Many critics from security academician and think tank about Global Maritime Fulcrum (Poros Maritim Dunia, Jokowi launches maritime doctrine to the world) is only a domestic campaign slogan but doesn’t have its implementation in Navy projecting power/only inward looking Indonesia's Global Maritime Fulcrum: An Updated Archipelagic Outlook? / 3 Years Later, Where Is Indonesia's 'Global Maritime Fulcrum'? / Indonesia’s Global Maritime Fulcrum: Challenge and Trajectories Jokowi seems to not give enough attention about this many issues, instead focusing on economy only or bilateral trade Indonesia's Choice: Not the Indian Ocean, But Bilateralism / Indonesian Sea Policy: Accelerating Jokowi's Global Maritime Fulcrum? | Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. Infrastructure and logistic is OK for maritime business (I appreciate the spirit from Jokowi) which has some critics like how about this one? Luhut Bebaskan Asing Beri Nama 4.000 Pulau di Indonesia. But remember that with growing economy from shipment and trading, strong Navy and air forces is needed.Cyber Security coordination. Indonesia right now is a top cyber attack capital (as many attack originated from us) Indonesia Tops China as Cyber Attack Capital As I’m learning about this stuff and followed this issue closely, I’m really frustrated for slow progress that it needed 4 years, 2 president (which should be finish in SBY administration in last 2014, but Jokowi delay it again because his political promise to stop creating new agency), 3 times changes of Menkopolhukam (because He keep reshuffling this post every year) to finish National Cyber Agency. Sectoral ego (power grab between Kemhan, Kominfo, BIN, Polri, and TNI and Menkopolhukam) is the main reason….now finally we have National Cyber and Crypto Agency, which is formerly Deputy under Menkopolhukam, now it is an agency under the President, which formed after merger between ID-SIRTII Kominfo, Information Security Directorate Kominfo, and National Crypto Agency (Lemsaneg) (Perpres 53 2017), we have also newly created Cyber Intelligence Director at BIN (spin-off from Technology Intelligence Deputy BIN) (Perpres 73 2017) newly created Cyber Unit at TNI (spin-off from BAIS TNI) (Perpres 62 2016), and Cyber Crime Directorate (spin-off from Special Crime Directorate) at Bareskrim Polri (Perpres 5 2017), and Cyber Operation Center at Defense Ministry (since 2013, which its operational detail was classified information).At Tactical Level (TNI domain)Military professionalism, including not involve again in political interest/security policy. Increasing education, training, doctrine and day-to-day supervision. Including narcotics problem, wife/domestic abuses, and some soldiers criminal act.Personnel welfare, including in remote area. In the past, military is you can call it “makmur” because they have business, concession, cooperation, conglomeration, asset such as land ownership, network to businessman all over the country. You can call it financially independent. After Law 34/2004, business of TNI are being liquidated and TNI can only received money from official budget APBN. Let’s don’t forget that this was an issue and still an issue (until now? Bisnis Militer mencari legitimasi / ”Unkept Promise” Failure to End Military Business Activity in Indonesia ) For you who don’t understand, conflict of interest between businessman and TNI can become human right abuse, see this HRW report Too High a Price The Human Rights Cost of the Indonesian Military’s Economic Activities. After reformation, personnel welfare became an issue because TNI loses its core income and defense budget increasing progress is so slow. Although this is over and over becoming vision and mission while DPR conducted fit and proper test of next TNI Commander Ini Visi Misi Calon Panglima TNI / Capaian Panglima TNI Moeldoko Sejahterakan Prajuritnya , this issues always drown and doesn’t get enough attention than PKI and political issue Kesejahteraan Prajurit jadi Prioritas 2016/ Agar tak 'gelisah', penugasan anggota TNI di perbatasan 6 bulan / Profesionalisme TNI Tak Bisa Lepas dari Kesejahteraan don’t forget about this one “Penasihat bidang Kesejahteraan” Siapa Sebenarnya Tahir, Penasihat Panglima TNI yang Menuai Kontroversi? / Anggota DPR Minta Panglima TNI Jelaskan Pengangkatan Dato Sri Tahir / Tahir Jadi Penasihat TNI, Endriartono: Imbal Jasa / Kedekatan Panglima TNI dengan Bos Mayapada DikritikSocial Conflict. Continuing number 2 about TNI business and asset. Land ownership can create social conflict between TNI and people who live there. Legal problem especially land conflict is always complicated. Sometimes can tend to violence. But the critics is why TNI want to fight his own citizen? Bahaya Laten Sengketa Tanah TNI / Ini Status Tanah Penyebab Bentrok TNI AU dan Warga di Medan / Sengketa lahan Sari Rejo jadi pemicu konflik warga dan TNI AU and ugh about this one Menhan: Rakyat yang Berkonflik Tanah dengan TNI adalah Provokator. Besides lands conflict, sometimes when journalist want to report about this one or another events, it tends to violence and intimidation also. Root conflict usually about obstruction to report and seizure the camera Dewan Pers Kutuk Pemukulan Jurnalis oleh Oknum TNI / TNI didesak tindak tegas pelaku kekerasan terhadap wartawan / Panglima: TNI dan Jurnalis Sudah Berdamai / LBH Pers Kecam Tindakan Kekerasan TNI Terhadap Jurnalis / Dewan Pers: Ada Niat Buruk Jika Anggota TNI AU Halangi Wartawan Meliput. We have to know although TNI classified information (such as military strategy, tactic, special technique, military forces number, detailed version about the budget, intelligence, cryptography method, technology, inside military installation, etc) are protected by Information Public Law 14/2008, but in terms of public domain information, such as public policy, conflict with society, weapon accident, or criminal act, press are protected by Press Law 40/1999. Social conflict like this (violence) will always happen no matter who the commander are. So comprehensive review of doctrine and training will be needed, especially to Bintara level who live inside the society (although that Minister comment is an exception. haha).(Special cases) Papua security abuse. If deployment, the number of military and positioning is a strategic policy, after that its day-to-day operational which TNI domain sparks many critics not only in domestic but also foreign, since Suharto Indonesia: Violence And Political Impasse In Papua (until now, don’t close your eyes Orang Papua dan Orde Baru ala Jokowi / Menyoal Kondisi HAM Papua pada Era Presiden Jokowi / Setahun Jokowi, Komnas HAM: 700 Lebih Rakyat Papua Teraniaya / Komnas HAM Desak Jokowi Hentikan Kekerasan oleh Aparat di Papua Number of people arrested in Papua, along 2014, there are 150 people arrested, 540 people in 2015, and sparks until 2.628 peoples until 2016 July) So the demilitarization campaign in Papua is understandable because of this (is it acceptable? we question the motives later, but here’s the fact). The connection with number 2 before (Personnel Walfare) is this one, you can see it in Papua Miliaran Rupiah, Ini Isu Uang Keamanan Freeport untuk TNI dan Polri / Biaya Jutaan Dolar Mengamankan Freeport di PapuaSo, when our Commander talk (even to press) outside his authority and his domain competency, we have to criticize him. Because Minister who should talk much about strategic policy, not him. In day-to-day, or when we have active operation, that’s his domain. He just have to followed Minister’s policy and President instruction. Not show the “authority” like this one Panglima TNI: Atasan Saya Presiden, Bukan Menkopolhukam atau Menhan/ Posisi Panglima TNI yang Setara Menhan Dikhawatirkan Berdampak PolitisTo your questionWhen talk about defense, and TNI, we can classified Indonesian people into some group:Nationalist: “NKRI harga mati” “Ganyang PKI” “Ganyang Malaysia” ONLY for all question. If we said critiques to armed forces, they said we are traitor or spy. Average Indonesian join this group, Mostly they leave this policy talk to military only. They don’t want to talk details and I don’t blame them, they are only showing their proud to our TNI. Because defense studies is difficult to comprehend. Some purnawirawan classified into this group, maybe only in surface (to get political voters) or not I don’t know.Nationalist ‘hard-core’ or we can say-paranoid. They mostly “exaggerated” about proxy-war, they think Indonesia is the most vulnerable country, most strategic, most rich, most sexy, so other country want to invade us. Freeport, China, Syiah, Komunis, Kolonial, Neoliberal, Asing Aseng is their keyword. They also think, critics from some group to armed forces are effort from other country to “divide et empera” Indonesia again Pihak Asing Ingin Pecah Belah Indonesia dengan Isu Kegaduhan TNI, BIN, dan Polri? Ini Alasannya / Panglima TNI Anggap Ribut-ribut soal Senjata adalah "Proxy War". Pan-Nationalism, have tendency to fascist and racist, conspiracy lover (They tend to create unsupported-data analysis) “I have some A1 info…” (wheter it’s true or not). Some ‘crazy’ purnawirawan classified into this group.Weapon-Fan/Geeks Boy: They know everything about weapon, its series, its capability and many ‘lingo’ about weapon system. They compare Indonesian armed forces to other country armed forces capability. Some of they are also hobbyist and collector. They mostly can be found in online forum, in military sub-forum such Militer - Forum | KASKUS or website like JakartaGreater or Jurnal Maritim in comment section. Some people mostly undermined or trolling (“This is -name some alutsista- better than that” “For what they buying this stuff” “TNI is greater than country X blabla” which is favoritism and can’t get the right answer) or get into senseless debate with other group when other group talk about TNI. “They don’t know anything” “They just talk”Human Right activist: Indonesia armed forces history can’t be separated from human right abuse at New Order Era. So they mostly talk about armed force violence, torture, dwi-fungsi, martial courts, TNI business and TNI role in social politics. They advocated issues about TNI reform which big part of security sector reform (SSR), anti-militarization, civil-supremacy, military-politicization, etc. Some notable people/institution/NGO are: Al Araf (Imparsial), Munir, Haris Azhar Aziz(Kontras, because at Orde Baru, TNI often alleged being involved in activist/criminal kidnapping cases), etc.Intellectual: They are academician who have studied in field: National Security, International Relation, Strategic Studies, Geopolitics, Public Policy, Defense Studies, etc. In other country, there are many established, well funded think-tank who take special interest in defense policy like RAND Corporation, Center of Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Brookings Institute (which sometimes their studies about Indonesia or foreign media are being called foreign agent interest here. haha). In Indonesia itself, some notable speaker is Connie Rahakundini Bakrie (UI), Prof. Salim Said (Unhan, specializing in military politics), Jaleswari Pramowardhani (LIPI, now part of President Deputy Chief of Staff), Susaningtyas Kertopati (UI, former Member of Parliament also, specializing in intelligence communication), Andi Widjajanto (UI, former Cabinet Secretary), Ikrar Nusa Bakti (LIPI, although recently he is known more as a political analyst, now Ambassador), Kusnanto Anggara (CSIS), Evan Laksmana (CSIS), Mufti Makaarim (Institute for Defence, Security, and Peace Studies (IDSPS)) etc. Some purnawirawan known as “Intellectual officer” like Rear Admiral (Ret.) Soleman Ponto (former Chief Military Intelligence BAIS), Gen. (Ret.) Moeldoko (former TNI Commander, he hold doctoral degree!), Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Agus Widjojo (later, Military Staff and Commando School of TNI Commander (Dansesko TNI), now, Lemhanas Governor), or SBY (later, Chief of Social-Politics of TNI, former President) (Agus Widjojo and SBY is some of key people in TNI reform in 1999 who propose “Paradigma Baru TNI”) Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono also classified into this one by pioneering Defense University (Unhan) establishment. Some of them (Intellectual) also included in Komisi I DPR-House of Parliament (which supervises Defense Ministry and TNI)Disclaimer:None of this were classified information and these are public information based on Law 14/2008 (you can find it at official website of Kemhan/TNI, books, papers, and national mainstream media/foreign news outlet)If you think my critics mostly to person like Jokowi, General Gatot Nurmantyo or General Ryamizard Ryacudu, yes it is my academic opinion. I’m not part of any political party, foreign country/NGO, ahokers, liberal, asing aseng, syiah, even PKI haha (response to Heboh Sambutan Panglima TNI yang Bikin Ahokers, Orang Liberal dan PKI Ketakutan), or people who scare that Gatot will became President (Elektabilitas Makin Kinclong, Kader PKI Serang dan Bully Jenderal Gatot) (for what? I don’t care either if he want to become President, it his right, but just do your job right now and stop talking and doing politics like TNI have to). I’m not attacking their personal. I’m just talking and reminding the mandate of our security sector reform of, and that person who happened to be our Military Commander and Defense Minister (coincidentally they are, now) and whoever our President is (currently it is Jokowi), should hold that commitment to reform as a nations since 1998. They are public official, so their policy/statement have to be open to receive input/critiques. My opinion is about defense policy and military in general (past administration will not forgotten) but right now, our current commander-in-chief is Jokowi. So give it a take.No matter what my critics to military/defense policy of Indonesia, there you are, I will said it. “NKRI harga mati” haha. I thanks and applaud TNI for their service to our sovereignty and our security. I proud of them, because lack of budget doesn’t stop their spirit Alutsista Minim, TNI AD Kawal Negara bermodal Semangat. I don’t want to discredit them, and made they are our public enemy. Don’t spin it. They just have to keep progressing with reform. They have to know with great power, comes great responsibility. This is part of my supports to them.

Apologies in advance for the absurdly long answer, and full disclosure obliges me to acknowledge that this question is related to my PhD work on hydrogen safety, and informed by some of the research I've done on that and related topics.Most of the discourse surrounding climate change has centred on the adverse effects of using fossil fuels in the energy and transportation sectors, and indeed the consequences of a century of industrial use of carbon-based fuels are already manifesting in extreme weather events [1] , migrations [2] [3] , and harm to the environment due to increasingly disruptive methods of resource extraction [4] which, notably, demonstrate the vast influence that corporations have over all segments of the political and social spheres. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change warns [5] that a temperature rise of more than 2 degrees Celsius from anthropogenic activity is highly likely to result in a vertiginous increase in the same extreme weather events being observed presently.Energy and transportation are easy targets for climate activists because the mid- to long-term solutions to these problems are based on the development of emissions-reducing or renewable technologies, rather than a fundamental shift in social attitudes or political frameworks. It is easy for a consumer to choose to purchase a Prius or carbon offset within the framework of a capitalist and consumerist society, and to feel as though this suffices to contribute towards a mitigation of the harmful effects of climate change. Such changes do not challenge, in any palpable way, the privileges and moral consciences of those in western, industrial societies to carry on with "life as usual", relatively insulated from the deleterious environmental effects of the lifestyle.However, these measures belie the structural factors embedded in industrial, capitalist societies which, it is argued, are the chief drivers of climate change today. To look forward to a sustainable future, it is helpful first to look backwards at the individual and governmental choices which led to the current geopolitical climate, and then at the latest research on the chief drivers of climate change today.The future of the contemporary crisis of climate change is inextricably strapped to a holistic, multifaceted, and sadly unfashionable notion of climate justice, which affects an environment that includes every segment of global society.The historical legacy of colonialism is largely responsible for kick-starting the pre-industrial growth of western societies [6] . The slave trade fuelled economic growth in the southern US, in Caribbean plantations, and elsewhere. Resource extraction by European countries from Africa of precious metals galvanized trade with Asia (primarily China and India, the latter with its own legacy of settler colonialism by the UK). The colonial project in Africa was complicit with local brokers who were later elevated to positions of power in the governments that formed after decolonization - thus making it trivial for contemporary international corporations to continue the extractive project by setting up industries in the former colonial states. These countries, many among the chief sufferers of climate change, shouldered a massive debt burden for the reconstruction of their infrastructure after the second world war. The restructuring of this debt by the IMF paved the way for western governments and international corporations to take over national industries in developing countries, as well as to stipulate the terms of their future growth [7] in a way that provided comfortable outcomes for the former colonizers.These factors provided the framework in which international agreements on trade, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership, are negotiated today and which facilitate the ongoing neo-colonialism by western nations of humans and capital in developing countries [8] . The terms of this massive, global agreement were negotiated by US corporations and representatives from the government in a way to be most favorable to their profit margins and long-term earnings. Similar agreements with(in) the EU [9] have the potential to stimulate local growth, but the potential ramifications for indigenous rights, product safety, and regulations are clear: corporations will continue seeking out places to do business where the terms are most favourable to them alone. The regulatory frameworks intended to protect against climate change are largely decided in the context of overbearing corporate influence, who have a vested interest in the maintenance of the status quo.The continuance of neo-colonialism also manifests in the economies of scale of contemporary industry. After the massive industrial efforts of the second world war, western societies underwent a period of liberalisation and strengthened workers' and civil rights and environmental protection. As post-WWII economic growth stagnated in the late 1970s and 1980s, austerity politics in the UK and US (and later in other EU countries and Canada) eroded the regulatory frameworks that ensured the shared economic well-being of the post-war decades. The increased scale of technological and industrial growth during this time, combined with decreased regulation on businesses in the west, gave rise to a climate in which corporate monoliths are able to wield as much power over societies as the wealthy landowners of a century earlier [10] [11] . The difference from the previous feudal model and present-day circumstance is that these consolidated industries have in many ways supplanted small businesses. The latter are embedded in local communities, provide indigenous growth and have a legacy of respecting the environment from which they came, of sustainable practices that promote long-lasting partnerships with the local population, and of accountability to their neighbours. (Here, I was going to include a citation of Naomi Klein's This Changes Everything, but none of the online resources I looked at include the points she makes about small business and sustainability in the book.)The industrial activities most often vilified by environmental groups often centre on the energy and transportation sectors, which fuel the comfortable lifestyles afforded by those in the west. Recent research [12] [13] indicates, however that the chief driver of anthropogenic climate change, more than both of those sectors combined, is actually the animal agriculture industry. Up to 51%[14] of the emissions caused by human activity come from domesticated livestock. Deforestation to plant animal feedstock is devastating local economies in Latin and South America, yet largely escapes mention in western discourse except as an abstract problem "out there" - untethered to the low-cost animal products available in stores in public discourse. The devastation of biodiversity caused by runoff from concentrated animal feeding operations, a loss of biodiversity at a rate greater than the extinction of the dinosaurs [15] [16] , is largely ignored by the mainstream media. (In the extremely unlikely event that anyone has read this far, there's a riveting album whose lyrics and mood focus on this ongoing catastrophe by American deathgrind quartet Cattle Decapitation, appropriately entitled The Anthropocene Extinction, which I highly recommend.) The costs to the environment of these activities are externalized by the enormous corporations which are permitted write the regulations that are supposed to protect the environment from their activity.Instead of dealing with the unpopular idea that animal agriculture and its concomitant extractive colonialism, which is deeply embedded in mainstream society, are largely responsible for the climate crisis we face today, corporate solutions to climate change tend to focus on technological advances without an associated reduction in consumption of those things that tend to drive climate change in the first place. Despite dire warnings by the UN [17] about the need to immediately adjust patterns of consumption in order to mitigate the devastating effects of climate change, animal agriculture has continued largely unabated and often the proponents of reducing consumption are ridiculed [18] or viewed as extravagant or novelty. Instead, largely cosmetic measures like the purchase of hybrid cars, carbon offsets, or solar panels are marketed as ways to live a "green" lifestyle with no loss of comfort or privilege. These measures are easy and palatable by technology companies, who stand to profit from a protracted and belabored transition to new technologies.Many areas of active research stand to provide little to no short-term benefit for reducing climate change. My PhD research improves (marginally) the fire safety of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles, which are marketed as a potential way to reduce emissions. Stripped of context, hydrogen seems like a brilliant idea - the only inputs are hydrogen, the output is water, which can be split to get more fuel to continue running the engine. However, hydrogen requires a significant energy penalty for its use, and the least expensive way to extract hydrogen presently is through the use of methane reformation, which provides 95% of the hydrogen used in the US presently [19] . The net carbon emissions from a hydrogen car are greater than if the car were simply to be run by burning the methane! The infrastructure required for the widespread use of hydrogen is completely different from that which can be used for petrol cars, and will require years of retraining and technological development and hundreds of billions of US dollars to compete even marginally in the transportation sector. Despite this, hydrogen technology is hyped (to borrow a phrase from Joe Romm) as "pollution-free" or able to "save America", and General Motors has made the transparently Machiavellian assertion that the future potential of hydrogen technology justified the present-day delaying of emissions reductions. As Elon Musk sagely mused, hydrogen is a "mind-bogglingly stupid" choice of alternative fuel [20] .The industrial activity of the 19th and 20th centuries which led to the present-day climate crisis did not occur without a long, grim legacy of colonialism which resulted in the disenfranchisement of entire continents who continue to suffer today in poverty and, in a grim irony, from the worst effects of climate change. We in western countries are comfortably situated far away from most of these effects of these realities, and are able to project our will on the rest of the world through the exertion of power - through leveraging trade agreements in our favour, or through drone strikes and invasions when negotiations are inadequate.In the debate surrounding climate change, it is clear that there is little clarity about what to do next. The success of any future efforts hinges on a reckoning with past injustices and the asymmetries between powerful countries and those less so, the hegemony over industries enjoyed by massive global corporations, and a long and steady erosion of the role of indigenous populations in civil society. When the countries which are the worst polluters are allowed to dominate the discussions about future policies, a miscarriage of justice is inevitable.Conversely, empowering civil society and encouraging local self-determination will stimulate the growth of small, sustainable business and local jobs, strengthening communities and rebuilding the social fabric torn by a colonial legacy of extraction. Reparations for past and ongoing pollution and environmental devastation will internalise some of the costs associated with industrial activity. Finally, a sober discussion of the chief drivers of anthropogenic climate change will force global society to deal with the actual problems we face with concrete measures, rather than cosmetic distractions that are palatable at the expense of pertinence.The future depends on it.Footnotes[1] Fact Sheet: The Connection Between Climate Change and Recent Extreme Weather Events[2] UNHCR - Climate Change[3] Global Estimates 2014: People displaced by disasters[4] Naomi Klein: UK fracking trespass law flouts democratic rights[5] Understanding the IPCC Reports[6] Richard Drayton: The wealth of the west was built on Africa's exploitation[7] UN proposal of debt relief for climate adaptation divides aid experts[8] In 2016, let's hope for better trade agreements - and the death of TPP[9] U.S.-EU Free Trade Agreement (TTIP)[10] Thomas Piketty’s “Capital”, summarised in four paragraphs[11] Page on princeton.edu[12] The World’s Leading Driver of Climate Change: Animal Agriculture[13] Livestock, Environment and Development: Climate change[14] Study claims meat creates half of all greenhouse gases[15] Global Farm Animal Production and Global Warming: Impacting and Mitigating Climate Change[16] Holocene extinction[17] UN urges global move to meat and dairy-free diet[18] Dublin café owner attracts the attention of angry Irish vegans after banning them from the establishment - Independent.ie[19] Issues in Science and Technology[20] Elon Musk Is Right: Hydrogen Is ‘An Incredibly Dumb’ Car Fuel