The Effects Of U.S. National Security Strategy On Force: Fill & Download for Free

Most of the other answers reflect a position off USA defeat and heavy troop losses in an Asian war. I respectfully disagree and I believe there are some ‘facts’ from that time period that would support a position of probable USA success (of a type).I originally considered and answered a related question: Bob Reisner's answer to Why did the USSR not send ground troops to join the Korean War? In the answer and reply discussion text, I identify considerable data from the period that shows a threat from Eisenhower to use nuclear weapons was credibly received by the Russians and Chinese and caused them to end the Korean War.I believe the same facts plus some other data points from that period would support the position of fundamental Chinese weakness. I’ll explore what might have happened but we’ll just make an assumption (as the question seems to do) that the USA population in general supports a significant action against China.First, a war with China might not involve more USA troops than what were used in the Korean War. A war in China would be long, perhaps 5 to 10 years in length but not necessarily a WW1 type of war with massed armies fighting across trenches.[1] Nuclear weapons get usedThe first thing we need to understand is that nuclear weapons would be used in China. They were used in Japan only a couple of years earlier and there was no military or civilian expectation that they wouldn’t be used.For all of the 1950s, there was overwhelming USA superiority in nukes. And in real life the USA could have scaled up nuke production even faster than what actually happened. The USSR was not going to respond to USA nuclear aggression in China.I point to the Eisenhower threat to use nukes in 1953 as a principal cause of ending the Korean War (Full text of "DTIC ADA173521: Military Planning in the Twentieth Century, Proceedings of the Military History Symposium (11th) Held on 10-12 October 1984," page 263):During the spring of 1953, the Eisenhower administration was able secretly to threaten to use atomic weapons if the United Nations did not soon get an honorable military armistice in Korea. The armistice came on 27 July 1953, and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles offered a cogent reason why the Communists agreed to the armistice: “The fighting was stopped on honorable terms because the aggressor, already thrown back to and behind his place of beginning, was faced with the possibility that the fighting might, to his own great peril, soon spread beyond the limits and methods he had selected." 41  I don’t know how it could be clearer that the USA had a strategy and capability of destroying the USSR in the 1950 era and that the USSR agreed at that time with this assessment.[2] Nuclear weapons deliveryThe USA had the ability to deliver a nuke from continental USA to any point in Russia or China. With bases in Korea, Philippines, Japan and other places in off shore Asia actual bombing distances would be quite modest.The tiny plane in the picture above was the famous B-29 strategic bomber. The big plane is the B-36. The range was over 9,000 miles and service ceiling (45,000 ft) made it largely unassailable by Russia in the Korean war period.The USA had during this period massive numbers of B-29 in operation and in light storage. And hundreds of the B-36 that had the ability to strike any place in China. In addition to massive amounts of conventional bombs, there were hundreds of nuclear weapons available and a strong nuclear weapons production program in place.The use of B-29s in the Korean war proved their ability to adequately perform in an environment with heavy anti air and MiG-1s. While little discussed in popular press the B-29 attacks were massive and hugely effective against a heavily defended small area. These same tactics over a vastly larger China area would have been more effective. China had little air defense and most of it would not have survived the first few weeks of any war.[3] TroopsThe core of any ‘invading army’ in the early 1950s would have been the Chinese Nationalist Army that had fled to Taiwan. China, especially the south, was not a uniform, united society that believed in Communism or Mao. There was a civil war that Mao won but that doesn’t mean the people as a whole followed or that the win was secure.The ability to invade China was probably not that complicated. In 1950, the Nationalists invaded the mainland south of Shanghai and held the territory for a time. They couldn’t hold because they lacked the logistical and air support needed. It was a raid but clearly showed the ability to land troops.How a war might have happened.[1] Nuclear weapons used on troop concentrations, rail centers and key production areas would have caused havoc at a minimum and perhaps almost immediate collapse. Heavy in northern China and north of the Korean peninsula and a bit lighter in the south.It is easy to talk about limitless Chinese but reality is different. Japan conquered and held most of populated coastal China in a 7 year war whee they were always a much smaller army and population. Armies need men but they also need weapons, training and a long supply trail. It failed them in the 1930s and would have been worse in the 1950s.I believe that the use of conventional and nuclear bombing could have prevented mass mobilization, troop concentration, and supply movement. The China of 1950 was not prepared to handle these kind of attack and the industrial backbone was quite fragile (as the great leap forward later proved).The goal would have been to devastate the north and to create a buffer that effectively separated the north and south (and prevented the north from moving substantial forces south).A war focused on occupying the south and leaving the north alone for some time would have somewhat comforted Russia (made them not feel like a target). A north in distress would have added a burden on to the PRC beyond fighting …. feeding the population and recovering from the bombing would have been a massive and distracting effort.[2] The nationalists would have been able to gain a foothold in the south and would have been able to raise and train armies largely out of reach of the north. Unlike WW2, the nationalists would have become a more professional army adopting the style and operation of the USA military.The nationalist loss and the retreat to Taiwan taught them a lesson. Their ways of operation (loose semi independent armies poorly trained and led) failed and they clearly would have been willing to act under USA direction. It would have been their only choice to recover.There would be a war of attrition but the nationalists would win in the south pretty quick. And eventually the PRC north would collapse.[3] A word about Russia. Russia was still recovering from WW2. It was poor and life was difficult. Russia/Stalin wasn’t going to die for China. They would pass aid and material to the extent they could. Surplus WW2 equipment would have made available. New material would have been sold to the PRC until they ran out of convertible currency … which would have been very quick.Because of very limited China - Russia physical connection, the interdiction of supplies on the Chinese side of the border would have been ridiculously easy. With limited aviation fuel and airbases in China being vulnerable, PRC use of air power would have been limited and mostly defensive.Russia would NOT have supplied China with nukes. It would have drawn them into the conflict. A conflict they knew they would lose.[4] The end game.There would likely have been a negotiated solution. The sooner the PRC came to the table, the better it would have been for them.Any outcome would have given all of Korea to the ‘west’. No divided Korea in any outcome.An early PRC peace call might have resulted in something close to the 1947 boundary:The line would have likely been hundreds of miles further north but the result would have been a large South China (nationalist) and a smaller, rump North China (PRC) that would have been a dependency of Russia and would have also comforted Russia by being a buffer state. Mongolia and much of the territory north of Korea would have gone to Russia in one form or another.Russia would have been a big winner and they would understand this from the very first day of war. This would cause them to ‘moderate’ their support for the PRC. Stalin was Russian first and a communist second.I have no idea how western China would have been sorted out but we should assume that Tibet exists in some form and that India tweaks it’s borders in some fashion.Truman and the USA population didn’t want another war. Truman was very isolationist in his actions and worked hard to avoid military action. Korea was a great example of doing the absolute minimum. Personally, probably the right thing to do but we’ll never really know.Had Eisenhower or MacArthur or someone similar been president in 1948+, there might have been larger regional wars and use of strategic air in conjunction with local forces.The question asked assumed USA popular and governmental buy in to a China war so the discussion is limited as to how it might have happened.Bottom line, a war in China in 1950+ was possible and the USA would have been the winner. The human cost of USA lives would have been modest and the expense as well. China would have suffered but perhaps less than what they went through with the Great Leap Forward: