Del 17: Fill & Download for Free

I am not sure if I understood the question right.It is nowadays generally recognized that cancer is a chronic immune disorder that our immune system fails to recognize antigens presented on cancer cells. A lot of drugs on pipeline are being designed to improve our own immune system to kill cancer cells whereas traditional chemotherapy drugs kills all rapidly growing cells including our healthy cells like blood cells etc. We made a significant progress on understanding how cancer cells survive but a long way to go in terms of cancer drug development. Ibrutinib is a first in-class covalently binds to btk designed for treating B cell disorder. As in the study just published in New England Journal of Medicine june 19th 2013 by Byrd J et al. Ibrutinib produced a durable response in patients with relapsed and refractory chronic lymphocytic leukemia (CLL). Current phase 2 trial will tell us more about this drug soon. From the data on the phase 2 trial of Ibrutinib presented in ASH meeting last year are pretty impressive.Ibrutinib has been getting a lot of attention because 1. It causes very little effect on blood cells that means it has a very low risk of infection. 2. Once patients respond to ibrutinib, the response to it is getting better overtime. It is very unique!!! 3. It even works for people with a high risk of CLL ( del 17), which is harder to treat.I think it is a just beginning of the new way of cancer treatment. There are a lot more to come.

A Yankee aircraft carrier for the QueenUnited States provided its British ally with military hardware, logistical support and intelligence, which helped the British victory in the South Atlantic conflict.The offering of aircraft carriers to Britain, even if the offers were not accepted, shows that the Americans were willing to take their commitment to the limit.In this essay the negotiations involving the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower and USS Iwo Jima with its scope and limitations, are fully disclosed.The embassy party:On May 3, 1982, Sir Nicholas Henderson, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’s Ambassador to the United States, was hosting a party, which was taking place in the embassy grounds (1). Senior US government officials, including Alexander Haig and Caspar Weinberger, were present."Nico", as he was known, had been a career diplomat since 1946. although he retired in 1979 (2). Nico had been called especially by the conservative government of Margaret Thatcher to cover the strategic embassy in Washington, where he was surprised by the crisis over the Falkland Islands.Although he was considered somewhat eccentric (a very British character), Nico was considered to have had the experience enough to deal with the turbulence that the conflict generated in the relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States, after presiding over the embassies to Poland, Germany and France, in addition to extensive contacts in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the powerful FCO - Foreign and Commonwealth Office).Washington initially tried to act as a mediator, commissioning General Alexander Haig (the Secretary of State) for the negotiations. While this was happening within the US government, the positions that were expressed (mainly) by Jeane Kirkpatrick (i.e. the US ambassador to the UN) who was about to preserve the relationship with Argentina, as well as the other Latin American countries, and antagonistically clashed with the position of Caspar Weinberger (Secretary of Defense).It is good to remember that, from the beginning, the United States was not impartial as, even when it tried to mediate, the USA provided logistics, communications and other points of support for the British forces; Weinberger channeled much of the US aid to the UK.By 30th April it was clear that no common ground would be reached so the USA abandoned its initial position and made explicit its support for the British cause. Henderson knew he wouldn't have much time to talk to Weinbergerat at the embassy party. The main task entrusted to it by the FCO, at that time, was to get the United States to prevent Argentine imports: given the intense commercial relationship, it was understood that this would financially stifle Argentina and would be one more reason for it to abandon its position in Falklands. The day before, Sunday 2nd May, Francis Pym (the head of the FCO) had been visiting Alexander Haig in Washington which involved spending two hours in the morning in a private meeting, without any adviser (3) or prying ears. In the economic sphere, Pym had asked for Argentine imports to be banned as the countries of the European Economic Community had already done (4). He even made it clear that Prime Minister Thatcher was thinking of sending a personal letter to Ronald Reagan (the President of the United States), making the same point (5).Also Pym had mentioned (among many other subjects) that if the British military operations were prolonged, the problem of the air cover of the fleet could be exacerbated. Although he did not mention any aircraft carriers, he pointed out to Haig that he could be thinking about a solution to that question6.Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman Jr. signs the guest book aboard USS Dwight D. Eisenhower. August 1983. Photo: Department of Defense, USA.Anyway, Henderson's central problem that day was clearly to continue his boss's talks and to cut off imports from our country. With that issue in mind, he took Caspar Weinberger, the Anglophile, aside.Weinberger was very receptive but he did not focus (it seems that in an obvious way, since he was the Secretary of Defense ...) on the economic problem that beset the Queen's ambassador. However, he did take the glove when it came to air protection for the Royal Navy.First of all, he stated that he was more than willing to provide full assistance to the British forces and, to the surprise of his interlocutor, indicated that he would like to know if he could send an aircraft carrier to the South Atlantic: (7) this could serve as a mobile landing strip for British forces. The limitation, according to Weinberger, would be that US forces would not engage Argentine forces, even though (it seems) US reconnaissance flights were implicitly authorized. Navy departing from said platform. (8)That aircraft carrier was the USS Eisenhower and, according to Weinberger in the gardens of the British Embassy in Washington, it was in the vicinity of Gibraltar and, in 15 days, it could be helping the British cause over the Falklands (9).For him, "having an aircraft carrier available as an alternative landing strip would be much more effective than anything that could be done in the area of ​​imports" (10).Certainly, it would be necessary to agree (11).The Ike:It was not the first time that, in relation to the Falklands, the CVN-69 USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (familiarly known as "Ike"), was in the thoughts of Secretary of Defense Weinberger.On 30th April, in a meeting of just under an hour, chaired by Reagan in the Cabinet Room of the White House (12), in which it was decided to turn to Great Britain, Weinberger reported on the plans of evacuation of US citizens and embassy staff in Buenos Aires.Possibly still influenced by the events in Tehran (Iran) a few years earlier, it indicated that the Eisenhower would support this operation, at that time off the coast of Tunisia, making it known that (at 22 knots) it would take about 15 days to arrive to the Argentine coasts (13).He also noted that the sensitive material had already been removed from the embassy and that, at any event and if things got complicated (that is, if the Argentines resisted the evacuation), nothing could be done except an invasion to large scale of the Argentine territory.While in Washington, at 10:30 am, the meeting ended and the US government prepared a press release concluding the mediation tasks, the Ike crew was walking through the port of Naples, Italy. (14) The fact is that, contrary to what Weinberger informed the president, the ship had arrived in Naples on 26th April, where it would remain until 1st May.The 101,000-ton (nuclear powered) Nimitz class aircraft carrier, still active today in the United States Navy, entered active service in 1977 and, by 1982, was one of the most modern and powerful ships in the fleet.USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) in exercise DRAGON HAMMER '90. Behind, the silhouette of the HMS Invincible can be distinguished. Photo: Department of Defense, USAShe had departed on January 5, 1982, from the Norfolk base (in the State of Virginia) for a tour of duty in the Mediterranean Sea. On January 17, already in season, it had replaced the USS Nimitz, then becoming the flagship of the Commander of Task Force 60, part of the Sixth Fleet. The force included, of course, escorts in the form of cruisers and destroyers, in addition to the ever-present and necessary logistics ships.Its mission, for the 1982 deployment, was to "provide embarked tactical airpower for the defense of American rights to the freedom of the sea, as well as to protect the sovereignty of the United States" (15) and its main means of achieving it was Embarked Air Wing No. 7 (CVW-7).It included F-14A "Tomcat" interceptors (VF-142 and VF-143 squadrons), A-7E "Corsair II" attack aircraft (VA-12 and VA-66) and A-6E "Intruder" (VA- 65), electronic warfare EA-6B "Prowler" (VAQ-132), anti-submarine S-3A "Viking" (VS-31), early warning aircraft E-2C "Hawkeye" (VAW-121), reconnaissance EA -3B "Skywarrior" as well as antisubmarine helicopters (VS-5, with Sea King) and other aerial means. All this implied about 90 fixed wing airpcraft and helicopters available to fulfill the assigned mission.At the time that the guests enjoyed the British embassy party (around 3rd May), the Eisenhower was in the Tyrrhenian Sea (also at a considerable distance from where Weinberger placed it), participating in the important amphibious exercise "Far Drum "(" Distant Drum "), along with other NATO ships and forces.By 17th May, the exercise ended the day before, he had already returned to Naples.The offer:On the afternoon of the 3rd, the offer of a Yankee aircraft carrier for the queen, via a telegram encrypted from Henderson by means of 16, was in London and in the offices of various officials and even Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (17).Through various channels, an attempt was made to establish what it meant to have a North American aircraft carrier. That is, if the offer was from the carrier only, or with its air group embarked, or (the best scenario for the British) it also included the entire Battle Group.As later stated by Admiral Henry Leach, then First Lord of the Sea (head of the Royal Navy), the proposal was only for the aircraft carrier, empty of aircraft or even personnel (18). It would be the responsibility of the seafarers of Great Britain to operate it.This was really impractical: it would have taken a long time to learn to operate such a large and complex ship, there were not enough personnel and, above all, there were no fixed-wing aircraft in the British Navy that would make the presence of a aircraft carriers of that size in the theater of operations useful (19).As a detail, during the meeting at the embassy, ​​Henderson had asked Weinberger about his opinion that Blackburn Buccaneer attack planes, operated by the Royal Air Force (RAF), should take off from the Eisenhower. Weinberger had no problem, but the truth is that the problems would have been operational.Certainly, Buccaneers with RAF personnel had never flown from aircraft carriers, and it would have taken a considerable amount of time to train for embarked operations.As early as 4th May, Leach considered that he was (at that time) against the American proposal (20) and, later, Thatcher evaluated it as "more encouraging than practical" (21). Henderson then waited for an answer that never came and interpreted the silence as negative. Certainly, there was no urgency on the British side in acquiring a replacement carrier.A few hours later, Admiral John "Sandy" Woodward (in charge of the Carrier Group in the South Atlantic Theater of Operations) reported to London that an Exocet missile had hit HMS Sheffield, which was in danger of sinking (which happened days later).What if the next missile sank one of its carriers?The deploymentHMS Hermes and HMS Invincible were the two aircraft carriers deployed in the South Atlantic by British forces.The 24,000-ton Hermes had been launched as a light aircraft carrier in 1944, but was not completed until 1959, various design changes through (22). In 1977 it became a helicopter carrier and, three years later, it received minor modifications to be able to operate the Sea Harriers, with vertical take-off.The Invincible was smaller (16,000 tons), but much more modern, having entered service in June 1980 (23). The first of its kind, to be complemented by the Illustrious and the Ark Royal, was intended to be sold to Australia as soon as its twins were operational. Like the Hermes, it could only operate vertical take-off and landing planes, even though both had a bow ramp to facilitate the deflection of the aircraft with some horizontal movement.Both carriers were the most important vessels in the Task Force: their Sea Harrier aircraft provided anti-aircraft protection to all British forces and they were useful as a platform for Sea King helicopters for anti-submarine warfare and transport and they would also embark Harrier Gr.3 aircraft of the Royal Air Force, with a mainly ground attack mission.British Sea Harriers operating from the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower in October 1984. Photo: Department of Defense, USA.The two ships had been on alert for 4 hours since the early morning (British) of 2nd April before the main Argentine landing (24) had taken place and they sailed a few days later: the Invincible with 12 Sea Harriers from 801 Naval Air Squadron (and 40 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles), as well as the Hermes with 8 aircraft (800 Squadron) and 30 missiles. 33 more Sidewinders would go south with the RFA Resource (25).With very little difference, they made landfall on Ascension Island and then left for the waters of the Falkland Islands in order to obtain the total blockade of the islands (the maritime blockade was imposed by nuclear submarines on 12th April) and begin operations that would end. at the landing, by the amphibious force.According to estimates made in the middle of April (26), the aircraft carriers could remain in station only until the beginning of August, when there would be significant mechanical and logistical problems that would seriously affect their operational capacity.Given this problem and that "aircraft carriers were crucial for amphibious operations and for maintaining air and naval superiority" (27), amphibious operations could not be delayed until the end of May, as a limit.Woodward and the fleet headquarters at Northwood were very clear that "major damage to the Hermes or the Invincible ... would likely cause operations in the Falkland Islands to be abandoned" (28).Obviously, mechanical problems and wear from prolonged operations in adverse weather were much less than half the issue. The big problem, externalized since 4th May, was the Super Etendard and their Exocet missiles.New and old alternatives:With mechanical wear as the main problem in the head of the General Staff (that is, before the attack on Sheffield), HMS Illustrious (i.e. an Invincible class aircraft carrier) was considered as the natural successor to any one of the aircraft carriers in the South Atlantic.In mid-April, it was understood that it could be operating the first days of August, but with a limited capacity, as it would not have completed the sea trials or the adaptation of its crew (29) to the new ship by that date. These times were acceptable for the fleet, since it was not considered that the Argentine forces could significantly damage the aircraft carriers.The paradigm shift changed the degree of urgency to have a replacement aircraft carrier in the South AtlanticOn 12th May, a meeting of Chiefs of Staff considered three alternatives (30) to be able to maintain an air-naval force in the theater.The first alternative was to further advance the date of entry into service of the Illustrious, something that was underway and was, in practice, difficult to achieve, since it involved carrying out the work scheduled for almost a year in a few weeks. To make matters worse, it had been decided, given the already experienced anti-missile deficiencies, that the new aircraft carrier would carry Vulcan / Phalanx guns (which were provided by the United States on 14th May (31) which led to modifications to the original design and its consequent delays.So much so that, even with an important reinforcement of the naval and shipyard personnel to accelerate its construction, the "Lusty" (name given to the Illustrious in the Royal Navy) did not leave for Falkland waters until 2nd August (32).The second option involved reactivating HMS Bulwark, a helicopter carrier not so different from HMS Hermes (of the same Centaur class, modified in 1979 for the antisubmarine role). The ship had been inactive since April 1981 and had one of its boilers damaged by fire but it was still inspected (it was in Porstmouth) and evaluated for return to service.However, after a year of neglect (and the use of many of its parts to keep the Hermes operational), HMS Bulwark deterioration was enormous and its recovery (in a short period of time) was considered impossible.The last option involved procuring an aircraft carrier in a third country, which could be operated efficiently, and in a reasonable amount of time, by the Royal Navy.Considering that the only fixed-wing aircraft to operate on board the Royal Navy were vertical take-off (be it the Sea Harriers of the Fleet Air Arm or the Harriers of the Royal Air Force), it was only natural that they began to look at with interest to the amphibious ships of the United States, on which the more than similar AV-8A Harriers of the Marine Corps operated.The order for an amphibious platform was then placed directly from Navy to Navy, with the intervention of John F. Lehman (United States Secretary of the Navy) (33). With the request being made to the Second Fleet (with responsibility in the North Atlantic), it was estimated that the USS Iwo Jima would be the most suitable option for the British request (34).In service since 1961 and with 11,000 tons of displacement, the Iwo Jima was the first ship in the world designed exclusively to operate helicopters (35) and, since 1972, it had the necessary modifications to ship up to 12 Harriers of the Marines.A bow view of the USS Iwo Jima, in May 1979. Photo: Department of Defense, USA.The Iwo was in port (on the East Coast of the United States) and ready to go into operation. Given the reluctance of the US government to provide personnel to intervene in combat actions, "contractors" began to be identified (i.e. retired sailors with knowledge of the ship) who would embark on it as civilians under the orders of (limited) British personnel. (36). The system was no different than the Flying Tigers of China in World War II.The terms of the American offer were not, then, so different from those of the Eisenhower: just the ship, no escorts and no planes. The problem of making them sail and fight remained for the Royal Navy, even though in the latter case an ingenious alternative solution had been thought of in relation to the embarked personnel.Hostilities ended on June 14, with both British aircraft carriers operational (still with mechanical limitations) and, with it, the planned alternative never materialized.It is also worth mentioning that the advanced air base in San Carlos (RNAS Sheathbill according to the Royal Navy and RAF Port San Carlos for the British air force) was declared operational on June 2 (37). From there, with a 260-meter runway, planes and helicopters could operate and resupply (but not reload weapons).The construction of this base alleviated the urgency to obtain another naval platform and perhaps it did not continue to deepen in alternative plans to replace one of the aircraft carriers if it were damaged.In retrospectThe United States provided a variety of logistical assistance, as well as very accurate intelligence information, which allowed British forces to prevail in the battle in the South Atlantic.Carrier offers to Britain, even if they did not materialise, show that the USA was willing to push its task in the shadows to the limit.The Falklands War was a war that the UK could not lose and if the UK had been about to do so, her great ally would have immediately come to her aid.In other words, if the Argentine pieces were in a position to checkmate, it would be Uncle Sam who would kick the board.BibliographyENGLISH, Adrian y Watts, Anthony. Battle for the Falklands. Naval Forces. Londres. Osprey. 1982FREEDMAN, Sir Lawrence.The official history of the Falklands campaign.Tomo II. Londres. Routledge. 2005.THATCHER, Margaret. The Downing Street Years. Harper Collins e-books. 2010.WEST, Nigel. The Secret War for the Falklands. Londres. Warner Books. 1998.WOODWARD, John F y Robinson, Patrick. One Hundred Days. Londres. Harper Collins Publishers. 2012.1 Henderson, Nicholas en ‘The Falklands War’, seminario llevado a cabo el 5 de junio de 2002 (Centre for Contemporary British History), 2005, p.64.2 Su informe final confidencial, fechado el 31 de marzo de 1979 y dirigido a Sir David Owen (Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores Británico del momento), acerca del declive británico, sus causas y consecuencias se filtró a la prensa y causó gran revuelo por su franqueza. Ver The Economist (Londres), edición del 2 de Junio de 1979.3 Telegrama de Henderson, del 2 de mayo, en PREM 19-646. PREM es la sigla de clasificación que los National Archives británicos, en Kew, dan a los archivos correspondientes a la oficina del Primer Ministro. A su vez, DEFE son los archivos del Ministerio de Defensa, FCO del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, etc. Estos archivos, en lo que concierne al período de la guerra, fueron desclasificados (con algunas limitaciones) a fines del año 2012.914 Telegrama de Henderson, del 2 de mayo, en PREM 19-646.5 Lo que hizo el 4 de mayo, y amén de agradecerle las limitaciones que Estados Unidos ya había impuesto en lo que hace a venta de armamento, decía "Me gustaría urgir el tema, que vaya más allá, y que se imponga un completo bloqueo de las importaciones de los Estados Unidos desde Argentina" Ver PREM 19-624.6 Telegrama de Henderson, del 2 de mayo, en PREM 19-646.92 ESGN Nº 60 l Diciembre 20147 Telegrama de Henderson, del 3 de mayo, en PREM 19-624.8 Telegrama de Henderson, del 3 de mayo, en PREM 19-624.9 Telegrama de Henderson, del 3 de mayo, en PREM 19-624.10 Telegrama de Henderson, del 3 de mayo, en PREM 19-624.11 Hay que indicar que, en un seminario llevado a cabo en 2003, Weinberger afirmaba respecto la historia del portaaviones "…no podía recordar como empezó. Creo que en algunas discusiones con el embajador y probablemente con la Señora Thatcher y dos o tres otras personas, alguien me preguntó en broma: ¿Y si queremos un portaaviones? Y yo contesté: Claro, por supuesto, no hay problema". O Weinberber no lo recordaba, o no quería quedar, frente a la historia, como la persona que había realizado tamaña oferta. Ver Weinberger, Caspar en ‘The Falklands Roundtable, seminario llevado a cabo el 15 y 16 de mayo de 2003 (Ronald Reagan Oral History Project), 2003, p.20. A todo evento, los papeles personales de Weinberger se encuentran depositados en la Librería del Congreso (en Washington DC) y, pedida por el suscripto la autorización para poder examinarlos, la misma fue denegada por sus herederos.12 Reagan Library: Executive Secretariat, NSC: Meeting File (Box 91284) reagan Library: Executive Secretariat, NSC: Meeting ����������������File (Box 91284)9314 Naval History and Heritage Command (US Navy), Command History for USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) for calendar year 1982, archivo CVN69:114:gwf del 6 de mayo de 1983.94 ESGN Nº 60 l Diciembre 201415 Naval History and Heritage Command (US Navy), Command History for USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) for calendar year 1982, archivo CVN69:114:gwf del 6 de mayo de 1983.16 Telegrama de Henderson, del 3 de mayo, en PREM 19-624.17 Thatcher, Margaret "The Downing Street Years", Harper Collins e-books, julio 2010, p.8818 Leach, Henry en ‘The Falklands War’, seminario llevado a cabo el 5 de junio de 2002 (Centre for Contemporary British History), 2005, p.64.19 Leach, Henry en ‘The Falklands War’, seminario llevado a cabo el 5 de junio de 2002 (Centre for Contemporary British History), 2005, p.64.9520 Minuta del Chief of Staff Comitee, del 4 de mayo de 1982. En ALQ-050/1.21 Thatcher, Margaret "The Downing Street Years", Harper Collins e-books, julio 2010, p.88.22 English, Adrian y Watts, Anthony. Battle for the Falklands. Naval Forces, Londres. 1982, p.8.23Jane’s Fighting Ships, Edición 1981/82, p. 562.24 Freedman, Sir Lawrence. The official history of the Falklands campaign. Tomo II. Londres. Routledge. 2005, p. 42.25 Freedman, Sir Lawrence. The official history of the Falklands campaign. Tomo II. Londres. Routledge. 2005, p. 43.26 "Study into the scope for delaying landing operations on the Falkland Islands", borrador del 17 de abril de 1982, en FCO 7-45619727 Study into the scope for delaying landing operations on the Falkland Islands", borrador del 17 de abril de 1982, en FCO 7-456128 Woodward, John F y Robinson, Patrick. One Hundred Days. Londres. Harper Collins Publishers. 2012, p. 6.29 Study into the scope for delaying landing operations on the Falkland Islands" borrador del 17 de abril de 1982, en FCO 7-456130 Freedman, Sir Lawrence. The official history of the Falklands campaign. Tomo II. Londres. Routledge. 2005, p. 381.31 Freedman, Sir Lawrence. The official history of the Falklands campaign. Tomo II. Londres. Routledge. 2005, p. 329.32 Revista Navy News, Edición de Septiembre de 1982, p.5.33 USNI News, Reagan Readied U.S. Warship for ’82 Falklands War, 27 de junio de 2012, en Reagan Readied U.S. Warship for '82 Falklands War - USNI News34 Lehman, John F. Reflections on the Special Relationship, Revista Naval History (United States Naval Institute), Octubre 2012, p. 43.35 Jane’s Fighting Ships, Edición 1981/82, p. 669.36 USNI News, Reagan Readied U.S. Warship for ’82 Falklands War, 27 de junio de 2012, en Reagan Readied U.S. Warship for '82 Falklands War - USNI News37 Freedman, Sir Lawrence. The official history of the Falklands campaign. Tomo II. Londres. Routledge. 2005, p. 464.100 ESGN Nº 60 l Diciembre 2014

OPOQ: If there have been 6 moon landings, why was only one filmed?OK so you got this idea from where?You are right - there were six Moon landings during the Apollo program.But wrong in another way there were none shown landing by a camera on the Moon’s surface. It just wasn't possible.However, there was 16mm film footage of all of the landings (mute) taken from inside the LMs.But after landing there were plenty of live video broadcasts and, except for Apollo 12, were shown live on television. This amounted to about a hundred hours or so of broadcasts worldwide.Apollo 12 had a problem with their TV camera when it was pointed at the sun during the initial set up.However, Apollo 12 was covered to an extent on 16mm film.The other missions were all shown on live TV and 16mm film with many hours of footage.For example here is some video from Apollo 17. It lasts for about 2 hours:Here is video footage from Apollo 16:Here is live footage from Apollo 15:And from Apollo 14 – 16mm film:So as you can see, you are obviously wrong.There are massive amounts of visual evidence of the Apollo missions.All you have to do is look for it …It took me 5 minutes.Enjoy!