Declaration Of Ownership On Behalf Of A Body Corporate: Fill & Download for Free

So here’s the Second Amendment, as ratified:A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.In plainer, more modern English, this Amendment might read:Because having a well-armed and well-trained civilian population is necessary for that population to provide for its own security, the people of this country have a right to own, possess, carry and use weapons suitable for that purpose, and that right must not be limited.You’ll notice it gets a lot more wordy; this is because I broke out the connotations of several highly meaningful terms, which are commonly misinterpreted. The 27 words of the Second Amendment were, despite many assertions from modern scholars, very carefully chosen over multiple rounds of debate and drafting in both chambers of Congress for conciseness of language. This was for a variety of reasons, including that this document would have to be copied many times in a combination of hand-copying and typesetting in order to distribute it to the States for ratification.The version of the right to keep and bear arms (commonly abbreviated as the “RKBA”) that became the Second Amendment has its roots in the Virginia Declaration of Rights, penned by George Mason in 1776 shortly after Virginia joined with the other 12 American colonies declaring their independence from Britain. This Declaration stated, in part:That a well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defense of a free state; that standing armies, in time of peace, should be avoided as dangerous to liberty; and that in all cases the military should be under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power.A decade later, Mason was one of only three delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 that refused to sign the Constitution it produced. His dissent was largely on the grounds that the Constitution did not provide a similar enumeration and protection of basic rights of the people as his own State, and thus that a Federal government created and empowered by the Constitution could too easily overstep its bounds.Fellow Framer and Virginian James Madison, often considered alongside Alexander Hamilton as “the father of the Constitution”, took these concerns to heart, and incorporated the bulk of the Virginia Declaration into what was originally designed as an entirely new Article, but was eventually split into twelve separate proposed Amendments to the Constitution, ten of which were ratified to become our Bill of Rights (an eleventh Amendment, not ratified at the time, would be resurrected by a UT Austin political science student in a 1982 term paper, and was eventually ratified in 1992 as the 27th Amendment. But that’s a whole other answer to a whole other question).Mason’s dissent on these grounds was not alone; notably, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania also produced a missive to Congress and anyone else who would listen, “The Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania”, aka the “Pennsylvania Dissent”. Their version of the RKBA is derived from the Virginia Declaration, but mixes in language from the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights (“Part The First” of the Massachusetts Constitution).The Massachusetts version reads:The people have a right to keep and to bear arms for the common defence. And as, in time of peace, armies are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be maintained without the consent of the legislature; and the military power shall always be held in an exact subordination to the civil authority, and be governed by it.The Pennsylvania Dissent split the difference, and also went into more detail as to why the right was important, and what exceptions, if any, existed to the protection of the right against government control:That the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and their own state, or the United States, or for the purpose of killing game; and no law shall be passed for disarming the people or any of them, unless for crimes committed, or real danger of public injury from individuals; and as standing armies in the time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up; and that the military shall be kept under strict subordination to and be governed by the civil powers.A statement of the right to keep and bear arms that is closely related to either the Massachusetts or Pennsylvania versions is found in the constitutions of 23 states. So it’s not exactly unknown in legal circles, though SCOTUS, not being bound by any one state’s constitution in the general case, tends to consider their language primarily for educational and historical purposes, unless a provision of the state constitution is the subject of the question before the Court.So, while the 27 words ratified in 1791 represent the authoritative legal form of the right to keep and bear arms, in the interest of knowing what the RKBA actually means in today’s plain language, it’s important to consider these alternate statements of the right, written by the figures involved in debating it.There are some very common threads across all of these statements of the right; let’s examine a few in plain language.The right to keep and bear arms is a matter of defense and security. This is very plain from a reading of any of these versions of the RKBA, specifically stating that the right exists for this reason. It’s also apparently very important, given that few if any other enumerated rights in the Bill had any reason given for why they were being recognized and protected in the statement of the right itself.Many gun control advocates argue that “you can keep your hunting and target shooting firearms, therefore we are not infringing the Second Amendment”. That is a fallacy. The Second Amendment, and other statements of the RKBA, make it plain that the right exists so that people can provide for their own security, not just for their recreation or subsistence.The use of a professional, full-time armed force for domestic defense and security is a dangerous concept. The Framers learned this firsthand, as the British used enlisted military soldiers for law enforcement in the years leading up to the Declaration of Independence and in cities they controlled during the Revolutionary War. This resulted in several uses of deadly force by these troops to quell riots and other protests. The fledgling United States definitely did not want a force for law enforcement to be in the military chain of command. For such a nation to defend itself against enemies foreign and domestic, then, another solution was needed.This concept that standing armies ought not to be maintained has been significantly watered down in the wake of the Civil War, when a fundamental problem inherent in state-level organization and control of the country’s military forces was illustrated. It was accelerated with the mechanization of war in the Industrial Age, which made the materiel of war much more complex, requiring expensive upkeep of expensive armor and aircraft, and in-depth training of their operators which made them more valuable to keep around. Certainly by the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War, it was impractical not to have a sizable, professional military force to manage the materiel and support systems behind the front lines, ultimately leading to the transition to an “all-volunteer force” by the Nixon Administration. We also, over the last century or so but especially in the last 30 years, have developed a system of full-time, heavily-armed and armored forces under local control with the primary job of enforcing domestic law and order, and there are very notable cases of abuses of power within those forces.The spirit of the sentiment remains, however, as the States retain first-line control of the National Guard for their own use, and the Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the military being deployed domestically to enforce the laws of the United States by executive action alone (either Congress must expressly authorize such deployment, or the Constitution must explicitly grant the power to use military force in the situation presented, such as during a foreign invasion; the landmark Reconstruction case ex parte Millegan further defines situations in which martial law either may or must not not be imposed).The right refers to an individual’s ability to access weapons. This is most clearly illustrated in Pennsylvania’s version. The inclusion of the purpose of killing game makes the right specifically applicable to the activities of an individual person, and the declaration also specifically says that no law may disarm the people “or any of them”. While other statements of the right are not this specific, other uses of “the people” in the Constitution and Bill of Rights are at least dualist in connotation, referring to citizens of the country both as a corporate group and individually.The First Amendment, for instance, is commonly dualist in interpretation with regard to “the right[s] of the people” it contains. Religious expression, assembly and petition to government are, by nature or definition, corporate activities typically undertaken by groups of people, and are protected as such. However any single person also has the right and free choice to identify as a member of a religious or ideological group, to speak their own individual mind whether it agrees or contrasts with any such group, and to communicate directly to legislators and executives in government, unaffiliated with any corporate advocate. The Fourth Amendment, another mention of “the right of the people”, is almost universally considered a right of individual persons, and has never in any case law been predicated on identity as a member of any group smaller than that of all residents of the United States.A major tenet of the dissent in Heller v. D.C. as heard at the Circuit level, which was then brought to SCOTUS by the Solicitor General, was the idea that the 2A was a corporate right only; the right belonged to “people” in an aggregate sense, similar to the way we use the term “taxpayers” to refer to Americans in general in their capacity to foot the bill for government activities and projects. No one “taxpayer” owns or has direct and unfettered access to any specific part of public works, or military materiel, but these are produced, maintained and used for the benefit of all such taxpayers. Thus, the argument was made that the right to keep and bear arms was limited to the ownership of arms by corporate groups of people not directly controlled by the Federal government, and that exercising the right required active membership in such a group. Proponents of this argument further contend that just such a group - the National Guard - exists, and provides arms to its members as required in their duties, therefore the laws in DC restricting ownership of weapons by type and requiring secure unloaded storage at all times was not infringing the RKBA as the laws didn’t affect the National Guard.This is an incorrect interpretation, as SCOTUS unanimously agreed even among the dissents to the majority opinion. George Mason said it himself; the militia is “the whole people, except for a few public officials”, whether they identify as part of a group more specific than “Citizens of the United States” or not. Further, the National Guard, while available for use by state governments in a variety of situations, is ultimately administered by the Federal government, and the President has ultimate authority over when they’re called up and what they do where, overriding the States’ ability to do the same. They cannot, therefore, be “the militia” that Mason was talking about.The right refers to weapons, and other equipment, suitable for use in combat by an infantryman. The original idea of the RKBA was that, when called to duty, a person would bring the long gun they kept in their home, along with a store of powder, shot and flint. The ideal was the “minuteman”; a person who could be heading out their door ready for anything within 60 seconds of a messenger riding by with a call to arms.This is a major crux of the pushback against proposed bans of “military-style weapons”, usually called for with fingers pointed squarely at AR and AK pattern rifles. The entire point of the RKBA is for civilians to own weapons that wouldn’t be out of place in military combat. A common counterpoint is that the weapons of the time in which these rights were debated took about 20 seconds to reload between shots for a well-practiced rifleman. That may be, however no fighting force on the planet currently limits itself to such weapons, so the weapons suitable for combat have progressed in the same way lines of communication (protected by First and Fourth Amendments) and methods of punishment (restricted by the Eighth Amendment) have done. The enumerated rights of the people are not limited based on the advancement of technology beyond what the Framers could have considered, and Scalia specifically said as much in the Heller opinion.In fact, the weapons generally available to civilians don’t meet military specifications, because they don’t fire fast enough. U.S. v. Miller is interpreted as upholding the constitutionality of the National Firearms Act, in affirming Miller’s conviction for possessing a sawn-off shotgun, holding that such a weapon was not “suitable for military use” which is the scope of the protection of the Second Amendment. This ruling, had it been applied verbatim by the Court in deciding Heller, would have caused the entire NFA to be struck down, as every single category of restricted “Title II” weapons (including weapons capable of automatic fire, restricted as “machine guns” by the NFA) were and still are “common in military use” and thus the core of the 2A protection of the RKBA under Miller.The right assumes the individual’s ability and responsibility to be proficient in the use of that weapon. This tenet requires the general ability of citizens not only to own and possess a working firearm, but to be able to purchase ammunition and to use the firearm, shooting at a designated nonliving target for the purpose of acquiring and maintaining skill in marksmanship. As such, the RKBA naturally extends to a limitation on government’s ability to restrict the supply of ammunition, or to restrict the availability of suitable land or facilities to use as target ranges.This is another area where gun control advocates claim that the 2A is being perverted. The argument typically centers on the term “well-regulated”. When you hear “regulated” in modern conversation, the connotation is “something kept in check by a governing mechanism”, and when people or corporate groups and entities are “regulated”, the entity doing the regulation is usually an agency of the government. The argument is therefore made that the right, and those who exercise it, are subject to control at some level by some agency of the government.However, a look at documents authored around the 1790s shows the connotation of the word has shifted over 200 years, as words have a tendency to do. In the understanding of the Framers, something that was “well-regulated” was something that was prepared to do its job as designed. A “well-regulated clock” kept accurate time, a testament to the design of the machine and the skill of the watchmaker in implementing it. A “well-regulated mind” was one taught and trained to solve the problems presented to it. The concept of “making something regular”, in the sense that the preparation includes discipline and layers of control, is not incompatible with this understanding, however the control is not and cannot be the goal of regulation in itself.A “well-regulated militia”, therefore, is a militia that has the tools and training to provide “the security of a free state”. Even if we accept that the right is not totally absolute (and most people on both sides agree it isn’t), and that the ownership of a firearm carries with it a responsibility for not only proficient, but conscientious use, which is obviously being disregarded by a select few, it still does not follow that the government can ignore the Second Amendment and exercise a power it does not have over all gun owners as a result of these select few disregarding their responsibility.The right is not absolute. This one kinda goes the other way. Most 2A proponents will have openly and eagerly agreed to everything I’ve said so far. However, the idea that there is a limit, somewhere, to the public ownership and use of weapons, is problematic to supporters of the RKBA, because it invites gun control advocates to come right in and draw a line where they think that limit should be, usually somewhere between the current, already-”infringed” status of the right and not having the right at all, and call that a “compromise”.Let’s be clear; the limits of the right that the Pennsylvania Dissent mentions, that people may be disarmed “for crimes committed, or real danger of public injury from individuals”, are limits that are already in place. Proponents of the RKBA assert that the existing laws prescribing disarmament in these situations are not being enforced, and a law that isn’t enforced is a law that only people who are morally inclined to follow the law will obey. People who are inclined to ignore laws as it suits them are known as “scofflaws”, or in more absolute language, “criminals”, and they are and always have been the problem behind the use of guns in violent crime. Laws aimed at better identifying those people and forcing them to answer for breaking the law are laws generally supported by 2A proponents. Laws that primarily serve to present additional obstacles to lawful gun ownership, or that can be easily abused to disarm people who have done nothing wrong, are laws generally opposed by 2A proponents.The right is no less important today than it was in 1790. This goes beyond most written words in any form of the RKBA, suffice to say that an increasingly common argument of gun control is that we simply do not need the Second Amendment anymore, and should get rid of it.This is, again, misguided, as the reasons enumerated in the Pennsylvania Dissent are no less true today than in 1790. There were butchers selling meat that you didn’t have to hunt or slaughter yourself. There were professional law enforcers. There were very definitely professional soldiers in the US; George Washington was one of them for most of his life, first for the British, then for the Continental Army. So, you didn’t have to own a firearm in colonial or post-colonial America in order to be confident that your home, community, state or country would be defended, or that you could procure food for yourself and your family. Just as you don’t have to own a firearm to do any of the same things today. You just had to live somewhere that you could be reasonably sure someone else had the means to provide these things on your behalf.Despite that, the Framers still made it a priority to include a protection of the RKBA in the proposed Amendments, and the States still made it a priority to ratify that Amendment. Remember that the original slate had 12 Amendments, and only 10 were adopted; if any 5 states had said “no, this one’s too troublesome”, what we would call the Second Amendment would be our current Third Amendment, practically dormant for 200 years, and if the RKBA were recognized at all it would be at the state level.The right was and is recognized, because despite any substitute methods to otherwise guarantee the provision of things the RKBA enables, the RKBA was, and is, still the best method to provide many of these, especially as they relate to the individual and those closest to him.

Famous Advocate and former Attorney General of India, Lal Narayan Sinha, suggested that in Ram Janmbhumi – Babari Mosque dispute, there was need for Diety, The infant Rama to be made a Party in the disputeThe Indian judicial system treats deities as legal entities who could have legal representation in courts through the trustees or managing board in charge of the temple in which they are worshiped._____________________The deity, 'Ram Lalla Virajman', or the infant Lord Ram, through next friend and former Allahabad High Court judge Deoki Nandan Agrawal, and the Janmbhoomi (the birthplace) moved the lawsuit in 1989, seeking title right over the entire disputed property on the key ground that the land itself has the character of the deity and of a 'Juristic entity'._____________________Rama lalla virajmana / Rama lalla birajmanaRama lalla = Rama as an infantVirajmana/ birajmana = Reigning, Ruling, in power; on the throne; radiant, gleaming, effulgent_______________________________________CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 1908Order 32 of the Civil Procedure CodeORDER XXXII SUITS BY OR AGAINST MINORS AND PERSONS OF UNSOUND MIND -Rule 1 Order XXXII of Code of Civil Procedure 1908"MINOR TO SUE BY NEXT FRIEND"Every suit by a minor shall be Instituted in his name by a person who in such suit shall be called the next friend of the minor.Explanation-In this Order, "minor" means a person who has not attained his majority within the meaning of section 3 of the Indian Majority Act, 1875 (9 of 1875) where the suit relates to any of the matters mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of section 2 of that Act or to any other matter.Rule 2 Order XXXII of Code of Civil Procedure 1908"WHERE SUIT IS INSTITUTED WITHOUT NEXT FRIEND, PLAINT TO BE TAKEN OFF THE FILE"(1) Where a suit is instituted by or behalf or on behalf of a minor without a next friend, the defendant may apply to have the plaint taken off the file, with costs to be paid by the pleader or other person by whom it was presented.(2) Notice of such application shall be given to such person, and the Court, after hearing his objections (if any) may make such order in the matter as it thinks fit.2A. SECURITY TO BE FURNISHED BY NEXT FRIEND WHEN SO ORDERED(1) Where a suit has been instituted on behalf of the minor by his next friend, the Court may, at any stage of the suit, either of its own motion or on the application of any defendant, and for reasons to be recorded, order the next friend to give security for the payment of all costs incurred or likely to be incurred by the defendant.(2) Where such a suit is instituted by an indigent person, the security shall include the court-fees payable to the Government.(3) The provisions of rule 2 of Order XXV shall, so far as may be, apply to a suit where the Court makes an order under this rule directing security to be furnished.Rule 3 Order XXXII of Code of Civil Procedure 1908"GUARDIAN FOR THE SUIT TO BE APPOINTED BY COURT FOR MINOR DEFENDANT"(1) Where the defendant is a minor the Court, on being satisfied of the fact of his minority, shall appoint a proper person to be guardian for the suit for such minor.(2) An order for the appointment of a guardian for the suit may be obtained upon application in the name and on behalf of the monor or by the plaintiff.(3) Such application shall be supported by an affidavit verifying the fact that the proposed guardian has no interest in the matters in controversy in the suit adverse to that of the minor and that he is a fit person to be so appointed.(4) Order shall be made on any application under this rule except upon notice to any guardian of the minor appointed or declared by an authority competent in that behalf, or, where there is no such guardian, upon notice to the father or where there is no father or mother, to other natural guardian, of the minor, or, where there is no father, mother or other natural guardian, to the person in whose care the minor is, and after hearing any objection which may be urged on behalf of any person served with notice under this sub-rule.(4A) The Court may, in any case, if it thinks fit, issue notice under sub-rule (4) to the minor also.(5) A person appointed under sub-rule (1) to be guardian for the suit for a minor shall, unless his appointment is terminated by retirement, removal or death, continue as such throughout all proceedings arising out of the suit including proceedings in any Appellate or Revisional Court and any proceedings in the execution of a decree.Rule 3A Order XXXII of Code of Civil Procedure 1908"DECREE AGAINST MINOR NOT TO BE SET ASIDE UNLESS PREJUDICE HAS BEEN CAUSED TO HIS INTERESTS"(1) No decree passed against a minor shall be set aside merely on the ground that the next friend or guardian for the suit of the minor had an interest in the subject-matter of the suit adverse to that of the minor, but the fact that by reason of such adverse interest of the next friend or guardian for the suit, prejudice has been caused to the interests of the minor, shall be a ground for setting aside the decree.(2) Nothing in this rule shall preclude the minor from obtaining any relief available under any law by reason of the misconduct or gross negligence on the part of the next friend or guardian for the suit resulting in prejudice to the interests of the minor.Rule 4 Order XXXII of Code of Civil Procedure 1908"WHO MAY ACT AS NEXT FRIEND OR BE APPOINTED GUARDIAN FOR THE SUIT"(1) Any person who is of sound mind and has attained majority may act as next friend of a minor or as his guardian for the suit:Provided that the interest of such person is not adverse to that of the minor and that he is not, in the case of a next friend, a defendant, or, in the case of a guardian for the suit, a plaintiff.(2) Where a minor has a guardian appointed or declared by competent authority, no person other than such guardian shall act as the next friend of the minor or be appointed his guardian for the suit unless the Court considers, for reasons to be recorded, that it is for the minor’s welfare that another person be permitted to act or be appointed, as the case may be.(3) No person shall without his consent in writing be appointed guardian for the suit.(4) Where there is no other person fit and willing to act as guardian for the suit, the Court may appoint any of its officers to be such guardian, and may direct that the costs to be incurred by such officer in the performance of his duties as such guardian shall be borne either by the parties or by any one or more of the parties to the suit, or out of any fund in Court in which the minor is interested or out of the property of the minor, and may give directions for the repayment or allowance of such costs as justice and the circumstances of the case may require.Rule 5 Order XXXII of Code of Civil Procedure 1908"REPRESENTATION OF MINOR BY NEXT FRIEND OR GUARDIAN FOR THE SUIT"(1) Every application to the Court on behalf of a minor, other than an application under rule 10, sub-rule (2), shall be made by his next friend or by his guardian for the suit.(2) Every order made in a suit or on any application, before the Court in or by which a minor is in any way concerned or affected, without such minor being represented by a next friend or guardian for the suit, as the case may be, may be discharged, and, where the pleader of the party at whose instance such order was obtained knew, or might reasonably have known, the fact of such minority, with costs to be paid by such pleader.Rule 6 Order XXXII of Code of Civil Procedure 1908"RECEIPT BY NEXT FRIEND OR GUARDIAN FOR THE SUIT OF PROPERTY UNDER DECREE FOR MINOR"(1) A next friend or guardian for the suit shall not, without the leave of the Court, receive any money or other movable property on behalf of a minor either-(a) by way of compromise before decree or order, or(b) under a decree or order in favour of the minor.(2) Where the next friend or guardian for the suit has not been appointed or declared by competent authority to be guardian of the property of the minor, or, having been so appointed or declared, is under any disability known to the Court to receive the money or other movable property, the Court shall, if it grants him leave to receive the property, require such security and give such directions as will, in its opinion, sufficiently protect the property from waste. and ensure its proper application:Provided that the Court may, for reasons to be recorded, dispense with such security while granting leave to the next friend or guardian for the suit to receive money or other movable property under a decree or order where such next friend or guardian-(a) is the manager of a Hindu undivided family and the decree or order relates to the property business of the family; or(b) is the parent of the minor.Rule 7 Order XXXII of Code of Civil Procedure 1908"AGREEMENT OR COMPROMISE BY NEXT FRIEND OR GUARDIAN FOR THE SUIT"(1) No next friend or guardian for the suit shall, without the leave of the Court, expressly recorded in the proceedings, enter into any agreement or compromise on behalf of a minor with reference to the suit in which he acts as next friend or guardian.(1A) An application for leave under sub-rule (1) shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the next friend or the guardian for the suit, as the case may be, and also, if the minor is represented by a pleader, by the certificate of the pleader, to the effect that the agreement or compromise proposed is, in his opinion, for the benefit of the minor:Provided that the opinion so expressed, whether in the affidavit or in the certificate shall not preclude the Court from examining whether the agreement or compromise proposed is for the benefit of the minor.(2) Any such agreement or compromise entered into without the leave of the Court so recorded shall be voidable against all parties other than the minor.Rule 8 Order XXXII of Code of Civil Procedure 1908"RETIREMENT OF NEXT FRIEND"(1) Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, a next friend shall not retire without first procuring a fit person to be put in his place and giving security for the costs already incurred.(2) The application for the appointment of a new next friend shall be supported by an affidavit showing the fitness of the person proposed and also that he has no interest adverse to that of the minor.________________________STAGES OF CAPITAL: LAW, CULTURE, AND MARKET GOVERNANCE IN LATE COLONIAL INDIA By RITU BIRLA, provides a fascinating account of how British laws and financial practices were adapted to India, she puts this development in the wider context of the evolution of the trust in Victorian Britain. These roots might lie in Indian tradition, but it was the British who gave them explicit legal form in the 19th century.The idea of donating wealth on behalf of beneficiaries, but administered by third party trustees, had been developed by landed aristocrats in the 18th century but “it was in the next century that it came to be appropriated by the burgeoning middle class, especially the commercially astute and upwardly mobile business and professional sectors,” writes Birla.The Industrial Revolution had given these sectors new wealth, and charitable donations, often with a religious angle, were one way to deploy the wealth to gain status. Trusts were the mechanism for this, so it was natural enough that the British sought to replicate the same pattern in India, especially as native entrepreneurs started making money and also sought to increase their status.But Birla notes that there were long-standing Indian practices of giving donations, which existed within a web of community and religious associations, and these didn’t always sit easily with British models. With temples in particular, the links were complex, involving nuances of caste and community and also the practice of many merchants of treating temples as unofficial treasuries, where money could be kept, but also withdrawn when needed, even if it angered the priests who depended on that money.When these complexities met British laws it usually ended up in Court. And as British judges dealt with increasing disputes over temple property, they hit on the idea of treating THE DEITY AS A LEGAL PERSON in whom ownership could rest. At one stroke this avoided having to sift through all the claims of tradition, while also neatly appearing to respect Indian sentiments by treating the idols as living persons.In 1869 the Privy Council, the judges who made up the highest court of appeal in the British Empire decided the case of MAHARANI SHIBESSOUREE V. MOTHOORANATH ACHARJO by declaring that the shebait, the manager of the deity, could only act as a trustee on behalf of the deity. In 1875, in another case, the Privy Council articulated that the shebait had to act “as the manager of an infant heir.”And in 1887, in what is called THE DAKOR TEMPLE CASE, the Bombay High Court finally stated explicitly that the “Hindu idol is a juridical subject and the pious idea that it embodies is given the status of a legal person.” As Birla notes, the time was ripe, since this was just a year after the Indian Income Tax Act was passed which allowed exemptions for religious or public charitable purposes.By 1925 this principle was established enough for the Privy Council in London to sum it all up by ruling, in the case of PRAMATHA NATH MULLICK VS. PRADYUMNA KUMAR MULLICK that “the Hindu idol is, according to long established authority, founded upon the religious customs of the Hindus, and the recognition thereof by the Courts of Law, a ‘juristic entity’.” And it repeated the comparison with the trustee for an infant heir; the idols were, in law, infants who would never grow up.Perhaps in response to this, the following years were to see an explosion of cases where deities went to court. In 1934 the Times of India (ToI) reported on how THE DEITY AT THE BADRINATH TEMPLE had won a claim of Rs54, 000 (a huge sum at that time) against THE TRUST OF RANI GOMTI BIBI OF ALLAHABAD, which had not delivered on promised donations.In 1934 ToI reported on how Shri Thakoreji (Krishna), installed as an idol in several temples of the Vallabhacharya Vaishnav sect in Bombay had won an injunction against the sale of property donated by family whose patriarch had died, leaving an heir who was alleged to be “wasting and mismanaging the properties”. The heir argued that the properties were his, but the court sided with THE LORD.Deities didn’t always win. In 1937 a lady named ANANDIBAI VAMANRAO BARVE in Dahanu near Bombay filed a case against LORD MARUTI, alleging his devotees were performing religious ceremonies on LAND SHE HAD INHERITED, AND WERE OBJECTING TO HER BUILDING A WALL ON IT; two years later ToI reported that she had won her case, and the Lord and his devotees had to withdraw.Deities could also fight against each other. In 1938 ToI reported on a suit where “rival claims have been made on behalf of THE DEITIES SHRI RANCHODJI AND SHRI GOPAlji, to the ownership of a house in which the latter is worshipped.” Shri Ranchodji alleged that he had allowed Shri Gopalji to install his idol in his own house after Shri Gopalji’s temple was washed away in a flood, and now he was trying to usurp it.The post-Independence period saw further developments in the concept, not always to the benefit of deities. In 1969, for example, the Supreme Court upheld a decision first made by an income tax tribunal in Calcutta, which had decided that if DEITIES WERE INDIVIDUALS THEN THEY COULD PAY INCOME TAX. And in 1999 the Supreme Court again upheld THE PRINCIPLE THAT DEITIES COULD OWN PROPERTY, EVEN GOING TO THE EXTENT OF SPECIFYING HOW THE DEITY COULD BE CONSECRATED.Most famous of all, was the case OF THE PATHUR NATARAJA STATUE, which had been stolen from a temple in Tamil Nadu, and sold abroad to the Bumper Development Corporation. The company had sent it to the British Museum for restoration, from where it was seized by Scotland Yard in 1991. When a case was filed by the Indian government for restitution of the idol, LORD SHIVA WAS CITED AS ONE OF THE PLAINTIFFS.According to a report in ToI the company took issue with this: “Bumper’s plea was that the courts of Britain ought not to allow a Hindu god to sue here. They claimed that the sovereign (the Queen) was the highest power in the UK, and that this was, anyway, a Christian kingdom.” Rather magnificently, the COURT REPLIED THAT HINDUISM WAS PRACTICED IN THE UK TOO, AND SO LORD SHIVA COULD REMAIN AS A PLAINTIFF.Yet this period has also seen deities as persons appearing in more controversial contexts, most notably in the Ayodhya Ram Mandir case. And well before such painful controversies developed, doubts had been expressed about this concept. As far back as 1931 S.C.Bagchi, the principal of University Law College, Calcutta had delivered a series of lectures, later collected into a book titled JURISTIC PERSONALITY OF HINDU DEITIES, where he detailed his scepticism with the idea.Bagchi first establishes what is meant by a ‘juristic person’ and then cites a number of Sanskrit texts to help understand the idea of the deity in Hindu scripture: “There is so much anthropomorphism, mixed up with mysticism, in the Vedic conception of the deities that an entity of the type contemplated in the Vedas is not of any use in the jural world.”Bagchi considers the convenience of the argument of vesting the property with the idol, but then suggests a more progressive option: “One may naturally ask whether the community itself, for whose spiritual benefit the institution was founded and endowed, may not more appropriately be regarded as a corporate body, forming the juristic person in whom the properties of the institution are vested.”Bagchi’s argument seems to expose to 19th century creation of idols as juristic personalities as a legal fudge, devised by British jurists as a way of getting out of the tedious process of sorting out the claims of various Indian parties, with their complexities of caste and community practices. It is convenient and flattering to devotees, but it remains a fudge, with problems that will only show up with time.What is happening now might seem to support his case. A legal concept that was devised in a fairly narrow context of property rights and trusts, is now extending into areas like privacy and fundamental rights, which simply expose further problems.If deities pay tax, can they claim the right to vote, and if so, then could they run for political office? How can they claim to be celibate when, as perpetual legal minors, the issue of sex should not arise at all? And at what point does this entanglement of Hindu gods with such material issues start seeming like an offence to their spiritual role? Deities as juristic people might seem like a quaint part of Indian jurisprudence, but its consequences may not be quite as pleasant.

Please find below the basic procedure for Incorporation of a Company under Companies Act, 2013:1. Obtain Digital SignaturesNowadays various document prescribed under the Companies Act, 2013, are required to be filed with the digital signature of the Managing Director or Director or Manager or Secretary of the Company, therefore, it is compulsorily required to Obtain a Digital Signature Certificate from authorized DSC issuing authority for at least one director to sign the E-forms related to incorporate like form INC.1 and other documents.2. Obtain Director Identification Number [Section 153]As per 153 of the Companies Act, 2013, every individual intending to be appointed as director of a company shall make an application for allotment of Director Identification Number in form DIR.3 to the Central Government in such form and manner and along with such fees as may be prescribed.Therefore, before submission of e-Form INC.1 for availability of name, all the directors of the proposed company must ensure that they are having DIN and if they are not having DIN, it should be first obtained.3. Name availability for proposed companyAs per section 4(4) read with Rule-9 of Companies (Incorporation) Rules, 2014, application for the reservation/availability of name shall be in Form no. INC.1 along with prescribed fee of Rs. 1,000/-. In selection of Company name should be in accordance with name guidelines given in Rule-8 of Companies (Incorporation) Rules, 2014.Note: MCA has prescribed certain rules for name availability so it is advisable to check guidelines for the same before applying for name. Refer Rule-8 of Companies (Incorporation) Rules, 2014.After approval of name ROC will issue a Name availability letter w.r.t. approval for availability of name for a proposed company.Validity of Name approved by ROC: As per section 4(5), maximum time for which name will be available has been prescribed in the law itself under section 4(5). The name will be valid for a period of 60 Days from the date on which the application for Reservation was made.Note: The applicant cannot start business or enter into any agreement, contract, etc. in the name of the proposed company until and unless a certificate of registration is issued by the registrar of companies as per the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013 and the rules made there under.4. Preparation of the Memorandum of Association (MOA) and Articles of Association (AOA)rafting of the MOA and AOA is generally a step subsequent to the availability of name made by the Registrar. It should be noted that the main objects should match with the objects shown in e-Form INC.1. These two documents are basically the charter and internal rules and regulations of the company. Therefore, it must be drafted with utmost care and with the advice of the experts and the other object clause should be drafted in a very broader sense.As per section 4(6) the memorandum of a company shall be in respective forms specified in Tables A, B, C, D and E in Schedule I as may be applicable to such company.As per section 5(6) the articles of a company shall be in respective forms specified in Tables F, G, H, I and J in Schedule I as may be applicable to such company.5. Application for incorporation of a private companyAs per Rule-12 of Companies (Incorporation) Rules, 2014, application for incorporation of a private and Public company, with the Registrar, within whose jurisdiction the registered office of the company is proposed to be situated, shall be filed in Form no. INC 7 [Rule 12 to 18] along with Form no. INC.22 for situation of registered office of the Company, (as the case selected in form no. INC 7) and DIR -12 with the following attachments:Form no. INC 7 Attachments: (Read with Section 7 of Companies Act, 2013)1. Memorandum of Association as per Table A of schedule I2. Articles of association as per Table F of Schedule I3. Declaration in Form No. INC-8 by Professionals. (As per Rule-14 of Companies (Incorporation) Rules, 2014, A declaration in the prescribed form by an advocate, a CA, CMA or CS in practice who is engaged in the formation of the company, and by a person named in the articles as a director, manager or secretary of the company, that all the requirements of this Act and the rules made there under in respect of registration and matters precedent or incidental thereto have been complied with;)4. Affidavit from each of the subscriber to the Memorandum in Form No. INC-9 as per Rule-15 of Companies (Incorporation) Rules, 2014, (an affidavit from each of the subscribers to the memorandum and from persons named as the first directors, if any, in the articles that he is not convicted of any offence in connection with the promotion, formation or management of any company, or that he has not been found guilty of any fraud or misfeasance or of any breach of duty to any company under this Act or any previous company law during the preceding five years and that all the documents filed with the Registrar for registration of the company contain information that is correct and complete and true to the best of his knowledge and belief;)5. Proof of residential address (the address for correspondence till its registered office is established;)6. For verification of signature of subscribers [Pursuant to rule 16 (1)(q) of companies (Incorporation) Rules, 2014 in form no. INC – 107. NOC in case there is change in the promoters (first subscribers to Memorandum of Association)8. Proof of Identity (the particulars of name, including surname or family name, residential address, nationality and such other particulars of every subscriber to the memorandum and the particulars of the persons mentioned in the articles as the first directors of the company along with proof of identity, as may be prescribed, and in the case of a subscriber being a body corporate, such particulars as may be prescribed;)9. Entrenched Articles of Association, if any.Note: Where the articles contain the provisions for entrenchment, the company shall give notice to the Registrar of such provisions in Form No. INC.7, as the case may be, along with the fee as provided in the Companies (Registration offices and fees) Rules, 2014 at the time of incorporation of the company.10. PAN Card (in case of Indian national)11. Copy of certificate of incorporation of the foreign body corporate and proof of registered office address12. Certified true copy of board resolution/consent by all the partners authorizing to subscribe to MOA13. Optional attachment, if any14. Form no. DIR.12:As per Rule-17 of Companies (Incorporation) Rules, 2014, the particulars of each person mentioned in the articles as first director of the company and his interest in other firms or bodies corporate along with his consent to act as director of the company shall be filed in Form No.DIR-12 along with the fee as provided in the Companies (Registration offices and fees) Rules, 2014. Along with the above details in the Form no.INC.7, Form no.DIR 12 to be filed with the following attachments:Attachments:Declaration by first director in Form INC-9 is mandatory to attach in case of a new company.Declaration of the appointee Director, in Form DIR-2;Interest in other entities of director it is mandatory to attach in case number of entities entered is more than one.Optional attachment(s), if any15. Form no. INC 22:As per Rule 25 of Companies (Incorporation) Rules, 2014, verification of registered office shall be filed in Form No.INC.22 along with the fee.Section 12(2) of the Companies Act, 2013 states that the Company shall furnish to the Registrar verification of its registered office within a period of thirty days of its incorporation in such manner as may be prescribed.Section 12(4) of the Companies Act, 2013 states that Notice of every change of the situation of the registered office, verified in the manner prescribed, after the date of incorporation of the company, shall be given to the Registrar within fifteen days of the change, who shall record the same.Along with the above details in Form No. INC.7, Form no.DIR.22 to be filed with the following attachments:Attachments:Proof of Registered Office address (Conveyance/Lease deed/Rent Agreement along with the rent receipts) etc.; or(the notarized copy of lease / rent agreement in the name of the company along with a copy of rent paid receipt not older than one month; or the authorization from the owner or authorized occupant of the premises along with proof of ownership or occupancy authorization, to use the premises by the company as its registered office); andCopies of the utility bills as mentioned above (not older than two months) (the proof of evidence of any utility service like telephone, gas, electricity, etc. depicting the address of the premises in the name of the owner or document, as the case may be, which is not older than two months)List of all the companies (specifying their CIN) having the same registered office address, if any;Optional attachment, if anyPURPOSE OF THE E-FORM 7From above we can easily understand that lots of Information is to be arranged for Incorporation of a Company under Companies Act, 2013. So it is also important to understand the purpose of E-Form INC-7.E-Form INC-7deals with incorporation of a new company (other than OPC). This E-Form is accompanied by supporting documents such as details of Directors/subscribers, the Memorandum of Association (MoA) and Articles of Association (AoA) and evidence of payment of stamp duty. Once the E-Form is processed and found complete, a company is registered and CIN is allocated.Please note the following:User is required to file E-Form INC-7 for incorporation of Company other than OPC within sixty days from the date of application of reservation of name in E-Form INC-1.It is suggested that E-Form DIR-12 and E-Form INC-22 should be filed together at the time of filing of E-Form INC-7 when address for correspondence is the address of registered office of the company.In case the address for correspondence is not the address of the registered office of the Company, user is required to file INC-22 within 30 days of its incorporation.Stamp duty on E-Form INC-7, Memorandum of Association (MoA) and Articles of Association (AoA) can be paid electronically through the MCA portal and in such case submission of physical copies of the uploaded E-Form INC-7, MoA and AoA to the office of ROC is not required.Payment of stamp duty electronically through MCA portal is mandatory in respect of the States which have authorized the Central Government to collect stamp duty on their behalf.Now eStamp duty payment is to be done online through MCA portal for all the states.User is required to scan the photograph of every subscriber with MOA and AOA.DUTY OF REGISTRAR TO SCRUTINISE THE DOCUMENTSIf after filling the Requisite forms for incorporation with the Registrar of Companies along with fees, ROC is satisfied with the contents of the documents filed, ROC will issue the Certificate of incorporation in Form no.INC 11 as directed by Rule-18 of Companies (Incorporation) Rules, 2014.Declaration at the time of commencement of businessAs per Rule-24 of Companies (Incorporation) Rules, 2014, the declaration filed by a director shall be in Form No. INC.21 along with the fee as and the contents of the form shall be verified by a Company Secretary in practice or a Chartered Accountant or a Cost Accountant in practice:Provided that in the case of a company requiring registration from sectoral regulators such as Reserve Bank of India, Securities and Exchange Board of India etc, the approval from such regulator shall be required.Pursuant to Section 11(1)(a) of the Companies Act, 2013 and Rule 24 of the Companies (Incorporation ) Rules, 2014, Declaration prior to the commencement of business or exercising borrowing powers in Form No. INC.21 along with the following attachments:A. Specimen signature in form INC.10.B. Certificate of Registration issued by the RBI (Only in case of Non-Banking Financial Companies)/ from other regulatorsC. (Optional attachment(s) (if any)Additional Information:As per Rule-16(1) of Companies (Incorporation) Rules, 2014, Particulars of every subscriber to be filed with the Registrar at the time of incorporation:A. Name (including surname or family name) and recent Photograph affixed and scan with MOA and AOA,B. Father’s/Mother’s/ name,C. Nationality,D. Date of Birth:E.Place of Birth (District and State):F. Educational qualification:G. Occupation:H. Income-tax permanent account number:I. Permanent residential address and also Present address (Time since residing at present address and address of previous residence address (es) if stay of present address is less 24 than one year) similarly the office/business addresses.J. E-mail id of Subscriber;K. Phone No. of Subscriber;L. Fax no. of Subscriber (optional)Explanation.- information related to (i) to (l)shall be of the individual subscriber and not of the professional engaged in the incorporation of the company;N. Proof of Identity:For Indian Nationals:PAN Card (mandatory) and any one of the followingVoter’s identity cardPassport copyDriving License copyUnique Identification Number (UIN)For Foreign nationals and Non Resident Indians :-PassportN. Residential proof such as Bank Statement, Electricity Bill, Telephone / Mobile Bill:Provided that Bank statement Electricity bill, Telephone or Mobile bill shall not be more than two months old.O. Proof of nationality in case the subscriber is a foreign national.P. If the subscriber is already a Director or Promoter of a Company(s), the particulars relating to:Name of CompanyCorporate Identity Number Whether Interested as a Director or PromoterQ. the specimen signature and latest photograph duly verified by the banker or notary shall be in the prescribed Form No. INC.SOURCE :- LINKEDIN