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Almost nothing that has been published on this Experiment can be found on the web, what is readily available and accessible is about the very grave ethical issues of knowingly deceiving, not treating and only observing 412 blacks with non infectious (latent) Syphilis, and a group of 204 syphilis negative also black controls, even deferring treatment and trying to prevent treatment by others after penicillin in 1946 proved to be a very effective treatment and nationwide campaigns were started to diagnose and treat people with syphilis.After a diligent search I only came across one paper in The Archives of Internal Medicine, December 1964, The Tuskegee Study of Untreated Syphilis: The 30th Year of ObservationSince it was a paper read out before the 14th Annual Symposium on Recent Advances in the Study of Venereal Diseases, Houston, January 24-25, 1964, no abstract was available. On the first page they quoted a 1936 paper by Vonderlehr e.a. stating that after 15 years of non infectious (latent) untreated syphilis only one fourth was normal, and most abnormalities were in the cardiovascular system. Morbidity was approximately fourfold greater in the cardiovascular, central nervous, bone and joint systems in untreated syphilitic under age 40 than in the control population of the same age.From Page on Www p. 25 they noted that in a paper from 1946 the mortality in the syphilitics was twice as high as in the controls, and life expectancy was reduced by about 20%. In 1955 a paper reported that on autopsy 30% died directly because of advanced syphilitic lesions in the cardiovascular or central nervous systems. Another paper reported that in those still living an appreciable number have late complications of syphilis which probably will result, for some at least, in contributing materially to the ultimate cause of death.The researchers showed that untreated syphilis, even when non infectious, was very bad for one's health and reduced life expectancy by 20%, but still for the sake of continuing observation omitted to treat these subjects when an effective treatment became available in 1946, be it that at that time the side effects of penicillin on these people long standing syphilis was not known, and doctors had some trepidation starting this treatment.

I. Political relationsAs early as the 1980s France wished to give greater scope to its relations with India. This closer bilateral relationship was concretized with the establishment of a strategic partnership in 1998, and a strategic dialogue a year later. This dialogue is based on annual high-level meetings and consultations conducted twice a year by the Diplomatic Advisor to the French President and the National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister of India.The State visit of President Emmanuel Macron in March 2018, less than two years after that of President François Hollande in January 2016, marked the remarkable deepening of the of the Indo-French strategic partnership and helped boost the dynamism of our economic, university, scientific and cultural exchanges.The strategic partnership comprises the following focal areas:Civil nuclear cooperationThe bilateral cooperation agreement for the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which entered into effect on 14 January 2010, defined the framework of our cooperation in this field. Two agreements signed on 6 December 2010 completed its legal aspects. Several cooperation projects in the area of nuclear research and safety are in the process of being finalized. The project of building a nuclear power plant in Jaitapur now involves 6 EPRs (European pressurized reactors), with a total capacity of 9900 MW. The signing of the industrial agreement between EDF and NPCIL during President Macron’s State visit in March 2018 was a major landmark for progress of the project. The visit of the Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, Jean-Yves Le Drian, helped work out an action plan for the coming months for all the stakeholders concerned.Defence cooperationIndo-French cooperation in this area is ambitious and several collaborative projects are currently being considered. Bilateral military contacts are being strengthened through joint exercises.France and its defence industry also actively contribute to the “Make in India” programme in the defence sector. The first conventional submarine, Scorpene, which started being built in India in 2008 with transfer of technology and support from DCNS, began sea trials in 2015, and the second in January 2017. An agreement on India’s acquisition of 36 Rafale fighter jets was concluded in September 2016. This has paved the way for unprecedented technological and industrial cooperation for the next four decades to coperate.Maritime security cooperation:France and India’s respective leaders desired in March 2018 to give a fresh impetus to this longstanding area of our cooperation, which was initiated with the launch of the first bilateral naval exercise, Varuna, in 1983. Now bolstered by a joint strategic vision in the Indian Ocean, the cooperation between our two countries has become resolutely operational in several areas:Exchange of information in the area of maritime surveillance: implementation since 2017 of a “White Shipping” agreement and the conclusion in March 2018 of a general security agreement laying down the framework for the daily exchange of data on the Indian Ocean region for the purposes of security and stability in the region;Reciprocal logistics support between the French and Indian armed forces: the reciprocal logistics support agreement, which was concluded in March 2018 and entered into effect in December 2018, has further strengthened the cooperation between our navies by providing them mutual access to our military bases. The anti-aircraft destroyer FNS Cassard inaugurated the implementation of this agreement with its call at the Mumbai naval base from 24th to 29th January 2019;Heightened cooperation at multilateral bodies: France and India are determined to deepen their coordination at international organisations through concrete steps: support to France’s candidacy at the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), where India plays a prominent role; France’s chairing of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) in 2020, which will be an opportunity to closely associate India with France’s priorities.Counter-terrorism cooperationFrance and India have strengthened their cooperation in this area since the 2008 Mumbai attacks. The terrorist attacks that France has been facing since 2015 acted as a fresh catalyst. Our two countries have set up an intensive network of operational exchanges and joint actions between their respective intelligence and security forces, notably cooperation on investigations between their respective intervention units, GIGN and the NSG. Every year, a bilateral working group brings together all the players concerned by counter-terrorism. The March 2018 State visit helped institute two areas of deepened cooperation: prevention and fight against radicalization, including online radicalization and through social networks, and the financing of terrorism. India thus participated in the international conference on this matter, “No Money for Terror”, organized by France in April 2018, and is a member of the Paris Coalition, which resulted from it. Read more…Space cooperationFrance and India celebrated 50 years of their exemplary cooperation in this area in 2014.The agreement on the use of outer space for peaceful purposes, signed on 30 September 2008, extended and clarified the areas of cooperation, particularly emphasizing the study of climate change using space-based facilities for Earth observation, or the development of telecommunications satellites for commercial purposes. This agreement made it possible to develop the Megha-Tropiques satellite, launched on 12th October 2011, and the SARAL satellite, which was put in orbit on 25th February 2013.The April 2015 MoU signed between the French (CNES) and Indian (ISRO) space agencies enriched cooperation projects. It led to the finalizing of a joint mission of India’s Oceansat-3 satellite hosting France’s Argos system for climate monitoring and tracking, scheduled to be launched in 2019. It has also resulted in the third jointly developed satellite, Trishna, for thermal infrared imaging. France is also considering contributing to India’s space agency, ISRO’s, upcoming inter-planetary missions to Mars and Venus. January 2017 saw new cooperation in satellite launch technology.The ambitious Joint Vision for Space Cooperation signed in March 2018 paved the way for coordinating our space and maritime collaborations and enabled the commencement of work on a constellation of micro-satellites for maritime surveillance.Finally, France supports India’s ambition to launch a human space flight by 2022. In September 2018, CNES thus concluded an agreement with ISRO for training programmes and bioastronautics. Read more…Cybersecurity/digital cooperationA dedicated bilateral dialogue on this subject was instituted in 2013. The recent visit of the Ambassador for Digital Affairs, Henri Verdier, concretised the desire of both parties to deepen their cooperation in this area as well as on issues related to Internet governance, regulation of the digital world and new technologies.Foreign policyFrance and India share a common vision of reforms to be made in global governance processes. France supports India’s candidacy for a seat as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and multilateral export control regimes (accession to MTCR in June 2016, Wassenaar Arrangement in 2017, the Australia Group in January 2018). France and India hold discussions on their positions at multilateral, UN as well as regional bodies. They hold a biannual strategic dialogue between the Diplomatic Advisor to the French President and the National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister of India as well as annual consultations at the Foreign Secretary level. Since the State visit of the President of the French Republic in March 2018, regional consultations have been held on Asia, Africa, North Africa and the Middle East.At the regional levelAt the regional level, France fully supports India in its fight against terrorism and calls on all countries to fight effectively against terrorism originating from their territory or territories under their control. France also updates India regarding its position on sensitive regional issues (Iran, Afghanistan, Syria).Combating climate changeWith regard to combating climate change, France and India actively strengthened their cooperation under the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change. Together, they spearhead the implementation of this Agreement. They jointly launched the International Solar Alliance, a new international organization headquartered in New Delhi, which federates the endeavours of developing countries to accelerate the deployment of solar energy on a vast scale. The first Summit of the International Solar Alliance was held in New Delhi on 11th March 2018, co-chaired by the President of the French Republic and the Prime Minister of India. Over 70 countries have since joined this initiative. France and India have also developed their bilateral cooperation on energy storage, e-mobility and sustainable urban development. The French Development Agency (AFD), established in India in 2008 – where it is mandated to preserve global public goods – has extended a 1.8-billion-euro credit line for projects linked to Smart Cities and sustainable development projects.II. Economic relationsBilateral trade has increased significantly over the past fifteen years. More than the volume of bilateral trade, the dynamism of Indo-French economic relations springs from the establishment of French companies in India. Today, more than 550 French subsidiaries from a wide spectrum of sectors are present in India and employ a workforce of around 3,00,000 persons. The total French investment stock in India rose to 5.75 billion euros by the end of 2016. This figure rose swiftly over the past few years, having doubled since 2013 and almost quadrupled since the financial crisis.Having consistently registered an imbalance skewed to France’s detriment between 2008 and 2016, the Indo-French goods trade has gradually become more balanced over the past four years. Falling from 2.6 to 2.2 billion euros, our bilateral deficit dropped to 765 million euros in 2016 and to a mere 7 million euros in 2017. In fact, according to figures published by India, France enjoys a trade surplus of 1.8 billion USD in 2017. Shooting up to 23.1% to a historic high of 3.91 billion euros, French goods exports to India recorded their highest growth in 2017 in the past ten years. Conversely, after having reached the historic level of 5.4 billion euros in 2015, our imports from India contracted by 12.9% in 2017. This restoration of the Indo-French trade balance mainly came about due to the aeronautical sector – the top export sector at 49% of the volume of trade in 2017.France collaborates with India under the latter’s “Smart Cities” initiative. French companies specializing in the sustainable urban development sector are already active in around twenty Indian cities (metro, water, etc.).French companies are present throughout the territory of India but are principally concentrated in its large metropolitan cities (Delhi-NCR, Mumbai/Pune, Bengaluru, Chennai, Hyderabad, Ahmedabad, and Kolkata).French Companies in IndiaIII. Cultural, scientific and technological cooperationDeveloping bilateral cooperation on higher education, science, technology, research and innovation is a priority for France.The acclaimed cultural festival, “Bonjour India”, first launched with resounding success in 2009-2010, presented a hundred different shows during its second edition in 2013. The third acclaimed edition was held in 2017-2018.In the field of higher education, 10,000 Indian students chose France for pursuing higher education in 2019. The target of having 10,000 students annually in France, set for 2020 by President Emmanuel Macron and Prime Minister Narendra Modi, has thus been attained well in advance.Apart from an attractive visa policy, France’s carries out a twofold endeavour: support to scholarship programmes, and Indian and French institutions for developing inter-university agreements. Several agreements have been negotiated (academic mobility, recognition of each other’s degrees), while others have been signed for encouraging more Indian scholars to study in France.People-to-people contacts between France and India are also increasing with the development of tourism. The facilitation of visa procedures, with visa issuance within 48 hours and the implementation of biometrics, has encouraged this trend. In 2018, around 8,00,000 Indian tourists visited France, which desires to host them in greater numbers.Scientific and technological cooperation is another key area of our partnership, which was given a fresh impetus with the establishment of an Indo-French Commission for Scientific and Technological Cooperation. This cooperation is based on a unique structure bringing French and Indian researchers and scientists together, CEFIPRA/IFCPAR (Indo-French Centre for the Promotion of Advanced Research), which celebrated its 30th anniversary in 2018. The development of joint research laboratories in promising areas (neuroscience, chemistry); the two French Institutes in Delhi and Puducherry; the research centres and a very strong presence of French research in the private sector (10,000 to 20,000 persons) completes our presence.

Q. What is a good military history of the Vietnam War?A. Great books that I am reading: A Better War, Black April, Without Honor, and Westmoreland.Amazon.com: A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam (9780156013093): Lewis Sorley: BooksISBN-13: 978-0156013093ISBN-10: 0156013096Editorial ReviewNeglected by scholars and journalists alike, the years of conflict in Vietnam from 1968 to 1975 offer surprises not only about how the war was fought, but about what was achieved. Drawing on authoritative materials not previously available, including thousands of hours of tape-recorded allied councils of war, award-winning military historian Lewis Sorley has given us what has long been needed-an insightful, factual, and superbly documented history of these important years. Among his findings is that the war was being won on the ground even as it was being lost at the peace table and in the U.S. Congress. The story is a great human drama of purposeful and principled service in the face of an agonizing succession of lost opportunities, told with uncommon understanding and compassion. Sorley documents the dramatic differences in conception, conduct, and-at least for a time-results between the early and the later war. Meticulously researched and movingly told, A Better War is sure to stimulate controversy as it sheds brilliant new light on the war in Vietnam.Amazon Exclusive Essay: "New Vietnam War History" by Lewis Sorley, Author of A Better WarFor a long time most people thought the long years of American involvement in the Vietnam War were just more of the same--with a bad ending. Now we know that during the latter years, when General Creighton Abrams commanded U.S. forces, almost everything changed, and for the better.Abrams understood the nature of the war and devised a more availing approach to the conduct of it. Building up South Vietnam's own armed forces got high priority, whereas before they had been neglected and allowed to go into combat outgunned by the enemy. The covert infrastructure which through terror and coercion kept South Vietnam's rural population under domination was painstakingly rooted out, not ignored as earlier. And combat operations were greatly improved, concentrating on large numbers of patrols and ambushes designed to provide security for the people rather than cumbersome large-unit sweeps through the deep jungle.Some commentators have called the description of these changes "revisionist" history, but actually it is new history. Virtually all the better-known earlier books about the war concentrated heavily on the early years, leaving the later period grossly neglected.New insight came importantly from a collection of hundreds of tape recordings of briefings and staff meetings in General Abrams's headquarters during the four years he commanded in Vietnam. They are filled with human drama, professional debate, successes and frustrations, and ultimately a hard-won triumph, told in the voices of Abrams and his senior associates; such visiting officials as the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and a succession of often brilliant briefing officers.Later, of course, what they had won was thrown away by the United States Congress, but the story of their better war is still a dramatic testament to courage, integrity, devotion, and professional competence.--Lewis SorleyFrom Publishers WeeklyUsing a host of oral interviews, 455 tape recordings made in Vietnam during the years 1968-1972 and numerous other sources, military historian Sorley has produced a first-rate challenge to the conventional wisdom about American military performance in Vietnam. Essentially, this is a close examination of the years during which General Creighton Abrams was in command, having succeeded William Westmoreland. Sorley contends that Abrams completely transformed the war effort and in the process won the war on the battlefield. The North Vietnamese 1968 Tet offensive was bloodily repulsed, he explains, as was a similar offensive in 1969. Together, the 1970 American incursion into Cambodia and a 1971 Laotian operation succeeded in reducing enemy combat effectiveness. Renewed American bombing of the North and Abrams's use of air power to assist ground operations further reduced Hanoi's ability to wage war. Sorley argues that the combination of anti-war protests in America and a complete misunderstanding of the actual combat situation by the diplomats negotiating the 1973 Paris accords wasted American military victories. In spite of drug use and other problems, Sorley maintains, the army in Vietnam performed capably and efficiently, but in vain, for South Vietnam was sold out by the 1973 cease-fire, America's pullout and the failure of Congress to provide further military assistance to the South. Sure to provoke both passionate and reasoned objection, Sorley's book is as important a reexamination of the operational course of the war as Robert McNamara's In Retrospect is of the conflict's moral and political history. Maps and photos not seen by PW.Copyright 1999 Reed Business Information, Inc.Top Customer Reviews5.0 out of 5 starsTribute to General AbramsBy Amazon Customer on May 17, 2017The real story of Viet Nam and how we almost won that war. Not the normal un-researched politically correct dribble of media light weights who spent more time in Saigon bars than in the field. Right up there with Bernard Fall.5.0 out of 5 starsProud veteranBy kent Tompkins on May 14, 2017As a Vietnam combat veteran I arrived under General Abram in MACV it was my privilege to be part of such noble and courage purpose to bring freedom and democratic to south Vietnam. One thing I learn ed from this book is how thoroughly devastating the air campaign that was Linebacker I and II was to the enemy . We had won the battle but lost the war not because of the brave American and south Vietnam soldiers but self-serving modifications of President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger.4.0 out of 5 starswe did get a better military effort once Abrams took chargeBy Daniel E Swiger on May 4, 2017It was an interesting read, especially considering it covered the years I was in Vietnam. Having just read "Dereliction of Duty, by McMaster, which chronicles the early years of our intervention, I was prepared for what was to come. McMaster pointed out what I already knew about McNamara, LBJ & Westmoreland. Three words, Arrogance, Incompetence & Deception. On top of that, LBJ's myopia about his domestic agenda conspired to grind up lives and make us weaker. In Sorley's accounts, we did get a better military effort once Abrams took charge. hence the title. But the damage had been done and the Vietnamese were still too dependent on the U.S for money, materiel & air power. On top of that, they didn't seem to have the national will & purpose to meet the NVA head on. While Russia & China were unwavering in their support for their client state, the U.S was fickle and unreliable as an ally. But what bother's me more is that our negotiators in Paris actually seemed to believe what the North promised or committed too, then ultimately did nothing when they started to overrun the South. Then we just turned our backs & plugged our ears to the South's annihilation. I am disgusted, heartbroken & angry. There were so many things done poorly and yet so many opportunities missed. But the most painful part is the 58,000 that never had the opportunity to live a full life.In spite of all this,I am glad to have read both books as it somehow continues the closure. However, I am not likely to want to read more.5.0 out of 5 stars... combat tours in Vietnam and until I read "A Better War" I never fully grasped the ironic tragedy of ...By James Callahan on February 1, 2017I did four combat tours in Vietnam and until I read "A Better War" I never fully grasped the ironic tragedy of America's flawed commitment. The waste of Westmorland's misconceptions, the subsequent successes of the Bunker-Abrams-Colby team, General Giap's repeated ideologically driven strategic failures, and the ultimate triumph of the North Vietnamese handed to them by an American middle class and its political elite who not only betrayed an underrated South Vietnamese ally but in the process our own American heritage. When in 1975 that Soviet T-54 tank of the NVA broke through the gates of the Presidential Palace in Saigon, who in American still remembered John F. Kennedy's 1961 pledge that the torch had been passed to a new generation of Americans. A generation that would "bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty." To read " A Better War" gives you the answer. No one.5.0 out of 5 starsThe Seventies of the Vietnam War are not likely to ...By Christian Walser on January 2, 2017The Seventies of the Vietnam War are not likely to be told, as the failure became more and more obvious. Still Abrams managed to adapt the military need to the political situation which had changed. A long awaited insight in Abram's achievements.1.0 out of 5 starsThis is a wonderful book; then, why the “one star”?By Daniel Biezad on December 29, 2016This is a wonderful book; then, why the “one star”? Because it misses what, to me, are two essential points—two massive failures, actually— that cost the loss of over two million lives in Indochina.The first failure is the flippant way that Americans viewed the Vietnamese and their culture. From JFK’s appointment, at the start of the war, of the disastrous Westmoreland (based solely on first impressions) to his brother Edward’s legislation, at the end of the war, that disowned further American responsibility and accountability to the South Vietnamese, it was apparent that America never regarded Vietnam as a strategic necessity. The communist Ho Chi Minh, on the other hand, used nationalism to excite intense motivation for victory into the hearts of his people, and his government enjoyed the unending logistic support of communist Russia and China.The second failure was a lack of political will to use the full force of air power to end the conflict quickly and bring the North Vietnamese to the negotiating table willing to accept an independent South Vietnam. Linebacker II—lasting only a short time in December, 1972—was the only example of the inevitable effectiveness of this approach in the entire war. It showed that air power could have been employed with naval power and blockades continuously until the North Vietnamese pulled their forces and released their prisoners.The actions of Gerald Ford and Edward Kennedy at the end of the Vietnam War made me ashamed to be a veteran of that conflict, though I served with many superb individuals and had great respect for the South Vietnamese. Colin Luther Powell and Herbert Norman Schwarzkopf Jr. learned Abram’s lessons well, but we seem to be regressing into political morass once again. I thank Lewis Sorley for highlighting both the errors and the accomplishments of the Vietnam era.5.0 out of 5 starsand the poor farmers who gave so much to the NLF were ...By jellolion on October 10, 2016This book explains the period of the Vietnam war after Westmoreland, focusing on the leadership of General Abrams. This is a period of the war that was largely uncovered in Hollywood movies other distortions of the war. The book makes a point to show that Westmoreland largely squandered American popular support for the war, and ignored the ARVN. Abrams came in at at time when everything about the war was shown in a negative light. He turned the ARVN into a highly effective, fighting force able to utilize modern methods. Abrams was winning the war. Under his watch, the Americans were being pulled out, while the ARVN was being ramped up. Nixon's programs of Vietnamization and pacification were actually shown to be working. By 1972, the North Vietnamese were largely defeated, and undertook no new offensives until 1975, after they had time to rebuild their military, and after they realized the Americans would no longer be giving any assistance to the South. This book allows one to fully realize the tragedy. We gave massive amounts of military equipment to the South Vietnamese, then cut off all further support. Most of the equipment sat with no fuel, no ammunition, waiting to be appropriated by the communists.. The ARVN were buying hand grenades out of their own pocket money. By 1973, we could have allowed the South to defend themselves, with a fraction of the investment that was spent in previous years. But by then, Nixon was demonized, and Congress was out to shut him down, at all cost, regardless of the cost to the country, and to our commitments to foreign allies. Although we did not see the bloodbath that the right had threatened would occur, we did see that the communists were far from the freedom fighters the left made them out to be. They were opportunists, and they fully used the victory to line their own pockets, and to take whatever they wanted from South Vietnam. The "workers utopia" that they promised never came close to materializing, and the poor farmers who gave so much to the NLF were never even allowed to participate in the "new" (old) government. The South was taken over and run by Northern war heroes, many of whom had little education. The war veterans were hunted down and executed or put into prison camps to waste away to death, or be released 10-20 years later. The former Viet Cong got nothing more than to be allowed to march as odd rag tag soldiers at the tail end of May Day parades. The suffering in the South after the war was great, leading to hundreds of thousands risking their lives, and losing their lives attempting to escape. The author makes the point that life was generous to Abrams in that he died before seeing what happened to the Vietnam that he worked so hard to save.Black April: The Fall of South Vietnam, 1973-75 Paperback – September 17, 2013by George J Veith (Author)Black April: The Fall of South Vietnam, 1973-75: George J Veith: 9781594037047: Amazon.com: BooksProduct Note:The defeat of South Vietnam was arguably America’s worst foreign policy disaster of the 20th Century. Yet a complete understanding of the endgame—from the 27 January 1973 signing of the Paris Peace Accords to South Vietnam’s surrender on 30 April 1975—has eluded us.Black April addresses that deficit. A culmination of exhaustive research in three distinct areas: primary source documents from American archives, North Vietnamese publications containing primary and secondary source material, and dozens of articles and numerous interviews with key South Vietnamese participants, this book represents one of the largest Vietnamese translation projects ever accomplished, including almost one hundred rarely or never seen before North Vietnamese unit histories, battle studies, and memoirs. Most important, to celebrate the 30th Anniversary of South Vietnam’s conquest, the leaders in Hanoi released several compendiums of formerly highly classified cables and memorandum between the Politburo and its military commanders in the south. This treasure trove of primary source materials provides the most complete insight into North Vietnamese decision-making ever complied. While South Vietnamese deliberations remain less clear, enough material exists to provide a decent overview.Ultimately, whatever errors occurred on the American and South Vietnamese side, the simple fact remains that the country was conquered by a North Vietnamese military invasion despite written pledges by Hanoi’s leadership against such action. Hanoi’s momentous choice to destroy the Paris Peace Accords and militarily end the war sent a generation of South Vietnamese into exile, and exacerbated a societal trauma in America over our long Vietnam involvement that reverberates to this day. How that transpired deserves deeper scrutiny.About the AuthorGeorge J Veith: George J. Veith is the author of Code-Name Bright Light: The Untold Story of U.S. POW Rescue Efforts During the Vietnam War, published by The Free Press in December 1997. Code-Name Bright Light was Book of the Month for the Military Book Club in January 1998. Mr. Veith has also published Leave No Man Behind: Bill Bell and the Search for American POW/MIAs from the Vietnam War in March 2004. He has published many symposium papers, various newspaper articles, and a well-received article on the battle for Xuan Loc in April 1975 that appeared in the January 2004 issue of the "Journal of Military History," along with. He presented papers at the following major conferences, including the October 2005 Australian War College symposium "Entangling Alliances: Coalition Warfare in the Twentieth Century," in 2006 to the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency at Fort Belvoir, VA, at the May 2008 conference in Paris on “War, Diplomacy, and Public Opinion: The Paris Peace Talks on Vietnam and the End of the Vietnam War (1968-1975),” and at the 2009 Society for Military History Conference. Most recently, he helped organize a conference held in Washington, DC in April 2010 on “35-Year Retrospective Look on Vietnam.” He has appeared on Fox News and other radio and TV stations, and testified twice on the POW/MIA issue before the U.S. House of Representatives. He has been invited to speak at the American Legion National Conference, the National League of POW/MIA Families and National Alliance of Families annual meetings, and many other venues.BiographyAmazon.com: George J. Veith: Books, Biography, Blog, Audiobooks, KindlePeople often ask me how I got involved in writing about Vietnam, since I did not serve there. Here is the short answer to that question.I am a former Armor officer, having served in tank units in Germany and the U.S. I've always been interested in military history, and in particular, historical mysteries. My initial foray into Vietnam was investigating the POW/MIA issue, a natural fit on both counts. One can't understand the POW/MIA issue without learning about the war, which led me to dive deeper into the conflict.I also always wanted to write, and years ago, I found some documents at the Army's Carlisle Barracks on the Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC), the military's top-secret unit to recover American prisoners during the Vietnam War. Realizing that no one had ever written about these guys, I made ten trips to Carlisle going through all their Vietnam materials. Eventually I located about 80% of the JPRC weekly and monthly reports, and I was off! That research led to "Code-Name Bright Light," my first book.My second book, "Leave No Man Behind," is the memoirs of my friend Bill Bell, who led the USG's POW/MIA field investigation teams after the war. It was published in 2004.In April 2001, my friend and translator, Merle Pribbenow, and I visited MG Le Minh Dao, the last commander of the ARVN 18th Division. We interviewed him about the battle of Xuan Loc, which took place in April 1975. His unit stood their ground in some very heavy combat, and our article on the battle was published in January 2004 in the "Journal of Military History." Dao was so pleased with our efforts that he begged me turn the paper into a book on the final two years of the war. He emphatically told me that the RVNAF had fought well, and they were not the corrupt cowards so often portrayed in the American media. Thus began a ten-year journey of research and writing that finally culminated in "Black April."I hope you enjoy it, and I look forward to your comments.Top Customer Reviews5.0 out of 5 starsYou feel like you are a fly on the wall in Hanoi ...By Tennessee Craig on August 1, 2014Just finished (8/1/14). This book is loaded with complete details of all the battles, and political maneuvering, large and small that took place in the closing days, weeks, and months of the Vietnam War. I never knew so much was going on. It is being told from ALL SIDES. You feel like you are a fly on the wall in Hanoi and Saigon during the planning. You read all the movements of North and South Vietnam and how the USA dropped off the radar, leaving the South Vietnamese people hanging.....And, there was a Miracle that took place as the North Vietnamese were entering Saigon, which delayed their entry and caused many American Civilians not to be captured - (not giving full details, so the reader will find out for themselves) - .Great translation efforts of North Vietnam documents and letters...For any sincere Vietnam interested person, this is a FIVE STAR read, for sure !!!5.0 out of 5 starsA must-read for any serious student of the Vietnam WarBy Andrew California on April 14, 2013As a little teen-ager growing up in Saigon in the early 1970s, I have always been puzzled and perplexed about how the Vietnam War had ended the way it did in April of 1975. Why was the RVN's final collapse so sudden, so quick, and so chaotic ? How did the Northern Vietnamese Communists achieve final and total victory in such a short time and miraculous way ? Why was there no final deal agreement with the advancing and winning North Vietnamese for a more orderly, organized, transitional type of coalition government ? This book by George Veith have given me all the answers to those questions above, and much more.Very well-researched and written for a mainly Western/US audience, it tries to tell the story of how the Republic of South Vietnam has succumbed to the Northern Vietnamese Communist forces during the last 2 years of its existence. And this poignant story is told from a mainly Vietnamese (both North and South) viewpoints. Unless you were living in Vietnam and had participated in that War, it will be very hard for you to fully understand and grasp all of the details (geography, military, political, cultural, etc.) of the author's account, as well as the heroic fighting spirit of the South Vietnamese Army of that earlier era.Knowing what we know now, some of the insights, explanations and conclusions given by the author are really refreshing and dead-on. All of the unique military, geo-political, and socio-economic realities (and circumstances) that had lead to the Fall of South Vietnam have been revealed and analyzed in detail. (I have some relatives who were in the South Vietnamese Army and Government, and their account of the final 2 years, especially the final months and weeks leading to the Fall of Saigon, corroborates with the author's findings).Given all of the negative press from the liberal Left about the immoral nature of War (and the US involvement in it), the corrupt and incompetent South Vietnamese Government and Army, and its last "despotic" leader (Mr Nguyen Van Thieu), this book will help to rectify some of these falsehood, and help us see a more accurate, complete, and balanced picture of that final period of the Vietnam War, after the US has pulled out.No matter what side you are on (Hawk or Dove), I believe you will find this book very interesting. It is a definite must-read for all serious students of the Vietnam War.Knowing what we know now, some of the insights, explanations and conclusions given by the author are really refreshing and dead-on. All of the unique military, geo-political, and socio-economic realities (and circumstances) that had lead to the Fall of South Vietnam have been revealed and analyzed in detail. (I have some relatives who were in the South Vietnamese Army and Government, and their account of the final 2 years, especially the final months and weeks leading to the Fall of Saigon, corroborates with the author's findings).Given all of the negative press from the liberal Left about the immoral nature of War (and the US involvement in it), the corrupt and incompetent South Vietnamese Government and Army, and its last "despotic" leader (Mr Nguyen Van Thieu), this book will help to rectify some of these falsehood, and help us see a more accurate, complete, and balanced picture of that final period of the Vietnam War, after the US has pulled out.No matter what side you are on (Hawk or Dove), I believe you will find this book very interesting. It is a definite must-read for all serious students of the Vietnam War.5.0 out of 5 starsHighly educational and more..By Sally on May 10, 2017I was born and grew up in the Philippines during the Vietnam war. I was too young to remember it and my family would talked about it in whisper, for fear that Vietnam may invade us being so close to each other. It wasn't until recently that I heard a friend talked about Vietnam war so passionately that I decided to read this book. The book is incredibly detailed. It gave me a vivid pictures of how the war happened, the struggles of the faltering American soldiers, and how Vietnam finally fall under the Communist rule. Reading the book was like being funneled down to a live history documentary where you become a fly on the wall. A great read even if you are not a fan of history.4.0 out of 5 starsVery good picture of the fall of South Vietnam and the takeover by NVABy Chuck Cameron - Marine Mustang PA on February 27, 2014Step by step from north to south it details the moves made by the North Vietnamese and the unwillingness or inability of the ARVN we left well equipped in some respect but lacking will, guts and leadership to withstand the invasion from the north. I think the book is both well written factual. America under pressure from media and self-serving politicians abandoned South Vietnam and left it without air power and support necessary to hold its own against a powerful and determined enemy, therefore all the other weapons and support were not sufficient. Perhaps a lesson that should have been learned by the USA but unfortunately it appears it hasn't as we get involved ad pullout of other places and as our respect dwindles around the world.I enjoyed reading the book as I do most books involving our military in Vietnam.5.0 out of 5 starsNew light on the fighting abilities of the South VietnameseBy Scott Bailey on March 31, 2014Great book covering the fighting after America left. This book shows the South Vietnamese doing what they could to stop the offensive. One particular part I like the most is the Ranger units and certain South Vietnamese fighting to the last. Great book showing that the south did what they could and did not make it easy for the enemy to conquer.4.0 out of 5 starsTactically ExcellentBy Keith on November 18, 2014This is the only book on the Vietnam that gives a clear view of what the many other books overlook, that is the effect of excellent planning and also clear direction. It remains focused on how the plans and deployments could be used without any dispersion towards panic; despite enormous casualties. The role of the U.S. has been fully confessed to by former Defense Chief McNamara, in his long complete apology, itself a must read to fully understand the total picture.5.0 out of 5 starsIndispensable ResourceBy Frank Scotton on August 17, 2014Black April is an indispensable study resource for understanding one of the most prolonged and tumultuous foreign policy misadventures in the history of the United States of America. I believe, as a participant during that 1962-1975 period, that the most admirable aspect of the author's account is the objectivity with which he examines and then describes dynamics and problems of both sides during the final campaign. It is not easy for an American author to portray the extent to which his own country deceived the government in Saigon in order to extricate the United States of America. Veith, in a non-polemical way, describes our promises not kept and the devastating impact on Republic of Viet Nam combat capability relative to the better equipped/supplied and led PAVN.There is a wealth of essential detail. Readers who delve into other accounts will want to keep Black April at hand as a continuing reference. Maneuver/Battle Zone by Maneuver/Battle Zone, the author (benefiting from newly released materials and accurate translations by Merle Pribbenow) provides description of what both sides comprehended or misunderstood, and how they reacted to each other's moves. For those of us already aware of certain leadership deficiencies in Saigon, it is interesting to learn more about tensions on the other side between field commanders and Hanoi. Finally, depiction of the role played by communist agents providing on-time tactical intelligence is revelatory. Were I to move cross-country again, and bring only five or six books about Viet Nam with me, this would be one of them.5.0 out of 5 starsThe truth must be respected. Thank Mr Veith for telling the truth.By Michael Do on June 9, 2014For many years during and after the Vietnam War, the information of the War has been distorted to the American public. The fall of South Vietnam can be avoided if the American people knew what the North Vietnamese Communists's goals were. And if they knew how bravely our Republic of Vietnam soldiers fought in more than 20 years in the fierce war. We failed because we were not as good as our enemies in term of propaganda.Mr. Veith did the right thing in his valuable work. The book should be sent to all libraries in the USA for everyone will have a new look at the sorrowful past of our Vietnam.I myself, a soldier of South Vietnam, am very proud of all RVN Armed Forces servicemen and women.Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia by Arnold R. Isaacs (1998-12-30): Amazon.com: BooksPaperback, 576 pages39 b&w illus.ISBN:9780801861079December 1998 $41.00Supplemental MaterialsA gripping account of one of the century's most harrowing human catastrophes—the fall of South Vietnam— Without Honor captures the tragedy and the irony of the Vietnam War's last days and examines the consequences of the American military and political decisions that had sustained the war effort for a generation only to lead to the worst foreign policy failure in the nation's history. Arnold Isaacs, who spent the final years of the war in Vietnam as a correspondent for the Baltimore Sun, describes his firsthand observations of the collapse of Cambodia and South Vietnam—from the 1973 Paris peace agreement to the American evacuation of Saigon and its aftermath—with heartbreaking detail, from the devastated battlefields and villages to the boats filled with terrified refugees. He also provides an historical record of unparalleled accuracy and depth about the strategic decisions made during the war's end game and the intelligence failure that led Americans and their Southeast Asian allies to underestimate the strength and perseverance of the enemy. Drawing on previously classified military documents, field reports from American advisors, eyewitness accounts by soldiers and civilians, and North Vietnamese propaganda broadcasts, Isaacs offers a compelling and compassionate portrait of the impact of America's "Vietnamization" of the conflict and a bracing indictment of political and military leaders in the United States and both Vietnams for the massive human suffering that accompanied the end of the war.Arnold R. Isaacs witnessed the final years of the Vietnam War as a war correspondent for the Baltimore Sun, where he also worked as Washington correspondent and editor. He is the author of the acclaimed Vietnam Shadows: The War, Its Ghosts, and Its Legacy, also available from Johns Hopkins, and coauthor of Pawns of War. Since 1984, he has taught courses on Vietnam at Maryland's Towson University.Editorial Reviews"Reportage at its very best, conveying even now a breathtaking kind of immediacy... This is a meaty, fact-rich book, peppered with interpretations, not judgments... Without Honor deserves attention, for it offers vivid recollections of key moments in the war, set down with honesty by a man who saw and felt deeply."— Douglas Pike - New York Times Book Review"Vivid and very passionate... [Isaacs] succeeds so brilliantly that one almost wishes—before our near-universal national forgetfulness and instinct for self-justification take over for good—that all candidates for public office could be required to pass a public examination of its contents."— Gene Lyons - Newsweek"Impassioned... Isaacs's anguished chapter on the collapse of the city of Da Nang, where the first American Marines had landed in 1965, is reason enough to read his fast-paced report."— John Spragens, Jr. - Commonweal"A sound and interesting narrative, which succeeds in combining vivid images of the war with the statistics and analysis that are essential of historical perspective... A good book."— Times Literary Supplement"A wonderful weave of Isaacs' eyeball-reporting and subsequent, intense research. The thud and blood of combat in the wailing of mortally wounded nations are here. So are the softer sounds of negotiations, riffled documents, the sigh of broken agreements, and the tinkle of glass on conference tables."— Paul Dean - Los Angeles Times Book Review" Without Honor is a courageous and honest book about a period of American history which most would rather forget."— Seymour Hersh"The most complete account of the fall of Indochina... A biting indictment of American policy... The immediacy and impact of his book is compelling."— Reviews in American HistoryTop Customer Reviews5.0 out of 5 starsTrust USA, but have a Plan B, in case we change our minds.By Charles A. Krohn on March 12, 2015I served slightly more than two years in Vietnam, and have always been proud of my service. But as an American, reading for the first time the details of our betrayal and hasty departure, I am depressed, perhaps clinically at times, after reading the details of this super-depressing book. Those who think America does little wrong, all things considered, should avoid this work. But those who wonder why many countries harbor suspicions about getting too close to us, based on our behavior in Vietnam in its final hours, will react to this book about the same way I have. I know we tired of the war, after expending blood and treasure. But the way we withdrew in the midst of the Watergate scandal and Nixon's collapse, will be a source of shame for many years.5.0 out of 5 starsbut I feel like I am learning why the so-called "peace with honor" ...By Tom Weiner on July 15, 2015I've not yet finished Mr. Isaacs book, but I feel like I am learning why the so-called "peace with honor" the American public was sold on was a giant fabrication on every page. The book is gripping, terrifically well-written and illuminating. I recommend it highly to anyone who cares about American history and learning another tragic story that has been either neglected or mis-taught.5.0 out of 5 starsWitness to SlaughterBy SFORD on August 4, 2013Fantastic book about little known tragedies of the Vietnam War. Ninety thousand refugees left DaNang for Phu Quoc Island.... and about forty thousand ultimately went ashore. It was ugly... I was there on a Navy ship. Nobody talks about Phu Quoc Island, but I remember it every day.5.0 out of 5By Stephen B. Coleman Jr. on June 22, 2015No one is better qualified to tell the true story.Amazon.com: Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam (9780547518268): Lewis Sorley: BooksEditorial ReviewsAmazon Exclusive: A Q&A with Author Lewis SorleyQ: How can the loss of Vietnam be blamed on Westmoreland?A: He served for four years as U.S. commander there during the crucial period of the buildup of American ground forces, a flood that eventually reached 543,400 due to Westmoreland’s repeated requests for more and more troops. Given a free hand in deciding how to conduct the war within South Vietnam, he chose to pursue an unavailing war of attrition, which failed miserably. Westmoreland thus squandered four years of support by Congress, much of the American people, and even the media.Q: How did a man as limited as Westmoreland achieve such high rank and position?A: Fueled by ambition, Westmoreland drove himself relentlessly. He was of impressive military mien, energetic, effective at self-promotion, and skillful in cultivating influential sponsors. From his earliest days of service he led his contemporaries, was admired and advanced by his seniors, and progressed rapidly upward. Westmoreland’s strengths eventually propelled him to a level beyond his understanding and abilities.Q: What was Westmoreland’s approach as commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam?A: Westmoreland decided to conduct a war of attrition in which the measure of merit would be body count, the number of enemy killed. His premise was that if he killed enough of their soldiers, the enemy would lose heart and cease its aggression against South Vietnam. He went about this primarily through the use of search and destroy tactics, often involving very large operations in the jungles near South Vietnam’s western borders with Laos and Cambodia.Meanwhile he neglected other crucially important tasks, such as strengthening South Vietnam’s military forces and rooting out the covert infrastructure that enabled the enemy to use coercion and terror to dominate South Vietnam’s rural populace. He was successful in killing a large number of enemy troops, but this did not represent the progress he claimed; the communists simply replaced their losses and continued to fight. Westmoreland was on a treadmill.Q: What are the sources for your account of Westmoreland’s life and career?A: Westmoreland himself provided extensive—and revealing—archival material. His papers, on deposit at the University of South Carolina, run to many thousands of pages. I spent four months going through them.I interviewed about 175 people who had known and served with Westmoreland over the years. One of the most important, and most helpful, was General Bruce Palmer Jr., with whom I spoke dozens of times. Having been Westmoreland’s West Point classmate, then having served under him in Vietnam and subsequently as his Vice Chief of Staff, General Palmer was an authoritative, sympathetic, and invaluable source of both factual information and sensitive insights.Q: What do you hope will be the lasting impression of General Westmoreland?A: It is not a happy story, but I believe it is an important, even essential, one. Unless and until we understand William Childs Westmoreland, we will never fully understand what happened to us in Vietnam, or why.In the end, of course, this is the story of an officer whose strengths propelled him to a level of responsibility beyond his capacity. From early days prideful and image-conscious, Westmoreland developed into a man of incredible industry, driving himself to achieve, forever in a rush, with unbounded ambition and no apparent sense of personal limitations—doing it by the book, even though he hadn’t read the book or studied at any of the Army’s great schools. His ultimate failure would have earned him more sympathy, it seems certain, had he not personally been so fundamentally to blame by reason of his relentless self-promotion.Those who have long been Westmoreland admirers and supporters may be offended by an account that, as they will view it, tarnishes his reputation. But many others, I believe, will welcome a factual, detailed, and well-documented explanation of how and why he failed so completely in his most important assignment; what that failure cost us as a nation; and, most important, what it cost the ill-fated South Vietnamese, who risked all and lost all.Review"This is a terrific book, lively and brisk, and surprisingly interesting. How could this deeply flawed, limited man rise so high in the U.S. Army? This will be the definitive book on Westmoreland, and a must read for anyone who tries to understand the Vietnam War."-Thomas E. Ricks, author of Fiasco and The Gamble" Lewis Sorley's brilliant portrait of General Westmoreland helps us understand why our war lasted so long and ended as it did. This is biography at its finest."- Bui Diem, South Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States (1967-1972)"A riveting history of how ambition corrupted soldierly virtues and led to slyness, hubris and national disaster. A scorching indictment of how generals covered up for each other."-Bing West, author of THE WRONG WAR: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan"To understand the Vietnam War in its totality one must logically try to understand General Westmoreland. Dr. Lewis Sorley has made an enormous contribution by revealing General Westmoreland’s complex personality and the role it played in U.S. foreign policy."-Melvin R. Laird, former Secretary of Defense and nine-term Member of Congress"Reaching beyond the surface to penetrate the enigma of General William C. Westmoreland, Lewis Sorley gathers the recollections of Westy’s Army colleagues, the man’s personal papers, and official records to tell the story of a general who has remained opaque despite the many debates over his role in the Vietnam war. Eye-opening and sometimes maddening, Sorley’s Westmoreland is not to be missed."-John Prados, author of Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable WarProduct detailsPublisher: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt; 1 edition (October 11, 2011)ISBN-10: 0547518269ISBN-13: 978-0547518268Top Customer Reviews5.0 out of 5 starsgreat bookBy L. B on April 6, 2017Wonderfully write. As a member of the US Army, active duty 1969-1971, the information and description is right on. The a general,visited the base to which I was assigned. Many days were spent making the location spotless. Much time and energy expended. He swept out of his vehicle, great coat swirling, made a circle around his vehicle, into his vehicle and disappeared in a cloud of dust. That was the time the General provided to those who labored long and hard to please him.5.0 out of 5 starsComprehensive Biography of Gen. Westmoreland.By John M. Cooper on January 21, 2017My father was assigned to ACSI when Gen. Westmoreland was the CSA. Storley's biography brings this time to life for me. When Westmoreland commanded MACV, Dad was first an aide to Gen. Knowlton and later part of the G-2 Section and II Field Force. I had little idea what II Field Force did, and this biography helped me understand somewhat. It also left me very interested about Gen. Weyand, the II Field Force commander who had a complex relationship with Westmoreland.4.0 out of 5 starsGood ReadByJumpmaster173on March 26, 2017I wonder how things would have turned out if Westmoreland had not been in command? Tragic.....5.0 out of 5 starsA Model Soldier Stretched to the Limit - Caught in a Difficult ConflictBy Carl H. Mcnair Jr. on August 28, 2013Book is candid and clear, but incomplete. While it is well researched from the military tactical aspect, it fails to cover the strategic and political intrigue of the "will to win" versus the "resources and strategy to win". Other books have covered that well, but seems to be minimized in this phase of the war. Excellent reading, but not totally balanced in the political/military sense.5.0 out of 5 starsFive StarsBy Christian Walser on January 2, 2017You will find out a lot more about the Vietnam war, its backgrounds, reasons, and effects5.0 out of 5 starsA biography of a General which should be read by everyone who cares about how the USA prosecutes COINBy Sgt. Rock on October 19, 2013I rarely read the memoirs of or biographies about General officers simply because there have been so very few that I admire. I did not admire Gen. Westy Westmoreland and I admire him less after having read Lewis Sorley excellent biography of him. This does not mean that I hate him either, Westmoreland was after all a decent man who was well intentioned in his prosecution of the war in vietnam. He was sadly out of his depth especially intellectually. I actually feel sorry for Westy an emotion bordering on near pity for the man he must have gone to his grave realizing that his bungling of the war killed 58.000. Americans and killed millions of Asians. Westy strikes me as being emblematic of too many Generals a man who feigned high intellect and got by because he was politically hooked and because with his matinee like looks he 'looked like a soldier.' While Westy was in charge of MACV from 1964-early 1968 he wasted nearly 4 years pursuing a policy of 'firepower,' trying to kill his way out of it.' A policy that the majority of the other Generals especially the marine corp generals knew was fatally flawed. In short West squandered 4 irreplaceable years, thousands of US lives, wounded, billions of dollars and much of the prescious good will of the American public and media pursuing a failed strategy. In short Westy lost the war! But damn he did it while looking like a soldier.5.0 out of 5 starsWestmoreland: The General Who Lost VietnamBy Daniel J. Blattenbauer on July 1, 2014The book was very interesting and included how the insiders saw the progression of the Vietnam War over time. I highly recommend the book to anyone interested in our military.4.0 out of 5 starsSad but TrueBy M. Dawson on July 12, 2012The picture that Lewis Sorley paints in this book is of an intelligent, dedicated and ambitious military career officer but with a few fatal flaws, namely that he was unimaginative and rigid in his thinking. Westmoreland is consistently portrayed as conformist and "by the book" throughout his life. Enamored first of the Boy Scouts and then of the military, he loved living "in the box". It is no wonder that as the book describes and several reviewers have commented, Westmoreland could not think "outside the box". Not a good choice for the commander who was to develop the strategy for and command the forces of an ever-changing insurgency war in a foreign country with a foreign culture. Sorley paints the picture but lets the readers draw their own conclusion, but the conclusion is inescapable, Westy was not up to the job.I felt that Sorley's earlier book "The Better War" did a better job of making the case that Westmoreland did a poor job in Viet Nam. By contrasting Westmoreland's approach with that of Gen. Creighton Abrams, who took over as MACV commander in 1968, it became clear what a flawed approach Westmoreland's strategy of attrition was, and how a different strategy and different tactics could actually make positive progress in Viet Nam. Unfortunately it was too late. The U. S. press and population had turned against the war and the U. S. was on the way out. This book adds color to "The Better War" by going into more detail about the commander who played such a major roll.As an infantry veteran who served in Viet Nam while Westy was commander my thoughts on him have run the gambit over the years. Although I enjoyed reading this excellent short summery of his life I felt a bit sad when I was finished.