For The Purpose Of This Clause Similar Work Means The: Fill & Download for Free

Ty Doyle's answer is, of course, correct. I’d simply like to dig into the statutory details a little further.The relevant statute is 5 U.S. Code § 3110 - Employment of relatives; restrictions. I’m going to break down the relevant portion a little differently than the statutory textual breaks, because there are some run-on clauses and we need to see each of the elements in sharp relief.We’re going to start with Subsection (b), because that’s the part that actually tells us what is being prohibited. All bullet points are mine.(b) A public official may notappoint, employ, promote, advance, or advocate for appointment, employment, promotion, or advancement,in or to a civilian position in the agency in which he is serving or over which he exercises jurisdiction or controlany individual who is a relative of the public official.An individual may not beappointed, employed, promoted, or advancedin or to a civilian position in an agencyif such appointment, employment, promotion, or advancement has been advocated bya public official, serving in or exercising jurisdiction or control over the agency,who is a relative of the individual.The two parts I split out are basically redundant (as with all law, there are almost certainly very narrow corner cases where the distinction might be important… but not here).Now, before we can start analyzing this, we need to go back up to Subsection (a) and figure out some definitions.First, from the top (of the previously cited text), we need to know if President Trump is a “public official”. It’s actually not obvious, because there are several statutes and regulations that define “public official” in a way that expressly or implicitly excludes the President.But here, we have Subsection (a)(2):(2) “public official” means an officer (including the President and a Member of Congress), a member of the uniformed service, an employee and any other individual, in whom is vested the authority by law, rule, or regulation, or to whom the authority has been delegated, to appoint, employ, promote, or advance individuals, or to recommend individuals for appointment, employment, promotion, or advancement in connection with employment in an agency;OK, simple enough. It’s a very broad definition in general, but we don’t even need to parse its limits because we’re expressly told, “including the President”. So, President Trump is a public official for purposes of this law.Next, are Ivanka and Jared being “appointed, employed, promoted, or advanced”?Arguably not, since they don’t get paid or have any formal titles or job responsibilities. But, Jim Edgington makes a fair argument in his answer that the fact that they are being treated as top-level staffers makes them so for the purposes of this statute. I don’t think this is correct, but it’s a fair argument, so we’ll assume it’s true and keep going (because if we assume it’s false, the analysis ends—if they’re not employed, then the rule doesn’t apply).Then, the real crux of the matter: are they employed in an “agency” over which a relative (Trump) exercises jurisdiction or control? This is… tricky. In part because the person who drafted this law broke one of the cardinal rules of legislative drafting (or really, of defining terms in general). Let’s look:(a)For the purpose of this section—(1) “agency” means—(A) an Executive agency;(B) an office, agency, or other establishment in the legislative branch;(C) an office, agency, or other establishment in the judicial branch; and(D) the government of the District of Columbia;Now, clearly they don’t fall under parts (B)–(D). They aren’t working for Congress or the courts, and they aren’t in the city government of D.C.So, is the President’s staff an “Executive agency”?Do you see the problem? The definition of “agency” includes the term “agency”.This is like if I tried to define the term “pet” as, “a dog, a cat, a bird, or any other household pet.”How do we know what is a “household pet”?Well, we’d know it has to be a “household” something or other, so it needs to live indoors… but that includes the mice in the attic, your kid brother, and the person you’ve got chained in the basement.So, we look to see what “pet” means…“A dog, a cat, a bird, or any other household pet.”Sorry, any other household what?A household pet, Your Honor.What is a “pet”?Thankfully, unlike Judge Haller, we don’t have to depend on Joe Pesci’s enunciation abilities to get our answer—or at least, to get an answer that I will argue is the most reasonable one we can get without simply leaving a court to make one up on their own authority.Way back at the top of Title 5 (the title of the U.S. Code under which the anti-nepotism statute falls), we have 5 U.S. Code § 105 - Executive agency, which reads as follows:For the purpose of this title, “Executive agency” means an Executive department, a Government corporation, and an independent establishment.Now, pay careful attention to that language.Recall that § 3110 which we’ve been looking at said in its definitions subsection, “For the purpose of this section[. . .]”.Here, we have, “For the purpose of this title[. . .]”.Now, normally, “specific supersedes general”—so, if one clause says, “All X are Y” and a second clause says, “This X is not Y”, we treat the second as an exception to the first.But, in this case we can’t use the § 3110(a)(1) definition of “agency” to figure out what an “Executive agency” is for the purpose of § 3110.We tried that. Judge Haller got perplexed and annoyed.Furthermore, it isn’t particularly uncommon in law to get phrases that have unitary definitions distinct from the definitions of the words that make them up. For instance, “actual malice” and “malice aforethought” have entirely different meanings (really, they’re pretty much 100% unrelated), and “malice” standing alone doesn’t really have a legal meaning at all.So, here we have a phrase, “Executive agency”, that makes no sense if we try to parse it as simply “an agency which is Executive”. But we do have a perfectly usable definition of the entire phrase, “Executive agency”.So, is the President’s own staff—An Executive department,a Government corporation, oran independent establishment?Thankfully, we have crystal clear answers to that… maybe.5 U.S. Code § 101 - Executive departments gives us an all-inclusive list of which things are “Executive departments”. I’m not going to copy it here because it would be a waste of space, but very simply… it’s the Cabinet departments (i.e., the departments headed by all those folks who are “Secretary of X”). Simple as that.Clearly, the West Wing staff is not a Cabinet department.5 U.S. Code § 103 - Government corporation tells us that,For the purpose of this title—(1) “Government corporation” means a corporation owned or controlled by the Government of the United States[. . .]Clearly also not the case with the President’s staff.And lastly, 5 U.S. Code § 104 - Independent establishment tells us,For the purpose of this title, “independent establishment” means—(1) an establishment in the executive branch (other than the United States Postal Service or the Postal Regulatory Commission) which is not an Executive department, military department, Government corporation, or part thereof, or part of an independent establishment; and(2) the Government Accountability Office.Ugh. I’ll give you the spoiler version—no, we don’t have a clear statutory definition of “establishment”.But we can get one anyway.First, we can use the interpretive rule of noscitur a sociis (literally, “it is known by its associates”) to infer that an “establishment” is meant to be something similar to the other things listed that it is being distinguished from here—that is, it’s a category something like the categories of “Executive department”, “military department”, and “Government corporation”.This means likely some sort of defined body within the Executive Branch, with a hierarchy, a specific mandate, and likely a defining statute.Further, we can consider the very simple question: What very large category hasn’t already been covered, but is something we would very definitely expect to be covered?Independent regulatory agencies. That is, those not under the control of any of the “Executive departments”.The Social Security Administration, the SEC, the NEA, OSHA (technically the OSHRC), and so on.So, while it’s far from ironclad, I would strongly argue that West Wing staff are also not an “independent establishment” for the simple reason that they are not an “establishment” at all, but simply a loose colloquial grouping of otherwise separate employees.Lastly, let’s assume that I’m wrong.Let’s assume that the President’s personal staff are part of an “Executive agency” within the intended meaning of the term.What then? Has Trump done something “illegal”? Can Jared and Ivanka be indicted? Can the administration be sued to force Trump to dismiss them?Nope.Going back to 5 U.S. Code § 3110 - Employment of relatives; restrictions, we see,(c) An individual appointed, employed, promoted, or advanced in violation of this section is not entitled to pay, and money may not be paid from the Treasury as pay to an individual so appointed, employed, promoted, or advanced.And… that’s it.There is no, “…shall be guilty of a Class X misdemeanor,” or, “…shall be fined not more than ten thousand dollars,” or anything like that.Contrary to what many believe (and perhaps think should be true), this statute does not exist to curb the influence of family members in government. It exists to prevent the use of government authority for the enrichment of family members through the awarding of lucrative sinecures.The one and only effect if Jared and Ivanka fall within the prohibition of this statute is that they cannot be paid for their position… which… they already aren’t.So, if President Trump were to nominate Ivanka as Secretary of State, and the Senate were to approve… it would be an undoubtedly bad choice, but it would be perfectly lawful, other than that she could not receive the pay due to the Secretary of State.And at least insofar as the President’s appointments are concerned, this must be true—because Congress has no authority to limit the President’s constitutional prerogative to nominate whomever he pleases and appoint whomever the Senate will confirm.Original Question:“If nepotism is forbidden in the executive branch, what loophole allowed Jared and Ivanka to be appointed to their positions?”

If you normally write obfuscated code, sure, no problem. Running perfectly normal looking code through an obfuscator with the purpose of making it difficult to read or maintain, however, is not.Section 3 of the GNU General Public License v2 states:The source code for a work means the preferred form of the work for making modifications to it.Section 1 of the GNU General Public License v3 makes a similar statement, adding a pair of quotes:The “source code” for a work means the preferred form of the work for making modifications to it.Just in case that wasn’t quite explicit enough: The FSF has made it clear in other places that obfuscated code does not satisfy this provision. For example, the entry for Xvcg at the FSF’s Free Software Directory states:Some of the source files (five of them) contain obfuscated code which contradicts section 3 of the GNU GPL.(Given that this mentions section 3, I presume it refers to GPLv2.)There is a situation where this is a bit tricky: The original author of a work can obfuscate it all day long, and then hand it to the world as GPL’d. That is, it was already obfuscated before the GPL was applied to it.However, the code is effectively not GPL in practice, as it cannot easily be integrated with other GPL’d code. So, the code may technically be GPL, but GPL licensees—those who receive the source code and intend to copy it—will not enjoy the benefits of the GPL license with respect to that code. They cannot copy the code without running afoul of the clause.The GPL license is effectively meaningless with respect to that code. It acts as a “further restriction” on redistribution (Section 6 of GPLv2), as the code received cannot actually be redistributed as-is.They cannot integrate it with other GPL codebases and redistribute the result, as the derived work runs afoul of the “preferred form” clause.In essence, the original author has failed to fully abide by their side of the agreement when extending the GPL license to the first tier of recipients.For example, NVIDIA once released an obfuscated driver marked “GPL.” That was effectively worthless. No GPL project would be able to incorporate that code and redistribute it without running afoul of the “preferred form” clause.Note: I am not a lawyer, and this is not legal advice. This is my best understanding of the license and how it applies to real-world situations.

There is Law that regulates Opening and Runing of SPA Business which is governed under The Karnataka private Medical Establisment Act 2007 ,(o) “Physiotherapy establishment” includes an establishment where massaging, hydro-therapy, remedial gymnastics or similar work is usually carried on, for the purpose of treatment of diseases or infirmity or for improvement of health or for the purposes of relaxation or for any other purpose whatsoever, whether or not analogous to the purposes mentioned in clause (l) of this section; (p) “Public Authority” means an Authority established by or under any law. (q) “Registration” means registration granted under section 7; (r) 3[Registration and Grievance Redressal Authority]3 means the 3[Registration and Grievance Redressal Authority]3 referred to