A Detailed Description Of The Transactions Described In This Letter Of Transmittal I: Fill & Download for Free

It is a hypothesis. A false hypothesis, mind you.First, a little background on GR theory, and then I'll present the theory of dynamic gravitation devised by Tesla. Why competing theory when "the data fits the theory", you may ask. Well, first and foremost, GR theory does NOT explain movement of bodies in the universe. In order to "repair" the theory, scientists introduced so called "dark stuff" and stuffed it into equations like a sculptor stuff that material he uses in producing his sculptures.There is a book titled 'The Love Letters', a nice collection of (53, in the latest edition 3 crucial letters are "missing") love letters between Albert Einstein and his first wife, Mileva Maric. If you don't know the rest of the tragic story (for her, anyway), it's just as well. It's enough to make you reflect on the amount of pain that love turn to hate can engender.They cover the period when he is getting his PhD, his first job at the patent office (which he was happy to get, by the way) in Zurich, and the birth of their first, but illegitimate child, a daughter named Lieserl, whose eventual whereabouts became a mystery (see the excellent Einstein's Daughter by Michele Zackheim for an exhaustive search for Lieserl).What is most intriguing about these letters is the number of times Einstein refers to "our" in his scientific work. He has never acknowledged Mileva's help, but I don't know how anyone can avoid the conclusion that she was a collaborator during the critical period leading up to 1905. Consider the following, in Einstein's own words: " . . . our work on relative motion . . . "(p. 39); "Don't [Mileva] forget to check on the extent to which glass conforms to the Dulong-Petit law." (p. 40); " . . .our theory of molecular forces . . ."(p. 45); " . . . enough empirical material for our investigation . . . "(p. 47); and "I gave him our paper" (p. 52). There are other references.Mileva has had her defenders in the last ten or fifteen years, but for the most part those who want to keep the Einstein myth alive that whatever he did, he did without any help have relegated her to the role of some sort of amanuensis and helpmeet. If the word "our" means what I think it means, she was a whole lot more than that.For those who think the sainted Einstein did not get any help from a mere woman, consider the following: "Poincare undoubtedly discovered many of the ideas that now form our mental picture of the theory of special relativity and associate with the name of Einstein," (HENRI POINCARE, Jeremy Gray, Princeton, 2014, p.368).Ever since the announcement of Maxwell's electro-magnetic theory scientific investigators all the world over had been bent on its experimental verification. They were convinced that it would be done and lived in an atmosphere of eager expectancy, unusually favorable to the reception of any evidence to this end. No wonder then that the publication of Dr. Heinrich Hertz's results caused a thrill as had scarcely ever been experienced before. At that time I was in the midst of pressing work in connection with the commercial introduction of my system of power transmission, but, nevertheless, caught the fire of enthusiasm and fairly burned with desire to behold the miracle with my own eyes. Accordingly, as soon as I had freed myself of these imperative duties and resumed research work in my laboratory on Grand Street, New York, I began, parallel with high frequency alternators, the construction of several forms of apparatus with the object of exploring the field opened up by Dr. Hertz. Recognizing the limitations of the devices he had employed, I concentrated my attention on the production of a powerful induction coil but made no notable progress until a happy inspiration led me to the invention of the oscillation transformer. In the latter part of 1891 I was already so far advanced in the development of this new principle that I had at my disposal means vastly superior to those of the German physicist. All my previous efforts with Rhumkorf coils had left me unconvinced, and in order to settle my doubts I went over the whole ground once more, very carefully, with these improved appliances. Similar phenomena were noted, greatly magnified in intensity, but they were susceptible of a different and more plausible explanation. I considered this so important that in 1892 I went to Bonn, Germany, to confer with Dr. Hertz in regard to my observations. He seemed disappointed to such a degree that I regretted my trip and parted from him sorrowfully. During the succeeding years I made numerous experiments with the same object, but the results were uniformly negative. In 1900, however, after I had evolved a wireless transmitter which enabled me to obtain electro-magnetic activities of many millions of horse-power, I made a last desperate attempt to prove that the disturbances emanating from the oscillator were ether vibrations akin to those of light, but met again with utter failure. For more than eighteen years I have been reading treatises, reports of scientific transactions, and articles on Hertz-wave telegraphy, to keep myself informed, but they have always imprest me like works of fiction.The history of science shows that theories are perishable. With every new truth that is revealed we get a better understanding of Nature and our conceptions and views are modified. Dr. Hertz did not discover a new principle. He merely gave material support to hypothesis which had been long ago formulated. It was a perfectly well-established fact that a circuit, traversed by a periodic current, emitted some kind of space waves, but we were in ignorance as to their character. He apparently gave an experimental proof that they were transversal vibrations in the ether. Most people look upon this as his great accomplishment. To my mind it seems that his immortal merit was not so much in this as in the focusing of the investigators' attention on the processes taking place in the ambient medium. The Hertz-wave theory, by its fascinating hold on the imagination, has stifled creative effort in the wireless art and retarded it for twenty-five years. But, on the other hand, it is impossible to over-estimate the beneficial effects of the powerful stimulus it has given in many directions.As regards signaling without wires, the application of these radiations for the purpose was quite obvious. When Dr. Hertz was asked whether such a system would be of practical value, he did not think so, and he was correct in his forecast. The best that might have been expected was a method of communication similar to the heliographic and subject to the same or even greater limitations.In the spring of 1891 I gave my demonstrations with a high frequency machine before the American Institute of Electrical Engineers at Columbia College, which laid the foundation to a new and far more promising departure. Altho the laws of electrical resonance were well known at that time and my lamented friend, Dr. John Hopkinson, had even indicated their specific application to an alternator in the Proceedings of the Institute of Electrical Engineers, London, Nov.13, 1889, nothing had been done towards the practical use of this knowledge and it is probable that those experiments of mine were the first public exhibition with resonant circuits, more particularly of high frequency. While the spontaneous success of my lecture was due to spectacular features, its chief import was in showing that all kinds of devices could be operated thru a single wire without return. This was the initial step in the evolution of my wireless system. The idea presented itself to me that it might be possible, under observance of proper conditions of resonance, to transmit electric energy thru the earth, thus dispensing with all artificial conductors. Anyone who might wish to examine impartially the merit of that early suggestion must not view it in the light of present day science. I only need to say that as late as 1893, when I had prepared an elaborate chapter on my wireless system, dwelling on its various instrumentalities and future prospects, Mr. Joseph Wetzler and other friends of mine emphatically protested against its publication on the ground that such idle and far-fetched speculations would injure me in the opinion of conservative business men. So it came that only a small part of what I had intended to say was embodied in my address of that year before the Franklin Institute and National Electric Light Association under the chapter "On Electrical Resonance." This little salvage from the wreck has earned me the title of "Father of the Wireless" from many well-disposed fellow workers, rather than the invention of scores of appliances which have brought wireless transmission within the reach of every young amateur and which, in a time not distant, will lead to undertakings overshadowing in magnitude and importance all past achievements of the engineer.The popular impression is that my wireless work was begun in 1893, but as a matter of fact I spent the two preceding years in investigations, employing forms of apparatus, some of which were almost like those of today. It was clear to me from the very start that the successful consummation could only be brought about by a number of radical improvements. Suitable high frequency generators and electrical oscillators had first to be produced. The energy of these had to be transformed in effective transmitters and collected at a distance in proper receivers. Such a system would be manifestly circumscribed in its usefulness if all extraneous interference were not prevented and exclusiveness secured. In time, however, I recognized that devices of this kind, to be most effective and efficient, should be designed with due regard to the physical properties of this planet and the electrical conditions obtaining on the same. I will briefly touch upon the salient advances as they were made in the gradual development of the system.The high frequency alternator employed in my first demonstrations is illustrated in Fig. 1. It comprised a field ring, with 384 pole projections and a disc armature with coils wound in one single layer which were connected in various ways according to requirements. It was an excellent machine for experimental purposes, furnishing sinusoidal currents of from 10,000 to 20,000 cycles per second. The output was comparatively large, due to the fact that as much as 30 amperes per square millimeter could be past thru the coils without injury.The diagram in Fig. 2 shows the circuit arrangements as used in my lecture. Resonant conditions were maintained by means of a condenser subdivided into small sections, the finer adjustments being effected by a movable iron core within an inductance coil. Loosely linked with the latter was a high tension secondary which was tuned to the primary.The operation of devices thru a single wire without return was puzzling at first because of its novelty, but can be readily explained by suitable analogs. For this purpose reference is made to Figs. 3 and 4.In the former the low resistance electrical conductors are represented by pipes of large cross section, the alternator by an oscillating piston and the filament of an incandescent lamp by a minute channel connecting the pipes. It will be clear from a glance at the diagram that very slight excursions of the piston would cause the fluid to rush with high velocity thru the small channel and that virtually all the energy of movement would be transformed into heat by friction, similarly to that of the electric current in the lamp filament.The second diagram will now be self-explanatory. Corresponding to the terminal capacity of the electric system an elastic reservoir is employed which dispenses with the necessity of a return pipe. As the piston oscillates the bag expands and contracts, and the fluid is made to surge thru the restricted passage with great speed, this resulting in the generation of heat as in the incandescent lamp. Theoretically considered, the efficiency of conversion of energy should be the same in both cases.Granted, then, that an economic system of power transmission thru a single wire is practicable, the question arises how to collect the energy in the receivers. With this object attention is called to Fig. 5, in which a conductor is shown excited by an oscillator joined to it at one end. Evidently, as the periodic impulses pass thru the wire, differences of potential will be created along the same as well as at right angles to it in the surrounding medium and either of these may be usefully applied. Thus at a, a circuit comprising an inductance and capacity is resonantly excited in the transverse, and at b, in the longitudinal sense. At c, energy is collected in a circuit parallel to the conductor but not in contact with it, and again at d, in a circuit which is partly sunk into the conductor and may be, or not, electrically connected to the same. It is important to keep these typical dispositions in mind, for however the distant actions of the oscillator might be modified thru the immense extent of the globe the principles involved are the same.Consider now the effect of such a conductor of vast dimensions on a circuit exciting it. The upper diagram of Fig. 6 illustrates a familiar oscillating system comprising a straight rod of self-inductance 2L with small terminal capacities cc and a node in the center. In the lower diagram of the figure a large capacity C is attached to the rod at one end with the result of shifting the node to the right, thru a distance corresponding to self-inductance X. As both parts of the system on either side of the node vibrate at the same rate, we have evidently, (L+X)c = (L-X)C from which X = L(C-c/C+c). When the capacity C becomes commensurate to that of the earth, X approximates L, in other words, the node is close to the ground connection. The exact determination of its position is very important in the calculation of certain terrestrial electrical and geodetic data and I have devised special means with this purpose in view.My original plan of transmitting energy without wires is shown in the upper diagram of Fig. 7, while the lower one illustrates its mechanical analog, first published in my article in the Century Magazine of june, 1900. An alternator, preferably of high tension, has one of its terminals connected to the ground and the other to an elevated capacity and impresses its oscillations upon the earth. At a distant point a receiving circuit, likewise connected to ground and the other to an elevated capacity and impresses its oscillations upon the earth. At a distant point a receiving circuit, likewise connected to ground and to an elevated capacity, collects some of the energy and actuates a suitable device. I suggested a multiplication of such units in order to intensify the effects, an idea which may yet prove valuable. In the analog two tuning forks are provided, one at the sending and the other at the receiving station, each having attached to its lower prong a piston fitting in a cylinder. The two cylinders communicate with a large elastic reservoir filled with an incompressible fluid. The vibrations transmitted to either of the tuning forks excite them by resonance and, thru electrical contacts or otherwise, bring about the desired result. This, I may say, was not a mere mechanical illustration, but a simple representation of my apparatus for submarine signaling, perfected by me in 1892, but not appreciated at that time, altho more efficient than the instruments now in use.The electric diagram in Fig. 7, which was reproduced from my lecture, was meant only for the exposition of the principle. The arrangement, as I described it in detail, is shown in Fig. 8. In this case an alternator energizes the primary of a transformer, the high tension secondary of which is connected to the ground and an elevated capacity and tuned to the imprest oscillations. The receiving circuit consists of an inductance connected to the ground and to an elevated terminal without break and is resonantly responsive to the transmitted oscillations. A specific form of receiving device was not mentioned, but i had in mind to transform the received currents and thus make their volume and tension suitable for any purpose. This, in substance, is the system of today and I am not aware of a singe authenticated instance of successful transmission at considerable distance by different instrumentalities. It might, perhaps, not be clear to those who have perused my first description of these improvements that, besides making known new and efficient types of apparatus, I gave to the world a wireless system of potentialities far beyond anything before conceived. I made explicit and repeated statements that I contemplated transmission, absolutely unlimited as to terrestrial distance and amount of energy. But, altho I have overcome all obstacles which seemed in the beginning unsurmountable and found elegant solutions of all the problems which confronted me, yet, even at this very day, the majority of experts are still blind to the possibilities which are within easy attainment.My confidence that a signal could be easily flashed around the globe was strengthened thru the discovery of the "rotating brush," a wonderful phenomenon which I have fully described in my address before the Institution of Electrical Engineers, London, in 1892, and which is illustrated in Fig. 9. This is undoubtedly the most delicate wireless detector known, but for a long time it was hard to produce and to maintain in the sensitive state. These difficulties do not exist now and I am looking to valuable applications of this device, particularly in connection with the high-speed photographic method, which I suggested, in wireless, as well as in wire, transmission.Possibly the most important advances during the following three or four years were my system of concatenated tuned circuits and methods of regulation, now universally adopted. The intimate bearing of these inventions on the development of the wireless art will appear from Fig. 10, which illustrates an arrangement described in my U.S. Patent No. 568178 of September 22, 1896, and corresponding dispositions of wireless apparatus. The captions of the individual diagrams are thought sufficiently explicit to dispense with further comment. I will merely remark that in this early record, in addition to indicating how any number of resonant circuits may be linked and regulated, I have shown the advantage of the proper timing of primary impulses and use of harmonics. In a farcical wireless suit in London, some engineers, reckless of their reputation, have claimed that my circuits were not at all attuned; in fact they asserted that I had looked upon resonance as a sort of wild and untamable beast!It will be of interest to compare my system as first described in a Belgian patent of 1897 with the Hertz-wave system of that period. The significant differences between them will be observed at a glance. The first enables us to transmit economically energy to any distance and is of inestimable value; the latter is capable of a radius of only a few miles and is worthless. In the first there are no spark-gaps and the actions are enormously magnified by resonance. In both transmitter and receiver the currents are transformed and rendered more effective and suitable for the operation of any desired device. Properly constructed, my system is safe against static and other interference and the amount of energy which may be transmitted is billions of times greater than with the Hertzian which has none of these virtues, has never been used successfully and of which no trace can be found at present.A well-advertised expert gave out a statement in 1899 that my apparatus did not work and that it would take 200 years before a message would be flashed across the Atlantic and even accepted stolidly my congratulations on a supposed great feat. But subsequent examination of the records showed that my devices were secretly used all the time and ever since I learned of this I have treated these Borgia-Medici methods with the contempt in which they are held by all fair-minded men. The wholesale appropriation of my inventions was, however, not always without a diverting side. As an example to the point I may mention my oscillation transformer operating with an air gap. This was in turn replaced by a carbon arc, quenched gap, an atmosphere of hydrogen, argon or helium, by a mechanical break with oppositely rotating members, a mercury interrupter or some kind of a vacuum bulb and by such tours de force as many new "systems" have been produced. I refer to this of course, without the slightest ill-feeling, let us advance by all means. But I cannot help thinking how much better it would have been if the ingenious men, who have originated these "systems," had invented something of their own instead of depending on me altogether.Before 1900 two most valuable improvements were made. One of these was my individualized system with transmitters emitting a wave-complex and receivers comprising separate tuned elements cooperatively associated. The underlying principle can be explained in a few words. Suppose that there are n simple vibrations suitable for use in wireless transmission, the probability that any one tune will be struck by an extraneous disturbance is 1/n. There will then remain n-1 vibrations and the chance that one of these will be excited is 1/n-1 hence the probability that two tunes would be struck at the same time is 1/n(n-1). Similarly, for a combination of three the chance will be 1/n(n-1)(n-2) and so on. It will be readily seen that in this manner any desired degree of safety against the statics or other kind of disturbance can be attained provided the receiving apparatus is so designed that is operation is possible only thru the joint action of all the tuned elements. This was a difficult problem which I have successfully solved so that now any desired number of simultaneous messages is practicable in the transmission thru the earth as well as thru artificial conductors.The other invention, of still greater importance, is a peculiar oscillator enabling the transmission of energy without wires in any quantity that may ever be required for industrial use, to any distance, and with very high economy. It was the outcome of years of systematic study and investigation and wonders will be achieved by its means.The prevailing misconception of the mechanism involved in the wireless transmission has been responsible for various unwarranted announcements which have misled the public and worked harm. By keeping steadily in mind that the transmission thru the earth is in every respect identical to that thru a straight wire, one will gain a clear understanding of the phenomena and will be able to judge correctly the merits of a new scheme. Without wishing to detract from the value of any plan that has been put forward I may say that they are devoid of novelty. So for instance in Fig. 12 arrangements of transmitting and receiving circuits are illustrated, which I have described in my U.S. Patent No. 613809 of November 8, 1898 on a Method of and Apparatus for Controlling Mechanism of Moving Vessels or Vehicles, and which have been recently dished up as original discoveries. In other patents and technical publications I have suggested conductors in the ground as one of the obvious modifications indicated in Fig. 5.For the same reason the statics are still the bane of the wireless. There is about as much virtue in the remedies recently proposed as in hair restorers. A small and compact apparatus has been produced which does away entirely with this trouble, at least in plants suitable remodelled.Nothing is more important in the present phase of development of the wireless art than to dispose of the dominating erroneous ideas. With this object I shall advance a few arguments based on my own observations which prove that Hertz waves have little to do with the results obtained even at small distances.In Fig. 13 a transmitter is shown radiating space waves of considerable frequency. It is generally believed that these waves pass along the earth's surface and thus affect the receivers. I can hardly think of anything more improbable than this "gliding wave" theory and the conception of the "guided wireless" which are contrary to all laws of action and reaction. Why should these disturbances cling to a conductor where they are counteracted by induced currents, when they can propagate in all other directions unimpeded? The fact is that the radiations of the transmitter passing along the earth's surface are soon extinguished, the height, of, the inactive zone indicated in the diagram, being some function of the wave length, the bulk of the waves traversing freely the atmosphere. Terrestrial phenomena which I have noted conclusively show that there is no Heaviside layer, or if it exists, it is of no effect. It certainly would be unfortunate if the human race were thus imprisoned and forever without power to reach out into the depths of space.The actions at a distance cannot be proportionate to the height of the antenna and the current in the same. I shall endeavor to make this clear by reference to diagram in Fig. 14. The elevated terminal charged to a high potential induces an equal and opposite charge in the earth and there are thus Q lines giving an average current I=4Qn which circulates locally and is useless except that it adds to the momentum. A relatively small number of lines q however, go off to great distance and to these corresponds a mean current of ie=4qn to which is due the action at a distance. The total average current in the antenna is thus Im = 4Qn + 4qn and its intensity is no criterion for the performance. The electric efficiency of the antenna is q/Q+q and this is often a very small fraction.Dr. L. W. Austin and Mr. J. L. Hogan have made quantitative measurements which are valuable, but far from supporting the Hertz wave theory they are evidences in disproval of the same, as will be easily perceived by taking the above facts into consideration. Dr. Austin's researches are especially useful and instructive and I regret that I cannot agree with him on this subject. I do not think that if his receiver was affected by Hertz waves he could ever establish such relations as he has found, but he would be likely to reach these results if the Hertz waves were in a large part eliminated. At great distance the space waves and the current waves are of equal energy, the former being merely an accompanying manifestation of the latter in accordance with the fundamental teachings of Maxwell.It occurs to me here to ask the question - why have the Hertz waves, been reduced from the original frequencies to those I have advocated for my system, when in so doing the activity of the transmitting apparatus has been reduced a billion fold? I can invite any expert to perform an experiment such as is illustrated in Fig. 15, which shows the classical Hertz oscillator altho we may have in the Hertz oscillator an activity thousands of times greater, the effect on the receiver is not to be compared to that of the grounded circuit. This shows that in the transmission from an airplane we are merely working thru a condenser, the capacity of which is a function of a logarithmic ratio between the length of the conductor and the distance from the ground. The receiver is affected in exactly the same manner as from an ordinary transmitter, the only difference being that there is a certain modification of the action which can be predetermined from the electrical constants. It is not at all difficult to maintain communication between an airplane and a station on the ground, on the contrary, the feat is very easy.To mention another experiment in support of my view, I may refer to Fig. 16 in which two grounded circuits are shown excited by oscillations of the Hertzian order. It will be found that the antennas can be put out of parallelism without noticeable change in the action on the receiver, this proving that it is due to currents propagated thru the ground and not to space waves.Particularly significant are the results obtained in cases illustrated in Figures 17 and 18. In the former an obstacle is shown in the path of the waves but unless the receiver is within the effective electrostatic influence of the mountain range, the signals are not appreciably weakened by the presence of the latter, because the currents pass under it and excite the circuit in the same way as if it were attached to an energized wire. If, as in Fig. 18, a second range happens to be beyond the receiver, it could only strengthen the Hertz wave effect by reflection, but as a matter of fact it detracts greatly from the intensity of the received impulses because the electric niveau between the mountains is raised, as I have explained with my lightning protector in the experimenter of February.Again in Fig. 19 two transmitting circuits, one grounded directly and the other thru an air gaas shown. It is a common observation that the former is far more effective, which could not be the case with Hertz radiations. In a like manner if two grounded circuits are observed from day to daythe effect is found to increase greatly with the dampness of the ground, and for the same reason also the transmission thru sea-water is more efficient.An illuminating experiment is indicated in Fig. 20 in which two grounded transmitters are shown, one with a large and the other with a small terminal capacity. Suppose that the latter be 1/10 of the former but that it is charged to 10 times the potential and let the frequency of the two circuits and therefore the currents in both antennas be exactly the same. The circuit with the smaller capacity will then have 10 times the energy of the other but the effects on the receiver will be in no wise proportionate.The same conclusions will be reached by transmitting and receiving circuits with wires buried underground. In each case the actions carefully investigated will be found to be due to earth currents. Numerous other proofs might be cited which can be easily verified. So for example oscillations of low frequency are ever so much more effective in the transmission which is inconsistent with the prevailing idea. My observations in 1900 and the recent transmissions of signals to very great distances are another emphatic disproval.The Hertz wave theory of wireless transmission may be kept up for a while, but I do not hesitate to say that in a short time it will be recognized as one of the most remarkable and inexplicable aberrations of the scientific mind which has ever been recorded in history.Tesla's proposition that gravity is a field effect is being given more serious consideration by researchers. At the time of his announcement, his critique on Einstein's work was considered by the scientific establishment to exceed the bounds of reason. While this theory is disputed by some or simply ignored by others, it does not change the clear indication of the resurfacing of many supposedly "new" ether based theories by current scientists. Initially developed between 1892 and 1894 during the period in which he was conducting experiments with high frequency and high potential currents and electromagnetism, it was subsequently never officially published. Though these principles guided his future research and experiments, Tesla did not announce his theory until near the end of his life after he had been disillusioned by the war efforts. The Dynamic Theory of Gravity neither appears nor is mentioned anywhere in standard Tesla informative sites and reportedly, is still classified and unavailable under the FOIA.http://...Dynamic theory of gravityTesla published a prepared statement on his 81st birthday (July 10, 1937) critiquing Albert Einstein's theory of relativity. The following is a portion of that statement:"... Supposing that the bodies act upon the surrounding space causing curving of the same, it appears to my simple mind that the curved spaces must react on the bodies, and producing the opposite effects, straightening out the curves. Since action and reaction are coexistent, it follows that the supposed curvature of space is entirely impossible - But even if it existed it would not explain the motions of the bodies as observed. Only the existence of a field of force can account for the motions of the bodies as observed, and its assumption dispenses with space curvature. All literature on this subject is futile and destined to oblivion. So are all attempts to explain the workings of the universe without recognizing the existence of the ether and the indispensable function it plays in the phenomena.""My second discovery was of a physical truth of the greatest importance. As I have searched the entire scientific records in more than a half dozen languages for a long time without finding the least anticipation, I consider myself the original discoverer of this truth, which can be expressed by the statement: There is no energy in matter other than that received from the environment." — Nikola TeslaWhile this statement asserted that Tesla had "worked out a dynamic theory of gravity" that he soon hoped to give to the world, he reportedly died before he publicized the details. There is still a halo of mystery around his death - even the exact date is not certain. It is speculated that his death may have been caused by too much "pressure" by agents in order to extract and obtain the secret documents regarding this theory.Unfortunately few details were publicly revealed by Tesla about his theory. Available details argument against space being curved by gravitational effects, which leads some to believe Tesla failed to understand Einstein's theory is not about curved space at all, but curved space-time. However, there is disagreement about Tesla's exact understanding of Einstein's theories; Tesla was actively conducting tangible experiments during the time of Einstein's theoretical research. He underlined that time was a mere man-made reference used for convenience and as such the idea of a "curved space-time" was delusional, hence there was no basis for the Relativistic "space-time" binomium concept.http://...Tesla's aether conceptIt is important to correctly comprehend Tesla's unique aether concept as several popular researchers in the field have not done. Tesla's aether is analogous to the classical aether "gas" theory."Long ago he recognized that all perceptible matter comes from a primary substance, or tenuity beyond conception, filling all space, the Akasha or luminiferous ether, acted upon by the life giving Prana or creative force, calling into existence, in never ending cycles all things and phenomena. The primary substance, thrown into infinitesimal whirls of prodigious velocity, becomes gross matter; the force subsiding, the motion ceases and matter disappears, reverting to the primary substance." (Grotz, 1997)Tesla's aether is a rarefied gas having extreme elasticity. It allows ponderable matter to pass almost freely through it, waves in it are electromagnetic waves and electrostatic, gravitational and magnetic forces are all directly related to the aether. It is important to note that there are major errors in the works of several major Tesla researchers, they have incorrectly deduced from Tesla's pre-1900 lectures on alternate currents of high potential that Tesla said his aether could be "polarized" and made "rigid" through a particular high frequency alternator and single terminal coil (ex. 1892 lecture in London) and 2 metal plates which he "suspended" in the air making the space between them rigid "privately" on one another (ed. the Tesla Effect). Tesla believed his aether to be an insulating medium and after studying the lectures in detail it becomes apparent that he is in fact talking about polarizing and solidifying the air, not the aether. Also his aether is said to be carriers immersed in an insulating medium as supposedly quoted from one of his high frequency lectures. This is incorrect as reading it properly it states that the air is the carriers and the insulating medium is the aether. In 1894, Tesla invented a special bulb (which was the ultimate result of his research in vacuum tubes; the unipolar "targetless" bulb) which augmented this technology to create "tubes of force" which could be used for motive power (what Tesla later cited as "veritable ropes of air"). Note that the tubes of force is only a theory and without proof should not be taken seriously.http://...Theory structureTesla said he had fully developed his Dynamic Theory of Gravity and "worked it out in all the details". This aether-based theory, which initially was developed between 1893-94, explained gravity and directly linked it to electromagnetic phenomena, explaining also that the sun and all stars emit "primary solar rays" which in turn produce secondary radiations. Tesla's theory states that the phenomena produced by electromagnetic forces is the most important phenomenon in the universe. According to portions from his theory, mechanical motions are universally a result of electromagnetic force acting upon and through media. Unfortunately, no mathematical details of the theory have officially surfaced.Tesla demonstrated that all bodies have electrical content and as such, are all moving charges as our earth hurls through space at incredible speed (hence 'dynamic'). He demonstrated, through the use of his particular evacuated tubes and high voltage coils powered by specifically designed high frequency alternators, how earth emanates "microwaves" and how it behaves as a charged sphere. Based on these discoveries and their confirmation at Colorado Springs, he developed and tested his first electromagnetic machine that could fly "devoid of sustaining wings, propellers or gas bags".http://...Non-hertzian wavesIn the Responses to Questions on December 20, 2000 of various authors and researchers concerning Mr. Tesla, it is reported that Tesla's concept of "electromagnetic momentum" appears to have been gleamed from Maxwell's original work (ed. the equation usually referred to as the Maxwell's equation in use today were written by Oliver Heaviside and could rightly then be called the "Maxwell-Heaviside equations"). Tesla was familiar with the quaternion notation in Maxwell's work and often referred to Maxwell's books. Tesla also conveyed the notion of J. Zenneck's longitudal ground wave as the non-Hertzian wave he was talking about. These are now known today in microwave field theory as "surface waves". Tesla calls attention to a "field of force" being indispensable for explaining the movements of astronomical objects (a concept that fields model the phenomenon more precisely). Heaviside himself offered "a gravitational and electromagnetic analogy" (The Electrician, 1893). Others have continued this line of work. Oleg D. Jefimenko wrote the book "Causality, electromagnetic induction, and gravitation : a different approach to the theory of electromagnetic and gravitational fields" (Star City [West Virginia] : Electret Scientific Co., c1992.ISBN 0917406095 ).http://...ComponentsThis theory is a logical extension of the rotating magnetic field model. According to the Swami Vivekananda,"the Vedantic Prana and Akasha and the Kalpas, which according to [Tesla was] the only theories modern science can entertain [... he] thinks he can demonstrate that mathematically that force and matter are reducible to potential energy" (Grotz, 1997)Tesla electromagnetics are composed of potentials and their corresponding motion. This potential's motion causes in the surrounding medium an equivalent and opposite effect (determining the positive and negative character of the medium). Some elements of the theory may include:All ponderable bodies are constantly in motion in through space.Absence of a medium would result in no electromagnetic forces (the space-vacuum fabric is a medium, the aether (the ultimate medium))Ponderable bodies and other media filling space all possess a dielectric level.Motion through space produces the "illusion of time".Mechanical effects are produced by electromagnetic forces acting through media (i.e., momentum and inertia is electromagnetic in nature; Energy is force over time)A media exposed to resonant vibrations of electromagnetic force interact.Electromagnetic energy fills all space (referred to as radiant energy).Electromagnetic force is a phenomenon produced through the medium in space (eg., the result of the medium acting upon ponderable matter).Modulating Wideband frequencies of electromagnetic phenomenon permeate through all media (akin to spread spectrums).Self-regenerative hetrodyning electromagnetic fields condense through the medium in space.Electromagnetic potentials arrange themselves in groups according to the medium's polarization and the medium's dielectric resistance.Electromagnetic fields interact and produce rotating fields.Electromagnetic entropy returns energy to potentials.Electromagnetic potentials of high frequency produce: [a] lower environmental interaction, [b] uniform movement without rotation through space-time, and [c] electromagnetic saturation [i.e., plasmas]Stationary low frequency electromagnetics behave as waves.Medium's electromagnetic fields creates attractive forces from negative polarity [or what is commonly referred to as "gravity"].Tesla never referred to "space-time" directly, referring instead to the concept of the "primary substance". He also never used this relativistic "twin" term. He considered time as a mere man-made "measure" of the rate at which events occur such as a distance travelled (in miles or kms) in a certain period of time, for a frame of reference. He considered the "curving" of space to be absurd (putting it in gentle terms) saying that if a moving body curved space the "equal and opposite" reaction of space on the body would "straighten space back out".http://...Contrasts and knowledgeTesla's theory put him in direct contrast with the re-emerging Relativity theory, which is that energy does not directly originate from matter or vice versa, but that matter behaves as a medium for forces to act upon or to act through, and that without matter there is no Energy (nor Force) and vice versa (he said a body without force is like a body without a mind).All this energy (sometimes viewed as "Zero Point Energy") comes from the environment (through aether or the "medium") and reverts back to the environment giving life to matter, forming a "closed circuit" through one way or the other (being "accessed" more efficiently or less based on the methodology). It is omnipresent, day or night, and is "re-emitted" by every star in our universe naturally including our sun. Tesla knew every "ponderable body" had an electrical content, and as such, proportionally interacted with the surrounding aether. The earth is like a charged sphere hurling through space (thus a current, hence magnetic field), around the sun powered by it's primary rays (and giant electric currents along "frozen magnetic lines of force", according to the works of Hannes Alfven mentioned in Lehrner's "The Big Bang Never Happened" ISBN 067974049X).The observed effects of solar flares through earth's magnetic field, and auroras at the poles, also manifest themselves through high voltage distribution overloads in certain areas due to these high energy/radiation "bursts". As the Earth rotates and revolves around the sun at great speed, a portion of the aether is polarized (is "rigidified" by "rapidly varying electrostatic forces" emitted by the Earth) and carried along by the electric field of the Earth which decreases with the inverse square of the distance from the Earth. Tesla measured these electrostatic emissions with a particular partially evacuated tube which he could orient as desired and watch the wave patterns change shape.Here come into play the "tubes of force" (Faraday, Lord Kelvin, Maxwell, J.J. Thomson) that - due to independent charge ratio depending on density and electrical content - are absorbed by bodies and impart a downward momentum (thus "gravity" is a downward push, not a pull) creating the sensation of a "gravity field". It is the interaction between the electrical content of every "dynamic" body with aether carriers (comprising tubes of force) that results in momentum being imparted to a body (an electromagnetic to mechanical interconversion). It is an endless "circuit loop" that continuously keeps everything in motion in our universe (Tesla's "Wheelwork of Nature") which if understood can give the ability to achieve "any desired result".This "carrier exchange" is constant, but can be artificially manipulated using high voltage direct current brush and appropriate high voltage high frequency alternating current potentials in order to block or reduce it. Every moving body in our universe transverses this omni-directional radiation and interacts with the aether since all media have electrical content. The important fact is that the aether can convert the weaker, mechanical force, to the much stronger electromagnetic one. This holds the key to increasing "work" over a period of time. This exchange is constantly occurring in our universe and is it's unlimited "prime mover".http://...Einstein and relativityAs an alternative to Einstein's general relativity (the original relativity theory came from R. Boscovich, [1711-1787]), the Dynamic Theory of Gravity explained the fields of gravity through electrodynamics. Tesla stated that there was no energy in matter other than that received from its environment: he did not accept the mass-energy equivalence asdelineated by special relativity. Tesla rejected this concept from Einstein, as the special relativity theory's principles ignored gravitional effects.One must keep in mind that Einstein was involved with aether theories of the time (one of his first papers was titled, "The Investigation of the State of Aether in Magnetic Fields"). He had access to patents and documentation as he worked as a library clerk at the Swiss patent office since 1902 and undoubtly gave more than a good look at them, before the Relativistic theory popped up for the second time (the original being the theory of Boscovich). Einstein himself said,"The secret to creativity is knowing how to hide your sources".Einstein has been accused, by his detractors (historically and even recently), of plagiarizing other people's work without giving them any credit. Einstrein's work at the patent office early in his career gave him plenty of information, also. Aether is the "ultimate" medium (Tesla often interchanged the term "medium" with "aether") - being a perfect fluid and transporting independent carriers. Tesla said that electromagnetic radiation was propagated, like sound waves in the ether.

EbzaarAll about ebazaarTerms & Conditions“GeneralThis document is an electronic record in terms of Information Technology Act, 2000 and rules there under as applicable and the amended provisions pertaining to electronic records in various statutes as amended by the Information Technology Act, 2000. This electronic record is generated by a computer system and does not require any physical or digital signatures.This document is published in accordance with the provisions of Rule 3 (1) of the Information Technology (Intermediaries guidelines) Rules, 2011 that require publishing the rules and regulations, privacy policy and Terms of Use for access or usage of eBZaar.com website.The domain name eBZaar.com is owned by Mr. Viral Thakker and is made available to Yamini India Private Limited, a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 2013 with its registered office at B502, Greenwoods, Andheri Kurla Road, Chakala, Andheri East, Mumbai 400093, Maharashta, India (hereinafter referred to as "YIPL") under a licensing arrangement. The website eBZaar.com (hereinafter referred to as “ebzaar” or "Website") is owned and operated by YIPL and it is explicitly understood that Mr. Viral Thakker has no obligations to any parties in his personal capacity.Your use of the Website and services and tools are governed by the following terms and conditions ("Terms of Use" including policies listed under “Additional Terms” herein below) as applicable to the Website including the applicable policies which are incorporated herein by way of reference. If You transact on the Website, You shall be subject to the policies that are applicable to the Website for such transaction. By mere use of the Website, You shall be contracting with Yamini India Private Limited (“YIPL”) and these terms and conditions including the policies constitute Your binding obligations, with YIPL.For the purpose of these Terms of Use, wherever the context so requires "You" or "User" shall mean any natural or legal person who has agreed to become a buyer on the Website by providing Registration Data orother Personally Identifiable Information while registering / transacting on the Website as Registered User / Guest User using the computer systems. YIPL allows the User to surf the Website or making purchases without registering on the Website. The term "We", "Us", "Our" shall mean Yamini India Private Limited.When You use any of the services provided by Us through the Website, including but not limited to, (e.g. Product Reviews, Seller Reviews), You will be subject to the rules, guidelines, policies, terms, and conditions applicable to such service, and they shall be deemed to be incorporated into this Terms of Use and shall be considered as part and parcel of this Terms of Use. We reserve the right, at Our sole discretion, to change, modify, add or remove portions of these Terms of Use, at any time without any prior written notice to You. It is Your responsibility to review these Terms of Use periodically for updates / changes. Your continued use of the Website following the posting of changes will mean that You accept and agree to the revisions. As long as You comply with these Terms of Use, We grant You a personal, non-exclusive, non-transferable, limited privilege to enter and use the Website.ACCESSING, BROWSING OR OTHERWISE USING THE SITE INDICATES YOUR AGREEMENT TO ALL THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS UNDER THESE TERMS OF USE, SO PLEASE READ THE TERMS OF USE CAREFULLY BEFORE PROCEEDING. By impliedly or expressly accepting these Terms of Use, You also accept and agree to be bound by YIPL Policies (including but not limited to Privacy Policy available on eBZaar.com) as amended from time to time.I. Membership EligibilityUse of the Website is available only to persons who can form legally binding contracts under Indian Contract Act, 1872. Persons who are "incompetent to contract" within the meaning of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 including minors, un-discharged insolvents etc. are not eligible to use the Website. If you are a minor i.e. under the age of 18 years, you shall not register as a User of the Website and shall not transact on or use the Website. As a minor if you wish to use or transact on website, such use or transaction may be made by your legal guardian or parents on the Website. YIPL reserves the right to terminate your membership and / or refuse to provide you with access to the Website if it is brought to YIPL's notice or if it is discovered that you are under the age of 18 years.II. Your Account and Registration ObligationsBy using the Website, you agree that You shall be responsible for maintaining the confidentiality of your Display Name / User Name and Password and that You shall be responsible for all activities that occur under your Display Name / User Name and Password. You agree that if You provide any information that is untrue, inaccurate, not current or incomplete or We have reasonable grounds to suspect that such information is untrue, inaccurate, not current or incomplete, or not in accordance with the this Terms of Use, We shall have the right to indefinitely suspend or terminate or block access of your membership on the Website and refuse to provide You with access to the Website.III. CommunicationsWhen You use the Website or send emails or other data, information or communication to us, You agree and understand that You are communicating with Us through electronic records and You consent to receive communications via electronic records from Us periodically and as and when required. We may communicate with you by email or by such other mode of communication, electronic or otherwise.IV. Platform for Transaction and CommunicationThe Website is a platform that Users shall utilize to transact with ebzaar and / or other Sellers, affiliates, merchants, vendors, partners (Collectively “Sellers” or “Partners”) and / or interact with one another for their transactions. User understands that ebzaar can also act as a Seller in certain instances and in all such cases, the name of ebzaar shall be displayed as a Seller, as also on the Invoice. YIPL is not and cannot be a party to or control in any manner any transaction between the Website's Users.Henceforth:1. All commercial/contractual terms are offered by and agreed to between Buyers and Sellers alone. The commercial/contractual terms include without limitation price, shipping costs, payment methods, payment terms, date, period and mode of delivery, warranties related to products and services and after sales services related to products and services. YIPL does not have any control or does not determine or advise or in any way involve itself in the offering or acceptance of such commercial/contractual terms between the Buyers and Sellers, except in limited cases of transactions where ebzaar is acting as a Seller.2. YIPL does not make any representation or Warranty as to specifics (such as quality, value, salability, etc) of the products or services proposed to be sold or offered to be sold or purchased on the Website. YIPL does not implicitly or explicitly support or endorse the sale or purchase of any products or services on the Website. YIPL accepts no liability for any errors or omissions, whether on behalf of itself or third parties.3. YIPL is not responsible for any non-performance or breach of any contract entered into between Buyers and Sellers. YIPL cannot and does not guarantee that the concerned Buyers and/or Sellers will perform any transaction concluded on the Website except in limited cases where ebzaar itself is acting as a Seller. YIPL shall not and is not required to mediate or resolve any dispute or disagreement between Buyers and Sellers.4. YIPL does not make any representation or warranty as to the item-specifics (such as legal title, creditworthiness, identity, etc) of any of its Users. You are advised to independently verify the bona fides of any particular User that You choose to deal with on the Website and use Your best judgment in that behalf.5. Except to the extent that ebzaar is acting as a Seller, YIPL does not at any point of time during any transaction between Buyer and Seller on the Website come into or take possession of any of the products or services offered by Seller on it’s own account nor does it at any point gain title to or have any rights or claims over the products or services offered by Seller to Buyer. Where so warranted the Seller may request YIPL to undertake possession of goods for one or more purposes like storing, sorting, storing, labelling, storing, packaging, shipping or returns or other such purposes and in such a case, the Buyer and Seller agrees that YIPL is not responsible to either the Buyer or the Seller for any damage, defect, theft or any other loss incurred in respect of such goods while in possession of goods irrespective of whether such a loss is caused by event of nature or is a man made incident.6. At no time shall YIPL does not hold any right, title or interest over the products nor shall YIPL have any obligations or liabilities in respect of such contract entered into between Buyers and Sellers except in the limited case of transactions where ebzaar is also acting as a Seller. YIPL is not responsible for unsatisfactory or delayed performance of services or damages or delays as a result of products which are out of stock, unavailable or back ordered.7. You shall independently agree upon the manner and terms and conditions of delivery, payment, insurance etc. with the Partner(s) that You transact with.8.You release and indemnify YIPL and/or any of its officers, representatives, affiliates, Partners, licensors, licensees from any cost, damage, liability or other consequence of any of the actions of the Users of the Website and specifically waive any claims that you may have in this behalf under any applicable law. Notwithstanding its reasonable efforts in that behalf, YIPL cannot take responsibility or control the information provided by other Users which is made available on the Website. You may find other User's information to be offensive, harmful, inconsistent, inaccurate, or deceptive. Please use caution and practice safe trading when using the Website.Please note that there could be risks in dealing with underage persons or people acting under false pretence.V. ChargesMembership on the Website is free for Buyers. YIPL does not charge any fee from Buyers for browsing and buying on the Website. YIPL reserves the right to change its Fee Policy from time to time. In particular, YIPL may at its sole discretion introduce new services and modify some or all of the existing services offered on the Website. In such an event YIPL reserves the right to introduce fees for the new services offered or amend/introduce fees for existing services, as the case may be. Changes to the Fee Policy shall be posted on the Website and such changes shall automatically become effective immediately after they are posted on the Website. Unless otherwise stated, all fees shall be quoted in Indian Rupees. You shall be solely responsible for compliance of all applicable laws including those in India for making payments to YIPL.VI. Use of the WebsiteYou agree, undertake and confirm that Your use of Website shall be strictly governed by the following binding principles:1. You shall not host, display, upload, modify, publish, transmit, update or share any information which:(a) belongs to another person and to which You do not have any right to;(b) is grossly harmful, harassing, blasphemous, defamatory, obscene, pornographic, paedophilic, libellous, invasive of another's privacy, hateful, or racially, ethnically objectionable, disparaging, relating or encouraging money laundering or gambling, or otherwise unlawful in any manner whatever; or unlawfully threatening or unlawfully harassing including but not limited to "indecent representation of women" within the meaning of the Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986;(c) is misleading in any way;(d) is patently offensive to the online community, such as sexually explicit content, or content that promotes obscenity, paedophilia, racism, bigotry, hatred or physical harm of any kind against any group or individual;(e) harasses or advocates harassment of another person;(f) involves the transmission of "junk mail", "chain letters", or unsolicited mass mailing or "spamming";(g) promotes illegal activities or conduct that is abusive, threatening, obscene, defamatory or libellous;(h) infringes upon or violates any third party's rights [including, but not limited to, intellectual property rights, rights of privacy (including without limitation unauthorized disclosure of a person's name, email address, physical address or phone number) or rights of publicity];(i) promotes an illegal or unauthorized copy of another person's copyrighted work (see "Copyright complaint" below for instructions on how to lodge a complaint about uploaded copyrighted material), such as providing pirated computer programs or links to them, providing information to circumvent manufacture-installed copy-protect devices, or providing pirated music or links to pirated music files;(j) contains restricted or password-only access pages, or hidden pages or images (those not linked to or from another accessible page);(k) provides material that exploits people in a sexual, violent or otherwise inappropriate manner or solicits personal information from anyone;(l) provides instructional information about illegal activities such as making or buying illegal weapons, violating someone's privacy, or providing or creating computer viruses;(m) contains video, photographs, or images of another person (with a minor or an adult).(n) tries to gain unauthorized access or exceeds the scope of authorized access to the Website or to profiles, blogs, communities, account information, bulletins, friend request, or other areas of the Website or solicits passwords or personal identifying information for commercial or unlawful purposes from other users;(o) engages in commercial activities and/or sales without Our prior written consent such as contests, sweepstakes, barter, advertising and pyramid schemes, or the buying or selling of "virtual" products related to the Website. Throughout this Terms of Use, YIPL's prior written consent means a communication coming from YIPL's Legal Department, specifically in response to Your request, and specifically addressing the activity or conduct for which You seek authorization;(p) solicits gambling or engages in any gambling activity which We, in Our sole discretion, believes is or could be construed as being illegal;(q) interferes with another USER's use and enjoyment of the Website or any other individual's User and enjoyment of similar services;(r) refers to any website or URL that, in Our sole discretion, contains material that is inappropriate for the Website or any other website, contains content that would be prohibited or violates the letter or spirit of these Terms of Use.(s) harm minors in any way;(t) infringes any patent, trademark, copyright or other proprietary rights or third party's trade secrets or rights of publicity or privacy or shall not be fraudulent or involve the sale of counterfeit or stolen products;(u) violates any law for the time being in force;(v) deceives or misleads the addressee/ users about the origin of such messages or communicates any information which is grossly offensive or menacing in nature;(w) impersonate another person;(x) contains software viruses or any other computer code, files or programs designed to interrupt, destroy or limit the functionality of any computer resource; or contains any trojan horses, worms, time bombs, cancelbots, easter eggs or other computer programming routines that may damage, detrimentally interfere with, diminish value of, surreptitiously intercept or expropriate any system, data or personal information;(y) threatens the unity, integrity, defence, security or sovereignty of India, friendly relations with foreign states, or public order or causes incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence or prevents investigation of any offence or is insulting any other nation.(z) shall not be false, inaccurate or misleading;(aa) shall not, directly or indirectly, offer, attempt to offer, trade or attempt to trade in any item, the dealing of which is prohibited or restricted in any manner under the provisions of any applicable law, rule, regulation or guideline for the time being in force.(ab) shall not create liability for Us or cause Us to lose (in whole or in part) the services of Our internet service provider ("ISPs") or other suppliers;2. You shall not use any "deep-link", "page-scrape", "robot", "spider" or other automatic device, program, algorithm or methodology, or any similar or equivalent manual process, to access, acquire, copy or monitor any portion of the Website or any Content, or in any way reproduce or circumvent the navigational structure or presentation of the Website or any Content, to obtain or attempt to obtain any materials, documents or information through any means not purposely made available through the Website. We reserve Our right to bar any such activity.3. You shall not attempt to gain unauthorized access to any portion or feature of the Website, or any other systems or networks connected to the Website or to any server, computer, network, or to any of the services offered on or through the Website, by hacking, password "mining" or any other illegitimate means.4. 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You shall not make any negative, denigrating or defamatory statement(s) or comment(s) about Us or the brand name or domain name used by Us including the terms YIPL, Flog, eBZaar.com, or otherwise engage in any conduct or action that might tarnish the image or reputation, of YIPL or sellers on platform or otherwise tarnish or dilute any YIPL's trade or service marks, trade name and/or goodwill associated with such trade or service marks, trade name as may be owned or used by us. You agree that You will not take any action that imposes an unreasonable or disproportionately large load on the infrastructure of the Website or YIPL's systems or networks, or any systems or networks connected to YIPL.6. You agree not to use any device, software or routine to interfere or attempt to interfere with the proper working of the Website or any transaction being conducted on the Website, or with any other person's use of the Website.7. You may not forge headers or otherwise manipulate identifiers in order to disguise the origin of any message or transmittal You send to Us on or through the Website or any service offered on or through the Website. You may not pretend that You are, or that You represent, someone else, or impersonate any other individual or entity.8. You may not use the Website or any content for any purpose that is unlawful or prohibited by these Terms of Use, or to solicit the performance of any illegal activity or other activity which infringes the rights of YIPL and / or others.9. You shall at all times ensure full compliance with the applicable provisions of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and rules thereunder as applicable and as amended from time to time and also all applicable Domestic laws, rules and regulations (including the provisions of any applicable Exchange Control Laws or Regulations in Force) and International Laws, Foreign Exchange Laws, Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations (including, but not limited to Sales Tax/VAT, Income Tax, Octroi, Service Tax, Central Excise, Custom Duty, Local Levies) regarding Your use of Our service and Your listing, purchase, solicitation of offers to purchase, and sale of products or services. You shall not engage in any transaction in an item or service, which is prohibited by the provisions of any applicable law including exchange control laws or regulations for the time being in force.10. Solely to enable Us to use the information You supply Us with, so that we are not violating any rights You might have in Your Information, You agree to grant Us a non-exclusive, worldwide, perpetual, irrevocable, royalty-free, sub-licensable (through multiple tiers) right to exercise the copyright, publicity, database rights or any other rights You have in Your Information, in any media now known or not currently known, with respect to Your Information. We will only use Your information in accordance with the Terms of Use and Privacy Policy applicable to use of the Website.11. From time to time, You shall be responsible for providing information relating to the products or services proposed to be sold by You. In this connection, You undertake that all such information shall be accurate in all respects. You shall not exaggerate or over emphasize the attributes of such products or services so as to mislead other Users in any manner.12. You shall not engage in advertising to, or solicitation of, other Users of the Website to buy or sell any products or services, including, but not limited to, products or services related to that being displayed on the Website or related to us. You may not transmit any chain letters or unsolicited commercial or junk email to other Users via the Website. It shall be a violation of these Terms of Use to use any information obtained from the Website in order to harass, abuse, or harm another person, or in order to contact, advertise to, solicit, or sell to another person other than Us without Our prior explicit consent. In order to protect Our Users from such advertising or solicitation, We reserve the right to restrict the number of messages or emails which a user may send to other Users in any 24-hour period which We deem appropriate in our sole discretion. You understand that We have the right at all times to disclose any information (including the identity of the persons providing information or materials on the Website) as necessary to satisfy any law, regulation or valid governmental request. This may include, without limitation, disclosure of the information in connection with investigation of alleged illegal activity or solicitation of illegal activity or in response to a lawful court order or subpoena. In addition, We can (and You hereby expressly authorize Us to) disclose any information about You to law enforcement or other government officials, as we, in Our sole discretion, believe necessary or appropriate in connection with the investigation and/or resolution of possible crimes, especially those that may involve personal injury.We reserve the right, but have no obligation, to monitor the materials posted on the Website. YIPL shall have the right to remove or edit any content that in its sole discretion violates, or is alleged to violate, any applicable law or either the spirit or letter of these Terms of Use. Notwithstanding this right, YOU REMAIN SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONTENT OF THE MATERIALS YOU POST ON THE WEBSITE AND IN YOUR PRIVATE MESSAGES. Please be advised that such Content posted does not necessarily reflect YIPL views. In no event shall YIPL assume or have any responsibility or liability for any Content posted or for any claims, damages or losses resulting from use of Content and/or appearance of Content on the Website. You hereby represent and warrant that You have all necessary rights in and to all Content which You provide and all information it contains and that such Content shall not infringe any proprietary or other rights of third parties or contain any libellous, tortious, or otherwise unlawful information.13. Your correspondence or business dealings with, or participation in promotions of, advertisers found on or through the Website, including payment and delivery of related products or services, and any other terms, conditions, warranties or representations associated with such dealings, are solely between You and such advertiser. We shall not be responsible or liable for any loss or damage of any sort incurred as the result of any such dealings or as the result of the presence of such advertisers on the Website.14. It is possible that other users (including unauthorized users or "hackers") may post or transmit offensive or obscene materials on the Website and that You may be involuntarily exposed to such offensive and obscene materials. It also is possible for others to obtain personal information about You due to your use of the Website, and that the recipient may use such information to harass or injure You. We do not approve of such unauthorized uses, but by using the Website You acknowledge and agree that We are not responsible for the use of any personal information that You publicly disclose or share with others on the Website. Please carefully select the type of information that You publicly disclose or share with others on the Website.15. YIPL shall have all the rights to take necessary action and claim damages that may occur due to your involvement/participation in any way on your own or through group/s of people, intentionally or unintentionally in DoS/DDoS (Distributed Denial of Services).VII. Contents Posted on SiteAll text, graphics, user interfaces, visual interfaces, photographs, trademarks, logos, sounds, music and artwork (collectively, "Content"), is a third party user generated content and YIPL has no control over such third party user generated content as YIPL is merely an intermediary for the purposes of this Terms of Use.Except as expressly provided in these Terms of Use, no part of the Website and no Content may be copied, reproduced, republished, uploaded, posted, publicly displayed, encoded, translated, transmitted or distributed in any way (including "mirroring") to any other computer, server, Website or other medium for publication or distribution or for any commercial enterprise, without YIPL's express prior written consent.You may use information on the products and services purposely made available on the Website for downloading, provided that You (1) do not remove any proprietary notice language in all copies of such documents, (2) use such information only for your personal, non-commercial informational purpose and do not copy or post such information on any networked computer or broadcast it in any media, (3) make no modifications to any such information, and (4) do not make any additional representations or warranties relating to such documents.You shall be responsible for any notes, messages, emails, billboard postings, photos, drawings, profiles, opinions, ideas, images, videos, audio files or other materials or information posted or transmitted to the Website (collectively, "Content"). Such Content will become Our property and You grant Us the worldwide, perpetual and transferable rights in such Content. We shall be entitled to, consistent with Our Privacy Policy as adopted in accordance with applicable law, use the Content or any of its elements for any type of use forever, including but not limited to promotional and advertising purposes and in any media whether now known or hereafter devised, including the creation of derivative works that may include the Content You provide.You agree that any Content You post may be used by us, consistent with Our Privacy Policy, Terms of Use, Additional Terms and Rules of Conduct on Site as mentioned herein, and You are not entitled to any payment or other compensation for such use.VIII. PrivacyWe view protection of Your privacy as a very important principle. We understand clearly that You and Your Personal Information is one of Our most important assets. We store and process Your Information including any sensitive financial information collected (as defined under the Information Technology Act, 2000), if any, on computers that may be protected by physical as well as reasonable technological security measures and procedures in accordance with Information Technology Act 2000 and Rules there under. Our current Privacy Policy is available at eBZaar.com. If You object to Your Information being transferred or used in this way please do not use Website.We and our affiliates will share / sell / transfer / license / covey some or all of your personal information with another business entity should we (or our assets) plan to merge with or are acquired by that business entity, or re-organization, amalgamation, restructuring of business or for any other reason whatsoever. Should such a transaction or situation occur, the other business entity or the new combined entity will be required to follow the privacy policy with respect to your personal information. Once you provide your information to us, you provide such information to us and our affiliate and we and our affiliate may use such information to provide you various services with respect to your transaction whether such transaction are conducted on eBZaar.com or with third party merchant's or third party merchant's website.Further details on our Privacy Policy are available at ebzaar.com/privacy-policy and that policy is incorporated as part of Terms of Use by reference.IX. Disclaimer of Warranties and LiabilityThis Website, all the materials and products (including but not limited to software) and services, included on or otherwise made available to You through this site are provided on "as is" and "as available" basis without any representation or warranties, express or implied except otherwise specified in writing. Without prejudice to the forgoing paragraph, YIPL does not warrant that:• This Website will be constantly available, or available at all; or• The information on this Website is complete, true, accurate or non-misleading.YIPL will not be liable to You in any way or in relation to the Contents of, or use of, or otherwise in connection with, the Website. YIPL does not warrant that this site; information, Content, materials, product (including software) or services included on or otherwise made available to You through the Website; their servers; or electronic communication sent from Us are free of viruses or other harmful components.Nothing on Website constitutes, or is meant to constitute, advice of any kind. All the Products sold on Website are governed by different state laws and if Seller is unable to deliver such Products due to implications of different state laws, Seller will return or will give credit for the amount (if any) received in advance by Seller from the sale of such Product that could not be delivered to You.You will be required to enter a valid phone number while placing an order on the Website. By registering Your phone number with us, You consent to be contacted by Us via phone calls and/or SMS notifications, in case of any order or shipment or delivery related updates.X. SellingAs a registered seller, you are allowed to list item(s) for sale on the Website in accordance with the Policies which are incorporated by way of reference in this Terms of Use. You must be legally able to sell the item(s) you list for sale on our Website. You must ensure that the listed items do not infringe upon the intellectual property, trade secret or other proprietary rights or rights of publicity or privacy rights of third parties. Listings may only include text descriptions, graphics and pictures that describe your item for sale. All listed items must be listed in an appropriate category on the Website. All listed items must be kept in stock for successful fulfilment of sales.The listing description of the item must not be misleading and must describe actual condition of the product. If the item description does not match the actual condition of the item, you agree to refund any amounts that you may have received from the Buyer. You agree not to list a single product in across multiple categories on the Website. YIPL reserves the right to delete such multiple listings of the same product listed by you in multiple categories.SERVICESXI. PaymentWhile availing any of the payment method/s available on the Website, we will not be responsible or assume any liability, whatsoever in respect of any loss or damage arising directly or indirectly to You due to:i. Lack of authorization for any transaction/s, orii. Exceeding the preset limit mutually agreed by You and between "Bank/s", oriii. Any payment issues arising out of the transaction, oriv. Decline of transaction for any other reason/sAll payments made against the purchases/services on Website by you shall be compulsorily in Indian Rupees acceptable in the Republic of India. Website will not facilitate transaction with respect to any other form of currency with respect to the purchases made on Website.Before shipping / delivering your order to you, Seller may request you to provide supporting documents (including but not limited to Govt. issued ID and address proof) to establish the ownership of the payment instrument used by you for your purchase. This is done in the interest of providing a safe online shopping environment to Our Users.Further:1. Transactions, Transaction Price and all commercial terms such as Delivery, Dispatch of products and/or services are as per principal to principal bipartite contractual obligations between Buyer and Seller and payment facility is merely used by the Buyer and Seller to facilitate the completion of the Transaction. Use of the payment facility shall not render YIPL liable or responsible for the non-delivery, non-receipt, non-payment, damage, breach of representations and warranties, non-provision of after sales or warranty services or fraud as regards the products and /or services listed on YIPL's Website.2. You have specifically authorized YIPL or its service providers to collect, process, facilitate and remit payments and / or theTransaction Price electronically or through Cash on Delivery to and from other Users in respect of transactions through Payment Facility. Your relationship with YIPL is on a principal to principal basis and by accepting these Terms of Use you agree that YIPL is an independent contractor for all purposes, and does not have control of or liability for the products or services that are listed on YIPL's Website that are paid for by using the Payment Facility. YIPL does not guarantee the identity of any User nor does it ensure that a Buyer or a Seller will complete a transaction.3. You understand, accept and agree that the payment facility provided by YIPL is neither a banking nor financial service but is merely a facilitator providing an electronic, automated online electronic payment, receiving payment through Cash On Delivery, collection and remittance facility for the Transactions on the YIPL Website using the existing authorized banking infrastructure and Credit Card payment gateway networks. Further, by providing Payment Facility, YIPL is neither acting as trustees nor acting in a fiduciary capacity with respect to the Transaction or the Transaction Price.Payment Facility for Buyers:• You, as a Buyer, understand that upon initiating a Transaction You are entering into a legally binding and enforceable contract with the Seller to purchase the products and /or services from the Seller using the Payment Facility, and You shall pay the Transaction Price through Your Issuing Bank to the Seller using Payment Facility.• You, as a Buyer, may agree with the Seller through electronic communication and electronic records and using the automated features as may be provided by Payment Facility on any extension / increase in the Dispatch and/or Delivery time and the Transaction shall stand amended to such extent. Any such extension / increase of Dispatch / Delivery time or subsequent novation / variation of the Transaction should be in compliance with Payment Facility Rules and Policies.• You, as a Buyer, shall electronically notify Payment Facility using the appropriate Website features immediately upon Delivery or non Delivery within the time period as provided in Policies. Non notification by You of Delivery or non Delivery within the time period specified in the Policies shall be construed as a deemed Delivery in respect of that Transaction. In case of Cash On Delivery transactions, Buyer is not required to confirm the receipt of products or services.• You, as a Buyer, shall be entitled to claim a refund of the Transaction Price (as Your sole and exclusive remedy) in case You do not receive the Delivery within the time period agreed in the Transaction or within the time period as provided in the Policies, whichever is earlier. In case you do not raise a refund claim using Website features within the stipulated time than this would make You ineligible for a refund.• You, as a Buyer, understand that the Payment Facility may not be available in full or in part for certain category of products and/or services and/or Transactions as mentioned in the Policies and hence You may not be entitled to a refund in respect of the Transactions for those products and /or services• Except for Cash On Delivery transaction, refund, if any, shall be made at the same Issuing Bank from where Transaction Price was received.• For Cash On Delivery transactions, refunds, if any, will be made via demand draft in favour of the Buyer (As per registration details provided by the Buyer)• Refund shall be made in Indian Rupees only and shall be equivalent to the Transaction Price received in Indian Rupees.• For electronics payments, refund shall be made through payment facility using NEFT / RTGS or any other online banking / electronic funds transfer system approved by Reserve Bank India (RBI).• Refund shall be conditional and shall be with recourse available to YIPL in case of any misuse by Buyer.• Refund shall be subject to Buyer complying with Policies.4. YIPL reserves the right to impose limits on the number of Transactions or Transaction Price which YIPL may receive from on an individual Valid Credit/Debit/ Cash Card / Valid Bank Account/ and such other infrastructure or any other financial instrument directly or indirectly through payment aggregator or through any such facility authorized by Reserve Bank of India to provide enabling support facility for collection and remittance of payment or by an individual Buyer during any time period, and reserves the right to refuse to process Transactions exceeding such limit.5. YIPL reserves the right to refuse to process Transactions by Buyers with a prior history of questionable charges including without limitation breach of any agreements by Buyer with YIPL or breach/violation of any law or any charges imposed by Issuing Bank or breach of any policy.6. YIPL may do such checks as it deems fit before approving the receipt of/Buyers commitment to pay (for Cash On Delivery transactions) Transaction Price from the Buyer for security or other reasons at the discretion of YIPL. As a result of such check if YIPL is not satisfied with the creditability of the Buyer or genuineness of the Transaction / Transaction Price, it will have the right to reject the receipt of / Buyers commitment to pay Transaction Price.7. YIPL may delay notifying the payment confirmation i.e. informing Seller to Dispatch, if YIPL deems suspicious or for Buyers conducting high transaction volumes to ensure safety of the Transaction and Transaction Price. In addition, YIPL may hold Transaction Price and YIPL may not inform Seller to Dispatch or remit Transaction Price to law enforcement officials (instead of refunding the same to Buyer) at the request of law enforcement officials or in the event the Buyer is engaged in any form of illegal activity.8. The Buyer and Seller acknowledge that YIPL will not be liable for any damages, interests or claims etc. resulting from not processing a Transaction/Transaction Price or any delay in processing a Transaction/Transaction Price which is beyond control of YIPL.9. Compliance with Laws: Buyer and Seller shall comply with all the applicable laws (including without limitation Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 and the rules made and notifications issued there under and the Exchange Control Manual as may be issued by Reserve Bank of India from time to time, Customs Act, Information and Technology Act, 2000 as amended by the Information Technology (Amendment) Act 2008, Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and the rules made there under, Foreign Contribution Regulation Act, 1976 and the rules made there under, Income Tax Act, 1961 and the rules made there under, Export Import Policy of government of India) applicable to them respectively for using Payment Facility and the Website.10. Buyer's arrangement with Issuing Bank: All Valid Credit / Debit/ Cash Card/ and other payment instruments are processed using a Credit Card payment gateway or appropriate payment system infrastructure and the same will also be governed by the terms and conditions agreed to between the Buyer and the respective Issuing Bank and payment instrument issuing company.11. All Online Bank Transfers from Valid Bank Accounts are processed using the gateway provided by the respective Issuing Bank which support Payment Facility to provide these services to the Users. All such Online Bank Transfers on Payment Facility are also governed by the terms and conditions agreed to between Buyer and the respective Issuing Bank.XII. Returns and Cancellation Policy1. Add /modify / delete Orders: A customer can add/modify an existing order at least one hour prior to the start of the delivery slot. For instance, if delivery is schedule for 2-6PM delivery slot, order can be modified till one hour prior i.e. 1PM. To cancel an item, please reach out to our Customer Service team on numbers displayed under the Contacts section or write to us at [email protected]. Delivery of defective (broken / leaking / expired) items: eBZaar and Sellers on the Website take utmost care to ensure delivery of quality goods to you – our esteemed customers/Users. We have a no questions asked return policy. However to minimize the inconvenience we request you to check all the items at the time of delivery. In case you are not satisfied with the product received, you can return it with our delivery person at time of delivery or contact our Customer Service team at numbers displayed under the Contacts section or write to us at [email protected]. Products purchased can be returned as per the below:a. Bread/Dairy Products/Fruits & Vegetables – Within 1 day of deliveryb. Packaged Food & Non Food – Within 5 days of deliveryThe detailed Returns Policy can be read at ebzaar.com/returns-policy and is incorporated as part of this Terms of Use by referenceXIII. IndemnityYou shall indemnify and hold harmless YIPL, its owner, licensee, affiliates, subsidiaries, group companies (as applicable) and their respective officers, directors, agents, and employees, from any claim or demand, or actions including reasonable attorneys' fees, made by any third party or penalty imposed due to or arising out of Your breach of this Terms of Use, privacy Policy and other Policies, or Your violation of any law, rules or regulations or the rights (including infringement of intellectual property rights) of a third party.XIV. Applicable LawTerms of Use shall be governed by and interpreted and construed in accordance with the laws of India. The place of jurisdiction shall be exclusively in Mumbai.XV. Jurisdictional Issues/Sale in India OnlyUnless otherwise specified, the material on the Website is presented solely for the purpose of sale in India. YIPL make no representation that materials in the Website are appropriate or available for use in other locations/Countries other than India. Those who choose to access this site from other locations/Countries other than India do so on their own initiative and YIPL is not responsible for supply of products/refund for the products ordered from other locations/Countries other than India, compliance with local laws, if and to the extent local laws are applicable.XVI. Trademark, Copyright and Restriction1. The Website and the processes, and their selection and arrangement, including but not limited to all text, graphics, user interfaces, visual interfaces, sounds and music (if any), artwork and computer code (collectively, the "Content") on the Website is owned and controlled by YIPL and the design, structure, selection, coordination, expression, look and feel and arrangement of such Content is protected by copyright, patent and trademark laws, and various other intellectual property rights.2. The trademarks, logos and service marks displayed on the Website ("Marks") are the property of YIPL or their vendors or respective third parties. You are not permitted to use the Marks without the prior consent of YIPL, the vendor or the third party that may own the Marks.3. Unless otherwise indicated or anything contained to the contrary or any proprietary material owned by a third party and so expressly mentioned, YIPL owns all intellectual property rights to and into the trademark "ebzaar", and the Website, including, without limitation, any and all rights, title and interest in and to copyright, related rights, patents, utility models, designs, know-how, trade secrets and inventions (patent pending), goodwill, source code, meta tags, databases, text, content, graphics, icons, and hyperlinks.4. Except as expressly provided herein, You acknowledge and agree that You shall not copy, republish, post, display, translate, transmit, reproduce or distribute any Content through any medium without obtaining the necessary authorization from YIPL or thirty party owner of such ContentYou may also refer the Copyright Policy section in the “Additional Terms” listed in following pages.XVII. Product DescriptionYIPL we do not warrant that Product description or other content of this Website is accurate, complete, reliable, current, or error-free and assumes no liability in this regard.XVIII. Limitation of LiabilityIN NO EVENT SHALL YIPL BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OF ANY KIND IN CONNECTION WITH THESE TERMS OF USE, EVEN IF USER HAS BEEN INFORMED IN ADVANCE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.ADDITIONAL TERMS: Additional Terms of Use form part of this main Terms of Use and are incorporated here by reference. You may read additional terms at ebzaar.com/additional-terms.Additional TermsThe following terms will also form integral part to terms of use of the Website and should be read in conjunction with the Terms of Use as mentioned elsewhere on the Website.POLICIESI. Profanity PolicyYIPL prohibits the use of language that is racist, hateful, sexual or obscene in nature in a public area.This policy extends to text within listings, on Seller pages and all other areas of the site that another User may view. If the profane words are part of a title for the item being sold, we allow Sellers to 'blur' out the bulk of the offending word with asterisks (i.e., s*** or f***).Please report any violations of this policy to the correct area for review:· Report offensive Display Names· Report offensive language in a listing or otherwiseIf a feedback comment; or any communication made between Users on the Website; or email communication between Users in relation to transactions conducted on Website contain profanity, please review Our feedback removal policy and submit a request for action/removal.Disciplinary action may result in the indefinite suspension of a User's account, temporary suspension, or a formal warning.YIPL will consider the circumstances of an alleged policy violation and the user's trading records before taking action. Violations of this policy may result in a range of actions, including:1. Limits placed on account privileges;2. Loss of special status;3. Account suspension.II. Disputes (Resolutions) PolicyOverviewGenerally, transactions are conducted smoothly on the Website. However there may be some cases where both the Buyers and Sellers may face issues. At YIPL, we have a Dispute Resolution process in order to resolve disputes between Buyers and Sellers.1. What is a 'dispute'?A 'Dispute' can be defined as a disagreement between a Buyer and a Seller in connection with a transaction on the Website.2. How does a 'dispute' occur in the Marketplace?Disputes are filed as a result of a disagreement between the Buyer and the Seller. Disputes arise out of an issue that is raised by either party not being completely satisfied with the resolution of their complaint/issue.It is important that before a Buyer/Seller raises a dispute, they should attempt to solve the issue. Please note that whenever a Buyer raises a dispute, the Seller's payment for that order is put on hold immediately until the issue is resolved.3. How is a 'dispute' created?Whenever there is a disagreement, the Buyer can write to [email protected], while the Seller can write to [email protected], in order to raise a dispute. The email should clearly mention the word “DISPUTE” in the subject line to ensure that it is treated as a dispute. Disputes can be raised at a particular transaction level.4. What are the various types of 'disputes'?Following are the indicative examples of potential disputes:1. Wrong item received2. Item Not as described· Damaged or Seal broken on Product· Part/Accessory missing· Item not Compatible· Seller Description/Specification Wrong· Defective (Functional issues)· Product not working and Manufacturer claims invalid InvoiceIn case the Seller rejects the return request of the Buyer, and Buyer raises a dispute, then YIPL will try to mediate and resolve the dispute between both the parties. If the dispute is resolved in favour of the Buyer, a refund is provided once the product is returned to the Seller. If the dispute is settled in favour of the Seller, Buyer is not entitled to any refund.5. Buyer Protection ProgramIn case of a dispute where the Seller is unable to provide a refund or a replacement, YIPL will actively work towards reaching a resolution. The Buyer Protection Program covers Buyers who are unable to successfully resolve their dispute with the Seller or are not satisfied the resolution provided bythe Seller.The Buyer can write to [email protected] if the issue with the Seller is not resolved. YIPL's Customer Support team will look into the case to check for possible fraud and if the Buyer has been blacklisted/blocked from making purchases on the Website. Only after verifying these facts, a dispute can be registered.In due course of resolution, YIPL's Customer Support Team will facilitate a conference call including the Seller and the Buyer. When a dispute has been raised, YIPL may provide both the parties access to each others Display Names, contact details including email addresses and other details pertaining to the dispute. Buyers and Sellers are subject to final consent from YIPL for settling the dispute.6. Buyer Eligibility and Restrictionsa. Only Buyers who have purchased the product on the Website are eligible for the Buyer Protection Program. Further, eligibility extends only to those products for which a price is paid.b. Buyers can file a dispute within the Returns Period mentioned under the Returns/Refund Policyc. Any damage or loss to the product after delivery will not be covered under this program and will completely be the Buyer's responsibility. Buyers should refuse to accept delivery if the item is damaged.d. To be able to take advantage of the Buyer Protection Program, Buyers should first contact the Seller and attempt to resolve the issue. If the Buyer doesn't hear from the Seller or is unable to resolve the issue with the Seller even after contact, a dispute can be raised with eBZaar.com by writing an email to [email protected]. Fraudulent charges and claims are not covered under Buyer Protection Program.If the Buyer has already initiated chargeback through the credit card issuing bank, it will not be covered under Buyer Protection Program, though in such cases a Seller can file a claim through the Seller Protection Program.g. Blacklisted and Blocked Buyers are not covered by the Buyer Protection Program.h. Buyers who have reached their maximum lifetime limit for claims are also not eligible. Buyers can make a maximum of 5 claims per year for transactions on the Website. If the claim was withdrawn, it is not counted. The coverage amount will be limited to Rs. 5,000i. Through the Buyer Protection program, YIPL does not provide any guarantee/warranty to Buyers for products sold on YIPL against technical/manufacturing defects.j. Raising disputes against Sellers does not automatically entitle the Buyer to a refund or replacement for the product purchased. YIPL shall verify the disputes so raised and may process only such claims that are valid and genuine.k. YIPL shall at no point be responsible for any direct or indirect losses, expenses, costs of any nature whatsoever that may be incurred by any Buyer/Seller.l. Claims of the nature of 'Buyer remorse' (i.e. instances where products are bought by the Buyer by mistake or where the Buyer chooses to change his/her mind with regard to the product purchased by him) will not be entertained through this program.m. YIPL reserves its right to initiate civil and/or criminal proceedings against a User who, files an invalid and/or false claims or provides false, incomplete, or misleading information. In addition to the legal proceedings as aforesaid, YIPL may at its sole discretion suspend, block, restrict, cancel the Display Name [and its related Display Names/User Names] of such User and/or disqualify that user and any related users from availing protection through this program.n. Decisions made by YIPL under the Buyer Protection Program shall be final and binding on its Users.o. YIPL reserves the right to modify / discontinue Buyer Protection Program without any prior notice period to its Users.p. Through this program, YIPL shall not entertain claims of Buyers who have incurred loss due to delayed shipment or delivery of the item by the Seller.q. YIPL Customer Support Team may seek additional information / clarification from Buyer to facilitate resolution of the dispute. In the event Buyer does not respond with information / clarification sought within 10 days of such request, the dispute shall be auto-closed in favour of the Seller.7. Disputes via ChargebackWhenever a chargeback (CB) comes from a payment gateway/bank, following situations may arise:a. Item not received CB - Buyer hasn't received the item. Refund will be created in accordance with the dispute policiesb. Unauthorized CB - Buyer hasn't made this particular transaction. Refund will be created in accordance with the dispute policies.c. Seller expressly agrees that issuing the correct and complete invoice is the sole and primary responsibility of the Seller. Furthermore, Seller shall ensure that invoices state "Powered by ebzaar" and failing to do so Seller will be liable for chargebacks (as applicable).d. Item not as described - meaning item is not what Buyer expected. Dispute will be decided in accordance with the dispute policies.III. Email Abuse & Threat PolicyPrivate communication, including email correspondence, is not regulated by YIPL. YIPL encourages its Users to be professional, courteous and respectful when communicating by email. However, YIPL will investigate and can take action on certain types of unwanted emails that violate YIPL policies. Such instances:- Threats of Bodily Harm - YIPL does not permit Users to send explicit threats of bodily harm.- Misuse of Website - YIPL allows Users to facilitate transactions through the ebzaar Website, but will investigate any misuse of this service.- Spoof (Fake) email - YIPL will never ask you to provide sensitive information through email. In case you receive any spoof (fake) email, you are requested to report the same to Us through 'Contact Us' tab on the Website.- Spam (Unsolicited Commercial email) - YIPL's spam policy applies only to unsolicited commercial messages sent by YIPL Users. YIPL Users are not allowed to send spam messages to other Users.- Offers to Buy or Sell Outside of YIPL - YIPL prohibits email offers to buy or sell listed products outside of the YIPL Website. Offers of this nature are a potential fraud risk for both Buyers and Sellers.YIPL policy prohibits user-to-user threats of physical harm via any method including, phone, email and on Our public message boards.Violations of this policy may result in a range of actions, including:· Limits on account privileges· Account suspension· Cancellation of listings· Loss of special statusOther BusinessesYIPL does not take responsibility or liability for the actions, products, content and services on the Website, which are linked to Affiliates and / or third party websites using Website's APIs or otherwise. In addition, the Website may provide links to the third party websites of Our affiliated companies and certain other businesses for which, YIPL assumes no responsibility for examining or evaluating the products and services offered by them. YIPL do not warrant the offerings of, any of these businesses or individuals or the content of such third party website(s). YIPL does not endorse, in any way, any third party website(s) or content thereof.IV. Copyright PolicyCopyright in this Website belongs to Yamini India Private Limited ("YIPL"). YIPL also uses contents of their vendors and third parties as well who might not be the original owners of copyright therein. The users should assume that standard copyright protection applies to all materials and contents displayed on the Website. Any redistribution, modification or reproduction of part or all of the contents featured in the Website in any form is prohibited. You may display, print, or download the contents to a local hard disk extracts for your personal, non-commercial use, but only if you acknowledge the Website as the source of the material. You are not permitted, except with the express written consent of Yamini, to distribute or commercially exploit the contents on this Website. You are also prohibited from transmitting the contents or storing it in any other Website or in other form of electronic retrieval system.A) Intellectual Property Rights Policywww.ebzaar.com ("Website" or "eBZaar") contains the trademark "eBZaar", creations with the trademark "eBZaar", other trademarks, logos, trade name, service marks and other marks (collectively "Marks") which are the intellectual property of Yamini India Private Limited ("YIPL") or their vendors or respective third parties. You understand that Ebzaar uses the Marks of vendors and respective third parties procured from the owner and/or distribution channel solely for promotional purposes. In doing so, Ebzaar has no intention, whatsoever, to acquire rights of use or license to these Marks and these Marks remain the property of their respective owners / licensees.You are not permitted to use the Marks without the prior consent of YIPL, the vendor or the third party that may own the Marks. If you do so, ebzaar may, in its sole discretion, terminate Your usage of the Website.You agree not to challenge the use, registration or application to register the Marks, anywhere in the world, and that You will not harm, misuse, or bring into disrepute any of the Marks. The goodwill derived from using the Marks or any part thereof, shall inure exclusively to the benefit of Ebzaar or its vendors or the third party that may own the Marks.All Marks, domain name, trade dress including the "look and feel" of the Website, its text, graphics, button icons, interfaces, etc., and the arrangements thereof, is the property of ebzaar or its vendors or the third party, as the case may be, unless otherwise indicated. All the contents are protected under copyright, trademark and other applicable intellectual property laws and may not be used by You, except as permitted by Ebzaar, its vendors or the concerned third party.If you see something on the Website, which you believe is violating the intellectual property rights of any person, please send an infringement notice to Ebzaar at [email protected] with the word “INFRINGEMENT NOTICE” in the subject line of the email.B) Notification of copyright infringement - [Take Down Notice]1. If you are the owner of copyright in any content available on eBZaar.com ("Website" or "Ebzaar") and uploaded without your consent, or you believe that your content has been copied in any way that constitutes infringement, please provide the following information to the Company Secretary/ Manager Legal of YIPL:a. A statement specifying that you have found specific content on the Website e.g., video/ audio/ text/ graphic content, which you believe infringes your copyright;b. The title and description of the content, as available on the Website, and the full URL of the web page where the content is available;c. Description of the content/ work, the copyright - which belongs to you, and which you believe has been infringed. In case this information is available on the internet, please send Ebzaar a link to the same;d. The country in which your copyright applies;e. An explanation on how the content available on the Website infringes your copyright (e.g. in case of any audio content, the musical works or the sound recordings are a copy of your original works, etc.);f. Your contact information so that Ebzaar can get in touch with you (e-mail address is preferred);g. Your contact information which Ebzaar can pass on to the submitter of the concerned content, so that he/ she can get in touch with you to resolve your complaint directly (e-mail address is preferred);​h. A statement by you that you have a good faith belief that the disputed use of the copyrighted work is not authorized by the copyright owner (or by a third party who is legally entitled to do so on behalf of the copyright owner, such as his agent) and is not otherwise permitted by law; andi. A statement by you, made under penalty of perjury, that the above information in your notice is accurate and that you are the copyright owner or authorized to act on the copyright owner's behalf.2. Please affix the electronic or physical signature of the copyright owner or person authorized to act on behalf of the owner. If you are providing notice by e-mail, a scanned physical signature or a valid electronic signature will be accepted.3. Please send your copyright infringement notice to the attention of Ebzaar Company Secretary/Manager- Legal at:By mail:Company Secreary/ Manager- LegalYamini India Private Limited (Unit eBZaar)B/502, Greenwoods, Andheri Kurla Road,Chakala, Andheri EastMumbai – 400093E-mail: [email protected]; subject line: “INFRINGEMENT NOTICE”4. Please note that the information provided in this notice may be forwarded to the person who provided the allegedly infringing content.5. Any person who knowingly misrepresents that any material or activity is infringing, may be subject to legal liability. Accordingly, if you are not sure whether material available online infringes your copyright, please contact a lawyer.6. The Company Secretary/ Manager- Legal should be contacted only if you believe that your work has been used or copied in a way that constitutes copyright infringement and that such infringement is occurring on the Website or on websites linked to or from the Website, or in connection with the services provided on the Website. All other inquiries directed to the Company Secretary/ Manager- Legal will not be responded to. Such inquiries should be made through the feedback procedure referenced in the Website.V. Privacy PolicyWe value the trust our Users place in us. A reason we insist upon the highest standards for secure transactions and privacy of customer information. The following paragraphs elaborate on our information gathering and dissemination practices of our Website.Our privacy policy is subject to change at any time without notice. To make sure you are aware of any changes, please review this policy periodically. By visiting and using the Website, you expressly consent and agree to be bound by the terms and conditions of this Privacy Policy and to use and disclosure of your information as stated herein. This Privacy Policy is incorporated into and subject to the Terms of Use.Collection of Personally Identifiable Information and other InformationYou can generally browse the side without providing any personal information – however certain activities may require you to register [e.g. making a purchase / entering a contest etc] and / or provide personal information. We may collect personal information in the nature of your name including first and last name, primary and alternate email address, mobile phone number and contact details, Postal code, Demographic profile (like your age, gender, occupation, education, address etc.). Apart from personal information, we may also collect browsing related information, including but not limited to URL that you just came from (whether this URL is on our Website or not), which URL you next go to (whether this URL is on our Website or not), your computer browser information, and your IP address etc.Manner of Collection of such InformationYour personally identifiable information is collected as part of a voluntary registration process or a contest or on-line surveys or any combination thereof. The Site and third-party vendors, including Google, use first-party cookies (example: Google Analytics cookie etc) and third-party cookies (example: DoubleClick cookie etc) together to inform, optimize, and serve ads based on someone's past visits to the Site.Use of Demographic / Profile Data / Your InformationThe information collected is primarily used to provide the services requested by you including to contact you if so required. The service(s) may be provided by Us or by our business partners, affiliates and/or service providers hired for this purpose. We will also use the information to store transaction history as may be required by prevailing laws and/our internal policies. Secondary usage of personal information includes but is not limited to – providing personalised features on the site, to send general or personalized promotions, offers and other marketing material, to contact you as a survey respondent, to ask you to participate in contests and inform you if you win a contest, to send you promotional materials from Us or from contest sponsors / advertisers / partners and affiliates.The information may also be used to serve various promotional and advertising materials to you via display advertisements through the Google Ad network on third party websites. As a user / customer you can opt out of Google Analytics for Display Advertising at any time and/or customize Google Display network ads using the Ads Preferences Manager. At an aggregate level, information about customers (excluding any information that may identify you specifically) covering your transaction data / demographics / location data or similar data may be provided to Our to improve your shopping experience, for creating additional features on our Website, creating appropriate merchandising or new products / services / offerings and conducting marketing research and / or statistical analysis of customer behaviour / transactions.Sharing of personal informationWe may share personal information with our other corporate entities and affiliates to help detect and prevent identity theft, fraud and other potentially illegal acts; correlate related or multiple accounts to prevent abuse of our services; and to facilitate joint or co-branded services that you request where such services are provided by more than one corporate entity. 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OCTOBER TERM, 1996SyllabusRENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL. v. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION ET AL.APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIANo. 96-511. Argued March 19, 1997-Decided June 26, 1997Two provisions of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA or Act) seek to protect minors from harmful material on the Internet, an international network of interconnected computers that enables millions of people to communicate with one another in "cyberspace" and to access vast amounts of information from around the world. Title 47 U. S. C. § 223(a)(I)(B)(ii) (1994 ed., Supp. II) criminalizes the "knowing" transmission of "obscene or indecent" messages to any recipient under 18 years of age. Section 223(d) prohibits the "knowin[g]" sending or displaying to a person under 18 of any message "that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs." Mfirmative defenses are provided for those who take "good faith, ... effective ... actions" to restrict access by minors to the prohibited communications, § 223(e)(5)(A), and those who restrict such access by requiring certain designated forms of age proof, such as a verified credit card or an adult identification number, §223(e)(5)(B). A number of plaintiffs filed suit challenging the constitutionality of §§ 223(a)(I) and 223(d). After making extensive findings of fact, a three-judge District Court convened pursuant to the Act entered a preliminary injunction against enforcement of both challenged provisions. The court's judgment enjoins the Government from enforcing § 223(a)(I)(B)'s prohibitions insofar as they relate to "indecent" communications, but expressly preserves the Government's right to investigate and prosecute the obscenity or child pornography activities prohibited therein. The injunction against enforcement of § 223(d) is unqualified because that section contains no separate reference to obscenity or child pornography. The Government appealed to this Court under the Act's special review provisions, arguing that the District Court erred in holding that the CDA violated both the First Amendment because it is overbroad and the Fifth Amendment because it is vague.Held: The CDA's "indecent transmission" and "patently offensive display" provisions abridge "the freedom of speech" protected by the First Amendment. Pp. 864-885.845(a) Although the CDA's vagueness is relevant to the First Amendment overbreadth inquiry, the judgment should be affirmed without reaching the Fifth Amendment issue. P. 864.(b) A close look at the precedents relied on by the GovernmentGinsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629; FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726; and Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U. S. 41-raises, rather than relieves, doubts about the CDA's constitutionality. The CDA differs from the various laws and orders upheld in those cases in many ways, including that it does not allow parents to consent to their children's use of restricted materials; is not limited to commercial transactions; fails to provide any definition of "indecent" and omits any requirement that "patently offensive" material lack socially redeeming value; neither limits its broad categorical prohibitions to particular times nor bases them on an evaluation by an agency familiar with the medium's unique characteristics; is punitive; applies to a medium that, unlike radio, receives full First Amendment protection; and cannot be properly analyzed as a form of time, place, and manner regulation because it is a content-based blanket restriction on speech. These precedents, then, do not require the Court to uphold the CDA and are fully consistent with the application of the most stringent review of its provisions. Pp. 864-868.(c) The special factors recognized in some of the Court's cases as justifying regulation of the broadcast media-the history of extensive Government regulation of broadcasting, see, e. g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 399-400; the scarcity of available frequencies at its inception, see, e. g., Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 637-638; and its "invasive" nature, see Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115, 128-are not present in cyberspace. Thus, these cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to the Internet. Pp.868-870.(d) Regardless of whether the CDA is so vague that it violates the Fifth Amendment, the many ambiguities concerning the scope of its coverage render it problematic for First Amendment purposes. For instance, its use of the undefined terms "indecent" and "patently offensive" will provoke uncertainty among speakers about how the two standards relate to each other and just what they mean. The vagueness of such a content-based regulation, see, e. g., Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U. S. 1030, coupled with its increased deterrent effect as a criminal statute, see, e. g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479, raise special First Amendment concerns because of its obvious chilling effect on free speech. Contrary to the Government's argument, the CDA is not saved from vagueness by the fact that its "patently offensive" stand-846ard repeats the second part of the three-prong obscenity test set forth in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15,24. The second Miller prong reduces the inherent vagueness of its own "patently offensive" term by requiring that the proscribed material be "specifically defined by the applicable state law." In addition, the Miller definition applies only to "sexual conduct," whereas the CDA prohibition extends also to "excretory activities" and "organs" of both a sexual and excretory nature. Each of Miller's other two prongs also critically limits the uncertain sweep of the obscenity definition. Just because a definition including three limitations is not vague, it does not follow that one of those limitations, standing alone, is not vague. The CDA's vagueness undermines the likelihood that it has been carefully tailored to the congressional goal of protecting minors from potentially harmful materials. Pp.870-874.(e) The CDA lacks the precision that the First Amendment requires when a statute regulates the content of speech. Although the Government has an interest in protecting children from potentially harmful materials, see, e. g., Ginsberg, 390 U. S., at 639, the CDA pursues that interest by suppressing a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to send and receive, see, e. g., Sable, 492 U. S., at 126. Its breadth is wholly unprecedented. The CDA's burden on adult speech is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in achieving the Act's legitimate purposes. See, e. g., id., at 126. The Government has not proved otherwise. On the other hand, the District Court found that currently available user-based software suggests that a reasonably effective method by which parents can prevent their children from accessing material which the parents believe is inappropriate will soon be widely available. Moreover, the arguments in this Court referred to possible alternatives such as requiring that indecent material be "tagged" to facilitate parental control, making exceptions for messages with artistic or educational value, providing some tolerance for parental choice, and regulating some portions of the Internet differently from others. Particularly in the light of the absence of any detailed congressional findings, or even hearings addressing the CDA's special problems, the Court is persuaded that the CDA is not narrowly tailored. Pp.874-879.(f) The Government's three additional arguments for sustaining the CDA's affirmative prohibitions are rejected. First, the contention that the Act is constitutional because it leaves open ample "alternative channels" of communication is unpersuasive because the CDA regulates speech on the basis of its content, so that a "time, place, and manner" analysis is inapplicable. See, e. g., Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y. v.847Public Servo Comm'n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 530, 536. Second, the assertion that the CDA's "knowledge" and "specific person" requirements significantly restrict its permissible application to communications to persons the sender knows to be under 18 is untenable, given that most Internet forums are open to all comers and that even the strongest reading of the "specific person" requirement would confer broad powers of censorship, in the form of a "heckler's veto," upon any opponent of indecent speech. Finally, there is no textual support for the submission that material having scientific, educational, or other redeeming social value will necessarily fall outside the CDA's prohibitions. Pp. 879-881.(g) The § 223(e)(5) defenses do not constitute the sort of "narrow tailoring" that would save the CDA. The Government's argument that transmitters may take protective "good faith actio[n]" by "tagging" their indecent communications in a way that would indicate their contents, thus permitting recipients to block their reception with appropriate software, is illusory, given the requirement that such action be "effective": The proposed screening software does not currently exist, but, even if it did, there would be no way of knowing whether a potential recipient would actually block the encoded material. The Government also failed to prove that § 223(b)(5)'s verification defense would significantly reduce the CDA's heavy burden on adult speech. Although such verification is actually being used by some commercial providers of sexually explicit material, the District Court's findings indicate that it is not economically feasible for most noncommercial speakers. Pp.881-882.(h) The Government's argument that this Court should preserve the CDA's constitutionality by honoring its severability clause, § 608, and by construing nonseverable terms narrowly, is acceptable in only one respect. Because obscene speech may be banned totally, see Miller, 413 U. S., at 18, and § 223(a)'s restriction of "obscene" material enjoys a textual manifestation separate from that for "indecent" material, the Court can sever the term "or indecent" from the statute, leaving the rest of § 223(a) standing. Pp. 882-885.(i) The Government's argument that its "significant" interest in fostering the Internet's growth provides an independent basis for upholding the CDA's constitutionality is singularly unpersuasive. The dramatic expansion of this new forum contradicts the factual basis underlying this contention: that the unregulated availability of "indecent" and "patently offensive" material is driving people away from the Internet. P. 885.929 F. Supp. 824, affirmed.848STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., joined, post, p. 886.Deputy Solicitor General Waxman argued the cause for appellants. On the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General Hunger, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler, Irving L. Gornstein, BarbaraBruce J. Ennis, Jr., argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief for appellees American Library Association et al. were Ann M. Kappler, Paul M. Smith, Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., John B. Morris, Jr., Jill Lesser, Richard M. Schmidt, Jr., Bruce Rich, James Wheaton, Jerry Berman, Elliot M. Mincberg, Lawrence S. Ottinger, Andrew J. Schwartzman, Ronald L. Plesser, James J. Halpert, Michael Traynor, Robert P. Taylor, Rene Milam, Marc Jacobson, Bruce W Sanford, and Henry S. Hoberman. Christopher A. Hansen, Steven R. Shapiro, Marjorie Heins, Catherine Weiss, Stefan Presser, David L. Sobel, Marc Rotenberg, and Roger Evans filed a brief for appellees American Civil Liberties Union Foundation et al. **Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Member of Congress Dan Coats et al. by Bruce A. Taylor and Cathleen A. Cleaver; for Enough is Enough et al. by Ronald D. Maines; for the Family Life Project of the American Center for Law and Justice by Jay Alan Sekulow, James M. Henderson, Sr., Colby M. May, Keith A. Fournier, John G. Stepanovich, and Thomas P. Monaghan; for Morality in Media, Inc., by Paul J. McGeady and Robert W Peters; and for James J. Clancy by Mr. Clancy, pro se, and Carol A. Clancy.Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Association of University Professors et al. by James D. Crawford, Carl A. Solano, Theresa E. Loscalzo, Jennifer DuFault James, and Joseph T. Lukens; for Apollomedia Corporation et al. by William Bennett Turner; for the Association of National Advertisers, Inc., by P. Cameron DeVore, John J. Walsh, Steven G. Brody, Mary Elizabeth Taylor, Gilbert H. Weil, and Sol Schildhause; for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States by Clifford M. Sloan, Bert W Rein, Robert J. Butler, Stephen A. Bokat, and849JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.At issue is the constitutionality of two statutory provisions enacted to protect minors from "indecent" and "patently offensive" communications on the Internet. Notwithstanding the legitimacy and importance of the congressional goal of protecting children from harmful materials, we agree with the three-judge District Court that the statute abridges "the freedom of speech" protected by the First Amendment.1IThe District Court made extensive findings of fact, most of which were based on a detailed stipulation prepared by the parties. See 929 F. Supp. 824, 830-849 (ED Pa. 1996).2 The findings describe the character and the dimensions of the Internet, the availability of sexually explicit material in that medium, and the problems confronting age verification for recipients of Internet communications. Because those findings provide the underpinnings for the legal issues, we begin with a summary of the undisputed facts.The InternetThe Internet is an international network of interconnected computers. It is the outgrowth of what began in 1969 as aRobin S. Conrad; for Feminists for Free Expression by Barbara M cDowell; for the National Association of Broadcasters et al. by Floyd Abrams, Jack N. Goodman, and Susanna M. Lowy; for Playboy Enterprises, Inc., by Robert Corn-Revere and Burton Joseph; for the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press et al. by Jane E. Kirtley and S. Mark Goodman; for Site Specific, Inc., et al. by Jamie B. W Stecher; and for Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts et al. by Daniel H. Weiner.Raphael Winick filed a brief of amicus curiae for the Speech Communication Association.1 "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech."2 The Court made 410 findings, including 356 paragraphs of the parties' stipulation and 54 findings based on evidence received in open court. See 929 F. Supp., at 830, n. 9, 842, n. 15.850military program called "ARPANET," 3 which was designed to enable computers operated by the military, defense contractors, and universities conducting defense-related research to communicate with one another by redundant channels even if some portions of the network were damaged in a war. While the ARPANET no longer exists, it provided an example for the development of a number of civilian networks that, eventually linking with each other, now enable tens of millions of people to communicate with one another and to access vast amounts of information from around the world. The Internet is "a unique and wholly new medium of worldwide human communication."4The Internet has experienced "extraordinary growth." 5 The number of "host" computers-those that store information and relay communications-increased from about 300 in 1981 to approximately 9,400,000 by the time of the trial in 1996. Roughly 60% of these hosts are located in the United States. About 40 million people used the Internet at the time of trial, a number that is expected to mushroom to 200 million by 1999.Individuals can obtain access to the Internet from many different sources, generally hosts themselves or entities with a host affiliation. Most colleges and universities provide access for their students and faculty; many corporations provide their employees with access through an office network; many communities and local libraries provide free access; and an increasing number of storefront "computer coffee shops" provide access for a small hourly fee. Several major national "online services" such as America Online, CompuServe, the Microsoft Network, and Prodigy offer access to their own extensive proprietary networks as well as a link to the much larger resources of the Internet. These com-3 An acronym for the network developed by the Advanced Research Project Agency.4Id., at 844 (finding 81). 5Id., at 831 (finding 3).851mercial online services had almost 12 million individual subscribers at the time of trial.Anyone with access to the Internet may take advantage of a wide variety of communication and information retrieval methods. These methods are constantly evolving and difficult to categorize precisely. But, as presently constituted, those most relevant to this case are electronic mail (e-mail), automatic mailing list services ("mail exploders," sometimes referred to as "listservs"), "newsgroups," "chat rooms," and the "World Wide Web." All of these methods can be used to transmit text; most can transmit sound, pictures, and moving video images. Taken together, these tools constitute a unique medium-known to its users as "cyberspace" -located in no particular geographical location but available to anyone, anywhere in the world, with access to the Internet.E-mail enables an individual to send an electronic message-generally akin to a note or letter-to another individual or to a group of addressees. The message is generally stored electronically, sometimes waiting for the recipient to check her "mailbox" and sometimes making its receipt known through some type of prompt. A mail exploder is a sort of e-mail group. Subscribers can send messages to a common e-mail address, which then forwards the message to the group's other subscribers. Newsgroups also serve groups of regular participants, but these po stings may be read by others as well. There are thousands of such groups, each serving to foster an exchange of information or opinion on a particular topic running the gamut from, say, the music of Wagner to Balkan politics to AIDS prevention to the Chicago Bulls. About 100,000 new messages are posted every day. In most newsgroups, po stings are automatically purged at regular intervals. In addition to posting a message that can be read later, two or more individuals wishing to communicate more immediately can enter a chat room to engage in real-time dialogue-in other words, by typing messages to one another that appear almost immediately on852the others' computer screens. The District Court found that at any given time "tens of thousands of users are engaging in conversations on a huge range of subjects." 6 It is "no exaggeration to conclude that the content on the Internet is as diverse as human thought."7The best known category of communication over the Internet is the World Wide Web, which allows users to search for and retrieve information stored in remote computers, as well as, in some cases, to communicate back to designated sites. In concrete terms, the Web consists of a vast number of documents stored in different computers all over the world. Some of these documents are simply files containing information. However, more elaborate documents, commonly known as Web "pages," are also prevalent. Each has its own address-"rather like a telephone number."s Web pages frequently contain information and sometimes allow the viewer to communicate with the page's (or "site's") author. They generally also contain "links" to other documents created by that site's author or to other (generally) related sites. Typically, the links are either blue or underlined text-sometimes images.Navigating the Web is relatively straightforward. A user may either type the address of a known page or enter one or more keywords into a commercial "search engine" in an effort to locate sites on a subject of interest. A particular Web page may contain the information sought by the "surfer," or, through its links, it may be an avenue to other documents located anywhere on the Internet. Users generally explore a given Web page, or move to another, by clicking a computer "mouse" on one of the page's icons or links. Access to most Web pages is freely available, but some allow access only to those who have purchased the right from a6Id., at 835 (finding 27). 7Id., at 842 (finding 74). 8Id., at 836 (finding 36).853commercial provider. The Web is thus comparable, from the readers' viewpoint, to both a vast library including millions of readily available and indexed publications and a sprawling mall offering goods and services.From the publishers' point of view, it constitutes a vast platform from which to address and hear from a worldwide audience of millions of readers, viewers, researchers, and buyers. Any person or organization with a computer connected to the Internet can "publish" information. Publishers include government agencies, educational institutions, commercial entities, advocacy groups, and individuals.9 Publishers may either make their material available to the entire pool of Internet users, or confine access to a selected group, such as those willing to pay for the privilege. "No single organization controls any membership in the Web, nor is there any single centralized point from which individual Web sites or services can be blocked from the Web." 10Sexually Explicit MaterialSexually explicit material on the Internet includes text, pictures, and chat and "extends from the modestly titillating to the hardest-core." 11 These files are created, named, and posted in the same manner as material that is not sexually explicit, and may be accessed either deliberately or unintentionally during the course of an imprecise search. "Once a provider posts its content on the Internet, it cannot prevent that content from entering any community." 12 Thus, for example,9 "Web publishing is simple enough that thousands of individual users and small community organizations are using the Web to publish their own personal 'home pages,' the equivalent of individualized newsletters about that person or organization, which are available to everyone on the Web." Id., at 837 (finding 42).l°Id., at 838 (finding 46). 11 Id., at 844 (finding 82). 12 Ibid. (finding 86).854"when the UCR/California Museum of Photography posts to its Web site nudes by Edward Weston and Robert Mapplethorpe to announce that its new exhibit will travel to Baltimore and New York City, those images are available not only in Los Angeles, Baltimore, and New York City, but also in Cincinnati, Mobile, or Beijing-wherever Internet users live. Similarly, the safer sex instructions that Critical Path posts to its Web site, written in street language so that the teenage receiver can understand them, are available not just in Philadelphia, but also in Provo and Prague." 13Some of the communications over the Internet that originate in foreign countries are also sexually explicit.14Though such material is widely available, users seldom encounter such content accidentally. "A document's title or a description of the document will usually appear before the document itself ... and in many cases the user will receive detailed information about a site's content before he or she need take the step to access the document. Almost all sexually explicit images are preceded by warnings as to the content." 15 For that reason, the "odds are slim" that a user would enter a sexually explicit site by accident.16 Unlike communications received by radio or television, "the receipt of information on the Internet requires a series of affirmative steps more deliberate and directed than merely turning a dial. A child requires some sophistication and some ability to read to retrieve material and thereby to use the Internet unattended." 17Systems have been developed to help parents control the material that may be available on a home computer with In-13 Ibid. (finding 85).14Id., at 848 (finding 117). 15Id., at 844-845 (finding 88). 16 Ibid.17Id., at 845 (finding 89).855ternet access. A system may either limit a computer's access to an approved list of sources that have been identified as containing no adult material, it may block designated inappropriate sites, or it may attempt to block messages containing identifiable objectionable features. "Although parental control software currently can screen for certain suggestive words or for known sexually explicit sites, it cannot now screen for sexually explicit images."18 Nevertheless, the evidence indicates that "a reasonably effective method by which parents can prevent their children from accessing sexually explicit and other material which parents may believe is inappropriate for their children will soon be widely available." 19Age VerificationThe problem of age verification differs for different uses of the Internet. The District Court categorically determined that there "is no effective way to determine the identity or the age of a user who is accessing material through e-mail, mail exploders, newsgroups or chat rooms." 20 The Government offered no evidence that there was a reliable way to screen recipients and participants in such forums for18Id., at 842 (finding 72). 19 Ibid. (finding 73).2°Id., at 845 (finding 90): "An e-mail address provides no authoritative information about the addressee, who may use an e-mail .alias. or an anonymous remailer. There is also no universal or reliable listing of e-mail addresses and corresponding names or telephone numbers, and any such listing would be or rapidly become incomplete. For these reasons, there is no reliable way in many instances for a sender to know if the e-mail recipient is an adult or a minor. The difficulty of e-mail age verification is compounded for mail exploders such as listservs, which automatically send information to all e-mail addresses on a sender's list. Government expert Dr. Olsen agreed that no current technology could give a speaker assurance that only adults were listed in a particular mail exploder's mailing list."856age. Moreover, even if it were technologically feasible to block minors' access to newsgroups and chat rooms containing discussions of art, politics, or other subjects that potentially elicit "indecent" or "patently offensive" contributions, it would not be possible to block their access to that material and "still allow them access to the remaining content, even if the overwhelming majority of that content was not indecent." 21Technology exists by which an operator of a Web site may condition access on the verification of requested information such as a credit card number or an adult password. Credit card verification is only feasible, however, either in connection with a commercial transaction in which the card is used, or by payment to a verification agency. U sing credit card possession as a surrogate for proof of age would impose costs on noncommercial Web sites that would require many of them to shut down. For that reason, at the time of the trial, credit card verification was "effectively unavailable to a substantial number of Internet content providers." 929 F. Supp., at 846 (finding 102). Moreover, the imposition of such a requirement "would completely bar adults who do not have a credit card and lack the resources to obtain one from accessing any blocked material." 22Commercial pornographic sites that charge their users for access have assigned them passwords as a method of age verification. The record does not contain any evidence concerning the reliability of these technologies. Even if passwords are effective for commercial purveyors of indecent material, the District Court found that an adult password requirement would impose significant burdens on noncommercial sites, both because they would discourage users from accessing their sites and because the cost of creating and21 Ibid. (finding 93).22Id., at 846 (finding 102).857maintaining such screening systems would be "beyond their reach." 23In sum, the District Court found:"Even if credit card verification or adult password verification were implemented, the Government presented no testimony as to how such systems could ensure that the user of the password or credit card is in fact over 18. The burdens imposed by credit card verification and adult password verification systems make them effectively unavailable to a substantial number of Internet content providers." Ibid. (finding 107).IIThe Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, was an unusually important legislative enactment. As stated on the first of its 103 pages, its primary purpose was to reduce regulation and encourage "the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies." The major components of the statute have nothing to do with the Internet; they were designed to promote competition in the local telephone service market, the multichannel video mar-23Id., at 847 (findings 104-106):"At least some, if not almost all, non-commercial organizations, such as the ACLU, Stop Prisoner Rape or Critical Path AIDS Project, regard charging listeners to access their speech as contrary to their goals of making their materials available to a wide audience free of charge."There is evidence suggesting that adult users, particularly casual Web browsers, would be discouraged from retrieving information that required use of a credit card or password. Andrew Anker testified that HotWired has received many complaints from its members about HotWired's registration system, which requires only that a member supply a name, e-mail address and self-created password. There is concern by commercial content providers that age verification requirements would decrease advertising and revenue because advertisers depend on a demonstration that the sites are widely available and frequently visited."858ket, and the market for over-the-air broadcasting. The Act includes seven Titles, six of which are the product of extensive committee hearings and the subject of discussion in Reports prepared by Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives. By contrast, Title V-known as the "Communications Decency Act of 1996" (CDA)-contains provisions that were either added in executive committee after the hearings were concluded or as amendments offered during floor debate on the legislation. An amendment offered in the Senate was the source of the two statutory provisions challenged in this case.24 They are informally de-24 See Exon Amendment No. 1268, 141 Congo Rec. 15536 (1995). See also id., at 15505. This amendment, as revised, became § 502 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 133, 47 U. S. C. §§ 223(a)-(e) (1994 ed., Supp. II). Some Members of the House of Representatives opposed the Exon Amendment because they thought it "possible for our parents now to child-proof the family computer with these products available in the private sector." They also thought the Senate's approach would "involve the Federal Government spending vast sums of money trying to define elusive terms that are going to lead to a flood of legal challenges while our kids are unprotected." These Members offered an amendment intended as a substitute for the Exon Amendment, but instead enacted as an additional section of the Act entitled "Online Family Empowerment." See 110 Stat. 137, 47 U. S. C. §230 (1994 ed., Supp. II); 141 Congo Rec. 27881 (1995). No hearings were held on the provisions that became law. See S. Rep. No. 104-23, p. 9 (1995). After the Senate adopted the Exon Amendment, however, its Judiciary Committee did conduct a one-day hearing on "Cyberporn and Children." In his opening statement at that hearing, Senator Leahy observed:"It really struck me in your opening statement when you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, that it is the first ever hearing, and you are absolutely right. And yet we had a major debate on the floor, passed legislation overwhelmingly on a subject involving the Internet, legislation that could dramatically change-some would say even wreak havoc-on the Internet. The Senate went in willy-nilly, passed legislation, and never once had a hearing, never once had a discussion other than an hour or so on the floor." Cyberporn and Children: The Scope of the Problem, The State of the Technology, and the Need for Congressional Action, Hearing on S. 892 before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 7-8 (1995).859scribed as the "indecent transmission" provision and the "patently offensive display" provision.25The first, 47 U. s. C. § 223(a) (1994 ed., Supp. II), prohibits the knowing transmission of obscene or indecent messages to any recipient under 18 years of age. It provides in pertinent part:"(a) Whoever-"(1) in interstate or foreign communications-"(B) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly-"(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and "(ii) initiates the transmission of,"any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene or indecent, knowing that the recipient of the communication is under 18 years of age, regardless of whether the maker of such communication placed the call or initiated the communication;"(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under his control to be used for any activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used for such activity,"shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."The second provision, § 223(d), prohibits the knowing sending or displaying of patently offensive messages in a manner that is available to a person under 18 years of age. It provides:25 Although the Government and the dissent break § 223(d)(1) into two separate "patently offensive" and "display" provisions, we follow the convention of both parties below, as well as the District Court's order and opinion, in describing § 223(d)(1) as one provision.860"(d) Whoever-"(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly-"(A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or persons under 18 years of age, or"(B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner available to a person under 18 years of age,"any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs, regardless of whether the user of such service placed the call or initiated the communication; or"(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under such person's control to be used for an activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used for such activity,"shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."The breadth of these prohibitions is qualified by two affirmative defenses. See § 223(e)(5).26 One covers those who take "good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions" to restrict access by minors to the prohibited communications. § 223(e)(5)(A). The other covers those who26 In full, § 223(e)(5) provides:"(5) It is a defense to a prosecution under subsection (a)(l)(B) or (d) of this section, or under subsection (a)(2) of this section with respect to the use of a facility for an activity under subsection (a)(l)(B) of this section that a person-"(A) has taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions under the circumstances to restrict or prevent access by minors to a communication specified in such subsections, which may involve any appropriate measures to restrict minors from such communications, including any method which is feasible under available technology; or"(B) has restricted access to such communication by requiring use of a verified credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult personal identification number."861restrict access to covered material by requiring certain designated forms of age proof, such as a verified credit card or an adult identification number or code. § 223(e)(5)(B).IIIOn February 8, 1996, immediately after the President signed the statute, 20 plaintiffs 27 filed suit against the Attorney General of the United States and the Department of Justice challenging the constitutionality of §§ 223(a)(1) and 223(d). A week later, based on his conclusion that the term "indecent" was too vague to provide the basis for a criminal prosecution, District Judge Buckwalter entered a temporary restraining order against enforcement of § 223(a)(1)(B)(ii) insofar as it applies to indecent communications. A second suit was then filed by 27 additional plaintiffs,2S the two cases27 American Civil Liberties Union; Human Rights Watch; Electronic Privacy Information Center; Electronic Frontier Foundation; Journalism Education Association; Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility; N ational Writers Union; Clarinet Communications Corp.; Institute for Global Communications; Stop Prisoner Rape; AIDS Education Global Information System; Bibliobytes; Queer Resources Directory; Critical Path AIDS Project, Inc.; Wildcat Press, Inc.; Declan McCullagh dba Justice on Campus; Brock Meeks dba Cyberwire Dispatch; John Troyer dba The Safer Sex Page; Jonathan Wallace dba The Ethical Spectacle; and Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc.28 American Library Association; America Online, Inc.; American Booksellers Association, Inc.; American Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression; American Society of Newspaper Editors; Apple Computer, Inc.; Association of American Publishers, Inc.; Association of Publishers, Editors and Writers; Citizens Internet Empowerment Coalition; Commercial Internet Exchange Association; CompuServe Incorporated; Families Against Internet Censorship; Freedom to Read Foundation, Inc.; Health Sciences Libraries Consortium; Hotwired Ventures LLC; Interactive Digital Software Association; Interactive Services Association; Magazine Publishers of America; Microsoft Corporation; The Microsoft Network, L. L. C.; National Press Photographers Association; Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc.; Newspaper Association of America; Opnet, Inc.; Prodigy Services Company; Society of Professional Journalists; and Wired Ventures, Ltd.862were consolidated, and a three-judge District Court was convened pursuant to § 561 of the CDA.29 After an evidentiary hearing, that court entered a preliminary injunction against enforcement of both of the challenged provisions. Each of the three judges wrote a separate opinion, but their judgment was unanimous.Chief Judge Sloviter doubted the strength of the Government's interest in regulating "the vast range of online material covered or potentially covered by the CDA," but acknowledged that the interest was "compelling" with respect to some of that material. 929 F. Supp., at 853. She concluded, nonetheless, that the statute "sweeps more broadly than necessary and thereby chills the expression of adults" and that the terms "patently offensive" and "indecent" were "inherently vague." Id., at 854. She also determined that the affirmative defenses were not "technologically or economically feasible for most providers," specifically considering and rejecting an argument that providers could avoid liability by "tagging" their material in a manner that would allow potential readers to screen out unwanted transmissions. Id., at 856. Chief Judge Sloviter also rejected the Government's suggestion that the scope of the statute could be narrowed by construing it to apply only to commercial pornographers. Id., at 854-855.Judge Buckwalter concluded that the word "indecent" in § 223(a)(1)(B) and the terms "patently offensive" and "in context" in § 223(d)(1) were so vague that criminal enforcement of either section would violate the "fundamental constitutional principle" of "simple fairness," id., at 861, and the specific protections of the First and Fifth Amendments, id., at 858. He found no statutory basis for the Government's argument that the challenged provisions would be applied only to "pornographic" materials, noting that, unlike obscenity, "indecency has not been defined to exclude works of serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value." Id., at 863.29110 Stat. 142-143, note following 47 U. S. C. §223 (1994 ed., Supp. II).863Moreover, the Government's claim that the work must be considered patently offensive "in context" was itself vague because the relevant context might "refer to, among other things, the nature of the communication as a whole, the time of day it was conveyed, the medium used, the identity of the speaker, or whether or not it is accompanied by appropriate warnings." Id., at 864. He believed that the unique nature of the Internet aggravated the vagueness of the statute. Id., at 865, n. 9.Judge Dalzell's review of "the special attributes of Internet communication" disclosed by the evidence convinced him that the First Amendment denies Congress the power to regulate the content of protected speech on the Internet. Id., at 867. His opinion explained at length why he believed the CDA would abridge significant protected speech, particularly by noncommercial speakers, while "[p]erversely, commercial pornographers would remain relatively unaffected." Id., at 879. He construed our cases as requiring a "medium-specific" approach to the analysis of the regulation of mass communication, id., at 873, and concluded that the Internet-as "the most participatory form of mass speech yet developed," id., at 883-is entitled to "the highest protection from governmental intrusion," ibid.3030 See also 929 F. Supp., at 877: "Four related characteristics of Internet communication have a transcendent importance to our shared holding that the CDA is unconstitutional on its face. We explain these characteristics in our Findings of fact above, and I only rehearse them briefly here. First, the Internet presents very low barriers to entry. Second, these barriers to entry are identical for both speakers and listeners. Third, as a result of these low barriers, astoundingly diverse content is available on the Internet. Fourth, the Internet provides significant access to all who wish to speak in the medium, and even creates a relative parity among speakers." According to Judge Dalzell, these characteristics and the rest of the District Court's findings "lead to the conclusion that Congress may not regulate indecency on the Internet at all." Ibid. Because appellees do not press this argument before this Court, we do not consider it. Appellees also do not dispute that the Government generally has a compelling interest in protecting minors from "indecent" and "patently offensive" speech.864The judgment of the District Court enjoins the Government from enforcing the prohibitions in § 223(a)(1)(B) insofar as they relate to "indecent" communications, but expressly preserves the Government's right to investigate and prosecute the obscenity or child pornography activities prohibited therein. The injunction against enforcement of §§ 223(d)(1) and (2) is unqualified because those provisions contain no separate reference to obscenity or child pornography.The Government appealed under the CDA's special review provisions, § 561, 110 Stat. 142-143, and we noted probable jurisdiction, see 519 U. S. 1025 (1996). In its appeal, the Government argues that the District Court erred in holding that the CDA violated both the First Amendment because it is overbroad and the Fifth Amendment because it is vague. While we discuss the vagueness of the CDA because of its relevance to the First Amendment overbreadth inquiry, we conclude that the judgment should be affirmed without reaching the Fifth Amendment issue. We begin our analysis by reviewing the principal authorities on which the Government relies. Then, after describing the overbreadth of the CDA, we consider the Government's specific contentions, including its submission that we save portions of the statute either by severance or by fashioning judicial limitations on the scope of its coverage.IVIn arguing for reversal, the Government contends that the CDA is plainly constitutional under three of our prior decisions: (1) Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629 (1968); (2) FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978); and (3) Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U. S. 41 (1986). A close look at these cases, however, raises-rather than relievesdoubts concerning the constitutionality of the CDA.In Ginsberg, we upheld the constitutionality of a New York statute that prohibited selling to minors under 17 years of age material that was considered obscene as to them even if not obscene as to adults. We rejected the defendant's broad865submission that "the scope of the constitutional freedom of expression secured to a citizen to read or see material concerned with sex cannot be made to depend on whether the citizen is an adult or a minor." 390 U. S., at 636. In rejecting that contention, we relied not only on the State's independent interest in the well-being of its youth, but also on our consistent recognition of the principle that "the parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society." 31In four important respects, the statute upheld in Ginsberg was narrower than the CDA. First, we noted in Ginsberg that "the prohibition against sales to minors does not bar parents who so desire from purchasing the magazines for their children." Id., at 639. Under the CDA, by contrast, neither the parents' consent-nor even their participationin the communication would avoid the application of the statute.32 Second, the New York statute applied only to commercial transactions, id., at 647, whereas the CDA contains no such limitation. Third, the New York statute cabined its definition of material that is harmful to minors with the requirement that it be "utterly without redeeming social importance for minors." Id., at 646. The CDA fails to provide us with any definition of the term "indecent" as used in § 223(a)(1) and, importantly, omits any requirement that the "patently offensive" material covered by § 223(d) lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Fourth, the New York statute defined a minor as a person under the age31390 U. S., at 639. We quoted from Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 166 (1944): "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."32 Given the likelihood that many e-mail transmissions from an adult to a minor are conversations between family members, it is therefore incorrect for the partial dissent to suggest that the provisions of the CDA, even in this narrow area, "are no different from the law we sustained in Ginsberg." Post, at 892.866of 17, whereas the CDA, in applying to all those under 18 years, includes an additional year of those nearest majority.In Pacifica, we upheld a declaratory order of the Federal Communications Commission, holding that the broadcast of a recording of a 12-minute monologue entitled "Filthy Words" that had previously been delivered to a live audience "could have been the subject of administrative sanctions." 438 U. S., at 730 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Commission had found that the repetitive use of certain words referring to excretory or sexual activities or organs "in an afternoon broadcast when children are in the audience was patently offensive" and concluded that the monologue was indecent "as broadcast." Id., at 735. The respondent did not quarrel with the finding that the afternoon broadcast was patently offensive, but contended that it was not "indecent" within the meaning of the relevant statutes because it contained no prurient appeal. After rejecting respondent's statutory arguments, we confronted its two constitutional arguments: (1) that the Commission's construction of its authority to ban indecent speech was so broad that its order had to be set aside even if the broadcast at issue was unprotected; and (2) that since the recording was not obscene, the First Amendment forbade any abridgment of the right to broadcast it on the radio.In the portion of the lead opinion not joined by Justices Powell and Blackmun, the plurality stated that the First Amendment does not prohibit all governmental regulation that depends on the content of speech. Id., at 742-743. Accordingly, the availability of constitutional protection for a vulgar and offensive monologue that was not obscene depended on the context of the broadcast. Id., at 744-748. Relying on the premise that "of all forms of communication" broadcasting had received the most limited First Amendment protection, id., at 748-749, the Court concluded that the ease with which children may obtain access to broadcasts,867"coupled with the concerns recognized in Ginsberg," justified special treatment of indecent broadcasting. Id., at 749-750.As with the New York statute at issue in Ginsberg, there are significant differences between the order upheld in Pacifica and the CDA. First, the order in Pacifica, issued by an agency that had been regulating radio stations for decades, targeted a specific broadcast that represented a rather dramatic departure from traditional program content in order to designate when-rather than whether-it would be permissible to air such a program in that particular medium. The CDA's broad categorical prohibitions are not limited to particular times and are not dependent on any evaluation by an agency familiar with the unique characteristics of the Internet. Second, unlike the CDA, the Commission's declaratory order was not punitive; we expressly refused to decide whether the indecent broadcast "would justify a criminal prosecution." 438 U. S., at 750. Finally, the Commission's order applied to a medium which as a matter of history had "received the most limited First Amendment protection," id., at 748, in large part because warnings could not adequately protect the listener from unexpected program content. The Internet, however, has no comparable history. Moreover, the District Court found that the risk of encountering indecent material by accident is remote because a series of affirmative steps is required to access specific material.In Renton, we upheld a zoning ordinance that kept adult movie theaters out of residential neighborhoods. The ordinance was aimed, not at the content of the films shown in the theaters, but rather at the "secondary effects" -such as crime and deteriorating property values-that these theaters fostered: "'It is thee] secondary effect which these zoning ordinances attempt to avoid, not the dissemination of "offensive" speech.''' 475 U. S., at 49 (quoting Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U. S. 50, 71, n. 34 (1976)). According to the Government, the CDA is constitutional be-868cause it constitutes a sort of "cyberzoning" on the Internet. But the CDA applies broadly to the entire universe of cyberspace. And the purpose of the CDA is to protect children from the primary effects of "indecent" and "patently offensive" speech, rather than any "secondary" effect of such speech. Thus, the CDA is a content-based blanket restriction on speech, and, as such, cannot be "properly analyzed as a form of time, place, and manner regulation." 475 U. S., at 46. See also Boos v. Barry, 485 U. S. 312, 321 (1988) ("Regulations that focus on the direct impact of speech on its audience" are not properly analyzed under Renton); Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U. S. 123, 134 (1992) ("Listeners' reaction to speech is not a content-neutral basis for regulation").These precedents, then, surely do not require us to uphold the CDA and are fully consistent with the application of the most stringent review of its provisions.vIn Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U. S. 546, 557 (1975), we observed that "[e]ach medium of expression ... may present its own problems." Thus, some of our cases have recognized special justifications for regulation of the broadcast media that are not applicable to other speakers, see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367 (1969); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978). In these cases, the Court relied on the history of extensive Government regulation of the broadcast medium, see, e. g., Red Lion, 395 U. S., at 399-400; the scarcity of available frequencies at its inception, see, e. g., Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 637-638 (1994); and its "invasive" nature, see Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115, 128 (1989).Those factors are not present in cyberspace. Neither before nor after the enactment of the CDA have the vast democratic forums of the Internet been subject to the type869of government supervision and regulation that has attended the broadcast industry.33 Moreover, the Internet is not as "invasive" as radio or television. The District Court specifically found that "[c]ommunications over the Internet do not 'invade' an individual's home or appear on one's computer screen unbidden. Users seldom encounter content 'by accident.' " 929 F. Supp., at 844 (finding 88). It also found that "[a]lmost all sexually explicit images are preceded by warnings as to the content," and cited testimony that" 'odds are slim' that a user would come across a sexually explicit sight by accident." Ibid.We distinguished Pacifica in Sable, 492 U. S., at 128, on just this basis. In Sable, a company engaged in the business of offering sexually oriented prerecorded telephone messages (popularly known as "dial-a-porn") challenged the constitutionality of an amendment to the Communications Act of 1934 that imposed a blanket prohibition on indecent as well as obscene interstate commercial telephone messages. We held that the statute was constitutional insofar as it applied to obscene messages but invalid as applied to indecent messages. In attempting to justify the complete ban and criminalization of indecent commercial telephone messages, the Government relied on Pacifica, arguing that the ban was necessary to prevent children from gaining access to such messages. We agreed that "there is a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors" which extended to shielding them from indecent messages that are not obscene by adult standards, 492 U. S., at33 Cf. Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 36 (CADC 1977) (LevanthaI, J., dissenting), rev'd, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978). When Pacifica was decided, given that radio stations were allowed to operate only pursuant to federal license, and that Congress had enacted legislation prohibiting licensees from broadcasting indecent speech, there was a risk that members of the radio audience might infer some sort of official or societal approval of whatever was heard over the radio, see 556 F. 2d, at 37, n. 18. No such risk attends messages received through the Internet, which is not supervised by any federal agency.870126, but distinguished our "emphatically narrow holding" in Pacifica because it did not involve a complete ban and because it involved a different medium of communication, id., at 127. We explained that "the dial-it medium requires the listener to take affirmative steps to receive the communication." Id., at 127-128. "Placing a telephone call," we continued, "is not the same as turning on a radio and being taken by surprise by an indecent message." Id., at 128.Finally, unlike the conditions that prevailed when Congress first authorized regulation of the broadcast spectrum, the Internet can hardly be considered a "scarce" expressive commodity. It provides relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication of all kinds. The Government estimates that "[a]s many as 40 million people use the Internet today, and that figure is expected to grow to 200 million by 1999."34 This dynamic, multifaceted category of communication includes not only traditional print and news services, but also audio, video, and still images, as well as interactive, real-time dialogue. Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can become a pamphleteer. As the District Court found, "the content on the Internet is as diverse as human thought." 929 F. Supp., at 842 (finding 74). We agree with its conclusion that our cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this medium.VIRegardless of whether the CDA is so vague that it violates the Fifth Amendment, the many ambiguities concerning the scope of its coverage render it problematic for purposes of the First Amendment. For instance, each of the two parts34 Juris. Statement 3 (citing 929 F. Supp., at 831 (finding 3)).871of the CDA uses a different linguistic form. The first uses the word "indecent," 47 U. s. C. § 223(a) (1994 ed., Supp. II), while the second speaks of material that "in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs," § 223(d). Given the absence of a definition of either term,35 this difference in language will provoke uncertainty among speakers about how the two standards relate to each other36 and just what they mean.37 Could a speaker confidently assume that a serious discussion about birth control practices, homosexuality, the First Amendment issues raised by the Appendix to our Pacifica opinion, or the consequences of prison rape would not violate the CDA? This uncertainty undermines the likelihood that the CDA has been carefully tailored to the congressional goal of protecting minors from potentially harmful materials.The vagueness of the CDA is a matter of special concern for two reasons. First, the CDA is a content-based regulation of speech. The vagueness of such a regulation raises35 "Indecent" does not benefit from any textual embellishment at all."Patently offensive" is qualified only to the extent that it involves "sexual or excretory activities or organs" taken "in context" and "measured by contemporary community standards."36 See Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U. S. 395, 404 (1991) ("[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion and exclusion" (internal quotation marks omitted)).37 The statute does not indicate whether the "patently offensive" and "indecent" determinations should be made with respect to minors or the population as a whole. The Government asserts that the appropriate standard is "what is suitable material for minors." Reply Brief for Appellants 18, n. 13 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, 633 (1968)). But the Conferees expressly rejected amendments that would have imposed such a "harmful to minors" standard. See S. Conf. Rep. No. 104-230, p. 189 (1996) (S. Conf. Rep.), 142 Congo Rec. H1145, H1165-H1166 (Feb. 1, 1996). The Conferees also rejected amendments that would have limited the proscribed materials to those lacking redeeming value. See ibid.872special First Amendment concerns because of its obvious chilling effect on free speech. See, e. g., Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U. S. 1030, 1048-1051 (1991). Second, the CDA is a criminal statute. In addition to the opprobrium and stigma of a criminal conviction, the CDA threatens violators with penalties including up to two years in prison for each act of violation. The severity of criminal sanctions may well cause speakers to remain silent rather than communicate even arguably unlawful words, ideas, and images. See, e. g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479, 494 (1965). As a practical matter, this increased deterrent effect, coupled with the "risk of discriminatory enforcement" of vague regulations, poses greater First Amendment concerns than those implicated by the civil regulation reviewed in Denver Area Ed. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U. S. 727 (1996).The Government argues that the statute is no more vague than the obscenity standard this Court established in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15 (1973). But that is not so. In Miller, this Court reviewed a criminal conviction against a commercial vendor who mailed brochures containing pictures of sexually explicit activities to individuals who had not requested such materials. Id., at 18. Having struggled for some time to establish a definition of obscenity, we set forth in Miller the test for obscenity that controls to this day:"(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Id., at 24 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).873Because the CDA's "patently offensive" standard (and, we assume, arguendo, its synonymous "indecent" standard) is one part of the three-prong Miller test, the Government reasons, it cannot be unconstitutionally vague.The Government's assertion is incorrect as a matter of fact. The second prong of the Miller test-the purportedly analogous standard-contains a critical requirement that is omitted from the CDA: that the proscribed material be "specifically defined by the applicable state law." This requirement reduces the vagueness inherent in the open-ended term "patently offensive" as used in the CDA. Moreover, the Miller definition is limited to "sexual conduct," whereas the CDA extends also to include (1) "excretory activities" as well as (2) "organs" of both a sexual and excretory nature.The Government's reasoning is also flawed. Just because a definition including three limitations is not vague, it does not follow that one of those limitations, standing by itself, is not vague.38 Each of Miller's additional two prongs-(l) that, taken as a whole, the material appeal to the "prurient" interest, and (2) that it "lac[k] serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value"-critically limits the uncertain sweep of the obscenity definition. The second requirement is particularly important because, unlike the "patently offensive" and "prurient interest" criteria, it is not judged by contemporary community standards. See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U. S. 497, 500 (1987). This "societal value" requirement, absent in the CDA, allows appellate courts to impose some limitations and regularity on the definition by setting, as a matter of law, a national floor for socially redeeming value. The Government's contention that courts will be able to give such legal limitations to the CDA's standards is belied by Miller's own rationale for having juries determine whether material38 Even though the word "trunk," standing alone, might refer to luggage, a swimming suit, the base of a tree, or the long nose of an animal, its meaning is clear when it is one prong of a three-part description of a species of gray animals.874is "patently offensive" according to community standards: that such questions are essentially ones of fact.39In contrast to Miller and our other previous cases, the CDA thus presents a greater threat of censoring speech that, in fact, falls outside the statute's scope. Given the vague contours of the coverage of the statute, it unquestionably silences some speakers whose messages would be entitled to constitutional protection. That danger provides further reason for insisting that the statute not be overly broad. The CDA's burden on protected speech cannot be justified if it could be avoided by a more carefully drafted statute.VIIWe are persuaded that the CDA lacks the precision that the First Amendment requires when a statute regulates the content of speech. In order to deny minors access to potentially harmful speech, the CDA effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another. That burden on adult speech is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve.In evaluating the free speech rights of adults, we have made it perfectly clear that "[s]exual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment." Sable, 492 U. S., at 126. See also Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U. S. 678, 701 (1977) ("[W]here obscenity is not involved, we have consistently held that the39413 U. S., at 30 (Determinations of "what appeals to the 'prurient interest' or is 'patently offensive' ... are essentially questions of fact, and our Nation is simply too big and too diverse for this Court to reasonably expect that such standards could be articulated for all 50 States in a single formulation, even assuming the prerequisite consensus exists"). The CDA, which implements the "contemporary community standards" language of Miller, thus conflicts with the Conferees' own assertion that the CDA was intended "to establish a uniform national standard of content regulation." S. Conf. Rep., at 191.875fact that protected speech may be offensive to some does not justify its suppression"). Indeed, Pacifica itself admonished that "the fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it." 438 U. S., at 745.It is true that we have repeatedly recognized the governmental interest in protecting children from harmful materials. See Ginsberg, 390 U. S., at 639; Pacifica, 438 U. S., at 749. But that interest does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to adults. As we have explained, the Government may not "reduc[e] the adult population ... to ... only what is fit for children." Denver, 518 U. S., at 759 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sable, 492 U. S., at 128).40 "[R]egardless of the strength of the government's interest" in protecting children, "[t]he level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be limited to that which would be suitable for a sandbox." Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U. S. 60, 74-75 (1983).The District Court was correct to conclude that the CDA effectively resembles the ban on "dial-a-porn" invalidated in Sable. 929 F. Supp., at 854. In Sable, 492 U. S., at 129, this Court rejected the argument that we should defer to the congressional judgment that nothing less than a total ban would be effective in preventing enterprising youngsters from gaining access to indecent communications. Sable thus made clear that the mere fact that a statutory regulation of speech was enacted for the important purpose of protecting children from exposure to sexually explicit material does not foreclose inquiry into its validity.41 As we pointed out last40 Accord, Butler v. Michigan, 352 U. S. 380, 383 (1957) (ban on sale to adults of books deemed harmful to children unconstitutional); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115, 128 (1989) (ban on "dial-aporn" messages unconstitutional); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U. S. 60, 73 (1983) (ban on mailing of unsolicited advertisement for contraceptives unconstitutional).41 The lack of legislative attention to the statute at issue in Sable suggests another parallel with this case. Compare 492 U. S., at 129-130 ("[A]side from conc1usory statements during the debates by proponents of876Term, that inquiry embodies an "overarching commitment" to make sure that Congress has designed its statute to accomplish its purpose "without imposing an unnecessarily great restriction on speech." Denver, 518 U. S., at 741.In arguing that the CDA does not so diminish adult communication, the Government relies on the incorrect factual premise that prohibiting a transmission whenever it is known that one of its recipients is a minor would not interfere with adult-to-adult communication. The findings of the District Court make clear that this premise is untenable. Given the size of the potential audience for most messages, in the absence of a viable age verification process, the sender must be charged with knowing that one or more minors will likely view it. Knowledge that, for instance, one or more members of a 100-person chat group will be a minor-and therefore that it would be a crime to send the group an indecent message-would surely burden communication among adults.42The District Court found that at the time of trial existing technology did not include any effective method for a sender to prevent minors from obtaining access to its communications on the Internet without also denying access to adults. The Court found no effective way to determine the age of a user who is accessing material through e-mail, mail exploders, newsgroups, or chat rooms. 929 F. Supp., at 845 (findings 90-94). As a practical matter, the Court also foundthe bill, as well as similar assertions in hearings on a substantially identical bill the year before, ... the congressional record presented to us contains no evidence as to how effective or ineffective the FCC's most recent regulations were or might prove to be .... No Congressman or Senator purported to present a considered judgment with respect to how often or to what extent minors could or would circumvent the rules and have access to dial-a-porn messages" (footnote omitted)), with n. 24, supra.42 The Government agrees that these provisions are applicable whenever "a sender transmits a message to more than one recipient, knowing that at least one of the specific persons receiving the message is a minor." Opposition to Motion to Affirm and Reply to Juris. Statement 4-5, n. 1.877that it would be prohibitively expensive for noncommercialas well as some commercial-speakers who have Web sites to verify that their users are adults. Id., at 845-848 (findings 95-116).43 These limitations must inevitably curtail a significant amount of adult communication on the Internet. By contrast, the District Court found that "[dJespite its limitations, currently available user-based software suggests that a reasonably effective method by which parents can prevent their children from accessing sexually explicit and other material which parents may believe is inappropriate for their children will soon be widely available." Id., at 842 (finding 73) (emphases added).The breadth of the CDA's coverage is wholly unprecedented. Unlike the regulations upheld in Ginsberg and Pacifica, the scope of the CDA is not limited to commercial speech or commercial entities. Its open-ended prohibitions embrace all nonprofit entities and individuals posting indecent messages or displaying them on their own computers in the presence of minors. The general, undefined terms "indecent" and "patently offensive" cover large amounts of nonpornographic material with serious educational or other value.44 Moreover, the "community standards" criterion as applied to the Internet means that any communication avail-43 The Government asserts that "[t]here is nothing constitutionally suspect about requiring commercial Web site operators ... to shoulder the modest burdens associated with their use." Brief for Appellants 35. As a matter of fact, however, there is no evidence that a "modest burden" would be effective.44 Transmitting obscenity and child pornography, whether via the Internet or other means, is already illegal under federal law for both adults and juveniles. See 18 U. S. C. §§ 1464-1465 (criminalizing obscenity); § 2251 (criminalizing child pornography). In fact, when Congress was considering the CDA, the Government expressed its view that the law was unnecessary because existing laws already authorized its ongoing efforts to prosecute obscenity, child pornography, and child solicitation. See 141 Congo Rec. 16026 (1995) (letter from Kent Markus, Acting Assistant Attorney General, U. S. Department of Justice, to Sen. Leahy).878able to a nationwide audience will be judged by the standards of the community most likely to be offended by the message.45 The regulated subject matter includes any of the seven "dirty words" used in the Pacifica monologue, the use of which the Government's expert acknowledged could constitute a felony. See Olsen Testimony, Tr. Vol. V, 53:1654:10. It may also extend to discussions about prison rape or safe sexual practices, artistic images that include nude subjects, and arguably the card catalog of the Carnegie Library.For the purposes of our decision, we need neither accept nor reject the Government's submission that the First Amendment does not forbid a blanket prohibition on all "indecent" and "patently offensive" messages communicated to a 17-year-old-no matter how much value the message may contain and regardless of parental approval. It is at least clear that the strength of the Government's interest in protecting minors is not equally strong throughout the coverage of this broad statute. Under the CDA, a parent allowing her 17-year-old to use the family computer to obtain information on the Internet that she, in her parental judgment, deems appropriate could face a lengthy prison term. See 47 U. S. C. § 223(a)(2) (1994 ed., Supp. II). Similarly, a parent who sent his 17-year-old college freshman information on birth control via e-mail could be incarcerated even though neither he, his child, nor anyone in their home community found the material "indecent" or "patently offensive," if the college town's community thought otherwise.45 Citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520 (1993), among other cases, appellees offer an additional reason why, in their view, the CDA fails strict scrutiny. Because so much sexually explicit content originates overseas, they argue, the CDA cannot be "effective." Brief for Appellees American Library Association et al. 33-34. This argument raises difficult issues regarding the intended, as well as the permissible scope of, extraterritorial application of the CDA. We find it unnecessary to address those issues to dispose of this case.879The breadth of this content-based restriction of speech imposes an especially heavy burden on the Government to explain why a less restrictive provision would not be as effective as the CDA. It has not done so. The arguments in this Court have referred to possible alternatives such as requiring that indecent material be "tagged" in a way that facilitates parental control of material coming into their homes, making exceptions for messages with artistic or educational value, providing some tolerance for parental choice, and regulating some portions of the Internet-such as commercial Web sites-differently from others, such as chat rooms. Particularly in the light of the absence of any detailed findings by the Congress, or even hearings addressing the special problems of the CDA, we are persuaded that the CDA is not narrowly tailored if that requirement has any meaning at all.VIIIIn an attempt to curtail the CDA's facial overbreadth, the Government advances three additional arguments for sustaining the Act's affirmative prohibitions: (1) that the CDA is constitutional because it leaves open ample "alternative channels" of communication; (2) that the plain meaning of the CDA's "knowledge" and "specific person" requirement significantly restricts its permissible applications; and (3) that the CDA's prohibitions are "almost always" limited to material lacking redeeming social value.The Government first contends that, even though the CDA effectively censors discourse on many of the Internet's modalities-such as chat groups, newsgroups, and mail exploders-it is nonetheless constitutional because it provides a "reasonable opportunity" for speakers to engage in the restricted speech on the World Wide Web. Brief for Appellants 39. This argument is unpersuasive because the CDA regulates speech on the basis of its content. A "time, place, and manner" analysis is therefore inapplicable. See Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y. v. Public Servo Comm'n of N. Y.,880447 U. S. 530, 536 (1980). It is thus immaterial whether such speech would be feasible on the Web (which, as the Government's own expert acknowledged, would cost up to $10,000 if the speaker's interests were not accommodated by an existing Web site, not including costs for data base management and age verification). The Government's position is equivalent to arguing that a statute could ban leaflets on certain subjects as long as individuals are free to publish books. In invalidating a number of laws that banned leafletting on the streets regardless of their content, we explained that "one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place." Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U. S. 147, 163 (1939).The Government also asserts that the "knowledge" requirement of both §§ 223(a) and (d), especially when coupled with the "specific child" element found in § 223(d), saves the CDA from overbreadth. Because both sections prohibit the dissemination of indecent messages only to persons known to be under 18, the Government argues, it does not require transmitters to "refrain from communicating indecent material to adults; they need only refrain from disseminating such materials to persons they know to be under 18." Brief for Appellants 24. This argument ignores the fact that most Internet forums-including chat rooms, newsgroups, mail exploders, and the Web-are open to all comers. The Government's assertion that the knowledge requirement somehow protects the communications of adults is therefore untenable. Even the strongest reading of the "specific person" requirement of § 223(d) cannot save the statute. It would confer broad powers of censorship, in the form of a "heckler's veto," upon any opponent of indecent speech who might simply log on and inform the would-be discoursers that his 17-year-old child-a "specific person ... under 18 years of age," 47 U. S. C. §223(d)(1)(A) (1994 ed., Supp. H)-would be present.881Finally, we find no textual support for the Government's submission that material having scientific, educational, or other redeeming social value will necessarily fall outside the CDA's "patently offensive" and "indecent" prohibitions. See also n. 37, supra.IXThe Government's three remaining arguments focus on the defenses provided in § 223(e)(5).46 First, relying on the "good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions" provision, the Government suggests that "tagging" provides a defense that saves the constitutionality of the CDA. The suggestion assumes that transmitters may encode their indecent communications in a way that would indicate their contents, thus permitting recipients to block their reception with appropriate software. It is the requirement that the good-faith action must be "effective" that makes this defense illusory. The Government recognizes that its proposed screening software does not currently exist. Even if it did, there is no way to know whether a potential recipient will actually block the encoded material. Without the impossible knowledge that every guardian in America is screening for the "tag," the transmitter could not reasonably rely on its action to be "effective."For its second and third arguments concerning defenseswhich we can consider together-the Government relies on the latter half of § 223(e)(5), which applies when the transmitter has restricted access by requiring use of a verified credit card or adult identification. Such verification is not only technologically available but actually is used by commercial providers of sexually explicit material. These providers, therefore, would be protected by the defense. Under the findings of the District Court, however, it is not economically feasible for most noncommercial speakers to employ such verification. Accordingly, this defense would not signifi-46 For the full text of § 223(e )(5), see n. 26, supra.882cantly narrow the statute's burden on noncommercial speech. Even with respect to the commercial pornographers that would be protected by the defense, the Government failed to adduce any evidence that these verification techniques actually preclude minors from posing as adults.47 Given that the risk of criminal sanctions "hovers over each content provider, like the proverbial sword of Damocles,"48 the District Court correctly refused to rely on unproven future technology to save the statute. The Government thus failed to prove that the proffered defense would significantly reduce the heavy burden on adult speech produced by the prohibition on offensive displays.We agree with the District Court's conclusion that the CDA places an unacceptably heavy burden on protected speech, and that the defenses do not constitute the sort of "narrow tailoring" that will save an otherwise patently invalid unconstitutional provision. In Sable, 492 U. S., at 127, we remarked that the speech restriction at issue there amounted to "'burn[ing] the house to roast the pig.'" The CDA, casting a far darker shadow over free speech, threatens to torch a large segment of the Internet community.XAt oral argument, the Government relied heavily on its ultimate fall-back position: If this Court should conclude that the CDA is insufficiently tailored, it urged, we should save the statute's constitutionality by honoring the severability clause, see 47 U. S. C. § 608, and construing nonseverable terms narrowly. In only one respect is this argument acceptable.A severability clause requires textual provisions that can be severed. We will follow § 608's guidance by leaving con-47 Thus, ironically, this defense may significantly protect commercial purveyors of obscene postings while providing little (or no) benefit for transmitters of indecent messages that have significant social or artistic value. 48929 F. Supp., at 855-856.883stitutional textual elements of the statute intact in the one place where they are, in fact, severable. The "indecency" provision, 47 U. S. C. § 223(a) (1994 ed., Supp. II), applies to "any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene or indecent." (Emphasis added.) Appellees do not challenge the application of the statute to obscene speech, which, they acknowledge, can be banned totally because it enjoys no First Amendment protection. See Miller, 413 U. S., at 18. As set forth by the statute, the restriction of "obscene" material enjoys a textual manifestation separate from that for "indecent" material, which we have held unconstitutional. Therefore, we will sever the term "or indecent" from the statute, leaving the rest of § 223(a) standing. In no other respect, however, can § 223(a) or § 223(d) be saved by such a textual surgery.The Government also draws on an additional, less traditional aspect of the CDA's severability clause, 47 U. S. C. § 608, which asks any reviewing court that holds the statute facially unconstitutional not to invalidate the CDA in application to "other persons or circumstances" that might be constitutionally permissible. It further invokes this Court's admonition that, absent "countervailing considerations," a statute should "be declared invalid to the extent it reaches too far, but otherwise left intact." Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U. S. 491, 503-504 (1985). There are two flaws in this argument.First, the statute that grants our jurisdiction for this expedited review, § 561 of the Telecommunications Act of 1961, note following 47 U. S. C. § 223 (1994 ed., Supp. II), limits that jurisdictional grant to actions challenging the CDA "on its face." Consistent with § 561, the plaintiffs who brought this suit and the three-judge panel that decided it treated it as a facial challenge. We have no authority, in this particular posture, to convert this litigation into an "as-applied" challenge. Nor, given the vast array of plaintiffs, the range of their expressive activities, and the vagueness of the stat-884ute, would it be practicable to limit our holding to a judicially defined set of specific applications.Second, one of the "countervailing considerations" mentioned in Brockett is present here. In considering a facial challenge, this Court may impose a limiting construction on a statute only if it is "readily susceptible" to such a construction. Virginia v. American Booksellers Assn., Inc., 484 U. S. 383, 397 (1988). See also Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 216 (1975) ("readily subject" to narrowing construction). The open-ended character of the CDA provides no guidance whatever for limiting its coverage.This case is therefore unlike those in which we have construed a statute narrowly because the text or other source of congressional intent identified a clear line that this Court could draw. Cf., e. g., Brockett, 472 U. S., at 504-505 (invalidating obscenity statute only to the extent that word "lust" was actually or effectively excised from statute); United States v. Grace, 461 U. S. 171, 180-183 (1983) (invalidating federal statute banning expressive displays only insofar as it extended to public sidewalks when clear line could be drawn between sidewalks and other grounds that comported with congressional purpose of protecting the building, grounds, and people therein). Rather, our decision in United States v. Treasury Employees, 513 U. S. 454, 479, n. 26 (1995), is applicable. In that case, we declined to "dra[w] one or more lines between categories of speech covered by an overly broad statute, when Congress has sent inconsistent signals as to where the new line or lines should be drawn" because doing so "involves a far more serious invasion of the legislative domain."49 This Court "will not rewrite a ... law49 As this Court long ago explained: "It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large. This would, to some extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative department of the government." United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 221 (1876). In part because of these885to conform it to constitutional requirements." American Booksellers, 484 U. S., at 397.50XIIn this Court, though not in the District Court, the Government asserts that-in addition to its interest in protecting children-its "[e]qually significant" interest in fostering the growth of the Internet provides an independent basis for upholding the constitutionality of the CDA. Brief for Appellants 19. The Government apparently assumes that the unregulated availability of "indecent" and "patently offensive" material on the Internet is driving countless citizens away from the medium because of the risk of exposing themselves or their children to harmful material.We find this argument singularly unpersuasive. The dramatic expansion of this new marketplace of ideas contradicts the factual basis of this contention. The record demonstrates that the growth of the Internet has been and continues to be phenomenal. As a matter of constitutional tradition, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that governmental regulation of the content of speech is more likely to interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage it. The interest in encouraging freedom of expression in a democratic society outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship.For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.It is so ordered.separation-of-powers concerns, we have held that a severability clause is "an aid merely; not an inexorable command." Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U. S. 286, 290 (1924).50 See also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U. S. 103, 121 (1990) (judicial rewriting of statutes would derogate Congress' "incentive to draft a narrowly tailored law in the first place").886JUSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.I write separately to explain why I view the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) as little more than an attempt by Congress to create "adult zones" on the Internet. Our precedent indicates that the creation of such zones can be constitutionally sound. Despite the soundness of its purpose, however, portions of the CDA are unconstitutional because they stray from the blueprint our prior cases have developed for constructing a "zoning law" that passes constitutional muster.Appellees bring a facial challenge to three provisions of the CDA. The first, which the Court describes as the "indecency transmission" provision, makes it a crime to knowingly transmit an obscene or indecent message or image to a person the sender knows is under 18 years old. 47 U. S. C. § 223(a)(1)(B) (1994 ed., Supp. II). What the Court classifies as a single" 'patently offensive display'" provision, see ante, at 859, is in reality two separate provisions. The first of these makes it a crime to knowingly send a patently offensive message or image to a specific person under the age of 18 ("specific person" provision). § 223(d)(1)(A). The second criminalizes the display of patently offensive messages or images "in a[ny] manner available" to minors ("display" provision). § 223(d)(1)(B). None of these provisions purports to keep indecent (or patently offensive) material away from adults, who have a First Amendment right to obtain this speech. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115, 126 (1989) ("Sexual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment"). Thus, the undeniable purpose of the CDA is to segregate indecent material on the Internet into certain areas that minors cannot access. See S. Conf. Rep. No. 104-230, p. 189 (1996) (CDA imposes "access restrictions ... to protect minors from exposure to indecent material").887The creation of "adult zones" is by no means a novel concept. States have long denied minors access to certain establishments frequented by adults.1 States have also denied minors access to speech deemed to be "harmful to minors." 21 See, e. g., Alaska Stat. Ann. § 11.66.300 (1996) (no minors in "adult entertainment" places); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3556 (1989) (no minors in places where people expose themselves); Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5-27-223, 5-27-224 (1993) (no minors in poolrooms and bars); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-7502(2) (1986) (no minors in places displaying movies or shows that are "harmful to children"); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, § 1365(i)(2) (1995) (same); D. C. Code Ann. § 22-2001(b)(I)(B) (1996) (same); Fla. Stat. § 847.013(2) (1994) (same); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-12-103(b) (1996) (same); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 712-1215(1)(b) (1994) (no minors in movie houses or shows that are "pornographic for minors"); Idaho Code § 18-1515(2) (1987) (no minors in places displaying movies or shows that are "harmful to minors"); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:91.11(B) (West 1986) (no minors in places displaying movies that depict sex acts and appeal to minors' prurient interest); Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, §416E (1996) (no minors in establishments where certain enumerated acts are performed or portrayed); Mich. Compo Laws § 750.141 (1991) (no minors without an adult in places where alcohol is sold); Minn. Stat. § 617.294 (1987 and Supp. 1997) (no minors in places displaying movies or shows that are "harmful to minors"); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-5-11 (1994) (no minors in poolrooms, billiard halls, or where alcohol is sold); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 573.507 (1995) (no minors in adult cabarets); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-809 (1995) (no minors in places displaying movies or shows that are "harmful to minors"); Nev. Rev. Stat. §201.265(3) (1997) (same); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 571-B:2(II) (1986) (same); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 30-37-3 (1989) (same); N. Y. Penal Law §235.21(2) (McKinney 1989) (same); N. D. Cent. Code § 12.1-27.1-03 (1985 and Supp. 1995) (same); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5903(a) (Supp. 1997) (same); S. D. Compo Laws Ann. §22-24-30 (1988) (same); Tenn. Code Ann. §39-17-911(b) (1991) (same); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, §2802(b) (1974) (same); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-391 (1996) (same).2 See, e. g., Ala. Code § 13A-12-200.5 (1994); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 133506 (1989); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-68-502 (1993); Cal. Penal Code Ann. §313.1 (West Supp. 1997); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-7-502(1) (1986); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-196 (1994); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, § 1365(i)(I) (1995); D. C. Code Ann. § 22-2001(b)(I)(A) (1996); Fla. Stat. § 847.012 (1994); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-12-103(a) (1996); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 712-1215(1) (1994); Idaho Code § 18-1515(1) (1987); Ill. Compo Stat., ch. 720, § 5/11-21 (1993); Ind. Code § 35-49-3-3(1) (Supp. 1996); Iowa Code § 728.2 (1993); Kan. Stat. Ann. §21-4301c(a)(2) (1988); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:91.11(B) (West 1986);888The Court has previously sustained such zoning laws, but only if they respect the First Amendment rights of adults and minors. That is to say, a zoning law is valid if (i) it does not unduly restrict adult access to the material; and (ii) minors have no First Amendment right to read or view the banned material. As applied to the Internet as it exists in 1997, the "display" provision and some applications of the "indecency transmission" and "specific person" provisions fail to adhere to the first of these limiting principles by restricting adults' access to protected materials in certain circumstances. Unlike the Court, however, I would invalidate the provisions only in those circumstances.IOur cases make clear that a "zoning" law is valid only if adults are still able to obtain the regulated speech. If they cannot, the law does more than simply keep children away from speech they have no right to obtain-it interferes with the rights of adults to obtain constitutionally protected speech and effectively "reduce[s] the adult population ... to reading only what is fit for children." Butler v. Michigan, 352 U. S. 380, 383 (1957). The First Amendment does not tolerate such interference. See ibid. (striking down a Michi-Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, §416B (1996); Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 272, §28 (1992); Minn. Stat. § 617.293 (1987 and Supp. 1997); Miss. Code Ann. § 975-11 (1994); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 573.040 (1995); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-8-206 (1995); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-808 (1995); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 201.265(1), (2) (1997); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 571-B:2(I) (1986); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 30-37-2 (1989); N. Y. Penal Law § 235.21(1) (McKinney 1989); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 14190.15(a) (1993); N. D. Cent. Code § 12.1-27.1-03 (1985 and Supp. 1995); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.31(A)(I) (Supp. 1997); Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 1040.76(2) (Supp. 1997); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5903(c) (Supp. 1997); R. 1. Gen. Laws § 11-31-10(a) (1996); S. C. Code Ann. § 16-15-385(A) (Supp. 1996); S. D. Compo Laws Ann. §22-24-28 (1988); Tenn. Code Ann. §39-17911(a) (1991); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 43.24(b) (1994); Utah Code Ann. § 7610-1206(2) (1995); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, §2802(a) (1974); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-391 (1996); Wash. Rev. Code § 9.68.060 (1988 and Supp. 1997); Wis. Stat. § 948.11(2) (Supp. 1995).889gan criminal law banning sale of books-to minors or adults-that contained words or pictures that" 'tende[d] to ... corrup[t] the morals of youth' "); Sable Communications, supra (invalidating federal law that made it a crime to transmit indecent, but nonobscene, commercial telephone messages to minors and adults); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U. S. 60, 74 (1983) (striking down a federal law prohibiting the mailing of unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives). If the law does not unduly restrict adults' access to constitutionally protected speech, however, it may be valid. In Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629, 634 (1968), for example, the Court sustained a New York law that barred store owners from selling pornographic magazines to minors in part because adults could still buy those magazines.The Court in Ginsberg concluded that the New York law created a constitutionally adequate adult zone simply because, on its face, it denied access only to minors. The Court did not question-and therefore necessarily assumed-that an adult zone, once created, would succeed in preserving adults' access while denying minors' access to the regulated speech. Before today, there was no reason to question this assumption, for the Court has previously only considered laws that operated in the physical world, a world that with two characteristics that make it possible to create "adult zones": geography and identity. See Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 Emory L. J. 869, 886 (1996). A minor can see an adult dance show only if he enters an establishment that provides such entertainment. And should he attempt to do so, the minor will not be able to conceal completely his identity (or, consequently, his age). Thus, the twin characteristics of geography and identity enable the establishment's proprietor to prevent children from entering the establishment, but to let adults inside.The electronic world is fundamentally different. Because it is no more than the interconnection of electronic pathways, cyberspace allows speakers and listeners to mask their iden-890tities. Cyberspace undeniably reflects some form of geography; chat rooms and Web sites, for example, exist at fixed "locations" on the Internet. Since users can transmit and receive messages on the Internet without revealing anything about their identities or ages, see id., at 901, however, it is not currently possible to exclude persons from accessing certain messages on the basis of their identity.Cyberspace differs from the physical world in another basic way: Cyberspace is malleable. Thus, it is possible to construct barriers in cyberspace and use them to screen for identity, making cyberspace more like the physical world and, consequently, more amenable to zoning laws. This transformation of cyberspace is already underway. Id., at 888-889; id., at 887 (cyberspace "is moving ... from a relatively unzoned place to a universe that is extraordinarily well zoned"). Internet speakers (users who post material on the Internet) have begun to zone cyberspace itself through the use of "gateway" technology. Such technology requires Internet users to enter information about themselves-perhaps an adult identification number or a credit card number-before they can access certain areas of cyberspace, 929 F. Supp. 824, 845 (ED Pa. 1996), much like a bouncer checks a person's driver's license before admitting him to a nightclub. Internet users who access information have not attempted to zone cyberspace itself, but have tried to limit their own power to access information in cyberspace, much as a parent controls what her children watch on television by installing a lock box. This user-based zoning is accomplished through the use of screening software (such as Cyber Patrol or SurfWatch) or browsers with screening capabilities, both of which search addresses and text for keywords that are associated with "adult" sites and, if the user wishes, blocks access to such sites. Id., at 839-842. The Platform for Internet Content Selection project is designed to facilitate user-based zoning by encouraging Internet speakers to rate the content891of their speech using codes recognized by all screening programs. Id., at 838-839.Despite this progress, the transformation of cyberspace is not complete. Although gateway technology has been available on the World Wide Web for some time now, id., at 845; Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 933-934 (SDNY 1996), it is not available to all Web speakers, 929 F. Supp., at 845-846, and is just now becoming technologically feasible for chat rooms and USE NET newsgroups, Brief for Appellants 3738. Gateway technology is not ubiquitous in cyberspace, and because without it "there is no means of age verification," cyberspace still remains largely unzoned-and unzoneable. 929 F. Supp., at 846; Shea, supra, at 934. U serbased zoning is also in its infancy. For it to be effective, (i) an agreed-upon code (or "tag") would have to exist; (ii) screening software or browsers with screening capabilities would have to be able to recognize the "tag"; and (iii) those programs would have to be widely available-and widely used-by Internet users. At present, none of these conditions is true. Screening software "is not in wide use today" and "only a handful of browsers have screening capabilities." Shea, supra, at 945-946. There is, moreover, no agreedupon "tag" for those programs to recognize. 929 F. Supp., at 848; Shea, supra, at 945.Although the prospects for the eventual zoning of the Internet appear promising, I agree with the Court that we must evaluate the constitutionality of the CDA as it applies to the Internet as it exists today. Ante, at 881. Given the present state of cyberspace, I agree with the Court that the "display" provision cannot pass muster. Until gateway technology is available throughout cyberspace, and it is not in 1997, a speaker cannot be reasonably assured that the speech he displays will reach only adults because it is impossible to confine speech to an "adult zone." Thus, the only way for a speaker to avoid liability under the CDA is to refrain completely from using indecent speech. But this892forced silence impinges on the First Amendment right of adults to make and obtain this speech and, for all intents and purposes, "reduce[s] the adult population [on the Internet] to reading only what is fit for children." Butler, 352 U. S., at 383. As a result, the "display" provision cannot withstand scrutiny. Accord, Sable Communications, 492 U. S., at 126131; Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U. S., at 73-75.The "indecency transmission" and "specific person" provisions present a closer issue, for they are not unconstitutional in all of their applications. As discussed above, the "indecency transmission" provision makes it a crime to transmit knowingly an indecent message to a person the sender knows is under 18 years of age. 47 U. S. C. § 223(a)(1)(B) (1994 ed., Supp. II). The "specific person" provision proscribes the same conduct, although it does not as explicitly require the sender to know that the intended recipient of his indecent message is a minor. § 223(d)(1)(A). The Government urges the Court to construe the provision to impose such a knowledge requirement, see Brief for Appellants 2527, and I would do so. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568, 575 (1988) ("[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress").So construed, both provisions are constitutional as applied to a conversation involving only an adult and one or more minors-e. g., when an adult speaker sends an e-mail knowing the addressee is a minor, or when an adult and minor converse by themselves or with other minors in a chat room. In this context, these provisions are no different from the law we sustained in Ginsberg. Restricting what the adult may say to the minors in no way restricts the adult's ability to communicate with other adults. He is not prevented from893speaking indecently to other adults in a chat room (because there are no other adults participating in the conversation) and he remains free to send indecent e-mails to other adults. The relevant universe contains only one adult, and the adult in that universe has the power to refrain from using indecent speech and consequently to keep all such speech within the room in an "adult" zone.The analogy to Ginsberg breaks down, however, when more than one adult is a party to the conversation. If a minor enters a chat room otherwise occupied by adults, the CDA effectively requires the adults in the room to stop using indecent speech. If they did not, they could be prosecuted under the "indecency transmission" and "specific person" provisions for any indecent statements they make to the group, since they would be transmitting an indecent message to specific persons, one of whom is a minor. Accord, ante, at 876. The CDA is therefore akin to a law that makes it a crime for a bookstore owner to sell pornographic magazines to anyone once a minor enters his store. Even assuming such a law might be constitutional in the physical world as a reasonable alternative to excluding minors completely from the store, the absence of any means of excluding minors from chat rooms in cyberspace restricts the rights of adults to engage in indecent speech in those rooms. The "indecency transmission" and "specific person" provisions share this defect.But these two provisions do not infringe on adults' speech in all situations. And as discussed below, I do not find that the provisions are overbroad in the sense that they restrict minors' access to a substantial amount of speech that minors have the right to read and view. Accordingly, the CDA can be applied constitutionally in some situations. Normally, this fact would require the Court to reject a direct facial challenge. United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 745 (1987) ("A facial challenge to a legislative Act [succeeds only if] the challenger ... establish[es] that no set of circum-894stances exists under which the Act would be valid"). Appellees' claim arises under the First Amendment, however, and they argue that the CDA is facially invalid because it is "substantially overbroad"-that is, it "sweeps too broadly ... [and] penaliz[es] a substantial amount of speech that is constitutionally protected," Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U. S. 123, 130 (1992). See Brief for Appellees American Library Association et al. 48; Brief for Appellees American Civil Liberties Union et al. 39-41. I agree with the Court that the provisions are overbroad in that they cover any and all communications between adults and minors, regardless of how many adults might be part of the audience to the communication.This conclusion does not end the matter, however.Where, as here, "the parties challenging the statute are those who desire to engage in protected speech that the overbroad statute purports to punish, ... [t]he statute may forthwith be declared invalid to the extent that it reaches too far, but otherwise left intact." Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U. S. 491, 504 (1985). There is no question that Congress intended to prohibit certain communications between one adult and one or more minors. See 47 U. S. C. § 223(a)(1)(B) (1994 ed., Supp. II) (punishing "[w]hoever ... initiates the transmission of [any indecent communication] knowing that the recipient of the communication is under 18 years of age"); § 223(d)(1)(A) (punishing "[w]hoever ... send[s] to a specific person or persons under 18 years of age [a patently offensive message]"). There is also no question that Congress would have enacted a narrower version of these provisions had it known a broader version would be declared unconstitutional. 47 U. S. C. § 608 ("If ... the application [of any provision of the CDA] to any person or circumstance is held invalid, ... the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby"). I would therefore sustain the "indecency transmission" and "specific person" provisions to the extent they895apply to the transmission of Internet communications where the party initiating the communication knows that all of the recipients are minors.IIWhether the CDA substantially interferes with the First Amendment rights of minors, and thereby runs afoul of the second characteristic of valid zoning laws, presents a closer question. In Ginsberg, the New York law we sustained prohibited the sale to minors of magazines that were "harmful to minors." Under that law, a magazine was "harmful to minors" only if it was obscene as to minors. 390 U. S., at 632-633. Noting that obscene speech is not protected by the First Amendment, Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 485 (1957), and that New York was constitutionally free to adjust the definition of obscenity for minors, 390 U. S., at 638, the Court concluded that the law did not "invad[e] the area of freedom of expression constitutionally secured to minors," id., at 637. New York therefore did not infringe upon the First Amendment rights of minors. Cf. Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 213 (1975) (striking down city ordinance that banned nudity that was not "obscene even as to minors").The Court neither "accept[s] nor reject[s]" the argument that the CDA is facially overbroad because it substantially interferes with the First Amendment rights of minors. Ante, at 878. I would reject it. Ginsberg established that minors may constitutionally be denied access to material that is obscene as to minors. As Ginsberg explained, material is obscene as to minors if it (i) is "patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is suitable ... for minors"; (ii) appeals to the prurient interest of minors; and (iii) is "utterly without redeeming social importance for minors." 390 U. S., at 633. Because the CDA denies minors the right to obtain material that is "patently offensive"-even if it has some redeeming value for minors and even if it does not appeal to their pruri-896ent interests-Congress' rejection of the Ginsberg "harmful to minors" standard means that the CDA could ban some speech that is "indecent" (i. e., "patently offensive") but that is not obscene as to minors.I do not deny this possibility, but to prevail in a facial challenge, it is not enough for a plaintiff to show "some" overbreadth. Our cases require a proof of "real" and "substantial" overbreadth, Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 615 (1973), and appellees have not carried their burden in this case. In my view, the universe of speech constitutionally protected as to minors but banned by the CDA-i. e., the universe of material that is "patently offensive," but which nonetheless has some redeeming value for minors or does not appeal to their prurient interest-is a very small one. Appellees cite no examples of speech falling within this universe and do not attempt to explain why that universe is substantial "in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." Ibid. That the CDA might deny minors the right to obtain material that has some "value," see ante, at 878, is largely beside the point. While discussions about prison rape or nude art, see ibid., may have some redeeming educational value for adults, they do not necessarily have any such value for minors, and under Ginsberg, minors only have a First Amendment right to obtain patently offensive material that has "redeeming social importance for minors," 390 U. S., at 633 (emphasis added). There is also no evidence in the record to support the contention that "many e-mail transmissions from an adult to a minor are conversations between family members," ante, at 865, n. 32, and no support for the legal proposition that such speech is absolutely immune from regulation. Accordingly, in my view, the CDA does not burden a substantial amount of minors' constitutionally protected speech.Thus, the constitutionality of the CDA as a zoning law hinges on the extent to which it substantially interferes with the First Amendment rights of adults. Because the rights897of adults are infringed only by the "display" provision and by the "indecency transmission" and "specific person" provisions as applied to communications involving more than one adult, I would invalidate the CDA only to that extent. Insofar as the "indecency transmission" and "specific person" provisions prohibit the use of indecent speech in communications between an adult and one or more minors, however, they can and should be sustained. The Court reaches a contrary conclusion, and from that holding I respectfully dissent.