How to Edit and sign Sedgwick Leave Of Absence Forms Online
Read the following instructions to use CocoDoc to start editing and completing your Sedgwick Leave Of Absence Forms:
- To start with, seek the “Get Form” button and tap it.
- Wait until Sedgwick Leave Of Absence Forms is loaded.
- Customize your document by using the toolbar on the top.
- Download your customized form and share it as you needed.
An Easy Editing Tool for Modifying Sedgwick Leave Of Absence Forms on Your Way
How to Edit Your PDF Sedgwick Leave Of Absence Forms Online
Editing your form online is quite effortless. It is not necessary to get any software with your computer or phone to use this feature. CocoDoc offers an easy application to edit your document directly through any web browser you use. The entire interface is well-organized.
Follow the step-by-step guide below to eidt your PDF files online:
- Find CocoDoc official website from any web browser of the device where you have your file.
- Seek the ‘Edit PDF Online’ button and tap it.
- Then you will visit here. Just drag and drop the document, or attach the file through the ‘Choose File’ option.
- Once the document is uploaded, you can edit it using the toolbar as you needed.
- When the modification is done, click on the ‘Download’ icon to save the file.
How to Edit Sedgwick Leave Of Absence Forms on Windows
Windows is the most widespread operating system. However, Windows does not contain any default application that can directly edit file. In this case, you can get CocoDoc's desktop software for Windows, which can help you to work on documents efficiently.
All you have to do is follow the guidelines below:
- Get CocoDoc software from your Windows Store.
- Open the software and then import your PDF document.
- You can also import the PDF file from Google Drive.
- After that, edit the document as you needed by using the different tools on the top.
- Once done, you can now save the customized template to your device. You can also check more details about how to alter a PDF.
How to Edit Sedgwick Leave Of Absence Forms on Mac
macOS comes with a default feature - Preview, to open PDF files. Although Mac users can view PDF files and even mark text on it, it does not support editing. Utilizing CocoDoc, you can edit your document on Mac instantly.
Follow the effortless steps below to start editing:
- At first, install CocoDoc desktop app on your Mac computer.
- Then, import your PDF file through the app.
- You can attach the file from any cloud storage, such as Dropbox, Google Drive, or OneDrive.
- Edit, fill and sign your paper by utilizing this tool.
- Lastly, download the file to save it on your device.
How to Edit PDF Sedgwick Leave Of Absence Forms with G Suite
G Suite is a widespread Google's suite of intelligent apps, which is designed to make your job easier and increase collaboration within teams. Integrating CocoDoc's PDF editor with G Suite can help to accomplish work effectively.
Here are the guidelines to do it:
- Open Google WorkPlace Marketplace on your laptop.
- Seek for CocoDoc PDF Editor and install the add-on.
- Attach the file that you want to edit and find CocoDoc PDF Editor by clicking "Open with" in Drive.
- Edit and sign your paper using the toolbar.
- Save the customized PDF file on your cloud storage.
PDF Editor FAQ
If Churchill had continued to attempt to appease Hitler rather than declaring war, what would have happened following the invasion of Poland?
hurchill's warnings about the danger of the new Nazi regime in Germany initially fell on deaf ears. In 1938 Britain and Germany almost went to war over Hitler's desire to annex part of Czechoslovakia. Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain flew to Munich to secure a guarantee that there would be no further German aggression. Churchill was critical of the policy of appeasement and broadcast directly to the United States, appealing for greater American involvement in Europe. When Hitler occupied Prague and the Czech provinces of Bohemia and Moravia, Churchill's predictions were seen to be coming true.In September 1939 Germany invaded Poland. The attack touched off the world struggle that Churchill would later call “The Unnecessary War” because he felt a firm policy toward aggressor nations after World War I would have prevented the conflict. Chamberlain brought Churchill into government again as First Lord of the Admiralty. Churchill became Prime Minister on May 10, 1940, the day Hitler launched his invasion of France, Belgium, and Holland. During the tense months that followed, Britain stood alone with her Empire and Commonwealth, surviving the Battle of Britain and the Blitz. Churchill's speeches and broadcasts carried a message of determination and defiance around the globe.HitlerChurchill spent much of the 1930s warning about the dangers of Nazi Germany and working on a biography of his illustrious ancestor, the first Duke of Marlborough. The Duke had led a coalition against a dominant and aggressive European superpower (Louis XIV's France). This cartoon shows that others saw a parallel in Churchill's similar approach toward Germany's Adolf Hitler. Churchill also was concerned about Hitler's anti-Semitic actions and rhetoric. This letter to Churchill from a fellow Conservative member of Parliament, Robert Boothby, describes Boothby's meeting with Hitler and asks about “the Jewish question.” It reveals concern about the Nazis, and perhaps something about latent anti-Semitism in the British establishment—a view not shared by Churchill. Churchill later arranged for a similar meeting with Hitler in Germany in 1932, but the Nazi leader failed to appear.1 of 2Cartoon from Punch Magazine, November 2, 1938. Copyprint. Churchill Papers, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge, U.K. (20.2)Robert Boothby to Winston Churchill, January 22, 1932. Page 2 . Holograph letter. Churchill Papers, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge, U.K. (92)Read the transcriptBookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/churchill/wc-hour.html#92The 1930sIn the 1930s, while out of power and with the international scene becoming ever more threatening, Churchill began his multi-volume study of the English-speaking peoples as a way to trace the emergence of concepts of freedom and law. This passage from the fourth volume of The Great Democracies reflects Churchill's lifelong interest in the American Civil War. Early in 1937, Churchill wrote to his friend, Bernard Baruch, giving his views on the Abdication Crisis. When Edward VIII was pressured to resign the throne over his determination to marry the American divorcée Wallis Simpson, Churchill was one of the few who defended the King. Churchill's support of the King was damaging to him—he was shouted down in Parliament and appeared out of touch with mainstream politics.1 of 2Winston S. Churchill. A History of the English-Speaking Peoples, vol. 4. New York: Dodd, Mead 1956-1958. Rosenwald Collection, Rare Book and Special Collections Division, Library of Congress (93.1)Winston Churchill to Bernard Baruch, January 1, 1937. Carbon copy of letter with annotations. Churchill Papers, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge, U.K. (94)Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/churchill/wc-hour.html#93“We must arm”In this key page from Churchill's notes for his broadcast to the United States in the aftermath of the Munich Crisis, his plea for greater American involvement in Europe is set out in his distinctive “psalm form.” Churchill always spoke with a full set of notes, even though he committed most of the content to his remarkable memory.1 of 2Page from speaking notes for Churchill's broadcast to the United States, October 16, 1938. Annotated typescript. Churchill Papers, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge, U.K. (95)Winston Churchill. Broadcast to the United States, October 16, 1938. Sound disc. Motion Picture, Broadcasting and Recorded Sound Division, Library of Congress (95.1)Play audioBookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/churchill/wc-hour.html#95DISCOVER!Phony WarBritain and France declared war on Germany on September 3, 1939. On the same day, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain brought Churchill back into government as First Lord of the Admiralty. Churchill threw himself tirelessly into all aspects of war policy and direction. This letter, written to his chief during a prolonged lull in the ground action known as the “Phony War,” shows his aggressive approach. In a November 12 broadcast speech, he taunted the “boastful and bullying” Nazis, led by “that evil man,” Hitler. The editorial cartoon, shown here, depicts Churchill and a German official goading each other over the German border defense system called the West Wall.1 of 2Winston Churchill to Neville Chamberlain, October 1, 1939. Typescript letter with manuscript annotations. Churchill Papers, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge, U.K. (98) ©Crown copyright 1939, Archival Reference # CHAR 19/2C/303Rollin Kirby. “Heavy Firing Heard on the Western Front,” 1939. Drawing. Cartoon Drawings Collection, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress (102)Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/churchill/wc-hour.html#98The Threat of InvasionAfter the fall of France to Germany in June 1940, Britain faced the possibility of invasion. Germany, however, was unable to achieve the necessary air superiority, and the planned invasion, code-named sealion, was postponed. By October Churchill quipped, “We are waiting for the long-promised invasion. So are the fishes.” This photograph shows the new Prime Minister inspecting his coastal defenses during the summer of 1940, when landings seemed imminent.Churchill Inspects Coast Defenses, 1940. Photographic print. New York World-Telegram & Sun Collection, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress (101) LC-USZ62-128362Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/churchill/wc-hour.html#101DISCOVER!Prime MinisterOn May 10, 1940, as the Germans were beginning to attack the British and French ground forces arrayed against them, Churchill became Prime Minister and Minister of Defense. He later wrote, “I felt as if I were walking with Destiny, and that all my past life had been but a preparation for this hour and for this trial.” This cartoon shows the British national symbol John Bull handing him “complete control,” at least temporarily.Clifford Berryman. We Are Just Lending This to You, Winnie, You Can Return It Later, 1940. Drawing. Cartoon Drawings Collection, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress (104) © 1940, The Washington Post. All Rights Reserved.Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/churchill/wc-hour.html#104“This was their finest hour”This is Churchill's draft for one of his most famous pieces of oratory. His speech of June 18, 1940, delivered first in the House of Commons and then broadcast to the Nation, occurred against the backdrop of the fall of France, one of the darkest moments in British history. Churchill did not flinch from admitting the severity of the situation, but he turned it into a roar of determination and defiance.1 of 2Extract from draft of “Finest Hour” speech by Winston Churchill, June 1940. Typescript with manuscript annotations. Churchill Papers, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge, U.K. (104.1) © Crown copyright 1940, Archival Reference #9/172/152Winston Churchill. “Finest Hour” speech, June 1940. Sound disc. Motion Picture, Broadcasting and Recorded Sound Division, Library of Congress (104.2)Play audioBookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/churchill/wc-hour.html#104_2Mobilizing the English LanguageChurchill's inspirational wartime speeches rank among the greatest delivered by any leader in history. He carefully crafted the rhetorical flourishes in addresses that he broadcast to the nation over the radio, to members of Parliament, and to a wide variety of groups. Ten years after World War II ended, Churchill said of his wartime role that it was Britain that “had the lion's heart,” he merely “had the luck to be called upon to give the roar.”Winston Churchill, undated. Copyprint. W. Averell Harriman Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress (105)Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/churchill/wc-hour.html#105September 1940September 1940 was a key month for Churchill as this schedule shows. The Royal Air Force had managed to hold its own against the powerful German Luftwaffe, winning the Battle of Britain. But Hitler now changed tactics and began the wholesale bombing of London and other civilian centers. Churchill's engagements included, numerous cabinet meetings, speeches before the House of Commons, a radio broadcast, and more.Engagements card, September 1940. Churchill Papers, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge, U.K. (105.2) © Crown copyright 1940, Archival Reference # CHAR 20/19/3Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/churchill/wc-hour.html#105_2Befriendus LeaselendusIn this caricature, Churchill, with cigar, is shown as a puffin, “Perpetually carrying a stump in its mouth.” A reference to recent defeats by British forces in Greece implies that it was drawn in 1941, when Churchill's attempt to stop the Nazis from overrunning that nation met with disaster. Other references are to Churchill's beloved British Empire—“Range: The sun never sets,—as we all jolly well know.”—and to the recently passed Lend-Lease Act, which provided American assistance to the United Kingdom.Justin Murray. Winston Churchill (Befriendus Leaselendus), ca.1945. Photomechanical print. Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress (111) LC-USZ62-106670Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/churchill/wc-hour.html#111The Destruction of CoventryThe German raid on the English city of Coventry (November 14-15, 1940) left 380 people dead, 865 were inured, and the center of the city was devastated. The attack shocked the American public. In later years Churchill would be accused—falsely, according to many scholars—of deliberately failing to protect Coventry in order to protect secret intelligence sources that had provided advance knowledge of the attack. This photograph shows Churchill walking through the ruins of Coventry's fourteenth-century cathedral.Prime Minister Winston Churchill walks… through the ruins of Coventry Cathedral…, 1942. Photograph. Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress (106) LC-USZ62-16191 [Digital ID# cph 3a18421]Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/churchill/wc-hour.html#106Coping With the BlitzThe Ministry of Information distributed this poster in an effort to help the people of Coventry deal with the severe damage that resulted from the German bombing raid. One week after the attack residents were told how to obtain—and offer—assistance and warned against attempts to flee to neutral Ireland. They were also told that there was “no ground for believing that large numbers of bodies remain to be recovered.” Such tales were “pure rumor,” the notice stated, “and to believe it is playing Hitler's game.”Ministry of Information. “Bulletin,” November 22, 1940. Poster. John Belfort Keogh Collection, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress (106.1)Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/churchill/wc-hour.html#106_1Churchill in an Air RaidAttempting to bomb Britain into submission, the German Luftwaffe attacked the city of Ramsgate while Churchill was visiting in August 1940. Taking cover in an underground shelter, he exchanged his trademark civilian hat for a steel helmet. The city's mayor forced him to discard his cigar, eliciting the rueful response, “There goes another good one.”Associated Press. Churchill Dons Helmet, 1940. Copyprint. New York World-Telegram & Sun Collection, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress (107)Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/churchill/wc-hour.html#1071940Cartoonist Herbert Block (“Herblock”) summed up the year 1940 optimistically with implied hopes for victory under the leadership of Churchill and Roosevelt. Shown in this sketch are British successes in the Mediterranean at Oran (against the Vichy French fleet), at Taranto (against the Italian fleet), in the skies by the Royal Air Force, and in North Africa. Also depicted are Italy's failed attempted invade of Greece, the peacetime military conscription act passed by the U.S. Congress, and the supplies shipped to Britain from America.Herbert Block. Herblock's Own History of the Year—The Worlds of 1940, ca. 1940. Ink and graphite drawing. Herb Block Foundation Collection, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress (109). Herblock © 1940. LC-USZ62-127197 [Digital ID# ppmsc 03402]Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/churchill/wc-hour.html#109Back to TopAn American ConnectionThe fall of France, in June 1940, left Britain in a desperate situation. Threatened with a Nazi invasion and with his country under savage attack, Churchill was determined to obtain assistance and eventually a declaration of war against Germany and its allies from the United States.Churchill intensified his contacts with President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had started corresponding with him even before Churchill became Prime Minister. Churchill also welcomed the American supplies, both military and civilian, that Roosevelt had provided through such measures as the Lend-Lease Act of March 1941. Many Americans, however, were reluctant to enter the conflict, and Roosevelt felt compelled to adopt a gradual approach toward full belligerency.In June 1941 the immediate pressure on the British eased somewhat after Hitler attacked the Soviet Union. Two months later Churchill and Roosevelt met in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland, to formulate a joint military strategy and a statement of war aims,—the Atlantic Charter. With less success, they tried to work out a plan to prevent Germany's ally, Japan, from entering the war.Churchill-Roosevelt MessagesIn September 1939 President Franklin D. Roosevelt began one of the most remarkable correspondence in history by sending a personal letter to Churchill, then still First Lord of the Admiralty. Across the years the total number of messages would grow to 1,949. Although this cable was the second one that Churchill sent back to Roosevelt, its substance had been communicated in a telephone call made earlier. It concerned fears of a German plot to sink a ship filled with Americans and then to blame the incident on the British.Winston Churchill to Franklin Roosevelt, October 6, 1939. Typewritten cable. Cordell Hull Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress (98.1). © Crown copyright 1939Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/churchill/wc-hour.html#98_1“An inspiration”President Roosevelt wrote this letter to Churchill in January 1941, quoting from the Longfellow poem “The Building of the Ship.” It was then hand-delivered to the British Prime Minister by Wendell Wilkie, Roosevelt's Republican opponent in the 1940 Presidential election. Churchill, desperate for U.S. support, found the letter “an inspiration” and told Roosevelt that he would have it framed. The letter hung for a long time at Chartwell, Churchill's home, hence it has faded from the original green of White House stationery to brown.President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Winston Churchill, January 20, 1941. Facsimile. Churchill Additional Papers, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge, U.K. (112)Read the transcriptBookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/churchill/wc-hour.html#112“Give us the tools, and we will finish the job”In this famous speech broadcast over the BBC, Churchill recites the poem included in President Roosevelt's recent letter—Longfellow's “The Building of a Ship.” Churchill ends this broadcast with an explicit message to Roosevelt in the heartfelt plea, “Give us the tools, and we will finish the job.”1 of 2Extract from speaking notes for broadcast by Winston Churchill, February 9, 1941. Churchill Papers, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge, U.K. (113). © Crown copyright 1941, Archival Reference # CHAR 9/150A/51Winston Churchill. Broadcast speech, February 9, 1941. Sound disc. Motion Picture, Broadcasting and Recorded Sound Division, Library of Congress (113.1)Play audioBookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/churchill/wc-hour.html#113Aid to BritainIn 1941 President Roosevelt faced a dilemma: should the United States short change its own armed forces in order to help a nation that might capitulate to the Nazis? To answer that question, and to facilitate the flow of aid if (as it turned out) surrender seemed unlikely, he sent two personal representatives to Churchill—Harry Hopkins and W. Averell Harriman. In this letter, which shows the closeness of their relationship, Harriman argues that Britain is not adequately molding American public opinion. Churchill's handwritten reply invites him to draft a solution.W. Averell Harriman to Winston Churchill, April 15, 1941. Typed letter. W. Averell Harriman Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress (115). © Crown copyright 1941Read the transcriptBookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/churchill/wc-hour.html#115“We do not feel alone”Moved by the suffering, endurance, and courage displayed by the residents of Bristol during an air raid that took place while Churchill and Harriman were visiting there, Harriman made an anonymous donation to a relief fund. In this thank you note Clementine Churchill wrote of her hope that “all this pain and grief” might “bring our two countries permanently together.” “Anyhow,” she concluded, “whatever happens we do not feel alone any more.”Clementine Churchill to W. Averell Harriman, April 15, 1941. Page 2 Holograph letter. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress (116)Read the transcriptBookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/churchill/wc-hour.html#116U.S. Neutrality and IsolationismRoosevelt had great difficulty persuading many Americans to provide assistance to the British. Isolationists, in particular, were quick to demand that the United States should avoid what they felt was a foreign entanglement that could lead to war. The Citizens National Keep America Out of War Committee distributed this flyer to raise funds and promote its cause. It urged people to apply political pressure on Congress and to demand that motion picture theater owners not show war films.Citizens National Keep America Out of War Committee, September 16, 1939. Mimeographed flyer. Cordell Hull Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress (116.1)Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/churchill/wc-hour.html#116_1Churchill Views the DevastationIn May 1941, during what turned out to be the last major attack of the Blitz, German bombs destroyed the debating chamber of the House of Commons. A member of Parliament told Churchill not to be distressed by the results stating, “Such ruins are good assets: all round the globe, and especially in America.” This photograph was republished shortly before Churchill's death.Winston Churchill, 1941. Copyprint. New York World-Telegram & Sun Collection, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress (118)Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/churchill/wc-hour.html#118Supplies via AfricaThe German U-boat campaign and uncertain weather in the North Atlantic posed difficulties for sending American aircraft to the British forces fighting in the eastern Mediterranean. This letter concerns the routes available for shipment through neutral airspace to the jumping-off point for the South Atlantic route. Presidential advisor Averell Harriman solved the problem by arranging to have American pilots fly the planes to Natal, on the Brazilian coast, and from there to Bathurst, in Gambia, Africa—the shortest route across the ocean.Winston Churchill to W. Averell Harriman, May 20, 1941. Page 2. Typed letter. W. Averell Harriman Collection, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress (119). © Crown copyright 1941Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/churchill/wc-hour.html#119American B-17s for the RAFThe two photographs taken in the summer of 1941, displayed here, show Churchill's recognizable figure as he watches the arrival of the first B-17 “Flying Fortress” and as he inspects an American M-3 tank. Even though the U.S. was desperately trying to build up its military forces throughout 1941, Roosevelt decided to give the British models of the United States' most advanced weapons. Military aid to Britain was greatly facilitated by the Lend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941, in which Congress authorized the sale, lease, transfer, or exchange of arms and supplies to “any country whose defense the president deems vital to the defense of the United States.”1 of 2Prime Minister Sees Flying Fortresses, June 6, 1941. Copyprint. Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress (121). LC-USZ62-49896. [Digital ID# cph 3a49988]Prime Minister Winston Churchill, July, 1941. Photograph. Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress (123). LC-USE6-D-008530Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/churchill/wc-hour.html#121Americans Meet With the British Chiefs of StaffThroughout 1940 and 1941 Churchill attempted to win the confidence of Americans by demonstrating his trust in them. As this secret record shows, he invited presidential advisors Averell Harriman and Harry Hopkins to meet with Britain's highest military leaders. Outlining his views on strategy, with an eye toward securing as much American participation as possible, Churchill reassured his guests “that the Japanese would not enter the war until they were sure that we were beaten. They did not want to fight the United States and the British Empire together.”British War Cabinet. Record of a meeting, July 24, 1941. Mimeograph paper. W. Averell Harriman Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress (124). ©Crown copyright 1941Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/churchill/wc-hour.html#124A Secret Meeting with President RooseveltIn this letter King George VI grants permission for his Prime Minister to leave the country in order to attend a secret meeting with President Roosevelt off the coast of Newfoundland. The journey by sea to the Atlantic meeting was clearly dangerous, and measures had to be put in place to provide for continued government during Churchill's absence and in case of his failure to return.King George VI to Winston Churchill, July 25, 1941. Page 2. Signed typescript letter. Churchill Papers, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge, U.K. (126)Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/churchill/wc-hour.html#126On Board HMS Prince of WalesChurchill's trip to and from Newfoundland involved some risk. Submarines and German surface raiders prowled the Atlantic and, closer to Europe, there was always the possibility of long-range German air attack. Risking the wrath of isolationists in the United States, the Americans sent two U.S. destroyers to escort Churchill as far as Iceland on the return voyage. Roosevelt's son was aboard one of them. This photograph shows Churchill striding the deck of the British battleship Prince of Wales.The Prime Minister's Return Journey Across the Atlantic, August, 1941. Copyprint. Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress (127)Bookmark this item: //www.loc.gov/exhibits/churchill/wc-hour.html#127
Who is considered as being the superior tactical commander, Stonewall Jackson or William T. Sherman?
Jackson whose Valley Campaign is among the most important in all military History. He paralyzed five times the number of men he commanded. Sherman was good but always had the advantage of numbers and logistics. He was repeatedly defeated by Joe Johnston but his much larger forces could absorb the punishment and kept flanking Johnston. His men were exceptionally successful against women, children and old men, not so much against CSA Cavalry.Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign of 1862(From The Confederate Military History, Volume 3, Chapter XIV)BEFORE the opening of active military operations in the spring of 1862, Lincoln determined to reopen the Baltimore & Ohio railroad. Jackson held the portion of this road, which he had badly damaged, between Harper's Ferry and Hancock, and he must be forced back from the Potomac before the road could be repaired and reopened. To effect this Banks marched, February 22nd, from his winter camp at Frederick, Md., and his advance entered Harper's Ferry the 24th, and laid a bateau bridge across the Potomac on which two brigades crossed on the 26th and occupied the town. McClellan himself reached that place the same day and ordered the establishment there of a depot of army supplies, preparatory to another forward movement, while the railroad was being opened. After going to Charlestown, on the 28th, he instructed Banks to locate Abercrombie's brigade at that place and Hamilton's at Smithfield, a few miles to the westward; Sedgwick, to whose division these belonged, to establish himself at Charlestown. Shields, now in command of Lander's force from the South Branch valley, was ordered to Martinsburg, and Williams from Hancock to Bunker Hill; thus establishing a line entirely across the Valley, in front of the Baltimore & Ohio. These camps were all connected by fine macadam roads. All arrangements were completed by March 6th and the three brigades of Banks were well placed, not only for guarding the Baltimore & Ohio, but also for an advance on Winchester.On the same day Banks marched from Frederick to attack him, Jackson, in obedience to Johnston's orders, sent the Seventh and Fourteenth Tennessee regiments to Manassas and the Third Arkansas to Strasburg, to take the cars for Fredericksburg. He retained for further orders the rest of Loring's men who"were not Virginians. Having been thus depleted, Jackson asked Johnston, by letter, February 24th, whether he desired additional fortifications at Winchester, stating that he was arranging to construct a raft bridge over the Shenandoah so that his troops and those at Leesburg could quickly co-operate. At that very time Johnston was sending his stores and baggage to the rear, and on the 7th of March, Whiting withdrew toward Fredericksburg, from his camp on the lower Occoquan, and D. H. Hill, from his at Leesburg, by way of Warrenton, toward the Rappahannock; and on the 9th, the center, under Johnston himself, abandoned Centreville and Manassas. By March 11th all the Confederate infantry and artillery from the Blue ridge to Fredericksburg, were aligned on the south bank of the Rappahannock.These movements left Jackson exposed to both front and flank attacks; but Johnston had confidence in his ability to take care of himself, and instructed him "to endeavor to employ the invaders in the valley, but without exposing himself to the danger of defeat, by keeping so near the enemy as to prevent him from making any considerable detachment to reinforce McClellan, but not so near that he might be compelled to fight." Jackson was ready enough to obey orders as far as keeping the invaders in the valley, and constantly employed, were concerned; but he doubtless fully intended to fight them, notwithstanding these instructions, if opportunity offered for so doing.By Jackson's field return of February 28th, he had 4,297 infantry, 369 artillery and 601 cavalry; a total of 5,267, officers and-men, present for duty. This little army of three brigades (among them the already famous "Stonewall brigade") was made up of ten regiments of Virginia volunteer infantry and a battalion of Virginia Irish regulars; five Virginia artillery companies with 24 guns, and a cavalry regiment composed of Virginia companies and Chew's horse artillery of 3 guns, under the already renowned Ashby. Included among these men were some fragments of militia brigades, mostly on special duty.By McClellan's field return of March 2d, Banks had present for duty, of all arms, 38,484 men. After the occupation of Winchester, Sedgwick's brigade was sent back to guard the Potomac from the mouth of the Monocacy down to the Great Falls, still leaving Banks full 30,000 men when he followed Jackson, with about one-sixth as many, as he retired up the Valley, after evacuating Winchester on the 11th of March.Banks' advance occupied Charlestown, 22 miles from Winchester, February 26th; the advance of his right, marching from Bunker Hill, appeared at Stephenson's, four miles in front of Winchester, March 6th, when Jackson promptly formed line in front of his fortifications and offered battle; but the Federals as promptly fell back. On the 11th Banks cautiously advanced his left to Berryville, 10 miles east of Winchester, by a good stone road. Jackson again drew up his little army, in front of Winchester, covering the three roads by which Banks was advancing his whole army, and all day awaited an attack from the large force that came to within four miles of his position. When this did not come on to combat, he, late in the day, reluctantly followed his trains to the vicinity of Newtown, after having called a council of war (the first and the last he ever called), consisting of General Garnett and his regimental commanders, in Winchester, after dark, to which he proposed that they should make an attack on Banks' advance, at Stephenson's, before daylight the next morning. The council, as yet ignorant of the manner of man that counseled, rejected his proposal. He doubtless would have carried out his plans regardless of this conclusion if he had not then learned that, without orders, his army was already five miles away from Winchester; too far to recall them for a night march and attack. He later followed his army and bivouacked in its rear, with "Little Sorrel," in a fence corner. The next day he marched to Strasburg, 18 miles from Winchester, where he halted until the 15th. Banks occupied Winchester the 12th, but Ashby, with his cavalry, many of them bold riders reared in the lower valley, kept him so occupied in protecting the rear and flanks of his army as well as its front, that he did not follow after Jackson until the 18th, when he started Shields' division in pursuit. This reached Strasburg, the sally-port of the western middle section of the Valley, the next day, when Jackson, leaving the gateway open, with Ashby as its sentinel, again fell back, first to Woodstock, 12 miles, and then to Mt. Jackson, 24 miles from Strasburg.On the 16th of March, McClellan, convinced that his grand movement on Jackson, by which he had so easily secured control of the lower Valley, would enable him to hold that lovely country with a small force, ordered Banks to cross the Blue ridge, establish and strongly intrench his Command at and near Manassas, and proceed to open the railway from Washington to that point and thence to Strasburg; then intrench a brigade of infantry with two batteries, near Front Royal, where the railway crosses the Shenandoah; intrench another brigade at Strasburg; build and occupy blockhouses at the railway bridges; leave two regiments of cavalry at Winchester, and keep his front covered by constantly employed cavalry well advanced--" the general object being to cover the line of the Potomac and Washington," and, he doubtless mentally added, protect the right of the army moving toward Fredericksburg. Banks hastened to comply with these orders. Shields' division was recalled from Strasburg, and on the 20th, Williams' division took up its line of march for Manassas.Ashby, who kept up a constant skirmish with the Federal advance between Woodstock and Strasburg, routing its pickets and peering into its camps, reported to Jackson on the evening of March 21st, that the enemy had evacuated Strasburg and he was following them. Jackson, having been instructed by Johnston to hold in the valley the enemy already there, followed after Ashby at dawn of the 22nd, Fulkerson's brigade from Woodstock and Garnett's and Burks' from Mt. Jackson, all reaching Strasburg and encamping there that night. Ashby with 200 to 300 cavalry and three cannon, attacked and drove in the Federal pickets, about a mile from Winchester, at 5 p.m. of the 22nd. Banks ordered his command under arms and sent a brigade of infantry, two batteries and some artillery to meet this attack. Ashby skirmished for a time and then withdrew, three miles, to Kernstown, for the night, reporting to Jackson that he had learned that all but four regiments of the Federal army had left for the north and that these would follow the next morning. Ashby's information was only partly correct. The last of Williams' division of Banks' command had marched for Manassas the morning of the 22nd, but Shields' division, some 7,000 men, had not yet left Winchester.Shields, whose arm had been broken in the skirmish of the 22nd, reported to Banks that he thought the attack was only by a small cavalry force, but during the night, as a precautionary provision, he posted Kimball's brigade of infantry and a battery across the Valley turnpike, well toward Kernstown, with Sullivan's brigade in supporting distance, and covered all roads leading to Winchester from the north, west and south. Tyler's infantry brigade and Broadhead's cavalry he held in Winchester. On the morning of the 23rd, after a careful reconnaissance of the front, it was concluded, as before, that only a small Confederate cavalry force was there, and that Jackson would not venture so far from his support. Thus satisfied, Banks took his departure, under orders, for Washington, leaving his staff to ride toward Manassas in the afternoon.Jackson knew that a large body of Banks' men had left the Valley and concluded, from Ashby's reports, that but a small force remained at Winchester. This he determined to attack, with the expectation that by so doing he could recall Banks' whole army to the Valley. At daybreak, on Sunday, the 23rd of March, he sent four companies of infantry to support Ashby, following these with his whole force. It was 14 miles from his camp at Strasburg to Kernstown, a fair day's march, so his advance did not reach Ashby until about 10 a.m. and his main body until 1 p.m.Jackson's men were much wearied by the long march of 26 miles, that most of them had made in about a day and a half, over a somewhat muddy stone road, so he gave orders to go into bivouac for the night, intending to attack, with rested troops, the next morning. On a further examination, he found that the position he had taken, about a mile south of Kernstown, could be seen from Pritchard's hill, about a mile north of Kernstown, which was occupied by Federal artillery, and that it would be dangerous to delay his attack, now it was known he was present in force, as the enemy might be reinforced during the night; so he decided to give battle as soon as he could arrange to do so.Ashby, with his cavalry and Chew's battery, had engaged the enemy's attention from early dawn; when Captain Nadenbousch arrived, at 10 a.m., with his four companies of infantry skirmishers, he again advanced and made a spirited attack. Colonel Kimball, commanding the Federal forces in Shields' enforced absence, met this by more than a regiment of Ohio skirmishers, deployed across the Valley turnpike, flanked by batteries and followed by Sullivan's brigade. These forced Ashby to retire, a few hundred yards, to Kernstown. When Jack. son's main body came up, he was ordered to prepare for the attack in force by threatening the Federal left, resting on the old Front Royal road, and also its right on the Opequon road. To the latter he sent Major Funsten with 140 cavalry, leaving himself but 150.Jackson mustered, on this' Kernstown battlefield, 3,087 infantry, of which 2,742 became engaged; 27 cannon, 18 of which came into action, and 290 cavalry. Shields reported that he had for fighting duty 6,000 infantry, 750 cavalry and 24 cannon. Of his thirteen infantry regiments, six were from Ohio, three from Indiana, and one each from Illinois and West Virginia; of his artillery, two companies were from West Virginia, two from Ohio and one from the Fourth regular United States artillery. Of his sixteen companies of cavalry, four were from Michigan, two each from Ohio and Maryland, six from West Virginia, and two appear to have been regulars. McClellan's return for March indicates that Shields had 9,000 men present for duty at this time.Scanning the topography of the field of battle and the positions his foe had occupied, from a rising ground near Kernstown, Jackson saw that a front attack would be hazardous, since the Federals were protected and concealed by a wood on their left, while their batteries, on commanding hills, guarded their right and swept the roads and open fields in their front. He quickly discovered that the dominating feature of the whole field was a prominent, but rather low ridge, partly wooded and partly cleared, that ran northeast and southwest, nearly parallel to the Valley turnpike and about three miles from it where he had massed his troops, and two miles from it where the Federal line crossed that road. This Sandy ridge, as it was called, was about four miles long; it sank down, its end crossed by a cleared field, into a large open forest at its northeastern end; this forest extended to and, concealed the Cedar Creek turnpike, which diverged to the west from the Valley turnpike some three miles beyond Kernstown.Satisfied that he could easily flank Shields' right and force him in retreat from his position if he could gain the crest of the Sandy ridge and advance to its northeastern end, Jackson at once proceeded to execute his designs. Burks' brigade was left on the turnpike, a mile south of Kernstown, to support Ashby, guard the train and form a reserve. Fulkerson's brigade, followed by part of Carpenter's battery, was marched northward, as if to attack the enemy's right center, passing bravely through a storm of shot and shell, from Pritchard's hill, to which Carpenter made brief reply in passing. Nearing the Federal batteries, Fulkerson turned northwest and, rapidly moving, soon gained and deployed across Sandy ridge, at right angles to its trend, securing a very strong position, on its crest, for his left, behind a stone fence overlooking and dominating the field that extended down the slope of the northeastern end of the ridge to the forest that reached from the foot of that end to the Cedar Creek turnpike. Garnett's brigade followed, but much farther to the left, and having gained the crest of the ridge, marched along that to Fulkerson's line, where most of it took position on his right, thus extending a strong line of battle across Sandy ridge and into the open field, on its eastern slope, which extended from near the crest and overlooked the Federal position. Jackson quickly saw its advantages and ordered up McLaughlin's and Waters' batteries and Carpenter's other guns, and placed them, nearly at right angles to his infantry line, in front of the wood above this field, supported by some of Fulkerson's men. This dis. position of his fighters was admirable. It was a right-angled salient with a protecting wood in the rear at each side. The angle looked into the midst of the Federal position; the batteries protected his right and commanded those of the enemy.Ashby was ordered to keep up a bold demonstration on the right and Jackson now opened on the left, and soon forced his foe to withdraw from his chosen position. Seeing that his right was in extreme danger, Kimball promptly provided to counteract Jackson's movements. Tyler's brigade, which at about 2 p.m. had reached the junction. of the Cedar Creek and Valley turnpikes, and was there waiting in reserve, was ordered to vigorously attack the Confederate left. Jackson was now master of the situation, and unless he could be driven from his position he would, undoubtedly, gain the day.Tyler, equal to the emergency, marched rapidly along the Cedar Creek road to opposite the northeastern end of Sandy ridge, and there, concealed and protected by the intervening forest, formed his line of battle, parallel to and longer than Jackson's, and at 3:30 p.m. advanced to the attack, just as Jackson had placed his men in position and was advancing to flank Sullivan's right. Tyler's vigorous onset was unexpected, but Fulkerson, on Jackson's left, behind the stone fence, met it with a withering fire, at short range, and the two attacking regiments were repulsed with severe loss and broke to the rear, the One Hundred and Tenth Pennsylvania so demoralized as to be of no further use that day. Tyler, with his other regiments, soon renewed the attack, which Fulkerson again repulsed from his front, but which fiercely continued for two hours in front of Garnett. Shields says of it: "Here the struggle became desperate, and for a short time doubtful."Observing that the great contention was now on his right, and that there was no fighting force to detain him on the left, Kimball hastened six of his and Sullivan's regiments to Tyler's left, extending his line so that in advancing it would overlap Jackson's right and turn that flank. Jackson made heroic efforts to meet this superior force, inciting his thin line of weary veterans to stubborn resistance, bringing up the Fifth Virginia, which had been held in reserve, ordering up the Forty-second and sending for the Forty-eighth, which had been left to guard his train, that he might throw the last man and the last gun into the final struggle. Tyler did not wait for Jackson to get even these small additions to his force, but with added strength, again led forward his men and by their vigorous charge, the front of which fell on Garnett, caused the Confederate line to waver, and then, by order of its brigadier, to fall back.Jackson, who was directing the artillery on his right and forcing back the advancing Federals, knew nothing of this order, and was highly indignant, when, just about dark, his army, which he tried in vain to rally, swept by him in retreat. Fulkerson was easily holding his position on the left when Garnett's retreat exposed his right and forced him to retreat, stubbornly fighting the superior numbers now rushing to attack him. The Fifth Virginia was coming to his relief in this emergency when Garnett, ordered that also to retreat, but Jackson met and halted it in the edge of a wood in rear of his former position, and ordered the retreating infantry to form behind that. The Forty second, coming up, was placed on the right of the Fifth. These regiments and some batteries resisted the enemy's advance, twice repulsing their attacks, and gave the retreating men opportunity to rally and other batteries time to withdraw. By extending their lines the Federals finally forced these regiments from the field.The mass of the Confederate army retreated along Sandy ridge for some distance, then took a road leading to the Valley. turnpike, and then, slowly but sullenly, retired five or six miles to their trains in the vicinity of Newtown, having lost 691 men, of whom 80 were killed, 340 wounded (some 70 of these left on the field) and 260 missing. The Federals held the field of battle, captured two disabled guns and 200 or 300 prisoners. They made no pursuit, and Jackson's rear spent the night where his command had massed in the afternoon. Six days after the battle Shields was uncertain as to his losses, but reported his killed as 103, the wounded as 441, and the missing as 24, a total of 568.The day after the battle the citizens of Winchester, mainly men past middle age, obtained permission to bury the Confederate dead, and its noble women did all they were allowed to do in caring for the wounded. Jackson firmly believed that his failure was the result of the retreat ordered by General Garnett, and circumstances, months afterward, showed that he continued in that belief. To teach his subordinates a lesson, and to show them and others what he expected should be done under similar circumstances, he placed Garnett under arrest and relieved him from his command. For this he has been censured by writers ignorant of the facts in the case. Those who knew Jackson can testify that in this case, as in others for which he has been blamed, he was not animated by animosity or personal feeling. After the Seven Days' battles, Garnett was released from arrest and subsequently fell at Gettysburg leading a brigade.On the 24th Jackson retired to the south side of Cedar creek and then fell back to his former camps near Mt. Jackson, holding the line of Stony creek which his engineer, after a careful examination, had recommended as the best one for defense in all that region.Shields, confident that Jackson would not have brought on such an engagement without expecting reinforcements, hastened, the night after the battle, to bring together all the troops within his reach; Williams was recalled from his march toward Manassas, with the request that his rear brigade, already 20 miles away, should march all night and rejoin him on the morning of the 24th. He gathered all the men he could find in his rear to join him by forced night marches. Banks was halted, on his way to Washington, at Harper's Ferry. He promptly ordered back all of Williams' division and returned at once to Winchester, retaining Sedgwick at Harper's Ferry. Jackson's prompt action and bold attack had completely changed McClellan's plans, and instead of establishing Banks near Manassas with 20,000 men, he ordered him to remain in the Valley with all these forces and sent him 10,000 more, detached from his own army, to aid in driving back Jackson or to meet another anticipated attack.McClellan sent his orders to Banks on the 1st day of April, from the steamer on which he was just starting to join his command at Fortress Monroe. Disquieted by what had happened, Lincoln ordered the retention of McDowell's corps in front of Washington until further orders. On the 1st of April, 73,456 men and 109 cannon were held for the defense of that city. Of these, 18,000 were in the forts around Washington, 1,350 along the Potomac above that city, 10,859 at Manassas, 7,780 at Warrenton, and 35,467 (including the 10,000 under Blenker ordered to him) were with Banks in the Shenandoah valley. When Lincoln, on the 3d of April, detained McDowell's corps, it was, as he informed McClellan on the 9th, because he feared that the Confederates might turn back from the Rappahannock and sack Washington. On the 4th, McDowell was put in command of the forces between the Blue ridge and Fredericksburg, including those in the defenses of Washington; his command, thus made independent of McClellan, was called the department of the Rappahannock; Banks was placed in command of the department of the Shenandoah, including that valley and its extension into Maryland, and Fremont was put in command of the Mountain department, embracing the Appalachian region west of the Valley.Jackson established his headquarters at Woodstock March 24th, at Narrow Passage the 26th, and at Hawkinstown on the 29th. Banks made an advance on the 1st of April and forced Ashby's pickets back to Edinburg, on the line of Stony creek, which Jackson had decided to hold. He established his headquarters at Rude's hill, April 2d, and there remained until the 17th, when the Federals again moved forward in force, occupying himself, as well as the cold and raw weather, with snow and rain would permit, in recruiting and drilling his troops, marching them back and forth, almost daily, from their camps to the line of Stony creek, and otherwise keeping them in fighting trim, doing all in his power to get to his command the regiments of Virginia militia that had been ordered to him from the counties of Augusta and Rockingham in the Shenandoah valley. He was greatly aided in reorganizing his army by the anticipated general conscription bill, placing all the able-bodied men of the country, between eighteen and thirty-five years of age, in the military service, which became a law on the 16th of April, as patriotic Virginians preferred to volunteer rather than be conscripted.When Banks again began his forward movement, on the 17th of April, he captured some of Ashby's outposts, but that fearless trooper turned on him at every favorable opportunity, and forced him to contend for every mile he made up the valley. Jackson retired before the oncoming enemy and reached Harrisonburg, 25 miles beyond Mt. Jackson, during the morning of the 18th. To the east of this town the Massanutton mountains, beginning opposite Strasburg and dividing the middle section of the Shenandoah valley into two parts, drop off abruptly and the valley widens to near 30 miles between the North mountain and the Blue ridge. Sending all his surplus trains and his tents on to Staunton, with orders to burn the Valley Turnpike bridge at Mt. Crawford after these had crossed the North river of the Shenandoah, Jackson, at Harrisonburg, turned abruptly to the left, abandoning the Valley turnpike and taking the one leading from Harrisonburg around the southwestern end of the Massanutton mountains to Conrad's store, and thence across the Blue ridge, by Swift Run gap, to Gordonsville, halting the night of the 18th at Peale's cross roads, six miles from Harrisonburg, and the next day crossing the main Shenandoah to camps on Elk run near the western entrance to Swift Run gap of the Blue ridge; thus placing himself in a thoroughly secure position, where he could easily hold the road leading to Ewell's division, of Johnston's army, which had fallen back and was holding the line of the Rapidan, taking the precaution of sending to burn the bridges across the South Fork Shenandoah in the eastern, or Page valley, below him.When Banks learned of Jackson's unexpected movement to the left, he informed his government that he believed Jackson had abandoned the valley. Continuing his tardy pursuit, his cavalry entered Harrisonburg on the 22nd of April and part of his infantry on the 26th. Looking out at the broadly widening valley before him, recalling that his base of supplies was nearly 100 miles in his rear by a wagon road, and uncertain as to what had become of his elusive foe, he hesitated what to do and asked for instructions.Jackson, in his secure position but with his men exposed in open bivouacs to the snow, rain and sleet that made memorable the closing days of April, completed the reorganization of his army, received additions by enlistments and the Tenth Virginia, ordered to him from Ewell's division, increasing his force to near 6,000 men; in the meantime stimulating Ashby to keep Banks busy guarding his encampment and his long line of communication to his rear, which presented so many favorable points of attack to the horsemen of the Valley who knew all its byways as well as its highways and the sally-ports to these from the mountains on either side. He had his engineers, as well as his cavalry, on the outlook for opportunities to attack any exposed positions occupied by Banks. On the 28th, Jackson appealed to Lee, now the acting commander-in-chief of the Confederate forces, to let Ewell's command cross the' Blue ridge and join him, that thus reinforced he might march out and attack Banks and drive him back down the Valley, suggesting also that some additional men could be spared him from the force covering Fredericksburg. General Lee was favorably impressed with Jackson's suggestion, writing, that "a decisive and successful blow at Banks' column would be fraught with the happiest results, but regretting that the large force of the enemy now threatening Fredericksburg would not admit of the withdrawal of troops from that line, but suggesting that he might combine the forces of Ewell and Edward Johnson with his own, if he thought that by so doing he could hold Banks in check. Jackson gladly accepted Lee's suggestions, and, at his headquarters at Conrad's store, in the Elk Run valley, worked out his plan of operations.When Jackson retired from Harrisonburg, on the 19th, to the Blue ridge, and left the road to Staunton, 25 miles by the Valley turnpike, uncovered, Edward Johnson's command, consisting of six regiments of infantry, three batteries and a small force of cavalry, in all about 3,000 fighting men, fell back to West View, 7 miles west of Staunton, to be prepared for any movement Banks might make in that direction; the two brigades of Milroy and Schenck, of Fremont's command, that had been opposing Johnson, following him up and establishing a Federal advance at the eastern foot of the Shenandoah mountain, about 20 miles west of Staunton.There was no enemy in front of Ewell to prevent his joining Jackson, as McDowell's army, now that all threatened danger of an attack on Washington was apparently removed, had been diverted toward Fredericksburg. It was different with Edward Johnson's force. That could not be removed without endangering Staunton, a base of supplies for Lee's as well as Jackson's army; that town was also on the important line of railway leading to Richmond. This condition of things compelled Jackson to strike his first blow at Fremont's advance under Milroy, and thus release Johnson's command for co-operating with his. Only common country roads led from Jackson's camp, along the western foot of the Blue ridge, to Staunton, and these were rendered almost impassable by the well-nigh continuous wet weather and the freezings and thawings that characterized that season. To solve this difficulty, and at the same time to effectually cover his strategic movement, Jackson, after having had the roads examined and ascertained that he could secure railway transportation, decided to march his own army along the foot of the Blue ridge, some 18 miles, to the vicinity of Port Republic, the way for most of the distance leading through fiat woods, and there take the turnpike across the Blue ridge to Meechum's River station of the Virginia Central railroad, whence, by the aid of the railway, he could speedily transfer his command to Staunton and join Johnson, just beyond, in a rapid movement that would unexpectedly fall upon and demoralize Fremont's advance; arranging that Ewell's division should cross the Blue ridge and occupy the camps at Elk run even before he left their vicinity. To cover the changes decided on and deceive Banks, Jackson, on the 29th of April, sent Ashby, reinforced by infantry and artillery, to make a demonstration in front of Harrisonburg, sending Captain Hotchkiss, of the engineers, to the peak of the Massanutton mountains during the previous night, to observe the effect of the movement, as this outlook commanded a full view of Banks' camp, and regulate the movements of Ashby by signal. His-whole army followed after Ashby, thus clearing his camps, which Ewell, crossing the Blue ridge the same day, occupied immediately after. Banks sent his trains to the rear and formed a line of battle on a very advantageous position, but made no attack. His object accomplished, late in the day Jackson countermarched to Conrad's store, but instead of going into his former camps, as his men expected, he turned up the river, just as a driving rain began, and marched several miles in the direction of Port Republic before going into camp. Jackson and his staff rode a dozen miles to "Lewiston," the home of Gen. S. H. Lewis, for the night. Ashby's cavalry covered and concealed the movement by advancing along the roads on the western side of the Shenandoah.During the whole of May 1st and 2d all of Jackson's command was engaged in an arduous struggle in getting his trains and artillery through the rain, the mud and the quicksands between their camp of the night of the 30th and Port Republic, 12 miles distant. The 3d proved a genuine sunny May day and the troops marched rapidly over the hard, well-graded road across the Blue ridge, and Saturday night found their advance at Meechum's River station of the Virginia Central railroad. The next day, the troops that had reached the railway were conveyed by train to Staunton, while those in the rear marched to the nearer Afton station, to which the cars returned for them. The artillery and army trains took the country road to Staunton, recrossing the Blue ridge at Rockfish gap. The despair of the citizens of Staunton when apprised that Jackson had left the valley was unexpectedly turned into joy, when, just as the church bells were ringing for the Sunday morning service, the trains rolled in with the advance of Jackson's army, all of which was there concentrated by the afternoon of the 5th. Taking the next day for rest and to settle with the Lord of the Sabbath for the day that had, of necessity incurred from bad roads, been taken for a march, Jackson was ready to move against the enemy on the morning of the 7th. During the afternoon of the previous day Johnson marched his brigade from his camps at West View, through Buffalo gap and up the eastern slope of Big North mountain, and at dusk rested his advance, in bivouac, in Dry Branch gap or Notch, of that mountain, 15 miles west of Staunton. Milroy's advance was encamped near the eastern foot of Shenandoah mountain, across the Big Calf Pasture valley, in sight of Johnson's pickets. Jackson's engineers had previously conferred with Johnson, after a reconnaissance of the Federal advance, and it had been agreed that Johnson should send a flanking party, by a detour to the left, in advance of his front attack, to fall upon the rear of Milroy's camp.Learning from his spies that a junction had been made between the forces of Jackson and Johnson, Milroy ordered his detachments to concentrate at McDowell, and calling for reinforcements from Fremont, who was advancing up the South Branch valley, he prepared to make a stand. When Johnson's flanking party reached Milroy's previous camp they found there only a picket, the most of which was captured. Jackson, by rapid riding from Staunton, was early on the ground at Rodgers', at the foot of the Shenandoah mountain, 23 miles from Staunton, and under his personal direction the pursuit was continued across that mountain to Shaw's Fork, the Federal artillery opposing a further advance from the crest of Shaw's ridge. The march was resumed early on the morning of the 8th, Johnson's regiments still in advance. The enemy had retreated during the night, and Jackson met with no opposition in crossing Shaw's ridge, the Cow Pasture valley and the western slope of Bull Pasture mountain, the summit of which was reached early in the forenoon. From a projecting rock on the right of the road Jackson was enabled to see the camp and the position taken by the enemy across the Bull Pasture river, on the terraces and bottoms of that valley in the vicinity of McDowell; while his engineer, who was familiar with the locality, sketched for him the topography and the approaches to the Federal position, which were partly concealed by a forest along the eastern bluffs of the river. Generals Jackson and Johnson then rode up into the fields on the undulating top of the mountain, on the left, and from that locality further reconnoitered the ground Milroy had chosen for defense, observing at the same time arrangements for placing a battery on a cleared spur to the northeast of McDowell. Noticing this group of horsemen with but a line of skirmishers to protect them, Milroy sent a flanking party up the mountain side, through the woods on his right, to try and capture these officers. Johnson reinforced his skirmishers and after a lively engagement the enemy retired. Concluding from this, and the appearance of things in the Federal camp, that no further attack would be made that day, Jackson gave instructions for the posting of Johnson's brigade in rear of the fields on the summit of the mountain south of the turnpike, and ordered the opening of a road by which artillery could be taken to the same position, expecting to attack the enemy the next morning unless they should attack him in his chosen position. At the same time he desired to await the movements of a flanking column. which he had sent around to the left into the Bull Pasture valley, to ascend that valley and fall upon Milroy's right while he attacked in front. With these arrangements made and Johnson's brigade in position for attack or defense, and Taliaferro's and Campbell's brigades near at hand, Jackson sent his staff back to headquarters, at Wilson's on the Cow Pasture, intending himself soon to follow for refreshments and rest. In the meantime Schenck's brigade, which had left Franklin at 11 a.m. of the preceding day, had covered 34 miles in twenty-three hours and reached McDowell at 10 a.m. of the 8th, thus adding some 1,300 infantry, a battery of artillery and about 250 cavalry to Milroy's command, now in charge of the former as the senior in rank.Informed by his scouts and skirmishers that the Confederate force was increasing and that there were indications of the moving of a flanking party, Milroy, with the approval of Schenck, at about half past three in the afternoon of the 8th, formed and moved forward a line of battle, composed of portions of his own and of Schenck's brigade, across the Bull Pasture and up the slope of Sitlington's hill, as the part of the mountain held by Johnson was called, to seize that hill and drive the Confederates from it. A skirt of woods concealed his initial movement, but as soon as his skirmishers appeared in the bushy field, Jackson, who was still on the lookout, ordered up four regiments of Johnson's brigade which had been halted in concealment along the turnpike. He deployed the Fifty-second Virginia as skirmishers and advanced them to engage the enemy; posting in their rear, in the center of his position on the summit of the hill, the Twelfth Georgia, and on its right the Forty-fourth Virginia. The Fifty-eighth Virginia was marched to the left to support the Fifty-second. The Confederate line then formed an arc of a circle, with its convexity toward the enemy so that its right was nearly perpendicular to its left. As the Federal skirmishers, in line of battle, advancing up the mountain side, came in sight they became engaged with Johnson's skirmishers. Two Federal regiments attacked the Confederate left, advancing boldly and steadily and pushing back the skirmish line until they became engaged with the line of battle in a fierce struggle on the brow of the hill. In the meantime, Milroy had sent two Ohio and a West Virginia regiment to attack and attempt to turn the Confederate right. The two Ohio regiments vigorously attacked Johnson's right, while the West Virginia one pushed up the turnpike to accomplish the purpose for which it was sent. Anticipating such a movement, Jackson had placed the Thirty-first Virginia on the turnpike below the point where the Confederates had climbed to Sitlington's hill. The attack on Johnson's right led Jackson to withdraw the Thirty-first from guarding the turnpike and send that and the Twenty-fifth Virginia to Johnson, who placed them in support of the Forty-fourth on his right, thus extending his line not only across the field on Sitlington's hill, but down the slope of that hill northward toward the turnpike. Jackson then committed the guarding of the turnpike to the Twenty-first Virginia. Milroy next ordered two cannon and a force along the turnpike, but their attack amounted to nothing. The main contention was with Johnson's right by the combined attack of all the Federal forces that had climbed up the mountain side. Again and again were the brave attacks of the Ohio and West Virginia troops repulsed in their efforts to drive the Confederates from the crest of the hill; the issue being joined at close quarters while the musketry firing was incessant. The Confederates had some little advantage of position, and the uneven ground, such as is characteristic of most limestone regions, gave them some advantage, but, on the other hand, facing to the west as they did, they were clearly outlined against the eastern sky, and so were plain targets for the Federals, who were themselves advancing not only up the slope but in the shadows of the waning day; consequently the Confederates suffered terribly from the long range rifles of the Federals, especially the Twelfth Georgia, which became the special object of attack, but which unflinchingly held its position and drove back its assailants.(From The Confederate Military History, Volume 3, Chapter XIV)The attack all along Johnson's line, even as extended by some of Jackson's men, indicated that the Federal leader was throwing all his force into this engagement. This led Jackson to order Taliaferro's brigade to Johnson's aid; when this reached him, he placed the Twenty. third and Thirty-seventh Virginia regiments near the center of his line, and advanced them to reinforce the gallant Twelfth Georgia, just in time to promptly meet the movement of the enemy on the Confederate right and drive it back. To still further strengthen his right, Johnson sent portions of the Twenty-fifth and Thirty-first Virginia regiments to occupy an elevated piece of woods on his right and rear, thus securing a commanding position. Campbell's brigade, which Jackson had hastened toward the field of carnage, came up about this time, and that and the Tenth Virginia, from Taliaferro's rear, were also ordered to support Johnson's right in the woods down the slope of the spur toward the turnpike. These arrangements thwarted all the enemy's movements, and by securing the larger tactical force on the immediate field of action made certain the result of the conflict.The battle lasted from half past four until half past eight of the afternoon. Every movement of the enemy was promptly met and defeated, and Johnson held firmly to his first position. Jackson had no hesitancy in leaving the immediate field of contention in charge of the hero of Alleghany mountain, but taking no chances, he located himself on the turnpike, where it crosses the top of the mountain, to watch the right, guard the roads which were concealed from Johnson, and at the same time hurry forward reinforcements, having promptly ordered his whole army forward to meet any emergency. Late in the day General Johnson was wounded in the arm and had to retire from the field, leaving Taliaferro in immediate command. Learning from Johnson, as he was taken, badly wounded, to the rear, the condition of things on the field of battle, he quickly ordered Taliaferro, now left in command, through a staff officer, to hold his position at all hazards, and he would soon be there with the Stonewall brigade to help him, if necessary. But the conflict was then over, and Milroy had become satisfied that he was no match for his antagonist, so in the coming darkness he withdrew to McDowell and Schenck hastened to retreat toward Franklin, where he expected to meet Fremont, with the main body of his command, coming up the South Branch valley.The Federal artillery placed on the terrace to the south of McDowell was quite active, but uselessly so, prior to the advance of its infantry, because of the elevation of the position held by the Confederates. A single gun on Hull's hill, a spur of the mountain opposite the Federal left, did a little damage but not much. The Confederates that did the fighting were five Virginia regiments and one Georgia of Johnson's brigade, and three Virginia regiments of Taliaferro's brigade, about 4,500 men. They were supported by the three Virginia regiments and the Irish battalion of Campbell's brigade, but which did not become engaged; making the Confederate force on the immediate battlefield about 6,000 men. Of these, 71 were killed and 390 wounded. Milroy's force that took part in the battle was, parts of four Ohio and two West Virginia regiments, and parts of two Ohio batteries, in all about 2,500 men, who, considering the disparity of forces, made a most determined and brave fight. Schenck reported the losses as 28 killed, 225 wounded and 3 missing.Jackson prepared himself to renew the conflict on the morrow unless the Federals did it, arranging to have his artillery in position on Sitlington's hill by daylight and his whole army closed up and ready for action, issuing strict orders to those in advance to be on the alert to detect any movement of the enemy. Schenck, satisfied that Jackson, from his position, could very soon make McDowell untenable, evacuated that place early in the night, after lighting his camp-fires and making a show of remaining there, and fell back during the night in the direction of Franklin.On the morning of the 9th, Jackson sent a laconic dispatch to General Cooper, the adjutant-general of the Confederate States at Richmond, saying, "God blessed our arms with victory at McDowell yesterday;" then mounting his horse at dawn, he rode in the keen and frosty air to the summit of the mountain, there to learn from officers he had sent in advance to reconnoiter that his enemy had fled. He at once took possession of McDowell and proceeded to close up and ration his men preparatory to a pursuit. Following the road to Monterey for a few miles from McDowell, Schenck turned to the northeast, by the road to Franklin, resting his wearied men for a short time when his rear guard reached the junction of the two roads on the morning of the 9th, but moving on before Jackson could close up on his rear. A retreat is easily managed in a narrow valley and through a wooded country like that which Schenck was traversing, so he was able to make Jackson's pursuit on the l0th a slow one; but the latter managed to press the Federal rear, and on the 11th came very near to it in the vicinity of Franklin, although impeded by the smoke and flames from the forests that hemmed in the road, which his crafty foe had set on fire.During the march on the l0th, Jackson sent Captain Hotchkiss, of the engineers, to ride rapidly back to the Valley and there take a cavalry company which had been left on guard, and blockade the North river and the Dry river gaps of the Shenandoah mountain, by either of which Fremont might cross from the South-Branch valley and join Banks in the Shenandoah valley, at or near Harrisonburg, Jackson's positive orders being that these roads must be blockaded by daylight of the 11th. The execution of this order required a ride of over 60 miles during the afternoon and night of the loth, but the order was executed, and when Lincoln telegraphed to Fremont to make the move Jackson had said to his engineer he should make (although he did not think he would), the reply was, that the road was blockaded and he could not do it.Having advanced to within two miles of Franklin and finding Schenck in a very strong position which could only be reached by a combat at a disadvantage in a gap of the mountain, and ascertaining that Fremont was near at hand with large reinforcements, and being very desirous of getting back to the Valley to look after Banks' army, and that he might also be at hand to respond to a call from General Lee, Jackson, after resting his army, fell back toward the Valley on Monday, May 12th, leaving a company of cavalry to look after Fremont's army of from 15,000 to 20,000 men enveloped in the smoke of the burning forests, which had now become Jackson's ally instead of his foe.Having used the previous Sunday, or a part of it, in the pursuit of his enemy, Jackson devoted the forenoon of Monday, May 12th, to Sunday observances as well as to rest, and issued the following order to his troops:Soldiers of the Army of the Valley and Northwest: I congratulate you on your recent victory at McDowell. I request you to unite with me this morning in thanksgiving to Almighty God for thus having crowned our arms with success, and in praying that He will continue to lead you on from victory to victory until our independence shall be established and make us that people whose God is the Lord. The chaplains will hold divine service at 10 a.m. this day in their respective regiments.Leaving the front of Franklin on the afternoon of May 12th, Jackson's army reached McDowell on the afternoon of the 14th, at about the same time that Fremont arrived in Franklin with reinforcements for Schenck, and where he remained quietly for the next ten days, leaving Jackson free to prosecute his intentions. Continuing his march from McDowell, Jackson encamped on the night of the 15th at Lebanon Springs, in the Big Calf Pasture valley, where the Warm Springs and Harrisonburg turnpike crosses the Parkersburg and Staunton turnpike, giving his troops opportunity to speculate as to his next movement while he rested there on the 16th to observe the day of fasting and prayer which had been proclaimed by the President of the Confederate States.While on his way back from Franklin, Jackson sent a message to Ewell asking him to meet him for a conference, which took place at Mt. Solon on the evening of the next day, the 17th, on which the army marched with alacrity down the valley, its advance reaching North river, opposite Bridgewater, the troops in high spirits in anticipation of a victorious movement. Sunday, the 18th, was spent resting in camps in one of the most delightsome portions of the Shenandoah valley, its charms heightened by the full flush of springtime, and in religious observances; the general himself tiding to the camp of the Stonewall brigade, on the south bank of North river, where his adjutant-general, Maj. R. L. Dabney (a revered doctor of the Presbyterian church), preached a soul-stirring sermon.Nineteen days had now elapsed since Jackson left Ewell in his old camps in the Elk Run valley. Learning that Jackson had been reinforced by Ewell, although probably not informed as to Jackson's movements to attack Fremont's advance, Banks evacuated Harrisonburg on the 1st of May and withdrew to New Market, whence, after detaching Shields' division to march toward Luray, on the way to join McDowell's "on to Richmond," he continued down the valley to Strasburg, which he proceeded to fortify, in compliance with his first orders from McClellan. Shields left New Market May 12th, after the departure of Banks, with orders to march by way of Luray and Front Royal toward Fredericksburg, taking with him about 11,000 men and leaving Banks about 8,000; of this number, the latter placed 1,000 at and near Front Royal, on May 16th, to protect the Manassas Gap railroad, the bridges of that road, and the bridges of the turnpike leading to Winchester, in that vicinity; in this also obeying McClellan's original orders.With Fremont's large command safely disposed of at Franklin and the large force of Shields removed from the valley, Jackson found himself possessed of a larger tactic force than Banks had in hand, after he had arranged with Ewell, with the consent of General Lee, to join him in a movement on Banks, holding now the portal of the western part of the Shenandoah valley at Strasburg with the aid of defensive works.On May 17th, the day Jackson's advance reached North river at Bridgewater and was again fairly in the Valley, with Ewell's division only some 20 miles away to the east, as the crow flies, the Federal authorities ordered McDowell to move upon Richmond, as soon as Shields' division should join him, to become the right wing of McClellan's army, now in front and in sight of that city, but always holding himself in position "to cover the capital of the nation against the sudden dash by any large body of the rebel forces."On the morning of the 19th, Jackson advanced to the vicinity of Harrisonburg, and on the 20th continued to near New Market, a portion of Ewell's command, which had marched around the southwest end of the Massanutton mountains, joining him on the way while the rest of his division marched down the eastern, or Page valley, to opposite New Market. Ashby, under instructions, demonstrated all along Banks' front, which held the line of Pugh's run with cavalry pickets, below Woodstock, while Jackson proceeded, with urgent expedition to maneuver Banks from his position at Strasburg by capturing his exposed left at Front Royal, and, that turned, reaching his rear somewhere between Strasburg and Winchester. The great Massanutton chain not only screened, but absolutely concealed and protected this movement.On the 21st, Jackson crossed the Massanuttons by the turnpike leading from New Market, to Luray, and being joined on the road by the portion of Ewell's division that had followed down the eastern valley, he, with between 16,000 and 17,000 men and 48 guns, encamped that evening on the South Fork of the Shenandoah. On the 22nd, with Ewell in advance, he marched quietly, but rapidly, down the Luray valley and bivouacked his advance within 10 miles of Front Royal.On Friday morning, May 23rd, the cavalry of Ashby and Flournoy, which had preceded the army, crossed the South Fork of the Shenandoah at McCoy's ford, and, following along the eastern foot of the Massanuttons by a road between that mountain and the river, soon reached a fork of the road, where it divided into two bodies, one under Flournoy proceeding down between the rivers to capture the bridges at the fork and prevent a retreat of the Federals at Front Royal toward Winchester, while the other under Ashby, moving farther to the left, was to cut the railroad and telegraph at Buckton, between Front Royal and Strasburg, thus breaking communication between those places and preventing the sending of reinforcements to the latter. In order to flank the enemy's position at Front Royal, concerning which he was well informed through Ashby's local scouts, and prevent a retreat eastward across the Blue ridge, Jackson, when his advance reached Asbury chapel on the river road, 4 miles from Front Royal, turned the head of his main body eastward, by a by-road up the slope of the Blue ridge, until he reached the turnpike leading from Gooney Manor to Front Royal, which was well up on the side of the mountain and led into the eastern side of the town. That road reached, the head of his column, consisting of the First Maryland Confederate regiment and a Louisiana battalion, supported by Taylor's Louisiana brigade, advanced rapidly into and through the town to the camp of the Federal forces which were mainly Maryland troops with two pieces of artillery, on a hill between Front Royal and the Shenandoah, overlooking the forks of the river and near the railway and turnpike bridges which they were specially guarding. Two companies of cavalry had just arrived from Strasburg in time to resist the Confederate advance. The Federal opposition was spirited, but being attacked in front by the force that first reached them, and then in flank by one that Ewell had turned to the left from his command, and discovering the advance of Flournoy's Confederate cavalry between the rivers that would soon block his way toward Winchester, Colonel Kenly, the Federal commander, abandoned his position before the infantry closed down upon him, and retreated across the two rivers, firing his camp and attempting to fire the bridges. The Confederates pressed him so closely that he did but little damage to the bridge over the South Fork, but did sufficient to that over the North Fork to check the pursuit. Having gained the commanding bluff of Guard hill, beyond the rivers, which the road to Winchester crosses, Kenly attempted to further check the Confederate advance with the artillery that he had brought off, but Flournoy's cavalry soon dashed through the river, after a few shots from a Confederate battery had driven off the Federal artillery, and continued the pursuit. Covering his retreat with two companies of New York cavalry, Kenly hurried toward Winchester. With invincible ardor Flournoy pressed after him with his four companies of cavalry, charged and routed Kenly's cavalry rear guard, and came upon the rear of his infantry, which he found drawn up on either side of the road with his artillery in the road to meet him. Jackson had joined in the pursuit, and, inspired by his presence and enthusiastic bearing, Flournoy did not hesitate to attack the enemy's artillery and infantry in position, but dashed upon and routed them. They rallied again and made a gallant stand in an orchard in the rear of the position from which they had been driven; but this stand was in vain; they had become thoroughly demoralized and so magnified Flournoy's troopers into an army of 'horsemen, when they dashed among them with the assurance of victory and scattered them, in wild disorder, but taking most of them prisoners when they threw down their arms and surrendered. Reinforced by the coming of two more of his companies, Flournoy pushed the pursuit to within four miles of Winchester, capturing one gun near the fighting ground and soon after the wagon train and the other gun, abandoned in the road, sending the latter back with two plough horses taken from a farmer's field.The victory was complete. A large quantity of stores was captured in Front Royal; the Federal camp was taken; the wagon bridges across the two rivers were saved for the passage of the Confederate army and its trains and artillery, and 904 of the enemy made the list of killed, wounded and captured, while the Confederate loss was but 26 killed and wounded. Ashby's movement had been successful, he having reached Buckton before the enemy were aware of the move on Front Royal, and cut the telegraph and railway, capturing the blockhouse guarding that station, after a spirited resistance, his attacking party being the troopers from that immediate vicinity; his attack turned back a train of cars, which was captured near Front Royal.Late in the day Jackson established headquarters at Cedarville, some 5 miles from Front Royal on the road to Winchester, near the scene of the last conflict between Flournoy and Kenly, where a country road leaves the Front Royal and Winchester pike and leads to the Valley turnpike at Middletown, some 8 miles in the rear of Banks' position at Strasburg, which he was firmly holding in anticipation of a front attack while Jackson was successfully turning his left, at Front Royal, routing and capturing his men and cutting his communications with Manassas and Washington, concerning which he had no information until after nightfall, attaching but little importance to the message which Kenly sent him by a courier, informing him that an overwhelming force had descended from the Blue ridge on his position at Front Royal. Jackson and his staff slept near the picket line, on the ground in the front yard of McCoy's house at Cedarville, while his army bivouacked along the road between that place and Front Royal.By the dawn of Saturday, May 24th, Jackson was on the alert, pushing his cavalry scouts forward toward Winchester and to points along the Valley turnpike between that place and Middletown, dispatching his topographical engineer toward the latter place to find out the movements of the enemy. That officer soon struck the Federal pickets, within less than a mile of where Jackson had bivouacked, and following after these were cavalry, infantry and artillery that he had successively sent for, he reached the vicinity of Middletown early in the day in time to cut Banks' retreating column just a: Jackson himself came up with a larger force, which he formed into two bodies, one pushing after Banks' men retreating toward Winchester, and the other following those that fell back toward Strasburg when they found their line of march interrupted at Middletown. This latter body destroyed the bridge as they crossed Cedar creek, thus checking the Confederate pursuit, and then hastened through Strasburg and retreated by the Strasburg and Capon road and by the Winchester and Capon road, through the mountains to Winchester, which they reached during the night. These disposed of, Jackson reunited his men and pressed toward Winchester, having ordered Ewell's division forward along the Front Royal and Winchester road on which he was constantly coming nearer and nearer to Banks' line of retreat, as that road and the Valley turnpike converged toward Winchester. Brig. Gen. George H. Steuart, who had been temporarily placed in command of the Second and Sixth Virginia cavalry, was sent in advance of Ewell to Newtown, 8 miles from Winchester, to observe the enemy's movements. There he attacked the flank of Banks' retreat and made some captures of prisoners, wagons and ambulances.Banks, now fully realizing his perilous situation, and alarmed at the rapid and incomprehensible movements of Jackson, and realizing that his only safety was in flight, retreated, pressed in rear and flank. as rapidly as possible toward Winchester, making vigorous efforts to ward off the Confederate attacks; constantly strengthening his rear guard and right flank for that purpose, ordering back, among others, a New York and a Massachusetts regiment, under the brave Col. George Gordon, an intimate classmate of Jackson at West Point, with two sections of artillery, from Bartonsville to Newtown. Gordon checked the confusion in the rear and boldly drove back the Confederate advance, aided by the considerable cavalry force that General Hatch brought around the Confederate left to his assistance. Apprised of the near presence of Ewell on his right flank and that the Federal infantry cut off at Strasburg had escaped Gordon fell back from Newtown at dusk, steadily resisting Jackson's pursuit, burning loaded commissary wagons and a pontoon train in and beyond Newtown, and reaching Winchester about midnight, leaving the Second Massachusetts infantry as a rear guard. With this Jackson, with regiment after regiment of the Stonewall brigade, contended during all the night, its leader, Lieutenant-Colonel Andrews, taking advantage of the darkness and of the stone fences along the turnpike, hotly and courageously disputed every mile of the way with Jackson's advance, led by that indomitable leader in person, who was anxious to occupy the heights overlooking Winchester before dawn of the next day. Ewell, keeping even pace with Jackson's movements, but rather in advance of them, brought his command, on the Front Royal road, to within two or three miles of Winchester, then bivouacked along that road, thus preventing any retreat of Banks to the eastward. Steuart's cavalry moved still farther to the right and occupied the roads leading to Millwood and Berryville from Winchester.Banks was in a state of uncertainty, until he reached Winchester, as to what had actually happened to him; but soon learning that all of his detachments had been routed and that a large force was pressing after his main column, he became satisfied that Jackson was upon him with overwhelming numbers; and although the day before he had concluded that his safety lay "in a foot race," he decided, on the morning of May 25th, that he would stand an attack "to test the substance and strength of the enemy by actual collision." He had at Winchester about 6,400 men for duty, including infantry, cavalry and artillery, while Jackson, by his magnificent strategy, was confronting him with a tactic force of near 15,000 of all arms.Banks selected a fine defensive position in front of Winchester. The gallant Gordon, with his brave New Englanders and western men and one Pennsylvania regiment, was placed by Banks on a low ridge, sloping gently to the south but abruptly to the north, just in front of the town, with its left on the Valley turnpike and its right extending westward along the ascending ridge in front of Winchester, while skirmishers were thrown out in advance and guns were placed on either flank. Hatch's cavalry supported the center. Donnell's brigade, of Connecticut, New York and Pennsylvania troops, was placed on the left of the turnpike and extended around to the eastward of Winchester, covering the Front Royal and Millwood roads, with eight pieces of artillery in a commanding position; the Federal line, forming the are of a circle, covering Winchester from the west around by the south to the east.Jackson, personally, had with his Valley men pressed, with all the energy at his command, the pursuit of the Federal army, and just at dawn he discovered the coveted position in front of Winchester occupied by the enemy. He promptly ordered Winder, of the Stonewall brigade, to drive them from this position as speedily as possible, first taking possession of a commanding crest in the enemy's front, from which Gordon promptly moved the Second Massachusetts further to his right to lengthen his line and guard against the threatened flank attack. Jackson massed his abundant artillery and opened fire on the Federal guns in place, extended his left by ordering up Taylor with his Louisianians, who, passing behind Winder, formed on his left, overlapping the Federal right. He sent the Tenth Virginia to extend Taylor's line still further to the left, and the Twenty-third to promptly strengthen his right. This formidable battle array soon moved forward, regardless of the enemy's destructive fire of musketry and artillery, swept them from the crest of the hill down the steep to the northward and across the fields and through the town of Winchester, bearing down all opposition, cheered forward by old men and matrons, maidens and children who crowded the sides of the streets as the Confederate veterans swept through them in pursuit of the retreating Federals. Jackson, cap in hand, dashed to the front, cheering as wildly as the men that followed him, and when cautioned that he was rushing into the midst of the retreating foe, said to the officer who cautioned him, "Go back, and tell the whole army to press forward to the Potomac," in utter forgetfulness of the fact that that army had been fighting and marching almost without rest for the past thirty hours.Ewell was not standing idly by while this contest was raging. He had encamped in the immediate presence of the enemy, and when daylight came, on the 25th, he moved forward, and at 5 a.m. his North Carolinians, under Kirkland, boldly dashed on Donnell's line, stretched across the Front Royal road. These met with a hot reception, for the Federals were posted behind stone fences at right angles to the road, and Kirkland was forced to retire with a large loss in killed and wounded; but in the meantime Col. B. T. Johnson, with the First Maryland, moved forward between the Front Royal road and the Valley turnpike and turned Donnell's right, while the Twenty-first Georgia turned his left, and by an enfilade fire routed him from behind the stone fences. Donnell took a new line, nearer the town, but at Trimble's suggestion, Ewell sent the Sixteenth Mississippi and the Fifteenth Alabama, the remainder of Trimble's brigade, still farther to the right, threatening Donnell's flank and rear just as Jackson's men broke in wild triumph over the Federal center and right. These movements caused the entire Federal line to give way and retreat, as rapidly as possible, toward Martinsburg, between 8 and 9 a.m. Elzey's brigade shared in the attack by obeying Jackson's order and following the Valley turnpike through the town as the enemy gave way on each side. At first the Federals fell back in very good order, but they were thrown into confusion in passing through the town, from which they were unable to rally, especially as Jackson's pursuit with his infantry was quick and vigorous, while his artillery promptly took advantage of favorable positions and shelled the retreating enemy.Never was there a better opportunity for capturing the remnant of an army and all of its artillery and wagons that had started in retreat, if a well organized and well led cavalry force were at hand to reap the fruits of victory; but, unfortunately, such was not the condition of Jackson's cavalry at that time. Ashby's poorly disciplined cavalry had been diverted and demoralized by the tempting sutlers' and other stores that had been scattered along the Valley turnpike by Banks' retreating army, many of them being unable to resist the temptation to secure many things that they had long been in need of and which, now to be had for the taking, they hastened to appropriate and conceal, thus greatly depleting his command. Ashby himself, with the few faithful men who had remained with him, had ridden to the enemy's right to prevent their retreat by way of Berryville to Harper's Ferry, hoping to capture a part of Banks' force by so doing. This movement delayed him so that he did not reach the Martinsburg road and join Steuart in the pursuit, some 10 or 12 miles beyond Winchester, after Banks had passed that point. Steuart, with the Second and Sixth Virginia cavalry, was under the immediate command of Ewell and led the advance of his movement. When he was ordered by Jackson, through one of his aides, to pursue the retreating Federals, he refused to do so until ordered by General Ewell, and so much time was lost and Banks had made considerable distance in his rapid retreat before Steuart took up the pursuit, which accomplished but little except that he captured a large quantity of stores at Martinsburg, :o miles beyond Winchester, where Banks had halted for an hour or two before he continued his retreat to the Potomac, at Williamsport, which he reached about sundown, after having fought the battle of Winchester and marched 34 miles during daylight of the 25th. The next morning he crossed the Potomac with two-thirds of his previous command in a thoroughly disorganized condition, thankful that he was safe from the blows of his sturdy antagonist.Jackson's immediate victory was a glorious one, even if he had not accomplished all that his ardent desires and unconquerable energy thought desirable. In two days he had driven his enemy, that in fancied security dreamed he had permanent possession of the lower valley of the Shenandoah, nearly 60 miles from Front Royal and Strasburg to the Potomac, and freed the valley of his presence. He had captured immense military stores of all kinds; had sent to the rear some 2,300 prisoners, besides leaving enough in hospitals to make a total Federal loss of 3,050; while his own loss was less than 400 in killed, wounded and missing, the killed being but 68. But this is a narrow view of the results accomplished with a force only about one-fourth that of his enemy in the strategic field. The wider and more important result was that affecting the movements of the entire Federal army in and near Virginia. On May 23rd, the day Jackson struck Banks' left at Front Royal, President Lincoln visited McDowell at Fredericksburg, and wired McClellan on the 24th that Shields, with his 10,000 men, had joined McDowell, and that on the following Monday, the 26th, the 40,000 men of his command would march from Fredericksburg to reinforce McClellan's right in front of Richmond. Returning to Washington the night of the 23rd, he heard of the attack on Front Royal. The next day more alarming intelligence came, and Fremont was ordered, by telegraph, to move from Franklin to Harrisonburg, to intercept Jackson and capture or destroy his forces, and so relieve Banks; McDowell was ordered to lay aside his movement on Richmond and put 20,000 men in motion for the Shenandoah valley, to capture Jackson, either with or without the co-operation of Fremont, informing McClellan of these orders at 4 p.m. of the 24th, adding, "the enemy are making a desperate push on Harper's Ferry." On the 25th the alarm at Washington increased as Jackson drove Banks from Winchester, and Lincoln again telegraphed McClellan: "I think the time is near when you must either attack Richmond or give up the job and come to the defense of Washington. Let me hear from you instantly." Later, on the same day, he again telegraphed: "Banks ran a race with the rebels, beating them into Winchester yesterday morning. This morning a battle ensued between the two forces, in which Banks was beaten back into full retreat toward Martinsburg, and probably is broken up into a total rout.''The news of Banks' defeat caused the Federal government to call upon all the loyal States for all their militia and other troops, to be forwarded immediately to Washington, and an order was issued taking military possession of all the railways in the United States for the transportation of these troops. The alarm at Washington produced an almost indescribable panic throughout the North, on Sunday the 25th and for several days thereafter. The governor of Massachusetts, at 11 p.m. of the 25th, ordered the whole active militia of that State to report on Boston Common the next day, "to oppose with fierce zeal and courageous patriotism the progress of the foe." The .governor of Ohio proclaimed, on the same day, "The seat of our beloved government is threatened with invasion, and I am called upon by the secretary of war for troops to repel and overwhelm the reckless invaders." In consequence of Jackson's movements threatening to pass through the gateway of the Potomac and attack Washington, a half million men, within twenty-four hours after the issue of Lincoln's proclamation, offered themselves for the defense of the Federal capital. McClellan's plans were all disconcerted, and although he protested against the detachment of McDowell to intercept Jackson, claiming that it could lead to no results because of his distance from the field of operations, his protests were of no avail, and McDowell's march toward the Valley began while McClellan stood hesitating on the banks of the Chickahominy, and the plans of the army of the Potomac, in all of its departments, were thoroughly demoralized by the boldness and results of Jackson's grand strategic movements.Jackson's infantry followed after Banks, on Sunday the 25th, as far as Stephenson's, five miles beyond Winchester, when he handed over the pursuit to the cavalry and ordered his wearied men into camp, taking up his own headquarters in Winchester, whose citizens, mostly women, had first put out the fires which the retreating Federals kindled in the warehouses where their great army stores, including gunpowder and explosive shells, were accumulated, and then cared for the wounded and buried the dead.A Sabbath having been appropriated in the pursuit of Banks, Jackson ordered the observance of the 26th as a day of rest and devotion, issuing this stirring order:Within four weeks this army has made long and rapid marches, fought six combats and two battles, signally defeating the enemy in each one, captured several stands of colors and pieces of artillery, with numerous prisoners, and vast medical, ordnance and army stores; and finally driven the boastful foe, which was ravaging our beautiful country, into utter rout. The general commanding would warmly express to the officers and men of his command his joy in their achievements, and his thanks for their brilliant gallantry in action and their patient obedience under the hardships of forced marches, often more painful to the brave soldier than the dangers of battle. The explanation of the severe exertions to which the commanding general called the army, which were endured by them with such cheerful confidence in him, is now given in the victory of yesterday. He receives this proof of their confidence in the past with pride and gratitude, and only asks a similar confidence in the future.But his chief duty today, and that of the army, is to recognize devoutly the hand of a protecting Providence in the brilliant successes of the last three days (which have given us the results of a great victory without great losses), and to make oblation of our thanks to God for His mercies to us and our country in heartfelt acts of religious worship. For this purpose the troops will remain in camp to-day, suspending as far as possible all military exercises; and the chaplains of regiments will hold divine service in their several charges at 4 o'clock p.m.It is noteworthy that after this battle of Winchester there was inaugurated a humanitarian movement, in reference to surgeons left in charge of wounded prisoners, that has since become the rule among civilized nations engaged in war. Immediately after Banks was driven out of Winchester, Dr. Hunter McGuire, the medical director of the army of the Valley district, visited the Federal hospital, which had been established in the old Union hotel, where he found among the captured prisoners eight Federal surgeons or assistant surgeons. He reported this fact to General Jackson, and asked his permission to unconditionally release these medical officers upon their parole of honor that they would remain in charge of the Federal sick and wounded in Winchester for fifteen days, after which, by the terms of their paroles, they would be permitted to report to their commanding officers for duty. It was further understood that these surgeons should use every effort to have released, on the same terms, the medical officers of the Confederate States who were then held as prisoners by the Federal government, or who might thereafter be captured.General Jackson readily assented to Surgeon McGuire's proposition, and directed him to carry out his suggestions. Accompanied by Dr. Daniel B. Conrad, of the Second Virginia regiment, he then went to the Federal hospital and released, on their paroles, the surgeons, assistant surgeons, attendants and nurses, but not the sick and wounded, who were afterward paroled by the regular officers of the army, not to take up arms again until properly exchanged. General Jackson issued no regular order to perform this duty, but he frequently discussed with Dr. McGuire, subsequently, the policy and humanity of such a measure. This rule established, by this precedent, was kept up by Dr. McGuire during his term of service as medical director with Generals Jackson, Ewell, Early, and Gordon, with whom he successively served as medical director until the close of the war. Near the end of February, 1864, some Confederate scouts captured the medical inspector of Sheridan's army in the Valley. Dr. McGuire promptly released him on his parole, and returned him to his command. About a week after that, Dr. McGuire was captured in the defeat of Early at Waynesboro, when General Sheridan promptly released him on the same terms he had accorded to his medical inspector. In consequence of this action of General Jackson and Dr. McGuire, a number of Confederate surgeons were released and sent back from Northern prisons.The Confederates had another day of well-earned rest on May 27th, while Jackson was busy providing for the safety of the vast military stores he had captured at Front Royal, Winchester and Martinsburg, and waiting for instructions from Richmond, in response to dispatches he had sent by a trusty aide immediately after the capture of Winchester, as to his future operations. He had now shown the character of his military genius and established his fame as an independent commander. He had relieved Richmond from the danger of an immediate attack by the overwhelming force of the army of the Potomac, and the authorities were only too willing to direct him to press the enemy still hovering in the defense of Harper's Ferry, threaten an invasion of Maryland and an attack upon Washington, and thus still further derange the plans of McClellan by stimulating the fears of the Federal authorities and inducing them to deplete the army of the Potomac for the defense of their capital.Ashby's tireless and everywhere-watching spies and scouts kept Jackson informed as to the movements of the enemy, and he quickly divined their plans for intercepting his way of retreat up the Valley, should the necessity arise for so doing; but his cardinal rule of action in military, as well as in other matters, was to "take no counsel Of his fears," therefore, early on the morning of the 28th he dispatched Winder with four regiments and two batteries toward Charlestown by the direct road. Nearing Charlestown and learning that the enemy held that place in force, he notified Jackson, who promptly ordered Ewell to move in the same direction. A small Federal force had been holding Harper's Ferry, but when the defeat of Banks became known, troops were hurried by rail to that point from all directions, and by the morning of the 28th, 7,000 men and 18 cannon had been collected there, under the command of General Saxton, who at once occupied the commanding plateau of Bolivar heights, in front of that place, and located a formidable battery on Maryland heights, across the Potomac in its rear, which, from its still more commanding position, dominated nearly all the approaches from the Virginia way to Bolivar heights and Harper's Ferry. Finding that it was only a reconnaissance that had advanced to Charlestown, Winder pressed forward and drove the enemy back to Bolivar heights, where Saxton had drawn up his main body in line of battle. Seeing he could accomplish nothing more, Winder fell back to Charlestown and went into camp, having marched 21 miles and had an engagement with the enemy during the day. There Ewell joined him after dark and Jackson in person, with the main body of his army, during the next day, when he made a demonstration against Bolivar heights and sent a part of his infantry force to Loudoun heights. Saxton, being informed that Jackson was crossing a division over the Potomac above Harper's Ferry, moved a part of his infantry: force to Maryland heights to defend his rear, and withdrew his line in front of Harper's Ferry to the crest of the plateau nearest that town, thus not only shortening his line, but securing protection from his own batteries on Maryland heights which could fire over his men at an approaching enemy.Jackson having accomplished the object of his advance to Harper's Ferry, which was to gain time for the removal of the captured stores from Winchester, was now ready to extricate his army from the seemingly perilous position into which he had brought it, a position which induced the Federal commanders, who were seeking to intercept his line of retreat, to say to their men, to stimulate their marching ability, that they now had Jackson in a bottle, and all they had to do was to be in time to close it with a stopper, at Strasburg, and so end the war. They had not yet learned that Jackson was not to be caught by any combination of movements they could bring about, for while it was true that he only had about 15,000 men to meet the 60,000 that were concentrating toward his rear, he knew the strategic advantages that the great flank-protecting bulwarks of the mountains placed at his disposal farther up the Valley, and had no doubt of his ability to reach these, avail himself of their impregnable protection of his flanks, and at the same time divide the strategic forces of his enemy and enable him to meet them on his own grounds with superior tactic strength. While demonstrating in front of Harper's Ferry, Jackson was definitely informed on the morning of Friday, May 30th, that Fremont was marching his 15,000 men down the South Branch valley to Moorefield and had there turned toward Strasburg, and that his advance had reached 10 miles east of Moorefield, where he halted the 29th to rest his army, and on the 30th had moved to the western foot of the Shenandoah mountain, to within some 20 miles of Strasburg, and that McDowell's advance was already crossing the Blue ridge and not far from Front Royal. Thus advised of the strategic situation, Jackson, on the morning of the 30th, ordered all his troops back to Winchester except Winder's brigade, the First Maryland, and a body of cavalry which he left to continue threatening Harper's Ferry. After dinner at the home of Major Hawks, his chief commissary in Charlestown, he took the railway train which he had captured at Winchester, and with most of his staff rode back to that town, reaching it late in the afternoon of the 30th, where he received intelligence that McDowell's advance had that morning reached Front Royal and surprised the Twelfth Georgia, which had been left there to guard the captured stores and the bridges across the Shenandoah, and that he was now in force at that town, within 12 miles of Strasburg by the direct road leading past the northern end of the Massanutton mountains. Fremont had reached Wardensville, 20 miles from Strasburg, and had telegraphed Lincoln that he would enter that place by 5 p.m. of Saturday, May 31st. The main body of Jackson's army had marched 25 miles on the 30th and encamped in the vicinity of Winchester, 20 miles from Strasburg; Winder's brigade had spent most of the day skirmishing with the Federals at Harper's Ferry and collecting his men together, and late in the afternoon had encamped near Halltown, some 43 miles from Strasburg by way of Winchester.Fully apprised by Ashby of the movements of the enemy and of the points which they had reached in marching from opposite directions toward Strasburg, Jackson prepared with the utmost calmness to meet the threatening emergency. At 10 that night he dispatched Captain Hotchkiss, of his staff, to Harper's Ferry, with orders to bring Winder's force to Strasburg with the utmost dispatch, informing him of the points reached by Fremont and McDowell at that time, and saying that he would remain at Winchester as long as he could. To the question of Captain Hotchkiss as to what he should do if he found Winchester occupied by the enemy before reaching that place, Jackson replied, with a wave of his hand to the westward, "Come round through the mountains." Winder was reached at an early hour and hastened to bring in his pickets, some of which were across the Shenandoah on Loudoun heights, and then marched rapidly, passing through Winchester late in the afternoon, to the vicinity of Newtown, within about 10 miles of Strasburg, where he encamped after dark after a march of 28 miles for the main body, and of 35 miles for a portion of the brigade. Early on the morning of the 31st, Jackson put everything in motion from Winchester for Strasburg. The 2,300 Federal prisoners marched first, guarded by the Twenty-first Virginia; then followed, in double column, 7 miles of wagons loaded with captured stores and the ordnance and supplies of the army, the main body of which followed these, and the whole reached and passed through Strasburg late in the afternoon and the army bivouacked just beyond, in line of battle, within the portal of the narrow western valley of the Shenandoah, with its flanks safely guarded by the Massanuttons on the right and the North mountains on the left, and ready to meet either the advance of Fremont from the northeast or that of McDowell from the southeast, or of both combined; well satisfied that in such a strong defensive position he could easily defeat any force they could bring against him.The next morning, Sunday, June 1st, the heavy rainstorm that had been prevailing the previous day passed by, and the encouraging and cheerful sun gladdened Jackson's men who were resting at Strasburg, and helped Winder's men in their early march to the same place, which they reached about noon and passed to the rear of their comrades, who in line of battle had been waiting for them. Maj. John Alexander Harman, Jackson's tire. less quartermaster, was busy all day pushing the great wagon train to the rear, while those in charge of the Federal prisoners made a full day's march in the same direction. Fremont's advance did not put in an appearance in front of Strasburg until late in the afternoon, Ashby having contested the way in a series of remarkable engagements, in which hundreds contended with thousands, impeding the enemy's progress and keeping them within the mountains until Jackson had safely passed his trains and his collected army to beyond Strasburg.Once in the valley where he could deploy his forces, Fremont drove in the cavalry, but Jackson supported these with Ewell and other troops, who repulsed the Federal attack and induced Fremont to withdraw to the rear, where he remained idle the rest of the day, fearful of results if he should bring on a general engagement with Jackson while he was not certain of any support from McDowell, whose advance, instead of marching directly to Strasburg as ordered, had by mistake taken the road toward Winchester from Front Royal, and so did not appear upon the scene during the day, except a cavalry brigade under Bayard, which took the direct road to Strasburg, but failed to reach it in time to be of any assistance to Fremont.It is interesting to pause for a moment and review the movements of the past three days. Friday morning Jackson was 50 miles from Strasburg, in front of Harper's Ferry; Fremont was at Moorefield, 38 miles from Strasburg, with the head of his army 10 miles in advance; the main body of Shields' division of McDowell's army was not more than 20 miles from Strasburg, for his advance had entered Front Royal, but 12 miles away, before midday, while McDowell, in person, was following with two divisions close in his rear; yet, by Sunday night Jackson, encumbered with prisoners and a long train of captured stores, had marched between 50 and 60 miles, reached Strasburg before either of his adversaries, and passed safely between their converging armies, holding Fremont at bay on the left by an offer of battle, and blinding and bewildering McDowell on the right by the celerity and secrecy of his movements.CONTINUED ON PAGE 3:
- Home >
- Catalog >
- Medical Catalog >
- Medical Certification Form >
- Sedgwick Leave Of Absence Forms