The Us Nuclear Industry: Current Status And Prospects Under The: Fill & Download for Free

Here is my understanding of the agreement, and the different interpretations of it:First of all, it must be understood that the statements being made by both sides now are for political reasons. Obama interprets the agreement in the best possible way so that there is minimum opposition to it by the American people and Congress. Zarif Presser has a bigger problem. He has to make the deal attractive to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the religious leader of Iran. There is so much hatred for the U.S. by all the religious leaders of Iran that Presser is under extreme pressure to not have any impression that he caved into the U.S. This means putting the agreement in the best light when explaining it to Khamenei and his religious colleagues.When Obama made public his outline he put it in the best terms for the U.S., naturally. This was before Presser had time to discuss the agreement with Khamenei under Iran's best interpretation. That is why Presser said "There is no need to spin using ‘fact sheets’ so early on.” In my opinion he was pissed as hell. Not because he felt that the U.S. twisted facts, but because the U.S. made his selling of the agreement to his leader that much more difficult. As a result he was forced to make public HIS interpretation of the agreement.Here, then, are the different, and not-so-different, interpretations as I see them:1) Zarif Presser- Iran keeps Fordow underground facility and will build centrifuges within it – but will not activate them.1) Obama- No enrichment will be done at Fordow – but Fordow will remain. Centrifuges will be reduced by two-thirds.Fact-Iran's Fordow nuclear reactor would stop enriching uranium for at least 15 years. It will not have fissile material at the facility, but it will be able to keep 1,000 centrifuges there. Fordow, one of the country's biggest reactors, is buried more than 200 feet under the side of a mountain and was hidden from the international community until the U.S. revealed it in 2009.Comment-There is no contradiction here. Iran currently has about 19,000 centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium in order to make bombs. They will be forced to dismantle 2/3 of their centrifuges, that is all but 6,104 of which 5,060 will be allowed to enrich uranium. The U.S. and its allies feel that they will be able to tell if nuclear material is transferred to the Fordow facility, should Iran try to break its promise. The centrifuges Presser talks about building at Fordow is no problem, as long as their specs are what was agreed on, and the total number remains under 5,060 and 6,104.2) Zarif Presser- Iran will continue nuclear enrichment in other facilities.2) Obama- Iran will not be able to pursue a bomb containing plutonium.Fact-Iran's centrifuges will only enrich uranium to 3.67% -- enough for civil use to power parts of the country, but not enough to build a nuclear bomb. That agreement lasts 15 years. And Tehran has agreed not to build any new uranium enrichment facilities over that period as well. The 3.67% is a major decline, and it follows Iran's move to water down its stockpile of 20% enriched uranium last year. In addition, Iran will reduce its current stockpile of 10,000 kilograms of low-enriched uranium to 300 kilograms for 15 years.Comment-No conflict here either. As long as enrichment stays under 3.67%3) Zarif Presser- Iran promises to wait 10 years until it builds a nuclear bomb.3) Obama- Iran's Fordow nuclear reactor would stop enriching uranium for at least 15 years.Fact-The period of time that it would take for Iran to acquire the material it needs to make one nuclear weapon, currently assessed at two to three months, would be extended to about one year under the deal. That year-long breakout period would be in place for at least 10 years. That is a separate issue from being able to produce nuclear material at Fordow, which has a 15-year window.Comment-In 10 years Iran could build a bomb. But they can't make the material at Fordow, their most advanced facility, for 15 years.4) Zafir Presser- Iran will be allowed to develop more heavy water facilities.4) Obama- Iran will not be able to pursue a bomb containing plutonium. Current plutonium facility (heavy water) to be taken down.Fact-Iran can continue its research and development on enrichment, but that work will be limited to keep its breakout time frame of one year. Though Iran will be required to make changes at a number of its facilities -- including reducing centrifuges and rebuilding a heavy water reactor in Arak -- the country will get to maintain its current facilities.Comment-Develop more heavy water facilities = rebuild. That does not necessarily mean improve. It could also mean to scale down. Bottom line is that they could do all the R&D they want. But break-out time is to remain 1 year.5) Zafir Presser- All UN and U.S. sanctions will be lifted. U.S. sanctions to be lifted as asoon as legally possible.5) Obama- U.S. sanctions to be lifted gradually.Fact-All sanctions to be lifted eventually.Comment-This is a sticking point as of April 6, 2015. Iran wants the U.S. sanctions lifted immediately and Obama wants to do it gradually. So when Presser says to his people "All sanctions will be gone!" he says that knowing there will be dancing in the streets (and that undoubtedly makes Khamenei happy as it takes pressure off his regime). And he is not lying or in contradiction with Obama. The key question is WHEN will they be lifted.That's all the different interpretations I came up with. But there are more complications, as there are 5 misconceptions about the agreement I came across which bear notice. They are as follows:Misconception No. 1: Breakout time measures the time needed to build a nuclear weaponNot really. Breakout time measures the time needed to produce fissile material for a bomb, not the bomb itself. After enriching enough weapons-grade uranium hexafluoride gas, Iran would have to turn the gas into powder form, convert the powder into a metallic core, assemble explosives around the core and finally integrate a miniaturized weapons package into the nose cone of a missile. Those steps would require a further 6 to 18 months after creating the fissile material, depending on how far Iran progressed in its alleged weaponization research that U.S. intelligence concluded had been shelved in 2003. Even if Iran got everything right on a first attempt, it would still need to test its bomb — as every nuclear-armed country has done — which would require more than one device and lengthen the time frame.Misconception No. 2: Breakout time is measurableFar from it; breakout time is estimated rather than calculated. Different experts using the same numbers come up with different time frames, even among the countries negotiating with Iran. They differ on assessments of average centrifuge efficiency and the time required to chemically covert uranium into feedstock, reconfigure centrifuge cascades and recycle waste. Breakout estimates, moreover, usually assume that an Iranian dash for the bomb would face none of the technical challenges that have plagued the program over the past decade.More importantly, the breakout capacity measure ignores the reality that a single bomb does not make a nuclear deterrent. Assuming that Tehran would at minimum need two bombs’ worth of material in order to test one, the breakout time estimate doubles; assuming that Iran, like other nuclear-armed countries, would want a small arsenal, the time frame increases several times over.Finally, while the number of centrifuges attracts disproportionate congressional attention, it is only one factor in the complex equation that determines breakout time. Other elements include the type and efficiency of centrifuges, the configuration of interconnected machines, the level of enrichment and the amount of stockpiled enriched material. And some of these elements are inversely correlated.Misconception No. 3: Breaking out is Iran’s most likely path to weaponizationThat’s a misguided assumption. The U.S. intelligence community has long concluded that Iran will not, in fact, use the intrusively monitored nuclear facilities under discussion in the current talks to pursue a nuclear weapon. Washington believes that should Iran decide to build nuclear weapons, it would be more likely to try to “sneak out” in a clandestine facility. Over the past three decades, this has been the route chosen by virtually every country dreaming of nuclear weapons, including North Korea, Iraq, Syria, Libya and Romania, with varying degrees of success. Both Iranian enrichment facilities, in Natanz and Fordow, were built covertly and declared only after being exposed by Western intelligence agencies. Fixation on a possible breakout distracts from the greater risk of a sneak-out and therefore from the two main safeguards for preventing one: transparency and monitoring.Misconception No. 4: A shorter breakout time reduces Washington’s ability to prevent an Iranian sprint to nuclear weaponsIncorrect. Under all conceivable agreements — and even under the status quo inspection regime — the discovery of any trace of uranium enriched beyond civilian-grade would trigger an alarm. Skeptics counter that such evidence would likely be ambiguous and require time-consuming analysis, which combined with the West’s aversion to confrontation may prevent the mobilization of forceful action in time. But the scale of enrichment activity required to produce bomb material would require a brazen breakout, significantly increasing the prospects for speedy detection under a watchful monitoring regime. Such evidence would prompt and in the eyes of world powers legitimize a firm response, for which the U.S. and Israel probably already have extensive contingency plans. Given the extensive long-term U.S. deployments in the Persian Gulf, air strikes could be launched — with or without international blessing — in a matter of days. And that capacity to strike means there’s little practical difference between six, 12 or 24 months of breakout time.Misconception No. 5: If the breakout time is short enough, Iran will dash to build a bombThis idea is not supported by the factual track record. Iran’s nominal breakout time over the past four years has, in fact, been less than six months but that did not prompt weaponization. Now it’s negotiating a deal that would extend the breakout time, by the same measures, to one year and subjects it to enhanced monitoring. Since 2007, the U.S. intelligence community has consistently assessed Iran to have the scientific, technical and industrial capacity to produce nuclear weapons, if it chooses to do so, but that no such political decision had been taken. In addition, U.S. National Intelligence Estimates have concluded that Iranian leaders’ decisions on whether to build nuclear weapons will be based on their perception of their threat environment and on a cost-benefit analysis. If leaders in Tehran believe that their survival requires the ultimate deterrent, they would likely be willing to endure even more punishing sanctions to acquire the bomb.Beyond technical parameters of a nuclear deal, the question facing Western powers is how to shape Tehran’s perception of its threat environment. By that logic, pursuing a more expansive engagement with Iran on economic, political and security questions may become even more important than lengthening breakout time.

Q. What was Japan's role in the Cold War?A.Japan always seems invisible within Cold War politics, what role did she play?? by m3ltd0wn02The Myth of the 'Pacifist' Japanese Constitution | The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan FocusJapan–United States relations - WikipediaThe United States Marines in the Occupation of JapanDomestic sources of Japanese foreign policyDon't Weaken the U.S.-Japan Alliance, Strengthen It5 Things You May Not Know About the End of World War IIJapan always seems invisible within Cold War politics, what role did she play?? by m3ltd0wn02Certificate of Surrender as a unit of the Third Fleet off Yokohama, Japan for the signing of the agreement. Occupation of Japan - WikipediaInvisibility is not an accident. Japanese involvement within the Cold War was often oblique, even though it was firmly in the US camp. This was in no small measure because of the nature of the US-Japan security relationship. The postwar US-Japan security relationship is one that emerged very quickly in the immediate postwar period, but also quite unexpectedly. Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), the American occupation government, initially saw the end game for Japan was a demilitarized polity that would delegate security issues to the US. For its part, the emerging Japanese civilian government under the conservative LDP politician PM Yoshida Shigeru pursued its own agenda which intersected with American strategic thought in the evolving Cold War. This partnership though was not entirely free of complications and neither side truly got what they wanted out of their ally.The Dai-Ichi Seimei Building which served as SCAP headquarters, c. 1950"Formless" is the best word to describe American strategic thought with regards to Japan's immediate geopolitical future in the Autumn of 1945. SCAP generally did not envision reforming Japan with an eye to meet American needs. Article 9 in the Japanese Constitution outlawed war as a policy and there was a good deal of SCAP directives aimed at the demilitarization of Japanese society and culture. This was in keeping with much of the wartime planning for East Asia was predicated on both having a Nationalist China as well as Commonwealth forces form a bulwark for US interests, especially as the Cold War started to shape up. Events in China with the resumption of the Civil War as well as the general draw down of the British East of Suez almost immediately meant that the US was lacking a regional power partner in East Asia. This did not mean that American planners immediately considered Japan as the nation that could fill this vacuum. As late March 1949, SCAP chief MacArthur claimed in a newspaper interview that:Japan should be the Switzerland of the Far East and neutral for the same reasons Switzerland is neutral - no matter which side she might join, she would inevitably be destroyed.Pace MacArthur's public statements, both the State Department and the Pentagon were considering rearming Japan and having it as the central regional partner.It took the twin shocks of the victory of the Communists in China and the Korean War to transform these thoughts into action. The latter conflict opened up the frightening possibility that Japan could be invaded and the overstretched US forces would be unable to defend the islands. The Korean invasion alarmed the Japanese government as well and it led to the expansion of the National Police Reserve (NPR), a sort of ersatz military that the US armed with a variety of weapons.The NPR laid the foundations for the later Self-Defense Forces (SDF), but it was not a straight line. Yoshida pursued what later be known as the Yoshida Doctrine, in which the Japanese government would prioritize economic growth while relying upon US power for security. The role Yoshida envisioned for the SDF was one that would supplement the American defense network in Japan. Yoshida had both domestic and international motives for this limited commitment. Domestically, an open move against Article 9 would provide fuel for his left-wing opponents in the Diet. Moreover, Yoshida also recognized that economic growth was also more important for immediate domestic needs. And like his German counterpart Adenauer, Yoshida was adamant that civilian control over the military was essential. As one of the sidelined bureaucrats from the wartime government, Yoshida came from a political milieu that looked askance at militarist rule, especially given the scale of the defeat in 1945. Internationally, Yoshida also recognized that the US arguably needed Japanese bases and its geographic position far more than the US needed Japan to make a costly outlay for rearmament. This was one of the key differences between Yoshida and Adenauer as the German Chancellor and a number of his CDU-CSU allies were more leery of American commitments to West German defense.Thus although the common metaphor of the US-Japanese relationship was spear and shield- with the US able to strike out offensively while the SDF guarded US bases-the reality was often more complicated than such a symbiotic metaphor. Pentagon estimates in the late 1950s and early 1950s evaluated the SDF as a credible deterrence to the Soviets, but not a force that could neither project power abroad or be able to stop a Soviet invasion of Hokkaido if the Soviets pressed them. For these reasons, Washington often considered Japanese rearmament tardy and never as thorough to meet the needs of the Cold War in East Asia, despite the US signing Mutual Cooperation Treaties with Japan in 1952, 1960, and 1970. The escalation of the Vietnam War put a further strain on the US-Japanese relationship as both the Johnson and Nixon administrations expected Japan to act as a regional ally and send troops to South Vietnam as its other allies, South Korea and Australia. This was an issue which Tokyo would not budge on, and earned Japan a good deal of resentment in the US during the 1970s. Kissinger in particular was quite vocal in private with his deriding of the Japanese, at one point calling his Tokyo counterparts "small and petty bookkeepers." Such opprobrium was not limited to the corridors of power in the US as the declining American economy of the 1970s fueled resentment that Japan was profiting off of US defenses by not maintaining an army and instead investing the monies it would have used on defense into automobile and consumer electronics industries.Japan–United States relations - WikipediaThe United States Marines in the Occupation of JapanSuch complaints, which only grew during the Japan-bashing of the 1980s, were more than a tad unfair. Japan, despite its foot-dragging, was rearming and building up its own domestic arms industry, which was not only time-consuming, but expensive. The threat of a wide-scale US post-Vietnam draw-down in the region also forced a greater commitment on Tokyo's part to beef up the SDF. Although the naval and air components of the SDF had practiced joint operations with the US in the 1960s, the ground forces started to so in the 1970s. There was a fear within Tokyo that the Vietnam defeat, coupled with the domestic problems in South Korea during the Park dictatorship could have led to a domino effect in which Japan was isolated in the region. The Belenko MiG-25 defection also added urgency to defense expenditures as fears of Soviet retaliation or a commando raid to destroy the plane did concern SDF chiefs. One of the ironies of the 1980s was that despite the Japan-bashing tone of US domestic politics, the US-Japanese security arrangement was the closest it had ever been to reaching the shield-sword metaphor. The Japanese significantly expanded their air defense and ASW forces and the Japanese PM Suzuki in May 1981 actually called the bilateral relationship a military alliance.The cold war most influential defection: MIG -25 (bestchinanews.com)Suzuki's breaking of this taboo in 1981 underscores the real domestic costs of the Yoshida Doctrine and its various post-Yoshida iterations. In short, the alliance put the LDP in a very awkward position. While the Japanese nationalist right was staunchly anti-communist, ideologues like Ishihara Shintaro excoriated the mainstream LDP champions of the alliance as the lap-dogs of American power. This disgruntlement sometimes exploded into violence, such as the assassination of the left-wing politician Asanuma Inejiro by a right-wing nationalist on national tv or the seppuku of the author Mishima Yukio after his private army tried to take over a SDF military base. Such events, which were widely publicized around the world- the photo of Asanuma's assassination won a Pulitzer- created an embarrassing situation for the LDP. From the perspective of the Japanese left, this security arrangement was Japan being co-opted by American imperialism and militarism. While the extremes of left-wing disgruntlement likewise manifested itself in the terrorism like the Japanese Red Army on the extremes, there was always a danger that the Social Democratic Party could use the sotto voce US alliance as a wedge issue to unseat the LDP and unify the splinter-prone Japanese left. Adding to this, the presence of American forces and bases was incredibly unpopular within Japan. The transformation of Okinawa into a hive network of American bases, the perceived footdragging of US military justice to punish crimes committed on Japanese soil, the association of US bases with vices like prostitution and drugs, as well as the extreme unpopularity of the Vietnam conflict within a broad spectrum of the Japanese electorate also made the alliance a political liability for the ruling governments.Domestic sources of Japanese foreign policyYOSHIDA DOCTRINE (1950’S-1973)Economic Growth is Japan’s main objectiveInvolvement in international political affairs should be avoidedTo guarantee security, Japan will rely on US basesKeep military expenditures lowCOROLLARIES TO YOSHIDA DOCTRINE (OBSERVED FROM 1950’S TO 1970S)SDF will not be dispatched abroadJapan will not become a nuclear powerJapan will not export armsJapan will limit defense spending to 1% GDPWHAT IS NEW: HEISEI MILITARIZATIONHollowing out Article 9Shift from “defensive defense”/“comprehensive defense” to “threat-based defense”/”proportional defense”Upgrading and expanding military forcesWillingness to rely on military solutionsLegitimation of use of military force abroadClose operational integration with US forcesGrowing possibility of weapons of mass destruction“Great power realism”The new nationalismCOLD WAR AND US-JAPAN RELATIONSHIPSoviet Union and China take peace offensive to Japan.Indochina tail spinning caused US uneasinessPresident Eisenhower argues “domino theory”.Japan keystone in containment policy in the Far East.Japan Prepares for Soviet Attack | Cold War Era Documentary | 1954Although the mechanisms of the alliance were at their most functional in the 1980s, there were rumblings in political quarters that the alliance needed to change. Suzuki's successor, Nakasone Yasuhiro struck a more militant line versus the Soviets than his predecessors. While such a stance indicated a success for the alliance, it was also a sign that Japan was making tentative steps away from the Yoshida Doctrine's subservient position accorded to Japan. Greater stridency also indicated that Japan could toe an independent line and Gorbachev and his Foreign Ministry began to hold out the prospect of returning the Kuriles and a formal peace treaty with Japan. These feelers foundered for a number of reasons, not the least of which was still the importance of the alliance for Japan, but the fact that the Soviets made them suggests the new vulnerabilities of the alliance in the bubble economy.The alliance itself went into a form of stasis with the end of the Cold War and the bursting of the bubble in the 1990s. This has imparted a degree of inertia into 1990s and beyond; one of the cliches in news coverage of US-Japan relations is the question of whether or not the Yoshida Doctrine is still relevant. For example, contrast this 1993 NYT piece on Japan to this 2014 Japan Today opinion piece. Although over twenty years of history separates the two articles, they are still asking much the same questions.The Myth of the 'Pacifist' Japanese Constitution | The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan FocusThe US-Japanese alliance may have been born out of necessity, but its midwife was a very favorable geopolitical situation. Unlike German rearmament which had to take place amidst quite tense negotiations with Western European powers, the rebirth of the Japanese military was a bilateral affair. The Sino-Soviet split also allowed for a more quiet Cold War in the northern Pacific as the USSR and PRC were more leery of each other than Japan. At points in the 1970s and 80s, both Beijing and Tokyo could put aside wartime legacies to find common accord such as joint protests of Soviet deployments of SS-20 missiles in Siberia. Although there were persistent fears of Korean unification by the DPRK, such a scenario did not come to pass. As odd as it sounds in 2017, during the 1960s and 70s it looked to a good many outside observers in the West that Juche was a more successful model than the ROK's military dictatorship. Fear of Korean unification encouraged Tokyo to hew to the alliance, but did not provide enough of a pretext to radically modify it. Some of these conditions do still apply in post-Cold War East Asia, but others do not. US-Japanese relations now operate in a much more multilateral and interconnected world than the one that birthed it in the late-1940s. While current permutations of the Yoshida Doctrine are still alive, the endurance of the alliance itself should not be taken as a given.Japan record-high budget plan approved for 2018, defense spending swellsFor the first time in 70 years, the Japanese parliament has approved the use of its Military Forces, most notably its Navy and Air Forces, through re-interpretation of its pacifist constitution’s article 9, to allow for ‘pre-emptive’ strikes in the collective defense of its allies like the U.S. Navy’s 7th Fleet. It is interesting to note that the majority of the Japanese public oppose such a move, and as in the U.S., have no real say in the sway of its political power elite spear headed by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and the powerful LDP government.On the surface, the re-engagement of Japan with the world’s most advanced Aegis-class destroyers and F-22 raptors, will raise eyebrows of its Asian neighbors who were victimized by Imperial Japan’s WWII aggressions, and will understandably question what Japan’s true intent is in its sudden rush to loosen the self-imposed military restrictions since the end of WWII. Behind closed doors, this is but one part of the United States’ Asian Pivot strategy in using Japan’s advanced military forces as a proxy for the American containment plan of the rapidly accelerating ‘blue water’ PLA Navy plans for the rise of China and Russia in the Pacific theater. With the tight integration and coordination of similar war fighting ships and equipment, Japan’s Navy is in effect, the U.S. Navy’s 11th Fleet, and supporting the Japanese to allow the potential for foreign conflict involvement increases the containment capacity of the U.S. Naval Command, while allowing Japan to carry the cost of this additional fleet.While the U.S. is delicately balancing allowing its closest Asian ally to restore its full standing military to deploy overseas, after 70 years of suppression from being allowed to be a ‘normal’ country with a standing military, the cooperation and exercises between Japan and its Non-Chinese Asian neighbors should be closely monitored. Most ASEAN and smaller military budget countries in the Pacific and Southeast Asia welcome the counter weight of a U.S.-Australian-Japanese lead Pacific Asian Treaty Organization (PATO), an Asian equivalent of NATO, to form to come to the collective defense of smaller countries like the Philippines or Vietnam from unilateral Chinese Military moves to claim the entire South China Sea and eventually the straight of Malaca, which resource poor Japan finds unacceptable for safe Japanese oil and trade shipment passage.While fiery rhetoric will fly, and exhibits of naval and air military exercises and posturing will increase over the coming quarters, it is in the best interest of both Japan and China to continue to build trust, and grow their economic inter dependence for each’s own future prosperity. With the recent stock market crash in China from mid-June this year, we are seeing signs of economic weakness and correction in the mighty growth engine of China, and the overtures by top diplomats from both countries meeting, and announcing a potential ‘high level’ meeting later this year between President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Abe, are more signs these complex military posturings may also have more than just an American mastermind dimension to them behind closed doors. Keeping America’s military planners appeased, while building on the strengths and trusts between old Asian rivals to pave way for a TPP busting East Asian Union (an Asian version of the EU), with China/Japan as the French/German equivalent on the European continent, will be an interesting development as the U.S. continues to show signs of empire fatigue.Watch for signs of detente in Japanese and Chinese cooperation, especially any form of military exercise cooperation, as critical signs of a move away from the uni-polar U.S. dominated geopolitical sphere we have enjoyed for the past 70 years.Related Article:http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/17/world/asia/japans-lower-house-passes-bills-giving-military-freer-hand-to-fight.htmlRelated Article:http://news.yahoo.com/top-chinese-japanese-diplomats-meet-beijing-100842916.htmlDon't Weaken the U.S.-Japan Alliance, Strengthen ItCOMMENTARY (The National Interest) August 14, 2017The RAND Blog by Scott W. Harold Photo by Viktorcvetkovic/Getty ImagesThe threat environment in Northeast Asia has been shifting in recent years as China's military modernization and assertiveness, North Korea's nuclear and missile provocations, and Russia's turn towards hostility against the United States are fueling a rise in the risk of armed conflict between major powers. Confronting threats as varied as ISIS, al-Qaeda, Iran, and Ebola, some might wonder if the United States has the resources and will to stay engaged and shape the future of security in the Asia-Pacific, including offering extended deterrent guarantees to its Japanese, South Korean, Filipino, Australian, and Thai allies. Others are asking whether U.S. allies are even worth defending. Are they?I believe that the answer is yes, the United States has the resources to shape the future of the Asia-Pacific, and yes, its allies are worth defending. To abandon U.S. alliances would not only be more costly but also ultimately make America less safe at home. While U.S. defense budgets will remain constrained for some years to come, the U.S. military still retains very substantial hardware, training, doctrinal, operational experience, and human capital advantages. In addition, the United States enjoys the support of major allies who provide basing and access, logistical support, and critical enabling capabilities that ultimately make them important force multipliers for the defense of the U.S. homeland as well as its overseas interests and core values.To abandon U.S. alliances would not only be more costly but also make America less safe at home.As the largest status quo power allied with the United States in East Asia, no country plays a more important role than Japan in supporting the rule of law-based international order. If the United States wants to meet the challenges posed by increasingly well-armed, hostile and autocratic governments bent on intimidating the free world, it needs to continue to broaden and deepen its defense cooperation with Japan and states like it. Below I suggest four urgent priority areas for continued improvements: planning and joint training for a variety of contingencies; additional types of military hardware to bolster deterrence; addressing the basing of U.S. forces in Okinawa; and closer cooperation on innovative thinking about deterrence and war-fighting concepts.Forward, TogetherTo date, the two allies have taken a number of important steps both separately and together, but much more work remains to be done. Japan, under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, has reinterpreted Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution to engage in collective self-defense. The Abe administration has also established a National Security Secrets Act; set up a National Security Secretariat to assist with decisionmaking; lifted restrictions on defense exports; shifted the focus of defense planning scenarios from a ground invasion from the north to an air and naval threat from the southwest; and increased the country's defense budget to approximately $40 billion. It has added critical hardware to the inventory of its Self-Defense Forces, including RQ-4 Global Hawk high-altitude Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, and advanced F-35 Lightning II fighters. Tokyo has also inducted helicopter carriers into the Maritime Self-Defense Forces, brought on-line new P1 maritime patrol aircraft, and expanded its submarine fleet from 16 to 22 boats, all while developing a 4,000-man rapid reaction amphibious capability and emplacing radar and anti-ship cruise missiles along the coasts of remote islands in the country's southwest. In November 2015, it announced plans to send 500 Ground Self Defense Force troops to one of these islands, Ishigaki, and in March it activated a radar station on another, Yonaguni Island, to be staffed by 160 Ground Self-Defense soldiers. Both islands are close to the Senkakus that China claims and is seeking to undermine Japanese control over. Ultimately, Tokyo plans to station approximately 10,000 troops across the southwest islands chain to meet this threat.For its part, in 2011 the Obama administration announced that it would “rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific region (PDF), a policy whose military component aims to create a more geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable force posture across the region. The United States is also improving the capabilities it forward deploys in Japan, and has moved up many of its most advanced capabilities, including the F-22 Raptor, MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft to replace the more dated CH-46 Seaknight, an additional AN/TPY-2 radar, Global Hawk UAVs, and P-8maritime patrol aircraft for submarine tracking. In late 2015, the 7th Fleet replaced the aging USS George Washington with the much newer USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier.Bilaterally the allies have also taken important steps together. During his 2014 trip to Japan, President Obama noted that the United States would regard an attack on the Senkakus as triggering Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan mutual defense treaty. Following this, in April 2015, the United States and Japan signed new defense guidelines (PDF) that establish the basis for more effective coordination between the allies, including by establishing a new bilateral planning mechanism, an alliance coordination mechanism, and beginning discussions about cooperation in gray zones at sea, in outer space, and in cyberspace. And in December 2015, Tokyo agreed to increase its annual contributions in support of U.S. forces stationed in Japan, promising up to $8 billion over the next five years. The Department of Defense has calculated that this makes Japan the cheapest nation in the world in which to station U.S. forces, cheaper even than bringing them back to the United States…The remainder of this commentary is available at nationalinterest.org.Scott W. Harold is associate director of the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy, a political scientist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation, and a professor at the Pardee RAND Graduate School.5 Things You May Not Know About the End of World War IIWorld War II, fought from 1939 to 1945, was the deadliest war in history and involved more than 30 countries around the globe. More than 50 million people lost their lives during the war.TOKYO, Japan- Sept. 2, 1945- Allied sailorsand officers watch Army Gen. Douglas MacArthur sign documents during the surrender ceremony aboard USS Missouri. U.S Army photoHere are five things you may not know about Sept. 2, 1945:1. The Instrument of Surrender was signed in Tokyo Bay, Japan.The Instrument of Surrender was actually signed off the coast of Tokyo, Japan. On the morning of Sept. 2, 1945, Japanese representatives signed the surrender document during a ceremony on the deck of the battleship USS Missouri. This day marked the end of World War II.Japanese representatives on board the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay to participate in formal surrender ceremonies on Sept. 2, 1945. U.S. Air Force photo2. The document was signed one month after atomic bombs were dropped on Japan.On Aug. 6, 1945, a U.S. Boeing B-29 aircraft dropped the atomic bomb known as Little Boy on Hiroshima. Three days later, another bomb was dropped on the city of Nagasaki. This was the first time atomic bombs were used in military operations.3. Army Gen. Douglas MacArthur signed the Instrument of Surrender for the United Nations, and Fleet Adm. Chester Nimitz signed for the United States.The rank of five-star, or OF-10, was first established in 1944 and is held during wartime. Gen. Douglas MacArthur and Fleet Adm. Chester Nimitz were two of the nine five-star officers in U.S. military history.4. Commodore Matthew C. Perry’s original flag was present during the signing.On the USS Missouri that day was the original American flag flown in 1853 on the USS Powhatan by Commodore Matthew C. Perry (see in the background of the photo below). Perry flew the flag on the first of his two expeditions to Japan. Perry’s expeditions had resulted in the Convention of Kanagawa, which forced the Japanese to open the country to American trade.Surrender of Japan, Tokyo Bay, Sept. 2, 1945. Army Gen. Douglas MacArthur, supreme Allied commander, reads his speech to open the surrender ceremonies onboard the USS Missouri. Commodore Matthew C. Perry’s original 1853 American flag can be seen in the background. Photo from the Army Signal Corps Collection in the U.S. National Archives5. World War II did not officially end in 1945.Although Sept. 2, 1945, is known as the end of World War II, the state of war formally ended when the treaty of San Francisco came into force on April 20, 1952. It was a peace treaty with Japan.Source:Department of Defense BlogJapanese Military Power | Japan Self-Defense Forces 2017 - 2018SDFSDF: GroundJapan and Germany military expansionWhy China fears Japan’s military

A superpower is a nation that has the ability to influence events around the world. It does this through building its political, military and economic capabilities. Through these it's able to bend political issues in line with the plans it has. If we do a past, present and future look at Russia we can then asses its prospects.The PastToday's Russia is very far from where it was during the Soviet era. The Soviet Union became a world power who competed with the leader of the capitalist world — the US for global dominance. It embraced communism and undertook the mission of spreading this around the world. This led to a global struggle with the US, despite some periods of peace, détente etc.The Soviet economy was predicated on natural minerals, especially oil and gas. This was used to mass produce heavy industrial grade products that included nuclear reactors. Any nation that was part of the Warsaw pact or part of the communist struggle could expect significant economic help from Moscow.The Soviet Union constructed and maintained a large defence industry, army and advanced weaponry as well as a space program, to project power globally. It created thousands of military bases to act as supply lines throughout its republics. It also maintained a large nuclear arsenal with an array of missiles. It alsoThe KGB became world renowned intelligence agency penetrating foreign governments, with moles spending their entire lives in senior positions.The PresentWhen the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, its economy was siphoned of by the oligarchs and the mafia. The prescriptions of the IMF and World Banks gave Russia what was worse than the great depression. The failed coup of 1991 saw the army shrunk, it largely fell into disrepair by 2000. Much of the equipment was not maintained and most of it became obsolete. In fact shipbuilding discontinued altogether.In 2008 when Russia invaded Georgia Vladimir Putin had stopped the rot. He had recentralised Russia, dealt with the oligarchs and began using the nation's oil and gas as strategic assets.But Russia's foreign policy no longer had anything for the world. In fact it was all based on Mother Russia (nationalism), Russia's right to be a power, due to its history and Russia's right over its near abroad. There was no global ambitions and no global capability. Russia has regional power and influence, but beyond that it has little.Politically Russia has maintained its central, authoritarian character. The former Soviet republics would rather be in the EU and NATO then under Russia influence, good example is Ukraine.Economically Russia today is very far from the capabilities it has under the Soviets. Despite being nearly 4 times bigger population wise then Spain and Canada, it has the same GDP as them. Russia's economy is mainly driven by oil, gas & grain production and exports. This has made Russia's economy narrowly focussed and dependent on commodities, for which it doesn't set the price for.Militarily Russia is very far from what it achieved under the Soviet Union. Russia can today barely manage a presence beyond its region. Syria was a very small operation and it faced no active opposition from the US, despite the rhetoric.The economic revival under Putin is by no means based upon a return to the Soviet era when manufactured items from motor cars to complete nuclear power plants formed the bulk of Russian exports.The FutureSo will Russia be a superpower in the next 50 yearsRussia will play a role in the world, but what we are seeing currently is the most Russia will achieve, because many developments, will hinder Russia, these include:Economy — Russia has failed to transform its energy revenues into a self-sustaining economy. This has made it vulnerable to price fluctuations. The fall in oil prices in 2014, caused a recession in Russia. There are little plans coming from Moscow to address this. Russia is a huge country, it needs infrastructure, transport and wealth for its diverse population. Russia is 6 times the size of the UK and 3 times the size of Spain, it has mineral wealth far excess then both nations combined, but has an economy smaller then both of them, This is not an economy that gives you superpower status.Political — Russia has no global values to propagate. The Russia of today has no global ideological component and Putin cares little about propagating values to Germany, Cuba and Vietnam. Russia has a kingdom and should be respected that is all Russia has. These are not ways a nation becomes a superpower.Demographic — Russia's population is in decline. A nation's population affects everything from the number of soldiers, tax revenues and social cohesion. The decline in the Slavic population is leading to minorities, especially Muslims, to be a significant proportion of the population. This is already leading to social cohesion issues and will only get worse. Rather than abroad, Russia will face significant internal issues going forward.Military - Russia possesses a very sizable arsenal, which suffers with deep structural problems associated with age and the lack of maintenance. As the equipment continues to age, maintenance becomes more expensive, taking up more of the defence budget. The equipment will also be retired at an ever-increasing pace as it becomes obsolete. The Russian military therefore is dependent on increased military funding if it wishes to maintain its current combat potential, much less increase it. Whilst the Soviet Union challenged the US in the arms and space race, today’s Russia is militarily weak to use this as an effective tool.Ideology - Russia today has nothing in the realm of ideology, values, thought, philosophy or culture to spread around the world. Russian foreign policy is not aimed at advancing any values but only to protect its strategic interests. Whilst the Soviet Union attracted many to the Communist ideology, today the world in no way wants to model itself on Russia or its culture.Vladimir Putin has played a very able role in keeping Russia in the game, despite what the country went through after the collapse of the Soviet Union. What we see is the able playing of a weak hand. The context of Russia today and challenge any ruler would face ruling over Russia is the social, demographic, economic and technological tide is going away from it.So the best Russia can do it to just hold onto what it already has.