Invasion Of Personal Privacy 8, U.S. Citizenship And Immigration: Fill & Download for Free

Absolutely not.Some parts are simply redundant (and therefore unnecessary), and others are outright toxic to our system.And I’d be happy to go through piece by piece and explain. But first, let me note that my objection to redundant provisions is threefold:Simply unnecessary—why fix what ain’t broke?In legal interpretation it is usually presumed that a change in wording indicates a change in meaning—so replacing U.S. Constitutional provisions with “equivalent” UDHR provisions would endanger settled constitutional precedent.Related to the above, adopting the UDHR as part of our own Constitution runs the risk of implying that we are also agreeing to adopt UN or other foreign interpretations of the UDHR. Ceding authority to any other power to interpret our law is a flatly moronic idea.So…PREAMBLE:Irrelevant. Preambles are never legally binding anyway.ARTICLE 1:Mere philosophical language. I agree with all of it, and it’s pretty close to the Declaration of Independence, but it’s entirely “nonjusticiable” (meaning there is no way for a court to actually use it to decide a case).ARTICLE 2:To the extent that it applies only to the rights enumerated (and does not act as a blanket “equal protection” provision), I have no problem with this. But it’s already encompassed within several principles of U.S. law, so it’s entirely unnecessary.ARTICLE 3:“Security of person” is already encompassed within “liberty” in U.S. law. The omission of “property” is addressed in Article 17… but it has a few issues. Otherwise, this is entirely redundant with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.ARTICLE 4:Duplicates the 13th Amendment, except that it is not clear if involuntary labor may be imposed as punishment for a crime (which our Constitution rightly permits). Also, given the propensity for the UN to radically reinterpret terms, I’d be very concerned that they might decide that “servitude” includes plenty of things that are nothing like slavery.ARTICLE 5:I have three issues:“Degrading”—it is all too easy to determine that any punishment which has the effect of shaming a criminal or lowering his social status or self-image is “degrading”. This, in my view, is absurd. “Cruel and unusual” in out Eighth Amendment already prohibits punishments which are deliberately degrading.“Treatment or punishment”—this, especially in combination with “degrading”, leaves the door open for all sorts of arguments that the government is being “cruel, inhuman or degrading” by not doing something, or by merely adopting a policy that causes distress.Omission of “unusual”—the Framers were careful to say, “cruel and unusual” because I’m sure they knew that someone would eventually try to stretch “cruel” to cover even very common punishments. Without the requirement that the punishment be “unusual,” I suspect someone in the next 10 years will argue that maximum security prisons (for instance) are “cruel” or that imposing any prison sentence on a single parent is “cruel”, or any number of other such absurdities.ARTICLE 6:“Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.”This is tautological and meaningless. “Everyone” cannot mean anything other than “every person” (in context, I mean)—so it simply says, “Every person has the right to recognition as a person.”If a government wants to deny someone “personhood” status, they’ll simply say, “Well, s/he isn’t a person, so we’re not obligated to recognize him/her as a person.”In practice, this will mean, “Anyone the UN thinks is a person…”Besides, with the exception of the unborn, U.S. precedent is already very clear that every living human is a “person”.ARTICLE 7:The first clause merely duplicates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.The second clause has issues, particularly in the last half: “against any incitement to such discrimination” sounds to me suspiciously like a restriction on speech—which (outside of Brandenburg-type “true incitement” and a few non-relevant other exceptions) is utterly unacceptable to America.ARTICLE 8:OK… either this merely duplicates Bivens and Article III (of the U.S. Constitution), or it prohibits statutes of limitations. If the former, it is not needed. If the latter, it is not wanted nor feasible.ARTICLE 9:Entirely duplicative of the Due Process Clause—which goes beyond this Article as well.ARTICLE 10:This duplicates parts of the Sixth Amendment.ARTICLE 11:This merely duplicates Due Process and Ex Post Facto. It’s actually quite a well-drafted Article, to be fair—but there’s no need to amend the Constitution to guarantee rights we already guarantee.ARTICLE 12:Why??? Why, UDHR drafters? Why tantalize me with such a well-drafted Article just now, and then give me this crap?!The first half is entirely ambiguous as to what exactly it prohibits, but my best guess is that it is the equivalent of our Fourth Amendment... except it doesn’t specify government interference, so it would imply a governmental obligation to defend against private invasions of privacy, which is a very slippery slope.The second half is yet another speech restriction. It would make it possible (indeed, mandatory) to allow civil suits not only for libelous statements, but even for true defamatory statements under at least some conditions, or even for statements of “dishonorable” opinion. This is wholly unacceptable.ARTICLE 13:Already fully encompassed in U.S. law (except, of course, for people serving sentences for crimes committed, or having a warrant out for their arrest).ARTICLE 14:This is more shoddy drafting.OK, everyone has the right to “seek and enjoy” asylum—so, does this mean that the U.S. must take every person who states a valid claim for asylum?As-worded, the only justifications this Article allows for denial of asylum are A) there is no persecution, or B) the persecution is “genuinely arising from non-political crimes”.So, this means that even if the asylum-seeker is a known member of a criminal organization, as long as he is genuinely being persecuted in his home country for something other than his criminal behavior, we still have to let him in.ARTICLE 15:A good concept, but the “no one shall be [. . .] denied the right to change his nationality” bit could very easily be interpreted to mean that we have no right to deny someone seeking naturalization and citizenship.ARTICLE 16:The first clause is inherently problematic because it doesn’t define what an acceptable marriage is. If the country in question gets to decide what marriage is, then the clause is virtually meaningless. But if not, then it could mean anything from gay marriage, to incest, to polygamy. Also, the right “to found a family” could be interpreted to mean a legal positive right to childbearing and/or adoption (i.e., cannot be denied adoption, government must provide fertility services, etc.).The second clause is already law in America.The third clause is a wonderful sentiment which I fully support—but it’s effectively nonjusticiable, especially given the lack of definition of “family” in this context.ARTICLE 17:The first clause is good, but redundant with the Due Process Clause(s).The second clause lacks any “just compensation” or “due process” element. So, I can’t have my property arbitrarily taken from me, but if the government decides to nationalize the industry in which I work, they can do so, and they don’t owe me a penny.ARTICLE 18:This is actually reasonably good. There is one major issue, as I see it:By using “thought” and “conscience” and “belief” as interchangeable with “religion”, this protects all philosophical positions, not only religious ones. It’s not that I’m in favor of coercion as to non-religious beliefs—but there is a difference between claiming a constitutional right to wear a cross at work (at a government facility) because I’m a Catholic, versus a constitutional right to wear Mickey Mouse ears at work because I “sincerely believe” that Disney World is a really cool place and that more Mickey will bring happiness to people’s lives.ARTICLE 19:OK, this one’s pretty good again—with, again, one major issue:The “right to receive” was originally conceived of, in the U.S., as a derivative right—it’s not that anyone has a freestanding right to access information, but simply that there cannot be a “backdoor” ban on certain types of speech by saying, for instance, “Sure, you can publish and sell your book without restriction—we’re just going to make it illegal to read it.”As written here, however, (and, interestingly, as interpreted by the Second Circuit), it morphs into a freestanding right which is not dependent on any limitation on the information itself. For example, it might be unconstitutional to ban a disruptive patron from a library, because this would restrict his “right to receive information”.This is well beyond any sort of mere ban on content-based speech restriction, and has the potential for all manner of mischief.ARTICLE 20:No issues here.In fact, I actually like this one, because it makes explicit what is implicit (and therefore ignored) in the U.S. Constitution regarding compulsory union dues for public sector unions.ARTICLE 21:Clause 1 is fine—though it duplicates the “Guarantee Clause” of the Constitution and is therefore unnecessary.Clause 2 is ambiguous enough to be nearly meaningless. Read narrowly, it only duplicates Article 7, saying that government can’t deliberately discriminate in hiring for public service. Read broadly, it’s hard to know what sort of “discrimination” is permitted—can public service hiring screen out people who are uneducated? Unprofessional? Incompetent? Openly anti-government?(Of course, Clause 2 might actually be about public services, not public service in the sense of government jobs—but if that’s the case, then it completely overlaps Article 7.)Clause 3 sounds great, but what does it mean? Again, read narrowly, it does pretty much nothing (it basically duplicates Clause 1). But read broadly, it eliminates the Electoral College at minimum, but probably also eliminates equal representation in the Senate (because the vote of a Californian in a Senate election is worth much less than the vote of a Nebraskan). In fact, if it does eliminate equal Senate representation, then it’s the one thing that cannot be introduced to the Constitution via the Article V amendment process (unless all 50 States consented):“[N]o State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate.”ARTICLE 22:Not only is this poorly-drafted mumbo-jumbo, but it’s also a positive right (that is, a guarantee that the government must provide something). Positive rights are virtually always a problem, because they deny government the option to judiciously prioritize different budgetary concerns.Also, it’s so vague as to what “social security” in this context actually consists of, that this would be a “blank check” for anyone to argue that their pet welfare scheme is a “constitutional right.”ARTICLE 23:Clause 1 is frankly absurd. It transforms an economic reality (unemployment) into a constitutional violation. Also, it arguably (“free choice of employment”) makes it illegal not to hire someone for the job they want.Clause 2 is already the law in the U.S., but not a constitutional mandate. In general, I’m in favor of more contracting flexibility, not less. Also, read strictly, this would mean that two people doing the same job have to be paid the same regardless of seniority, credentials, or experience, and that no person may ever receive a raise unless all workers with the same job title also receive a raise. That may seem good to some—but it’s anathema to the American employment culture.Clause 3 is even more absurd—it’s effectively an attempt to yoke the market to the law. It also conflicts with Clause 2. Basically, if Worker A is a single man, and Worker B has 10 children, then either:They get paid different amounts (such that both get paid a wage sufficient to ensure a “worthy existence” for their families)—in violation of Clause 2.They both get paid an amount relative to A’s needs—and B doesn’t make enough to feed his family.They both get paid an amount relative to B’s needs—and A gets a massive windfall, and the company goes broke.Clause 4 is fine, assuming it only means no restraints on the formation of unions. But if it is interpreted as the right to have an effective labor union (as opposed to one that simply makes its demands and gets flatly rejected by management), then there’s trouble—because there’s no proviso included that says that a majority of the workers have to want a union. But, if 10% of the employees are allowed to unionize, and yet there has to be equal pay for equal work, then any wage concessions granted to the 10% have to be granted to the other 90% as well—even if the 90% reject the union because they believe its demands will bankrupt the company.ARTICLE 24:The subordinate clause (“including…”) is fine, though I don’t think it’s proper matter for a constitutional provision. But a clause of that sort is not limiting—and the main clause, “Everyone has the right to rest and leisure,” is simply too broad. Quite simply, there will always be people whose outgoing expenses (voluntary or otherwise) exceed their income to the extent that they need to work multiple jobs—exactly what is the legal remedy if one such person sues under this Article?ARTICLE 25:Again, unworkable positive rights. The only reasonably enforceable part of this entire thing is the ban on discriminating between legitimate and illegitimate children in the administration of social benefits—and that’s already a part of U.S. constitutional law.ARTICLE 26:Clause 1 is yet another positive right. At least this one has an “on the basis of merit” limitation.Clause 2 is constitutionally-mandated thought control. It sounds innocuous enough, but what it would mean is that education is constitutionally mandated to promote liberal/progressive views on diversity and culture, and that once something is declared to be a “fundamental freedom”, all schools must fall in line and not question it. This would mean that Catholic schools, for instance, would be constitutionally banned from teaching that marriage was instituted by God between a man and a woman, or that abortion is a mortal sin, or that it is better to be Catholic than non-Catholic.Clause 3 conflicts entirely with the other two. What if a parent wants to send their kid to an exclusive private school rather than a free school? What if a parent wants to inculcate non-progressive values?ARTICLE 27:Clause 1 is essentially meaningless, except where it overlaps with Articles 7 and 19.Clause 2 is a good principle, but an awful law—because it provides for no limits on Intellectual Property. Read narrowly, it merely means that there must be some IP protection (but it could be very weak and last for only a year). Read broadly, it would mean that IP protection is perpetual and unlimited. Any attempt to “chart a middle course” would be pure judicial fiat.ARTICLE 28:Utterly meaningless—“You have the right to have all your other rights.”ARTICLE 29:Clause 1 is, again, either meaningless or ludicrously expansive. It could mean nothing beyond, “Hey, people need to pay their taxes and obey the laws,” or it could mean, “Despite all these rights, the State still comes before individuals.” Not to mention that “community” is ill-defined—do I have a duty to my country, or to my city, or to my church, or to my neighborhood?Clause 2 is either entirely implicit in the very concept of “rights” (if you place little emphasis on the last line or two), or else it provides an unstructured “escape clause” that effectively negates all the foregoing rights by allowing the government to claim a “general welfare” exemption.Clause 3, once more, either means nothing (i.e., “This doesn’t give you the right to incite international war”) or else it makes all the “rights” subject to the whims of the UN’s voting majority.ARTICLE 30:We’re on a roll, here, with yet another “either nothing or disaster” Article. This either means nothing that is not implicit in the very concept of rights, or it justifies the arbitrary restriction of the rights of people or groups who hold non-progressive views (e.g., “You cannot use your freedom of speech to advocate restrictions on immigration.”). In fact, read literally, this would forbid anyone from using any enumerated right to advocate for the amendment or repeal of any one of the foregoing Articles.In reading these objections, do remember that I’m treating them in the context of a scenario in which they are adopted verbatim into the Constitution.I’m well aware that some of the more absurd connotations are not a problem in the actual UDHR, both because it is interpreted loosely, as a list of principles not of laws, and also because continental European jurisprudence (which predominates at the UN) is much less text-bound than U.S. jurisprudence. But no constitutional amendment is going to effect a wholesale change in the way we approach constitutional law, so I have to imagine that these are all U.S. constitutional provisions interpreted as U.S. constitutional provisions.And in that context, they are simply terrible ideas.