Draft Agreement Form For - Integrated Coastal Zone Management: Fill & Download for Free

Things seen on the surface.The Burmese military accused Aung San Suu Kyi's party of cheating in the elections and violating the constitution, and then the military took over state power.The essential insider story is this.Myanmar held parliamentary elections last November in which Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) gained about 83% of the seats and Aung San Suu Kyi was expected to remain as the senior minister of state. The Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), a party seen as pro-military, won only 33 of the 476 seats.However, the military alleged that the election was fraudulent and it appealed earlier to the local election commission to have the results overturned, but the appeal was not accepted.It's a similar story to the US election, with a different ending. If Trump had any determination, he would not have ordered the army to surround Capitol Hill, nor would he have had to open the "office of the former president".The military government has been in power for decades and is so entrenched that they have people in every state in Myanmar. Apart from the Rohingya independence forces and other independent ethnic groups, there is hardly anyone who has the ability to compete with them militarily. When Aung San Suu Kyi came to power, it was only a compromise by the Burmese military in response to international public pressure.Their calculations were that the pro-Western Aung San Suu Kyi would come to power in the arms of the West and clash with China, and that Myanmar needed China's help to maintain stability due to its geopolitical relations. However, they did not expect Aung San Suu Kyi to pursue a pragmatic diplomacy after coming to power. While fighting for more interests in China's economic and trade issues, she does not reject cooperation with China at all, and even maintains respect for China in sensitive areas such as the Taiwan and Hong Kong regions.More importantly, despite the military's repeated attempts to force Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to oppose the massacre of the Rohingya minority in Myanmar out of political correctness and thus shake her popularity, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi cleverly chose to ignore it and neither supported nor opposed the military, leading to the failure of their calculations. As a result, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi came to power with rapid economic growth, a stable political environment, and rising public support, with almost no opposition to her and the NLD, except from a few extremely pro-Western liberals who remained indifferent to her on the Rohingya issue. As a result, the military had no choice but to resort to a coup d'état. That said, the coup was not a spur-of-the-moment move, but one that had been well planned. In a matter of hours, the top brass of the NLD, including Aung San Suu Kyi, and even the governors of Myanmar's states were brought under control, showing the military's efficiency in this coup. It is clear that despite Aung San Suu Kyi's efforts to reduce the influence of the military since she came to power, the military's roots are still quite deep. The situation in Myanmar is now in chaos, but at least at this point in time it appears that the military has won a major victory.What is happening is that the Burmese military had only wanted to support a puppet, but now realising that an election could lead to a weakening of the military's influence, it has simply gone ahead and made the first move.Why has the Burmese military always wanted to control the country?The reason is that the ethnic problem within Myanmar. The main ethnic group in Myanmar is the Burmese, who make up two-thirds of the country's total population, a ratio that is actually embarrassing, as the vast majority of stable countries in the world have one main ethnic group in the absolute leadership position.Myanmar is a multi-ethnic country with 135 ethnic groups, of which the Burmese, Karen, Chan, Kachin, Mon, Rakhine and Wa are the main ones. The Burmese, who account for two-thirds of the total population, are the main ethnic group in Myanmar, mainly living in the central plains and southern coastal areas (accounting for more than 1/2 of the country's total area), which are relatively economically and culturally developed. The ethnic minorities are located in the economically backward and inaccessible highlands of the east, west and north. Economic disparities fuel ethnic tensions, and ethnic and religious issues are intertwined, making it extremely easy for conflicts to arise.Myanmar's ethnic problems are very complex, and the main ethnic group, the Burmese, has a long history of conflict with other ethnic groups. During the British colonial period, the colonialists adopted a policy of "divide and rule" and "rule the barbarians with the barbarians", deliberately provoking and creating ethnic conflicts, which led to a long history of conflict between Myanmar's ethnic groups. After consolidating its rule, the central government pursued a policy of Greater Burmese Nationalism, which failed to achieve genuine ethnic equality and led to the accumulation of conflicts between the central government and the ethnic groups.On 12 February 1947, the main ethnic group, the Burmese, and the major ethnic groups of the Shan Confederation, Kachin State and Chin State signed the Bin Long Agreement, agreeing to establish a unified Union of Burma and granting the ethnic minority regions full autonomy and mutual equality in national politics. The Constitution of the Union of Burma, which was adopted on this basis, pays more attention to the rights of the ethnic minorities, but allows ethnic states to vote on whether to secede from the Union after ten years, which in essence is a compromise with the ethnic minorities in exchange for national unity, leaving legal space for future demands for secession.When the military government came to power in 1988, it made significant changes to the policy of nation-state formation and introduced a new policy of national reconciliation. The policy was based on "political flexibility and economic freedom", supplemented by military encirclement, and no longer presupposed that the ethnic armed groups "lay down their arms first" for peace talks. By the end of the 20th century, 17 ethnic armed groups had reconciled with the military government or concluded ceasefire agreements, with 12 of them turning their areas into special zones like Kokang, and ethnic relations in Burma had improved significantly.After the fall of former Prime Minister Khin Nyunt, who advocated "peace for stability", the military government made major changes to its ethnic policy, accelerating the pace of restriction and integration of the ethnic armed groups, while the ethnic armed groups expanded their forces, strengthened their ties with each other, and fought against the military government in a tit-for-tat manner, even proposing a "true federal system" in the National Convention.After the referendum on the new constitution was passed in 2008, the military government called for the integration of the ethnic armed groups, strengthening the unified management of the ethnic areas and making an example of those who resisted the central government's integration. "In August 2009, the Kokang Incident was staged as an example to others. The outbreak of the Kokang Incident signalled a fundamental change in the government's policy towards ethnic armed groups and renewed ethnic tensions in Myanmar.This should be clear from what you have read.The army is an ethnic Burmese force and a hardliner, supported only by ethnic Burmese minorities.Aung San Suu Kyi's party, which is moderate, is therefore supported by the ethnic minorities and the Burmese moderates.The army is afraid that Aung San Suu Kyi will become bigger and lead to the damage of ethnic Burmese interests. But the army is reluctant to change its approach to the Burmese moderates, the ethnic minorities of Burma.Thus the conflict arises!The Burmese military's position in Burmese society and politics is similar to that of Turkey without secularisation, or Thailand without the Thai King. Since independence, it has always held the banner of "nationalism" and appointed itself the "patron saint" of the Burmese nation, staging three coups and two quasi-coups throughout its history, keeping a firm grip on the country's direction of travel and remaining in direct power for many long periods. (The 1958 'constitutional coup', the 1962 and 1988 coups, as well as preventing Aung San from coming to power for the first time in 1990 and bringing down the then ruling USDP in 2015, to name but a few minor cases of interference) Unlike most other countries, Myanmar's current constitution explicitly states "The Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces shall be the supreme commander of all armed forces", which also provides that "in the event of a state of emergency caused by insurrection, violence or other unlawful means of coercion or intent to endanger the unity, national unity and sovereign integrity of the Union, the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces shall have the power to take over and exercise the powers of the State in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution. power." (This effectively gives the Burmese military the power to legally coup) The constitution also gives the Burmese military legislative powers (25% of the fixed seats in the federal and provincial state parliaments) and executive powers (the powerful "General Administration Bureau" is under the military-controlled Ministry of Home Affairs).Analysis of the causes of the "coup"The Burmese military is an overwhelmingly powerful force in Myanmar's domestic political life. But it is a nationalist force on the whole, capable of self-reflection on the problems caused by the military government's prolonged rule. I personally support the idea that the political process in Burma since the new century has been planned and controlled by the Burmese military. "The generals do have the power and means to undermine and overthrow the new NLD government, but an empirical analysis (rather than "philosophical discourse" or "normative deduction") of Burma's development over the past decade or so shows that the military groups have been in power for a long time. But an empirical analysis (rather than a "philosophical" or "normative" one) of the history of Burma over the last decade or so shows that the military group's long-standing political strategy (line) actually helped to bring the NLD government under Aung San Suu Kyi to power, step by step. This is the only confirmed political strategy of the military junta, the rest of the "underlying agenda" is not based on facts.It all began in 2003 when then Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt announced a "seven-step roadmap" for Myanmar's national development, aimed at establishing a "disciplined and prosperous democracy".The first step was the restoration of the National Convention, which had been interrupted in 1996.The second and third steps are the introduction of new mechanisms to introduce democratic processes and the drafting of a new constitution.the fourth and fifth steps are the holding of a referendum to establish a new constitution and the holding of parliamentary electionsThe sixth step is the convening of a new parliament.The final step (step seven) is to build a modern, developed and democratic state.The next developments followed the roadmap to the letter: the promulgation of a new constitution in 2008, the holding of national elections in 2010 (the NLD declined to run and the USDP government came to power), the holding of parliamentary by-elections in 2012 (the NLD ran) and the holding of national elections again in 2015 (the NLD came to power by a wide margin). The whole process is happening under the close watch of the generals, who can terminate or manipulate the process at will at any time." Overall the military wants to end up with an elaborate military-dominated political situation in Burma, with checks and balances between the parties: Aung San's NLD and the USDP, which has some support from the military, alternate as the elected government, with the military acting as an arbiter from behind the scenes. The trick is similar to the red and yellow armies of Thailand, with the King and the military acting as judges.The political benefits are twofold: firstly, the military can gain political supremacy and even seek a "deified" status, as the saying goes, "the favour comes from the top, the grievance goes to the bottom (the ruling party)". Secondly, it would be better for Myanmar's openness to the outside world and its economic development, and it would also be better placed to navigate between China and the US. In order to guarantee the military's de facto power, the Burmese military has released a certain amount of power while maintaining a number of strict insurance policies, in addition to the possibility of a legal coup: the Constitution gives the Burmese military legislative powers (25% of the fixed seats in the federal and provincial parliaments) and the Constitution gives the military significant executive powers. The "General Administration Bureau", which has enormous powers, is under the authority of the military-controlled Ministry of Home Affairs. The military's means of controlling the country are sufficiently effective and layered: it continues to hold absolute dominance in areas such as security; it relinquishes dominance in areas such as legislation, retaining the right of veto; and it shares power with the democratically elected government in areas such as administrative matters. It is for this reason that the military has tolerated Aung San's "state capitalism" tactics.The reason for the military's outburst in the name of election fraud is that they believe that the NLD, led by Aung San, has gained what they consider to be a dangerous level of "popular support" and that the political balance they had envisaged has been or is about to be upset. It is as if we were running together and the military wanted two runners to win in turn, but one of them turned out to be Bolt. The military, as judge, had to blow a black whistle and even come down and accuse her of doping themselves.

The invasion would have ended in a bloodbathAnd I have hard facts to corroborate my argument.This is one of the most complex questions I have ever answered because of the HUGE amount of data and facts that must be synthesized from various sources and presented in a logical manner to substantiate the opening statement. Truth be told, this answer does not contain all the relevant facts I have at my disposal. But because including all of them will result in a very long answer which may bore the readers and hence, I choose to include only the most representative facts to support the central argument. All the numbers and their associated significance/interpretation can be bewildering. But, I shall do my best to create a coherent and factually abundant answer to the readers.Acronyms and DefinitionsIt is necessary to define acronyms and terms that are too long to write conveniently:IJA: Imperial Japanese ArmyIJN: Imperial Japanese NavyUSN: US NavyRN: Royal NavyUSSBS: United States Strategic Bombing SurveyUSAAF: US Army Air ForceUSA: US ArmyUSM: US MarineMIS: Military Intelligence ServiceJIC: Joint Intelligence CommitteeUltra: decrypts of radio traffic of the Japanese militaryMagic: decrypts of encrypted Japanese diplomatic messagesJCS: Joint Chiefs of StaffsCINCPAC: Commander-in-Chief Pacific FleetAlso, an explanation concerning the IJA’s hierarchical organization of formations is necessary. In European armies and the USA, the hierarchical organization of formations arranged in ascending order by size was:regiment < division < corp < army < army groupBy contrast, the IJA’s hierarchical organization of formations arranged in ascending order by size was:regiment < division < army < area army < general armyThe IJA did not have corp. Hence, an IJA’s army was about the size of an corp in the USA and smaller than a USA’s army.ContextAfter Germany’s unconditional surrender in Europe in May 1945, the US military began transferring manpower and materials from Europe and the US homeland to the Pacific theater. The aim of this redeployment: defeating the remaining Axis Power - the Japanese Empire.Image source - Hell to Pay - D. M. GiangrecoOverview of Invasion planOn 25th May 1945, the JCS adumbrated a plan for the invasion of Japan. The details was to be fleshed out by subordinate commanders, starting with the top 2 commanders in the Pacific theaters: CINCPAC Chester W. Nimitz and Army commander General Douglas MacArthur.On May 28th, MacArthur issued his strategic plan for the invasion codenamed Downfall. His vision was to accomplish assigned aims by 2 successive operations. The two operations and their respective aim were:1/ Operation OlympicAimed at invading and securing southern part of Kyushu. The attack would be initiated on X-day which was decided tentatively to be 1st November 1945.2/ Operation CoronetAimed at invading and destroying the remaining Japanese forces in the Kanto Plain and Tokyo-Yokohama area on Honshu on Y-day tentatively decided to be 1st March 1946.As a side note, both MacArthur and the JCS by no means supposed that Operation Downfall would guarantee the end of hostilities in Asia. The US high command anticipated the contingency that fighting would last as long as needed to extinguish Japanese resistance in the central and northern of the Japanese home islands AND on the Asian mainland if required.Operation Downfall (Image source: Hell to Pay - D. M. Giangreco)US Order of BattleOne essential aspect of the invasion plan was the task of determining the amount of manpower, supplies and equipment needed to accomplish all objectives. This in turns depends on estimates of Japanese forces that would oppose the invasion.With regards to Olympic, US intelligence’s estimates of Japanese military strength on Kyushu varied by sources and with time. American intelligence’s originally estimated that the IJA had only 6 divisions, of which 3 were stationed in southern Kyushu and the other 3 were stationed in northern Kyushu.In May 1945, using information gathered by radio intelligence, MacArthur’s staff estimated that Olympic would be opposed by 8–10 IJA’s divisions. Then on June 18th, it was estimated a maximum of 350,000 Japanese troops would oppose the invasion.So all in all, the assumptions underlying the US invasion plan were:The maximum number of divisions the Japanese could deploy to reinforce Kyushu was 10. This was based on the assurance that absolute US air and naval superiority would prevent the Japanese from transporting large amount of equipment and manpower from Shikoku and Honshu to Kyushu across the sea lanes between these islands.Maximum Japanese troop strength was 350,000.Japanese air strength stood between 2,500–3,000 aircraft.The enemy would fight with the utmost fanaticism and that Allied forces would confront a “fanatically hostile population”.Using these estimates and the cardinal rule of warfare which emphasizes numerical superiority to guarantee victory, American military planners orders of battle for Olympic and Coronet were as follow:Operation OlympicThe invasion of southern Kyushu was entrusted to the USA’s 6th Army under the command of Prussian-born Lieutenant General Walter Krueger. The 6th Army was composed of 4 Corps, 12 divisions plus additional reserve units. The amounts of manpower, equipment and supplies allocated for Olympic were impressive:766,700 men134,000 vehicles1,470,930 tons of materialsThe invasion would begin with a typical heavy naval and aerial bombardment followed by amphibious landing supported by tactical air support. To sea-lift the 12 divisions, CINCPAC committed 1,315 amphibious vessels. The USN’s 3rd and 5th Fleets would operate jointly to support the invasion. The 3rd Fleet would render strategic support while the 5th Fleet would render tactical support. An impressive task force composed of 16 fleet + 6 light carriers of the USN and 6 fleet + 4 light carriers of the RN would provide the primary offensive power for the invasion force. The total number of carrier-borne aircraft was 1,914.Once US forces established stronghold on the island, they would construct forward bases and airfields in preparation for the 2nd operation. It was projected that 40 air groups and about 2,794 aircraft would operate from these bases to provide air cover for Operation Coronet.Plan for Operation Olympic and Estimated Japanese Strength and Dispositions as of May 1945. (Image source: Downfall - Richard B. Frank)Operation CoronetThis operation would be carried out by 23 US divisions plus 4 divisions held in reserve. The amounts of manpower, equipment and supplies were staggering:1,026,000 servicemen190,000 vehicles2,640,000 tons of materialUS military strength allocated for Olympic and CoronetIt was hoped that the Japanese would be subdued quickly (within 90 days) by bringing overwhelming forces and firepower to bear.The invasion of Japan would pose an enormous logistical challenge to the US military and the numbers bespoke this. In a series of meetings, logistical planners estimated that the amount of supplies deemed adequate to pursue the war in the Pacific for one year was 53,880,000 tons. This in turn posed the difficult problem of how to transport, store and deliver that massive amount through the vast expanse of the Pacific. Sea ports with large storage and handling capacity would have to be built which in turn required huge amount of construction labor and time which would severely hamper the invasion.Ultimately, planners decided against using intermediate bases. Instead, once stronghold on Kyushu was established, most supplies would be transported directly from the US mainland to Japan. Under this design, cargo vessels, 482 for Olympic and 700 for Coronet, would travel to US forward base at Ulithi atoll. From there, they would be directed to loading sites in Japan.However, the most dreadful problem for the planners of the invasion concerned casualties.How many casualties would we incur?This was a question that bedeviled those involved in the planning of Downfall. It mattered greatly because the American public was particularly averse to heavy casualties. The US had been involved in the war for 4 years. Many families had lost their sons, husbands, brothers. Despite some censorship, the military could not completely suppress casualty-related information released by the press. After victory in Europe, there was growing public demand for demobilization, partly motivated by war-weariness, partly by the desire to reunite with family members, and partly by the concern that the end of war would bring about lay-offs in American industry and those who returned home early had better chance of securing employment.Unfortunately, there was no simple answer to this question. Indeed, project casualties has always been immensely difficult because war is reigned by chaos, and uncertainty. Numerous unforeseen factors can conspire to produce surprising number of casualties. All unforeseen factors cast aside, casualties are affected by battlefield terrains as well as the strength, equipment, skill and resolve of the enemy.The statement that the invasion would inflict anywhere between 500,000 and 1,000,000 is so trite as to masks the many complex issues related to casualties projection. I think fresh information is needed.Planners of Downfall used various methods and context information to estimate potential casualties.One simplistic and dubious method applied casualty ratio derived from past campaigns to the number of men committed to Downfall.For example, a paper produced by the Surgeon General of the Army contained a table that showed casualty rates per thousands of men committed per day in the Pacific and European theater:(Image source: Downfall - Richard B. Frank)So for a Pacific campaign with the following parametersNumber of men committed: NNumber of days a campaign lasted: MThen estimated casualties for this campaign would be:WIA = [math]\frac{N}{1,000}\times M \times 5.50 [/math]KIA = [math]\frac{N}{1,000}\times M \times 1.78[/math]MIA = [math]\frac{N}{1,000}\times M \times 0.17[/math]Total casualties = [math]\frac{N}{1,000}\times M \times 7.45[/math]Applying the above formula for Olympic where N = 766,700 and M = 90, casualties would be:WIA=[math]\frac{766,700}{1,000}\times 90 \times 5.50 = 379516.5[/math]KIA=[math]\frac{766,700}{1,000}\times 90 \times 1.78 = 122825.34[/math]MIA=[math]\frac{766,700}{1,000}\times 90 \times 0.17 = 11730.51[/math]Total casualties = [math]\frac{N}{1,000}\times M \times 7.45 = 514072.35[/math]These numbers are consistent with the table below (the tables above show only casualties for ground troops, not sailors and airmen.)Image sources: Downfall - Richard B. FrankOn 13th May 1945, Admiral Nimitz presented a draft produced by his Joint Staff Study for Olympic which contains the following estimates for casualties during the first 30 days of Olympic:(Image source: Downfall - Richard B. Frank)A paper dated 15th June 1945 created by the JCS planner projected that the total casualties for both Olympic and Coronet would be 193,000.On 18th June 1945, a meeting was held in the White House whereby President Truman would inquire his military chiefs about casualty estimates. The record of the meeting reveals at least 5 markedly different estimates given to the President.Estimate 1 was derived from a set of casualty ratios derived from previous campaigns.Estimate 2 used a simple equation which multiplied a fixed casualty percent in any one particular campaign to the number of committed American troops to produce the estimate. Admiral Leahy used the casualty rate of 35% suffered in the battle of Okinawa to yield an estimate of 0.35 * 766,700 = 268,345 for Olympic.Estimate 3 given by George Marshall was very questionable in that Marshall claimed it would equal the 31,000 casualties incurred on Luzon.Estimate 4 given by Admiral Ernest King was equally dubious: casualties would be in the range [31,000 - 41,000] incurred in the battles of Luzon and Okinawa respectively.Estimate 5 given by Marshall was just as dubious: casualties would be 63,000 out of 190,000 “combatant troops.” Exactly what he meant by “combatant troops” was unclear.It must be noted that the aforementioned estimates were for Olympic only. President Truman postponed his inquiry for potential casualties incurred in Coronet.All in all, hopefully the readers can appreciate just how difficult it was to make a realistic and reasonably accurate estimate of the potential casualties the US forces would have suffered in Operation Olympic. Consequently, President Truman never got either an unambiguous or unanimous answer to his concern about casualties.HOWEVERAll disputes set aside, I encourage you to read carefully the rest of this answer filled with hard data and facts. Once you finish, you will be able to draw your own conclusion regarding potential casualties the US military would have incurred from the invasion of Japan.Japanese intention and order of battleIn 1945, the Empire of Japan was a defeated nation, as I have explained in this answer. The Pacific War was a naval war and hence which side controlled the sea won the war. In 1944, the USN had crippled the IJN in the battle of the Philippines Sea. Thereafter, despite there were still island battles to be fought, American victory in those battles was a foregone conclusion because the IJN could neither deliver supplies nor relieve the beleaguered Japanese garrisons.BUTThe logic that no victory meant defeat and that the war was lost did not apply to Japanese military leaders. Instead, as I understand it, they believed that no victory did not necessarily meant defeat and the war was lost. They were convinced that although they could no longer win, they could still avoid a defeat by exploiting one weakness of the US: American aversion to heavy casualties.Although Japanese military leaders demonstrated appalling strategic incompetence, a lack of understanding about the nature of modern total war and unwarranted contempt for their enemies, they understood very well that Americans were weary of the war and that they wanted to end the war quickly by an invasion of the Japanese home islands. It followed that if they could inflict extremely heavy losses on the Americans, they would be able to effect a negotiated peace with favorable terms for Japan, thereby avoiding total defeat.This understanding is best encapsulated in a statement in the Basic General Outline on Future War Direction Policy adopted at the June 6, 1945, Imperial Conference:The United States ... is confronted with numerous problems; such as, mounting casualties, the death of Roosevelt, and a growing war weariness among the people. .. . Should Japan resolutely continue the war and force heavy enemy attrition until the latter part of this year, it may be possible to diminish considerably the enemy’s will to continue the war.and in a statement made by General Korechika Anami 1945Diplomacy will have a better chance after the US has sustained heavy losses. We cannot pretend to claim that victory is certain, but it is far too early to say that the war is lost. That we will inflict severe losses on the enemy when he invades Japan is certain, and it is by no means impossible that we may be able to reserve the situation in our favor, pulling victory out of defeat.It was with this understanding that the Japanese government formulated and adopted a new strategic directive published on 20th January 1945 which declared the Home Islands a scene for a “final decisive battle” of the war. The Japanese armed forces were to construct defenses in the national defense sphere which encompassed the Bonin Islands, Formosa, the coastal region of East China and Korea. All Japanese servicemen were exhorted to:Fiercely resist the enemy.Reduce the enemy’s overwhelming advantage in the air, at sea, and on the ground with the support of suicide air units.Prevent the enemy from gaining a foothold.Shatter their morale.Repel the invasion of the home islands.To achieve these aims, the Japanese military extensively modified command structure to better organize and deploy existing assets, mobilize manpower and resources to raise and equip new combat formations.On 6th February 1945, an agreement between the IJA and IJN dictated that all air units in the home islands would be concentrated and deployed for suicide attacks. All IJA’s air units were subsumed into the so-called Air General Army. All IJN’s air units were organized into the 5th Air Fleet entrusted with defending the Kyushu-Ryukyu sphere and the 3rd Air Fleet entrusted with defending the rest of the Home Islands.Then on 8th April, the IJA’s staff officersFor the defense of Japan proper, the IJA created two theater of operations with respective commands:The 1st General Army headquartered in Tokyo; entrusted with defense of Central and Norther HonshuThe 2nd General Army headquartered in Hiroshima; entrusted with defense of Western Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu.The 5th Area Army entrusted with the defense of Hokkaido.Then on 8th April 1945, the IJA’s staff officers in Tokyo completed a complex master plan for the forthcoming decisive battle entitled Ketsu-Go (Decisive Operation). In essence, Ketsu-Go envisioned that US forces would potentially invade 7 key areas. To crush the invaders, both the IJA and IJN would make every possible preparation to construct and strengthen defenses in those areas.The most salient aspect of Ketsu-Go was that the Japanese accurately predicted the areas most likely to be attacked by US forces: Kyushu and the Kanto-Tokyo areas. Accordingly, these two areas would receive a tremendous amount of manpower and resources required to inflict heavy losses on the American invaders.Preparation for Ketsu-Go were divided into 3 phases lasting from April to October. But preparation for Kyushu had to be completed by early June.There were 3 distinctive characteristics of Ketsu-Go1/ The emphasis on destroying enemy beachhead ASAPAfter mid 1944, the IJA recognized that water-edge defense (i.e fighting near or right on the beaches in the invasion areas) was futile due to overwhelming American naval and air power which could hurl fortifications skyward with massive 16-in naval shells. Hence, the IJA adopted inland defense designed to bring about attritional battles to wear down the American attackers and inflict small-scale casualties that would accumulate over the course of the battles. This strategy worked well on Iwo Jima and Okinawa, on which battles lasted much longer than anticipated and US casualties were high.But, inland defense had its downsides: it allowed the invaders to secure a foothold that could not be dislodged. This was acceptable on Iwo Jima and Okinawa because defeat on those islands were inevitable. Plus, the aim of those two battles were to prolong combat as long as possible to buy more time to strengthen the defenses in the Home Islands.However, the Home Island was different. This was the sacred soil of the Empire. This meant that the American invaders must never be allowed to secure a foothold as they did on Iwo Jima and Okinawa.Because it took a few days to gain such a foothold, it followed that the Japanese defenders had to destroy the American attackers within that window of opportunity. This in turn required rapid movements of IJA’s units to the invasion sites to counterattack the Americans. Due to the lack of mechanized means of transports and the mountainous terrains of Japan, the Japanese were constrained to move on foot to the invasion sites. It followed that IJA units had to be stationed reasonably close to the beachheads, not too close to avoid destruction by American naval and air units, but not too far as to give the invaders more time to secure a foothold.To prevent the enemy from advancing unchallenged inland, it was vital that the IJA opposed the enemy close to the beachheads to delay them and buy time for reinforcements to arrive.The solution to this dilemma? - forming Coastal and counterattack divisions.The 3 phases of Japanese mobilization plans (Image source: Downfall - Richard B. Frank)As you can see from the table above, the mobilization created two new formations:Static coastal-combat divisions: designed for close-quarter combat with the invaders a short distance inland from the water’s edge.Counterattack divisions: understrength field divisions designed to move swiftly from inland positions to reinforce IJA’s defense.2/ heavy use of suicide attack tactic2/ extensive mobilization of the civilian population to support combat operationsLet’s elaborate on the above characteristics.A disturbing revelation of IJA’s troop strengthIn the last 8 weeks of the war, from June to August, Olympic planners were in for a rude awakening because Ultra uncovered extremely disturbing information that invalidated all the initial assumptions and nullified the US battle plan. During this time span, radio intelligence gathered information that pointed to a massive increase in IJA’s troop strengths and disposition.To illustrate how massive such an increase was, I will let the numbers speak for themselves.MacArthur’s intelligence chief, general Charles A. Willoughby estimated that in March 1945, IJA’s troop strength in the Home Islands was 937,000 men of which 466,000 were combat troops organized into 11 combat and 14 training divisions.But as Japanese mobilization quickened, more units were formed and were detected by radio intelligence. In Mid July 1945, Willoughby estimated that IJA’s troop strength in the Home Islands was 1,865,000 - nearly double the estimate in March. By the end of July, MIS detected 27 new IJA divisions in the Home Island since the start of 1945. By Mid-August 1945, the MIS projected that the IJA could form between between 15–29 new divisions. By 1st January 1946, the total number of IJA divisions would be 54–70 divisions, according to the MIS’s assessment. This was a considerable increase from a total of 45–48 divisions Willoughby estimated in March 1945.Equally disturbing was the revelation concerning the deployment of these new formations. In particular, Olympic planners were alarmed by the fact that the Japanese accurately predicted where US forces would attack: in southern Kyushu and Kanto-Tokyo.It bears repeating that American intelligence originally estimated Japanese troop strength in Kyushu to be 350,000 men maximum and Japanese air strength between 2,500–3,000 aircraft. Therefore, by committing 766,700 American troops to Olympic, their leaders hope to overwhelm the Japanese defender and achieve victory quickly.But the influx of information gathered by radio intelligence shattered that confidence.By mid-July 1945, the MIS identified the presence of major units in Kyushu only suspected previously. Willoughby noted:a tremendous influx and organization of mobile units pouring into Kyushu, with positive identification of six divisions, as well as code names for at least two unidentified major units plus an artillery command.During the 2nd half of July, Willoughby identified 3 more divisions, 2 brigades, and 2–3 tank brigades on Kyushu. By July 21, the MIS provided a map in the Far East Summary which pinpointed 8 Japanese field divisions on Kyushu, 7 of which were stationed within the areas targeted by Olympic.By 2nd August 1945, the MIS identified 3 Japanese armies, 11 divisions, 1 brigade and 1 regiment on Kyushu. Estimated total troop strength was 545,000 - of which 445,000 were combat troops.By 7th August 1945, the MIS positively detected 2 more divisions on Kyushu, for a total of 13 divisions - 9 of which were stationed close to the targeted areas in southern Kyushu. Total troop strength were 560,000 men - of which 460,000 were combat troops.On 10th August 1945, the JIC estimated that by 15th October 1945, 56 field divisions and 14 training divisions would be present in the Home Islands. IJA’s troop strength would be 2.6 million men. On Kyushu, there would be 600,000 men in 13 field divisions. On 20th August 1945, the JIC issued the final revision of the initial estimates: the overall IJA’s troop strength on Kyushu would be 900,000 men and 14 field divisions. At least 9 of these divisions were stationed in southern Kyushu.Taking into account all of these numbers, the actual battle plan is visually depicted in the map below:Olympic invasion plan and IJA’s disposition and strength. (Image source: Downfall - Richard B. Frank)Moreover, the terrain of Japan in general and Kyushu in particular favored the defenders and negated a great deal of American advantage in mechanization.Coastal terrain common in Southern Kyushu. (Image source: Hell to Pay - D. M. Giangreco)Terraced rice fields on Kyushu were common and could not be bypassed easily. They were also highly defensible. (Image source: Hell to Pay - D. M. Giangreco)Rice paddies in the photo presented formidable barriers to mechanized units which would deny the attackers room for maneuvering and created ideal killing zones for the Japanese defenders. (Image source: Hell to Pay - D. M. Giangreco)A typical mountain village in central Honshu. With dwellings packed from hillside to hillside and extensive rice paddies extending from both ends, these areas were would have to be taken by assault by ground troops lacking sufficient armor support. (Image source: Hell to Pay - D. M. Giangreco)This disturbing revelation pointed to the dreadful prospect that instead of facing just 350,000 IJA’s troops, the 766,700 American servicemen committed to the invasion would face between 560,000 - 900,000 IJA troops. The attacker-defender ratio of 2:1 advantage was lost. The Americans would face much stiffer resistance. The IJA had stockpiled a huge amount of ammunition for Ketsu-go, including over 1,000,000 ballistic grenades for the humble Type 89 grenade discharger which had caused great casualties to US forces in Okinawa and Iwo Jima. Assuming that at each grenade would kill/maim 1 American, the expenditure of all 1,000,000 grenades would cause 1,000,000 American casualties.And the bloodshed on the ground would be rivaled by the slaughter at sea inflicted by incessant Japanese kamikaze attacks.Japanese Kamikaze attacksAmerican intelligence underestimate of IJA’s troop strength was matched by its own underestimate of Japanese air strength. If Olympic planners were stunned by the revelation of massive increase in IJA’s troop strength, they were equally stunned by the revelation of actual Japanese airpower.For Olympic, the original estimate of Japanese airpower was 2,500–3,000 aircraft. However, that number was refuted by the discovery of a much larger number of Japanese aircraft.The MIS discovered that the Japanese were employing the so-called “extreme conservation” strategy by:not deploying aircraft to challenge US bombersdispersing and concealing aircraft in hidden airfieldsconserving aviation fuelAs a result, the Japanese were able to amass a HUGE number of aircraft for suicide missions.Another reason for the increase in number of aircraft was the fact that the MIS found information hinting at the Japanese decision to commit trainer aircraft for suicide attack missions. The incorporation of trainer aircraft to the inventory of combat aircraft hugely increased the number of aircraft available for Ketsu-Go.Aerial reconnaissance discovered a huge number of aircraft shown in the table below.(Image source: Downfall - Richard B. Frank)Apart from the estimates of Ultra and the MIS, the CINCPAC, the USAAF and the USSBS contributed their own estimates of Japanese air strength.On 16th July 1945, the CINCPAC estimated that the Japanese had 11,190 aircraft of which 8,750 were available for the defense of the Home Island. On 13th August, the figures were revised to be 11,930 aircraft of which 10,290 would be available for the Home Island. Of these 4,880 were combat types and 5,410 were trainers.The USAAF estimated Japanese air strength to be 10,210 aircraft.A post-war examination of Japanese air strength revealed that the Japanese had a large number of aircraft reserved for kamikaze attacks. As shown in the table below:Postwar accounting of Japanese airpower by the USSBS (Image source: Downfall - Richard B. Frank)The Japanese had enough pilots trained for suicide missions. The USSBS estimated there were 18,600 pilots, 8,000 in the IJA and the rest in the IJN. Of the IJN aviators, 2,450 pilots were capable of day and night missions, 1,750 IJN were capable of dawn and dusk missions, and 5,950 required additional training. The IJN estimated that a pilot needed just 30-50 hours of flying time to man a trainer aircraft converted to kamikaze attack.The USSBS also established that the Japanese had sufficient aviation fuel to carry out these kamikaze attacks. At the end of the war, about 1,000,000 barrels of aviation fuels were uncovered. This would last for 7 months at the consumption rates of June and July 1945, and Japan still managed to produce about 25% of this low level of consumption.Now, unlike the kamikaze attacks around Okinawa which suffered heavy losses while inflicted a dismal fatality rate of only 1,78 per sortie, the kamikaze attacks around Kyushu enjoyed the following distinct advantages:Shorter travel distance: At Okinawa, fuel limitation constrained Japanese kamikaze units to fly in a relatively straight path that made their approach predictable to American interceptors. But around Kyushu, these units would fly much shorter distance, allowing them to fly in a circuitous route that made their approach less predictable and more difficult to intercept.Mountainous terrain: this masked low-flying kamikazes from search radars, giving US ship less time to spot and react to kamikaze aircraft.Secure communication: the battles would be conduct on Japanese soil which obviated the need for radio communication vulnerable to intercepts. Instead the Japanese would be able to use telephones to coordinate counterattacks and defense secure from the prying eyes of American radio intelligence.Element of surprise: during the kamikaze attacks around Okinawa, Japanese suicide aircraft had to fly relatively high to spot American ships before attacking. This made them vulnerable to detection by American radars which deprived them of the advantage of surprise. Both of these disadvantages would disappear around Kyushu. Mountains would shield kamikaze aircraft from radar; and Because American ships would operate close to the coast, there was no need for kamikaze units to fly far and high to find their targets. They could fly low to achieve the element of surprise. Hundreds of kamikaze aircraft attacking in mass could overwhelm American AA defense.Vulnerability of American troopships: A combination of cover afforded by the ground and mountainous terrain, surprise and short travel distance made it much easier for kamikaze units to attack the slow troop ships moving toward the landing zones.The advantages of trainer aircraft: while trainer aircraft were slow and could not lift a heavy bomb load, they had two distinct advantages over combat aircraft. They were made of wood and fabric which rendered them undetectable by radar AND invulnerable to proximity-fused shells fired by American shipboard AA guns.(Image source: Hell to Pay - D. M. Giangreco)(Image source: Hell to Pay - D. M. Giangreco)One of the most underrated weapons of WW2: the Yokosuka K4Y1 Training Seaplane. Made of wood and fabric materials, this aircraft could evade radar detection and proximity-fuzed shells.As shown in the estimates above, the Japanese had thousands of these trainer aircraft. They could inflict widespread destruction if used against supply vessels and troops landing craft.Imagine the carnage inflicted upon the American invaders by a large number of suicide aircraft and pilots operating with the aforementioned advantages.Fierce resistance from Japanese civiliansIn March 1945, the government implemented measures designed to prepare the civilian for Ketsu-Go. One measure involved establishing the Area Special Policing Units in every town and village. They would be subordinated to military commanders of an area. These units effectively integrated the civilian population into the military. governmental and civilian spheres. They would be employed to support combat units and perform other duties at the discretion of military unitsOn 27th March 1945, the government instituted a law which mobilized all citizens in the coastal areas to construct defenses, transport supplies and perform other duties as needed. Even young students above the 6th grade were mobilized (only 1st to 6th graders were exempted).On 23rd March 1945, the government established the Patriotic Citizens Fighting Corps which provided a mechanism for drafting able-bodied citizens for military service. All men between the ages of 15 to 60 and all women between the ages 17 to 40 were subject to conscription.All able-bodied civilians, regardless of age and gender, received basic training in how to kill the American invaders using whatever weapons available, including bamboo spears.A high school girl named Yukiko Kasai was drafted and given the following order:Even killing just one American soldier will do. You must prepare to use the awls for self-defense. You must aim at the enemy’s abdomen.Students trained to fight with bamboo spearsIJA officer trained civilians how to fight with bamboo spearsAs preposterous and unbelievable as all of these may seem to you, the IJA was serious about using bamboo spears to fight gun-wielding American soldiers as attested to by the recollection of a Japanese man who was drafted into the People’s Volunteer Corps when he was a young boy:His “equipment” consisted of a bamboo spear and a backpack filled with two large stones. He practiced huddling in a dank, stinking foxhole, waiting for the Americans. If the enemy approached, he would exchange his stones for a land mine. His mission was to destroy an enemy tank, and himself, with it. Reflecting back, the training, indeed the whole notion, was similar to something out of a demented cartoon. But, he emphasized, the military was serious. And if the Americans landed, he is certain he would have perished.This fusion of the civilian population and the military implied that any distinction of civilians from military personnel practically disappeared. It would be impossible for soldiers to determine who was an innocuous civilian warranting protection and who was a combatant in civilian clothes. One intelligence officer noted in a report:The entire population of Japan is a proper military target … there are no civilians in JapanJapanese fanaticism and confidence in Ketsu-GoMy research led me to the following conclusion which I want you to read very very carefully:The Japanese military was determined to fight to the death, even if that entailed utter national annihilation and sacrifice millions of Japanese lives.And the Japanese had unfailingly demonstrated that determination throughout the war. It was reflected both through incredibly high fatality rates of the IJA in all major battles and the words of Japanese military leaders.On Guadalcanal, US forces witnessed for the first time how the Japanese of all ranks literally chose death over surrender. US Marines trapped and annihilated an IJA’s detachment consisting of 800 men. Only 15 survived as POWs. A fatality rate of 98.1%.In May 1943, US forces fought the IJA in the battle of Attu. At the end of the battle, the 2,350-men Japanese garrison had only 29 men left, a fatality rate of 98.8%.In the battle on Gilbert Islands in November 1943, the Japanese garrison on Tarawa had 2,571 men at the outset of the battle. When the battle ended, only 8 men were captured alive: a fatality rate of 99.7%. On the nearby Makin island, of the 300-men garrison, exactly 1 was taken alive, a fatality rate of 99.67%.In the battle on the Marshalls Islands in February 1944, on Roi Namur, the Japanese garrison suffered 3,472 KIA. Only 51 were captured, a fatality rate of 98.6%. On Kwajalein island, the Japanese garrison suffered 4,938 KIA. Only 79 taken prisoner, a fatality rate of 98.4%.At the end of the battle of the Marianas Island during June and July 1944, the Japanese garrison of 30,000 on Saipan suffered 29,079 KIA. Only 921 became POWs: a fatality rate of 96.93%; and what shocked US marines even more was the spectacle of Japanese civilians taking their own lives by jumping off high cliffs or blowing themselves up with grenades after being told by the IJA the terrible fate that awaited them if they fell into American hands.Given that Japan’s warriors had consistently fought to the point of self-annihilation in the past and the fact that Ketsu-Go would take place on the sacred Home Island, Japanese fighting men would have fought with extreme zeal to repel the invaders.What’s more? Japanese military leaders were confident in final victory and were prepared to sacrifice millions of Japanese lives to achieve it:Admiral Takijirō Ōnishi:I can guarantee absolutely that Japan will not lose.. The war is just beginning. The expected Allied invasion would be repelled with acceptable Japanese casualties of 3 to 5 millions, With sufficient Japaneseness of spirit, the struggle might be maintained for years or even decades.If we are prepared to sacrifice 20 million Japanese lives in special attacks, victory will be ours.Army Minister General Korechika Anami:There were considerable chances of victory in the decisive battle in the homeland. Army officers universally believed in Japan’s victory in the “first decisive battle. He even believed that if Ketsu-Go managed to inflict extremely heavy casualties, Japan might be able to continue the war or avoid unconditional surrender.Lieutenant General Seizo Arisue, explained to his American interrogators after the war:If we could defeat the enemy in Kyushu or inflict tremendous losses, forcing him to realize the strong fighting spirit of the Japanese Army and People, it would be possible, we hoped, to bring about the termination of hostilities on comparatively favorable terms.Major General Masakazu Amano, Chief of Operation Division, assessed the outcome for Ketsu-Go as follows:We were absolutely sure of victory. It was the first and the only battle in which the main strength of the air, land and sea forces were to be joined. The geographical advantages of the homeland were to be utilized to the highest degree, the enemy was to be crushed, and we were confident that the battle would prove to be the turning point in political maneuvering.Captain Inoguchi Rikibei, Imperial Japanese Navy:Inasmuch as the Kamikaze attacks were the last means of any favorable results in the war and the only chance for breaking down American resistance a little, we did not care how many planes were lost. Poor planes and poor pilots were used, and there was no ceiling on the number of either available for use. . . . If enough damage could be done to American ships and enough American casualties resulted, perhaps there would be a ‘new deal’ later in which some form of victory might be salvaged from the war.Final ConclusionThe IJA still had millions of troops who would fight with the utmost zeal and bravery as their comrades had done during the war. They would be assisted by millions of loyal civilians enjoined to hurl themselves against American tanks and soldiers. Thousands of kamikaze aircraft would crash into troop ships loaded with men and ammunition. These millions of soldiers and civilians would be commanded by military leaders who were prepared to sacrifice millions of their own people to kill as many Americans as possible to force the US to the negotiation table.It is not difficult to imagine the gut-wrenching bloodbath brought about by the invasion of Japan. American casualties that resulted from the expenditure of huge stockpiles of Japanese ammunition, suicide air attacks and civilian suicide attackers would have been immensely heavy. Japanese casualties would have been far heavier.William B. Shockley, “Proposal for Increasing the Scope of Casualties Studies,” July 21, 1945If the study shows that the behavior of nations in all historical cases comparable to Japan’s has in fact been invariably consistent with the behavior of the troops in battle, then it means that the Japanese dead and ineffectives at the time of the defeat will exceed the corresponding number for the Germans. In other words, we shall probably have to kill at least 5 to 10 million Japanese. This might cost us between 1.7 and 4 million casualties including 400,000 and 800,000 killed.Maj. Gen. Graves B. Erskine, commanding general, 3rd Marine Division:Victory was never in doubt. Its cost was. ... What was in doubt, in all our minds, was whether there would be any of us left to dedicate our cemetery at the end, or whether the last Marine would die knocking out the last Japanese gun and gunner.It is a spine-chilling scenario to contemplate. I am certain that American leaders were tormented and horrified by the specter of this unprecedented butchery. In the face of an enemy that resolved to fight to the death, they were compelled to resort to the most drastic course of action: the atomic bombs the shock-and-awe effect of which forced the Emperor to surrender, thereby sparing millions of lives from the bloodshed that would have taken place on Japan.Reference(s)1/ Hell to Pay: Operation DOWNFALL and the Invasion of Japan - D. M. Giangreco2/ Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire - Richard B. Frank3/ Werner Hermann's answer to What really caused Japan to surrender in WW2, the atomic bomb drop of Nagasaki or the Soviet invasion of Manchuria?

Good question.None of the countries you mentioned with the exception of Cuba can be considered socialist.Short answerScandinavia- Capitalist market economy and liberal democracy.China- State capitalist market economy with an authoritarian government.Vietnam- State capitalist market economy with an authoritarian government.Cuba- Planned economy with an authoritarian government.Firstly,we must define Socialism.Karl Marx and Frederic Engels were the first "scientific socialists". They were the ones who properly outlined the historical development of capitalism and based on it predicted what would likely happen in the future. The basic idea is this-Society goes through a series of stages i.e Hunter gatherer, Slavery, Feudal, Capitalist, Socialist, Communist. The evolution is based on the material conditions of the society which is the base, through which a super structure is formed that reflects the interests of the ruling class. Under Capitalism, it is the bourgeoisie (i.e the owners of means of production). Marx viewed society as going through various epochs and each of them defined by class conflicts. The development of capitalist mode production simplified that with society now being divided into owners of means of production (i.e bourgeoisie) and those who worked for them (i.e proletariat). Capitalism was characterized by a large section of population dependent on wage labour who were forced to sell their labour power to the capitalists who extracted the “surplus value” through their ownership of means of production. Capitalism was characterized by the revolutionization of means of production through new inventions and industrial improvements as capitalists sought to extract the maximum profits.The development of the capitalist mode of production led towards division of labour which was characterized by separations between manual and skilled workers, between towns and villages, between commerce and industry which was termed by Marx as “alienation” as the process developed was independent of control of individuals or society. As per historical materialism, each historical epoch contains the seed of it’s own destruction. Therefore, Capitalism like other historical stages had it’s own seeds of destruction which in this case happened to be the very thing that made it powerful-development of the means of production. The productive forces of the economy would grow geometrically but markets could expand arithmetically. Capitalism cannot survive in one country which would lead them (i.e capitalists) to go and search for markets abroad to export products as soon as home markets were conquered. However, even this has a real limit. Thus there would be increasingly severe booms and bursts and because he viewed capital as a centralizing and socializing (as large number of workers performing different tasks moved and worked together in factories) force. The relentless exploitation of labour power through technology massively increases real wealth of society but much of it is extracted by the capitalist from the labourer keeping the latter in poverty.Over the long run, the rate of profit which is defined as the ratio of surplus value to the total amount of capital invested must fall. The contradiction between the anarchy in production in markets and highly centralizing nature of capital is because the productive forces of the economy have outgrown the capitalist mode of production and what ended up creating it and making it so powerful (the continuous expansion of capital) itself becomes a barrier to further progress as the limits of markets are reached and a subsequent crisis comes about. This can only be solved through collective ownership of means of production, the abolition of wage labor, markets, and liberation of productive forces of the economy i.e Socialism. The socialization of means of production is already done by Capitalism by bringing workers together to operate the gigantic means of production. The contradiction lays in the fact that the mode of appropriation is still individualist. Ultimately, this comes about because of the inability of enterprises to run on a for profit basis. This would be the next historical epoch i.e Communism. This epoch however would be free of contradictions and hence he claimed thus it was the historical riddle solved and the real movement.This was considered exploitative by Socialists and thus they supported collective ownership of means of production with non Commodity production and negation of (to use a Marxian phrase) law of value. It is also opposed to the domination of bureaucratic and technocratic method in government and managerialism in the enterprise. Since Socialism comes out from capitalist society some defects from the Capitalist mode of production remain because of what Marx termed narrow bourgeoisie outlook by the workers, so temporarily something akin to wages (like labour notes but which cannot be circulated) is established and everyone gets as per the quantity and quality of goods they have produced. So, where does Liberal democracy fits into this scheme? The general view was that liberals were the spokesperson of the Capitalist class and different political parties represented different sections of the "ruling class". Thus this class-based exploitation was the basis for political power. The very purpose of the Socialist revolution is to smash the State which was viewed by Marx as the organization that held class based society together which otherwise would have collapsed because of the contradictions and antagonism between different classes. Under Socialist society, the proletariat no longer exists and thus the ‘State’ collapses into civil society because the conditions for the existence of political power which is class-based antagonism no longer exist.A communist society comes when the Socialist society has developed fully. It is the higher end of Socialism and comes about when there is super abundance of goods available.“Socialism” in USSRAfter the end of War Communism which proved disastrous for the economy, there was a need recognized by the Party for a strategic retreat' and allow for the resumption of small scale commodity production between peasants to encourage agricultural output and make pragmatic concessions to foreign and domestic Capital.There was a stable currency that was introduced, banking system was restored and it was a combination of commercial banks, municipal banks, cooperative mutual banks, savings banks etc. The Soviet trade with Western countries notably the United States was increasing rapidly with much of that carried out through joint stock companies with State as a shareholder, mixed companies, foreign firms, small private firms and State syndicates and the Soviet Union had even created a law for recognizing patents that was copied from Germany. The Soviet Union returned to almost full Capitalism and the Party was being increasingly dominated by the middle class (technicians, engineers, mangers) and the functioning was mostly being carried out by the bureaucracy rather than revolutionaries. This laid the basis for the strengthening of the bureaucracy under Stalin. Meanwhile, the control of managers over the Industry was becoming stronger day by day and trade unions were losing ground.One of the key notions was that Soviet Union had to undertake the Industrial Revolution if it had to catch up with the advanced Capitalist countries. The presence of kulaks, wealthy mangers and technicians and private businessman was considered to be a major threat by the State primarily because it was the surplus savings from agricultural revenue through which the Industry (which was collectivized and therefore considered "Socialist") was to be expanded. When the farmers refused to give grain at a prize fixed by the State as the price they could obtain on the free market was higher, there was panic in the Party that Capitalism was strengthening in the countryside and could then increase in urban areas too which would ultimately lead towards the weakening of the Party from the outside or even from within. Thus bringing control of agriculture under collective control along with Industry and elimination of Capitalist class and kulaks was considered necessary.he collectivization was declared to have established "Complete Socialism" in both the country side and urban areas. The Five Year Plans were to lay the foundations for rational economic planning through which outputs in Industry and Agriculture were established by the State Planning Body and which would also focus on improving social services like healthcare and education. The Planned economy would eliminate unemployment (by removal of use of market mechanism and consequently the boom and bust cycle) which it did for most part.Nonetheless, there was many concessions that were being made. Firstly, despite the abolition of market economy the Soviet Government decided to continue the use of money (instead of use of labour notes), banking (through the monobank called Gosbank) which was actually more of a giant accounting book in order to check for all the transactions that were happening in the economy and more controversially the presence of managers under scientific management in an enterprise. There was a quasi Capitalist like wage structure that was created and a complex distribution system for goods. This included "open shop", "closed shops" and "free trade goods shop".While material incentives were the primary means through which production was encouraged in Capitalist countries, the Socialist Government used a wide variety of methods in order to encourage the workers to increase output. Nonetheless, Stalin in particular encouraged the policy of wage differentiation through introduction of different wage scales and a bonus system both for workers and mangers. He even declared that wage equalization was a "petite bourgeoisie" principal that had no place in a Socialist country!. Up until 1932, a cap existed on the highest wages any person could achieve which was put at 6 times the lowest wage. This was abolished during the course of "Second Five Year Plan" and the Government up until 1980's never revealed the wages which people at different percentiles were receiving. Curiously, a Brookings Institution study after Gorbachev came to power found out that Gini Coefficient was around 0.29 (without taking it into account "secondary income").An even more controversial piece of policy legislation was the introduction of piece wage system of payment which unlike a fixed system of payment explicitly linked pay to output and which forced labourers to enter into Competition with each other. About 70 percent of workforce in Industry was paid in this way by 1933.Indeed, here is what Kudriavtsev had to say in his article "The Problem of Trade Unionism" and I quote,The right-opportunist leadership of, the Trade Unions has, in practice, carried out a policy of equalisation and decrease of piece work.The enemy of the people, Tomsky, and his gang have been perverting the policy of the Party directed towards a system of payment by quantity and quality of work. An exceptional role in overcoming the petty-bourgeois equalisation was played by Comrade Stalin, who in 1931 has given a complete programme of the struggle for the eradication of equalisation. On the directives of Comrade Stalin, the Party and the Trade Unions have carried out an enormous work for the establishment of piecework, progressive bonus and other encouraging forms of paymentIndeed, there had already been a decree that had been issued in 1933 that prevented "squandering" of funds through giving wages mechanically. The growing inequality forced the Party to allocated another 600,000,000 roubles for 1938 and 100,000,000 for November and December, 1937 to raise the earnings of the low-paid workers to 100-115 roubles per month. It is well worth noting that the average wages in the Year 1937 was 170 roubles per month. The Soviet currency had however depreciated which actually hid how difficult the condition was for the average worker. Up until, 1934 about one third of needs of the worker was covered through ration cards which subsidized prices for essential items. There were "open shops" which could be used by all people to purchase goods and services without any special permit. "Closed shops" contained better variety of goods at higher prices and which were open depending upon one's (ironically) social standing because of wage inequality. This was abolished and ultimately in 1936 a unifying price system was established.So, how was this defended? There were two main principles for wages in the Soviet Union. The first was remuneration or compensation (raspredezenie po trudu). This had to be as per contribution made by workers and the quality of work. As per the Soviets the wage inequality might actually be greater under transition period than under Capitalism since the workers paid full product of their value rather than just reproducing labour. The second was incentive. Wages (and other benefits) were considered to be tool through which outcomes could be controlled by the Party. Material needs of the workers were to fulfilled through wages while social funds were to cover non material needs. The principle of earning remuneration that is directly dependent upon final results (zarabatyvanie).This is what makes the analysis of the economic system so difficult. On one hand, there was no production of commodities for exchange in a market, trade was restricted especially with Capitalist countries in favour of self sufficiency (until 1970's). Profit was not the key indicator in terms of allocation of resources until Kosgyin reforms. Enterprises were not autonomous and could not keep their reserves in order to accumulate Capital or exchange with other enterprises. They acted more like Ministries do in developed Capitalist countries. On the other hand, not only did wage labour and inequality exist, it was positively encouraged in order to push up the output and technocratic management very much existed in Industry. After 1936, money started playing a very similar role as in Capitalist economy (i.e as a unit of storage value, bookkeeping etc) though the organization of enterprises within a planned economy restricted it's role in distribution of resources by law of value.So, what about the Nordic countries? It would be useful to learn about Social Democracy.Many people have a very mistaken understanding of what Social Democracy means and part of the problem is because Social Democratic Parties were dominant across Europe post World War 2. Thus, social Democracy has become a off hand way to describe them just like Communism was used to describe USSR, Cuba, Eastern Europe etc.The term "Social Democracy" was first used by Marx in 1848 when translating the title of a French political party “Partie Democrat-Socialist” into German as "Partei der Sozialdemokratie,". This was later picked by a German Socialist organization led by Ferdinand Lassalle who named their news paper as “The Social Democrat”. This was used in order to distinguish themselves from liberal democrats and to indicate their support for creating social change through parliamentary route rather than a revolution. In essence, they were not supporters of "Welfare Capitalism" but firmly opposed to it and also to bourgeoisie democracy.The 1875 manifesto of Lasalle's German Social Democratic Party is particularly relevant. Here are the 3 main planks and I quote:[1]."The German Workers' party, in order to pave the way to the solution of the social question, demands the establishment of producers' co-operative societies with state aid under the democratic control of the toiling people. The producers' co-operative societies are to be called into being for industry and agriculture on such a scale that the socialist organization of the total labor will arise from them."[2]."Starting from these basic principles, the German workers' party strives by all legal means for the free state—and—socialist society: that abolition of the wage system together with the iron law of wages -- and—exploitation in every form; the elimination of all social and political inequality."[3]."Labor is the source of wealth and all culture, and since useful labor is possible only in society and through society, the proceeds of labor belong undiminished with equal right to all members of society."The Social Democratic Party of Germany included such well known Marxists like Karl Kautsky who was considered to be the third most important Marxian theorist after Marx and Engels themselves. I must add that Kautsky later was strongly critical of Leninism and the Soviet Union and today remains forgotten for the most part. Similarly, Social Democratic Workers Party of Austria included theorists like Victor Adler, Otto Bauer who made many theoretical contributions towards Marxist thought. Infact, the term "Austro Marxism" is used to describe the ideas of this group. Nonetheless, most Social Democratic Parties wholeheartedly embraced the Market when they came to power and something similar happened in Yugoslavia where Capitalism thrived under the Red Banner. In some ways, this was the practical application of the ideas of Italian Socialist Economist Enrico Barone who seemed to support a Socialist Planned Economy where price mechanisms along with wages, rents, interest rate and profits would exist.The economic system that emerged in Europe post World War 2 could be best described as State Capitalism. By State Capitalism, I am referring to presence of large State owned Enterprises that play a key role in the economy and which are organized and managed like any private Multinational Enterprise. Another important component is in export of Capital (Outward Looking Investment) in developing countries through State owned funds like Norfund in Norway and IDFU in Denmark. The Social Democrats used macro economic management to smooth the boom and burst cyclewith emphasis on maintaining low inflation and unemployment, expanded the Social insurance schemes in Healthcare and Education and imposed certain other controls on Competition. Some like the Social democratic Party of Austria even entered into alliances with the center right parties. An important legacy however, was the creation of the Tripartite structure which didn't exist before. It bought together employers, employees (through their common associations) and the Government in creating what we call an Industrial policy. It is well worth noting that even in Sweden, Government spending was 28 percent of GDP in 1960 which was only 3 percent higher than in US and they also successfully deregulated transportation in 1963 and 1979. The State also set profit margins which the Nationalized Enterprises must obtain. An example would be Railways where the profit requirement was 14 percent. As Isaac Deutscher noted, a thoroughly Capitalist spirit permeated in the Nationalized Industry.Surprising as it may sound but the Nordic countries rank very high on freedom of markets. The markets are clean and efficient because of rule of law, tariffs are low and trade is free with the median tariff rate in Scandinavia is around 1.1 percent while in the United States it is around 1.6 percent, it is exceptionally easy to start a business, trading between borders is very easy to achieve. All Scandinavian countries and the US maintain relatively limited regulation on FDI (Foreign Direct Investment). This is very necessary given the nature of their economies. The United States maintains a constant trade deficit with it's trade partners while Scandinavian countries rely very heavily on foreign investment and exports given the small size of their economies. In terms of financial sector regulation, Scandinavia and United States both have these sectors that are largely left to run freely. There is no restrictions on currency trading, capital accounts remain liberalized and interest rates are largely determined by the markets. Both have a central bank to maintain the money supply and maintain a stable monetary regime. There are limited restrictions on scaling for enterprises. There are bond markets, stock markets , financial institutions that are present to allocate resources just like in the United States. Another key difference is that even State owned enterprises are largely run as a private corporations in terms of management and organization .China and VietnamThe economic model followed by these are somewhat distinct from what is followed by the Western world. Unlike in Scandinavia real socialist parties had come to power and had tried to establish Socialism with rather disastrous consequences.China, after 1978 adopted capitalism to a limited degree by allowing the farmers to sell some produce in a market after allotting their quotas to government. This allowed the price mechanism and markets to re enter leading to increasing production. Soon they started to be adopted by other villages. The commune system was disbanded soon after. Special Economic Zones were created to receive foreign investment to kick start it's dormant manufacturing system. However these were run by capitalists and the incentive structure was similar (increase in profits were rewarded with promotions and wages were allowed to be fluctuated) for the benefit of stage.China has allowed banks to sell wealth management products, liberalized interest rates and allowed the floating of Real Estate Investment Trusts starting from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The Chinese Government is not primarily ideological and does not look it as a “Market Vs State” thing. For instance, the Government tried to rely on markets for delivering health insurance but it didn’t really work so State intervention has been expanded and China has come close to achieving universal heath coverage. One thing that seems to me, to be implicitly assumed is that China immediately transitioned from Planning to Markets in one stroke. The Chinese reforms however has continuous process that involves experimentation to see what works and what does not. For instance, during early 1990’s a large number of State owned Enterprises were converted into Western style Corporations and the rest of the country apart from coastal cities and Special Economic Zones were allowed to seek foreign Investment. I am not much aware of Vietnam but apparently they undertook the same in 1985. They also have joined TPP which can hardly be called Socialist agreement.3. Cuba.In order to counteract the US embargo, the Cuban government had moved closer to the Soviet Union both politically and economically. Cuba sought to Industrialize by importing advanced machinery from the Eastern block in exchange for export of sugar and other such basic commodities. The Cuban Government also complained about being treated unfairly by the USSR and Castro remained somewhat suspicious about it until the end of 1960's. In mid 1960's after a major policy failure with regards to sugar production, Castro looked towards China as an alternative model. At the same time, the Chinese Government was competing with the USSR for influence in Latin America and Cuba in particular. The Chinese Government after Sino Soviet split sought to portray itself as the true Socialist State as compared to the USSR which it claimed had abandoned Socialism especially after the 1965 economic reform by Kosgyin that stressed profits and enterprise sales. There were also many bonus (managerial incentives) there were paid to factory directors in order to encourage output. In effect, the USSR had started using pseudo market mechanisms. Many left wing radicals in US, Sweden and Hong Kong were becoming influenced by China and increasingly looking to Mao and the CCP. Mao also launched the Cultural Revolution against the party bureaucracy which he feared would restore Capitalism (which they thankfully did).Cuba then undertook a large scale collectivization drive for agriculture. Like Mao, Castro hoped that the revolutionary rhetoric would overcome many problems and motivate the bureaucracy and the workers. Unlike Mao, the Cuban government never purged the bureaucracy or destroyed the Party. This resulted in a major failure and the economic growth from 1965 to 1970 was an extremely poor 1 percent. To make matters worse, the Cuban government had cut spending on education to utilize the resources for Industrialization. By 1970, Cuba once gain re integrated into the Soviet bloc and joined COMECON. Castro supported the crushing of revolution in Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union provided aid worth $ 2 to $ 5 billion per year until it's collapse. Castro sought to compensate it by increasing trade with Japan, France, Mexico and Spain. He also stressed the importance of sugar exports as a source of Comparative advantage and relied upon a complex mechanism of State directed market, free markets , Dollar shops and direct rationing for consumer goods. More importantly, the hostile attitude towards profit ended and Cuba adopted Soviet Style economic planning to improve output. However, this could not stop Cuba's economic problems which began to grow throughout 1970's and became noticeable in 1980's as the Soviet aid began to reduce because the Soviet Union itself had began to stagnate.The Cuban Government had started stressing upon increasing output in State owned enterprises through what was termed as "Socialist competition". The Government stressed upon material incentives, rational economic planning and trade with Capitalist countries. In order to obtain much needed hard currency, the Cuban government started increasingly stressing upon the comparative advantages in production of basic commodities like sugar. However, the collapse of Soviet Union had the most dramatic effect upon Cuba. It's economic output collapsed between 35 to 50 percent between 1989 and 1992. Total exports in 1993 were down 80 percent from the level recorded in 1990 ad Imports were down by more than 70 percent. It left Cuba with relatively little hard currency which were needed to buy imports in order to continue building it's Industry. The Cuban government implemented severe austerity measures along with the expansion of market mechanisms to direct resources. The complex network which I have mentioned above was expanded. The rations given to each person on the island started decreasing and the calorific input per person decreased dramatically from 3,100 calories in 1985 to 1,800 calories in 1991 which is about 72 percent of the level recommended by WHO.A new law was drafted in 1995 which allowed foreign investment in some strategic sectors. Mangers were paid directly in US dollars while workers were paid in pesos from State who in turn were paid by the foreign firm in dollars. This decreased some pressure on the State though it increased inequality. The Cuban government also told the workers to co-operate with their foreign managers in order to upgrade their skills and increase productivity. There was also an increase in unemployment which reached 7 percent in 1994. Many people started emigrating which reduced unemployment, but further added pressure because of loss of labourers. About 100,000 had already fled the country in 1980 when the government allowed people who didn't like it to leave. Bill Clinton responded by temporarily stopping the automatic granting of asylum status to a person arriving from Cuba. This also led to development of a second economy based on tourism which had flourished under Batista. The $1.9 billion tourist industry is once again Cuba’s “second harvest,” which joined sugar and dollar remittances as source for foreign investment. The Government had set up 3 such export zones in 1998 to attract foreign companies.Much of my answer has been taken from these answers,Shashank Nayak's answer to Can you explain Fidel Castro to me? Why was he hated in western countries?Shashank Nayak's answer to What were Mikhail Gorbachev's aims when he implemented his Perestroika and Glasnost reforms in the 1980's?Shashank Nayak's answer to What are some common misconceptions about the economy of China?Shashank Nayak's answer to What are the neoclassical economic/non-socialist reasons for the success of Scandinavia, Canada, Switzerland, Netherlands economically and happiness?.