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That the Japanese were prepared to surrender and the two atomic bombs were not necessary, as succinctly stated by British historian Max Hastings:The myth that the Japanese were ready to surrender has been so comprehensively discredited by modern research that it is astonishing some writers continue to give it credence.Let’s examine how the myth emerged and debunk it.The Big SixThe fate of Japan rested in the hands of the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War which consisted of 7 prominent figures of the Japanese military and political establishment.Emperor HirohitoMitsumasa Yonai: Navy MinisterSoemu Toyoda: Chief of the Naval General StaffKorechika Anami: Army MinisterYoshijirō Umezu: Chief of the Army General StaffKantarō Suzuki: Prime MinisterShigenori Tōgō: Foreign MinisterJapan was ruled by a military dictatorship. The army was more dominant than the Navy and wielded absolute political power. The minister was an actively serving general in the Japanese Army. He had the power to dissolve a cabinet if it opposed army’s policies and found a new cabinet more amenable to the ambition and demands of the military.Also, contrary to the popular but mistaken belief that Emperor Hirohito was merely a figurehead who was manipulated by the militarists and that he was kept in the dark about the war, the truth was that he actually had real political power and was fully aware of the course of the war and its outcomes. In an underground chamber, he monitored the progress of the war, domestic conditions, and inquired about war plans with the aid of senior military commanders. The hearing sessions during which the Emperor passively listened to major military plans were intended to create the misleading impression that he was controlled by the military. In reality, the emperor had questioned those plans, voiced his opinions, concerns and suggestions behind the closed doors.Therefore, military leaders and the Emperor had the power to make decisions that determined the fate of Japan. No one else outside of this exclusive circle could negotiate or carry out any diplomatic initiative without unanimous approval of the group. This very fact will explain why the various attempts at peace negotiation carried out by Japanese diplomatic and military representatives in foreign countries failed.Magic and UltraUltra: intelligence about anything related to the Japanese military. It comprised information derived from decrypts of military messages and radio intelligence.Magic: decrypts of Japanese diplomatic messages. Before the outbreak of war between Japan and the US, American codebreakers had begun intercepting and deciphered Japanese diplomatic communication. Thereafter, they had uncovered huge amount of diplomatic information communicated between Japanese officials all over the world. In 1945, Magic became highly successful because in many cases, Japanese diplomatic messages were deciphered and read before they reached the intended recipients.An elite group of intelligence analysts was entrusted with separating the wheat from the chaffs - analyzing the mountain of information gathered to extract actionable insights. Specifically, the analysts would scrutinize decrypts, retain only the most significant parts and translate them into English. Whenever advisable, the analysts would complement those parts with their own assessments + cross references to other texts and ultra information. Finally, they would assemble those passages into Magic Diplomatic Summaries - top-secret documents spanning 6–32 pages to be delivered to a small circle of US wartime leaders every day.The value of Magic consisted in its truthfulness. Because Japan’s leaders were unaware that US intelligence regularly broke their code and read their messages, they expressed themselves candidly in coded messages. This makes Ultra and Magic the most definitive evidential basis for assessing claims of Japanese intention in the last year of the Pacific War: including the claim that Japan was prepared to surrender.How did the myth originate?Since the end of the war, critics of the A-bombs have promoted the following two assertions:The Japanese were prepared to surrender and actively seeking to do so in 1945.US wartime leaders were aware of Japanese peace-seeking attempts.From both of these assertions came the judgment that the use of the A-bombs were unnecessary and war atrocities.Now to be fair, there is some truth in those two assertions.The source of that basis? - Declassified Magic documents.At some point after the war, the US government declassified wartime documents, among which were Magic documents concerning Japanese peace-seeking attempts in 1945 and American awareness of those attempts. When people alighted on those documents, they concluded that the Japanese were prepared to surrender and the two atomic bombs should not have been dropped.BUTWhat these people did not realize at the time was that the declassification was partial, meaning that the US government did not declassify in one go all there was to be declassified.Particularly, the first batch of information was released in the early 1950s and they contained no Ultra information and only partial Magic information, the latter of which was about Japanese peace negotiation with the Soviet Union since mid-July 1945. Being partial, the released Magic information was only a fraction of all Magic information related to all Japanese diplomatic overtures in 1945.These initial disclosures were followed by disclosures of translations of all archived Japanese diplomatic communications. These disclosed documents lacked all the remarks and edits made and attached by intelligence analysts as well as cross-reference to Ultra.In 1978, a relatively complete set of the Magic Diplomatic Summary was released. Finally in 1995, a complete set of the Magic Diplomatic Summary was released.Because the first and second batches of Magic information contained selected pieces that only indicated that the Japanese were seeking peace and were missing all the assessments and cross references by intelligence experts, people were misled into thinking that Japan was truly near surrender and that top-level US leaders were aware of this. The lack of expert assessments plus the missing pieces of sensitive information contained in subsequent disclosures allowed a false picture of historical reality to emerge. By the time the complete set of Magic information was released in 1995 which allowed the actual situation to be accurately and completely reconstructed, the myth had become well-entrenched in public consciousness after 40 years of perpetuation.That is how the myth developed and has lingered as long as it has. The misunderstanding created by partial declassification of Magic information which distorted historical reality and gave rise to the mistaken belief that the Japanese were ready to surrender. By the time all Magic information became public knowledge, this mistaken belief had gained so much credence that it became “historical truth”, and its proponents have refused to consider the other pieces of Magic information that contradicted their belief.This begs the question: what was the rationale of the partial declassification?The answer to this question derives from comparing the two batches of information released in 1978 and 1995. As it turned out, American codebreakers were reading diplomatic messages not only of Japan but also of other allied and neutral nations: Argentina, Belgium, Bulgaria, Chile, China, China, Japanese puppet state, Colombia, Cuba, Free France and Vichy France, Greece, Iran, etc… This amounted to an act of spying.Because the revelation of the fact that the US had been reading diplomatic exchanges of friendly nations could have jeopardized diplomatic relations with those nation, the US government chose not to disclose all Magic Information in one-go.Debunk the MythLet’s examine the MAGIC Information concerning Japanese intention in 1945. This body of information could be divided logically into 2 time frames: before and after 13th July 1945 - the date on which Emperor Hirohito personally intervened into diplomatic attempts.Content-wise, it can be logically divided into two categories: Intention toward the US and intention toward the Soviet Union.These documents had three underlying themes in common:The Big Six’s consistent lack of any desire for peace negotiation with the Western Allies.The rejection of Allies’ demand for unconditional surrender.The will to fight to the bitter end.On January 20, 1945, American codebreakers deciphered a message transmitted to French Ambassador to Japan Henri Cosme. According to the message:thinking people at the Court and in the Navy . . . appear inclined to believe that an end must be put to this war.The so-called thinking people in Cosme’s message did not include Army leaders. As explained the above, Army leaders wielded absolute power in Japan’s government. According to Cosme, they were not among those who wanted to end the fighting.A summary report of 1944 produced by the German military attache in Tokyo indicated that the attitude of the Japanese government toward the war had changed very little. The report points out:recent increases in preparations to defend the Homeland and noted that total mobilization is progressing. The Japanese Army and the circles it influences were determined to go through with the war without compromise on the side of Germany.A Magic decrypt of a mid-January 1945 cable sent to Berlin by German Ambassador Stahmer in Tokyo reported the precarious situation of the cabinet under Kuniaki Koiso. Stahmer expressed concern over the attitude of the Japanese Navy and warned that anew Cabinet would probably be formed of liberal personalities whose past would facilitate a settlement with the Americans. Such a Cabinet would then be overthrown, however, by ultranationalist groups who demand total war until final victory and would oppose with their full strength - and probably with violence - a compromise Cabinet. If these nationalist groups obtain control - which is possible - it will mean a substantial increase in Japan’s total war effort.On 12th March 1945, a deciphered message sent by Swiss Minister Camille Gorge indicated that although the Japanese government “is being criticized more more.”, there was a conspicuous determination to continue the war:there was even talk of transferring the greater part of Japan's war industry to Manchuria in order to carry the war as far as possible to Chinese soilAfter the collapse of the Koiso cabinet on 5th April 1945, Magic experts monitored diplomatic traffic to gauge the intentions the new government led by Kantaro Suzuki and found some glimmers of hope in the assessment of the German ambassador in Japan:To judge by its inner make-up, the new Cabinet is devoting itself to continuing the war with the utmost exertion of energy. It is seeking to reach an agreement with Russia, even if this involves the greatest sacrifices. By this means, in addition to protection in the rear, a more favorable basis for later negotiations with America is expected.However, subsequent Magic information dissolved any hope of and end to hostilities. On 5th May 1945, Swiss Minister Gorge reported to his government that he:no perceptible difference between the present government and its predecessor.The Portuguese minister suspected that the Suzuki cabinet would be short-lived:since the military and the nation in general are not yet prepared to make peace.On 6th May 1945, a message sent from Portuguese Minister Fernandes to his government indicated that:the fortification of coasts and mountains continues, giving the impression that this country, like Germany, is disposed to prosecute the war to its very end without the least probability of victory.On 22nd June 1945, Swiss Minister Gorge noted in his report:Japan does not expect to win, but is still hoping to escape defeat by prolonging the war long enough to exhaust [her] enemies.When the battle of Berlin was raging, a Magic decrypt of a message dated 28th April 1945 indicated that Japan’s government instructed its military attache in Lisbon to:report as fully as possible on the last stage of resistance [in Berlin] in order to furnish reference material for the decisive battle in the Homeland. His attention was directed to matters such as the training of civilian militias, as well as whether the direct participation of the German High Command in combat and the death of Hitler in Berlin would brace German morale and determination to defend the capital to the bitter end.This message unambiguously demonstrated the determination of the Japanese military to commit the nation to one last desperate battle modeled after the Battle of Berlin.One Magic decrypt featured a message announced by the Vice Chief of the Japanese Army general staff to his attaches in Europe. Magic experts commented on this message that while the Vice Chief expressed pessimism over all aspects of the war and concern over a potential invasion of the Home Island, he also proclaimed thatJapan preserves unaltered her conviction of inevitable victory.Other Magic decrypts indicated that despite heavy destruction and death tolls inflicted, there was no sign that the military’s resolve to fight to the bitter end wavered. A total of at least 13 diplomatic messages indicated that the Japanese resolved to continue the war no matter how dire the situation had become for them, as implied by their plans to:produce synthetic aircraft fuelsorganize regional governments designed to continue the war in case an invasion occurred and occupy parts of the countryinduct boys ages 14 and older among Japanese colonists in China.You see? All the Magic decrypts showed an unequivocal determination to continue fighting and refusal to capitulate. This fact alone makes a mockery of the claim that Japan was about to surrender.Next, let’s examine the basis of the myth: Japanese peace-seeking attempts.There were indeed attempts to negotiate an end to war made by Japanese diplomatic and military representatives in foreign nations. However, promoters of the ready-to-surrender myth have either conveniently omitted or overlooked one crucial fact: those Japanese peace-feelers were not empowered to negotiate on behalf of the Japanese government. It follows that their intentions and attempts were not approved by the Japanese government (or more accurately the Big Six)MAGIC uncovered genuine attempts to secure peace for Japan by Japanese representatives serving in Japanese embassies in foreign countries. There were several notable attempts by in Switzerland, the Vatican, and Sweden.In Switzerland, Naval attache Commander Yoshiro Fujimura sought to establish a diplomatic channel to negotiate peace between between the US and Japanese governments. I recounted his commendable attempt here. However, his attempt ended in utter failure due to Japanese military leaders’s apathy toward any peace talk with the US or Britain.Simultaneously with Fujimura’s endeavor, Japan’s military attaché in Zurich and Basel, Lieutenant General Seigo Okamoto, personally made an attempt to negotiate peace with the US. He explained his intentions to Army Chief of Staff Umezu. He hoped to gain official blessing for the talk by appealing to his long-standing friendship with Umezu. But Okamoto’s attempt also failed utterly.In Stockholm, minister Suemasa Okamoto attempted to persuade the Swedish government to facilitate peace talk between the US and Japan. Unfortunately, his commendable but unapproved attempt was flatly rejected by the vice chief of the Imperial Army General Staff as revealed by Magic decrypts dated 24th June 1945:As we have said before, Japan is firmly determined to prosecute the Greater East Asia war to the very end. There is a report, however, to the effect that some Japanese official stationed in Sweden is making peace overtures to America. That is demagoguery pure and simple, and if you have any idea as to the source of those reports please inform us.These genuine peace attempts had two commonalities:They were initiated by Japanese representatives in foreign countries, far away from the military-controlled government in Tokyo.They all failed due to army leaders’ lack of interest in peace talk with the Western Allies.The 2nd point is telling in that it demonstrated the power of army leaders in any political matter: including diplomacy. Without their authorization, no one was entitled to negotiate with the Allies. The fact that all of these secret peace talks failed utterly pointed to a complete lack of desire of army leaders to negotiate peace with the Allies, let alone surrender.That refusal to capitulate and the determination to keep fighting will become more obvious through examining MAGIC documents concerning Japanese diplomatic dealings with the Soviet Unions.Japanese dealing with the Soviet UnionWhile the Big Six shunned negotiations with the Allies, they chose to negotiate with the Soviet Unions to effect an end to the war on terms favorable to Japan. Indeed, a topic that drew great attention from Magic analysts was Japan’s evolving relation with the Soviet Unions which developed from:Japanese wartime leaders’ concern over the prospect of Soviet violation or cancellation of the Neutrality Pact (signed in April 1941) which would likely entail Soviet military aggression against Japan in Manchuria.The hope that the Soviets could somehow be persuaded to mediate an end of war. This hope arose much later in 1945.Since the start fo 1945, Japan’s foreign ministers, Mamoru Shigemitsu and later Shigenori Togo instructed Japanese ambassador to the Soviet Union Naotake Satō to gauge Soviets’ intention toward Japan. The Japanese government feared that as the defeat of Germany was inevitable and Japan’s situation was deteriorating rapidly, the Soviets would exploit Japan’s weakness to opportunistically attack and seize Manchuria.Through several meetings with Soviet foreign minister Molotov, Sato realized that Japan was facing potential danger posed by the Soviet Union and urged the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War to make concessions to forestall Soviet hostile moves.Starting since June 1945, Magic decrypts revealed intriguing Japanese intention with regard to the Soviet Union.On 1st June 1945, Togo sent Sato the message below:In view of our situation both at home and abroad, it is quite clear that we will find it extremely difficult to reach any settlement with Russia. We must realize, however, that it is a matter of the utmost urgency that we should not only prevent Russia from entering the war, but should also induce them to adopt a favorable attitude toward Japan. I would therefore like you to miss no opportunity to talk to the Soviet leaders.To discourage the Soviets from entering the war against Japan, Japanese diplomats attempted all kinds of talks such as forming an alliance, renouncing fishing right in exchange for Soviet supply of oil, renouncing the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth that ended the Russo-Japanese war, etc…Of course, the pragmatic Soviets were fully aware that the Japanese were just trying to buy time to delay defeat. Hence, they had no interest in dealing with the Japanese.Soviet indifference alarmed Togo and compelled him to try harder in the diplomatic gamble. On 11th July 1945, he sent Togo the two cables below:We are now secretly giving consideration to termination of the war because of the pressing situation which confronts Japan both at home and abroad. Therefore, when you have your interview with Molotov ... you should not confine yourself to the objective of a rapprochement between Russia and Japan but should also sound him out on the extent to which it is possible to make use of Russia in ending the war...While we naturally hope[d] to obtain a treaty through negotiations between Hirota and Malik, those talks are also intended to find out the extent to which it is possible to make use of Russia in ending the war. We should like to know the views of the Russian government on this subject with all haste.And:Despite the last statement in my previous message, it would appear suitable to make clear to the Russians our general attitude with regard to termination of the war. Therefore, please tell them that:“We consider the maintenance of peace in East Asia to be one aspect of the maintenance of world peace. Accordingly, Japan—as a proposal for ending the war and because of her concern for the establishment and maintenance of lasting Peace—has absolutely no ideas of annexing or holding the territories occupied as a result of the war.”One noteworthy point: the Japanese government was seeking to enlist Soviet help in “ending the war”. Just exactly what the Japanese meant by “ending the war” was extremely vague and suggested a lack of a definite desire for peace.On 12th July 1945, Togo sent Sato a message marked “Very Urgent”:I have not yet received a wire about your interview with Molotov. Accordingly, though it may smack a little of attacking without sufficient reconnaissance, we think it would be appropriate to go a step further on this occasion and before the opening of the Three Power [i.e Potsdam] Conference, inform the Russians of the Imperial Will concerning the ending of the war. We should therefore like you to present this matter to Molotov in the following terms:His Majesty the Emperor mindful of the fact that the present war daily brings greater evil and sacrifice upon the people of all the belligerent powers, desires from his heart that it may be quickly terminated. But so long as England and the United States insist upon unconditional surrender the Japanese Empire has no alternative but to fight on with all its strength for the honor and existence of the Motherland. His Majesty is deeply reluctant to have any further blood lost among the people on both sides, and it is his desire, for the welfare of humanity, to restore peace with all possible speed...It is the Emperor’s private intention to send Prince Konoe to Moscow as a Special Envoy with a letter from him containing the statements given above. Please inform Molotov of this and get the Russians’ consent to having the party enter the country.Two noteworthy points in the cable above:Damning evidence that the Japanese government preferred fighting to the bitter end over accepting unconditional surrender.The intervention of Emperor Hirohito in diplomatic dealing with the Soviets.While his superiors in Tokyo demonstrated a complete loss of touch with reality, Ambassador Saito displayed tremendous rationality. He candidly and accurately pointed out the flaw in the various instructions Togo had sent: a complete lack of realistic terms on the part of the Japanese government. Sato argued convincingly that realistic terms were indispensable to elicit Soviet interest in engaging in a negotiation.In all of Togo messages addressed to Sato, the Japanese government offered zero realistic terms. Losing most of its naval assets, the IJN had been reduced to an ineffective fighting force. Most of Japan’s territories gained during the war were of little economic value beyond natural resources. The offer of fishing rights was just ludicrous. In response to Togo’s “Very urgent” message on 12th July, Sato conveyed his unequivocal and scathing remark:How much of an effect do you expect our statements regarding the non-annexation and non-possession of territories which we have already lost or are shout to lose will have on the Soviet authorities?As you are well aware, the Soviet authorities are extremely realistic and it extremely difficult to persuade them with abstract arguments. We certainly will not convince them with pretty little phrases devoid of all connection with reality.If the Japanese Empire is really faced with the necessity of terminating the war, we must first of all make up our own minds to terminate the war. Unless we make up our own mind here is absolutely no point in sounding out the views of the Soviet Government.Most tellingly however, is that Sato incisively argued that since the unlikelihood of enticing the Soviets meant that Japan had no choice but to accept unconditional surrender:in the long run . . . has indeed no choice but to accept unconditional surrender or terms closely Equivalent thereto.I would like to point out, however, that even on the basis of your various messages I have obtained no clear idea of the recent situation. Nor am I clear about the views of the Government and the Military with regard to the termination of the war. Moreover, I have been of the opinion that, if it were finally decided to bring the war to an end, it would be necessary to obtain a new formal resolution which would be sufficient to overrule the decision reached at the conference held in the Imperial Presence on 8 June.Now, being a rational realist that he was, Sato was also a committed patriot who revered the Emperor. Hence, he appealed for accepting unconditional surrender with one condition: the preservation of the Emperor and Imperial Institution.Here was Togo’s response to Sato’s rational assessment? The answer is in his 17th July 1945 message:Although the directing powers, and the government as well, are convinced that our war strength still can deliver considerable blows to the enemy, we are unable to feel absolutely secure peace of mind in the face of an enemy who will attack repeatedly. If today, when we are still maintaining our strength, the Anglo-Americans were to have regard for Japan’s honor ' and existence, they could save humanity by bringing the war to an end. If however, they insist unrelentingly upon unconditional surrender, the Japanese are unanimous in their resolve to wage a through-going war.The Emperor himself has deigned to express his determination and we have therefore made this request of the Russians. Please bear particularly in mind, however, that we are not seeking the Russians’ mediation for anything like an unconditional surrender.Two things that stood out from the message above:A non-committal desire to “solicit Soviet’s favor” without offering any realistic term.Most conspicuous of all: the refusal to accept unconditional surrender and the determination to fight to the end.Saito responded to Togo’s message on 17th July, trying to awaken his superiors to the reality:It goes without saying that in my earlier message calling for unconditional surrender or closely equivalent terms, I made an exception of the question of preserving our national structure [i.e., the Imperial system]. Although I have no fear that you misunderstood what I said in the last part of my 8th June message, I am wiring this for your information.In connection with the question of preserving our national structure.......we must create a strong impression [with the Soviets] that our proposals represent the positive demands of Japan’s 70 million people.Except for the matter of maintenance of our national structure, I think that we must absolutely not propose any conditions. The situation has already reached the point where we have no alternative but unconditional surrender or its equivalent.Here is Togo’s response on 21st July 1945,With regard to unconditional surrender we are unable to consent to it under any circumstances whatever. Even if the war drags on and it becomes clear that it will take much more than bloodshed, the whole country as one man will pit itself against the enemy in accordance with the Imperial Will so long as the enemy demands unconditional surrender. It is in order to avoid such a state of affairs that we are seeking a peace, which is not so-called unconditional surrender, through the good offices of Russia...Therefore, it is not only impossible for us to request the Russians to lend their good offices in obtaining a peace without conditions, but it would also be both disadvantageous and impossible, from the standpoint of foreign and domestic considerations, to make an immediate declaration of specific terms.Once again the same complete absence of unambiguous and realistic terms to the Soviets AND the unequivocal rejection of demand for unconditional surrender.And here is Togo’s public announcement in response to the broadcasts by Captain Zacharias:The fact that the Americans alluded to the Atlantic Charter is particularly worthy of attention at this time. It is impossible for us to accept unconditional surrender, no matter in what guise, but it is our idea to inform them by some appropriate means that there is no objection to the restoration of peace on the basis of the Atlantic Charter.All of these messages between Togo and Saito were deciphered and commented on by Magic experts. On July 27th, the analysts delivered a Magic Summary Report which contained the following accurate assessment of Japan’s political situation:An analysis of Japan’s situation, as revealed through Ultra sources, suggests her unwillingness to surrender stems primarily from the failure of her otherwise capable and all-powerful Army leaders to perceive that the defenses they are so assiduously fashioning actually are utterly inadequate. There is nothing in the Japanese mind to prevent capitulation per se, as demonstrated by the advocacy of virtual unconditional surrender by an increasing number of highly placed Japanese abroad. However, until the Japanese leaders realize that an invasion can not be repelled, there is little likelihood that they will accept any peace terms satisfactory to the Allies.Summary of Magic insightsHopefully the preceding presentation of facts has demonstrated beyond any dispute the true picture of Japanese intention in the chaotic last months of the Pacific War.While it is true that there were attempts to open diplomatic channels to negotiate for peace with the US, those attempts were carried out entirely by representatives of the Japanese government; and they failed utterly due to the lack of official blessing of army leaders in Tokyo who wielded absolute political influence.Even in diplomatic dealings with the Soviet Union, the Japanese government displayed appalling ineptitude evidenced through its lack of specific diplomatic objectives beyond the general desire of keeping the Soviets from entering the war against Japan and attempting to persuade the Soviets to mediate an end to the war. They did not even define exactly what “end to the war” meant; and they asked the rational Sato to negotiate with the Soviets without providing him with clear and realistic terms to elicit Soviet interest in negotiating.Most importantly, as far as Magic evidence reveals, there was NO attempt, official or unofficial, on the part of the Big Six to negotiate with the Western Allies for peace. Instead, what Magic experts had seen led them to the conclusion that Japanese army leaders consistently rejected Allied demand for unconditional and resolved to fight to the bitter end. After reading Magic Summary Report, Joseph Grew stated in an announcement to the press on 10th July 1945:We have received no peace offer from the Japanese Government, either through official or unofficial channels. Conversations relating to peace have been reported to the Department from various parts of the world, but in no case has an approach been made to this Government, directly or indirectly, by a person who could establish his authority to speak for the Japanese government, and in no case has an offer to surrender been made. In no case has this Government been presented with a statement purporting to define the basis upon which the Japanese government would be prepared to conclude peace…Japanese determination to continue fightingJapanese refusal to accept Allies’ demand for unconditional surrender was accompanied by the determination to continue fighting. In the last months of the war, Ultra uncovered an alarming increase in Japanese military strength in Kyushu - the chief target of operation Olympic. Having deduced accurately where and when the American invasion would be mounted, the Japanese stationed large number of troops, weapons near the invasion areas. In addition, they stockpiled thousands of aircraft, motor boats and sea crafts for kamikaze attacks.Japanese intention was clear. They would endeavor to inflict heavy casualties on the invaders in the hope that US leaders - horrified by the losses - would seek to negotiate an end to the fighting. At the negotiation conference, Japanese leaders would dictate terms from an advantageous position that would allow the Japanese to exit the war with the honor of the Empire preserved and some gains of their previous conquest retained.Reference(s)1/ Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire - Richard B. Frank2/ Hirohito’s War: War in the Pacific - Francis Pikes

How much you will pay in legal fees will really come down to how you structure your financing.Are you doing a convertible note or equity round?A convertible note is essentially short-term debt that converts into equity. For example, your family and friends give you money and that automatically converts into shares of preferred stock when you close your Series A round. This is appealing for early stage investments because you don't have to deal with the valuation negotiations and it's much faster to close. Not to mention, it's only a few pages of legal documents which can cost between $1,500-$2,000 in legal fees.An equity round on the other hand is much more complicated and time consuming. The issuance of preferred shares is quite and can take weeks to negotiate at the terms and agreements--with legal fees coming out to $10,000-$30,000 or more depending on what the investor wants.For some free legal documents on startup fundraising check out: 'KISS' from 500 Startups. And if you'd like competitive rates from real startup lawyers who will handle the whole process for you, then head over to LawTrades.

TL;DR — you don’t negotiate a separate deal with each investor. Rather, you have a funding round that offers the same terms and investment documents to everybody in the round, with case-by-case exceptions based on the specific needs of each investor and/or some orderly changes over time on the valuation.Detailed answer:Learn how to do startups: The Startup ChecklistLearn how venture funding works: Venture Deals: Be Smarter Than Your LawyerGet some good advisorsHire a good lawyerDone that? Okay, what they will tell you is something like this:Groom your company so it is fundable, presentable, you can pitch, etc.Through your network, keep pitching until you find a lead investor. See if you can get an AngelList syndicate interested, or a relatively large or well known angel. Discuss with them what the terms of the deal will be (valuation / valuation cap, amount of investment, discount, various rights, board seats), what sort of format (SAFE, convertible note, priced round, and what flavor). If you have more than one you can go with the most attractive offer.If you get only soft circles, friends and family interest, or parties that are not putting in enough money or sophisticated enough to take lead, reach an understanding with them and keep them warm as long as you can.When you reach some sort of tipping point, prepare a term sheet and get that signed. At another tipping point, this time based on having enough signed term sheets to start the round, draft a set of definitive documents, which may range from an off-the-shelf SAFE note all the way to custom-drafted documents. All of this is best done through your lawyer.Although possible if done very carefully with the help of an experienced lawyer, it is rarely a good idea to offer different terms to different investors, particularly different investors who are coming in at the same time. If you try this yourself, offering different structural or procedural terms to different people (investor protections, conversion rights, information rights, tranches, closing conditions — or worse, try to mix two different form documents in a single funding round) it will be like you have shaken two or three different 1,000 piece jigsaw puzzles together and you’re trying to put one together, knowing that some of the pieces are probably missing. It just won’t work.Ideally, an investor who needs an extra sweetener will get a side letter providing for something simple, like warrant coverage or MFN status. I wouldn’t go much farther than this, but you can also take one or two simple parameters like discount and valuation cap, and dial them up or down over time as the company gets into a stronger or weaker position. If you have some logic for it, investors may understand why some are getting better pricing than others. Or they may not. Investors will definitely not feel good if your pricing is all over the map.Most convertible notes these days are on what is known as a rolling closing. Usually there is a minimum threshold, formally or informally, so you don’t have your first closing until a certain minimum amount is reached. You set a maximum subscription amount, and a maximum time you have to reach it, ideally with some provision allowing the company to extend the round, perhaps subject to investor approval. And then, during the period when the round is open, you can sign up additional investments as they come in until your round is full, you run out of time, or the company has as much money as it needs.