Statutory Declaration: Fill & Download for Free

this is the most frequent question asked by fresh female dentist. i will try my best to explain the options. hope this will help you.let me explain.it depends a lot what you are aiming in life? if you are looking for earning lot of money then you have options as below:you should think about MDS and then you can choose UK,USA,CANADA. to practice there as a dentist you have to go through some exams. for UK, you have to pass exam of ORE part(1) &(2). Before you apply for the ORE​To apply for the ORE you will need to fill in the application form, and send in supporting documents at the same time.Applicants are required to ensure they have read and understood the student fitness to practice guidance and exam rules as part of the application form:Student Fitness to Practice Guidence (157.9 KB, PDF)You are not expected to be familiar with the National Health Service (NHS) or British culture other than the ways in which it will affect your treatment of patients. You should be familiar with how people in the UK might behave, but you should not make assumptions about a patient based on issues such as gender or ethnic origin.When you apply for the ORE, you should be certain that you have the overall clinical acumen to successfully complete a series of tests. The ORE will sample the Learning Outcomes covered in ‘Preparing for Practice’ (PfP), and your chances of passing will be improved if you have had a recent broad experience of clinical dentistry, rather than relying entirely on preparation courses. The exam is designed to determine whether you can safely practice dentistry in the UK and for this purpose you must be able to demonstrate the necessary knowledge, skills and attitudes at one sitting.A candidate is expected to be able to show competence, knowledge and familiarity in the different aspects of dentistry which are outlined in the Learning Outcomes in the GDC’s document ‘Preparing for Practice’ (PfP). The standards of conduct, performance and ethics required are described in the GDC’s publication ‘Standards for the Dental Team’RequirementsBefore applying, you need to make sure you meet our clinical experience and English language requirement. You will need to send evidence of the following:Clinical experience requirementYou must have at least 1600 hours of clinical experience where you have personally treated patients in the dental chair. The number of hours of this clinical experience will either be hours spent undertaking appropriate investigations and administering dental treatment:during your dental degree;during post-qualification experience; ora combination of the two.It could also be undertaken during temporary registration.This cannot include time observing other dentists or assisting other dentists/dental students in undertaking diagnosis/treatment planning or provision of treatment.English language requirementFor the purpose of the ORE, candidates are required to submit evidence of English language. The types of evidence we are likely to accept are:An International English Language Testing System (IELTS Academic) certificate at the appropriate level.A recent primary dental qualification that has been taught and examined in English.A recent pass in a language test for registration with a regulatory authority in a country where the first and native language is English.Recent experience of practising in a country where the first and native language is English.Please also see the GDC Guidance on English Language Controls document, for full details of the above requirements and 'other evidence' we may accept.After you have passed the ORE​When you pass the ORE you will be sent your Part 2 results by email. In your results email you will be directed to download the application pack in order to apply for full registration on the GDC dentists register.Overseas Dentist Registration Form (180.1 KB, PDF)ORE dentists application advice sheet (47.2 KB, PDF)The GDC assessments team will be sent the names of the people who passed the ORE, so there is no need for you to contact them separately.If you have changed your name since applying for the ORE and wish to be registered under your new name, you will have to send a certified copy of your name change document with your registration application.When you send back your completed registration application form, registration fee and valid certificate of good standing, our assessments team will take over and you no longer need to communicate with the exams team.Working in the UKThe Home Office has removed the categories of ‘employed dental practitioner’, 'employed dental assistant' and ‘vocational dental practitioner’ from the list of UK shortage occupations.You may also be asked to do up to a year’s Vocational Training (VT) in order to work for the NHS. This will be influenced by your qualifications and experience and will be at the discretion of the Primary Care Trust which employs you.English Language ControlsNecessary knowledge of English language for dental professionals​The General Dental Council (GDC) is committed to ensuring that only dental professionals who demonstrate the necessary knowledge of the English language are able to treat patients in the UK.In collaboration with other healthcare regulators we worked with the Department of Health to amend the legislation that governs what we do - the Dentists Act 1984 – and to introduce new powers to assess English language proficiency. The powers came into force in April 2016.Who does this apply to?These new powers, allow the GDC to assess the English language proficiency of any dentist or dental care professional (DCP) before they can practise in the UK.Dentists and dental care professionals who apply to return to the GDC register will, also have their proficiency in English language considered.These powers reflect the requirement in our Standards for dental professionals to:"be sufficiently fluent in written and spoken English to communicate effectively with patients, their relatives, the dental team and other healthcare professionals in the United Kingdom."Applicants from the European Economic Area (EEA)We are required to recognise the dental qualifications and training from applicants from EEA countries, in line with other professional healthcare regulators.We require applicants from EEA countries to provide appropriate evidence that they have the necessary knowledge of English before they can be registered.If we are satisfied about an applicant's knowledge of English from their initial application for registration, we will not request further evidence.Dental professionals qualifying in a country where English is the first language will not routinely need to provide additional evidence about their knowledge of English.If the evidence provided does not meet our requirements applicants will be required to undertake a language proficiency test. Full details of our requirements are set out in our guidance.Applicants from outside the European Economic Area (EEA)Dental professionals who qualified outside the EEA, must demonstrate they have the necessary knowledge of English as part of the assessment of their qualifications, knowledge and skills.The process for demonstrating English language proficiency varies according to the circumstances of applicants.If we are satisfied about an applicant's knowledge of English from their initial application we will not request further evidence. Dental professionals qualifying in a country where English is the first language will not routinely need to provide additional evidence about their knowledge of English.If the evidence provided does not meet our requirements, applicants will be required to undertake an English language proficiency test.Full details of our requirements are set out in our guidance.Types of evidence we are likely to acceptExamples of the types of evidence we will routinely accept to demonstrate applicants have the necessary knowledge of English, are:A recent primary dental qualification that has been taught and examined entirely in EnglishA recent pass in a language test for registration with a regulatory authority in a country where the first language is EnglishRecent and continuous experience of practising in a country where the first language is EnglishA pass in the International English Language Testing System (IELTS) exam that meets the requirements set out in our guidance.Changes in English Language Testing System (IELTS) levelsOn 1 April 2016, the IELTS pass levels for dental nurses and dental technicians changed from Level 6 to Level 7. The IELTs pass levels for dentists and other dental care professionals (DCPs) are unchanged and remain at level 7.The decision to bring dental nurses and dental technicians in line with the rest of the dental team followed feedback received from our consultation on the English language control requirements.Following the consultation and the views expressed about the IELTS levels, we gathered further information to establish whether to maintain the current IELTs pass levels for dental nurses and dental technicians or whether to raise them to the levels required for dentists and other members of the dental team.We considered the responses from the professional bodies, namely the British Association of Dental Nurses (BADN), the British Dental Association (BDA) and the British Orthodontic Society (BOS). The BDA commented on the differences in IELTS levels we require and highlighted the important role dental nurses play in recording work undertaken in surgery, and their oral health education role, the BOS considered that all registrants with 'direct access to patients' should be required to attain the same levels of language competence as other registrant groups and the BADN called for the same levels across the dental team.From the evidence and information gathered we found no compelling patient safety case either for or against requiring different IELTS levels for dental nurses and dental technicians than we set for other registrant groups.On this basis and recognising the complex technical elements of much of the work involved, our Council decided to act on the advice of the professional bodies and align the levels by making a modest increase in the requirements for dental nurses and technicians.It is anticipated that over the next decade all dental care professionals will provide a greater proportion of dental care than is currently the case and this coupled with the desire of NHS policy makers to make better use of the dental workforce and thereby increase access to dental care, supports an argument for aligning the levels across the dental team.Other evidenceThere are many ways in which an applicant may be able to satisfy us that they have the necessary knowledge of English for registration. If evidence other than those we have listed is provided they must meet the criteria we have set out i.e. the evidence must be robust, recent and readily verifiable by the GDC.https://www.gdc-uk.org/professionals/education/recent-inspections/inspections-dentistryhttps://www.dentalorg.com/settle-in-uk-as-dentist-after-bds.html/3https://www.dentalorg.com/settle-in-uk-as-dentist-after-bds.html/5ORE Part 1The Exam​Part 1 is designed to test candidates' application of knowledge to clinical practice.It consists of two computer-based exam papers:·Paper A covers clinically applied dental science and clinically applied human disease.·Paper B covers aspects of clinical dentistry, including law and ethics and health and safety.All questions are mapped to learning outcomes in the GDC document 'Preparing for Practice' (PfP).Each paper lasts three hours and is made up of Multiple Short Answer questions (Extended Matching Questions and Single Best Answer Questions).A candidate is expected to be able to show competence, knowledge and familiarity in the different aspects of dentistry which are outlined in the learning outcomes in the GDC’s document ‘Preparing for Practice’ (PfP).You must pass both papers in order to progress to Part 2.Location and CostThe Part 1 exam is held at King's College London and costs £806. Please note, the exam fee is not normally refundable.Dates​Month/Year​Date​July - August 2018​31 - 3​​April 2019​15 - 18July - August 201930 - 2ResultsYour exam results will be sent to you by email. We will endeavour to release the results to you within 20 working days of the examination.You will be given a percentage mark out of 100 for Paper 1 and for Paper 2, as well as an overall pass or fail award. As the examination is taken at a computer, the results are calculated as soon as you click 'submit'. This ensures there is no room for error in this marking system and so we do not offer the opportunity of questioning the marks awarded. However, all results are quality assured after the exam by the exam board.The GDC is not able to provide you with any feedback on your performance in this examination. However, approximately 40 working days after the examination, the Part 1 Supplier, King's College London, will provide you with result feedback.Upon passing Part 1, your name will be added to the Part 2 candidate list.Survey FeedbackAfter each exam the GDC exam supplier collects feedback about the sitting. Attached to this webpage is the feedback from the April 2018 exam and some responses from GDC about certain topics. The attached report is a tool for candidates to clarify certain aspects about the part 1 exam and should be read as preparation for the exam.Policies​Policies governing the examination of Part 1 are available on the exam centre's website hereTo practice dentistry in Australia you have to register yourself in the dental Board of Australia as a general dentist.You can take admission in any Australian University to complete a dental degree program; afterwards you can practice their as a general dentist.Or you can choose an alternate pathway by sitting in the examination conducted by Australian Dental Council.Australian Dental Council has been empowered by Australian government to assess the non Australian degrees earned by a foreign dentist.The Australian Dental Council assesses the knowledge of dentists by an examination which is conducted in three stages:1.the initial assessment2.part 1 written examination and3.part 2 practical examinationThe initial assessment involves the checking of your papers.The part 1 written examination assesses your theoretical knowledge.The part 2 practical examination assesses your clinical knowledge.If you are interested further in the examination conducted by Australian Dental Council, you can see the following website for details.https://dentalknowledge.in/The process to settle as a dentist in Canada is long and tedious but I am sure it's rewarding.As you must be knowing Indian Dental degree is a non accredited dental degree according to NDEB. So before applying for the licensure you'll first need to complete a NDEB EQUIVALENCY PROCESS, only then you are qualified to take the NDEB written andOSCE.1st step- NBED equivalency process1.Online self assessment quiz- you'll need to complete a online self assessment quiz.2.Application for NDEB Equivalency process- submission and verification of documents.3.Assessment of fundamental knowledge- once your documents are verified, you'll need to take a 3 hours/section test of 2 separate sections with 150 multiple choice questions. You'll have to score at least 75 or above to qualify for the next exam. You can take this exam 3 times.4.Assessment of Clinical knowledge- it is also a 3 hour long multiple choice test for each section of two sections. You can take this exam 3 times too.Once you qualify the above, you can start your process of getting certified.Certification process includes-1.Application for NDEB certification with the necessary documents along with the completion of Accredited qualification or NDEB Equivalency process2.Written exam- it's a written exam with 2 sections of 150 mins each with 150 multiple choice questions.3.OSCE- Objective Structure Clinical Examination, it's a objective exam with 2 questions with extensive cases.Once you clear all these, you'll obtain your license to practice in Canada.This is known to be hard and extremely difficult but hey sky is the limit. Work towards it and I am sure you'll achieve.FOR CANADA:-However, you cannot just directly enter Canada and start working as a dentist. Since you have a degree from a foreign country, you will need to go through the rigorous & multilevel qualifying process.It's a long series of steps that are designed by the Canadian dental regulatory body to assess the qualification of foreign dentists and to make sure that they are fulfilling all the necessary points to work as a dentist in Canada.The good point is, once you clear the qualifying process, you do not need to study any further by joining a dental college in Canada. You are directly eligible to legally work as a dentist (pending to clearance of the license).In this article, I will provide you a basic overview of the points and also the reference to the article where you will sequentially find the details along with animated videos to explain you the process with complete information.Essential points to understand before you start your Canadian Dental Journey:·Any dental degree from outside of Canada is not directly valid there.·The foreign dental degrees are separated into two categories - Accredited and Non-Accredited. (Hence first know you fall into which category) For example, if you are from India with a BDS degree, then you fall under the Non-Accredited category.·Depending on the type of category your dental degree belongs to - Accredited or Non-Accredited, you will have to go through the appropriate steps respectively.·The steps of qualification for both Accredited & Non-Accredited are more or less similar however with two significant differences in between the flow of actions.·The entire process is a costly affair. The payment is in dollars and there is no refund in case of withdrawing or failing in the exams. Hence, you cannot take the exams casually. You need to be very particular about it and prepare for the exam to succeed in it. NO TRIAL ATTEMPT ATTITUDE!·The first step, before you start the qualifying process is to fulfill all the Visa-related obligations. Never trust any unverified party for the visa regulations. Always contact and get the latest information for the Visa-related rules from the official Canadian embassy in your country.·To become a licensed dentist in Canada, graduates of accredited/non-accredited dental programs must successfully complete the National Dental Examining Board of Canada’s (NDEB) Certification Process.·The NDEB Certification Process comprises two examinations. These examinations are based on the competencies required to be a beginning dental practitioner in Canada.·The exams will mostly take place in Canada and Australia. There are Assessment of Fundamental Knowledge, Assessment of Clinical Skills, Assessment of Clinical Judgement, Pathway to certification, Written ExaminationThough straightforward, however still a majority of the aspirants seem to be confused regarding the process.Hence to make the process easy to understand for all, we have written a detailed article explaining all the steps and associated official links. (Check the article just below)Here are the points that will be covered in the article mentioned above,Why will you find it the best & easiest article on Dentistry in Canada for Foreign Dentists?·The article has been broken down into separate slides to make it easier for you to understand the long and complex process.·Throughout the article, relevant official links are given in order for reference.·All the steps are explained with Animated Videos and Flowcharts to explain you the long process easily.·At the end of the article, all the relevant official links have been provided in a sequential step-wise manner.·In the last slide of the article, the entire process is again explained with the help of a video presentation.We hope that this answer has cleared some of the initial doubts you may have on the process of working as a qualified dentist in Canada with a foreign degree.As mentioned before, the article will provide you all the details in a sequential manner with all the official links and videos explaining the complete process.Once you complete reading the article, you will have a much better understanding of the process. Using this understanding, you can contact all the official links and start with all the necessary steps to appear for NDEB exams.Initial assessment for dental practitionersOverviewOverseas qualified dental practitioners wanting to register to practise with the Dental Board of Australia (DBA) who are required to complete the Australian Dental Council (ADC) assessment, must complete the three-stage assessment process.The first stage of the assessment process is initial assessment.The initial assessment process involves the assessment of documents including professional qualifications, work experience, registration history, and good standing to determine eligibility to sit the written examination.Am I eligible to apply for an initial assessment?To be eligible to apply for initial assessment applicants must:·hold a minimum qualification(s) at the required level that is comparable in duration and content to the nationally agreed minimal education standard for the relevant Australian dental profession, and·have held registration or license in either in their home country, or country of training, with no withdrawal of registration.The minimum required qualifications vary between professions.DentistsDentists must hold at least a four-year, full-time university dental degree, or diploma at an acknowledged university.Dental hygienists and dental therapistsDental hygienists must hold a qualification of at least two-years equivalent full-time study from a recognised provider.Dental therapists must hold a qualification of at least two-years equivalent full-time study from a recognised provider.Dual qualified dental hygienist/dental therapists must hold relevant qualifications totaling at least 3 years full-time study from a recognised provider.Dental prosthetistsDental prosthetists must hold, at least, a three-year, full-time prosthetist qualification from a recognised provider.When can I apply for an initial assessment?An initial assessment can be completed at any time of year by submitting an Initial assessment of professional qualification application form for the relevant profession.Once the application form and supporting documents have been received, applicants will be assigned an ADC candidate reference number. This number should always be used when you contact the ADC.Timeframe: Approximately 8 weeks, not including time taken to submit any additional documents.Cost: AUD $610Process1.1 Download and complete an application formThe Initial assessment of professional qualification application form should be downloaded and printed as a hard copy before it is completed.Please make sure that you are using the current version of the application form.Detailed guidelines, designed to help you complete the form, are included throughout the form.1.2 Submit application formAs well as a completed application form, you are required to submit a clear, certified copy of your:·current passport (high quality colour copy)·evidence of change of name (if applicable)·dental qualification, official certificate or testamur·academic transcript·internship certificate·evidence of registration or license to practise dentistry·two written professional references·evidence of practise or work history as a registered or licensed dentist.Please do not send original documents as we cannot return these to you.All supporting documentation must adhere to the ADC certification of document guidelines. Incorrectly certified documents will result in delays, or in the application being declined.Post your application and supporting documents to the address specified on the application form.You are also responsible for arranging a certificate, or letter, of good standing. This must be sent directly to the ADC from the organisation responsible for regulating dental registration or dental license in your country of practise.Once the application form and supporting documents have been received and payment taken, you will be assigned an ADC candidate reference number. This number should always be used when you contact the ADC.1.3 Receive an initial assessment outcome from the ADCOnce your application has been assessed, you will receive an email from the ADC advising of the outcome of your assessment.There are three possible outcomes:1.Your application was successful and you are now eligible to proceed to the written examination. A successful initial assessment does not expire.2.Your application is incomplete and you are required to submit additional information for further assessment.3.Your application was unsuccessful and you are ineligible to proceed with the ADC process.If you wish to appeal the outcome of an initial assessment, a written application for review, together with the nominated fee, is to be submitted to the ADC within 28 days of receipt of the notification of the assessment outcome.The appeals policy for the assessment of qualifications contains further information on the appeals process. You can view the policy here.Other important requirementsChange of nameThe ADC must ensure the legitimacy of all supporting documentation. If your supporting documents have different names or different versions of your name you must provide evidence of any name changes.Evidence must be a legal change of name document, issued by Births, Deaths and Marriages or an official change of name by deed poll. Newspaper or gazette articles, affidavits or statutory declarations are not considered as legal evidence.Documents issued in a language other than EnglishAll documents issued in a language other than English must be submitted attached to an official English translation.This means that you must submit both a certified copy of the document in its original language and its English translation. Both the translation and original document must be correctly certified.Please refer to the Translation of documents guidelines for more information about document translation.Nominating an Authority to ActAll candidates have the option to nominate a third party, such as a family member or migration agent, to act on their behalf. This nominated party will receive all correspondence from the ADC related to the candidate’s application on their behalf. If an authority to act is in place, correspondence will not be sent to the candidate.This person must not sign a candidate’s application form, and cannot certify or translate documents for them.To nominate an authority to act, you must complete and submit an Authority to act form.This form must be sent to the ADC by post to retain all the original signatures. The ADC will not accept forms returned via email or fax.hope this help you,good luck.if need any more guidance, mail me at: [email protected]

Here’s an excellent and footnoted discussion on the idea of martial law. If you read through the whole thing, you will see that the courts’ view of the legality of martial law is reflected by what the state of the union was at the time. But let it speak for itself. If you’d rather read it online at the source, it is Martial Law and Constitutional Limitations“Two theories of martial law are reflected in decisions of the Supreme Court. The first, which stems from the Petition of Right, 1628, provides that the common law knows no such thing as martial law;223 that is to say, martial law is not established by official authority of any sort, but arises from the nature of things, being the law of paramount necessity, leaving the civil courts to be the final judges of necessity.224 By the second theory, martial law can be validly and constitutionally established by supreme political authority in wartime. In the early years of the Supreme Court, the American judiciary embraced the latter theory as it held in Luther v. Borden225 that state declarations of martial law were conclusive and therefore not subject to judicial review.226 In this case, the Court found that the Rhode Island legislature had been within its rights in resorting to the rights and usages of war in combating insurrection in that state. The decision in the Prize Cases,227 although not dealing directly with the subject of martial law, gave national scope to the same general principle in 1863.The Civil War being safely over, however, a divided Court, in the elaborately argued Milligan case,228 reverting to the older doctrine, pronounced President Lincoln’s action void, following his suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in September, 1863, in ordering the trial by military commission of persons held in custody as “spies” and “abettors of the enemy.” The salient passage of the Court’s opinion bearing on this point is the following: “If, in foreign invasion or civil war, the courts are actually closed, and it is impossible to administer criminal justice according to law, then, on the theater of active military operations, where war really prevails, there is a necessity to furnish a substitute for the civil authority, thus overthrown, to preserve the safety of the army and society; and as no power is left but the military, it is allowed to govern by martial rule until the laws can have their free course. As necessity creates the rule, so it limits its duration; for, if this government is continued after the courts are reinstated, it is a gross usurpation of power. Martial rule can never exist where the courts are open, and in proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction. It is also confined to the locality of actual war.”229 Four Justices, speaking by Chief Justice Chase, while holding Milligan’s trial to have been void because it violated the Act of March 3, 1863, governing the custody and trial of persons who had been deprived of the habeas corpus privilege, declared their belief that Congress could have authorized Milligan’s trial. The Chief Justice wrote: “Congress has the power not only to raise and support and govern armies but to declare war. It has, therefore, the power to provide by law for carrying on war. This power necessarily extends to all legislation essential to the prosecution of war with vigor and success, except such as interferes with the command of the forces and the conduct of campaigns. That power and duty belong to the President as commander-in-chief. Both these powers are derived from the Constitution, but neither is defined by that instrument. Their extent must be determined by their nature, and by the principles of our institutions. . . .”“We by no means assert that Congress can establish and apply the laws of war where no war has been declared or exists.”“Where peace exists the laws of peace must prevail. What we do maintain is, that when the nation is involved in war, and some portions of the country are invaded, and all are exposed to invasion, it is within the power of Congress to determine in what states or districts such great and imminent public danger exists as justifies the authorization of military tribunals for the trial of crimes and offences against the discipline or security of the army or against the public safety.”230 In short, only Congress can authorize the substitution of military tribunals for civil tribunals for the trial of offenses; and Congress can do so only in wartime.Early in the 20th century, however, the Court appeared to retreat from its stand in Milligan insofar as it held in Moyer v. Peabody231 that “the Governor’s declaration that a state of insurrection existed is conclusive of that fact. . . . [T]he plaintiff ’s position is that he has been deprived of his liberty without due process of law. But it is familiar that what is due process of law depends on circumstances. . . . So long as such arrests are made in good faith and in honest belief that they are needed in order to head the insurrection off, the Governor is the final judge and cannot be subjected to an action after he is out of office on the ground that he had not reasonable ground for his belief.”232 The “good faith” test of Moyer, however, was superseded by the “direct relation” test of Sterling v. Constantin,233 where the Court made it very clear that “[i]t does not follow . . . that every sort of action the Governor may take, no matter how justified by the exigency or subversive of private right and the jurisdiction of the courts, otherwise available, is conclusively supported by mere executive fiat. . . . What are the allowable limits of military discretion, and whether or not they have been overstepped in a particular case, are judicial questions.”234Martial Law in Hawaii.The question of the constitutional status of martial law was raised again in World War II by the proclamation of Governor Poindexter of Hawaii, on December 7, 1941, suspending the writ of habeas corpus and conferring on the local commanding General of the Army all his own powers as governor and also “all of the powers normally exercised by the judicial officers . . . of this territory . . . during the present emergency and until the danger of invasion is removed.” Two days later the Governor’s action was approved by President Roosevelt. The regime which the proclamation set up continued with certain abatements until October 24, 1944.By section 67 of the Organic Act of April 30, 1900,235 the Territorial Governor was authorized “in case of rebellion or invasion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, [to] suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Territory, or any part thereof, under martial law until communication can be had with the President and his decision thereon made known.” By section 5 of the Organic Act, “the Constitution . . . shall have the same force and effect within the said Territory as elsewhere in the United States.” In a brace of cases which reached it in February 1945, but which it contrived to postpone deciding till February 1946,236 the Court, speaking by Justice Black, held that the term “martial law” as employed in the Organic Act, “while intended to authorize the military to act vigorously for the maintenance of an orderly civil government and for the defense of the Islands against actual or threatened rebellion or invasion, was not intended to authorize the supplanting of courts by military tribunals.”237The Court relied on the majority opinion in Ex parte Milligan. Chief Justice Stone concurred in the result. “I assume also,” he said, “that there could be circumstances in which the public safety requires, and the Constitution permits, substitution of trials by military tribunals for trials in the civil courts,”238 but added that the military authorities themselves had failed to show justifying facts in this instance. Justice Burton, speaking for himself and Justice Frankfurter, dissented. He stressed the importance of Hawaii as a military outpost and its constant exposure to the danger of fresh invasion. He warned that “courts must guard themselves with special care against judging past military action too closely by the inapplicable standards of judicial, or even military, hindsight.”239Articles of War: The Nazi Saboteurs.In 1942 eight youths, seven Germans and one an American, all of whom had received training in sabotage in Berlin, were brought to this country aboard two German submarines and put ashore, one group on the Florida coast, the other on Long Island, with the idea that they would proceed forthwith to practice their art on American factories, military equipment, and installations. Making their way inland, the saboteurs were soon picked up by the FBI, some in New York, others in Chicago, and turned over to the Provost Marshal of the District of Columbia. On July 2, the President appointed a military commission to try them for violation of the laws of war, to wit: for not wearing fixed emblems to indicate their combatant status. In the midst of the trial, the accused petitioned the Supreme Court and the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for leave to bring habeas corpus proceedings. Their argument embraced the contentions: (1) that the offense charged against them was not known to the laws of the United States; (2) that it was not one arising in the land and naval forces; and (3) that the tribunal trying them had not been constituted in accordance with the requirements of the Articles of War.The first argument the Court met as follows: The act of Congress in providing for the trial before military tribunals of offenses against the law of war is sufficiently definite, although Congress has not undertaken to codify or mark the precise boundaries of the law of war, or to enumerate or define by statute all the acts which that law condemns. “. . . [T]hose who during time of war pass surreptitiously from enemy territory into . . . [that of the United States], discarding their uniforms upon entry, for the commission of hostile acts involving destruction of life or property, have the status of unlawful combatants punishable as such by military commission.”240 The second argument it disposed of by showing that petitioners’ case was of a kind that was never deemed to be within the terms of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, citing in confirmation of this position the trial of Major Andre.241 The third contention the Court overruled by declining to draw the line between the powers of Congress and the President in the premises,242 thereby, in effect, attributing to the President the right to amend the Articles of War in a case of the kind before the Court ad libitum.The decision might well have rested on the ground that the Constitution is without restrictive force in wartime in a situation of this sort. The saboteurs were invaders; their penetration of the boundary of the country, projected from units of a hostile fleet, was essentially a military operation, their capture was a continuation of that operation. Punishment of the saboteurs was therefore within the President’s purely martial powers as Commander in Chief. Moreover, seven of the petitioners were enemy aliens, and so, strictly speaking, without constitutional status. Even had they been civilians properly domiciled in the United States at the outbreak of the war, they would have been subject under the statutes to restraint and other disciplinary action by the President without appeals to the courts. In any event, the Court rejected the jurisdictional challenge by one of the saboteurs on the basis of his claim to U.S. citizenship, finding U.S. citizenship wholly irrelevant to the determination of whether a wartime captive is an “enemy belligerent” within the meaning of the law of war.243Articles of War: World War II Crimes.As a matter of fact, in General Yamashita’s case,244 which was brought after the termination of hostilities for alleged “war crimes,” the Court abandoned its restrictive conception altogether. In the words of Justice Rutledge’s dissenting opinion in this case: “The difference between the Court’s view of this proceeding and my own comes down in the end to the view, on the one hand, that there is no law restrictive upon these proceedings other than whatever rules and regulations may be prescribed for their government by the executive authority or the military and, on the other hand, that the provisions of the Articles of War, of the Geneva Convention and the Fifth Amendment apply.”245 And the adherence of the United States to the Charter of London in August 1945, under which the Nazi leaders were brought to trial, is explicable by the same theory. These individuals were charged with the crime of instigating aggressive war, which at the time of its commission was not a crime either under international law or under the laws of the prosecuting governments. It must be presumed that the President is not in his capacity as Supreme Commander bound by the prohibition in the Constitution of ex post facto laws, nor does international law forbid ex post facto laws.246Articles of War: Response to the Attacks of September 11, 2001.In response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York City’s World Trade Center and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., Congress passed the “Authorization for Use of Military Force,”247 which provided that the President may use “all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks [or] harbored such organizations or persons.” During a military action in Afghanistan pursuant to this authorization, a United States citizen, Yaser Hamdi, was taken prisoner. The Executive Branch argued that it had plenary authority under Article II to hold such an “enemy combatant” for the duration of hostilities, and to deny him meaningful recourse to the federal courts. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court agreed that the President was authorized to detain a United States citizen seized in Afghanistan, although a majority of the Court appeared to reject the notion that such power was inherent in the Presidency, relying instead on statutory grounds.248 However, the Court did find that the government may not detain the petitioner indefinitely for purposes of interrogation, and must afford him the opportunity to offer evidence that he is not an enemy combatant.249In Rasul v. Bush,250 the Court rejected an Executive Branch argument that foreign prisoners being held at Guantanamo Bay were outside of federal court jurisdiction. The Court distinguished earlier case law arising during World War II that denied habeas corpus petitions from German citizens who had been captured and tried overseas by United States military tribunals.251 In Rasul, the Court noted that the Guantanamo petitioners were not citizens of a country at war with the United States,252 had not been afforded any form of tribunal, and were being held in a territory over which the United States exercised exclusive jurisdiction and control.253 In addition, the Court found that statutory grounds existed for the extension of habeas corpus to these prisoners.254In response to Rasul, Congress amended the habeas statute to eliminate all federal habeas jurisdiction over detainees, whether its basis was statutory or constitutional.255 This amendment was challenged in Boumediene v. Bush,256 as a violation of the Suspension Clause.257 Although the historical record did not contain significant common-law applications of the writ to foreign nationals who were apprehended and detained overseas, the Court did not find this conclusive in evaluating whether habeas applied in this case.258 Emphasizing a “functional” approach to the issue,259 the Court considered (1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process through which the status determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and detention took place; and (3) any practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ. As in Rasul, the Court distinguished previous case law, noting that the instant detainees disputed their enemy status, that their ability to dispute their status had been limited, that they were held in a location (Guantanamo Bay, Cuba) under the de facto jurisdiction of the United States, and that complying with the demands of habeas petitions would not interfere with the government’s military mission. Thus, the Court concluded that the Suspension Clause was in full effect regarding these detainees.Martial Law and Domestic Disorder.President Washing- ton himself took command of state militia called into federal service to quell the Whiskey Rebellion, but there were not too many occasions subsequently in which federal troops or state militia called into federal service were required.260 Since World War II, however, the President, by virtue of his own powers and the authority vested in him by Congress,261 has used federal troops on a number of occasions, five of them involving resistance to desegregation decrees in the South.262 In 1957, Governor Faubus employed the Arkansas National Guard to resist court-ordered desegregation in Little Rock, and President Eisenhower dispatched federal soldiers and brought the Guard under federal authority.263 In 1962, President Kennedy dispatched federal troops to Oxford, Mississippi, when federal marshals were unable to control with rioting that broke out upon the admission of an African American student to the University of Mississippi.264 In June and September of 1964, President Johnson sent troops into Alabama to enforce court decrees opening schools to blacks.265 And, in 1965, the President used federal troops and federalized local Guardsmen to protect participants in a civil rights march. The President justified his action on the ground that there was a substantial likelihood of domestic violence because state authorities were refusing to protect the marchers.266Footnotes223C. FAIRMAN, THE LAW OF MARTIAL RULE 20–22 (1930); A. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 283, 290 (5th ed. 1923).224Id. at 539–44.22548 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). See also Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 32–33 (1827).22648 U.S. (7 How.) at 45.22767 U.S. (2 Bl.) 635 (1863).228Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).22971 U.S. at 127.23071 U.S. at 139–40. In Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1864), the Court had held, while war was still flagrant, that it had no power to review by certiorari the proceedings of a military commission ordered by a general officer of the Army, commanding a military department.231212 U.S. 78 (1909).232212 U.S. at 83–85.233287 U.S. 378 (1932). “The nature of the power also necessarily implies that there is a permitted range of honest judgment as to the measures to be taken in meeting force with force, in suppressing violence and restoring order, for without such liberty to make immediate decision, the power itself would be useless. Such measures, conceived in good faith, in the face of the emergency and directly related to the quelling of the disorder or the prevention of its continuance, fall within the discretion of the Executive in the exercise of his authority to maintain peace.” Id. at 399–400.234287 U.S. at 400–01. This holding has been ignored by states on numerous occasions. E.g., Allen v. Oklahoma City, 175 Okla. 421, 52 P.2d 1054 (1935); Hearon v. Calus, 178 S.C. 381, 183 S.E. 13 (1935); and Joyner v. Browning, 30 F. Supp. 512 (W.D. Tenn. 1939).23531 Stat. 141, 153 (1900).236Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946).237327 U.S. at 324.238327 U.S. at 336.239327 U.S. at 343.240Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 29–30, 35 (1942).241317 U.S. at 41–42.242317 U.S. at 28–29.243Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37–38 (1942) (“Citizens who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents within the meaning of the Hague Convention and the law of war.”). See also Colepaugh v. Looney, 235 F.2d 429, 432 (10th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1014 (1957) (“[T]he petitioner’s citizenship in the United States does not . . . confer upon him any constitutional rights not accorded any other belligerent under the laws of war.”).244In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).245327 U.S. at 81.246See Gross, The Criminality of Aggressive War, 41 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 205 (1947).247Pub. L. 107–40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).248542 U.S. 507 (2004). There was no opinion of the Court. Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy and Justice Breyer, avoided ruling on the Executive Branch argument that such detentions could be authorized by its Article II powers alone, and relied instead on the “Authorization for Use of Military Force” passed by Congress. Justice Thomas also found that the Executive Branch had the power to detain the petitioner, although his dissenting opinion found that such detentions were authorized by Article II. Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsberg, rejected the argument that the Congress had authorized such detentions, while Justice Scalia, joined with Justice Stevens, denied that such congressional authorization was possible without a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.249At a minimum, the petitioner must be given notice of the asserted factual basis for holding him, must be given a fair chance to rebut that evidence before a neutral decisionmaker, and must be allowed to consult an attorney. 542 U.S. at 533, 539.250542 U.S. 466 (2004).251Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950).252The petitioners were Australians and Kuwaitis.253Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. at 467.254The Court found that 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which had previously been construed to require the presence of a petitioner in a district court’s jurisdiction, was now satisfied by the presence of a jailor-custodian. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973). Another “enemy combatant” case, this one involving an American citizen arrested on American soil, was remanded after the Court found that a federal court’s habeas jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 was limited to jurisdiction over the immediate custodian of a petitioner. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (federal court’s jurisdiction over Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld not sufficient to satisfy presence requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 2241). In Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008), the Court held that the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, applied to American citizens held by the Multinational Force—Iraq, an international coalition force operating in Iraq and composed of 26 different nations, including the United States. The Court concluded that the habeas statute extends to American citizens held overseas by American forces operating subject to an American chain of command, even when those forces are acting as part of a multinational coalition.255Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109–148, § 1005(e)(1) (providing that “no court . . . shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider . . . an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by . . . an alien detained . . . at Guantanamo Bay”). After the Court decided, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), that this language of the Detainee Treatment Act did not apply to detainees whose cases were pending at the time of enactment, the language was amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109–366, to also apply to pending cases where a detainee had been determined to be an enemy combatant.256553 U.S. 723 (2008).257U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9, cl. 2 provides: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” In Boumediene, the government argued only that the Suspension Clause did not apply to the detainees; it did not argue that Congress had acted to suspend habeas.258“[G]iven the unique status of Guantanamo Bay and the particular dangers of terrorism in the modern age, the common-law courts simply may not have confronted cases with close parallels to this one. We decline, therefore, to infer too much, one way or the other, from the lack of historical evidence on this point.” 553 U.S. at 752.259553 U.S. at 764. “[Q]uestions of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical concerns, not formalism.” Id.260United States Adjutant-General, Federal Aid in Domestic Disturbances 1787–1903, S. Doc. No. 209, 57th Congress, 2d sess. (1903); Pollitt, Presidential Use of Troops to Enforce Federal Laws: A Brief History, 36 N.C. L. REV. 117 (1958). United States Marshals were also used on approximately 30 occasions. United States Commission on Civil Rights, Law Enforcement: A Report on Equal Protection in the South (Washington: 1965), 155–159.26110 U.S.C. §§ 331–334, 3500, 8500, deriving from laws of 1795, 1 Stat. 424; 1861, 12 Stat. 281; and 1871, 17 Stat. 14.262The other instances were in domestic disturbances at the request of state governors.263Proc. No. 3204, 22 Fed. Reg. 7628 (1957); E.O. 10730, 22 Fed. Reg. 7628. See 41 Ops. Atty. Gen. 313 (1957); see also, Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Aaron v. McKinley, 173 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Ark. 1959), aff’d sub nom Faubus v. Aaron, 361 U.S. 197 (1959); Faubus v. United States, 254 F.2d 797 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 829 (1958).264Proc. No. 3497, 27 Fed. Reg. 9681 (1962); E.O. 11053, 27 Fed. Reg. 9693 (1962). See United States v. Barnett, 346 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1965).265Proc. 3542, 28 Fed. Reg. 5707 (1963); E.O. 11111, 28 Fed. Reg. 5709 (1963); Proc. No. 3554, 28 Fed. Reg. 9861; E.O. 11118, 28 Fed. Reg. 9863 (1963). See Alabama v. United States, 373 U.S. 545 (1963).266Proc. No. 3645, 30 Fed. Reg. 3739 (1965); E.O. 11207, 30 Fed. Reg. 2743 (1965). See Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965).