Horse Reservation And Lease Agreement: Fill & Download for Free

First, your linked article talks about the Gwadar port in Pakistan with an 13% interest rate. That appears to be a lie. From the horses mouth, the Pakistani government:“Noor Ahmed, secretary of the Economic Affairs Division of Pakistan, told Xinhua that the country‘s total foreign debt is about $106 billion and Chinese loan accounts for a mere 10 to 11 per cent of the total foreign debt, whereas the remaining 89-90 per cent is from other sources IMF, Paris Club, and other western organisations.“CPEC-related government loans have an interest rate of only 2 per cent and a repayment period of 20-25 years, and repayment of debt will begin in 2021. CPEC is not imposing any immediate burden with respect to loans repayment and energy sector outflows. All debt-related outflows will be outweighed by the resultant benefits of the investments to the Pakistan economy,” the statement read.Referring to China’s developmental project, the statement added that the infrastructure sector is being developed through interest-free or government concessional loans. Gwadar Port is a grant-based investment, which means the Government of Pakistan does not have to pay back the investment amount for the development of the port.Not only local, but foreign rating and economic organizations also see CPEC is a great benefit for Pakistan, rather than a debt trap. World’s leading rating agency Moody’s said that ongoing implementation of CPEC projects is likely to contribute 9 to 10 percent of Pakistan‘s GDP in the fiscal year 2018-2019.Another international audit, consulting, advisory, and tax services agency Deloitte said that CPEC would add up to 2.5 percentage points to the country’s growth rate. Xinhua”https://invest.gov.pk/node/678From what I have read, this is typical of BRI financing. Remember also, all financing for BRI does not come from just Chinese sources. There are 62 countries participating and as part of their participation, they have to invest funds to be used for development loans across the BRI. Many of these projects are considered high risk by the IMF and World Bank, both controlled by the US. It is not in the interest of the US to make the BRI a success.Most western media point to Sri Lanka as the poster child of how bad the BRI is and that the BRI was a debt trap. Sri Lanka’s problem was because it borrowed heavily and had a national cash-flow problem and bet big on its Hambantota port that went sour and on its own failed economy.“The Sri Lankan government is still obliged to pay off five loans obtained from the Exim Bank of China to construct the Hambantota port and the agreements pertaining to those loans have not been amended. The loans were not defaulted and the loan agreements remain unchanged. In that sense, the port lease cannot be interpreted as a debt-equity swap, which refers to a cancellation of debt in exchange for the equity of an asset. In this case there was no cancellation of the debt.Instead, a 70 percent stake of the port was leased to China Merchants Port Holdings Company Limited (CM Port) for 99 years for $1.12 billion. This $1.12 billion, however, was not used to pay off the debt obtained to construct the port. This significant dollar inflow was used to strengthen the country’s foreign reserves and make some short-term foreign debt repayments. To be precise, it is fair to say that the money earned from the Hambantota port deal was largely used to cover balance of payment (BOP) issues resulting largely from the soaring debt servicing cost while Sri Lanka’s export and FDI inflow growth remain sluggish.In August 2017, Sri Lanka’s cabinet of ministers took a decision to sign a concession agreement with CM Port to operate the Hambantota Port as a Private Public Partnership (PPP) project under which a 70 percent stake of the port is leased to CM Port. The remaining 30 percent of the stake is owned by the Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA) and the commercial operations of the port are handled by the CM Port and the SLPA jointly while the government of Sri Lanka still owns the port. At the time of entering into the lease agreement, Hambantota Port was valued at $1.4 billion and CM Port invested $1.12 billion as per the terms of the agreement.A common and popular myth is that Sri Lanka was unable to pay off the loan obtained to construct the port, thus it was handed over to China. However, by the time the Sri Lankan government entered into the agreement with CM Port to lease Hambantota port, the debt servicing cost pertaining to the loans obtained from China Exim bank to construct the port did not amount to much. Those loan installments (including interest) amounted to less than 5 percent of Sri Lanka’s total foreign debt repayments. Furthermore, loan repayments pertaining to the second phase of the Hambantota port project were yet to start at the time. A more serious concern pertaining to foreign debt servicing cost was the maturity of sovereign bonds, which amounted to more than 40 percent of the total debt servicing payments in 2019.There were five loans (excluding loans obtained for a bunkering facility project) obtained from 2007 to 2014 to construct the port under the government led by Mahinda Rajapaksa, who now holds the office of prime minister. Some of the loans were obtained at interest rates as high as 6 percent while some were concessionary loans. The total sum of these loans amounted to $1.263 billion. Out of these five loans, just two loans, collectively worth $357 million, were obtained at commercial rates, indicating that the majority of the loans for the Hambantota port project were concessionary. However, the loan payback period was not long, which resulted in higher loan installments subsequent to the completion of the grace period.In that context, it is incorrect to claim that China acquired Hambantota port because Sri Lanka failed to pay off the debt obtained to construct the port. The often quoted “port deal” was actually a lease agreement clearly separate from the loans obtained for the purpose of constructing the port and the money obtained from the lease was used to strengthen the foreign reserves of the country, not to repay China. There was no cancellation of debt, although the port was leased to China for 99 years. There has been no change in ownership. However, as per the lease agreement, a significant portion of the operations in the port will be handled by China Merchant Port company, thus a large portion of the profit, if any, will be earned by CM Port.Leasing out Hambantota port is not evidence of the Chinese debt trap. Instead, it is more of a reflection of the external sector crisis Sri Lanka is facing. It is indeed more alarming and concerning than a Chinese debt trap and reflects a far bigger crisis stemming from the reduction of trade, persistent twin deficits (trade deficit and budget deficit), and the middle income trap.”The Hambantota Port Deal: Myths and RealitiesChina took over the port with an additional investment of $1 billion to upgrade the port and make it a viable working port, for that, it took a 70% stake of a 99 year lease to recover its investment. Why is that a bad deal? If the west thought it was so bad, it could have come to Sri Lanka’s rescue and be a hero. It did not so what does that say about the western criticism?There is no one place to find the information you seek because the loans are from government and corporate sources. Countries like Japan that are investing in the BRI provide their own funding for their projects. It is also amazing that the ‘Business Insider’ now says the BRI is a $4 to 8 trillion dollar project. My recollection is that the estimates before were in the $2 trillion range so is the BRI getting bigger in scope or is that inflation?So the west demonizes China’s BRI as a debt trap when in reality most developing countries are in debt to the IMF and World Bank, American creations for debt by developing countries.

Britain had purchased US small arms in the summer of 1940, but needed an alternative to cash transactions. The Roosevelt administration came up with the straight trade concept, and in September 1940, Roosevelt signed the Destroyers-for-bases Agreement.This gave 50 US naval destroyers - generally referred to as the 1,200-ton type - to Britain in exchange for the use of naval and air bases in eight British possessions: on the Avalon Peninsula, the coast of Newfoundland and on the Great Bay of Bermuda.During negotiations, US access to bases was extended to include several locations in the Caribbean. A letter from the US Secretary of State to the British Ambassador, dated 2 September 1940, stated:'His Majesty's Government will make available to the United States… naval and air bases and facilities for entrance thereto and the operation and protection thereof, on the eastern side of the Bahamas, the southern coast of Jamaica, the western coast of St Lucia, the west coast of Trinidad in the Gulf of Paria, in the island of Antigua and in British Guiana within 50 miles of Georgetown...'The agreement had been negotiated in correspondence between the US Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, and the British Ambassador in America. The lease was guaranteed for the duration of 99 years 'free from all rent and charges other than such compensation to be mutually agreed on to be paid by the United States'.Britain had fended off the threat of German invasion in the Battle of Britain and America appreciated that the country was willing and able to fight alone - but Churchill understood that an alliance with the US was essential if Britain was to continue the war effort.BBC - WW2 People's War - TimelineWWIITrade of 50 American Destroyers for British Bases in World War IIDuring World War II, the controversial destroyers-for-bases deal helped save the British from Nazi domination.by William H. LangenbergIn early September 1940, the world was in turmoil. The battle of Britain was nearing its climax, and elsewhere global tensions ran high. Election year strife was just beginning to augment the furor of clashes between isolationists and interventionists in the United States.The many plots to assassinate the madman responsible for the death of millions... Get your copy of Warfare History Network’s FREE Special Report, Killing Adolf HitlerThis world stage provided a fitting backdrop for the transmission of the following message to Congress by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on September 3: “I transmit herewith for the information of the Congress notes exchanged between the British Ambassador at Washington and the Secretary of State on September 2, 1940, under which this Government has acquired the right to lease naval and air bases in Newfoundland, and in the islands of Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and Antigua, and in British Guiana; also a copy of an opinion of the Attorney General dated August 27, 1940, regarding my authority to consummate this arrangement.“The right to bases in Newfoundland and Bermuda are gifts—generously given and gladly received. The other bases mentioned have been acquired in exchange for fifty of our old destroyers.”President Roosevelt’s Message Stirs Up ControversyThis unilateral action by the president created a heated controversy. Its legality and neutrality were openly questioned, and the sub rosa nature of the associated negotiations was severely criticized. However, as dramatic events in Europe and activities of a national election began to dominate newspaper space, the controversy gradually subsided.President Roosevelt’s trade of 50 American destroyers for British air and naval bases has frequently been described in academic articles, popular periodicals, and books. Often the complex, secret negotiations leading to the exchange have been the principal focus of attention. The consummation of the trade via presidential executive agreement rather than congressional action remains controversial to this day. And the transfer of war materiel to a belligerent nation by a neutral country is still categorized by critics as an act of war.From the time of the defeat of Poland in 1939 until April of the following year, the European conflict was in a state of relative inactivity. On April 9, 1940, however, this temporary stalemate ended. Germany launched a blitzkrieg attack on Norway and Denmark that astounded the world with its startling success. One month later, on May 10, the invasions of Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, and France began. On the day the Germans marched into the Low Countries, Neville Chamberlain resigned as Great Britain’s prime minister. He was succeeded by Winston Churchill, who immediately formed a new coalition cabinet and prepared to lead his nation through its gravest crisis.Dutch Army Surrenders, Nazis Advance WestwardMeanwhile, the Nazi offensive made rapid advances. On May 14, the Dutch Army surrendered, and the German assault turned westward toward the classic battlefields of northern France. Armored columns broke through north of the Somme River to the English Channel. From there they proceeded northeastward to the Channel ports—within sight of Britain itself.In just 11 days the Germans had accomplished what they had failed to do in four years of bitter fighting during World War I. This was a brilliantly executed military campaign, creating panic and demoralization among Allied forces. On May 28, King Leopold of Belgium surrendered. The French commander in chief, General Maxime Weygand, attempted to form a line of defense at the Somme, but this tactic was unsuccessful.On June 4, the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) was evacuated from Dunkirk, and the Germans then turned south toward Paris. The French armed forces could not stem the Nazi onslaught. Paris fell on June 14, and three days later the French government sued for an armistice. Britain now stood alone in opposition to the Nazi enemy.Given this historical background, how important were the 50 American destroyers to the British cause? The ships involved in the exchange were all Clemson-class destroyers built circa 1917-1922. Both the U.S. and the British Royal navies had begun preparations for their transfer in mid-August 1940. The destroyers were rehabilitated, provisioned, and sent to the transfer port at Halifax, Nova Scotia. Royal Navy crews to man the ships sailed for that port from England.Exemplifying the alacrity of these proceedings, the first six ships to be transferred sailed for England manned by British crews on September 6, only three days after President Roosevelt announced the trade, and 40 of the 50 vessels arrived there before the end of 1940.The transfer of the American destroyers came at a propitious time for Britain. Royal Navy destroyer losses had been severe during the Norwegian campaign and the subsequent evacuation of the BEF from Dunkirk, with scant chance of their replacements joining the Royal Navy until mid-1941. Even more serious, the Battle of Britain raged in full swing during September 1940, with the outcome still undecided.Looming Threats for the BritishPerhaps most ominous for Britain was the ongoing threat posed by the U-boat menace to Britain’s lifeline of transatlantic shipping. The possibility of an all-out German cross-channel invasion was also very real. These looming threats required constant destroyer patrols in the English Channel.The 50 U.S. destroyers transferred to Britain were commissioned as Town-class destroyers in the Royal Navy. Forty-four were manned by Royal Navy crews, while six were crewed by the Royal Canadian Navy. All Royal Navy vessels initially steamed to Britain, where they were refitted to rectify defects, standardized with British equipment, and fitted with Royal Navy antisubmarine detection and weapons systems. This process required several months, thus the majority of Town-class ships did not become operational until early 1941. After refit, the Royal Navy destroyers were assigned to East coast escort duties, participation in the northern mine barrage, and North Atlantic convoy operations. Ships assigned to the Royal Canadian Navy principally engaged in convoy escort activities in the western Atlantic.Most of the destroyers remained on frontline service until late 1943, when they were gradually replaced by more modern warships. As a group, the Town-class destroyers performed yeoman, sometimes spectacular, service. For example, between 1941 and 1943 Town-class ships participated in the sinking of 10 German U-boats and one Italian submarine while on patrol or as convoy escorts. One also unfortunately sank a Polish-manned Allied submarine that had wandered out of her assigned patrol area.At least two specific actions by Town-class ships are worthy of special note. HMS Broadway, while serving on mid-Atlantic convoy-escort duties during May 1941, participated in one of the most important events of the war. On May 9, Broadway and other escorts of convoy OB318 depth-charged the German submarine U-110 to the surface, where the boat was abandoned by her crew.Royal Navy Strips U-110 of Its Top-Secret DeviceRoyal Navy personnel boarded the crippled U-110, temporarily stemmed flooding that endangered its staying afloat, and removed intact the submarine’s top-secret Enigma machine, which was used to decipher coded messages. U-110 later sank while under tow toward Iceland, and the captured German crewmen were unaware that their boat had been boarded and stripped of its secret device.Thus, the German High Command had no knowledge of this event, which aided efforts to decipher the Enigma code and led to the gathering of vital intelligence known to the Allies as Ultra. HMS Broadwayreceived serious hull damage from one of U-110’s hydroplanes during this action, requiring two months of repairs in Britain. Thereafter, she continued convoy escort duties in the Atlantic with no further successes against submarines for nearly two years. On May 14, 1943, however, Broadway again achieved notoriety when she attacked and sank U-89. The destroyer remained active throughout the war.The most highly publicized and dramatic action by a Town-class destroyer was the destruction of the Normandie Lock at the French port of St. Nazaire on March 29, 1942, via a nearly suicidal mission led by HMS Campbeltown. The former USS Buchanan, Campbeltown was refitted in England, then served as a convoy escort until being declared expendable in January 1942. She was prepared at the Devonport dockyard for the St. Nazaire raid. Modified to resemble a German torpedo boat, the destroyer was loaded with explosives and rammed into the Normandie Lock on March 29, 1942. Hours later, the ship blew up, rendering the lock inoperable in the process.Not all of the 50 Town-class destroyers proved to be as effective as Broadway and Campbeltown. For example, HMS Cameron was being refitted in drydock at Portsmouth during December 1940 when she was blown off her blocks by a German bombing attack. Although the ship was subsequently salvaged, she was never recommissioned and was scrapped in December 1944. HMCS Columbia suffered an even more ignominious fate. After serving mostly as an convoy escort in Canadian waters, Columbia somehow steamed into a rock cliff at Moreton Bay in Newfoundland on February 25, 1944, crushing her bow. Towed to St. John’s, she lay as a bowless hulk until scrapped in August 1945.“50 Ships That Saved the World”?While some historians have asserted that these destroyers were “50 ships that saved the world,” that seems to be unwarranted hyperbole. The Town-class vessels as a whole were not refitted and ready for combat until early 1941. By that time, the Battle of Britain had been won and the German invasion threat toward England abandoned, while Hitler devoted his army’s attention to the invasion of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, German U-boats continued to threaten crucial supplies reaching Britain by sea, and the Town-class vessels provided great service in antisubmarine operations throughout the war.The 1940 trade of the 50 U.S. destroyers for six British naval and air bases also had lasting political effects. It set a new precedent for bold executive actions by U.S. presidents, and thus remains controversial to this day. And it pioneered the acquisition by a neutral country of property rights in a belligerent nation’s territory. In the long run, perhaps the latter two geopolitical issues should be perceived as even more important than the strategic and tactical impact of the 50 Town-class destroyers upon the outcome of World War II.Trade of 50 American Destroyers for British Bases in World War IIDestroyers For Bases Agreement, September 2, 1940“In May of 1940 the public, the editors, the officials of the United States were thrown into utmost confusion by developments in Europe. Hitler had overrun quickly most of Western Europe. He had demonstrated furious and unanticipated striking power. The other countries had demonstrated weakness that was unexpected and unaccountable. Men lost their confidence in everything from seeing the nations of Europe go down so fast before Hitler’s armies.”– The Reminiscences of Robert H. Jackson. Harlan B. Phillips ed.,1955. Columbia University, Oral History Research Office. pg. 881Winston Churchill had recently assumed the premiership of Great Britain when, on May 15, 1940, he sought assistance from the United States. Churchill’s May 15 cable to President Roosevelt described the dire situation that England was in.“The scene has darkened swiftly. The enemy have a marked preponderance in the air, and their new technique is making a deep impression upon the French. I think myself the battle on land has only just begun…The small countries are simply smashed up, one by one, like matchwood. We must expect, though it is not yet certain, that Mussolini will hurry in to share the loot of civilization. We expect to be attacked here ourselves, both from the air and by parachute and air borne troops in the near future, and are getting ready from them. If necessary, we shall continue the war alone and we are not afraid of that. But I trust you realize, Mr. President, that the voice and force of the United States may count for nothing if they are withheld too long. You may have completely subjugated, Nazified Europe established with astonishing swiftness, and the weight may be more than we can bear.”Churchill, Winston, and Warren F. Kimball. Churchill and Roosevelt – the Complete Correspondence. First ed. Vol. 1. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Pr., 1984. 37-38.Churchill asked the United States for the loan of “forty or fifty of your older destroyers,” and warned that without them Britain would be unable to fight the “Battle of the Atlantic” against Germany and Italy. The defeat of Britain would be a catastrophe for the United States, leaving it at risk for war on two fronts.What followed was three-and-a-half months of negotiations. There were significant issues to sort out. President Roosevelt’s initial response was not what Churchill hoped for. Roosevelt responded, “a step of that kind could not be taken except with the specific authorization of Congress and I am not certain that it would be wise for that suggestion to be made to the Congress at this moment.”WINSTON CHURCHILL WEARS A STEEL HELMET DURING HIS VISIT TO DOVER AND RAMSGATE AIR RAID DAMAGED AREA, JULY 1940CREDIT: ASSOCIATED PRESS. “CHURCHILL DONS HELMET.” PHOTOGRAPH. NEW YORK: WORLD-TELEGRAM AND THE SUN NEWSPAPER PHOTOGRAPH COLLECTION C1940. FROM LIBRARY OF CONGRESS: CHURCHILL AND THE GREAT REPUBLIC. http://HTTP://WWW.LOC.GOV/ITEM/2004666450/ (ACCESSED SEPTEMBER 2, 2015).Throughout the rest of May, and into June, Churchill continued to reach out to the United States for assistance. On July 3, 1940, the British Navy bombed the French Navy at its base in northwestern Algeria. Jackson writes about this event in That Man: An Insider Portrait of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Pg 85.“The specter of overwhelming German naval power, added to her seemingly irresistible air and land forces, deeply troubled the President. If the Germans should capture the French fleet, it – with Germany’s own and that of Italy, and with probable cooperation from Japan – would leave the United States to face alone a most formidable naval and air power. But in the early days of July, Britain, defying what seemed to be forces as inexorable as fate and risking alienation of the French people, boldly attacked and largely disabled the French fleet so that it could no longer be of substantial service to Hitler. Britain won not only our admiration for her courage and audacity but our gratitude as well.”During the month of August, discussions between Britain and the United States shifted from a loan or sale of the destroyers to an exchange of the destroyers for bases on British territories in the North Atlantic and the Caribbean. Jackson discussed in length the “Destroyer-Bases Exchange” in the oral history he gave to Harlan B. Phillips from Columbia University in 1952-1953. Below is a quote from pages 892-893.“On the 13th of August, Stimson recites that he, with Knox, Sumner Welles and Henry Morgenthau, met with the President and formulated a proposed agreement — that is, outlined the essential points of an agreement. Sometime before that the President had discussed with me the legal situation as to whether he had authority to make a disposition of these destroyers without further authorization from Congress. On the 15th of August, I had advised him that we, in the Department of Justice, definitely believed that we did have authority to act without the consent of Congress.”ROOSEVELT HOLDS DESTROYER CONFERENCE, AUGUST 22, 1940 - LEFT TO RIGHT, ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT H. JACKSON, SECRETARY OF WAR HENRY STIMSON, ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE SUMNER WELLES, AND SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FRANK KNOX.CREDIT: THE ROBERT H. JACKSON CENTER, INTERNATIONAL NEWS PHOTO COLLECTIONJackson states in his Oral History that, “the opinion contained a simple, statutory interpretation, which if it hadn’t been in the context of war, would not have been even a very important one. It approved the transfer of the destroyers, because they fell in the classification of obsolescent materials, provided the naval and military authorities certified that they were not needful for the defense of the United States. The opinion refused to approve the transfer of the mosquito boats, since they fell in a different classification, and it made no discussion of international law aspects of the transaction.”The opinion resolved that:“Accordingly, you are respectfully advised:(a) That the proposed arrangement may be concluded as an executive agreement, effective without awaiting ratification.(b) That there is Presidential power to transfer title and possession of the proposed considerations upon certification by appropriate staff officers.(c) That the dispatch of the so-called “mosquito boats” would constitute a violation of the statute law of the United States, but with that exception there is no legal obstacle to the consummation of the transaction, in accordance, of course, with the applicable provisions of the Neutrality Act as to delivery.”Opinion on Exchange of Over-Age Destroyers for Naval and Air Bases, Office of the Attorney General, Washington D.C., August 27, 1940Jackson’s opinion did not deal with aspects of international law. Later, he would write about his views on international law and the right of neutral countries to extend aid to countries at war in a speech he was scheduled to make at the Inter-America Bar Association in Havana Cuba, March 27, 1941. He was prevented from giving this speech due to a violent storm. The Honorable George S. Messersmith, American Ambassador to Cuba, delivered the speech in his absence.“Present aggressive wars are civil wars against the international community. Accordingly, as responsible members of that community, we can treat victims of aggression in the same way we treat legitimate governments when there is civil strife and a state of insurgency – that is to say, we are permitted to give to defending governments all the aid we choose.”On September 2, 1940, President Roosevelt signed the Destroyers for Bases Agreement. Today, 75 years later, we remember the significant events that happened during the summer of 1940. September 2, 1945, Japan formally surrenders to the Allies, bringing an end to World War II. A few months later, on November 21, 1945, Robert H. Jackson steps to the podium in the Palace of Justice in Germany to give his powerful Opening Statement before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg.ROYAL NAVY AND U.S. NAVY SAILORS INSPECT DEPTH CHARGES ABOARD WICKES-CLASS DESTROYERS, IN 1940. IN THE BACKGROUND ARE USS BUCHANAN (DD-131), AND USS CROWNINSHIELD (DD-134). ON 9 SEPTEMBER 1940 BOTH WERE TRANSFERRED TO THE ROYAL NAVY. BUCHANAN BECAME HMS CAMPBELTOWN (I42), WHICH WAS EXPENDED AS A DEMOLITION SHIP DURING ST. NAZAIRE RAID ON 29 MARCH 1942. CROWNINSHIELD BECAME HMS CHELSEA (I35) WHICH WAS TRANSFERRED TO RUSSIA ON 16 JULY 1944 AND RENAMED DERZKIY. SHE WAS FINALLY RETURNED TO THE UK FOR SCRAPPING ON 23 JUNE 1949.CREDIT: UNITED STATES OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION. OVERSEAS PICTURE DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS.Destroyers For Bases Agreement, September 2, 1940 - Robert H Jackson CenterLend-Lease and Military Aid to the Allies in the Early Years of World War IIDuring World War II, the United States began to provide significant military supplies and other assistance to the Allies in September 1940, even though the United States did not enter the war until December 1941. Much of this aid flowed to the United Kingdom and other nations already at war with Germany and Japan through an innovative program known as Lend-Lease.FDR Signing the Lend-Lease BillWhen war broke out in Europe in September 1939, President Franklin D. Rooseveltdeclared that while the United States would remain neutral in law, he could “not ask that every American remain neutral in thought as well.” Roosevelt himself made significant efforts to help nations engaged in the struggle against Nazi Germany and wanted to extend a helping hand to those countries that lacked the supplies necessary to fight against the Germans. The United Kingdom, in particular, desperately needed help, as it was short of hard currency to pay for the military goods, food, and raw materials it needed from the United States.Though President Roosevelt wanted to provide assistance to the British, both American law and public fears that the United States would be drawn into the conflict blocked his plans. The Neutrality Act of 1939 allowed belligerents to purchase war materiel from the United States, but only on a “cash and carry” basis. The Johnson Act of 1934 also prohibited the extension of credit to countries that had not repaid U.S. loans made to them during World War I—which included Great Britain. The American military opposed the diversion of military supplies to the United Kingdom. The Army’s Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, anticipated that Britain would surrender following the collapse of France, and thus American supplies sent to the British would fall into German hands. Marshall and others therefore argued that U.S. national security would be better served by reserving military supplies for the defense of the Western Hemisphere. American public opinion also limited Roosevelt’s options. Many Americans opposed involving the United States in another war. Even though American public opinion generally supported the British rather than the Germans, President Roosevelt had to develop an initiative that was consistent with the legal prohibition against the granting of credit, satisfactory to military leadership, and acceptable to an American public that generally resisted involving the United States in the European conflict.British Prime Minister Winston ChurchillOn September 2, 1940, President Roosevelt signed a “Destroyers for Bases” agreement. Under the terms of the agreement, the United States gave the British more than 50 obsolete destroyers, in exchange for 99-year leases to territory in Newfoundland and the Caribbean, which would be used as U.S. air and naval bases. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had originally requested that Roosevelt provide the destroyers as a gift, but the President knew that the American public and Congress would oppose such a deal. He therefore decided that a deal that gave the United States long-term access to British bases could be justified as essential to the security of the Western Hemisphere—thereby assuaging the concerns of the public and the U.S. militaryIn December 1940, Churchill warned Roosevelt that the British were no longer able to pay for supplies. On December 17, President Roosevelt proposed a new initiative that would be known as Lend-Lease. The United States would provide Great Britain with the supplies it needed to fight Germany, but would not insist upon being paid immediatelyInstead, the United States would “lend” the supplies to the British, deferring payment. When payment eventually did take place, the emphasis would not be on payment in dollars. The tensions and instability engendered by inter-allied war debts in the 1920s and 1930s had demonstrated that it was unreasonable to expect that virtually bankrupt European nations would be able to pay for every item they had purchased from the United States. Instead, payment would primarily take the form of a “consideration” granted by Britain to the United States. After many months of negotiation, the United States and Britain agreed, in Article VII of the Lend-Lease agreement they signed, that this consideration would primarily consist of joint action directed towards the creation of a liberalized international economic order in the postwar world.Lend-Lease MemorialThe United Kingdom was not the only nation to strike such a deal with the United States. Over the course of the war, the United States contracted Lend-Lease agreements with more than 30 countries, dispensing some $50 billion in assistance. Although British Prime Minister Winston Churchill later referred to the initiative as “the most unsordid act” one nation had ever done for another, Roosevelt’s primary motivation was not altruism or disinterested generosity. Rather, Lend-Lease was designed to serve America’s interest in defeating Nazi Germany without entering the war until the American military and public was prepared to fight. At a time when the majority of Americans opposed direct participation in the war, Lend-Lease represented a vital U.S. contribution to the fight against Nazi Germany. Moreover, the joint action called for under Article VII of the Lend-Lease agreements signed by the United States and the recipient nations laid the foundation for the creation of a new international economic order in the postwar world.Milestones: 1937-1945The Town-class destroyers were a group of destroyers transferred from the United States Navy to the Royal Navy and the Royal Canadian Navy in exchange for military bases in the Bahamas and elsewhere, as outlined in the Destroyers for Bases Agreement between Britain and United States, signed on 2 September 1940. They were known as "four-pipers" or "four-stackers" because they had four smokestacks (funnels). Later classes of destroyers typically had one or two.Some went to the Royal Canadian Navy at the outset. Others went on to the Royal Norwegian Navy, the Royal Netherlands Navy, and the Soviet Navy after serving with the Royal Navy. Although given a set of names by the Commonwealth navies that suggested they were one class they actually came from three classes of destroyer: Caldwell, Wickes, and Clemson. "Town class" refers to the Admiralty's practice of renaming these ships after towns common to the United States and the British Commonwealth.[3]Ships initially commissioned into the Royal Canadian Navy, however, followed the Canadian practice of giving destroyers the names of Canadian rivers. The rivers selected for the Town class were on the border between Canada and the United States, with the exception of the Nova Scotia river sharing the name of the United States Naval Academy location.[4]One of the Towns achieved lasting fame: HMS Campbeltown (ex-USS Buchanan). In the Commando raid Operation Chariot, Campbeltown, fitted with a large demolition charge, rammed the Normandie Lock at Saint-Nazaire, France. The charge detonated on 29 March 1942, breaching the drydock and destroying Campbeltown, thus destroying the only drydock on the Atlantic coast capable of accepting the German battleship Tirpitz. This exploit was depicted in the 1950 Trevor Howard film The Gift Horse, which starred HMS Leamington (ex-USS Twiggs) after her return from service in Russia.Contents1Characteristics2Ships by United States Navy class2.1Caldwell-class destroyers2.2Wickes-class destroyers2.3Clemson-class destroyers3Ships by World War II navy4Notes5References6External linksRoughly contemporaneous to the British V and W-class destroyers they were not much liked by their new crews. They were uncomfortable and wet, working badly in a seaway. Their hull lines were rather narrow and 'herring-gutted' which gave them a vicious roll. The officers didn't like the way they handled either, since they had been built with propellers that turned the same way (2-screw ships normally have the shafts turning in opposite directions as the direction of rotation has effects on the rudder and the whole ship when manoeuvring, especially when coming alongside), so these were as awkward to handle as single-screw ships. Their turning circle was enormous, as big as most Royal Navy battleships, making them difficult to use in a submarine hunt which demanded tight manoeuvres, compounded by unreliable "chain and cog" steering gear laid across the main deck. They also had fully enclosed bridges which caused problems with reflections in the glass at night. Despite their disadvantages they performed vital duties escorting convoys in the Atlantic at a time when the U-boats, operating from newly acquired bases on the Atlantic coast of France were becoming an increasingly serious threat to British shipping.[citation needed]However, one Royal Canadian Navy corvette captain described them as "the most dubious gift since the Trojan Horse".[5]The original armament was four 4-inch (102 mm) guns,[6]one 3-inch (76 mm) anti-aircraft gun, and twelve torpedo tubes.[7]On the Wickes class, the 4-inch gun placement was one gun in a shield on the forecastle, one on the quarterdeck and one each side on a platform between the number 2 and number 3 funnels. The Admiralty promptly removed one of the 4-inch guns and six torpedo tubes to improve stability.[8]Twenty-three of the class had further armament reductions for anti-submarine escort of trade convoys.[9]Two of the remaining 4-inch guns and three of the remaining torpedo tubes were removed to allow increased depth chargestowage and installation of Hedgehog anti-submarine mortar system.[9]USS Conner became HMS Leeds on 23 October 1940. She was scrapped on 19 January 1949.USS Conway became HMS Lewes on 23 October 1940. She outlived all of her sisters in British service and was stripped of valuable scrap and scuttled off Sydney, Australia on 25 May 1946.USS Stockton became HMS Ludlow on 23 October 1940; stripped and beached as a target for rocket firing aircraft off Fidra Island, United Kingdom.USS Aaron Ward became HMS Castleton on 9 September 1940. She was scrapped on 2 January 1948.USS Abbot became HMS Charlestown on 23 September 1940. She was scrapped on 3 December 1948.USS Buchanan became HMS Campbeltown on 9 September 1940. She was destroyed in Operation Chariot on 29 March 1942.USS Claxton became HMS Salisbury on 5 December 1940; she was employed as a special escort for specific convoys, including escorting Wasp during the supply of Spitfires to Malta. She was scrapped in the US in April 1945.USS Cowell became HMS Brighton on 23 Sep 1940; transferred to the Soviet Union as Zharki on 16 July 1944; returned to the Royal Navy on 4 March 1949. She was scrapped on 18 May 1949.USS Crowninshield became HMS Chelsea on 9 September 1940; transferred to the Soviet Union as Derzkiy on 16 July 1944; returned to the Royal Navy on 24 June 1949. She was scrapped on 27 July 1949.USS Doran became HMS St. Marys on 23 September 1940. She was scrapped in December 1945.USS Evans became HMS Mansfield on 23 October 1940; heavily involved in the critical convoy actions of March 1943 with convoy HX-229, landing survivors in the United Kingdom; sold on 24 October 1944 for scrapping.USS Fairfax became HMS Richmond on 26 November 1940; transferred to the Soviet Union as Zhivuchi on 16 June 1944; returned to the Royal Navy on 26 June 1949. She was scrapped on 29 June 1949.USS Foote became HMS Roxborough on 23 September 1940; while with convoy HX-222 Roxborough met with such heavy weather that the entire bridge structure was crushed, with eleven dead, including the Commanding Officer and 1st Lieutenant; the sole surviving executive officer managed to regain control of the ship, and under hand steering from aft, she made St. John's, Newfoundland; was transferred to the Soviet Union as Doblestnyi on 10 August 1944; returned to the Royal Navy on 7 February 1949. She was scrapped on 14 May 1949.USS Hale became HMS Caldwell on 9 September 1940. She was scrapped on 7 June 1945.USS Haraden became HMCS Columbia on 24 September 1940. She was scrapped on 7 August 1945.USS Hopewell became HMS Bath on 23 September 1940; while escorting convoy OG 71 between Liverpool and Gibraltar, Bath was torpedoed by U-204 on 19 August 1941 and sank rapidly.USS Kalk became HMCS Hamilton on 23 September 1940; lost while being towed to Boston for scrapping in 1945.USS MacKenzie became HMCS Annapolis on 29 September 1940; towed to Boston for scrapping on 22 June 1945.USS Maddox became HMS Georgetown on 23 September 1940; transferred to the Soviet Union as Zhostki in August 1944; returned to the Royal Navy on 9 September 1952. She was scrapped on 16 September 1952.USS Philip became HMS Lancaster on 23 October 1940. She was scrapped on 30 May 1947.USS Ringgold became HMS Newark on 5 December 1940; consigned for scrapping on 18 February 1947.USS Robinson became HMS Newmarket on 5 December 1940. She was scrapped on 21 September 1945.USS Sigourney became HMS Newport on 5 December 1940. She was scrapped on 18 February 1947.USS Thatcher became HMCS Niagara on 26 September 1940; on 28 August 1941 Niagara was involved in the capture of U-570, which had surrendered to an RAF Hudson the previous day. She was scrapped by the end of 1947.USS Thomas became HMS St. Albans on 23 September 1940; while with convoy SL 81, St Albans took part in the sinking of U-401 on 3 August 1941; encountered the Polish submarine Jastrzab, and in company with the minesweeper Seagull, attacked and sank it in early 1942; transferred to the Soviet Union as Dostoinyi on 16 July 1944; returned to the Royal Navy on 28 February 1949; towed for scrapping on 18 May 1949.USS Tillman became HMS Wells on 5 December 1940. She was scrapped February 1946.USS Twiggs became HMS Leamington on 23 October 1940; during the fighting around convoy SC 42 in the North Atlantic she shared in the sinking of U-207 on 11 September 1941; while covering convoy WS-17 in the UK approaches, sank U-587 on 27 March 1942; transferred to the Soviet Union as Zhguchi on 17 July 1944; returned on 15 November 1950; hired for the film The Gift Horse, the last Town-class destroyer at sea under her own power. She was scrapped on 3 December 1951.USS Wickes became HMS Montgomery on 25 October 1940; on convoy escort Montgomery rescued the survivors of Scottish Standard on 21 February 1941 and sank the Italian submarine Marcello the next day. She was scrapped on 10 April 1945.USS Williams became HMCS St. Clair on 29 September 1940. She was scrapped on 5 March 1946.USS Yarnall became HMS Lincoln on 23 October 1940; transferred to the Soviet Union as Druzhny on 26 August 1944; returned to the Royal Navy on 24 August 1952. She was scrapped on 3 September 1952.USS Abel P. Upshur became HMS Clare on 9 September 1940. She was scrapped on 18 February 1947.USS Aulick became HMS Burnham on 8 October 1940. She was scrapped on 2 December 1948.USS Bailey became HMS Reading on 26 November 1940. She was scrapped on 24 July 1945.USS Bancroft became HMCS St. Francis on 24 September 1940. She was wrecked while being towed for scrapping on 14 July 1945.USS Branch became HMS Beverley on 8 October 1940; she attacked and sank U-187 on 4 February 1942. Beverley was torpedoed by U-188 on 11 April 1943 and was sunk with the loss of all but four of the ship's company of 152.USS Edwards became HMS Buxton on 8 October 1940. She was scrapped on 21 March 1946.USS Herndon became HMS Churchill on 9 September 1940; transferred to the Soviet Union as Dyatelnyi on 30 May 1944; torpedoed and sunk by U-956 on 16 January 1945 while escorting a White Sea convoy; the last war loss of the class and the only one of the destroyers transferred to the Soviet Union to be lost.USS Hunt became HMS Broadway on 8 October 1940; while escorting convoy OB 318, Broadway took part in the attack on U-110 on 9 May 1941; abandoned by its crew, U-110 was boarded and taken in tow. Escorting convoy HX 237, Broadway located and sank U-89 in the North Atlantic on 14 May 1943; allocated for scrapping in March 1948.USS Laub became HMS Burwell on 8 October 1940; one of the ships involved in the recovery of U-570 after its surrender to an RAF aircraft; consigned for scrapping in March 1947.USS Mason became HMS Broadwater on 2 October 1940; escorting convoy SC 48 between St. John's, Newfoundland and Iceland, Broadwater was torpedoed by U-101 and sunk on 19 October 1941.USS McCalla became HMS Stanley on 23 October 1940; escorting convoy HG 76 from Gibraltar, Stanley and accompanying vessels sank U-131 on 17 December 1941 and U-434 on the following day; Stanley was sunk by U-574 on 19 December 1941 with the loss of all but 25 of her crew.USS McCook became HMCS St. Croix on 24 September 1940; escorting convoy ON 113 she attacked and sank U-90 on 27 July 1942; escorting convoy KMS-10, St Croix and HMCS Shediac sank U-87; while escorting the combined convoys ONS 18/ON 202, St Croix was twice torpedoed by U-305 and sunk on 20 September 1943; survivors were taken aboard the frigate HMS Itchen, which was sunk on 22 September with very heavy loss of life; only one of St Croix's crew of 147 survived.USS McLanahan became HMS Bradford on 8 October 1940; consigned for scrapping in August 1946.USS Meade became HMS Ramsey on 26 November 1940. She was scrapped July 1947.USS Rodgers became HMS Sherwood on 23 October 1940; stripped of usable parts, Sherwood was beached on 3 October 1943 as a target for RAF rocket-equipped Beaufighters.USS Satterlee became HMS Belmont on 8 October 1940; while escorting troop convoy NA-2 from St. John's, Newfoundland, Belmont was torpedoed by U-82 on 31 January 1942 and sank with the loss of her entire ship's company.USS Shubrick became HMS Ripley on 26 November 1940; consigned for scrapping on 10 March 1945.USS Swasey became HMS Rockingham on 26 November 1940; while returning to Aberdeen on 27 September 1944, poor navigation brought her into the defensive minefields off the east coast of the United Kingdom, and after striking a mine Rockingham was abandoned and sank with the loss of one life.USS Welborn C. Wood became HMS Chesterfield on 9 September 1940. She was scrapped on 3 December 1948.USS Welles became HMS Cameron on 9 September 1940; Cameron never reached operational service; hit and set on fire by an air raid in Portsmouth on 5 December 1940, she was considered by the U.S. Navy as the worst damaged but surviving destroyer available and was extensively studied for explosive effects and damage control; consigned for scrapping on 1 December 1944.Royal Canadian NavyAnnapolis (ex-USS MacKenzie)Buxton (ex-HMS Buxton)Columbia (ex-USS Haraden)Hamilton (ex-USS Kalk)Niagara (ex-USS Thatcher)St. Clair (ex-USS Williams)St. Croix (ex-USS McCook; lost on 20 September 1943)St. Francis (ex-USS Bancroft)(RCN: loaned from the Royal Navy)Chelsea (ex-HMS Chelsea)Georgetown (ex-HMS Georgetown)Leamington (ex-HMS Leamington)Lincoln (ex-HMS Lincoln)Mansfield (ex-HMS Mansfield)Montgomery (ex-HMS Montgomery)Richmond (ex-HMS Richmond)Salisbury (ex-HMS Salisbury)Royal NavyBath (ex-USS Hopewell; to Norway as Bath)Belmont (ex-USS Satterlee; lost on 31 January 1942)Beverley (ex-USS Branch; lost on 11 April 1943)Bradford (ex-USS McLanahan)Brighton (ex-USS Cowell; to the Soviet Union as Zarkij)Broadwater (ex-USS Mason; lost on 18 October 1941)Broadway (ex-USS Hunt)Burnham (ex-USS Aulick)Burwell (ex-USS Laub)Buxton (ex-USS Edwards; to Canada as Buxton)Caldwell (ex-USS Hale)Cameron (ex-USS Welles; lost on 5 December 1940)Campbeltown (ex-USS Buchanan; lost on 28 March 1942)Castleton (ex-USS Aaron Ward)Charlestown (ex-USS Abbot)Chelsea (ex-USS Crowninshield; to the Soviet Union as Derzki)Chesterfield (ex-USS Welborn C. Wood)Churchill (ex-USS Herndon; to the Soviet Union as Dejatelny)Clare (ex-USS Abel P. Upshur)Georgetown (ex-USS Maddox; to the Soviet Union as Zostki)Hamilton (ex-USS Kalk; to Canada as Hamilton)Lancaster (ex-USS Philip)Leamington (ex-USS Twiggs; to the Soviet Union as Zguchi) (starred in 1950 film The Gift Horse, which depicted the St. Nazaire Raid)Leeds (ex-USS Conner)Lewes (ex-USS Conway)Lincoln (ex-USS Yarnall; to the Soviet Union as Druzny)Ludlow (ex-USS Stockton)Mansfield (ex-USS Evans; to Canada as Mansfield; to Norway as Mansfield)Montgomery (ex-USS Wickes; to Canada as Montgomery)Newark (ex-USS Ringgold)Newmarket (ex-USS Robinson)Newport (ex-USS Sigourney)Ramsey (ex-USS Meade)Reading (ex-USS Bailey)Richmond (ex-USS Fairfax; to the Soviet Union as Zivuchi)Ripley (ex-USS Shubrick)Rockingham (ex-USS Swasey; lost on 27 September 1944)Roxborough (ex-USS Foote; to the Soviet Union as Doblestnyj)Salisbury (ex-USS Claxton; to Canada as Salisbury)Sherwood (ex-USS Rodgers)St. Albans (ex-USS Thomas; to Norway as St. Albans; to the Soviet Union as Dostojny)St. Mary's (ex-USS Doran)Stanley (ex-USS McCalla; lost on 19 December 1941)Wells (ex-USS Tillman)Royal Netherlands NavyCampbeltown (March to August 1941. Returned to RN service in Sept 1941 as HMS Campbeltown)Royal Norwegian NavyBath (ex-HMS Bath) (lost on 19 August 1941)Lincoln (ex-HMS Lincoln)Mansfield (ex-HMS Mansfield)Newport (ex-HMS Newport)St. Albans (ex-HMS St. Albans)Soviet NavyDejatelnyj (ex-HMS Churchill; lost on 16 January 1945)Derzkij (ex-HMS Chelsea)Doblestnyj (ex-HMS Roxborough)Dostojnyj (ex-HMS St. Albans)Druznyj (ex-HMS Lincoln)Zarkij (ex-HMS Brighton)Zguchij (ex-HMS Leamington)Zivuchij (ex-HMS Richmond)Zostkij (ex-HMS Georgetown)Town-class destroyer - Wikipedia

Because some people want to put USSR on some high horse in order diminish everyone else effort in the struggle that was WW2. People who claim that the Soviets won WW2 ALONE are engaging in Confirmation bias in which they will only cite only a few facts and and statics that support their claim while ignoring all other data that contradicts their claim.These people ignore 2 importing things that worth mentioning:1) The fact that for all tense and purposes the USSR was on the other side of the war from Sept 1939-June 1941 doing everything form invading Poland and carving up Eastern Europe with Nazi Germany to supplying that fuel to them that would be used to bomb England all the way up to 1941.2) Is the US contribution to the war which was MASSIVE. Let me explain.United States Contribution to WW2:Funny enough more American troops died or were wonded in WW2 than British troops. Yet some people still claim that America did nothing. One thing people fail to realize is that America was fighting two major wars at once. Total war deaths WWII: US 407,000 in 31 months, UK; 383,800 in 71 months, including those of the overseas territories. The Pacific War is often forgotten by Europeans.There was Lend Lease. A total of $50.1 billion (equivalent to $639 billion today) worth of supplies were shipped. That represented 17% of the total war expenditures of the U.S. In all, $31.4 billion went to Britain, $11.3 billion to the Soviet Union, $3.2 billion to France, $1.6 billion to China, and smaller sums to other Allies. Joseph Stalin, during the Tehran Conference in 1943, acknowledged publicly the importance of American efforts during a dinner at the conference: "Without American production the United Nations [the Allies] could never have won the war." In addition the US comprised almost half of the D-Day invasion force. As well as the majority of Allied troops on the western front.at the very beginning of 1945, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, General Dwight D. Eisenhower had 73 divisions under his command in North-western Europe. Forty-nine of these divisions were American, 12 British, eight French, three Canadian and one Polish. Another seven American divisions arrived during February.The US contribution to the western front in Europe was threefold when compared to the Brits and Canadians in late 1944. We had three separate fronts working towards the Rhine in 1944. To the victory in western Europe and Italy, the United States had contributed 68 divisions, 15,000 combat aircraft, well over 1 million tanks and motor vehicles,and 135,000 dead.There were four theaters in WW2 - Western, Eastern, African, and Pacific. The Western European theater could not have been won without America. By the time the US got there the Germans already controlled most off it, and the US did more of the fighting to reclaim it than anyone else (with the British Commonwealth forces combined being a close second - many of them using US equipment). This front simply could not have been won without the US.The major Allied power in the Eastern European theater was the Soviet Union, and they did put up a hell of a fight (although the number of casualties they suffered isn't a good indication of their impact - most of their military tactics just sucked so bad that they kept dying). What you left out though was that they would have been slaughtered even worse without the huge donations of military hardware from the US, and would probably have lost the fight even if it meant their last babushka had to go down fighting with a pointy stick first while Stalin yelled at her to stop committing treason by bleeding so much.The British were the primary ally in the African theater, and deserve most of the credit for winning that one.The Pacific campaign often gets overlooked by Euro-philes, but it was as important as the others - and it was mostly an American fight Resources and Information. I would give the US credit for winning 2.5 out of 4 theaters - not a single-handed victory, but definitely one of the central figures (and for the second half of the war, the single most important one.The US produced 2/3 of total global oil production at the time of the war. All allied forces consumed 7 billion barrels of oil, 6 billion coming from the US.This fact in and of itself makes the US the largest contributor to the allied victory in WW2 period.The Allies’ War | EGEE 120: Oil: International Evolution D7Hidden History: Oil Won World War II - Social MatterThe US produced about 75% of all the weapons and supplies used by the Allies and was the only nation that took a leading combat role in both Europe and the Pacific. The US won, practically alone, almost all of the Allied victories against Japan. The US also provided the majority of the troops for the Italian Campaign, Normandy and for the rest of the battles in Western Europe from 1943 to the end of the war. The US Army Air Corps was the most responsible for destroying the German Air Force and crippling German industrial capacity. If it were not for the US, the war could not have been won. This can not be said of any of the other Allies.The U.S supplied Great Britain, the USSR, Republic of China, Free France, and others Allied nations with material between 1940 and August 1945.A total of $50.1 billion (equivalent to $650 billion today) worth of supplies were shipped. That represented 17% of the total war expenditures of the U.S. In all, $31.4 billion went to Britain, $11.3 billion to the Soviet Union, $3.2 billion to France, $1.6 billion to China, and smaller sums to other Allies.The U.S Industry produced over 2,382,311 military vehicles.102,410 Tanks and Self - propelled guns99,950 Fighter Aircraft97,810 Light and medium bombers35,366 Four-engined bombers257,390 Artillery (including Anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns)105,054 Infantry weapons:Mortars 2,679,840 Infantry weapons:Machine-guns (without sub-machine guns) 11,750,000 Infantry weapons:rifles 1,956,000 Infantry weapons: sub-machine guns3,918 Reconnaissance planes141 Aircraft carriers8 Battleships48 Cruisers349 Destroyers498 Escorts (Corvettes, Frigates)203 SubmarinesThe 1940 Destroyers for Bases Agreement, whereby 50 US Navy destroyers were transferred to the Royal Navy and the Royal Canadian Navy in exchange for basing rights in the Caribbean.The USSR received hundreds of thousands of military vehicles and motorbikes. Lack of fuel was ameliorated with deliveries of 2.5 million tons of petroleum products. The profusion of Roosevelt's "garden hose" provided Stalin with 595 ships, including 28 frigates, 105 submarines, 77 trawlers, 22 torpedo boats, 140 anti-submarine vessels and others. The Soviet air force received 4,952 Aerocobra and 2,410 Kingcobra fighter jets. Soviet pilot Alexander Pokryshkin fought with Hitler's Luftwaffe aces in Aerocobra planes, which made him a Hero of the Soviet Union hero three times over.The lend-lease agreement supplied the USSR with 2,7 thousand A-20 and 861 B-25 bomber planes. Soviet tank divisions received 7,056 tanks, 8,218 anti-aircraft emplacements, 131,600 machine guns and other arms. The USA provided the Soviets with 501,660 tactical wheeled and tracked vehicles, including 77,972 jeeps, 151,053 1-1/2-ton trucks, and 200,622 2-1/2-ton trucks.Soviet propaganda tried to diminish the importance of the American help. Back in those years, it was said that the Soviet Union had produced 30,000 tanks and 40,000 planes since the middle of 1943. Well, as a matter of fact, this was true. However, one has to take into consideration the fact that lend and lease deliveries were made to the USSR during the most difficult period of the war - during the second half of 1942. In addition, the USSR would not have been capable of producing its arms without the lend-lease agreement: The USA shipped 2.3 million tons of steel to the USSR during the WWII years. That volume of steel was enough for the production of 70,000 T-34 tanks. Aluminum was received in the volume of 229,000 tons, which helped the Soviet aviation and tank industries to run for two years. One has to mention food deliveries as well: 3.8 million tons of tinned pork, sausages, butter, chocolate, egg powder and so on. The lend-lease agreement provided orderlies with 423,000 telephones and tens of thousands of wireless stations. Deliveries also included oil distillation equipment, field bakeries, tents, parachutes, and so on and so forth. The Soviet Union also received 15 million pairs of army boots.The help was delivered to the USSR via Iran and major Soviet sea ports. About 3,000 transport vessels arrived at the ports of Murmansk, Arkhangelsk and Vladivostok, and delivered 1.3 million tons of cargo. It would be incorrect to diminish the significance of such all-embracing help from the United States as a serious factor that assisted in the victorious ending of the war. The Soviet Union had also pressed the United States and United Kingdom to start operations in Europe and open a second front to reduce the pressure of German forces on the Soviet troops. The Russians NEEDED another front or they would have negotiated a cease fire. They even said so. Without them stretching out the Nazi forces on the Russian front, the UK may not have been able to hold the Nazis back. The US provided that front, which kept the Russians in the war. The U.S favored Operation Sledgehammer, landing in Occupied Europe as soon as possible, but the British commanders believed that such a course would end in Page on disaster.so an attack on French North Africa was proposed instead, which would clear the Axis powers from North Africa and improve naval control of the Mediterranean Sea, and prepare for an invasion of Southern Europe in 1943.Never under estimate the massive US presence in the UK during WW2. During World War II 16,000,000 personnel served in the U.S. Military.Effectively invading Continental Europe would not have been possible for the British until 1949 by which time the massive armies of the British Empire would have been ready.The Americans managed to mount a successful invasion of France via Normandy in June 1944 - a clear five years ahead of the original British plan.The American troops who landed on Omaha Beach on D-Day had the hardest battleground of the invasion. Thousands died, but many more thousands succeeded in capturing the beach and pressing inland.Utah Beach was assaulted by elements of the U.S. 4th Infantry Division and was taken successfully with relatively few casualties.Without the US' anti-submarine resources the war in the Atlantic would have been lost rather quickly, and England knocked out of the war, unable to sustain her population let alone her military. Japan was brought down not by its internal crumbling or whatever he says, but by the phenomenally successful submarine war waged by US fleet boats, which ruined the Japanese merchant marine and severely hampered its Navy. You can't operate an island empire if you can't haul anything between islands that won't fit on a plane. The Japanese Navy was way beyond the abilities of British, Dutch, and Australian forces to handle; the story of those fleets is a story of remarkably capable people facing overwhelming force. The defeat of that navy is popularly attributed to the skill and luck of the US naval air forces. But the actual events were more complex, and in a real sense the result was created by the US' foresight and ingenuity in developing an immense ifrastructure of fleet auxiliaries which could move to any suitable undeveloped harbor and create an almost first class fleet base in days, lacking only drydock facilities for cruisers and capital ships... US applied industrial strength completely revamped the entire fuel generation and distribution systems of the western world; within a year or so of US entry to the war places like Maracaibo and Aruba were suddenly among the most important ports in the world, and the facilities that made them so were a product of complex planning, financing, and construction worked out in a remarkably short time. Its a story almost as impressive as the relocation of the entire Soviet industrial base to the Urals at the outbreak of war-- the weather was better and more financing was available, and it wasn't really done under fire. but the scale and timeline was similar. Those ports provided a huge porportion of the fuel for the entire effort against Germany-- without that fuel on the global market, the Soviet war machine might have had to depend on their cavalry in the summer too. :eek: Much has been written about the superiority of German tank design, and there is some justice in this-- but those writers are looking at half the picture and believing the American tanks came out the way they did through some lack of foresight or design skill. They did not. The good German tanks-- later Panthers and the Tigers-- were produced in surprisingly small numbers, were slow to react due to warm up times required, operated poorly in mud, and were difficult of repair. The American tanks were designed to start on a dime, operate off road in European conditions, to be produced about as fast as gumballs and to be reassembled out of pieces of damaged units overnight. I don't know the exact figures, but the Sherman alone must have been produced in something like two or three times the numbers the Germans managed for their entire program for twice the timespan... add to that the Soviet ability to manufacture T-34s like they were using carbon paper to do it and the German's vaunted design superiority vanishes like the real world illusion that it was. Produceabilty is part of design. I can't claim that the T-34 might not have won "its share" of the war alone, because it might have, but I can claim that there was never any chance that it would have to. The invasion of Normandy was really necessary whether the US was in the war or not, was it not? The Soviets certainly spent much of the war begging for increased pressure in the west anyway. Well, the landings were literally not possible without the landing craft technology developed by the US. Those boats didn't exist even in the dreams of anyone else; they are such a staple of the photos of the war that it is easy to forget that nothing like them existed before. They were the joint product of the US industrial machine's ability to design, and ability to produce in huge numbers in a short time, something never before seen just because it was needed.The most impactful help the Allies offered in WWII to the USSR from 1941 consisted of economic and military aid (such as US Lend-Lease that started in October 1941), followed by the ability to tie down some number of German and Italian divisions and weapons in Western Europe and North Africa. Half of Soviet agriculture was gone before harvest time in 1941. With much of Soviet industry destroyed by November 1941, or being shipped East in containers on slow trains, the Soviet economy would have likely collapsed without urgent help.Soviet Weapons Losses in 1941 (The First Six Months Of The War)72% of all Tanks.34% of all Combat Aircraft.56% of all Small-arms and Machine guns.69% of all Anti-Tank guns.59% of all Field guns and Mortars.While this was acknowledged by Stalin, this was not disclosed in Soviet media at the time, and not emphasized in Soviet history books. However, the total amount (about $100B in todays dollars, from the US alone) is significant. Russian literature and movies from the time often mention American trucks, ham, and other aid.The timeline is important. US aid before October 1941 is categorized as pre-Lend-Lease. Lend-Lease quickly ramped up in Fall-Winter 1941.Also helpful was the strategic bombing of Romanian oil fields and German production facilities. Starting from 1943, Germany was running short of weapons and ammunition, whereas the USSR received an increasing amount of vehicles, airplanes, food and other resources from the USA. Heard of the famous Katyusha rocket launchers? Most were installed on US-supplied light Studebaker truck chassis. Around 400,000 medium transport trucks was supplied by the US, along with warships and warplanes. When you enjoy a sizeable resource advantage, the nature of the war changes - the enemy's mistakes get exploited, and yours are often forgiven.The Normandy landings in 1944 were a huge help, but by that time Germany was already losing the war. Finishing the war sooner was a matter of not wasting the lives of millions of Soviet soldiers. Would any Russian just dismiss that?""It is now said that the Allies never helped us . . . However, one cannot deny that the Americans gave us so much material, without which we could not have formed our reserves and could not have continued the war . . . we had no explosives and powder. There was none to equip rifle bullets. The Americans actually came to our assistance with powder and explosives. And how much sheet steel did they give us. We really could not have quickly put right our production of tanks if the Americans had not helped with steel. And today it seems as though we had all this ourselves in abundance." -Zhukov, in an interview with Konstantin Simonov.From the Myth of Solo Russian Victory:What made the war against Germany decisive was the overwhelming weight of men and materials leagued against the Axis power. But even if we merely focus on Soviet production, here too we have to acknowledge a massive debt to the West. Most Soviet industries were not built up in some autarkic dreamworld as Leftists and Russophiles love to imagine. In Facing The Abyss, the British nationalist A.K.Chesteron comments on Anthony C. Sutton’s study Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1917 to 1930:"So far from Russia’s pulling herself up by her own boot-laces, as Communist propaganda would have us believe, almost all of the projects of the First Five Year Plan were designed by American companies. At least ninety-five percent of the industrial structure received Western assistance, the agreements to grant concessions having been reached by the Russian Congress of Councils of the National Economy as early as December 1917" (p 69-70)This pattern of a technologically backward Soviet Union relying on infusions of Western know-how ran all the way through to the final demise of the USSR in 1991.THE MYTH OF THE GREAT RUSSIAN VICTORYThe Economics of World War TwoThe US clearly didn't win the war alone, but it was probably the one nation most responsible for Allied victory.