Security Disposition: Fill & Download for Free

This is not as crazy as some of the other stories, but it was quite insane.A guy came in with his elderly mother. While in the ER, she slipped and hit her face. She was now bleeding from her nose and mouth. He called the nurse but nobody came. He became agitated and yelled at the nurse. At this point, she called security (still no doctor). The security guy showed up, and the person said: “It is good that you came. Now treat my mother.”The security guys walked over to the nurse station and told her to get a doctor right away. The nurse refused because the person yelled at her. The guard went to the head doctor and said: “you have a bleeding patient. The nurse is refusing to provide treatment.”The doctor went over to the patient and treated her. Then he walks to the nurse and said: “Go home now, and come tomorrow with a much better disposition toward patients.”

They would have been quickly confined to one of the many high-security government camps available and disarmed. After determining that they were time-travelers, Army Intelligence officials would have begun recording the vital information they carry: their knowledge of the Japanese dispositions in 1942, the strategies and beliefs of Japanese leaders, and the course of the war in 1942 and 1943. The data in the computer chips on their persons, of course, would be recorded on paper to accelerate the development of all manner of useful devices, including the then under-development atomic bomb.While scientific teams worked around the clock to discover what power or alien force had transported this group of people through time, presumably in a misbegotten attempt to change their own history, none of these people—absolutely none of them—would be allowed out in public unguarded. They certainly would not be allowed anywhere near the Japanese or Germany military, where their precious knowledge of future events would be at risk of being revealed to their nation’s enemies.Of course, the unit itself and its weaponry could not be risked in combat in 1942, as the United States Navy would not have the resources to land them or hardware back-engineered from from their personal kit in Europe or in Japan for at least another two years.

One crucial factor can be seen here:-The blue shaded area is roughly how far a Messerschmidt 109 could fly, fight for a few minutes, and hope to make it back to base without running out of fuel, in the summer of 1940, from bases in occupied France.That defined the limit of where the Luftwaffe could bomb by daylight (night bombing in 1940 was at best able to hit “a city”, certainly not “a factory” let alone “an airfield”) and therefore the limits of where RAF Fighter Command squadrons were at risk of being caught on the ground or having their bases bombed.This was critical for two reasons. Firstly, it meant that “most of the UK” was a safe haven for Fighter Command to rest, train and recuperate: pilots and squadrons were rotated out of the southeast (11 Group) to safer areas to recover, novice pilots could undergo their initial squadron training without getting bounced by enemy fighters on their first flight, and fighters and pilots were available in a secure reserve.Secondly, the Germans engaged in a textbook example of the mirror-image fallacy (http://www.howtogetyourownway.com/biases/mirror_imaging.html). Having thrown pretty much the entire Luftwaffe’s strength into the fight, they assumed that the RAF had likewise committed everything to what the Germans considered the decisive point (the skies over Kent). Despite the painful experience of 15 August (when Luftlotte 5, flying from bases in Norway against targets in northern Britain, was so badly mauled by the RAF that it took no further part in the fighting) they seem to have persisted in the belief that the entire force of Fighter Command had been concentrated in the areas they could reach and attack.The fact that so much of Fighter Command was held back out of their reach, and that while 11 Group might have been suffering significant pain this was not “destroying Fighter Command”, seems to have escaped them completely (although Luftwaffe intelligence on RAF strength and disposition was abysmal throughout). Having decided that “defeating the RAF” was the decisive battle, everyone from Goering down seems to have assumed that the RAF would agree and fight in a time and place of Germany’s choosing: while in fact the RAF viewed “preventing any invasion” as their top priority.As a result, the Luftwaffe’s fighter force shrank by 20% from July to September 1940, while Fighter Command was gaining strength throughout.Challenging the enemy to a battle of attrition, on their territory and on their terms, when they have a large secure hinterland in which to rest and recover, is a really bad idea.