11-12 Release To Another County - Henderson County Public: Fill & Download for Free

Robert Clouse cited a great case, but here's a few others that should explain that the government - DBA the military and police you so highly laud - is NOT the entity responsible for our protection as ordinary citizens. I've included the Court Reporter references in case there's a doubt as to the legitimacy of the citation.South v. Maryland 59 U.S. (How.) 396, 15 L.Ed.433 (1856)Robinson, a resident of Washington County, owed a judgment debt to Pottle, a resident of Massachusetts. When Pottle and a party consisting of his attorney and a deputy sheriff attempted to assert a levy upon Robinson's property, they were surrounded by a group of workmen armed with stones and other weapons. The workmen threatened violence should any attempt be made to assert the levy. After Pottle and his party took refuge in a nearby house, the workmen (described in the case as "rioters") maintained an armed guard around it. The deputy sheriff left Pottle and his attorney imprisoned in the house and went to consult with the High Sheriff, South. When South returned with the deputy, Pottle demanded that he be protected from the armed workmen, but South refused to do so. Pottle and his attorney were released, after four days of imprisonment, when they paid the workmen $2,500, a sum apparently equal to the amount of back wages owed them by Robinson.After the federal Circuit Court for the District of Maryland found for the plaintiff Pottle in a civil suit for damages against the sheriff, South appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, in reversing the lower court, found no cause of action under Maryland common law. The Court held that a sheriff, as a public officer, was liable personally only for misfeasance or nonfeasance of ministerial acts, where the sheriff is bound to an individual for a fee or salary, but not for a breach of his public duty.Cocking v Wade 87 Md. 529 (1898)Following indictment by a grand jury for the murder of his wife and her sister, Cocking was taken into the custody of the sheriff of Charles County, Wade. The sheriff placed Cocking in "an old, dilapidated building" in Port Tobacco that was used as a jail and under the care of "an aged and infirm negro," leaving the prisoner "wholly unprotected." That night a mob, in the presence of the sheriff, proceeded to lynch Cocking. Despite some evidence that the sheriff was told of the possibility of lynching and had been urged to either move the prisoner to Baltimore or to a newer jail, the Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the trial court in a civil action brought by the family of the hanged man in finding no liability on the part of the sheriff.Riss v. City of New York 22 N.Y.2d 579, 293 NYS2d 897, 240 N.E.2d 860 (N.Y. Ct. of Ap. 1958);Ms. Riss was being harassed by a former boyfriend, in a familiar pattern of increasingly violent threats. She went to the police for help many times, but was always rebuffed. Desperate because she could not get police protection, she applied for a gun permit, but was refused that as well. On the eve of her engagement party she and her mother went to the police one last time pleading for protection against what they were certain was a serious and dangerous threat. And one last time the police refused. As she was leaving the party, a thug hired by her former boyfriend threw acid in her face, blinding and permanently disfiguring her.Her case against the City of New York for failing to protect her was, not surprisingly, unsuccessful. The lone dissenting justice of New York's high court wrote in his opinion: "What makes the City's position [denying any obligation to protect the woman] particularly difficult to understand is that, in conformity to the dictates of the law [she] did not carry any weapon for self-defense. Thus, by a rather bitter irony she was required to rely for protection on the City of New York which now denies all responsibility to her."Ne Casek v. City of Los Angeles 233 Cal.App.2d 131, 43 Cal.Rptr. 294 (1965)Kathryne Ne Casek was knocked down on a sidewalk by two suspects who had been arrested by the officers, the Court of Appeal held the amount of force or method used by a police officer in attempting to keep an arrested person or persons in custody is a discretionary act for purpose of application of doctrine of immunity of government officials from civil liability for their discretionary acts, and therefore Ms. Ne Casek (who was injured by two escaped suspects who had been handcuffed together) could not maintain an action against the arresting officers based on the officer's alleged negligence in using insufficient force to keep the prisoners in custody.)Keane v. City of Chicago 98 Ill. App.2d 460, 240 N.E.2d 321 (1968);A Chicago public school teacher was killed while on the premises of the school to which she had been assigned was killed by a student enrolled at the school. The plaintiff alleged that the City was negligent in failing to assign police protection to the school, although it knew or should have known that failure to provide this protection would result in harm to persons lawfully on the premises in the removal of police protection from the school prior to the event, although it knew or should have known of the dangerous condition then existing at the school and in permitting a dangerous condition to exist at the school. The court dismissed the case because of the existing state law granting tort immunity with no proof the City had ever affirmatively assumed a "special duty”.Susman v. City of Los Angeles, et al. 269 Cal.App.2d 803, 75 Cal.Rptr. 240 (1969)Action was brought by several landowners against the City of Los Angeles and the State pleading eleven separate causes of action for damages arising out of the ‘Watts’ Riots’ of 1965. The Court of Appeal held that none of the allegations presented was sufficient to show any duty owed by any of the officials named as defendants to act to prevent or avoid the harm suffered by the plaintiffs.Silver v. City of Minneapolis 170 N.W.2d 206 (S.Ct. Minn. 1969)A riot occurred in the Plymouth Avenue North area of Minneapolis in July, 1967. Plaintiffs owned real estate located at 1709-1711 Plymouth Avenue North. On July 19, 1967, a riot occurred in that area during which looting occurred and a number of business and commercial properties along Plymouth Avenue were damaged or destroyed. The windows in the plaintiff’s store were broken in plaintiffs' store by rioters; this was investigated by the Minneapolis Police Department. According to plaintiffs, they received indications that their building and store were being threatened by further damage in riots that might follow.According to plaintiffs, after they had received indications that their building and store were being threatened by further damage they boarded up the windows and doors and contacted the police concerning the threats. A representative from MPD stated “we know about it and we are going to have some extra police to guard Plymouth Avenue, but we haven't got enough police, you know, to watch every business place on Plymouth. He says we are going to keep an eye on your place, but we cannot give you special protection."Following this conversation, Silver went home about 7 p. m., informing the police of his intention to leave at that hour and told them that he had boarded up his doors and windows. During the night of July 20-21, plaintiffs' building and store were burned by rioters throwing "Molotov cocktails" against the building. They sought recovery from the city for the damage to the building and store, alleging the city of Minneapolis was negligent in failing to provide police and fire protection to their building after it had been requested by plaintiffs, or to take reasonable measures to prevent the riot.The court was satisfied that under the facts of the present case the city was exercising discretion in determining how to best cope with impending trouble by deploying its police and fire manpower so as to protect the property of as many people as was possible within its limited resources, and as such fell under the existing Tort Immunity of state law.Evett v. City of Inverness, 224 So.2d 365, 366-67 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1969).The plaintiff's husband was killed when an automobile operated by him on U.S. Highway 41 was struck on its own side of the road by an automobile negligently operated by an intoxicated driver.A short time before the collision, a police officer of the City of Inverness had stopped the intoxicated driver for speeding on the same highway within the municipal limits of the City of Inverness. The plaintiffs alleged that the officer “knew or should have known that the operator was intoxicated to the extent that his normal faculties were impaired and that his continued operation of the vehicle would injure persons or property upon the public highways”, and that the officer negligently permitted him to continue driving upon the public highways, resulting in the crash.The court rejected the idea that the duty owed to the plaintiff's deceased husband was different from that owed to any other member of the public, and as such rejected the suit.Massengill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518, 456 P.2d 376 (1969);This case involved an automobile collision in which plaintiffs' decedents were killed. The plaintiffs argued that it resulted from a deputy sheriff's failure to apprehend and arrest intoxicated motorists observed driving in a reckless manner immediately prior to the accident. The court disagreed:"The general rule pertaining to governmental agencies and public officers is that `... if the duty which the official authority imposes upon an officer is a duty to the public, a failure to perform it, or an inadequate or erroneous performance, must be a public, not an individual injury, and must be redressed, if at all, in some form of public prosecution.”Simpson's Food Fair v. Evansville 272 N.E. 2d 871 (Ind.Ct. of Ap.) 1971;The plaintiff-appellant alleged that the City of Evansville knew or should have known of the high incidence of criminal activity in the plaintiff's neighborhood. He held that it refused to assign extra police to patrol the area or to request outside police assistance from the State, that a duty to protect the plaintiff and to prevent crime was breached, and that such breach proximately caused the plaintiff to lose customers and merchandise and ultimately to cease business operation. The court held that in this case, a general public duty was involved, and that no special duty had been undertaken.Antique Arts Corp. v. City of Torrence 39 Cal.App.3d 588, 114 Cal.Rptr. 332 (1974)A silent burglar alarm installed on the premises of the store operated by the plaintiff was, during the course of a robbery by two armed men, activated at 3:32 p.m. and the alert message was relayed to the police department.The dispatch message to the units in the field was at 3:43 p.m., and a police unit arrived at the scene of the robbery at 3:44 p.m. The delay in the transmission of the dispatch enabled the robbers to complete the robbery and escape with jewelry and merchandise in the amount of $49,000. The Court of Appeal held that Govt. Code section 846 provides for immunity if no police protection is provided; or, if police protection is provided, but that protection is not sufficient.Hartzler v. City of San Jose 46 Cal.App.3d 6, 120 Cal.Rptr. 5 (1975)Plaintiff's decedent, Ruth Bunnell, telephoned the main office of the San Jose Police Department and reported that her estranged husband, Mack Bunnell, had called her, saying that he was coming to her residence to kill her. She requested immediate police aid; the department refused to come to her aid at that time, and asked that she call the department again when Mack Bunnell had arrived.Approximately 45 minutes later, Mack Bunnell arrived at her home and stabbed her to death. The police did not arrive until 3 a.m., in response to a call of a neighbor. By this time Mrs. Bunnell was dead.Appellant has failed to plead facts supporting an assumption that a special relationship existed between decedent and the San Jose Police Department. The allegation that the police had responded 20 times to her calls and had arrested her husband once does not indicate that the department had assumed a duty toward decedent greater than the duty owed to another member of the public. The police may have responded repeatedly to her calls, only to discover that she was not in danger. Absent an indication that the police had induced decedent's reliance on a promise, express or implied, that they would provide her with protection, it must be concluded that no special relationship existed and that appellant has not stated a cause of action.Walters v. Hampton, 14 Wash. App. 548, 543 P.2d 648 (1975);Robert Walters was shot with a rifle by Gordon A. Hampton, while visiting in the latter's home in Port Orchard. Walters presented police records which showed that on three occasions in 1968 and two occasions in 1970 Gordon Hampton's wife complained to the police that her husband, while drunk, had threatened to kill her. On the three 1968 occasions Mrs. Hampton reported that Hampton had aimed a gun at her. Twice the police investigated her complaints and talked to Hampton. In June 1970 and September 1970 Mrs. Hampton again complained Hampton was beating her and had threatened to kill her. In the September incident Mrs. Hampton told the police Hampton had fired a gun at her. She also asked the police to remove a woman Hampton had allegedly brought to the home. The police officers observed no other woman in the house, but took Hampton's gun to the police station. It should be noted Hampton denied firing the gun. The firearm was returned to Hampton 2 days later. On almost all these occasions, the investigating officers found both Mr. and Mrs. Hampton either to have been drinking or drunk. Between the time Hampton retrieved his gun in September 1970 and when Walters was shot the police had no contact with either Mr. or Mrs. Hampton.Plaintiff's principal theory was that the chief of police had a mandatory statutory duty to prosecute Hampton for violation of city ordinances prohibiting the aiming or discharging of firearms, or to initiate criminal prosecution for assault. Plaintiff's apparent contention is that had Hampton been prosecuted, the gun could have been confiscated in 1968 or 1970 and plaintiff would not have been injured in 1972. Second, plaintiff contends the police had a mandatory and nondiscretionary duty to protect him against the harm which in fact befell him.The court held that the plaintiff's entire argument is based upon the false premise that arrest and the criminal process is the exclusive method available to the police in dealing with the variety of behavioral or social problems they confront; additionally, given that the only complaints received by the police prior to the shooting related to the Hampton's marital disputes (and the last contact the police had with the Hamptons prior to the shooting in February 1972 was in September 1970). In the absence of any allegation that the police knew Hampton posed a danger to the plaintiff, that the plaintiff required protection from Hampton, or that plaintiff was in some particular danger, these facts are inadequate to establish a specific duty owed by the City to plaintiff.Henderson v. St. Petersburg, 247 So.2d 23 (Fla. Ct. App. 1971);On May 9, 1969, Matthew Henderson came to the City of St. Petersburg, Florida, for the purpose of making business deliveries, which he has done on prior occasions. Because of prior criminal attacks previously made on him, he went to the Police Department, and alleged he made “specific arrangements with the officers, agents and employees of the defendant City acting within the scope of their employment” (a desk sergeant on duty at the precinct) created “a privity for specific police protection” while he was making his deliveries.He later proceeded to the area where he claims he was “assured officers would be there to protect him”. However, arriving at the above address, he was accosted by unknown assailants, who shot him. He sued for injury, damages and loss of future income, alleging that they were the result of the carelessness and negligence of the City, through “it's Police Department, officers and agents, in failing to properly protect the plaintiff as they had specifically undertaken through the direct contact..."The court held that the plaintiff did not make causal connection between the alleged negligence of the City and the injuries, prove that the presence of the police officers would have prevented the injuries, and did not show that the City owed Henderson a "special duty."Evers v. Westerberg, (1972)38 A.D.2d 751, 329 N.Y.S. 615;On December 4, 1966, at about 1:50 A.M., an automobile accident occurred in Valley Stream, NY, when an automobile driven by defendant Thomas Westerberg and owned by defendant Celeste Westerberg collided with a vehicle driven by John Evers, in which his wife (plaintiff) was a passenger, causing Evers' death. About 20 minutes earlier, the Westerberg vehicle had been involved in a rear-end collision with another automobile in the Village of Lynbrook.Mrs. Evers sued the Westerbergs and the Village of Lynbrook, charging them with negligence through the officers, for having failed to take Westerberg into custody on the ground of intoxication and/or impounding his damaged vehicle to prevent him from driving it away from the scene.They also complained that the village failed to provide Mr. and Mrs. Evers with adequate police protection insofar as it permitted Westerberg to drive away from the scene of the first accident. The court disagreed:“It is well settled that a municipality, acting in its governmental capacity for the protection of the general public, cannot be cast in damages for a mere failure to furnish adequate protection to a particular individual to whom it has assumed no special duty.”Huey v. Cicero, 41 Ill.2d 361, 243 N.E.2d 214 (1968);This action arose from the fatal beating of Jerome Huey, a black man, by four white youths armed with baseball bats. The attack occurred at about 10:00 P.M. on May 25, 1966, near the intersection of 25th Place and Laramie Avenue in Cicero, Illinois, while decedent was en route to an employment office. The complaint recited these facts and alleged that the defendants knew or would have known by the exercise of ordinary care that a large number of blacks entered and departed the confines of Cicero daily in pursuit of employment at various factories and that "The (city) however, or one or more of them so wantonly and wilfully neglected to use ordinary care for the protection and safety due to dark-skinned persons… that as a direct and proximate result, JEROME HUEY, was assaulted and severe injuries were inflicted from which he died."Plaintiffs charged that the defendants were under a duty to “warn, advise, or otherwise give notice to dark-skinned persons of the unusual and extraordinary hazards and perils to such persons as existed” in the town of Cicero and that they willfully and wantonly failed to exercise ordinary care to so advise, warn or otherwise give notice”The court ruled that the plaintiff failed to prove any special relationship that would exempt the city from the Tort Immunity statute, could not prove that the City knew of the presence of Mr. Huey in the town, that he had requested police protection, that he was in some peculiar danger, and did not actually allege any specific acts or omissions by the City or any causal connection between such conduct or lack of conduct and the fatal injury.Trautman v. City of Stamford, (1975 Super. Ct.)32 Conn. Sup. 258, 350 A.2d 782Trautman, injured after being struck by an automobile while standing on a public sidewalk in the city of Stamford, filed a suit against the City and two police officers individually, claiming that they “allowed automobile drag racing to occur in their presence for a substantial period of time on the street adjacent to the sidewalk on which he stood… when they knew or should have known that such activity could cause injury”. He also claimed that they failed to stop such drag racing when they knew that such activity in public was a violation of ordinance and statute, they “failed to disperse the persons congregating on the public sidewalk or to arrest the participants of the drag races when they had the authority and the duty to do so”; he also claimed that they “failed to warn the public lawfully using the sidewalk of the danger involved; and failed to properly and adequately to control and supervise the street in accordance with their duties as police officers”.The court held that because that alleged breach of duty was one owed not to the plaintiff individually but to the public generally the patrolmen and the city could not be held liable to the plaintiff in a negligence case.Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. City of Wichita, 217 Kan. 44, 536 P.2d 54 (1975);After having a business in the area suffer firebombings, a detective performed a stake-out on a business that had received specific threats. He observed two vehicles slow through the area then turn a corner, after which four males came from around that corner. Three went into an L-shaped recess where the shop was, while one stayed on the sidewalk. They were not carrying anything the detective could see, but as he attempted to request another unit to the scene via radio, he “saw a bright red flare” and as he neared he saw a front window in the area was burning, and saw the 4 males run away. Shortly thereafter as he was looking for them he saw one of the vehicles he had seen earlier flee the scene. He gave chase, and after a twenty to thirty block chase was able to apprehend four of the five occupants. During interviews, three young men told of being at a party earlier that evening in Wichita, and the idea came up to set fire to several businesses with Molotov cocktails.The insurance company alleged that the police failed to enforce the “mob action” statute and thus prevent the fire. They also argue that the detective breached his duty under state law to order the dispersal of the four boys in front of the Gentry Shop, and that such a breach of a statutory duty made him personally liable for the ensuing damage.The court held that “The statute amounts to a codification of the common law duty of a peace officer to preserve the peace. The duty owed is to the public at large, and not to any particular individual. For the breach of such duty an officer is answerable only to the public acting through its official representatives, and not to any particular individual.”Sapp v. City of Tallahassee 348 So.2d 363 (Fla. Ct. of Ap. 1977);Ms. Sapp's complaint alleged Tallahassee Police Department officers, on the evening of September 4, 1974, were on special assignment at the Tallahassee round Holiday Inn. One of the officers observed two males in the rear parking area and radioed a suspicious persons report to another officer on stake-out within the hotel. The officers observed the men loiter at opposite ends of the sidewalk near the rear entrance of the hotel for about ten minutes. Ms. Sapp, a temporary employee of the Inn, was then observed leaving the rear entrance, and looking for her ride before reentering the hotel. The officer on stake-out saw the two males follow her into the hotel about a minute later. Other than reporting in, the officer took no action. Twenty minutes later he saw the males running from the hotel after severely beating and robbing Ms. Sapp inside the hotel near the rear entrance. The complaint alleged the officers owed appellant a special duty to protect her from physical assaults and were negligent in failing to properly investigate the behavior of the men.The court held that there was no showing of a violation of statutory procedures by the Tallahassee police — nor a showing of a direct and personal contact with Ms. Sapp, and while the police were conducting surveillance at the time the incident took place, it was not a situation where police authorities undertook a responsibility to particular members of the public, exposing them, without adequate protection, to risks which then materialize into actual injury.Jamison v. Chicago, 48 Ill. App. 3d 567 (1st Dist. 1977)James O'Malley shot and killed John Jamison. For three days prior to the shooting, O'Malley's son had warned the Chicago police that his father had been acting in a violent manner and requested that the police arrest him. The police refused to do so and the shooting occurred. Plaintiff, administratrix of Jamison's estate, filed a wrongful death action against the city of Chicago and the individual police officers, alleging, inter alia, that the individual officers were guilty of willful and wanton negligence in refusing to arrest O'Malley.After appeal, the court held that the existing tort immunity legislation provided “blanket immunity in the area of police discretion over arrests”, as well as “any failure to prevent the commission of crimes, the failure to apprehend criminals, and the failure to make an arrest” unless such act or omission constituted willful and wanton negligence.Weutrich v. Delia 155 N.J. Super 324, 326, 382 A.2d 929, 930 (1978);The plaintiff alleged that on several occasions during the afternoon and evening of February 9, 1974 notification was given to the police department of the township that defendant John Delia was menacing with a firearm certain persons within a short distance of the Berkeley Heights police headquarters. The police department made no response to these warnings. Less than 12 hours later, in the early morning of February 10, 1974, John Delia in that same area shot John Weuthrich in the head with a gun, killing him instantly, leaving as survivors his wife and three infant children.The complaint alleged that decedent's death was caused not only by the wrongful act of defendant Delia but also by the neglect, failure and default of the township police department to carry out its duty (1) to "apprehend and disarm" defendant after receiving warning of his armed threats of imminent personal harm, and (2) to take "appropriate action to disarm [defendant]…file a Complaint against him or otherwise confiscate the firearms in his possession."The City replied that state law provided immunity for public entities and officers for adopting or failing to adopt or enforce (any) law, failing to provide police protection and failing to make arrests or retain persons so placed in custody.The court agreed, holding “While it is true that police officers have a duty to investigate information from citizens concerning unlawful or criminal activity, (cite), the failure of the police to make an arrest as a consequence does not subject the municipality to tort liability…Municipalities are expressly immunized from tort liability for the failure to provide police protection or the failure to provide sufficient police protection.”DeHoney v. Hernandez, 122 Ariz. 367, 372, 595 P.2d 159, 164 (1979)After consulting informally with several officers, DeHoney, the owner of a jewelry store, installed a silent alarm sytem. On the evening of 30 June 1975, the silent alarm for the Showcase was activated at the police station at 2:11 a.m. The dispatcher immediately radioed the officers in the field, and at 2:13 a.m. Sgt. Hernandez and Officer Hill simultaneously arrived in front of the Showcase and Officer Hovis arrived at the rear. The front and back doors were secure; the police saw no indications of disturbance. Sgt. Hernandez then instructed Edwards to telephone DeHoney and also directed Officer Hovis to remain in the general vicinity. Officers Hill and Hernandez left the area for other duties, not realizing a burglar had entered through the roof and remained inside, exiting thorough a back door once the officer left the rear of the building.The dispatcher had some difficulty in locating DeHoney’s phone number and reached him approximately 30 minutes later. He arrived on scene at 2:45 and entered the building with Officer Hovitz to discover the theft.DeHoney alleged the police were negligent in their delay in notifying him and their failure to remain at the building until the owner arrived. The court disagreed, stating “…there was no specific promise or representation that the owner would always be immediately notified, or that the officers would remain on the premises pending the owner's arrival in every instance... Certainly there are many situations where emergencies confronting the police in the discharge of their duties to the public generally would make it impossible to immediately notify the owner and await his arrival. There was, then, no narrowing of the general public duty to a special duty to prevent harm to plaintiffs' property.”Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 93 N.M. 564, 569, 603 P.2d 303 (1979)On June 22, 1975, plaintiff's decedent, Ernest Trujillo, along with a group of friends, was in Roosevelt Park, a park established and maintained by the City of Albuquerque. Earlier in the day, a rock concert had been held but Ernest and his friends went to the park after the concert was over. They were sitting on the grass when they were approached by, and had some kind of altercation with, another person who then left the park. Shortly thereafter, a second person approached Ernest and his group, accusing them of having "picked on" his brother, and drew a gun, firing it once or twice. Ernest and his friends then chased this person to the top of a knoll where a third person, Wilbert Miles, stood and fired a shotgun "into the ground", hitting and killing Ernest.Her complaint alleged that the City maintained the park; that the maintenance of the park was a proprietary function of the City; that the City allowed the rock concert to be held in the park without proper police and security arrangements; that the City had a duty to secure the park and protect citizens using it, particularly a duty to protect Ernest's well-being; and that the City breached its duty and was therefore liable in damages.The court held that “lacking proof of a direct relationship or contact between the victim and the police creating a special duty, there is no liability on the part of the police and municipality… Failing to establish that a special duty existed between the victim and the police, there is no liability.” The court also stated “To hold a municipality liable for the conduct of third persons, such as is alleged in the complaint before us, would, in our opinion, be contrary to sound public policy and create policing requirements difficult of fulfillment.”Crouch v. Hall, 406 N.E.2d 303, 304 (Ind.App.1980);Mildred Crouch brought suit against three police officers, individually and in their capacity as officers, for failure to properly investigate a rape of a third person by one Anthony Wayne Hall and to detect and apprehend Hall, who one week later raped and murdered Mildred Crouch's daughter Jeanne Crouch. The officers moved for summary judgment based on immunity under the Tort Claims Act.Upon appeal, the court agreed that while “there is no factual dispute… the police owed no special duty to the victim. The duty owed in the investigation of the rape was to the general public.”Porter v. Urbana, 88 Ill.App.3d 443, 445, 43 Ill.Dec. 610, 612, 410 N.E.2d 610, 612 (1980)The plaintiff's complaint alleges that Clarence King, Jr., invaded her home December 3, 1976, and beat and raped her, and that the Urbana Police Department and Gordon knew of six other rapes committed by King in Urbana beginning March 22, 1976, and claimed they were negligent for failing to investigate, question, or arrest the man that was known to them (having eyewitness descriptions of King, his fingerprints, and his name connecting him with the series of rapes) in time to prevent her assault.The Court disagreed, citing the Illinois Tort Immunity Act, which reads “Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for failure to provide adequate police protection or service, failure to prevent the commission of crimes and failure to apprehend criminals”.Stone v. State 106 Cal.App.3d 924, 165 Cal Rep. 339 (1980)The plaintiffs, together with some friends, attended the Cal Expo fairgrounds on September 9, 1975. They agreed to meet at the main gate prior to returning home. Near the gate the plaintiffs were overrun by a gang of youths who were shouting and hitting persons. During the melee Joyce Stone was attacked, her purse was taken and the plaintiffs were beaten and injured.In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the state “negligently owned, maintained, controlled, managed and operated” the premises, and negligently failed to provide adequate security measures, exposing persons on the premises to danger and injury. They also alleged that the State Of California, in making a policy decision not to use State Police for security but to use private security, assumed a duty to provide security, and that the persons hired by the State failed to use normal care while exercising their functions.The court found that the limited exception to tort immunity in cases involving discretionary acts in which a special relationship between the plaintiff and the public employee exist had not been proven, and given the existing law immunizing the government for failure to establish a police department, provide police protection or to provide sufficient police protection service, no liability existed for such failure.Warren v. District of Columbia (444 A.2d 1, 1981)Two women were upstairs in a townhouse when they heard their roommate, a third woman, being attacked downstairs by intruders. They phoned the police several times and were assured that officers were on the way. After about 30 minutes, when their roommate's screams had stopped, they assumed the police had finally arrived. When the two women went downstairs they saw that in fact the police never came, but the intruders were still there. As the Warren court graphically states in the opinion: "For the next fourteen hours the women were held captive, raped, robbed, beaten, forced to commit sexual acts upon each other, and made to submit to the sexual demands of their attackers."The three women sued the District of Columbia for failing to protect them, but D.C.'s highest court exonerated the District and its police, saying that it is a "fundamental principle of American law that a government and its agents are under no general duty to provide public services, such as police protection, to any individual citizen."Chapman v. City of Philadelphia, 434 A.2d 753 (Sup.Ct. Penn. 1981);William F. Chapman, died on August 14, 1978 as a result of injuries he sustained on August 11, 1978 when he was attacked and robbed by three men on the platform of the Wayne Junction Railroad Station. The complaint alleges that the City of Philadelphia negligently breached its duty to plaintiff's decedent by failing to maintain law and order, protect the citizens and prevent unsafe conditions from existing.The court held that “the duty of the City of Philadelphia to provide police protection is a public one which may not be claimed by an individual unless a special relationship exists between the city and the individual” and that the plaintiff had failed to “set forth any facts from which it would be possible to infer that a special relationship existed between William F. Chapman and the City of Philadelphia”.Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 61 (7th Cir. 1982).Thomas Vanda, was convicted of aggravated battery with a knife, and while being evaluated was diagnosed with schizophrenia. Less than a year later was charged in using a knife to murder of a woman. He was found “not guilty by reason of insanity” and was committed to a psychiatric facility. Five years later he was released and subsequently killed Marguerite Anne Bowers with a knife.The complaint alleged that the defendants knew that Vanda was dangerous when they released him, and acted recklessly in doing so, but the court held that “there is no constitutional right to be protected by the state against being murdered by criminals or madmen. It is monstrous if the state fails to protect its residents against such predators but it does not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or, we suppose, any other provision of the Constitution.”Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 C.3d 197, 185 Cal.Rptr. 252, 649 P.2d 894 (S.Ct. Cal. 1982);Yolanda Davidson was stabbed four times by Jack Blackmun while in a public laundromat. On three earlier occasions women had been stabbed at the same or nearby laundromats. The evening before Yolanda's stabbing, two police officers had the laundromat under surveillance when another stabbing occurred; the police chased the suspect but failed to catch him. The next evening the officers had the laundromat under surveillance for the purpose of preventing assaults and apprehending the felon. The officers were aware of Yolanda's presence in the laundromat throughout the surveillance. After about an hour of surveillance, they saw a man on the premises who closely resembled the attacker of the previous evening and, while watching him for 15 minutes, identified him as the likely perpetrator of that assault. As the officers watched, the suspect entered and left the laundromat "several times." The officers did not warn Yolanda. Eventually she was stabbed.Shore v. Town of Stonington, 187 Conn. 147, ___, 444 A.2d 1379, 1381 (1982);On January 14, 1980 at approximately 10:40 p.m., Lieutenant Edward Sylvia, a police officer of the town of Stonington, was engaged in the performance of his duties as a shift supervisor. As Sylvia proceeded east on Route One in Stonington, he observed a green Pontiac automobile on the same highway heading in a westerly direction at a fast rate of speed. Sylvia turned his cruiser around and proceeded to follow the Pontiac. He observed the vehicle cross the center line of the highway a few times and then pull into the parking lot of the defendant Veterans of Foreign Wars, Harley P. Chase Post 1265 (hereinafter V.F.W.).Sylvia followed the vehicle into the lot, got out of his cruiser, and approached the driver, later identified as Mark Cugini. When the officer asked Cugini where he was going in such a hurry, Cugini replied that he was there to pick up his girlfriend at the V.F.W. Sylvia informed him that if he wanted to keep his driver's license, he had better slow down and should let his girlfriend drive. The officer departed for other duties. Cugini entered the V.F.W. The evidence concerning his condition of sobriety as he entered the V.F.W., considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, could reasonably lead to a conclusion that he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs. Cugini did not drink at the V.F.W. After a short conversation with one of its patrons, he left and drove away in the green Pontiac.Subsequently that evening at about 11:30 p.m., Cugini, driving along Route 78 in Westerly, Rhode Island at a high rate of speed, struck a vehicle being operated by the plaintiff's decedent, Sherry Shore. Mrs. Shore died from the injuries suffered as a result of the collision.The plaintiff, whose decedent was killed by a drunk driver who had been stopped but not arrested by a town police officer, has a cause of action in negligence against the officer and the town for failure to enforce Connecticut General Statutes. The trial court granted the defendant town's motion for summary judgment, finding that the police officer owed no specific duty to the plaintiff's decedent to enforce the motor vehicle laws of the state, and the CT Supreme Court agreed.Morgan v. District of Columbia, 468 A.2d 1306 (D.C. Ct. of Ap. 1983);Over a three month period, Garnett Morgan had contacted her husband’s employer, the District of Columbia PD, and related that he had beaten and threatened her. She eventually moved, not informing her husband of her whereabouts and maintaining an unlisted telephone number.Three months later, Officer Morgan arrived at his wife's apartment, choked her into unconsciousness, and forced her into his car. Threatening to kill her if she objected, he drove to her parents' home, took their two children and left. Garnett Morgan then called the police. Along with two other officers, Lieutenant John R. Bowles, Jr. responded to the call and she told him what had happened, including the beating in July and the August gun threat. Lieutenant Bowles contacted Officer Morgan and directed him to report to the precinct. Morgan said that he would do so after he brought the children to the Pinkney house. When Morgan arrived, he was met by the Lieutenant, but rather than proceed with him to the precinct, Morgan carried the youngest child, with the older child beside him, toward the house. Lieutenant Bowles walked behind them. Officer Morgan walked into the house, said to his wife, "I told you so," then took out his revolver and shot at her twice; one of the bullets wounded her and the other hit John Keith, his son. Morgan then turned and shot Lieutenant Bowles, shot and killed Elton Pinkney, and surrendered to the police“Absent a special relationship between police department and victim, liability for failure to protect individual citizens from crime does not generally lie against police officials, who occupy positions necessarily fraught with discretion in the administration of justice. Appellants do not fall within the narrow exception to this longstanding rule. Furthermore, the facts of this case, as a matter of law, cannot support a finding of negligence by the city.”Morris v. Musser, 478 A.2d 937 (1984);On June 28, 1980 four assailants invaded plaintiffs' Gulf Service Station, viciously beat Mr. Morris, who suffered multiple injuries including a fractured jaw, and struck and terrorized Mrs. Morris, who vainly attempted to shield her unconscious husband from further punishment. Although on duty and apprised of the attack, Officer Musser did not intervene in sufficient time to prevent or reduce plaintiffs' injuries. The plaintiffs also alleged that in a prior incident, Officer Musser had refused to assist crime victims in jeopardy. They sued, contending that Officer Musser's “negligent, willful, reckless or intentional delay in furnishing assistance, after being notified of the assault in progress, proximately caused or aggravated their injuries”, and also sued because he continued to be employed by the Township after such behavior.The court, reviewing the state tort immunity law, concluded that “York Township is the only defendant cloaked with immunity…. The Township's conduct — failure to remove officer Musser from active duty and furnish adequate police protection to plaintiffs — does not fit within any of the eight types of negligent activity for which immunity is waived.”. They further held that while the Officer might be individually liable if his behavior was as alleged, the plaintiffs needed to prove that a special relationship existed, “those who are imperiled because they have aided law enforcement as informers or witnesses” or when the police “expressly promise to protect specific individuals from precise harm”. In this case, since “plaintiffs were neither allied with the police in a law enforcement project nor were they individually promised police protection from delineated harm. Further, an emergency aid request communicated to the police does not create a special duty owing to crime victims; thus, the police are not liable to crime victims for failing to furnish prompt and efficient aid upon request.” The court also dismissed a claim concerning Constitutional protection, stating “Since the defendants had no federal constitutional duty to protect plaintiffs from criminal assault, the inadequate provision of police protection services is not actionable under Section 1983 or the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”Thurman v. City of Torrington 595 F.Supp.1521 (D.Conn. 1984)A woman and her son were harassed, threatened and assaulted by her estranged husband, all in violation of his probation and a restraining order. Despite numerous requests for police protection, the police did nothing because "the police department used an administrative classification that resulted in police protection being fully provided to persons abused by someone with whom the victim has no domestic relationship, but less protection when the victim is either: 1) a woman abused or assaulted by a spouse or boyfriend, or 2) a child abused by a father or stepfather."Westbrooks v. State, 173 Cal.App.3d 1203, 219 Cal.Rtr. 674 (1985)The widow and sons of a motorist who drove into the void where a collapsed bridge had been, brought action against the State, county, and county deputy sheriff. The California Department of Transportation (Cal Trans) was aware that a violent storm with heavy rains had caused a bridge on State route 118 to collapse. A county deputy sheriff had observed the beginning of the collapse, reported it and requested assistance from Cal Trans. A jury award of $1,300,000 was reversed in part by the Court of Appeal which held: (1) the county deputy sheriff had no duty to warn drivers that the state highway bridge had collapsed during the storm, and his efforts to warn drivers did not in any way increase the risk of harm to users of the highway, and therefore the county was not liable to motorist's wife and children; and (2) the judgment was upheld against the state because the Cal Trans was notified at 1:52 a.m. and at 2:35 a.m., but no Cal Trans personnel nor CHP officer appeared at the scene until 5:45 a.m., and that such delay was unreasonable.)Calogrides v. City of Mobile, 475 So.2d 560 (S.Ct. A;a. 1985);John M. Calogrides attended a fireworks display sponsored in part by the City of Mobile at Ladd Memorial Stadium on July 3, 1982. After he arrived and as he was walking up the stadium ramp to find a seat, he was assaulted by a group of five or six teenage males. He was stabbed a number of times. Calogrides claimed the City was negligent in making its decision to deploy only eighty-two police officers to Ladd Stadium on the occasion of his injury. The Court held that liability cannot be predicated on that basis.DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 109 S.Ct. 998, 1989 (1989)Injured party was a boy who was beaten and permanently injured by his father. He claimed a special relationship existed because local officials knew he was being abused, indeed they had "specifically proclaimed by word and deed [their] intention to protect him against that danger," [7] but failed to remove him from his father's custody.The Court in DeShaney held that no duty arose because of a "special relationship," concluding that Constitutional duties of care and protection only exist as to certain individuals, such as incarcerated prisoners, involuntarily committed mental patients and others restrained against their will and therefore unable to protect themselves. "The affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State's knowledge of the individual's predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf."Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Department, 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990).Ms. Balistreri, beaten and harassed by her estranged husband, alleged a "special relationship" existed between her and the Pacifica Police Department, to wit, they were duty-bound to protect her because there was a restraining order against her husband. The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that DeShaney limited the circumstances that would give rise to a "special relationship" to instances of custody. Because no such custody existed in Balistreri, the Pacifica Police had no duty to protect her, so when they failed to do so and she was injured they were not liable.McKee v. City of Rockwall, Texas, 877 F.2d409 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct.727 (1990).Plaintiff claimed she was injured because the police refused to make an arrest following a domestic violence call. She claimed their refusal to arrest was due to a city policy of gender- based discrimination. In that case the U. S. District Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that "no constitutional violation [occurred] when the most that can be said of the police is that they stood by and did nothing..."Castle Rock v. Gonzales (04-278) 545 U.S. 748 (2005)The Supreme Court ruled that the police did not have a constitutional duty to protect a person from harm, even a woman who had obtained a court-issued protective order against a violent husband making an arrest mandatory for a violation.The decision, with an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia and dissents from Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, overturned a ruling by a federal appeals court in Colorado. The appeals court had permitted a lawsuitto proceed against a Colorado town, Castle Rock, for the failure of the police to respond to a woman's pleas for help after her estranged husband violated a protective order by kidnapping their three young daughters, whomhe eventually killed.

Well, given that the government bears no affirmative duty* to protect ordinary individuals, what makes you think that they are supposed to be responsible for our protection to start with?*-an affirmative duty is an obligation that you can be held liable for failing to perform.Every politician who tells you that you don’t need a gun and can “just call 9–1–1”? They know full well of this, but your potential death is inconsequential to advancing their agenda - while armed guard we pay for protect them but not us.In case anyone wants to try and challenge my statement, here’s the supporting case law with reporting citation and a brief synopsis:South v. Maryland 59 U.S. (How.) 396, 15 L.Ed.433 (1856)Robinson, a resident of Washington County, owed a judgment debt to Pottle, a resident of Massachusetts. When Pottle and a party consisting of his attorney and a deputy sheriff attempted to assert a levy upon Robinson's property, they were surrounded by a group of workmen armed with stones and other weapons. The workmen threatened violence should any attempt be made to assert the levy. After Pottle and his party took refuge in a nearby house, the workmen (described in the case as "rioters") maintained an armed guard around it. The deputy sheriff left Pottle and his attorney imprisoned in the house and went to consult with the High Sheriff, South. When South returned with the deputy, Pottle demanded that he be protected from the armed workmen, but South refused to do so. Pottle and his attorney were released, after four days of imprisonment, when they paid the workmen $2,500, a sum apparently equal to the amount of back wages owed them by Robinson.After the federal Circuit Court for the District of Maryland found for the plaintiff Pottle in a civil suit for damages against the sheriff, South appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, in reversing the lower court, found no cause of action under Maryland common law. The Court held that a sheriff, as a public officer, was liable personally only for misfeasance or nonfeasance of ministerial acts, where the sheriff is bound to an individual for a fee or salary, but not for a breach of his public duty.Cocking v Wade 87 Md. 529 (1898)Following indictment by a grand jury for the murder of his wife and her sister, Cocking was taken into the custody of the sheriff of Charles County, Wade. The sheriff placed Cocking in "an old, dilapidated building" in Port Tobacco that was used as a jail and under the care of "an aged and infirm negro," leaving the prisoner "wholly unprotected." That night a mob, in the presence of the sheriff, proceeded to lynch Cocking. Despite some evidence that the sheriff was told of the possibility of lynching and had been urged to either move the prisoner to Baltimore or to a newer jail, the Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the trial court in a civil action brought by the family of the hanged man in finding no liability on the part of the sheriff.Riss v. City of New York 22 N.Y.2d 579, 293 NYS2d 897, 240 N.E.2d 860 (N.Y. Ct. of Ap. 1958);Ms. Riss was being harassed by a former boyfriend, in a familiar pattern of increasingly violent threats. She went to the police for help many times, but was always rebuffed. Desperate because she could not get police protection, she applied for a gun permit, but was refused that as well. On the eve of her engagement party she and her mother went to the police one last time pleading for protection against what they were certain was a serious and dangerous threat. And one last time the police refused. As she was leaving the party, a thug hired by her former boyfriend threw acid in her face, blinding and permanently disfiguring her.Her case against the City of New York for failing to protect her was, not surprisingly, unsuccessful. The lone dissenting justice of New York's high court wrote in his opinion: "What makes the City's position [denying any obligation to protect the woman] particularly difficult to understand is that, in conformity to the dictates of the law [she] did not carry any weapon for self-defense. Thus, by a rather bitter irony she was required to rely for protection on the City of New York which now denies all responsibility to her."Ne Casek v. City of Los Angeles 233 Cal.App.2d 131, 43 Cal.Rptr. 294 (1965)Kathryne Ne Casek was knocked down on a sidewalk by two suspects who had been arrested by the officers, the Court of Appeal held the amount of force or method used by a police officer in attempting to keep an arrested person or persons in custody is a discretionary act for purpose of application of doctrine of immunity of government officials from civil liability for their discretionary acts, and therefore Ms. Ne Casek (who was injured by two escaped suspects who had been handcuffed together) could not maintain an action against the arresting officers based on the officer's alleged negligence in using insufficient force to keep the prisoners in custody.)Susman v. City of Los Angeles, et al. 269 Cal.App.2d 803, 75 Cal.Rptr. 240 (1969)Action was brought by several landowners against the City of Los Angeles and the State pleading eleven separate causes of action for damages arising out of the ‘Watts’ Riots’ of 1965. The Court of Appeal held that none of the allegations presented was sufficient to show any duty owed by any of the officials named as defendants to act to prevent or avoid the harm suffered by the plaintiffs.Silver v. City of Minneapolis 170 N.W.2d 206 (S.Ct. Minn. 1969)A riot occurred in the Plymouth Avenue North area of Minneapolis in July, 1967. Plaintiffs owned real estate located at 1709-1711 Plymouth Avenue North. On July 19, 1967, a riot occurred in that area during which looting occurred and a number of business and commercial properties along Plymouth Avenue were damaged or destroyed. The windows in the plaintiff’s store were broken in plaintiffs' store by rioters; this was investigated by the Minneapolis Police Department. According to plaintiffs, they received indications that their building and store were being threatened by further damage in riots that might follow.According to plaintiffs, after they had received indications that their building and store were being threatened by further damage they boarded up the windows and doors and contacted the police concerning the threats. A representative from MPD stated “we know about it and we are going to have some extra police to guard Plymouth Avenue, but we haven't got enough police, you know, to watch every business place on Plymouth. He says we are going to keep an eye on your place, but we cannot give you special protection."Following this conversation, Silver went home about 7 p. m., informing the police of his intention to leave at that hour and told them that he had boarded up his doors and windows. During the night of July 20-21, plaintiffs' building and store were burned by rioters throwing "Molotov cocktails" against the building. They sought recovery from the city for the damage to the building and store, alleging the city of Minneapolis was negligent in failing to provide police and fire protection to their building after it had been requested by plaintiffs, or to take reasonable measures to prevent the riot.The court was satisfied that under the facts of the present case the city was exercising discretion in determining how to best cope with impending trouble by deploying its police and fire manpower so as to protect the property of as many people as was possible within its limited resources, and as such fell under the existing Tort Immunity of state law.Keane v. City of Chicago 98 Ill. App.2d 460, 240 N.E.2d 321 (1968);A Chicago public school teacher was killed while on the premises of the school to which she had been assigned was killed by a student enrolled at the school. The plaintiff alleged that the City was negligent in failing to assign police protection to the school, although it knew or should have known that failure to provide this protection would result in harm to persons lawfully on the premises in the removal of police protection from the school prior to the event, although it knew or should have known of the dangerous condition then existing at the school and in permitting a dangerous condition to exist at the school. The court dismissed the case because of the existing state law granting tort immunity with no proof the City had ever affirmatively assumed a "special duty”.Simpson's Food Fair v. Evansville 272 N.E. 2d 871 (Ind.Ct. of Ap.) 1971;The plaintiff-appellant alleged that the City of Evansville knew or should have known of the high incidence of criminal activity in the plaintiff's neighborhood. He held that it refused to assign extra police to patrol the area or to request outside police assistance from the State, that a duty to protect the plaintiff and to prevent crime was breached, and that such breach proximately caused the plaintiff to lose customers and merchandise and ultimately to cease business operation. The court held that in this case, a general public duty was involved, and that no special duty had been undertaken.Antique Arts Corp. v. City of Torrence 39 Cal.App.3d 588, 114 Cal.Rptr. 332 (1974)A silent burglar alarm installed on the premises of the store operated by the plaintiff was, during the course of a robbery by two armed men, activated at 3:32 p.m. and the alert message was relayed to the police department.The dispatch message to the units in the field was at 3:43 p.m., and a police unit arrived at the scene of the robbery at 3:44 p.m. The delay in the transmission of the dispatch enabled the robbers to complete the robbery and escape with jewelry and merchandise in the amount of $49,000. The Court of Appeal held that Govt. Code section 846 provides for immunity if no police protection is provided; or, if police protection is provided, but that protection is not sufficient.Hartzler v. City of San Jose 46 Cal.App.3d 6, 120 Cal.Rptr. 5 (1975)Plaintiff's decedent, Ruth Bunnell, telephoned the main office of the San Jose Police Department and reported that her estranged husband, Mack Bunnell, had called her, saying that he was coming to her residence to kill her. She requested immediate police aid; the department refused to come to her aid at that time, and asked that she call the department again when Mack Bunnell had arrived.Approximately 45 minutes later, Mack Bunnell arrived at her home and stabbed her to death. The police did not arrive until 3 a.m., in response to a call of a neighbor. By this time Mrs. Bunnell was dead.Appellant has failed to plead facts supporting an assumption that a special relationship existed between decedent and the San Jose Police Department. The allegation that the police had responded 20 times to her calls and had arrested her husband once does not indicate that the department had assumed a duty toward decedent greater than the duty owed to another member of the public. The police may have responded repeatedly to her calls, only to discover that she was not in danger. Absent an indication that the police had induced decedent's reliance on a promise, express or implied, that they would provide her with protection, it must be concluded that no special relationship existed and that appellant has not stated a cause of action.Walters v. Hampton, 14 Wash. App. 548, 543 P.2d 648 (1975);Robert Walters was shot with a rifle by Gordon A. Hampton, while visiting in the latter's home in Port Orchard. Walters presented police records which showed that on three occasions in 1968 and two occasions in 1970 Gordon Hampton's wife complained to the police that her husband, while drunk, had threatened to kill her. On the three 1968 occasions Mrs. Hampton reported that Hampton had aimed a gun at her. Twice the police investigated her complaints and talked to Hampton. In June 1970 and September 1970 Mrs. Hampton again complained Hampton was beating her and had threatened to kill her. In the September incident Mrs. Hampton told the police Hampton had fired a gun at her. She also asked the police to remove a woman Hampton had allegedly brought to the home. The police officers observed no other woman in the house, but took Hampton's gun to the police station. It should be noted Hampton denied firing the gun. The firearm was returned to Hampton 2 days later. On almost all these occasions, the investigating officers found both Mr. and Mrs. Hampton either to have been drinking or drunk. Between the time Hampton retrieved his gun in September 1970 and when Walters was shot the police had no contact with either Mr. or Mrs. Hampton.Plaintiff's principal theory was that the chief of police had a mandatory statutory duty to prosecute Hampton for violation of city ordinances prohibiting the aiming or discharging of firearms, or to initiate criminal prosecution for assault. Plaintiff's apparent contention is that had Hampton been prosecuted, the gun could have been confiscated in 1968 or 1970 and plaintiff would not have been injured in 1972. Second, plaintiff contends the police had a mandatory and nondiscretionary duty to protect him against the harm which in fact befell him.The court held that the plaintiff's entire argument is based upon the false premise that arrest and the criminal process is the exclusive method available to the police in dealing with the variety of behavioral or social problems they confront; additionally, given that the only complaints received by the police prior to the shooting related to the Hampton's marital disputes (and the last contact the police had with the Hamptons prior to the shooting in February 1972 was in September 1970). In the absence of any allegation that the police knew Hampton posed a danger to the plaintiff, that the plaintiff required protection from Hampton, or that plaintiff was in some particular danger, these facts are inadequate to establish a specific duty owed by the City to plaintiff.Massengill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518, 456 P.2d 376 (1969);This case involved an automobile collision in which plaintiffs' decedents were killed. The plaintiffs argued that it resulted from a deputy sheriff's failure to apprehend and arrest intoxicated motorists observed driving in a reckless manner immediately prior to the accident. The court disagreed:"The general rule pertaining to governmental agencies and public officers is that `... if the duty which the official authority imposes upon an officer is a duty to the public, a failure to perform it, or an inadequate or erroneous performance, must be a public, not an individual injury, and must be redressed, if at all, in some form of public prosecution.”Henderson v. St. Petersburg, 247 So.2d 23 (Fla. Ct. App. 1971);On May 9, 1969, Matthew Henderson came to the City of St. Petersburg, Florida, for the purpose of making business deliveries, which he has done on prior occasions. Because of prior criminal attacks previously made on him, he went to the Police Department, and alleged he made “specific arrangements with the officers, agents and employees of the defendant City acting within the scope of their employment” (a desk sergeant on duty at the precinct) created “a privity for specific police protection” while he was making his deliveries.He later proceeded to the area where he claims he was “assured officers would be there to protect him”. However, arriving at the above address, he was accosted by unknown assailants, who shot him. He sued for injury, damages and loss of future income, alleging that they were the result of the carelessness and negligence of the City, through “it's Police Department, officers and agents, in failing to properly protect the plaintiff as they had specifically undertaken through the direct contact..."The court held that the plaintiff did not make causal connection between the alleged negligence of the City and the injuries, prove that the presence of the police officers would have prevented the injuries, and did not show that the City owed Henderson a "special duty."Evers v. Westerberg, (1972)38 A.D.2d 751, 329 N.Y.S. 615;On December 4, 1966, at about 1:50 A.M., an automobile accident occurred in Valley Stream, NY, when an automobile driven by defendant Thomas Westerberg and owned by defendant Celeste Westerberg collided with a vehicle driven by John Evers, in which his wife (plaintiff) was a passenger, causing Evers' death. About 20 minutes earlier, the Westerberg vehicle had been involved in a rear-end collision with another automobile in the Village of Lynbrook.Mrs. Evers sued the Westerbergs and the Village of Lynbrook, charging them with negligence through the officers, for having failed to take Westerberg into custody on the ground of intoxication and/or impounding his damaged vehicle to prevent him from driving it away from the scene.They also complained that the village failed to provide Mr. and Mrs. Evers with adequate police protection insofar as it permitted Westerberg to drive away from the scene of the first accident. The court disagreed:“It is well settled that a municipality, acting in its governmental capacity for the protection of the general public, cannot be cast in damages for a mere failure to furnish adequate protection to a particular individual to whom it has assumed no special duty.”Huey v. Cicero, 41 Ill.2d 361, 243 N.E.2d 214 (1968);Plaintiff, Isaac Huey, the administrator of the estate of his deceased minor son, Jerome, instituted a wrongful-death action in the circuit court of Cook County against the Town of Cicero, its board of trustees, and certain named individual officials of the town for the death of his son from a fatal felonious beating by four white youths armed with baseball bats while he was on his way to an employment office.The plaintiff alleged that the defendants knew or would have known by the exercise of ordinary care that a large number of Negroes entered and departed the confines of Cicero daily in pursuit of employment at various factories and that "the presence of a Negro on the public streets and ways of Cicero on or about May 25, 1966, constituted a peril and hazard to the personal safety [of such person]."They charged that "The defendants, however, or one or more of them so wantonly and willfully neglected to use ordinary care for the protection and safety due to dark-skinned persons and to plaintiff's intestate on May 25, 1966, that as a direct and proximate result, Jerome Huey was assaulted and severe injuries were inflicted from which he died on May 29th, 1966."They further charged that "Notwithstanding that the defendants, or one or more of them, were under a duty to warn, advise, or otherwise give notice to dark-skinned persons and plaintiff's intestate of the unusual and extraordinary hazards and perils to such persons as existed on May 25th, 1966 in the Town of Cicero, the defendants or one or more of them, willfully and wantonly failed to exercise ordinary care to so advise, warn or otherwise give notice to Jerome Huey."The Court dismissed the case for the defendants, citing “Independent of statutory or common-law concepts of sovereign immunity, the general rule is that a municipality or its employees is not liable for failure to supply general police or fire protection. (Vossler v. DeSmet, 204 Ill. App. 292, 295; Adamczyk v. Zambelli, 25 Ill. App.2d 121, 128. See also Motyka v. City of Amsterdam, 15 N.Y.2d 134, 204 N.E.2d 635.) This rule has been maintained in the face of decisions holding municipalities liable for affirmative negligent or wilful acts by their employees. (Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District, 18 Ill. 2d 11; Andrews v. City of Chicago, 37 Ill. 2d 309.) Exceptions to the rule have been found only in instances where the municipality was under a special duty to a particular individual, such as protecting a material witness from threatened injury by third parties.Trautman v. City of Stamford, (1975 Super. Ct.)32 Conn. Sup. 258, 350 A.2d 782The plaintiff's complaint alleged that he was seriously injured after being struck by a drag racing automobile while standing on a public sidewalk in the city of Stamford. He sued the city and the two officers who were present for a breach of duty for failing to enforce the anti-drag racing laws. Since the alleged breach of duty was one owed not to the plaintiff individually but to the public generally the patrolmen could not be held liable to the plaintiff in negligence.Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. City of Wichita, 217 Kan. 44, 536 P.2d 54 (1975);After having a business in the area suffer firebombings, a detective performed a stake-out on a business that had received specific threats. He observed two vehicles slow through the area then turn a corner, after which four males came from around that corner. Three went into an L-shaped recess where the shop was, while one stayed on the sidewalk. They were not carrying anything the detective could see, but as he attempted to request another unit to the scene via radio, he “saw a bright red flare” and as he neared he saw a front window in the area was burning, and saw the 4 males run away. Shortly thereafter as he was looking for them he saw one of the vehicles he had seen earlier flee the scene. He gave chase, and after a twenty to thirty block chase was able to apprehend four of the five occupants. During interviews, three young men told of being at a party earlier that evening in Wichita, and the idea came up to set fire to several businesses with Molotov cocktails.The insurance company alleged that the police failed to enforce the “mob action” statute and thus prevent the fire. They also argue that the detective breached his duty under state law to order the dispersal of the four boys in front of the Gentry Shop, and that such a breach of a statutory duty made him personally liable for the ensuing damage.The court held that “The statute amounts to a codification of the common law duty of a peace officer to preserve the peace. The duty owed is to the public at large, and not to any particular individual. For the breach of such duty an officer is answerable only to the public acting through its official representatives, and not to any particular individual.”Sapp v. City of Tallahassee 348 So.2d 363 (Fla. Ct. of Ap. 1977);Ms. Sapp's complaint alleged Tallahassee Police Department officers, on the evening of September 4, 1974, were on special assignment at the Tallahassee round Holiday Inn. One of the officers observed two males in the rear parking area and radioed a suspicious persons report to another officer on stake-out within the hotel. The officers observed the men loiter at opposite ends of the sidewalk near the rear entrance of the hotel for about ten minutes. Ms. Sapp, a temporary employee of the Inn, was then observed leaving the rear entrance, and looking for her ride before reentering the hotel. The officer on stake-out saw the two males follow her into the hotel about a minute later. Other than reporting in, the officer took no action. Twenty minutes later he saw the males running from the hotel after severely beating and robbing Ms. Sapp inside the hotel near the rear entrance. The complaint alleged the officers owed appellant a special duty to protect her from physical assaults and were negligent in failing to properly investigate the behavior of the men.The court held that there was no showing of a violation of statutory procedures by the Tallahassee police — nor a showing of a direct and personal contact with Ms. Sapp, and while the police were conducting surveillance at the time the incident took place, it was not a situation where police authorities undertook a responsibility to particular members of the public, exposing them, without adequate protection, to risks which then materialize into actual injury.Jamison v. Chicago, 48 Ill. App. 3d 567 (1st Dist. 1977)James O'Malley shot and killed John Jamison. For three days prior to the shooting, O'Malley's son had warned the Chicago police that his father had been acting in a violent manner and requested that the police arrest him. The police refused to do so and the shooting occurred. Plaintiff, administratrix of Jamison's estate, filed a wrongful death action against the city of Chicago and the individual police officers, alleging, inter alia, that the individual officers were guilty of willful and wanton negligence in refusing to arrest O'Malley.After appeal, the court held that the existing tort immunity legislation provided “blanket immunity in the area of police discretion over arrests”, as well as “any failure to prevent the commission of crimes, the failure to apprehend criminals, and the failure to make an arrest” unless such act or omission constituted willful and wanton negligence.Weutrich v. Delia 155 N.J. Super 324, 326, 382 A.2d 929, 930 (1978);The plaintiff alleged that on several occasions during the afternoon and evening of February 9, 1974 notification was given to the police department of the township that defendant John Delia was menacing with a firearm certain persons within a short distance of the Berkeley Heights police headquarters. The police department made no response to these warnings. Less than 12 hours later, in the early morning of February 10, 1974, John Delia in that same area shot John Weuthrich in the head with a gun, killing him instantly, leaving as survivors his wife and three infant children.The complaint alleged that decedent's death was caused not only by the wrongful act of defendant Delia but also by the neglect, failure and default of the township police department to carry out its duty (1) to "apprehend and disarm" defendant after receiving warning of his armed threats of imminent personal harm, and (2) to take "appropriate action to disarm [defendant]…file a Complaint against him or otherwise confiscate the firearms in his possession."The City replied that state law provided immunity for public entities and officers for adopting or failing to adopt or enforce (any) law, failing to provide police protection and failing to make arrests or retain persons so placed in custody.The court agreed, holding “While it is true that police officers have a duty to investigate information from citizens concerning unlawful or criminal activity, (cite), the failure of the police to make an arrest as a consequence does not subject the municipality to tort liability…Municipalities are expressly immunized from tort liability for the failure to provide police protection or the failure to provide sufficient police protection.”DeHoney v. Hernandez, 122 Ariz. 367, 372, 595 P.2d 159, 164 (1979)After consulting informally with several officers, DeHoney, the owner of a jewelry store, installed a silent alarm sytem. On the evening of 30 June 1975, the silent alarm for the Showcase was activated at the police station at 2:11 a.m. The dispatcher immediately radioed the officers in the field, and at 2:13 a.m. Sgt. Hernandez and Officer Hill simultaneously arrived in front of the Showcase and Officer Hovis arrived at the rear. The front and back doors were secure; the police saw no indications of disturbance. Sgt. Hernandez then instructed Edwards to telephone DeHoney and also directed Officer Hovis to remain in the general vicinity. Officers Hill and Hernandez left the area for other duties, not realizing a burglar had entered through the roof and remained inside, exiting thorough a back door once the officer left the rear of the building.The dispatcher had some difficulty in locating DeHoney’s phone number and reached him approximately 30 minutes later. He arrived on scene at 2:45 and entered the building with Officer Hovitz to discover the theft.DeHoney alleged the police were negligent in their delay in notifying him and their failure to remain at the building until the owner arrived. The court disagreed, stating “…there was no specific promise or representation that the owner would always be immediately notified, or that the officers would remain on the premises pending the owner's arrival in every instance... Certainly there are many situations where emergencies confronting the police in the discharge of their duties to the public generally would make it impossible to immediately notify the owner and await his arrival. There was, then, no narrowing of the general public duty to a special duty to prevent harm to plaintiffs' property.”Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 93 N.M. 564, 569, 603 P.2d 303 (1979)On June 22, 1975, plaintiff's decedent, Ernest Trujillo, along with a group of friends, was in Roosevelt Park, a park established and maintained by the City of Albuquerque. Earlier in the day, a rock concert had been held but Ernest and his friends went to the park after the concert was over. They were sitting on the grass when they were approached by, and had some kind of altercation with, another person who then left the park. Shortly thereafter, a second person approached Ernest and his group, accusing them of having "picked on" his brother, and drew a gun, firing it once or twice. Ernest and his friends then chased this person to the top of a knoll where a third person, Wilbert Miles, stood and fired a shotgun "into the ground", hitting and killing Ernest.Her complaint alleged that the City maintained the park; that the maintenance of the park was a proprietary function of the City; that the City allowed the rock concert to be held in the park without proper police and security arrangements; that the City had a duty to secure the park and protect citizens using it, particularly a duty to protect Ernest's well-being; and that the City breached its duty and was therefore liable in damages.The court held that “lacking proof of a direct relationship or contact between the victim and the police creating a special duty, there is no liability on the part of the police and municipality… Failing to establish that a special duty existed between the victim and the police, there is no liability.” The court also stated “To hold a municipality liable for the conduct of third persons, such as is alleged in the complaint before us, would, in our opinion, be contrary to sound public policy and create policing requirements difficult of fulfillment.”Crouch v. Hall, 406 N.E.2d 303, 304 (Ind.App.1980);Mildred Crouch brought suit against three police officers, individually and in their capacity as officers, for failure to properly investigate a rape of a third person by one Anthony Wayne Hall and to detect and apprehend Hall, who one week later raped and murdered Mildred Crouch's daughter Jeanne Crouch. The officers moved for summary judgment based on immunity under the Tort Claims Act.Upon appeal, the court agreed that while “there is no factual dispute… the police owed no special duty to the victim. The duty owed in the investigation of the rape was to the general public.”Porter v. Urbana, 88 Ill.App.3d 443, 445, 43 Ill.Dec. 610, 612, 410 N.E.2d 610, 612 (1980)The plaintiff's complaint alleges that Clarence King, Jr., invaded her home December 3, 1976, and beat and raped her, and that the Urbana Police Department and Gordon knew of six other rapes committed by King in Urbana beginning March 22, 1976, and claimed they were negligent for failing to investigate, question, or arrest the man that was known to them (having eyewitness descriptions of King, his fingerprints, and his name connecting him with the series of rapes) in time to prevent her assault.The Court disagreed, citing the Illinois Tort Immunity Act, which reads “Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for failure to provide adequate police protection or service, failure to prevent the commission of crimes and failure to apprehend criminals”.Stone v. State 106 Cal.App.3d 924, 165 Cal Rep. 339 (1980)The plaintiffs, together with some friends, attended the Cal Expo fairgrounds on September 9, 1975. They agreed to meet at the main gate prior to returning home. Near the gate the plaintiffs were overrun by a gang of youths who were shouting and hitting persons. During the melee Joyce Stone was attacked, her purse was taken and the plaintiffs were beaten and injured.In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the state “negligently owned, maintained, controlled, managed and operated” the premises, and negligently failed to provide adequate security measures, exposing persons on the premises to danger and injury. They also alleged that the State Of California, in making a policy decision not to use State Police for security but to use private security, assumed a duty to provide security, and that the persons hired by the State failed to use normal care while exercising their functions.The court found that the limited exception to tort immunity in cases involving discretionary acts in which a special relationship between the plaintiff and the public employee exist had not been proven, and given the existing law immunizing the government for failure to establish a police department, provide police protection or to provide sufficient police protection service, no liability existed for such failure.Warren v. District of Columbia (444 A.2d 1, 1981)Two women were upstairs in a townhouse when they heard their roommate, a third woman, being attacked downstairs by intruders. They phoned the police several times and were assured that officers were on the way. After about 30 minutes, when their roommate's screams had stopped, they assumed the police had finally arrived. When the two women went downstairs they saw that in fact the police never came, but the intruders were still there. As the Warren court graphically states in the opinion: "For the next fourteen hours the women were held captive, raped, robbed, beaten, forced to commit sexual acts upon each other, and made to submit to the sexual demands of their attackers."The three women sued the District of Columbia for failing to protect them, but D.C.'s highest court exonerated the District and its police, saying that it is a "fundamental principle of American law that a government and its agents are under no general duty to provide public services, such as police protection, to any individual citizen."Chapman v. City of Philadelphia, 434 A.2d 753 (Sup.Ct. Penn. 1981);William F. Chapman, died on August 14, 1978 as a result of injuries he sustained on August 11, 1978 when he was attacked and robbed by three men on the platform of the Wayne Junction Railroad Station. The complaint alleges that the City of Philadelphia negligently breached its duty to plaintiff's decedent by failing to maintain law and order, protect the citizens and prevent unsafe conditions from existing.The court held that “the duty of the City of Philadelphia to provide police protection is a public one which may not be claimed by an individual unless a special relationship exists between the city and the individual” and that the plaintiff had failed to “set forth any facts from which it would be possible to infer that a special relationship existed between William F. Chapman and the City of Philadelphia”.Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 61 (7th Cir. 1982).Thomas Vanda, was convicted of aggravated battery with a knife, and while being evaluated was diagnosed with schizophrenia. Less than a year later was charged in using a knife to murder of a woman. He was found “not guilty by reason of insanity” and was committed to a psychiatric facility. Five years later he was released and subsequently killed Marguerite Anne Bowers with a knife.The complaint alleged that the defendants knew that Vanda was dangerous when they released him, and acted recklessly in doing so, but the court held that “there is no constitutional right to be protected by the state against being murdered by criminals or madmen. It is monstrous if the state fails to protect its residents against such predators but it does not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or, we suppose, any other provision of the Constitution.”Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 C.3d 197, 185 Cal.Rptr. 252, 649 P.2d 894 (S.Ct. Cal. 1982);Yolanda Davidson was stabbed four times by Jack Blackmun while in a public laundromat. On three earlier occasions women had been stabbed at the same or nearby laundromats. The evening before Yolanda's stabbing, two police officers had the laundromat under surveillance when another stabbing occurred; the police chased the suspect but failed to catch him. The next evening the officers had the laundromat under surveillance for the purpose of preventing assaults and apprehending the felon. The officers were aware of Yolanda's presence in the laundromat throughout the surveillance. After about an hour of surveillance, they saw a man on the premises who closely resembled the attacker of the previous evening and, while watching him for 15 minutes, identified him as the likely perpetrator of that assault. As the officers watched, the suspect entered and left the laundromat "several times." The officers did not warn Yolanda. Eventually she was stabbed.Shore v. Town of Stonington, 187 Conn. 147, ___, 444 A.2d 1379, 1381 (1982);On January 14, 1980 at approximately 10:40 p.m., Lieutenant Edward Sylvia, a police officer of the town of Stonington, was engaged in the performance of his duties as a shift supervisor. As Sylvia proceeded east on Route One in Stonington, he observed a green Pontiac automobile on the same highway heading in a westerly direction at a fast rate of speed. Sylvia turned his cruiser around and proceeded to follow the Pontiac. He observed the vehicle cross the center line of the highway a few times and then pull into the parking lot of the defendant Veterans of Foreign Wars, Harley P. Chase Post 1265 (hereinafter V.F.W.).Sylvia followed the vehicle into the lot, got out of his cruiser, and approached the driver, later identified as Mark Cugini. When the officer asked Cugini where he was going in such a hurry, Cugini replied that he was there to pick up his girlfriend at the V.F.W. Sylvia informed him that if he wanted to keep his driver's license, he had better slow down and should let his girlfriend drive. The officer departed for other duties. Cugini entered the V.F.W. The evidence concerning his condition of sobriety as he entered the V.F.W., considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, could reasonably lead to a conclusion that he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs. Cugini did not drink at the V.F.W. After a short conversation with one of its patrons, he left and drove away in the green Pontiac.Subsequently that evening at about 11:30 p.m., Cugini, driving along Route 78 in Westerly, Rhode Island at a high rate of speed, struck a vehicle being operated by the plaintiff's decedent, Sherry Shore. Mrs. Shore died from the injuries suffered as a result of the collision.The plaintiff, whose decedent was killed by a drunk driver who had been stopped but not arrested by a town police officer, has a cause of action in negligence against the officer and the town for failure to enforce Connecticut General Statutes. The trial court granted the defendant town's motion for summary judgment, finding that the police officer owed no specific duty to the plaintiff's decedent to enforce the motor vehicle laws of the state, and the CT Supreme Court agreed.Morgan v. District of Columbia, 468 A.2d 1306 (D.C. Ct. of Ap. 1983);Over a three month period, Garnett Morgan had contacted her husband’s employer, the District of Columbia PD, and related that he had beaten and threatened her. She eventually moved, not informing her husband of her whereabouts and maintaining an unlisted telephone number.Three months later, Officer Morgan arrived at his wife's apartment, choked her into unconsciousness, and forced her into his car. Threatening to kill her if she objected, he drove to her parents' home, took their two children and left. Garnett Morgan then called the police. Along with two other officers, Lieutenant John R. Bowles, Jr. responded to the call and she told him what had happened, including the beating in July and the August gun threat. Lieutenant Bowles contacted Officer Morgan and directed him to report to the precinct. Morgan said that he would do so after he brought the children to the Pinkney house. When Morgan arrived, he was met by the Lieutenant, but rather than proceed with him to the precinct, Morgan carried the youngest child, with the older child beside him, toward the house. Lieutenant Bowles walked behind them. Officer Morgan walked into the house, said to his wife, "I told you so," then took out his revolver and shot at her twice; one of the bullets wounded her and the other hit John Keith, his son. Morgan then turned and shot Lieutenant Bowles, shot and killed Elton Pinkney, and surrendered to the police“Absent a special relationship between police department and victim, liability for failure to protect individual citizens from crime does not generally lie against police officials, who occupy positions necessarily fraught with discretion in the administration of justice. Appellants do not fall within the narrow exception to this longstanding rule. Furthermore, the facts of this case, as a matter of law, cannot support a finding of negligence by the city.”Morris v. Musser, 478 A.2d 937 (1984);On June 28, 1980 four assailants invaded plaintiffs' Gulf Service Station, viciously beat Mr. Morris, who suffered multiple injuries including a fractured jaw, and struck and terrorized Mrs. Morris, who vainly attempted to shield her unconscious husband from further punishment. Although on duty and apprised of the attack, Officer Musser did not intervene in sufficient time to prevent or reduce plaintiffs' injuries. The plaintiffs also alleged that in a prior incident, Officer Musser had refused to assist crime victims in jeopardy. They sued, contending that Officer Musser's “negligent, willful, reckless or intentional delay in furnishing assistance, after being notified of the assault in progress, proximately caused or aggravated their injuries”, and also sued because he continued to be employed by the Township after such behavior.The court, reviewing the state tort immunity law, concluded that “York Township is the only defendant cloaked with immunity…. The Township's conduct — failure to remove officer Musser from active duty and furnish adequate police protection to plaintiffs — does not fit within any of the eight types of negligent activity for which immunity is waived.”. They further held that while the Officer might be individually liable if his behavior was as alleged, the plaintiffs needed to prove that a special relationship existed, “those who are imperiled because they have aided law enforcement as informers or witnesses” or when the police “expressly promise to protect specific individuals from precise harm”. In this case, since “plaintiffs were neither allied with the police in a law enforcement project nor were they individually promised police protection from delineated harm. Further, an emergency aid request communicated to the police does not create a special duty owing to crime victims; thus, the police are not liable to crime victims for failing to furnish prompt and efficient aid upon request.” The court also dismissed a claim concerning Constitutional protection, stating “Since the defendants had no federal constitutional duty to protect plaintiffs from criminal assault, the inadequate provision of police protection services is not actionable under Section 1983 or the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”Thurman v. City of Torrington 595 F.Supp.1521 (D.Conn. 1984)A woman and her son were harassed, threatened and assaulted by her estranged husband, all in violation of his probation and a restraining order. Despite numerous requests for police protection, the police did nothing because "the police department used an administrative classification that resulted in police protection being fully provided to persons abused by someone with whom the victim has no domestic relationship, but less protection when the victim is either: 1) a woman abused or assaulted by a spouse or boyfriend, or 2) a child abused by a father or stepfather."Westbrooks v. State, 173 Cal.App.3d 1203, 219 Cal.Rtr. 674 (1985)The widow and sons of a motorist who drove into the void where a collapsed bridge had been, brought action against the State, county, and county deputy sheriff. The California Department of Transportation (Cal Trans) was aware that a violent storm with heavy rains had caused a bridge on State route 118 to collapse. A county deputy sheriff had observed the beginning of the collapse, reported it and requested assistance from Cal Trans. A jury award of $1,300,000 was reversed in part by the Court of Appeal which held: (1) the county deputy sheriff had no duty to warn drivers that the state highway bridge had collapsed during the storm, and his efforts to warn drivers did not in any way increase the risk of harm to users of the highway, and therefore the county was not liable to motorist's wife and children; and (2) the judgment was upheld against the state because the Cal Trans was notified at 1:52 a.m. and at 2:35 a.m., but no Cal Trans personnel nor CHP officer appeared at the scene until 5:45 a.m., and that such delay was unreasonable.)Calogrides v. City of Mobile, 475 So.2d 560 (S.Ct. A;a. 1985);In 1988, Lisa Bianco's violently abusive husband was finally in jail for beating and kidnapping her, after having victimized her for years. Ms. Bianco was somewhat comforted by the facts that he was supposedly serving a seven-year sentence, and she had been promised by the authorities that she'd be notified well in advance of his release. Nevertheless, after being in only a short time, he was temporarily released on an eight-hour pass, and she wasn't notified. He went directly to her house and, in front of their 6- and 10- year old daughters, beat Lisa Bianco to death.In 1989, in a suburb of Los Angeles, Maria Navarro called the L. A. County Sheriff's 911 emergency line asking for help. It was her birthday and there was a party at her house, but her estranged husband, against whom she had had a restraining order, said he was coming over to kill her. She believed him, but got no sympathy from the 911 dispatcher, who said: "What do you want us to do lady, send a car to sit outside your house?" Less than half an hour after Maria hung up in frustration, one of her guests called the same 911 line and informed the dispatcher that the husband was there and had already killed Maria and one other guest. Before the cops arrived, he had killed another.DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 109 S.Ct. 998, 1989 (1989)Injured party was a boy who was beaten and permanently injured by his father. He claimed a special relationship existed because local officials knew he was being abused, indeed they had "specifically proclaimed by word and deed [their] intention to protect him against that danger," [7] but failed to remove him from his father's custody.The Court in DeShaney held that no duty arose because of a "special relationship," concluding that Constitutional duties of care and protection only exist as to certain individuals, such as incarcerated prisoners, involuntarily committed mental patients and others restrained against their will and therefore unable to protect themselves. "The affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State's knowledge of the individual's predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf."Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Department, 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990).Ms. Balistreri, beaten and harassed by her estranged husband, alleged a "special relationship" existed between her and the Pacifica Police Department, to wit, they were duty-bound to protect her because there was a restraining order against her husband. The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that DeShaney limited the circumstances that would give rise to a "special relationship" to instances of custody. Because no such custody existed in Balistreri, the Pacifica Police had no duty to protect her, so when they failed to do so and she was injured they were not liable.McKee v. City of Rockwall, Texas, 877 F.2d409 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct.727 (1990).Plaintiff claimed she was injured because the police refused to make an arrest following a domestic violence call. She claimed their refusal to arrest was due to a city policy of gender- based discrimination. In that case the U. S. District Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that "no constitutional violation [occurred] when the most that can be said of the police is that they stood by and did nothing..."Castle Rock v. Gonzales (04-278) 545 U.S. 748 (2005)The Supreme Court ruled that the police did not have a constitutional duty to protect a person from harm, even a woman who had obtained a court-issued protective order against a violent husband making an arrest mandatory for a violation.The decision, with an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia and dissents from Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, overturned a ruling by a federal appeals court in Colorado. The appeals court had permitted a lawsuitto proceed against a Colorado town, Castle Rock, for the failure of the police to respond to a woman's pleas for help after her estranged husband violated a protective order by kidnapping their three young daughters, whom he eventually killed.Source Materials:Police Have No Duty to Protect Individuals by Peter Kaslerhttp://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/courtrulingsonpoliceprotection.php#axzz3XC8XgnOgNO AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO PROTECT USSmarter Legal Research | CasetextLawLink - The Attorney NetworkLeagle.com | The place to find U. S. Law, Lawyers and OpinionsCourtListener

It depends…live in a box, don’t spend any money, and it’s cheap. Instead of trying to guess how you’ll spend yourself, here are some pros and cons, good and bad points, and general info about living in Las Vegas from someone who has lived here a little while and lived throughout the world (Germany, Italy, Korea, Belgium), the US (Florida, Georgia, Texas, California, Nebraska, Mississippi) and the desert southwest (Arizona).EmploymentI’m on my third employer since moving to the Las Vegas valley. With the idea that the lower cost of living as compared to California comes lower corporate cost of living indexes as compared to the rest of the US, so national employers don’t always have the best compensation packages here. I’m fortunate, my current employer is based on the east coast (NoVA) and doesn’t adjust wages for out-of-market locations as there are so few of us there, so I’m pretty happy with that, but the other two companies did not have market adjustments based on “ground truth” but only large-scale economic factors such as housing costs (see below) and some basic generic living expenses. It’s easy to find work if you’ve got either the education or the experience in what companies out here look for. Check the job boards for what’s hot here before moving out thinking you’ll work a gaming table and make $500K a year off of tips because you’re a great comedian or your bust should be in the Louvre.HousingHome prices are reasonable, but the market is volatile. Depending on the part of town, cost per square foot can fluctuate wildly, and even within similar parts of the town, being in a planned community can significantly increase the costs - but also leads to (hopefully) more stable resale values. There are substantial portions of town that are gated, master planned communities. This restricts your ability to drive around and see the neighborhoods without a realtor or coordinating with an individual seller. There are many areas with custom multi-million dollar homes, especially on the west side/north west inside the CC-215 beltway, where this is not a problem, but variable zoned land, lack of HOA rules, and utility and drainage issues lead to some interesting home clusters. There are quite a few horse ranches as well, and while Las Vegas doesn’t have a huge problem with flies and mosquitoes, the more livestock, waste, and standing water, the more of a problem you’ll have.Figuring out what houses really cost can be a problem. There are still more foreclosures in Las Vegas than the national average and there is still a lot of foreclosed inventory that banks are releasing slowly in order to keep the market from getting thrown out of whack. (Finally, the banks do something smart.) So when you see housing cost averages, make sure they don’t include foreclosed or short-sale properties as those could radically lower the average home price and lead to sticker shock when you first show up.The foreclosures and housing bubble were real here in Las Vegas. Pull up the history of a home on Zillow and for new construction between 2003 and 2008, you’ll see the vast majority had at least one “sale to bank” between 2010 and 2012. Homes in my area sold new in 2005 for around $500K. They’re just now hitting the low-to-mid $300K’s in recovery; most were under $200K as foreclosures in 2011. The good news is the dry weather keeps the homes in excellent condition. Bonus: there’s not really a termite problem to speak of unlike many desert locations - even termites have trouble surviving here. Anecdotally, homes are going for $10K-$15K minimum over the “Zestimate” on the Zillow site - it just can’t keep up with the market here.Schools (K-12)They suck. Look it up. Bloated administration, apathy running deep with administrators, teachers, and students. Sports > academics. Heck, everything > academics. If you can, put your kids in a private school. If not, work hard to show them that there’s a payoff to independent study, reading, and developing a strong work ethic.Schools (vocational/community college)There are some good nursing schools, The College of Southern Nevada (CSN) has several conveniently located campuses, and there are vocational and service industry academies. The situation with this level of learning isn’t too bad.UNLVThe local high school students have nicknamed it “U Never Leave Vegas”. They’re opening up a medical school and are one of two accredited 4-year institutions that offer degrees in hotel and restaurant management (Northern Arizona University is the other) and this may be dated information, but last I heard it was only these 2.CrimeWell, if the students aren’t motivated, the criminals are. I think all but one ZIP code (Summerlin?) had crime rates above the national average for 2015. We were on track early this year for 11 homicides per 100,000, but that’s leveled off to a more respectable 6/100,000 or so, helped by our record-setting 16 days this July/August without a homicide. Drugs are right there if you need them, opiod abuse is rampant, and there are enough random acts of violence that you just never know what’s going to happen in specific parts of town. Here’s a tip: if you see a street sign that says “Maryland”, you’re where you shouldn’t be. (It’s almost a joke to side bet on the over/under when there’s a homicide to see how many blocks it is from Maryland Parkway between I-515 and the Airport.)The good news is the Las Vegas Metro PD keeps The Strip and Fremont Street areas very, very safe. They also have a very high solve rate on homicides and violent crime. So yeah, you might get killed, but odds are they’ll figure out who did it. So you’ll have that going for you.PotThe good news is that all of this crime will magically disappear because you can now buy recreational marijuana if you’re 21. (There have been 29 attempted burglaries, burglaries, robberies, or assaults on marijuana “dispensaries” in the last 12 months.) If you live here, cool, you can mellow out in your domicile. But you won’t, most likely, because the prices are higher than on the street (or so I’m told) and they’re in the crap areas of town. But you could, you know, if you wanted to. And if your employer let you. And if your wife didn’t give you that look when you mention it.SportsThe NHL decided one failing franchise in the desert (Phoenix Coyotes) wasn’t enough and thus the Las Vegas Golden Knights were born. They have the dumb name because the owner is a former US Army alumnus who wanted to name them after the Army’s parachute team, the Black Knights, but thank God the US Army said, “No, thank you, we own the copyright on that.” I love ice hockey, so I’ll go, but only for single games so I can deconflict with other major events on the strip as they will play in the T Mobile area smashed between I-15 and The Strip (Las Vegas Blvd).The NFL, not wanting to be left out, voted to let the Oakland Raiders move to Las Vegas. We’re crazy enough to be Raiders fans, but I don’t know that there’s going to be enough of the 2 million or so people who will be crazy enough to pay for season tickets. My gut feeling is 1/2 the stands will be full of the visiting team’s drunk/hungover fans who are combining a Vegas trip with a road game experience. More Backpage ads between September and January, I suppose. Traffic will be just short of apocalyptic on NFL game days.There’s NASCAR and NHRA tracks, the NBA Summer League, boxing, MMA, and there’s talk of bringing Formula 1 to the valley as a road circuit. That I would pay to see…like book a room in a resort hotel on the Strip, do the parties, spend the week just soaking it in. Fingers crossed.UtilitiesResidential natural gas for cooking and home heating is cheap; gas for your car is not. And while natural gas and (oddly enough) residential water prices are low, electricity rates are high unless your only other comparison is California or an overseas country, which is bizarre given that solar and hydroelectric power comprise the majority of of residential power sources. There are some that attribute this to the opening up of power utilities and the large casino corporations have been paying “exit fees” to the state-run utility in order to purchase power on the open market, thus reducing the subsidies for residential power costs. (When I first lived here it wasn’t unusual for your kWH price to drop every quarter or so. Nothing like that over the past few years.)TaxesThere isn’t an income tax, but there are two annual taxes that come as a surprise to some folks: the GST and the Supplemental GST. The GST, or General Services Tax, and it’s supplemental cousin, are assessed annually when you register or renew a vehicle registration. The assessment is based off of the (depreciated) MSRP of your vehicle and the depreciated value itself. For a 2015 BMW 3 series, with an MSRP of around $44K when new, this was $711 the first year, still in the mid $600’s last year. Some people see this as a vehicle registration fee, but vehicle registration is only $32…but you can’t register without the GST/S-GST, unless…Veteran’s Benefits/CareThe Southern Nevada VA Health Care system is pretty good. There are 6 or 7 primary care clinics in the Las Vegas/Henderson area, a brand-new VA hospital was built in northern North Las Vegas, very accessible from the highway, and the SNVA works with Veteran’s Choice in the event they can’t provide the care in a timely manner.For veterans with individual ratings that mathematically add up to 100% - not using the VA’s combined rating chart - Nevada offers a tax credit towards either property or the GST/S-GST that is collected when vehicles are registered or renewed. For the current fiscal year (the fiscal year starts on 1 July in NV) this was $1,365. You have the option of applying towards one or the other tax, but not both. I applied the entire amount to the GST/S-GST and so paid less than $100 to register 3 late model vehicles.For veterans with a combined rating of 100%, you are entitled to two (2) Disabled Veteran license plates that permit parking in disabled/handicapped parking spaces, the tax credit, and free parking at all paid public parking locations - including McCarran Airport.Dining & FoodThe vast majority of the non-strip restaurants are national chains and even the mom & pop places can be total crap. (I have yet to find good Italian food off the strip, if you know where to find it, please message me. Same for excellent legit Asian massage - if you know, message.) There’s chain restaurant after chain restaurant with 1 or 2 diamonds in the rough. One high point is that all of the Nevada-Style Taverns (read: local gambling spots with video poker and slots, a restaurant, and bar) are open 24/7, so you can always get food, and it’s not bad food, it’s just more “American” style or comfort food. Now, for Asian food? Jackpot. Las Vegas’ Chinatown and concentrations/clusters of Korean, Japanese, Vietnamese, and Thai restaurants, supermarkets (fresh giant prawns even!), and shops are a Godsend. It’s no Koreatown or Chinatown in LA or SFO, but it’s pretty damn good, and very reasonably priced. There are also some smaller markets and butcher shops, but given the volume of what’s brought into Las Vegas and the way the city is arranged most of the food will be at higher-volume retailers. (Yes, there’s good Mexican food, it’s Nevada.) Strip restaurants can be hit or miss depending on whether they’re serious (Wolfgang Puck) or kitsch (Guy Fieri). It’s hard to trust the reviews because so much of it comes “baked in” with the overall experience most tourists are having. Myself, I now just pick one, order what I like, and hope for the best…and it’s usually excellent. (I’ve lived in Seoul, Korea; Germany, Italy, & Belgium; Monterey, CA, and other places with pretty good dining, Las Vegas holds up - on the strip and for Asian food.) Russian and Balkan food can be more difficult to pin down. There’s an excellent no-kidding German-run German bakery with 2 1/2 locations (one is pickup only).ShoppingWhat you can’t get locally you can order and odds are it’ll be shipped from a local fulfillment center. The lack of decent indoor malls is odd given the weather, but the open-layout centers are quite nice. If you do need the “mall” experience, the one on the strip has just about everything and many stores have local discounts. Even the “premium” outlet malls now have Local’s Night with gifts, free valet parking, and coupon books. There are really nice high end and ultra high end shops in the major hotel resort casinos. The Shops at the Forum (Caesar’s Palace) and The Shops at the Venetian (The Venetian) are superb.Yeah, there are brothels outside of Clark Count on the other side of the Spring Mountains. Google it, I’m not going into it here as that kind of shopping’s not my thing.TrafficThere’s an almost-beltway for Las Vegas. The Air Force base and some mountains in the north east prevent extending a loop from I-515 to the new CC-215 highway, but it’s close enough with US 95 and the Summerlin Parkway that you can avoid the downtown and strip traffic if you don’t mind a few extra miles at regular speed as opposed to a shorter trip with some stop-and-go and slowdown. (It takes the same amount of time in most cases, so you’re balancing frustration vs. distance.)Right now, I think just about every single major highway or intersection is under construction. Maybe it just feels like it, but it’s a bit of a mess as things are re-routed to help the flow of traffic. It’s supposed to be much better when they finish…just in time for the NFL’s Raiders to get here and they’ll start all over.When there is traffic, it sucks. Las Vegas has some of the most aggressive drivers I’ve ever encountered, police presence on the highways is minimal, and almost every accident is litigated, which, as my insurance company explained to me, is why my rates doubled when I moved here.Oh, and with the high winds that are a part of the NV weather, there’s usually a fair bit of debris all over the roads. What doesn’t crack your windshield will puncture your tire.WeatherIt’s really not that bad. Okay, there are 4 months, June - September, that can just be incredibly miserable if you need to be outside, aren’t used to the heat, don’t have shade, and don’t have water. If that happens, you’ll not have to worry about it too long, because you’ll die.The reason it’s only 4 months of near-blast furnace temps and wind is because of both the elevation (most of Las Vegas is at or above 2,000 ft altitude) and the mountain range to the west. (I could be full of crap on the reasons, ask a meteorologist friend. What you don’t have one? Well, neither did I.) As the days grow shorter, the more time the city spends in the shadow of Mt. Charleston (11,916 ft) and the Spring Mountains. Oh, and the mountains, for the most part, appear to have been stripped of all soil, so there’s very little to hold the heat in once summer’s over, however, Las Vegas doesn’t experience the high diurnal temperature fluctuations that the northern part of the state does.One surprise for new residents is how cold the cold feels in the winter. While the lows may only be in the high 30’s or low 40’s, the cold, combined with the winds, lack of heat retention, and darkness will have you breaking out your old winter gear your 2nd or 3rd winter here. It’s not Scottsdale, Arizona. You’re not going to swim in November without a heated pool and it’s not a shorts-and-a-t shirt at 7 AM kind of place. There’s usually snow on Mt. Charleston from late October through late June, and this year, given the snow totals, into July.(Okay, the weather is really that bad, but only for those 4 months. 114 degrees F with a UV index of 9, 30+ MPH winds, and a sun that will cut through any amount of window tinting really sucks. But it’s only 1/3 of the year, and you do get used to it. Really, you do.)Non-Strip/Fremont Street Nightlife100’s of local places to hang out at, probably 1000’s. That’s not too bad…if you like your clothes smelling like 1,000 packs of cigarettes. Most places that are open late and cater to the nightlife crowd also have some slots, which means they can have indoor smoking. (All of the casinos have some indoor smoking, some have better ventilation systems than others.) I had forgotten how nice it was (even as a [now reformed, relax ma, I quit] smoker) to not have your clothes stink when you get home. Alas, if you go out here, you’re probably going to have to put up with it again.The good news is, there’s hiking, day trips, a park with stocked lakes, Mt Charleston recreation areas, and more than a few festivals, dining events, beer festivals, and same type of events other cities of 2+ million people have. Las Vegas is someplace I’ve spent more time outside as the sun’s going down (summer or not) grilling, swimming, and just plain relaxing than any other place I’ve lived.But, if you do want to dance to EDM until 5 AM, stay up bleary-eyed at a blackjack table all night, or take in pulsating neon and street performers, well, we have that, too, but you can read enough about that online. One thing The Strip and Fremont Street do is make it very easy to entertain guests, although 1/2 the time it’s the first time in a long time (or ever) that I’ve been to the same place I’m “showing” them.The town is seriously lacking in real museums, particularly art and history. Fly to NYC or drive to LA. But really, would it be so difficult to have at least one decent art museum that wasn’t in some casino shop backroom (really) or showing off old neon?TravelThe good news is that flights are cheap, plentiful, are rarely delayed, and the airport is conveniently located, both in relationship to where you want your guests to be (on The Strip) and where you live (it’s at the I-15/I-215 interchange).The bad news is, if you’re not flying there, you’re driving all damn day or several damn days, to get there. LA, Anaheim, and the beach cities are 5–7 hours away depending on traffic. You won’t go there as often as you think, mostly because the 2-lane sections of I-15 between Barstow, CA, and Primm, NV, will drive you absolutely insane with the number of slow, open-mouth breathers parked in the left lane at 10 MPH under the speed limit and the other 95% of non-truck traffic which is rental cars weaving around hungover or drunk going to or from Vegas.Phoenix is 5–6 hours away, but no one has really found a good reason to go there yet. (I’m from there with family there and the drive on US-93 alternates between sheer boredom and sheer terror.)Even Grand Canyon NP is over 4 hours away. There’s what’s left of Lake Meade (1 hour), Zion NM (2 1/2 hours), Death Valley (3 hours), Sedona (4 hours), see where I’m going with this?You wanna leave Vegas? You’re going to fly, but it’s not going to cost you much. (SFO is 10–12 hours by car, have fun.)EntertainmentShows are cool, sometimes, and there are pretty good discounts for locals for most attractions. Concerts, however, are a different story. For example, I bought two tickets for The Weeknd’s show in Las Vegas, $340/each, open seating/floor (New Year’s Eve Eve, was worth it). If I had the time it would have been cheaper to fly to Phoenix, have a rental car, stay 2 nights in a hotel, see The Weeknd there ($30 cheap seats), and still have money left over. Concerts, because they’re a Big Deal when they’re in Vegas, can be over-the-top expensive. On the positive side, the venues are typically smaller, more personal and intimate, and the performers hit the city while they’re in town, and the clubs will usually announce if they’ve got a talent scheduled to be there. But holy crap are they expensive. Most of the reason taxes are low for residents is because everything tourist-related is taxed to the edge of discouraging tourists. (I’m good with that by the way.) Again, a positive note, everyone comes here, some headline for a while, and if you combine a concert with a family or friend visit, it’s pretty cool to actually “act like a tourist” in your own city.GamblingYeah, some locals are heavy into this. I was honestly surprised at first. I would have thought that the industry wouldn’t pee in its own pool (so to speak), but they’ll take it all if they can get it. I remember my first visit to a car dealership to have routine maintenance done on a Saturday. There was a TV on in the customer area, some coffee, couches, etc. (Audi, they do things right, it’s not a McDonald’s play area atmosphere like at a Toyota dealer.) I was watching the CBS national game and a guy walked up and said, “What’s the score?” I told him I wasn’t really paying attention and he commented on the spread, how much he had on what, what prop bets he had taken, etc. Then another customer chimed in with his bets, and so on. I couldn’t believe it. Now I have local casino apps on my phone giving me the to-the-minute money line on games. I don’t bet much, less than $100 a year, but I still have the information handy.MiscellaneousA one day class, background check, and $93 will get you a concealed carry permit for your pistol. No special additional checks needed otherwise. You can open carry just about anywhere. (Screw you, Buffalo Wild Wings and Levi’s Jeans.)The Clark County shooting range is the largest municipal range in the US. They even have a .50 cal range. On quiet Sunday mornings I can just barely hear muted “pop pop pop” coming from the range while having my coffee on the patio; it’s soothing.If that’s not your scene, jack up your 4 x 4 phallus extender so your bumpers don’t protect regular car owners and your headlights blind everyone and head out into the desert for a full day of off-roading. I hear it’s nice. Dirt bikes and ATV’s and Utes are out there as well.Fishing and boating on both Lake Meade and the Colorado River are popular pastimes as are hiking, photography, camping, and hunting.Being a local has almost unfair advantages over tourists when it comes to, er, “hooking up” with tourists. If you’re single, or if it’s just your thing, male or female, you’ll love the “dating” scene. Serious, more meaningful relationships are, as I’m led to believe by my coworkers, just not worth it. When you’re ready to settle down move away, then come back after you are. Their words, not mine.After a few years, you’ll yearn to see real, natural, lush, green vegetation. You’ll kill to see rivers flowing with regular banks of grass, trees, and dirt instead of the cold, dead, lifelessness of Lake Meade and the Colorado River. You’ll start to forget about those “hot” summer days by the pond when it was almost 90 (can you believe it?!?!) and you’re just relaxing in the shade of a tree.Then you’ll go stand in line in the air conditioning at the Venetian to ride a fake gondola around a chlorinated “canal” with a bunch of fat tourists wearing Crocs and talking about how they were this close to winning big the night before. You’ll smile - smile smugly inside - sit back and enjoy the artificial breeze before heading back home.(I’d leave, but Vegas just fits.)