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Huh? OK.Maybe, the Ministers found in contempt of parliament over legal advice thing didn’t get full coverage in the UK.Let’s see…. How about, just quoting the Attorney General here. Let’s skip the boring details. Here is the relevant part, where her Majesty's Attorney General for England and Wales, explains why the EU27 wouldn’t want the backstop for a prolonged period. Emphasis is mine.The EU perspectiveHowever, a temporary customs union erected on such a legal foundation is by no means a comfortable resting place in law for the EU. First, it is unclear whether Article 50 provides an adequate legal basis in EU law for enduring and wide-ranging future arrangements between the EU and the UK. The EU has maintained that Article 50 is not designed for permanent future arrangements, with which the references to the impermanence of the Protocol are consistent. The EU’s position would appear to be that Article 50 is intended to mandate the settlement of historic obligations and liabilities and any arrangement that extends beyond that must be necessary and proportionate to the resolution of those obligations. The EU apparently contends that while the NI-only backstop can be defended on the basis that it is necessary and proportionate to secure an orderly withdrawal, the addition of GB to the EU customs territory is only sustainable because it is a temporary “bridge to the future”, which will be superseded by a final agreement.Therefore, the legal basis for the UK-wide customs union comes under pressure in the context of a whole-UK customs union, in particular, if it appears to be open-ended. The EU had previously argued in the negotiations that Article 50 could not afford a legal basis for such an arrangement — or at least not once the point is reached at which it becomes clear that it is not a bridge to a more permanent arrangement. There are numerous references in the Protocol to its temporary nature but there is no indication of how long such temporary arrangements could last. There may be, therefore, some doubt as to whether the proposed Protocol is consistent with EU law, and that uncertainly will increase the longer it subsists.Secondly, the regime under the Protocol is subject to enforcement by United Kingdom authorities. The EU has expressed the concern that the protection of the EU’s single market for goods (in which NI remains) and the Customs Union is substantially in the hands of a Third Country. It is fair to say that there is no precedent for this and it is reasonable to suppose that it is not a position that it will wish to prolong under conditions of legal uncertainty to which I refer above.It affords NI full access to the single market for goods, and the Customs Union, without the corresponding obligations of membership, thus splitting the “four freedoms”. It is arguable that this poses a dangerous precedent for other member states at risk of seeking to exit. In addition, precisely because the Protocol is expressed to last only until a superseding agreement, it introduces uncertainty as to the extent of the EU customs territory for trade negotiation purposes with Third Countries. It is likely to be important for the EU that it can be presented as a temporary arrangement with a clear and early end.The flexibilities that the UK will seek in the movement of goods between NI and GB may also set a difficult precedent for the EU, of which other member states that possess overseas territories with different regulatory regimes, such as Spain and the Canary Islands, may wish to take advantage. Furthermore, it might be said that the benefits to NI of access to the EU market will far outweigh any contributions to the EU system. The Irish, in particular, are likely to find this problematic, and it would be reasonable to expect them to exert pressure on the EU to find alternative arrangements.The Protocol creates the potential for trade distortion and relocation of businesses from Ireland to NI, in order to benefit from frictionless access to the market in GB. This issue is particularly pertinent in the context of the Irish agri-food industry. The Protocol is also not comprehensive. There are important EU requirements and areas of mutual economic interest that are not provided for in the backstop, for example within the field of socio-economic cooperation and of services.Finally, as we have seen from the negotiations, the legal and administrative arrangements required to underpin the Protocol would be enormously complex, particularly in the light of proposed GB / NI flexibilities and will require considerable resources. These are not something to which the Commission will readily commit in the long term, particularly because the financial contributions of the UK will have ceased.TL:DR from this is, the backstop is really expensive to the EU27; a third country will check EU goods; NI (and through it the UK) gets internal market access for free; this sets a precedent; it’s probably not even legal; it splits the four freedoms. Everything the EU said it would never do except for this special special temporary maybe circumstance.What’s not there is the genuine — justified — fear in the EU27 that the UK will obviously abuse the backstop to claw back into the internal market when this Brexit brouhaha blows up in their face.So, yeah.

German tanks were designed to be up-graded and improved but there is only so far you can take this.The PzIV was a pre-war design that stayed in production throughout the war and was continously upgraded. However it is open to discussion if the final version was an upgrade or a step back as cost cutting measures took priority at this late stage of the war.Either way, the PzIV design was improved as far as it could. It would still be considered an effective tank by the end of WW2.The PzIV started off as an infantry supprt tank with a short barrel 75mm gun intended to fire HE. It ended the war with a long barrel high velocity gun that was very effective against tanks.The Pz1 andPz II , both pre-war designs, were up-graded but had reached their limits by the time war broke out and were borderline obsolete by 1940. (The PzII was only supposed to be a stopgap tank until the PzIII came into service but was still used in significant numbers in the North Africa campaign and in the opening stages of operation Barbarossa).Stug III Assault gun with short barrel 75mm gun. This gun would have originally have been fitted to an early Pz IV. (infantry support role).The PzIII was improved as far as it could but by early 1943 the design had also reached its limits (Another pre-war design) and was effectively superseded by the PzIV, never mind the Pz V (panther) This isn’t bad considering the rate of progress in tank design during the war. The panther was supposed to replace both the PzIII and the PzIV but they kept the IV in production until the end.Tanks have a design life, set at the design stage, and sometimes this allows up-grades other times it doesn’t. The Germans did build in the ability to up-grade but this does have its limits.You can’t keep adding more weight (thicker armour) if the chassis and/or the engine cannot cope.Likewise you cannot up-grade the gun if the turret, and the turret ring, do not allow for this expansion.German tank design as set out in the mid-late 1930’s envisaged a progression of tanks, including what was to become the panther and tiger. However by the time that they put the panther into production it has gained about 25% additional weight over the original design. The Tiger was originally intended as a breakthrough/ assault tank but was never really used in this role.All German tanks went through upgrades during the war. Sometimes these changes were not major like thicker armour or a better gun. sometimes it was an attempt to improve reliabilty or servicing.In many respects the Germans found a way to “cheat “ the design limitations. The PzIII whilst obsolete as a tank by the start of 1943, was used as the basis for the Stug III and in this form remained an effective tank killer until the end of the war.Stug III with long bareel 75mm AT gun (also side skirt armour)Pre-war the Germans had time to build and plan tank production. however, they were not ready for a war in 1939 and German industrial production was always playing catchup. (not helped by the RAF and USAF). The Germans never discarded anything that they could still make use of, be it their own obsolete equipment or captured enemy equipment.PzIV D/H from around 1942 with later additions. This PzIV is now fitted with a long barrel high velocity 75mm gun and you can see additional armour has been added. This was captured at the end of the war so was still in service.Mostly due to cost cutting the Germans increasing used existing tank chassis such as the PzIV, panther and tiger to produce Jagdpanzer versions.Late war Panther, this came straight off the production line into the hands of the British so never fired a shot in anger I think that it’s an model G. Strangely enough the first mdel was D and then changed to A. Whilst the gun and frontal armour remained the same, side armour was improved and reliabilty issues were addressed. (with limited success). By this stage in the war, paint was limited so German tanks would often be issued with just an undercoat and the operational unit left to do the rest.Early panthers had a tendancy to catch fire, due to a combination of a poor fuel system and sealed compartments for submerged river crossings. They also has a “shot trap” due to the gun mantle shape. this was modified on later panthersThere were plans for a panther II, right from the start, but these were shelved due to lack of resources.

Thanks for the A2A, Habib.So, first of all, we need to distinguish two types of “conservatism” which are related, but not identical:“Conservative” in terms of valuing history and tradition, and preferring the “tried and true” over the “next big thing”.“Conservative” in terms of the specific set of policies favored by those individuals who are denominated “conservative” in modern Western politics - divided further into:“Social” conservatives, and“Fiscal” conservatives.So, why is the U.S. more philosophically conservative than Canada - more resistant to change and more desirous of preserving what is (perceived to be) good in the past?I suspect that the answer lies partly in history, and partly in structural elements of our respective governments.Historically, the U.S. was founded dramatically and intentionally by making a clean break with Britain and choosing the best parts of Anglo-Saxon tradition to retain, and the rest to reject and replace with the best other ideas and ideals the Founders could borrow or invent.By contrast, Canada came about by a gradual series of alterations, only gained independence less than 100 years ago, and never really did break away from Britain.Wait a minute… you’re saying the country with less historical continuity is the more conservative one?Well, yes.Rightly or wrongly, we in the U.S. have a great deal of reverence for the wisdom of our Founders. And, frankly, most of us can’t hope to be as smart or well-rounded as they were. So, we tend to assume by default that “Founder knows best.”We see our founding as a sort of crystallization of the “American Dream” - not that it had no flaws, but that it represents the enduring nucleus of what it means to be American, and it “points forwards” to the ideal of what America can become.So, in a way, many of us (most of us, at least until the last 50 years or so) are indeed looking to move forward in some respects, but also looking to get back to the “Golden Age”. We wish every President could be a modern-day Cincinnatus like Washington, and that every Supreme Court Justice could be as wise and erudite as John Marshall, and that every Congress could be as (relatively) dedicated to public service and high ideals as the First Congress was.Our history has been a long story of trying to live up to an ideal that was laid out for us almost 250 years ago.Canada, by contrast, exists because of change and evolution. It came about because the progress of history gradually ground away the past and replaced it with new ideas and new ideals - because empire gave way to independence and monarchy to Parliament.Canada has no “Golden Age” and no nigh-mythical Founders looming large in its national consciousness. I gather Canadians have some reverence for their “Fathers of Confederation” - but I’ve never heard of them holding Macdonald (for example) up as the ideal for all PMs to follow. Even the moment that Canada became Canada is debatable (given that its independence from Britain has always been a matter of degrees not of binary status).So, the U.S. is deeply invested in maintaining the legal and political heritage that has been passed down to us - whereas Canada has a much stronger “tradition of change”, if that makes any sense.When history has shown you that changing with the times got you to where you are today, you’ll be more inclined to change with the times.But when history has shown you that a plan laid out by a small group of thoughtful men centuries ago has been mostly adequate, and that major changes are almost always associated with upheaval and disruption…In short, the history of the U.S. encourages conservatism because “staying the course” has worked well for us, while attempts at rapid change have almost always caused problems. The history of Canada encourages progressivism because it is marked by near-constant change (which has apparently worked out to the general satisfaction of Canadians).Structurally, the U.S. has three key elements that make us resistant to change:A written Constitution, which is very difficult to amend, and which supersedes any contradictory enactment at any level.Separation of powers across three branches of government.Loosely-organized parties.The Constitution sets hard and fast limits on what changes can be made.For instance, even if 75% of the country decided to ban handguns, it couldn’t be done, because the Second Amendment forbids it (and 75% is insufficient to amend the Constitution, unless that 75% is distributed in a very specific pattern across the 50 States).By contrast, Canada has a (partially) unwritten Constitution (meaning courts are far freer to interpolate broad principles of justice as “constitutional” and thus effect legal change), and a system of (limited) “parliamentary supremacy”.Most particularly, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Canadian equivalent of the Bill of Rights) is far more amenable to “pragmatic” legislation and far less based on ideas of natural and (near-)absolute rights than the U.S. Bill of Rights is.For one thing, it expressly permits “limits” on enumerated rights, if such limits are “demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”.Second, with respect to most rights enumerated therein (not all), the Charter permits the legislature to invoke a “notwithstanding clause” - essentially, to pass a law that says, “We know this may violate the Charter, and we’re passing it anyway” - permitting them to enact an “unconstitutional” law with a sunset of five years (i.e., after five years, it must be renewed or else it lapses).So, due to constitutional features, Canada is less conservative than the U.S. because it can be less conservative than the U.S.Separation of powers forces a slow pace of governance.In Canada, the Prime Minister (who is perhaps not the official Head of State, but who is the Chief Executive for all practical purposes) must always have the support of a majority of the House of Commons. In turn, the Senate is appointed by the PM (again, not technically, but for all practical purposes) - though existing Senators retain their office until death or age 75 (with some exceptions).So, while the PM might not have the full support of Parliament on every issue, the sort of direct conflict between the Executive and the Legislature that we often see in the U.S. is nearly impossible - there will never be (for example) a Labour PM with a Conservative majority in Commons.*For all practical purposes, there is no separation between the Executive and the Legislature in Canada - in U.S. terms, it would be as though the Senate Majority Leader or the Speaker of the House automatically became President.In the U.S., by contrast, the President and Congress are elected entirely separately, and not even by the same electoral mechanism, so it is not at all uncommon to have an “opposition Congress” (in one or both Houses). It is relatively uncommon in a presidential election year, except in very close races - but quite frequently the President’s party will lose its majority in the House of Representatives in the “midterm” elections.Therefore, a President looking to make sweeping changes will often face a recalcitrant Congress, and a Congress looking to make changes will often face a veto threat from the President.Even when (as now, in 2017) the President’s party has a majority in both Houses of Congress… well, that’s when the next factor comes into play.*[NB: Technically it is possible to have a PM from a party other than the plurality party, if s/he forms a coalition of minority parties. This has only actually happened once and was last seriously considered almost 100 years ago. There was a brief attempt in 2008 that went nowhere.]Loose parties allow for intra-party disputes and factions.In Canada, the majority of votes in Parliament are predetermined, more or less. The parties instruct their members how to vote, and disobedience is very rare, as it is frequently punished by withdrawal of official nomination in the following elections (which, in Canadian politics, virtually guarantees defeat).A small number of votes are declared as “free votes” - meaning the parties “allow” their members to vote as they see fit.This means, in practice, that the dominant party can usually succeed in passing virtually every bill it puts forth.In Canadian terms, every U.S. Congressional vote is a “free vote”. The parties simply lack the clout to compel obedience, and in most cases, they don’t bother to try.Hence, there are a handful of Republicans who can be reliably expected to vote with the Democrats on, say, abortion issues, and there used to be a handful of Democrats who could be reliably expected to vote with the Republicans on fiscal issues.On almost every issue, both parties need to expect that they will receive less than total support from their own members, and on many issues, it is possible to court a small number of votes from the “opposition”.In essence, in Canadian terms, every U.S. Congress is a “coalition government” because the “winner-take-all” nature of our elections freezes out third parties, so each of the two major parties effectively is an uneasy coalition of multiple smaller factions.This means that even having a majority and the Presidency on paper does not guarantee a U.S. party the ability to advance its agenda - and again, this means a slow pace of change.Interestingly, the Democratic Party is beginning to buck this trend, subtly or not-so-subtly letting its members know that they will toe the line on certain issues, or else they will face a challenge from their Left in the next election. Whether this leads to increased Democratic strength, or to a mass “independent” exodus from the Democratic Party remains to be seen.[Admittedly, this isn’t strictly a “structural” issue - but it’s a “baked-in” part of U.S. politics that isn’t likely to change anytime soon.]In short, the underpinnings of the U.S. system inherently encourage (and often compel) a slow and measured pace of change, whereas the Canadian system makes it (comparatively) easy for a person or party with a broad “vision” to effect change.Next, why is the U.S. more politically conservative than Canada - more favorable to socially and fiscally conservative policies?Fiscally, it’s fairly simple - history, geography, and religion.Canada has only been a singular confederation at all for 150 years (actually, exactly, as of July 1, 2017), and didn’t become fully independent (with the power to amend its own Constitution independently of Britain) until 1982.Therefore, as Britain has changed over the years, moving in the direction of a European welfare state, Canada has largely followed course - perhaps not rigidly yoked to British policy, but not fully separate, either.By contrast, the U.S. was founded on a spirit of independence - independence of each citizen, generally, and independence from Britain, specifically.We also had the early example of Revolutionary France and the Reign of Terror to perhaps tarnish, in the national imagination, the idea of a broadly egalitarian society imposed from the top down.The philosophical origins of American thought, in John Locke, among others, created an environment in which the rights of each man to his own liberties and possessions was deemed vastly superior to the right of all men to the assistance of others, while the economic theories of Adam Smith led to a belief that there was no need for government to be a primary economic actor.Moreover, the U.S. has an abundance of natural resources, spread over most of its territory. Until fairly recently, most States could exist quite happily without any economic support from the federal government.By contrast, the vast majority of Canada’s territory is untamed wilderness - so it is virtually impossible to contemplate outlying regions surviving without significant governmental support.Both factors lead to a situation in which Canadians tacitly expect that it is the government’s role to provide services.In the U.S., however, this is a very new idea (first originating in the 1930’s and only really becoming entrenched in the 1970’s) and has never really been uncontroversial - the idea that the government can or should take from A to give to B just rubs many Americans the wrong way.Finally, Canada inherits its religious landscape on one side from Britain, where the Church itself is nationalized, and on the other side from France, where the principle of laïcité goes all the way back to the Revolution (though the term itself does not). In other words, the idea of a strong and organized Church operating as a social power independent of government simply isn’t a part of Canadian heritage.In sharp contrast, at least six of the original thirteen American Colonies (later U.S. States) were founded specifically for religious purposes, and as the frontier was pushed westward, the ideal of “Protestant self-sufficiency” was only strengthened. There was a strong sense that if a person needed assistance, he turned to fellow Christians, not to the government - and in many places, there was a strong enough religious organization in place (whether formal or informal) that it could act as the primary vehicle for charitable endeavors.*So, there has always been a strong undercurrent in American thought that the government is simply the wrong actor to address issues of poverty and quality-of-life services.*[It can, of course, be argued that many people were not adequately served by such systems - but we’re talking about broad public perception, not sociological data.]In short, the U.S. has historically had a fundamentally different view from Canada regarding what government’s proper role is, and thus, far more disputes when someone proposes that government expand that role (generally measured in dollars and cents).Socially, again, the combination of a peculiarly American brand of Protestant Christianity, along with a much later rise of secularism (which also allowed a strong Catholic presence, especially as the U.S. acquired its Southwestern territories and the accompanying Hispanic influences) led to a culture far more amenable to “traditional values.” Additionally, American views of the role of government (partially explored above) lead to a greater reluctance to permit government to dictate the obligations of one person to another. Our philosophical heritage was strongly individualistic, and our “frontier culture”* led to a strong sense that “being mean” does not constitute “real harm” to another person.Between the “Scripture and Tradition” of Catholicism, and the Sola Scriptura of Evangelical Protestantism, there is a strong sense that values do not and should not change, and that those values transcend humanity, rather than being derived from humanity.By contrast, the Canadian heritage of “broad church” Anglicanism and French laïcité (and the concomitant “cultural Catholicism”) lead to a much more humanistic and utilitarian view of social values.This was aided further by the era in which Canada was “born” - a sort of “golden age” of humanist and secularist philosophy, with a strong emphasis on dignity and communitarian sensibilities - while American philosophical influences (again, Locke being primary) led to a deeply-ingrained notion that I have a duty not to harm you, but that I have no duty to help you, or even to treat you well (speaking, of course, of legally enforceable duties, not moral duties).Lastly, as America forged westward, there grew an admiration in the popular culture for the sort of man (and woman) who might shrug off insults, or might lay a man out for them, but certainly wouldn’t complain about having been affronted. In the frontier towns, the thin-skinned didn’t last long. And each man had to see to his own well-being and that of his family - resources were too scarce and too hard-won to contemplate the idea that anyone should ever have a positive duty to surrender his resources in anything less than a completely voluntary transaction. So, there is a great reluctance in American culture to recognize any legally cognizable harm from making someone feel bad or from one private citizen refusing goods or services to another (for any reason or none).*[For the most part, the Canadian wilderness was (and still is) a place for brave souls to venture out into… and then come back to civilization. The American wilderness was a place to build civilization, by dint of sheer grit and fierce self-reliance. Or at least, so the popular perception goes.]In short, the core cultural influences of the U.S. - most of which are greatly attenuated or simply absent in Canada - weigh heavily in favor of unchanging social values, individual rights over community interests, and a notion that each person is owed nothing by any other person as long as one leaves the other no worse than they would have been (counting only measurable harms, not hurt feelings).I should close by emphasizing that, while I am both American and conservative (philosophically and politically), this is intended only as an exploration of causal reasons for U.S. conservatism in contrast to Canada.It is not intended as a defense of U.S. conservatism, nor should any of the foregoing contrasts be read to imply a denigration of Canada, neither in absolute terms nor in comparison to the U.S. Some of the circumstances and attitudes which lead to U.S. conservatism are ones I feel to be positive, and others negative - and I have no intention at this time of separating the two.It is also my own musings, based solely on personal consideration of the issues involved - a social-scientific analysis with hard data will have to be left to someone else.I welcome critiques and corrections, though I do ask that if anyone wants to debate the merits of U.S. conservatism (or Canadian progressivism), they do so in a separate topic.