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Is capitalism devouring democracy?
Two disclaimers:1 - Despite my following reasoning, I don’t even believe ‘democracy’ is a fundamental end-all and be-all of what it means to be an optimal social primate. And as an American, I am looking at the word as representing the current Multi-national, neo-liberal, zero-sum trends.2 - Despite having American citizenship, I have lived over half my life in Japan … 36 years and counting, and with a permanent visa, this is probably a terminal relationship.On my answer —Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time — Winston ChurchillQuite a catchy tune … but I have no idea whether democracy is the worst, or better, or just another experiment in how to manage social primates that have bred to populations of herding / swarming size.I just see democracy as one of many tools for sustainability of the species … and if lucky, perhaps even a higher quality of life.But as any other tool, democracy can be used and misused, depending on one’s inclination and perspective. For example, anyone who has been marginalized as a minority will likely be aware of the dangers of tyranny of the majority.I don’t have the time or scope for exploring the implications of John Rawls’ original position on morality here. It leads down one heck of a rabbit hole. But I would like to make a plug for Michael J. Sandel’s definition of ‘corruption’ as — any time ‘lower level’ values displace ‘higher level’ ideals.Certainly this is a provisional social construct. But I think most of us would agree that ‘everyone has their price’ is an easy to understand euphemism for how Michael Sandel is defining corruption.For my short answer … Yes.Just follow the money — https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/jul/27/fake-news-inquiry-data-misuse-deomcracy-at-risk-mps-conclude?utm_source=esp&utm_medium=Email&utm_campaign=GU+Today+main+NEW+H+categories&utm_term=282232&subid=10308016&CMP=EMCNEWEML6619I2It is not just democracy that is under threat.Family values and its institutions … adoption, weddings, birthdays, or funerals … are all under threat of being devoured by capitalism. It doesn’t take much triangulating to see the relationship between the misuse of corporate human capital in Japan Inc.’s ‘democracy’ to see the devastating effects on demographics … a falling population, but gutting the countryside for further concentration of power and opportunity in the Tokyo area.In pre-reformation Europe, the Catholic church similarly grew rich and therefore corrupt, partially due to selling special dispensations (those express train prayers to heaven) to the robber barons of that era.But here, in present day Japan, depending on the amount of donation offered to a priest performing burial rituals お布施, the deceased is given a new ‘spiritual’ name (kaimyou - Dharma name) that is ranked and correlated with the amount of money donated.I’d call that culturally sanctioned blackmail, but I guess we Americans do the same with weddings and funerals … the more money one has, the more lavish the ceremony is expected to be. I guess it comes with the package of what it means to be a social primate.But how much is ‘enough’? Where does one draw the line if it comes at the expense of others?This jives well with Sandel’s home run definition of corruption.Capitalism is devouring science.Common sense determines that neither scientific fact nor theory have been subject to the values of democracy, though lord knows it is not through lack of trying.I will leave it to the likes of Neil DeGrasse Tyson to point out the incompatibly of democracy with science in many of his excellent documentaries …or an even more scientifically capable contemporary, Steven Pinker …… but the good professors (institutionally sanctioned) are NOT making similar documentaries about how capitalism is devouring science.‘Publish or Perish’ — is NOT a scientific heuristics.It is an economic model, and an ultimately self-destructive one at that.In fact, they, among others (yeah, you too Michio) are making a tidy little sum riding off those gigs. It’s just too bad that the likes of Karl Popper or Thomas Kuhn are not so photogenic. Karl had much to say about what happens when science becomes subservient to capitalistic agendas in the Nazi form of Nationalism.And I think there is quite a bit much more than being ‘politically correct’ at stake when the whole scientific domain is being questioned as gender influenced … How Masculine and Feminine Traits Influence Science.For some examples of how capitalism is devouring of science, I modestly suggest reading Naomi Klein regarding Project MKUltra. Or Noam Chomsky on the M.I.T. - D.A.R.P.A. connection. Or for that matter Google’s true origin partly lies in CIA and NSA research grants for mass surveillance, Big Oil, Big Pharma, Big Agra.As I am making this edit, today’s news alone (Thursday, July 24, 2018 spells it out … Monsanto-on-trial … again.And to bring it closer to home (in Japan) … a copy of July 27-28th news … https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/07/27/national/crime-legal/japanese-prosecutors-raid-jaxa-facilities-connection-second-education-ministry-bribes-case/#.W1xSNygVSHoAnd to make sure the article is not ‘lost’ … another source, JapanToday.Prosecutors raid space agency over bureaucrat's bribery caseJuly 28 — 06:55 am JST TOKYOProsecutors on Friday raided locations linked to the space agency after they arrested a senior education ministry official earlier on a bribery charge in the second graft scandal to hit the ministry in a month.Kazuaki Kawabata, 57-year-old former director general for international affairs at the education ministry, was arrested Wednesday on suspicion of receiving bribes in the form of being wined and dined by a consulting firm executive in return for providing a favor to his firm.Prosecutors suspect former consulting firm executive Koji Taniguchi, 47, already arrested and indicted for alleged complicity in another bribery scandal involving a different senior education ministry official, provided 1.4 million yen ($12,600) worth of meals and drinks to Kawabata between 2015 and 2017.Kawabata was on loan at the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency at the time and was in a position to evaluate the agency's business contracts.Kawabata allegedly helped Taniguchi invite astronaut Satoshi Furukawa to an event at Tokyo Medical University in November 2016 among other favors he offered him, according to sources close to the matter.Furukawa was allegedly asked by the former chairman of the university's board of regents, Masahiko Usui, about whether the astronaut could take part in the event, they said.Taniguchi bribed Kawabata by wining and dining him more than 10 times, the sources said, adding that Kawabata and Taniguchi have denied the allegations.Other sources said the education ministry bureaucrat is also suspected of receiving taxi vouchers from the consulting firm executive.Earlier in the month, another education ministry bureaucrat, Futoshi Sano, 59, and the former official of Tokyo Medical University were indicted for bribery.Sano, former director general of the ministry's science and technology bureau, allegedly helped the university get selected for the ministry's funding program in return for securing the enrollment of his son at the school.Taniguchi is suspected of bringing Sano and Usui together.The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology was preparing to set up a third-party committee to investigate the suspected bribery involving Sano, but the minister, Yoshimasa Hayashi, said the plan will be postponed in the wake of Kawabata's arrest.© KYODONo mistake, ‘greed-is-good’ capitalism is devouring science, not driving it.Education, since the dawn of the industrial revolution, has been in danger of being devoured.For one semester, even while I was an Associate Professor at Jissen Women’s College, I took a leave of absence and attended open-classes as a student at a rival institution, Showa Women’s College. Among the courses I took, one was taught by a professor and employee of the central Ministry of Education (For about 7 years, I also used to be one of 2 or 3 native English speaking informants as textbook proofreaders and cultural advisors for the Ministry 平成17年4月文部科学省教科用図書検定調査審議会専門委員（平成23年3月迄). His course was about the history of Public Education in Japan.The Japanese public education system is based on England’s Victorian era education, which in turn was based on the structure and heuristics of two other institutions at that time … the penal system and the military. A liberal arts education was largely reserved for the elite ruling class.That’s a pretty grim hint as to the traditional ways in which large populations are ‘managed’ through capitalist values.Tied up with education, racial equality is in danger of being devoured … DeVos Doesn’t Believe that Promoting Racial Diversity in Schools Is a Worthwhile Cause.That military thing of ‘corruption’ through replacing one value with a lower value can be found in the outsourcing of the U.S. government’s accountability in warfare. Blackwater Protection was and still is, a convenient excuse for the U.S. government’s plausible deniability. But I guess the ancient Roman army did the same thing with ‘barbarian’ mercenaries long before capitalism was a gleam in Adam Smith’s eye.And as hinted earlier, the penal system — in private, for-profit hands?For the CEOs … the more inmates, the merrier. And throw away the keys. There is no financial incentive for rehabilitation.As for U.S. Public Health policy? Outside of the U.S., the laughing stock of the ‘developed’ world. Inside, a crying shame.That alone is enough to make me question the distinction between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ as an arrogant conceit. A more accurate distinction between countries might better be found along a sliding scale of institutionally sanctioned, legalized corruption.Personal health care costs account for the single greatest cause of family bankruptcy in the U.S. On the the other hand, a cozy little group of insurance company executives and Big-Pharma CEOs can afford another private jet or island retreat.For the personally ambitious, there is big money to be made off of sickness, infirmity, and death.And those ‘closed-door’ international trade talks are closed for good reason.For example, one of the conditions of the TPP was that medical products banned in the U.S. could be used in countries with less economic leverage, and any claims from citizens of those countries regarding health or environmental degradation will not be subject to that country’s laws or judicial system. The multi-national corporation will have the right to regulate, judge, and penalize themselves … as they wish, or not, and citizens of those economically marginalized countries, democratic or not, will have no say in the matter.Even elected politicians are not privy to all of the information in those closed-door trade talks.Anyone here old enough to remember Perestroika or Glasnost?Evidently, ‘what’s good for the goose is good for the gander’ does not apply to Capitalist management.It just goes on and on.One. Horror. Show. After. Another.I would say the loss of ‘democracy’ to the corruption of money should be among the least of our worries.Yanis is brilliant, full stop.Spot-on analysis.And compared to reading Piketty’s massive tome, a lot easier to listen to.Besides, I think his barber is doing a great job.I am just weighing in because of his observations from about 1:10 of the YouTube video above — when he explains how the Chinese economic system may be more humane than the U.S. counterparts. The local governments may allow somewhat more freedom than the national government, and individuals may be arguably just as free to follow, ignore, or game the system as their American counterparts.This is the same in Japan, For now.But as we are seeing in the U.S. now, the authoritarian dynamics could change overnight, and I assume the same could be said for China.Japanese scientists are worried about the same thing — Japanese scientists call for boycott of military research. But that is already old news. Japan is well under way in following the U.S.’s model of tax funded research at M.I.T. being funneled into Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.I think it was only three or four years ago, that Tokyo University was bringing out damage control PR in denying they were involved in military related research. Things have changed in a very short time. … Scientists and defense research | The Japan Times——————————————In any country, the socially progressive left will always be less united than the right. It's like trying to herd cats ... or order a jazz musician to follow a note for note transcription of a military marching band score.IMHO, the above observation points to something fundamentally contradictory about human nature.As a social primate, we do pretty well in small communities with empathy-driven morality. Of course even small groups can be led by bullies, and many a spouse has suffered at the hand of their 'beloved'.But when we become herding primates, probably anything larger than Dunbar’s Number, and guided by a rule-driven morality (or algorithm), it is just a matter of time before we become self-destructive swarming primates ... that 'Tower of Babel' thingy.I guess part of it is because large populations necessarily become hierarchically institutionalized, and therefore dependent on a rule-driven (legal/logical based - not empathy based) morality.But when empathy is no longer the basis for morality, the 'Dark Triad' personality types are most able to take advantage of the inevitable gap between empathy and rules ... the narcissists, machiavellian opportunists, and psychopaths among us.You know … your boss.(kudos to Alan Louis)Altruists become relegated to fools ... Diogenes carrying a lantern in the daylight, looking for an honest man.Diogenes … my hero, the template for ‘pro-social trolling’ … and the capitalist in me is wondering if I can get a copyright on that phrasing ;-)Compared to more egalitarian communities which are small enough for us to acknowledge and recognize each other as unique individuals, large populations and accompanying institutions simply provide too many niche opportunities for those dark-triad types to rise to the top.It might be useful to think of the ratio of dark-triads to altruists in a hierarchy as similar to the increase of surface area to volume of any structure as it increases in size.This surface area to volume ration, as biologists understand, is a salient variable which limits the size of living things.Surface Area to Volume Ratio - OBEN Science 7EAnd to extend the metaphor, as the surface area of hierarchies expand in proportion to the volume of its limited natural resources (can’t outsource costs and losses forever ya know), those dark-triad vampires, also proportionally increase to the point that those behavior traits become the dominant culture of the institution.Hmmm … the capitalist in me wondering if I should coin the above observation in the domain of social sciences as ‘Martin’s Law’. Or in the spirit of open source … ‘more like guidelines’.No matter what 'fool-proof' system is in place, those dark-triad types will suck the human capital dry, siphoning all resources into their own gated communities, until inevitably, 'too big to fail', fails, like a dinosaur collapsing under its own weight.'Housing loan crisis', 'Lehman Shock', the Great Wall Street crash of the ‘20’s ... a stinkweed by any other name would smell as rank. Alas, were it just restricted to smell.2012, what we ‘learned’ — Fukushima reactor meltdown was a man-made disaster, says official report.As a former Comparative Culture teacher, I should say a bit about how Japan Inc. parses ‘human error’ and ‘man-made’ disasters. Imagine a wide range of meanings ranging from an ‘honest mistake’ at one extreme, and getting caught doing what hierarchical social primates are primed to do … ‘gaming the system for personal advantage’ at the other extreme.Those two terms conveniently cover the gamut.Well hey, it’s the Fourth of July, 2018, and following good pedagogic practice, let’s see if, indeed we ‘learned’ anything.Just 3 stories today is enough to say it all …1 — Nuclear watchdog OKs restart of aging Ibaraki nuclear plant hit by tsunamiPhoto: REUTERS file(Read it while it’s ‘hot’ folks, to aid our short collective memories, Japan Today will typically delete the article from its archives in a week or so, so I have it copy-pasted for any future readers interested, assuming there is a future.)Yours truly, as an English teacher at the Tokai Mura nuclear power plant - before.And after?Can’t really say. Like the weather and earthquakes, that will be up to the Watchdog Committee’s official stamp of approval.2 — Japan oks ambitious nuke energy target plutonium reuse plan — Japan on Tuesday approved an energy plan that sets ambitious targets for nuclear energy use and sustains a struggling program for spent-fuel recycling despite setbacks after the 2011 Fukushima disaster.(But praise the lord we have government officials and Watchdog Committees!)3 — Senior education ministry official arrested over bribery — Tokyo prosecutors on Wednesday arrested a high-ranking Japan education ministry official on a bribery charge, suspecting he granted a research subsidy to a medical school in exchange for admitting his child as a student.Oops.Might as well add another few for good measure …(edit July 7, point 4, because of the relevance to points 1 and 2)4 — 5.9-magnitude quake felt in Tokyo, no tsunami warning. I felt that one. ALL of Tokyo felt it … and for close to 30 seconds.Mother nature couldn’t give a f.f. for the government’s official approval of where and when the next temblor will be permitted. But money-driven authoritarianism and mother nature have never been on good speaking terms, much less happily wedded.5 — Fukuoka's 'guest teachers' of English outstay their welcome. — After 36 year years of studying and teaching here, I found out the hard way that Japanese work contracts are not worth the paper they are written on. And this is not restricted to lay-teachers … Cautionary tale: Bern on how no protections against harassment in Japan’s universities targets NJ regardless of Japan savviness and skill levelHaving worked in American and Japanese Universities, high schools, and volunteered at kindergartens, I know a little bit about education. Now, having resigned in protest from a tenured Associate Professor position (qualifications here … Steven Martin, I am forced to pick up odd jobs at universities, but not as a professor — though still desperately trying to hang on to my identity as an educator, following its best, subversive to authority, liberal arts tradition. Now working for a subcontractor, likely similar to those mentioned above in the Fukuoka article.I have a contract here before me, that I will not sign. It makes no mention of accountability to the students who educators should be serving.Educational content and pedagogy have been boiled down to little more than economic constraints and opportunities. Just like any other business, everything is based on the bottom-line.Now with falling demographics and numbers of Japanese students to draw on, the overabundance of ‘educational institutes’ are forced to accept anyone who can breathe, and now an increasing number of the young and restless from China and Southeast Asia. This makes for some interesting cross-cultural possibilities.But it is an extra pedagogical burden on those who speak only Japanese and English, and these outsourcing companies are choosing teachers whose main qualification is ‘they look foreign, speak English, and are desperate enough for money to just sign on the dotted line and follow orders’.I try to make do.Here is a sketch done in my English class last week, by a speaker who maybe can say ‘Hello, how are you today?’ — yet she could visualize and understand Plato’s Allegory of the Cave better than most American counterparts. Bright girl.The ‘most recent comment’ under the following YouTube link describes how I got their attention last week, kept it, built on it .., and enjoyed a blast from the past.As bad as my situation is, still can’t pay the rent, it could be worse.6 — Japan’s open to foreign workers. Just don’t call them immigrants … The latest LDP plan is to open the door to 500,000 low-skilled, kkk workers (no not Jeff Sessions and company), the 3k jobs are kienai, kitsui, and kikken (dirty, hard, and dangerous) — jobs that anyone tries to avoid, but dirt-poor immigrants see as opportunity. There are just two teensy-weensy conditions to the special 5 year visas (10 years if language skills are up to snuff).• There is no legal path beyond the expiration date of that visa allowing for immigration or naturalization. When that visa expires, the worker has no choice. They MUST return to their native country.• If the 5 year or 10 year worker has a spouse or kids, even those immediate family members will not be allowed into Japan. All human needs will be taken care of by the Japanese company they work for.‘Special work visas’? I would call that a legal euphemism for ‘human trafficking’.It appears that Japan Inc. is hell bent on using hidden labor to build the infrastructure catering to the wealthy visitors who come to ‘do’ Japan. Not so different from Qatar, the UAE, and other oil rich sultanates.(edit) Today’s morning headline in Japan Today … https://japantoday.com/category/national/japan-firms-used-foreign-trainees-at-fukushima-cleanup-reportsI have saved the above to hard disc because as per policy, that website typically deletes its articles a week or two after posting it. No wonder we fail to learn from history … we are not allowed to even make a collective memory. So for anyone who wants the details of the article above (which are few — even the guilty companies were not named), I have saved the article to hard disc. And again, that title …4 firms made foreign trainees do Fukushima decontamination workYokoso (welcome to) Japan … tourists and ‘trainees’ alike.Japan’s 4th of July headlines is one for the record books … to hell in a hand basket. A big one.————————————So class, what have we learned since that 2012 official government report?Hmm. Something about a dead parrot?More like a whole menagerie — George Orwell's 'Animal Farm' in a nutshell.Credit: Carl Glover via FlickrJust a guess, but those 'dark triad' types probably make up between 1 and 5 percent of any population.But even among the remaining, more typical, members of ours species, Hannah Arendt .... and then later the behavioral psychologists Solomon Asch (conformity experiment), Stanley Milgram (experiment in obedience), and Philip Zimbardo (the malleability of identity in the Stanford Prison experiment) pointed out how easily even the average Joe Blow's behavior can be manipulated with relatively light touches of authoritarianism.Noam Chomsky in 'Manufacturing Consent', and later later Naomi Klein in 'The Shock Doctrine', shows us some blueprints. Antony Loewenstein is showing how this is playing out down under with Disaster Capitalism: Making a Killing Out of Catastrophe.And William Blum shows us some of the gut-ugly details in Killing Hope.A couple of yeas ago, Stephen Hawking wrote an editorial for The Guardian saying This is the most dangerous time for our planet ... implying we will either make it to Mars and exploit its resources, or destroy ourselves in a final malthusian meltdown over the remaining resources on earth.An increasing number of STEM specialists believe we may have already passed a species-ending tipping point.Chomsky, in his 2010 Chapel Hill speech, 'Human intelligence and the environment’ began that speech with a couple of paragraphs referring to the debate between Carl Sagan and Ernst Mayr regarding the probability of intelligent life elsewhere in the cosmos. Predictably, and sensibly, Sagan argued for the probability, on statistical chance alone.But Mayr gave a surprisingly sensible counter-argument from an evolutionary biologist's point of view. The biological record indicates an average of about 100,000 years for the shelf life of an apex (dominant) species ... and we are at about that point.Mayr said that while there is probably life out there, it is not likely to have a human-like intelligence. He went on to further imply that human intelligence is not the apex of evolution — it is merely one of many tools for the survival of a social primate.But worse, he suspects human intelligence is more likely a fatal mutation. An evolutionary spandrel at best.The more I observe of our swarming, self-destructive nature, the more I tend to agree with Mayr.
What are the different regime types?
A classical definition of autocracy has been given by various researchers, authors and political scientists focusing on versatile characteristics of this particular regime type. As a set of informal and formal rules for choosing leadership and the policies serves as the epitome of the phenomenon. Inclusion of informal rules is also significant to understand as the autocracies often conceal the rules that constrains and shape various political choices, even though the literature and the history suggests that dictatorship routinely coexists with the formal institutions that are observed in democracies (Cheibub, Gandhi & Vreeland, 2010). The most common informal rule implies to distinguish the autocratic regime from other is one that identifies the group from which a leader can be chosen and determining that which factors are influencing the policy and leadership choices.The conceptualization of dictatorship or autocracy is binary opposite of democracy in the previous literature. Some researchers explores the concept as the state bring monopolized by the group of individuals that either indirectly or directly exclude the other parties such as citizens from the political process as a fundamental characteristic of the autocratic government (McCandless Jr. & Weber, 1995). Autocracy may also have a legal system with a few restriction on state power as it is applied according to the interests of the politics which offers reduced or limited predictability of its application (Del Monte & Papagni, 2001). Depending on the degree of characteristics discussed above that support the regime type, it could easily be defined as the dictatorship. When the regime structure is understood further, such as policy making and its outcomes it is rudimentary to understand the purpose of the leadership in power exercising dictatorship (Maggi & Rodriguez-Clare, 1998).Theorists realized that the dictatorial regimes are way too diverse in their structure and goals therefore, literature can be found where dictatorship is sought as monarchies, civilian dictatorships and military dictatorship which is most common now a days (Alvarez et al., 1996). Thus, this model found its place when it was integrated with the Geddes’ categories, another political scientist, of civilian dictatorships into personalistic dictatorships and into dominant party. Whatever the regime type maybe, it was ascribed by the scholars to the certain expectations to the outcomes of the policy belonging to these categories, it is generally emphasized that the leaders in dictatorial states seek to maintain their power, their legal position and extract the meaningful resources for the purpose of maintaining those outcomes (Geddes, Wright & Frantz, 2014). A key issue that the theorists often debate about is on the regime classification which talks about the propensity for creating a basic binary definition of ‘democracy’, which is not the case in the practice as it offers diverse range linked with the policy outcomes (Hillman, 2013).Such differences in authoritarian regimes discussed about account for the variance in their investment and growth in economy, political survival, and prospects for democratization, conflict behavior and democratic consolidation. Despite their differences, the term dictatorship or non-democracy encompasses all the forms of regime where the voters do not get to choose their leader through contested election system, furthermore, no clear agreement on the dimension along which one this distinction could be made. Research discerns the differentiation between electoral authoritarianism and competitive authoritarianism on the degree of competition as silent dimension (Mansfield, Milner & Rosendorff, 2000). Geddes’ distinctive types mentioned above (military, personalist and party regime), although personalist was rejected as a separate type by the political scientists on the basis of occurrence of this trait among all the autocrats. Instead, more focus was given to the different ways a dictator retains his power, military regimes who threatens to use the power and have used in the past, monarchies that have involved hereditary succession and electoral regimes where the degree of national-level elections is far fetches from the party competition that occurs (Pye, 1970).Before the literature review explores the impact of authoritarian regime on the various political components, it is argued that the way in which a government is removed from power also matters and actually drives the distinction discussed above between the types of dictatorship as well as the certain types of democracy that are well-known in the literature (Barro, 1996). Yet, it is understood that there is no one institution involved such as lottery or an election which determines the succession of a dictator. Dictatorial regimes succumb to internal disputes quite frequently over the leadership and members of the elite pose the major threats to the dictators as well (Broz, 2002). Therefore, dictators are in fact, deposed in power by the fellow members of the regime. In some counties, it has seemed to work such as in Guatemala, power changed hands among military rulers since World War II to the extent of thirteen times. Hence, at times, to mitigate the threat posed to the government by the elites, dictators often establish inner sanctums where most needed decisions are made which the other regime types do not allow easily and offer the close scrutiny of potential rivals (Peinado & Céspedes, 2004).Understanding further about the different dimensions of dictatorship, it is interesting to see monarchs, both currently and traditionally, relying on their family and kin to come to power and then maintain it afterwards. For instance, literature review revealed that in 1992, Khalifa in Qatar reshuffled his cabinet to hire his family members as his ministers. Similarly, same practices have been seen in the history of Saudi Arabia where Kind Fahd had appointed his six brothers to major posts in government. Such practices of monarchy can be seen in various Asian countries in contemporary manner such as in Pakistan and India, monarchs at times do hire their family members or close friends for the purpose of maintaining the power (Herb,1999).Focusing on the culture and type of dictatorship in a particular country like Pakistan, which is the basis of this dissertation, it is essential to understand the nature of autocracy in the history of Pakistan as well. Military rulers have thrown the civilian government more than once and history distinguishes the military dictatorship from a number of reasons such as the institution which they use to formulate and organize their rules, their motivation for seizing power and the way in which they leave power (Ahmad, 1978). The motives for staging coups in the history of Pakistan and other Asian countries varies. Military rulers often regard themselves as ‘the protector or guardian of the national interest’, where they usually have the support of public as well to save them from disaster brought by myopic and corrupt civilian politicians. They use their membership within the armed forces to justify their position as the neutral arbiters, by bringing the institution which is supposed to be above the political dilemmas. There are other reasons which may be involved in the Asian countries but it seems that coups may be motivated by their corporate interests or by class (Khawaja & Khan, 2009).A look into sociological approaches have discussed the institutional heterogeneity among the dictatorship in depth. However, these results cannot have a simple translation or analysis which could predict the variables that make autocratic regime work. Moreover, they lack the theoretical categories required to shape the policy incentive which informs the measurements of these variables (Nasr, 2004). There are studies that have successfully focused on the achievements of the dictatorship in economic growth but there are seemingly contradictory institutional features as well for understanding this economic success; autonomy of the state that has dictator ruling it and the constraints that prevent the certain predatory behavior of the state. A theoretical orientation explains why two contradictory assumptions coexist; the state remains autonomous from the opposition only while the ruling parties tend to discipline the state to avoid it from turning to predatory behavior (Doorenspleet, 2000).The evidence that a non-dictator government is superior when it comes to economic outcomes is neither strong nor robust. Przewoski and Limongi (1993) explored the correlation between the economic growth with the regime type and found that it was weak for democracy suggesting that during autocratic government, superior results in economic growth have been noticed, which corroborates with the studies by Jones and Olken in 2005, noting that when autocratic leaders are removed unexpectedly, economic growth rates change drastically (Chani, Iqbal & Khan, 2008). Therefore, such heterogeneity bring the unexpected and interesting transition out of autocracy and democracy which needs to be further explored in a particular regime.Government is a key element that shapes the country’s image, its prosperity and lives of the public, which ever political system they belong to, it is not a single entity but composed of multiple departments that run the system. It is significant to use the political authority and control over public matters to ensure the smooth running of a country and meanwhile achieve the goals of the people welfare (McGuire & Olson, 1996). The task of policy making which is made by group of people, is highly dependent upon the governing body and regime type. Politically neutral bureaucrat is a notion which is ideal but due to constraints by external political pressures and internal administrative concerns, the political regime find it both convenient and viable to shape the organization to their preference. Considering the political climate of Pakistan, Merle Fainsad’s (1951) type of bureaucracies fit the institute such as ruler-dominated and military-dominated bureaucracies are the most common seen, apart from democratic.The literature review of Pakistan’s history during Musharraf’s regime put forth many challenges faced by the dictator. The National Accountability Bureau (NAB) was successful in his regime to harass the political opponents. During this period of dictatorship, military has the reins to build a policy which best benefit the government. The reemployment of retired or serving officials in civil institutions depicted the military dominance in the Pakistan’s political history. This devolution plan weakened the provincial bureaucracy as much of the reassignment of large population is government and civil sector went to the inexperienced local bodies (Huntington, 2006). This process of powers being devolved remained faulty almost all the areas of Pakistan except a few, causing a feudal to the power, that distorted the actual essence of decentralization. Military was drawn to the local politics and administration as well as the foreign policy did not remain immune to form alliance with USA on war of terror. It is safe to say that authors and political researchers argues that Pakistan Army monopolized the policymaking and took control over foreign policies, agencies, district management, and economic policy (Gasiorowski, 1996)Moreover, after Musharraf threw the government and established his government, further policies started trembling as well. Comparing the regime of Pakistan during Musharraf’s era when in 2002, Supreme Court’s judges were prompted to take an oath that promises to uphold the PCO, which lead to a conflict which played part in the end of a democratic regime. Later on, the sweeping validation to his actions, including the dissolution of provincial and national assemblies and the PCO, elections order was given which left Pakistan with a very real military dictatorship (Cheema, Khwaja & Qadir, 2006). His regime began with approval among the people and even policy makers or political scientists acquiesced with the hope that dictatorship might lead towards a radical regime in Pakistan which even a civil government failed to achieve.Researchers are interested in comparing and exploring the human development ensured during democratic regime and in the future with the challenges of the world. It is rudimentary to understand the relationship of HDI with the regime type within a country to follow the trends and fashion in which a particular regime facilitates the human development (Haider, ud Din & Ghani, 2011). Three common trajectories of the societal change are fundamental in the literature (Lewis, 1955). Socioeconomic development has been defined as the closely held linkages including productivity growth, technological innovation, rising level of education, improving life expectancy and health improvement, productivity growth as well as technological innovation which changes the societal complexity among the other components. Researchers have also measured the relationship of regime type i.e. autocracy in this particular case, with the variables mentioned above; the changes seen in the past regimes have a confusing explanations to them. For instance, they seem to thrive on one particular developmental milestone whereas their development decrease tremendously in others (Fischer, Sahay & Végh, 2002).The second variable i.e. value change, accompanies the socioeconomic development while expansion of social mobilization and markets diversify the human activities such as civic exchanges and commercial transactions. Such processes, according to the political experts, weakens the vertical authority relations that restrict the autonomy of human (mostly during autocracy) and strengthens the horizontal bargaining relations (Gupta, De Mello & Sharan, 2001). This fading constraints on autonomy of people reshape the people’s value orientation that could be described as civic cultural values, liberal values, self-expression values or individual modernity. Despite the variation in terminology, theorists of value change coincide in the notion that the conformity values tend to give away more emancipative values which emphasize human choice, thereby, characterizing the process as emancipative value change (Mitra, Thomakos & Ulubaşoğlu, 2002).Third and foremost major process involves the political institution of the society. Research shows that most notable development has been noticed in a massive trend towards non-dictator or democratic government. A reason for these developments can be credited as many authoritarian regime transformed into formal democracies by adopting the ‘the third wave of democratization’ in democratic constitution (Reuveny & Li, 2003). Since the 1970s, most regimes have extended the direct democratic institutions and consequently experienced a rise in direct civic participation which was decreased in the autocracy. This trend is explained by the scholars as the acceleration towards the democracy with modernization rather than the dictatorship (Li, 2006). The findings when compared with the Asian, especially Pakistan’s dictatorship in late 90s, Pakistan's HDI seemed to grown an average of 2.7% per year during the regime of President Musharraf roughly between the years of 2000-2007. Although Pakistan’s HDI is still lower than the average Human Development Index for South Asia (0.558). Further case studies are required to explore the relationship between the human development index and the dictatorship and the patterns it could follow with theoretical orientation as well. As often the authors have mentioned these three significant process of socioeconomic development, democratization and emancipative value change, they have been further explored and questioned as well. It has been debated repeatedly that whether these process actually manifest the irreversible linear trends or at the risk of major setback, follow the cyclical patterns, whether they are culturally specific process or uniformly global or cultural or race specific that prescribes the western models, whether been desirable or not (Fagre & Wells, 1982).Empirical studies have on the lack of conceptualization when it comes to understanding the relationship between socioeconomic development, autocracy and value change. Even the studies who have analyzed the relationship dissolve these complex multi relationships into single pair which yeasts the predictors of success (Welzel, Inglehart & Kligemann, 2003). Authors have claimed that socioeconomic developments whether they are part of any regime type sustain that government (usually occurs in establishment and maintenance of democracy) while other authors have also argued that a regime type promotes the political stability, provide the economic policies which grow towards the development such as in the past dictatorships in the Pakistan’s history, as discussed above, Musharraf’s policies established his downfall in the end, especially building alliance with USA on war of terror in Pakistan (Olson, 1993).Extensive body of literature on authoritarian politics points to the multiple factors that affect the survival of an autocrat. The key question that needs answer is how the institution in autocratic regime contribute to the survival of that regime and whether they help the dictators stay in power. For instance, autocratic election process allows the autocrats to collect information on distribution of regime support or by scoring the overwhelming victories in election help demonstrate their invincibility (Cheibub, 1998). Legislature provide the autocrats to co-opt ruling elites, make policy concession towards their opposition or either rule the opposition forces or divide them. On the other hand, one set of literature suggests that political institutions, if need be, may destabilize the autocracies under specific circumstances. For instance, in Africa, repetitive elections in multi-party contexts contributed to democratization. Similarly, it is debated upon in various studies that as compared to closed and hegemonic authoritarian regimes, competitive authoritarian regime is more likely to democratize (Latif & Hamza, 2009). And one of the strongest predictors of their survival is whether they base their rule on the presence of various dominant parties or not, making a dominant party regime resilient to autocratic breakdown. Therefore, comparing the examples of Africa and Mexico, in Pakistan a military regime is likely to collapse after a period of time as it fails to rule in the presence of various dominant parties or lack the alliance it could help build with these parties (Welzel, 2002). Pure military regimes are also opted to collapse as they are often willing to agree with democratization and return to their duties as long as their military status is guaranteed even after the transition of the government but when the military dictatorship becomes personalist regime, dictators do not reply of political institutions to co-opt the elite ruling, thereby, making them to fall more easily and drastically than dominant party regimes. Along with these findings and the pattern observed in the case studies of Africa and Mexico, it can be said that dominant party regimes (autocratic ruler), domestic terrorism is better dealt with as well as economic stagnation (Davis & Kanago, 1998).Looking into the role of dominant parties in autocracies and comparing it with the focus of this study i.e. with Pakistan’s autocratic regime of Musharraf, it is observed that they enable the leader to share the power with other ruling elites as well, thereby, accomplishing the alliance which is needed. History has revealed that dictators have problems with sharing their power and uncertainties about their members of the ruling coalition whether they remain loyal or fork a coup against them (Rahmani & Yousefi, 2009). By institutionalizing the organization with multiple parties, dictators create a collective decision making body which governs the elites reduce the risk of dictatorship, the policy stability tends to be high as well. Such a strategy allows the autocrats develop a career promotions among ruling elites thereby, mitigating their fear of uncertainties in the autocracy and making it work (Rizvi, 1976).Talking more about the factors that explain the differences of economic performance in a democratic regime, an influential body of empirical studies have identified the causes of poor economic outcomes as reflected in low economic growth and high rate of inflation (Giannini & Cottarelli, 1998). There is a near consensus that reveals that poor economic outcomes are associated with poor state institution, as mentioned above, which promotes rent seeking and lack of good governance or threat of corruption which impedes the process of economic growth. Linking it to the Pakistani regime, few scholars have examined the role of institutions and governance in microeconomic outcomes. Researchers have also added to the literature by suggesting that quality of institutions and elite parties’ involvement are necessary for better outcomes in Pakistan’s economy (Shiekh, 2010). A unidirectional causality was found out while investigating the long run positive relationship between two variables i.e. economic growth to institutional quality, running from institutional quality towards the economic growth with the regime type as moderator. In the case of Pakistan’s autocratic regime, economic growth was seen in the first few years as compared to the previous democratic government. Another significant finding that explains the high rate of inflation in Pakistan’s history comes from the global pattern where researchers have found the impact of political instability, which is defined as frequent changes in cabinet and crisis that government faces including the sudden throwing away of a regime, on the inflation in Pakistan. Since these studies lack empirical data and theoretical foundation which explains the interplay between governance, political instability, democracy, autocracy and quality of institutions that cause the changes in economic growth and inflation (Khan & Ssnhadji, 2001).Cross country studies have provided explanations of high inflation persistence with low economic growth. In general, high inflation could be cost-push factor such as shortage of food supplies, market imperfections or exchange rate fluctuations. But research put forth a common synthesis that only in the presence of excessive money supply growth, long run of inflation could persists on a government (Bastiaens, 2016). Several empirical studies in Pakistan and all around the world have found out that stable inflation is considered as conductive for economic growth process and vice versa. An estimate of threshold of inflation level for emerging economies is also in the view which positively related with rate of inflation between 1-3 percent for industrial countries and 7-11 for developing countries like Pakistan. Inflation is positively related with oil prices around the world, as Pakistan is a net oil importer, therefore confirming this scenario (Qayyum, Khawaja & Hyder, 2008). Any hike in international oil process leads to higher cost of transportation and increase in prices, according to the inflation model, the process are negatively associated with economic growth. One possible interpretation to this relationship is no frequent changes in the leadership as regime switching is said to be liked with positive changes in inflation in autocratic regime (Khan & Saqib, 2011). However, its magnitude is negligible as compared to democratic regime which increases the inflation rate.In 1990s, an economic globalization spread throughout Asia, Europe and Africa which comprised the strategy of offering tax incentives to attract FDI which is foreign direct investment. For instance, several countries such as Korea rewrote their foreign investment law to expand the scope of tax incentives to their foreign investors. In order to lure foreign capital, tax incentives are designed. Political conditions, level of economic development, macroeconomic and endowment of natural resources of a host country influence the FDI location (Clague et. al., 1996). Those host countries which lack the adequate economic conditions such as infrastructure, modern technology and natural resources even the political instability offer generous incentives in order to compensate for these weaknesses. Tax incentives then signal the foreign investors on high operating costs in those host countries. One reason that both autocracy and democracy have different level of tax incentives is due to the differences in policy credibility and property rights protection (Clague et. al., 1996). The possibility of property rights in violation in autocracy such as seizure of assets, government corruption, contract repudiation and expropriation could heavily affect the calculus of FDI decisions whereas democracy strives to secure the private property rights and rule of law by its judicial power (Li, 2009).Studies in Pakistan reveal that although the economic performance, human development and rate of inflation during the regime of Ayub, Zia and Musharraf had been well but the question remains about the reasons and correlations which influenced this relationship. The lack of theoretical data which help explain these anomalies during autocratic government remains unanswered (Zakaria & Fida, 2009). Whether it was due to United States of America and its role in Pakistan or due to external economic assistances that the economic growth was seen during these time periods or any other unidentified hypothesis exists that could explain the phenomenon. During the military period, if foreign aid and U.S. are the explanatory factors of the outcomes then an increased rate of foreign saving must be observed. The data from Ayub’s regime could not be compared to that of Musharraf’s as East Pakistan was also part of the economic growth rate in his regime (Hoffman, 2011). The evidence suggests that Pakistan’s current deficit was 6.5 percent of GDP (average) during the time period of 1972-1977, providing the outlay of 40 financial investment whereas it was similar during the time period of 1990-1999, as 6 percent of GDP (the non-military time). In other words, during Zia’s period, more than one third of investment was either financed by the external borrowing or grants as against almost 20 percent (Zahid, 2011). While during Musharraf’s regime, the country generated account surplus by exporting the capital to other developing countries and to US rather than receiving foreign flows. The country gained $12 billion plus in foreign exchange reserves in his regime as compared to the $1 billion in the non-military regime in 1990s (Mahmood, 2001).It is fair to assume that even though Pakistan’s economy is not thriving but when every shock destabilizes the economy and creates instability, in the last few years track record has shown that Pakistan has survived some serious economic changes without any major dislocation. Even though after 9/11 incident, Pakistan was transformed into a front line state despite all the negative consequences associated with the state or even mobilization of Indian troops that intensified the tension, the economy of Pakistan has recorded over 5 percent of growth rate, with registered surplus external account and low inflation, hardly speculating any attacks on currency in the past autocratic government (Rodrik, 1999).To conclude Pakistan’s political climate, it can be said that the state usually revolves around the personalities (from Jinnah, Zia, Musharraf, Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif to Imran Khan) informed by self-serving, colonial legacy, selective Muslim history to social conditions, little room was left for those politician and regimes who delivered up to the mark (Arif, 1995). The political climate neither won the hearts of people to inspire nor stopped by the politically maneuvering of the military of any other bureaucracy. Factors such as poverty, illiteracy, disorganized party-politics, and unemployment have been facilitating praetorian disruptions (Qureshi, Ali & Khan, 2010). The praetorianism could not be prevented by punitive clauses, which calls for the political tolerance and accommodation as well as political empowerment of the people.An in-depth look into the autocratic regime type and comparison of various examples based on long-run growth performances of economy, inflation rate, trade incentive, political policy making and human development has revealed overlapping and confusing results that fluctuates from one cultural and political climate to another. The literature suggests that poor democracies even exhibit poor or lower equilibrium balanced growth rate than a similar level of poor dictatorship emphasizing that no theoretical model could predict whether why an autocratic government has good governance, strong member coalition with elite parties and low rate of inflation (Ahmed & Afridi, 2014). The data from empirical studies do suggest that a few leadership qualities that a military democrat exercises at time play an integral role which is often approved by the general public.ReferencesAhmad, A. (1978). Democracy and dictatorship in Pakistan. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 8(4), 477-512.Ahmed, Z., & Afridi, M. K. (2014). Controlled Democracy and Political Opposition in Pakistan: A Case Study of Musharraf Era. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, 5(14), 560.Alvarez, M., Cheibub, J. A., Limongi, F., & Przeworski, A. (1996). Classifying political regimes. Studies in Comparative International Development, 31(2), 3-36.Arif, K. M. 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