I Purpose Ii Scope Iii Responsibilities Iv References V: Fill & Download for Free

This is the Ontario definition of provision of legal services (from section 1 of the Law Society Act):Provision of legal services(5) For the purposes of this Act, a person provides legal services if the person engages in conduct that involves the application of legal principles and legal judgment with regard to the circumstances or objectives of a person.Same(6) Without limiting the generality of subsection (5), a person provides legal services if the person does any of the following:1. Gives a person advice with respect to the legal interests, rights or responsibilities of the person or of another person.2. Selects, drafts, completes or revises, on behalf of a person,i. a document that affects a person’s interests in or rights to or in real or personal property,ii. a testamentary document, trust document, power of attorney or other document that relates to the estate of a person or the guardianship of a person,iii. a document that relates to the structure of a sole proprietorship, corporation, partnership or other entity, such as a document that relates to the formation, organization, reorganization, registration, dissolution or winding-up of the entity,iv. a document that relates to a matter under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (Canada),v. a document that relates to the custody of or access to children,vi. a document that affects the legal interests, rights or responsibilities of a person, other than the legal interests, rights or responsibilities referred to in subparagraphs i to v, orvii. a document for use in a proceeding before an adjudicative body.3. Represents a person in a proceeding before an adjudicative body.4. Negotiates the legal interests, rights or responsibilities of a person.In most cases, one must be a licensed lawyer or licensed paralegal to do any of the above. Paralegals are limited to the types and scope of law they may practice; lawyers are limited only by their zone of competence.There are a range of exceptions that may or may not apply in certain scenarios, but in general these are quite narrow.

Memorandum of Understanding is the letter of intent which shows the intention of the parties regarding their work, common businesses and mutual relationship including their rights, duties and responsibilities towards each other. MOU can be done between two nations, two universities, two companies, husband and wife etc. MOU is a document which shows the common understanding regarding a matter, work or business which, the parties entering into a MOU has achieved before entering into a binding contract. MOU basically lay-outs the terms and conditions of the relationship of two or more persons who have the intention to enter into a binding contract. MOU are generally of non-binding nature, thus they are non-binding agreements which are not enforceable by law and cannot be called Contract. Many times, they are done before entering into a full-fledged contract. However, in some cases, MOU has been treated as a contract due to the reason of the intention of the parties expressed by the words used in the MOU. If the words are intending that the parties had the intention to legally comply with the terms and conditions or had the intention to get the terms and conditions legally enforced and the other requites of Section 10 of Indian Contract Act like free consent and competency of parties, lawful consideration and lawful object are also present in MOU then the MOU has to be treated as a contract even though it is called MOU. So, MOU can be legally binding if it got recognised as a contract.Let’s have a look at an example of MOU:MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU) between__________________________________ [insert name of Party A]And___________________________________ [insert name of Party B]This is an agreement between “Party A”, hereinafter called _________________ and “Party B”,hereinafter called ______________________.I. PURPOSE & SCOPEThe purpose of this MOU is to clearly identify the roles and responsibilities of each party as they relate to….In particular, this MOU is intended to:Examples:• Enhance• Increase• Reduce costs• EstablishII. BACKGROUNDBrief description of the parties involved in the MOU with mention of any current/historical ties to this project.III. [PARTY A] RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THIS MOU[Party A] shall undertake the following activities:Examples:• Develop• Deliver• Share• Support• Provide• Promote• Refer• Review• Comply• Train• Maintain records• Sponsor• EvaluateIV. [PARTY B] RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THIS MOU[Party B] shall undertake the following activities:Examples:• Develop• Deliver• Share• Support• Provide• Promote• Refer• Review• Comply• Train• Maintain records• Sponsor• EvaluateV. IT IS MUTUALLY UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED BY AND BETWEEN THEPARTIES THAT:1. Modification2. TerminationVI. FUNDINGThis MOU does (does not) include the reimbursement of funds between the two parties.VII. EFFECTIVE DATE AND SIGNATUREThis MOU shall be effective upon the signature of Parties A and B authorized officials. It shall be inforce from (date) _____ to (date) _____.Parties A and B indicate agreement with this MOU by their signatures.Signatures and dates[Insert name of Party A] [Insert name of Party B]_________________________________ _____________________________________________ Date _________ Date

Since there have been quite a few excellent short and to-the-point answers already, this essay will attempt to delve into the issue at a greater depth. If you’re not interested in the history, please scroll down to the five part question (below the dashed line) and read about whatever you’d wish to know.In 5–10 minutes, you will be equipped with all you need to know about the Indian nuclear story. Please read with full focus as I’ve attempted to touch on almost everything relevant and hence the answer has grown really large.Before we come up to speed with events that have occurred since 2005 and start analyzing them, it is of essence to understand what led to those events. It is also critical to understand how the civil energy program has suffered due to the military program. The questions of existential threat (necessitating the military program) vs. growth of economy (necessitating the civilian power program) come into picture.India's indigenous efforts in nuclear science and technology were established remarkably early. The first steps were taken in 1945 when the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR) was founded with Dr. Homi Jehangir Bhabha as its first Director. After gaining Independence, the new government of India passed the Atomic Energy Act, on 15 April 1948, leading to the establishment of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC).India was heavily involved in the development of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (opened for signature in 1968), but ultimately opted not to sign it (much later). The three pillars on which NPT is based are non-proliferation, disarmament, and the right to peacefully use nuclear technology. India argues that the NPT creates a club of "nuclear haves" and a larger group of "nuclear have-nots" by restricting the legal possession of nuclear weapons to those states that tested them before 1967, but the treaty never explains on what ethical grounds such a distinction is valid. Basically, India felt that the NPT created a "nuclear club" that is divisive, highly discriminatory and unethical.In 1955, construction began on India's first reactor, the 1 MW Apsara research reactor, with British assistance and supplied by enriched Uranium from the UK, it went critical in 1957. Also, in 1955, after intense negotiations, Canada agreed to supply India with a powerful research reactor - the 40 MW Canada-India Reactor (CIR). Since in 1956, the US agreed to supply Heavy Water for the reactor, the reactor was dubbed the Canada-India Reactor, US - written as CIRUS (Later (became critical in 1985) a similar, but much larger Dhruva reactor was also constructed). India was careful to ensure that no effective regulation (no policy on technology transfer, no inspections) would accompany the reactor. India even refused to accept Canadian Uranium and set up a program to manufacture it indigeneously so as to keep complete control of the Plutonium produced there. This became critical in 1960. India also constructed the Phoenix reprocessing plant (operational from 1964) which separates out and yields weapons grade Plutonium (which is what is directly used in making Indian nuclear weapons) from the spent fuel of the Uranium reactors - CIRUS and Dhruva.Now lets look at the civilian program. At around the same time, in 1960, Bhabha envisaged the three stage nuclear plan. The infographic explains it completely (please have a careful look at it). Basically, we are short of Uranium resources to produce enough electricity to meet the energy demands in the long run. On the other hand, we have abundant Thorium reserves - enough to be completely self sufficient in terms of energy for a long, long period of time. The glitch is that Thorium by itself is not fissile. It must be transmuted to Uranium-233 in a reactor fueled by other fissile materials.The first two stages, natural Uranium-fueled heavy water reactors (PHWR’s - to be operational for a period of 30 - 40 years) and plutonium-fueled fast breeder reactors (FBR’s - 50 - 100 years), are intended to generate sufficient fissile material from India's limited Uranium resources and imported Uranium, so that all its vast Thorium reserves can be fully utilized in the third stage of thermal breeder reactors (AHWR’s - 350 - 500 years). As a first step, discussions with the US to establish power plants at Tarapur were held in 1960–61. Discussions with Canada to help assist in the construction and fuel supply of two power projects in Rajasthan were also held. Please note that at this point of time, nuclear energy was a hot prospect. Every country wanted to research it’s production. There was no concept of Solar Energy - or a visible Renewable Energy paradigm shift, as yet.Come 1962, India suffered a defeat in a war with China. Calls for Soviet help weren’t answered as they were themselves involved in the Cuban Missile Crisis. This, coupled with China’s 1964 nuclear tests, strengthened the Indian resolve to develop her own nuclear weapons for deterrence. Then came the 1965 war with Pakistan. Though India was victorious, she faced the serious threat of Chinese nuclear action and the US refused help citing Vietnam. Come 1971 and its the Bangladesh Liberation war and India was successful at helping Bangladesh gain its independence. The US went so far as to send a Carrier Battle Group to the Bay of Bengal. Only the Soviet involvement prevented the situation from escalating further. It was clear by now that India had to have her own nuclear weapons to establish her credentials on the world stage and to be safe from a very real existential threat.All along, Dr. Bhabha and the Jana Sangh party (which later became the BJP - one rising leader of the party who captured attention was Atal Behari Vajpayee) had pushed along the need for a nuclear weapon. Though he had to face three Prime Ministers - Nehru, Shastri (a staunch Gandhian) and Indira Gandhi, he was successful in convincing them of the need for a nuclear test. The civilian program had taken a back seat all along. He’d, under the guise of a PNE (Peaceful Nuclear Explosion - nuclear explosions conducted for non military purposes such as activities related to economic development including the creation of canals), set up a team of scientists who were working overtime on the project. Based on Soviet design, the team built the PURNIMA reactor ( became critical in 1972) - a pulsed fast reactor which could be used to study the fission bomb behaviour. These developments culminated in the Smiling Buddha test of 1974 (test site shown above after the test). Most believe that the material for this bomb came from the Canadian supplied CIRUS reactor (using American Heavy Water) which was mentioned earlier. Note that this test did not establish India as a nuclear weapons state as it was called a PNE and there have also been various debates about the yield. Possessing nuclear capability is not enough. This capability should be shown to the world for it to actually serve as a credible deterrent.Canada cutoff all nuclear ties with India in the aftermath. The US wasn’t so critical at first (as it was still in the process of restoring damaged ties following 1971) and said that the tests did not violate any agreement and even shipped Uranium to Tarapur (mentioned earlier) Later, it reacted much more severely and increased military aid to Pakistan. The most important event in the aftermath though, is the formation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The Indian test had clearly demonstrated that certain non-weapons specific nuclear technology could be readily turned to weapons development. Nations already signatories of the NPT saw the need to further limit the export of nuclear equipment, materials or technology which is the NSG’s objective. India was excluded and no nation was willing to do any kind of nuclear business (technology transfer, reactor sale, Uranium sale) with her. Thus, India could not tap into the immense potential of guaranteed, cheap power of nuclear technology and its civilian power program stagnated. The only project actively undertaken was on Dhruva (mentioned earlier) and India got some Uranium from the Soviets in 1976–77, albeit with safeguards.Up until 1989, there was very little progress in both the civilian and the military programs. Indian concerns about Pakistan and its nuclear military program began to grow beginning from 1978. In India, the nuclear program was in control of the civilian government and the military had no say (interest) in it whatsoever and this changed only after the mid 1980’s. In Pakistan though, on many an occasion, the political establishment had no clue about what the military was up-to with regard to the military program. Pakistani scientist AQ Khan was an expert at boasting about Pakistan’s nuclear prowess.On the other hand, India, in 1983, under APJ Abdul Kalam, began work on the ballistic missile program. The work was begun on the Prithvi missiles and in the early 1990’s on the Agni missiles. The reason for this haste was that India had correctly anticipated the tightening of international restrictions on the export of missile technology, which was realized as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MCTR) (informal and voluntary partnership between 35 countries to prevent proliferation of missile and UAV technology) that was signed in 1987.Due to the nuclear embargo in place, the cut-off of legal external supplies of heavy water and the failure of Indian domestic production efforts created a serious problem for India's reactor projects in the 1980s. This affected not only Dhruva, but a number of civilian reactors. India resolved the problem through covert means, importing over 180 tonnes of heavy water from China (60 tonnes), Norway (15 tonnes), and the Soviet Union (at least 4.7 tonnes) through a German middleman, Alfred Hempel by the end of 1983. None of the supplier nations knew of the destination of these shipments, and the revelation that India was receiving Hempel's shipments probably caused the cessation of supply from China and Norway. In the early 1980s it was clear that none of India's principal problems - economic development and internal stability - could be aided with nuclear weapons, a fact that diverted interest in testing or deployment. Further tests would have led to severe reactions by the US and the economy was not in a position to be hit by sanctions. Coming up to the 1990’s, the civilian reactors operational at this point of time were at Tarapur, Kakrapar, Madras, Narora and Rajasthan. (shown above - Kaiga began operations only in the 2000’s) Canada was responsible for the development of the earliest CANDU (CANada Deuterium Uranium) reactors in India. After the Indo-Canada nuclear cooperation came to halt in 1974, India continued to design her indigenous reactors based on CANDU. Thus, all of the Indian indigenous civil power generating reactors are CANDU based and operate outside the realm of safeguards. The fuel for these reactors was sourced as described above. In addition, India used her own Uranium resources, France supplied Uranium in the mid 1980’s and China in the mid 1990’s - both under safeguards. (I’ve been unable to find the rationale behind the Chinese decision to sell Uranium knowingly. Please do comment if you find some information - Edit: Please refer to Animesh Panda (अनिमेष पंडा)’s comment. It does shed some light on this matter) The development was very sluggish and as you can figure out, there is no public face for the Indian civilian power program as opposed to the weapons program which had scientists like Ramanna and now Kakodkar leading it.Then came the 1991 Economic Crisis. India had to put various austerity measures in place and the government came up with the liberalization policy which led to economic growth. During the period of austerity before the growth, the facilities at the indigenous Uranium mining plants weren’t improved and this would later result in an acute fuel shortage in the 2000’s for the civilian reactors. News of the advancement in the Pakistani weapons program caused some concern. Yet, due to the threat of economic sanctions (India had an eye to improve relations with the US after the fall of the Soviet regime at the end of the Cold War in the 1990’s), and though India had started stockpiling weapons as early as the mid 1990’s, no tests were conducted. In 1996, heavy pressure was put on India to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) (by which states agree to ban all nuclear explosions in all environments, for military or civilian purposes) India did not sign this as she felt that this treaty did not mean anything for the states which already had nuclear weapons (there was no disarmament proposal) while states like India would be hard done by and would forever be a second tier state. PM IK Gujral had this to say "I told President Clinton that when my third eye looks at the door of the Security Council chamber it sees a little sign that says 'only those with economic power or nuclear weapons allowed.' I said to him, 'it is very difficult to achieve economic wealth'." When the BJP came to power in 1998 with a coalition government, AB Vajpayee became the PM and he was always a staunch nuclear advocate. With all of the above factors coming into the picture, he authorized the tests. This led to the Pokhran II tests. India was now a nuclear weapon state with a nuclear arsenal in place. Efforts on nuclear weapon delivery systems like the ballistic missiles and fitting it on the IAF planes had also made progress. The US immediately placed an economic embargo on India. But since trade formed only 4% of the GDP and Indo-US trade was 10% of that, the Indian economy was not greatly affected by these sanctions. What followed were the Pakistani tests. This was followed quickly by the Kargil war of 1999. The US sanctions were lifted in 2001 but the diplomatic relations were not restored.Since India had just conducted her tests and was a non signatory to the NPT - and thereby could not receive imports, and since her Uranium production was not enough to supply for both the civil and the military programs, the Indian civil power generation reactors faced a severe shortage of Uranium in the early 2000’s and power production was crippled with the power output being nowhere near what was originally planned for stage I of the three-stage plan. Now there is an argument about why we need the Indo-US N deal when Russia is ready to supply us with reactors and fuel. Russia is a signatory to the NPT and belongs to the NSG. It stopped supply of Uranium to the Tarapur plant in 2004 citing that it was bound by the NSG guidelines. So we cannot rely solely on a single supplier for technology, reactors and Uranium.——————————————————————————————————————————————Now we’re at a stage where we can start discussing about the Indo-US Nuclear deal. Let’s do this in parts -Part I) What is the Indo-US Nuclear deal.Part II) What is the current energy scenario and why might we need the deal. At the same time we’ll also take a look at the American incentives to sign the deal.Part III) What are the concerns and the cons of the deal. What was the impasse about and what was the breakthrough achieved.Part IV) How have the nuclear relations between India and the other nations fared since the deal was signed.Part V) How would this deal effect the nuclear weapons program.Part I)What is the Indo-US Nuclear deal.As per the deal, India agreed to separate its civilian and military nuclear activity and open up the civilian part to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In return, the US offered to resume full nuclear trade (selling of reactors, transfer of technology, Uranium sale) with India, ending its nuclear ostracism. This U.S.-India deal took more than three years to come to fruition as it had to go through several complex stages, including amendment of U.S. domestic law, especially the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, a civil-military nuclear Separation Plan in India, an India-IAEA safeguards (inspections) agreement and the grant of an exemption for India by the NSG. 22 nuclear facilities have been placed under IAEA safeguards so far. The remaining nuances will be taken up in the other parts of the question.Part II)What is the current energy scenario and why might we need the deal. At the same time we’ll also take a look at the American incentives to sign the deal.Lets look at why we might need the deal first.If Indian economy is to grow at 7–8% for the next 25-year period of 2006 to 2032, total power generation capacity has to increase at 6–7% per annum. As the fissile material growth rate (India has not been able to step into the stage 2 of the three stage plan due to the reasons analyzed previously and is still in stage 1 and without imported Uranium, stepping into stage 2, while at the same time producing enough power to meet the requirements, is impossible) does not meet this objective, it becomes necessary to look at alternative approaches for obtaining the fissile material. It was realized that the best way to get access to the requisite fissile material would be through uranium imports, which was not possible without ending India’s nuclear isolation by US and the NSG. This deal would partially assuage our energy security concerns and access to uninterrupted reliable power would also aid in industrial growth under the Make In India scheme and would bring in foreign investment. Also, the stagnant Indian civilian nuclear program, which is entirely reliant on dated CANDU reactors, can now look to buy better reactors, not just from the US, but from other NSG states. It also gets access to better technologies in the civilian power generation ambit.Strategically, this deal recognizes India as a de-facto nuclear power and has taken the weak (before the deal) Indo-US relations (in all matters including political, economic, military, etc) to the next level (the N deal has turned into a flag-point for Indo-US relations). The US views India as a possible counter to China in the Asian region and this is good for India. By getting the NSG waiver, India can now look to have nuclear ties will all the other NSG signatories.The Agreement provides (as of 2015, India is building a strategic reserve) for the development of a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India’s reactors. This is essential as we do not want to face a repeat of the scenario in the early 2000’s when our reactors were critically short of fuel. Since the deal, the power production in all the reactors has greatly increased due to the Uranium imports. Another important point would be that the US has agreed to remove the tracking clause (as of 2015) which was one of the reasons for the impasse. The US had initially wanted to track all the nuclear material used, though the IAEA tracking is already in place. India had argued that such a clause is superfluous and intrusive.Now lets take a look at the US rationale behind the deal.The US wants to bring India closer to the Non Proliferation regime by placing most of its nuclear capabilities under IAEA safeguards. This is the first step towards achieving that end.Financially, the U.S. also expects that such a deal could spur India's economic growth and bring in $150 billion in the next decade for nuclear power plants, of which the U.S. wants a share. It also was under pressure from other nations to allow Uranium sale to India as India is one of the largest buyers of Uranium and everyone wants a share of this market. The US may also benefit from Indian technology, especially the Thorium based research, as India had to develop it’s capabilities in isolation, it may well have developed novel techniques.Strategically, this deal helps bring India closer to the US as before it, all cooperation was hampered because both nations did not see eye to eye on the nuclear issue. India can be a useful counter to China in Asia and the US does not want to let go of this opportunity.PART III)What are the concerns and the cons of the deal. What was the impasse about and what was the breakthrough achieved.The first concern that I would like to bring up is that of the necessity of nuclear power. Some analysts have asked the fundamental question as to why do we have to depend on unsafe, costly nuclear power when it’s the time for renewable and clean energy sources like solar and wind energy. Financially, solar and wind energy are already becoming more attractive than nuclear. Electricity from these renewable sources cost Rs 8 and Rs 4.5 per unit respectively. If it is ever built, electricity from the Westinghouse reactors will cost Rs 12 per unit (after taking the insurance pool cost into account) Even in the US, no new reactors are being planned and the people are growing wary of nuclear energy. Safety concerns are also a big question after the Fukushima Daiichi disaster. Do we have to pay such a great price for diplomatic cooperation with the US? Or is it the case of the future Thorium prospects which is luring us into this deal? Then there is also the case of weaning away from the 3 phase plan - given that we get cheap Uranium readily as a result of this deal, what is the guarantee that we will invest in the research required to move into the second and third stage of the plan ?(The BHAVINI reactor - an FBR of the second stage - has still not achieved criticality) Will it become a case of acquire in haste, repent at leisure..?The second concern is about certain facts presented to the US Congress by the Bush administration. In particular, portions of the agreement dealing with guaranteeing India a fuel supply or allowing India to maintain a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel appear to be diametrically opposed to what the Indian parliament was led to expect from the agreement. India will not be allowed to stockpile such nuclear fuel stocks as to undercut American leverage to re-impose sanctions. But reports in 2015 indicate that the US is willing to help with the Indian strategic reserves.The next concern is a major one concerning liability in case of a mishap. A breakthrough regarding this was recently achieved in 2015 and this is a great point of concern especially when the Fukushima disaster is put into perspective. Damages arising from nuclear accidents can run into billions of dollars, including compensation, relocation and rehabilitation, environmental remediation and lost trade due to contaminated agricultural and marine produce. The Indian Nuclear Liability Act of 2010, which was drawn up to help reactor manufacturing companies get insurance cover in their home states, is very controversial. Especially after what happened in the aftermath of the Bhopal Gas Tragedy, critics have said that it is too weak and that in case of a mishap, it lets off the reactor manufacturers easily while placing pressure on the Government to cover up. As per International norms, it is the organization which runs the power plant which is supposed to provide compensation. In the US, it is the private companies which run the power plants, while in India, it is run by the state owned NPCIL which makes the government bear the brunt. Major American companies, eagerly waiting to sell civilian nuclear technology to India, have refused to accept any liability placing the entire onus, even in the case of manufacturing defects, upon the operator alone. The Indian government has come up with an Insurance pool of Rs. 1500 crore of which Rs. 750 crore would be paid by the government. There is no clarity about the other half - as to whether it will be Indian insurance corporations or the American ones. All in all, this significantly adds up to the cost of producing nuclear power and critics ask is it worth it?The Communist parties had concerns that the deal would undermine the sovereignty of India and compromise foreign policy and also claimed that the Indian government was hiding certain clauses of the deal, which would harm India's indigenous nuclear program. One of their concerns is that this might just be the first step in bringing all Indian reactors under safeguards. We’ve already had to shut down the CIRUS reactor as a result of the deal. What if we’re asked to stop other military usage reactors?One of the other issues is the sale of enrichment and reprocessing technologies (ENR) to India. While the 2008 NSG decision allowed its members to sell sensitive nuclear technologies to India, NSG’s 2011 decision to limit the scope of the transfer of nuclear technologies to non-NPT countries has complicated India’s ability to acquire ENR technologies. ENR technologies are important for India to acquire adequate commercial uranium enrichment capacity so as to reduce dependence on advanced nuclear states for the supply of nuclear fuel. For instance Japan wants spent fuel to be sent back to it for reprocessing. Animesh Panda (अनिमेष पंडा)’s comment helps us again with further insight. Please do have a look below.PART IV)How have the nuclear relations between India and the other nations fared since the deal was signed.Firstly, the ties between India and the US have greatly improved. The US has become India’s largest trading partner in goods and services and ambitious future goals have been set. There has been increased cooperation in the Counter Terrorism and Intelligence spheres. The US has also become of the major suppliers of Arms to India. The US has refused to yield to Pakistan’s demands of a similar deal. While traditional differences between Delhi and Washington on global issues have endured, the two sides are now avoiding confrontation in multilateral fora dealing with trade and climate change. None of these developments would have been possible without the civil nuclear initiative that generated greater trust and provided the enabling environment for broadening the partnership.Without the NSG waiver, which it would not have got without the Indo-US nuclear deal, India would not have been able to sign nuclear deals with the other countries. The signing of the N deal in 2008 was quickly followed by agreements with Russia (sale of reactors and fuel as well as freedom to proceed with the closed fuel cycle including reprocessing of spent fuel) in 2008 and 2009, France in 2008 and 2010 (setting up of reactors in India and sale of Uranium for 25 years), Mongolia in 2009 (sale of Mongolian Uranium to India), Namibia in 2009 (sale of Uranium), Argentina in 2009 (exchange of technology and broad cooperation), Canada in 2010 and 2012 (reactor technology and Uranium sale), Kazakhstan in 2011 (sale of Uranium), South Korea in 2011 (bid to construct reactors in India), Australia in 2014 (sale of Uranium), UK (broad cooperation) and Japan in 2015 (still not a full agreement - broad cooperation and help with reactor technology - Japanese components are widely used in the reactors of French company Areva and the American companies GE and Westinghouse and their approval is necessary before these companies can sell reactors to India). After decades of isolation, the NSG waiver has quickly paved the way for nuclear cooperation with other nations.PART V)How would this deal effect the nuclear weapons program.This deal in no way harms the military nuclear program. India currently has a stockpile of around 110 weapons and the reactors of the military program will not be under the IAEA ambit. By using the imported Uranium for power generation, we can free up the indigenous Uranium for military usage if needed (currently our policy is about having a minimum credible deterrent with no first use and this means that there is no need for stockpiling) India is almost a nuclear triad and will become one when the INS Arihant (an SSBN equipped with the Sagarika missiles whose reactor was built with Russian assistance) is commissioned (land - ballistic missiles like the Agni V and Prithvi - and air strike - nuclear capable fighter aircraft like the Mirage, Sukhoi Su 30, MiG 29, Jaguar - capabilities are already under the control of the Strategic Forces Command) We are not obliged to sign the MCTR as far as the N deal is concerned. The N deal does not place any restrictions on further Indian nuclear tests, though all ties would be cut if such a test does take place. This would have been the case even if there had been no deal.To conclude, the facts have been presented and it’s up-to you to form your opinions as to whether the India-US nuclear deal, as it stands, is a boon or a bane. Please do comment and offer your opinion if you’d like to.