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There are several “levels” of Air Traffic controller, and not all of them work in a “Tower”.Indeed the controllers up in the Tower actually only control aircraft close to their airport, at most about 10 miles distant, and under 3000 feet.People in the towers can see aircraft on the ground with their eyes by looking out the window, and do actually use this as a controlling technique, ensuring that all parts of the aircraft have passed the hold-short lines before the next aircraft on the runway is cleared to land/takeoff. And to see other things that may not have a transponder, like cars, trucks, people, bags and the occasional animal or flock of birds.Then there are the Radar controllers. They are in an office building, often without any windows. They control hundreds, thousands, even tens of thousands of square miles of airspace using radar, ADS-B and predictive estimate computer software to control aircraft tens of thousand of feet high, hundreds of miles away, that may never even be touching down in the country they live in.Different countries sometimes do their handling of flightplans differently. There seems to be a reasonably significant difference between the FAA / North American method, and the ICAO methods you may find in Europe, Africa, Asia, South America, The Pacific Islands and Australia.There’s also some difference between your Airliner flying at high altitude on an IFR flight plan, and a small private propeller plane doing a low altitude flight flying VFR.These 2 aircraft, a Cessna 172, and a Boeing 747, would both be talking to the same controller on the same frequency, but their flight plans are likely to be wildly different… indeed, the Cessna may not even <have> a flight plan in the system beyond their departure direction and the expectation to leave controlled airspace in about 15 miles.Trent Hopkinson's answer to How do pilots change the radio to ATC?While the Cessna pilot either filed a flight plan themselves (or didn’t file one at all, it’s optional in the USA) The pilots of the 747 probably had their company dispatch office file a flightplan for them. Depending where they are flying to, the STAR (Standard Terminal Arrival Route) may be filed in their flight plan (USA, Canada, Caribbean) It also may not be (Europe, Australia, Asia, Africa etc)Lets plug in a flight plan in the United States because… reasons. Today we will fly United flight 530, with strangely no other aircraft in the airspace :P because it’s easier to type that way. Normally there will be more considerations because Air Traffic Controllers will be dealing with hundreds of other aircraft in their airspace at the same time requiring altitude holds, vectors for traffic, restricted climbs and descents that are given out in stages. But for this example, we will be the only aircraft in the sky. The only altitude restrictions will be sector boundaries and Airspace structure under standard LOA agreements between sectors. Everything else is as planned.United (UA) #530 ✈ 19-Jan-2019 ✈ KMSP - KDEN ✈ FlightAwareUnited Airlines flight 530 from Minneapolis to Denver.Routing via SCHEP9 ONL KIPPR51 hour 36 minutes.450 knots True airspeed. 36000ft altitude. SCHEP9 Instrument Departure to ONeill ONL. and the KIPPR5 Instrument arrival from ONL.All of this information is provided to the pilots from the Dispatchers, and the Routing information is provided to the Air Traffic Controllers via the flight plan filing. Basically all the ATC need is:Aircraft CallsignAircraft typeRouteAltitudeSpeed at cruiseDeparture timeEstimated enroute timeArrival timeThey don’t really care about other operational factors that the pilots need, such as Weight, fuel on board (other than to ensure it will actually have enough in time.) cargo, passengers, landing weight, that kind of thing. ATC’s job is to keep the planes safe without touching each other, and to get them on and off the runway efficiently. Things like managing fuel is the Pilot’s job.The Captain confirms that the Fuel truck puts the right amount of the correct type of liquid in the tank, manages the fuel pumps from the cockpit.. details ATC can’t help with, and won’t ask about unless there’s an emergency declared. (Sometimes they want the weight/volume of fuel on board so they can tell fire fighters what to expect).Let’s study the flight plan for UAL530. It’s an easy one, because it involves a Departure to a transition point. and an Arrival from that very same transition point.The aircraft will have to depart from (a runway that hasn’t been specified), and climb to at least 3500ft before reaching 5 miles away from MSP, which is a VOR navigation radio with DME Distance measuring equipment located with it.After takeoff from a runway, (The chart notes that there are options for runway 17, Runway 30L and 30R, Runway 12L and 12R) The Flight Plan states that the aircraft will follow the SCHEP9 arrival.This suggests that at some point the aircraft will be able to pick up a course bearing 232 degrees, and fly directly over any number of waypoints such as HUGIR, which is 20 miles away from MSP, then to MCONL, which is 12 miles from HUGIR, then to ARREX, 16 miles from MCONL, then to SCHEP, which it will pass above 7000ft (and is 66 miles from MSP).After SCHEP it will be above 9000ft and fly the remaining 60 miles to the OTG radio navigation beacon, crossing OTG above 16000ft.Passing OTG, the aircraft will turn to track the 236 degree outbound course for 154 miles to the ONL beacon.The aircraft has filed that it is capable of navigating from the intercepting of the 232 degree radial from MSP at or after 7 miles, and is capable of being directed to go to either HUGIR, MCONL, ARREX or SCHEP from any location as the ATC sees fit, then continuing from there on to OBH and ONL above 16000ft without any further assistance by ATC.So how do you get from here:To flying over ONL at 36000ft?Pilot to Clearance Delivery ATCMinneapolis Delivery, United 530 requesting IFR to Denver.Clearance Delivery ATC to PilotsUnited 530, you are cleared to Denver Airport via SCHEP 9 departure, then as filed, except climb 7000, Expect Flight Level 360 ten minutes after departure. Departure frequency is 125.75, Squawk 4207.Pilot confirms in readbackWe’re in USA, not other places such as “Rest of the world”, so “Climb 7000, Squawk 4207” is enough.> Bunch of piloty stuff happens here. Doors are closed, push back truck is attached, Aircraft is made ready to start engines, all the before start checks and flows are done. PLANE READY TO GO.Pilot contacts ramp controlRamp, United 530, gate Echo 7, ready to push.~~ Bunch of rampy stuff happens here. Tow truck pushes the plane out. Pilots start the engines, Flight attendants do the safety brief, Tow truck gets clear, Before taxi checklist done, plane is ready to fly.Pilot contacts Ground controlMinneapolis Ground, United 530 Information [ATIS designator], gate E7 on Quebec Ready to taxi.Then the Ground controller looks out their big windows, sees the United 737 that’s sitting there next to gate E7 on taxiway Q, and tells them where to go.Ground control to PilotsUnited 530, taxi to runway 30L via Quebec, Delta, Bravo, Alpha 1 hold point.(The pilots read back. “Taxi 30 left via Quebec, Delta, Bravo Hold Alpha 1, United 530”)As the aircraft arrives near A1 holding point, the Ground controller tells the pilots to contact the Tower controller frequency.Ground control to PilotsUnited 530, Monitor Tower on 126.70The pilots read back“Monitor tower, 126.70 good day”. and switch frequency. (A good pilot would then set the standby radio to 125.75 as per the Clearance Delivery earlier).Some time later, without the pilots having broadcast anything…Tower control to PilotsUnited 530, runway 30 Left, line up and wait.Pilots read backLine up and wait, 30 Left, United 530.and after a minute or two.Tower control to PilotsUnited 530, After departure, turn left heading 220, wind calm, Runway 30 Left, Cleared for Takeoff.Pilot to Tower ControlLeft Heading 220. Runway 30 Left, Cleared for takeoff, United 530.Takeoff. Gear up. Acceleration height, Climb speed, Left turn to the heading 220 happens all without any further instruction from Tower.Tower control to PilotsUnited 530 contact Departure.Pilot readbackContact departure United 530<Pilot monitoring switches to 125.75 on the radio>Pilot to Departure controlMinneapolis Departure, United 530 climbing 7000 leaving (the current altitude)Departure control to PilotsUnited 530, identified, Climb 1 6 thousand 16000ft Track direct to HUGIR and resume the SCHEP9 departure.Readback to Departure controlClimb 16000 track direct HUGIR to resume SCHEP9 departure, United 530.then, some time laterDeparture control to PilotsUnited 530, contact Minneapolis Centre on 125.65 good day.Pilot ReadbackContact Minneapolis 125.60, United 530.The pilot switches the radio frequency over.Pilot to Centre controllerMinneapolis Centre, United 530 on climb 16000ft leaving (current altitude).Centre controller to PilotsUnited 530, Track Direct SCHEP. Climb Flight Level 360.Pilot ReadbackDirect SCHEP, Climb Flight Level 360, United 530The aircraft will climb to 36000ft, and on reaching SCHEP will turn to OTG, then to ONL all on it’s own, probably without even talking to the Air Traffic Controller again while it does so.Before reaching ONL, the pilots will need to enter the STAR into their navigation system to ensure the aircraft continues along the filed flight plan into the KIPPR5 arrival.Passing ONL, the aircraft will track the 108 miles to YANKI, then the 20 miles to CAAST, then 35 miles to CTFSH, 20 miles to BRRUK, 42 miles to DORSL, then the 28 miles to LIBIE (where it merges with traffic from SNY and BFF), then 11 miles to ANCHR at or above 17000ft, and then to LANDR at between 17000ft and 19000ft at a speed of 250 knots, and on to page 2Passing LANDR, the aircraft should fly the 17 miles to HIGUN, where it will be at 14000ft and 210 knots. Then the 9 miles to KIPPR where it will pass at 12000ft and 210 knots.If the radio on the plane broke, they would then fly the ILS to runway 17RSo from KIPPR at an altitude of 12000ft and speed of 210 knots, the plane would track 2.9 miles to TARIE, then to HALDO, then to HEETT and cross HISSY at 12000ft before descending to 11000ft over 2.8 miles to HOOPE.Then it’d use the Instrument landing system which broadcasts on a radio frequency of 108.5 to track the 173 degree inbound course to the runway, passing JAPEX at above 9600ft, JOMAG above 9000, JOSEE above 8000 and JOULE at 7000. If the runway was not visible before passing an altitude of 5592 feet, the pilots would climb again and fly the missed approach, climbing to 10000 on heading 173 and on FQF VORTAC radial 197 to HOHUM intersection and hold.The pilots program all of this into the FMC and their ILS radios and minimum altitude callout system. ATC hasn’t said anything yet since the Climb to FL360.Minneapolis Centre to PilotsUnited 530, Contact Denver Centre on 120.575Pilot ReadbackOver to Denver on 120.575, United 530.Pilot to Denver CentreDenver Centre, United 530 maintaining Flight Level 360.Denver Centre to PilotsUnited 530, Roger.minutes pass.Denver Centre to PilotsUnited 530, descend via the KIPPR 5 arrival, Denver Altimeter 30.07Pilots to Denver CentreDescend via the KIPPER 5 arrival, Altimeter 30.07A pilot changes the autopilot altitude from 36000 to 12000, leaving it in VNAV altitude mode. The autopilot decides when the plane descends.Eventually the calculated Top of Descent is reached and the autopilot initiates descent.With both LNAV and VNAV modes active on the autopilot, and 12,000ft set in the MCP altitude window, the aircraft should meet all the altitude requirements of the STAR assuming the wind predictions entered into the FMS by the pilots or ACARS is accurate.Altitude, Direction / Speed -Temperature in Celsius.A pilot plugged those in during cruise, and both pilots checked it against the printed flight plan, didn’t they?And someone listened to the Denver Automatic terminal information service too yea? 125.6. Use Com 2.Denver Airport Information Tango. Expect Runway 17 Left and 16 R for arrivals. Runway 17 Right and Runway 16 Left for departures. Expect ILS then Visual approach when Visual. Wind 070 at 5 knots. Altimeter 30.07. Visibility 50 miles. CAVOK.So the plane is happily autopilot it’s way down the STAR now, Altimeter counting through the thousands of feet. Pilots doing the occasional gross error check with the odd 3 times table comparing distance to altitude, and the odd 5 times table comparing ground speed to descent rate when somewhere after passing 29,000ft…Denver Centre to PilotsUnited 530, contact Denver Approach on 124.95Pilots read backContact Approach on 124.95124.95 is dialed in and made active.Pilots to Denver ApproachDenver Approach, United 530 descending via the KIPPR5 leaving (current altitude) Information Tango.Denver Approach to PilotsUnited 530, Denver Approach, Descend to cross KIPPR at 12 thousand 210 knots, Altimeter 30.07, Assigned runway 17 Left, expect Visual approach.Pilot reads backDescend to cross KIPPR at 12000, 210 knots, Altimeter 30.07, runway 17 Left. United 530.The pilots then look at the ILS runway 17 Right approach data they had all set up ready to go and throw that chart away, and grab the 17 Left approach and make the change into the FMS as required.No longer flying from KIPPR - TARIE - HALDO - HEETT - HISSY - HOOPE, the flight will now fly direct from KIPPR to GAPPY, then GIRTH and GOLFN to GWENS where it will intercept the ILS Localizer on frequency 110.15, pass GRIFS and HALTR at 9000ft, then start down the glideslope to pass HHOLT at 8000, IRINE at 7000 and down to the missed approach altitude of 5539 feet. The missed is to climb to 5900ft then turn left to heading 120 while climbing to 10000ft to the LIMEX intersection to hold.Radio frequencies are changed. Minimum altitude settings are changed. The FMS is checked for no duplicate waypoints or discontinuities. The Ground chart is extracted, but the runway is the same length. The runway threshold height is different and the Land Altitude on the pressurization system is adjusted down a few feet.Looks like we’ll have to taxi further, but vacating on P4 looks good, and is equivalent to vacating at M4 on the other runway. Autobrake setting is kept.The aircraft is nearing KIPPR, the speed is 210 knots, on the flap marker for flap 1.Denver approachUnited 530 Contact Finals approach on 120.80Pilot reads backContact Approach 120.80, United 530.The frequency is keyed inPilot to Denver ApproachDenver Approach, United 530 crossing KIPPR at 12000.Denver ApproachUnited 530, cancel STAR, turn left heading 210 descend 9000.Pilot readbackHeading Left 210 Descend 9000, United 530.The heading mode is selected, and the heading bug moved to 210. The MCP altitude window is changed to 9000, and the autopilot is taken out of VNAV mode into one of the other modes such as V/S, or FLCH.Denver Approach to PilotsUnited 530, airport is to your 11 o’clock, report in sight.Pilot flying to Pilot MonitoringI have itPilot Monitoring to Denver ApproachUnited 530 is visual, field in sight.Denver ApproachUnited 530, you are cleared visual approach runway 17 Left. Contact the tower on 132.35Pilot Monitoring to Denver ApproachCleared Visual Approach runway 17 Left, Over to Tower on 132.35, United 530.Radio Frequency changed.Pilot to Denver Tower.Denver Tower, United 530 final 17 Left.Denver Tower - confirms there are no aircraft or vehicles on the runway by looking at it, and remembering if anyone was there.If: vehicle on the runway, Then: United 530 continue approach.Or: If no vehicle on runway, then:United 530, Wind 070 5 knots, runway 17 Left Cleared to Land.Pilot readbackRunway 17 Cleared to Land, United 530.And then the pilot lands the plane on 17 Left at Denver Airport.(Video of a 737 landing on runway 16 Right at Denver Airport).Other countries do things slightly different. In Australia, For instance, the flight plan is filed without the SID/STAR. Instead the flightplan is made up of Airways that terminate at the Airport or transition point. For example the route between Melbourne and Sydney isML H129 DOSEL Y59 TESATMelbourne’s VOR/DME navigation aid. via the H129 airway to DOSEL, then the Y59 airway to the GPS derived waypoint TESAT (which happens to be located at the same location as the Sydney DME station SY).On receiving a clearance at Melbourne, the Pilots would receive a departure clearance via the DOSEL9 Departure if using runway 34, 16 or 27… or the ML5 departure if using runway 09… unless the are a Turboprop like a Q400 whereby they’d get the ML5 departure for the other runways too…The STAR would not be given during Departure at all, and instead is given by a Centre controller enroute. ExampleMelbourne Centre to Qantas flight 490, cruising at 37000ft going from Melbourne to SydneyQantas 490, Arrival clearance available advise ready to copy.Qantas 490Ready to copy, Qantas 490.Melbourne CentreQantas 490 cleared to Sydney via the RIVET2 arrival, runway 34 Left. When ready, descend to Flight Level 210.Qantas 490Cleared to Sydney via the RIVET2 arrival, runway 34 Left. Descend Flight Level 210 when ready.later:Melbourne Centre:Qantas 490, Descend via the STAR to 10,000ft, QNH 1024.Qantas 490Descend 10,000ft via the STAR, QNH1024, Qantas 490.Then:Melbourne Centre:Qantas 490, Contact Sydney Approach on 124.40Qantas 490Sydney Approach 124.40, Qantas 490.For the most part though, the basics are the same, just that outside the USA, the SID Departure route is given by the Clearance Delivery or Ground controller, and the STAR initial arrival route is given by the Centre controller to the Pilots, instead of the company dispatch filing it in the plan.TL;DR - It depends what kind of flight you are flying, how high you are going, and What country you are flying in.

HMS Splendid today (Royal Navy Photo)POSSUB, HMS Splendid (Malvinas / Falklands 1982)SHARE:On May 5, 1982, at 0705 am, the aircraft carrier (PAL) of the Argentine Navy “May 25” was catapulted, while it was sailing near Faro Punta Lobos, in the Province of Chubut, the aircraft S-2E Tracker number 2AS-23, with the mission of locating the Notice ARA Alferez Sobral.ANTI-SUBMARINE OPERATIONS ON MAY 5, 1982.Contact within 10 miles!On May 5, 1982, at 0705 am, the aircraft carrier (PAL) of the Argentine Navy “May 25” was catapulted, while it was sailing near Faro Punta Lobos, in the Province of Chubut, the aircraft S-2E Tracker number 2AS-23, with the mission of locating the Notice ARA Alferez Sobral.The Warning had been attacked a few days before, in circumstances of having penetrated the total exclusion zone delimited by the enemy forces, in search of the downed crew of a Canberra bomber of the Argentine Air Force.The Tracker, configured for surface exploration (and lacking a magnetic anomaly detector - MAD, and sonobuoy receiver [iii]), was under the command of Lieutenant Carlos Cal. [Iv]Rare photo of Tracker plane in operations on the deck of PAL "May 25" Anonymous author (an attempt has been made to locate him)Taking an SSE heading, he adopted a surface search pattern, and 38 minutes later, flying at 2000 meters with clear skies, sea and calm wind [v], he detected a small contact on his AN / APS-88A radar, which he decided to investigate. .Having landed the aircraft three minutes later on the data point (located at latitude 44 ° 20'S longitude 64 ° 40'W), the crew visually observed the wake of a point object, similar to a periscope / snorkel / radio mast / etc.submarine (there are different versions of whether or not the indicated appendix was crowned by a small cloud of smoke) disappearing from the surface, while the echo on the radar disappeared.Taking into account that the FT79 commander had ordered to attack submarine contacts classified as possible [vi], the aircraft commander ordered the launch of a Mk-44 torpedo and a passive sonobuoy.However, no explosion could be observed, as well as the torpedo's run could not be followed because the aircraft lacked the suitable equipment.Seeing the lack of means to effectively reuse its weapons, the explorer Tracker, after remaining in orbit, returned to its original surface search mission. [Vii]At 0805 am, and after Naval Lieutenant Cal reported the antisubmarine attack, the helicopter "Sea King" 2-H-231 takes off from the aircraft carrier, with Lieutenant Osvaldo Iglesias in the cockpit, as well as 0847 2-H-232 takes off, under the command of Lieutenant Commander Norberto Barro, Commander of the Squadron.A minute later, Tracker 2-AS-24 is catapulted, in ASW configuration and under the command of Lieutenant Enrique Fortini.The aircraft head towards the data point, and at it, the 2-H-231 antisubmarine search begins with the ASQ-13A sonar, beginning the typical “jumps” that the use of the listening system requires, the other helicopter having problems with said sensor. [viii]At 0910, 2-H-231 obtains a hydrophonic sound in sonar and updates the data point at latitude 44º27'S and longitude 64º19'W.Likewise and in the meantime, the Tracker launches three Jezebel sonobuoys (LOFAR) in the Alpha trajectory, obtaining noise of the propellers in them [ix], as well as various MAD contacts (which are classified as “not submarine”).At 10:06 the 2-H-232 obtained a new contact in its sonar, appreciating that the contact increased its speed and making a plot coherent with that of a submarine [x].Taking this into account, it proceeds to guide the aircraft to carry out a torpedo attack, finally launching a new Mk-44 antisubmarine torpedo at latitude 44º33'S and longitude 64º16'O.The commander of the Tracker aircraft can appreciate the entry into the water of the torpedo, the operation of the same and the characteristic emission of its active sonar.Likewise, moments later he hears the duplication of the "ping" (signal that the active sonar "hooked" its target) [xi].However, once the torpedo had run, no explosion was observed, although the abrupt change in underwater conditions was observed, while reverberations, cavitation and hydrophonic rumors ceased to be heard in all the listening sensors [xii].Contact had been lost.Possible submarine.The debriefing carried out on board the aircraft carrier with the participating crews, as well as their respective reports, were analyzed by the various specialists of the Embarked Air Naval Group, finally concluding that the contacts obtained were classified as POSSIBLE SUB (POSSUB), CONFIDENCE 2/3 [xiii ].Now, in the Argentine Navy the contacts in which submarines could be involved are classified doctrinally, and according to their degree of certainty, as:1- True Submarine.(CERTSUB) Meanwhile, the contact was seen by suitable personnel and positively identified as a submarine.2- Probable Submarine.(PROBSUB) The contact has multiple and strong evidences of being a submarine.Degrees of confidence are established for the case, which are set by the Officer in Tactical Command according to his criteria.They range from 1 to 4, with 1 being the lowest and 4 being the highest.3- Possible Submarine.(POSSUB) It is believed that it is a submarine due to the circumstances of the case, but there is not enough evidence to give it a higher certainty classification.Degrees of confidence are also established for the case, from 1 to 4.4- Not underwater.(NONSUB) Visual contact, radar or sonar indicate unequivocally and reliably that the contact is not a submarine.In other words, after analyzing the case, it was concluded that a submarine had possibly been attacked, although there is no assurance of this.It should not be forgotten that a great problem in any Anti-Submarine Warfare operation is to correctly identify an underwater contact, be it as a submarine or as any other human or biological phenomenon.This generally requires a long period of contact from multiple sensors.This classification period is already extraordinarily tense during exercises in peacetime, being the same more complicated in times of war, when tensions grow, causing there to be higher rates of false contacts there [xiv]In the case at hand, no extensive plotting was carried out in any case, but the various contacts were lost and resumed throughout the morning of that May 5.None of the sensors, on the other hand, appears to have been conclusive in relation to the presence of a submarine.Sensor operator in Tracker plane - Photo by MY Martin, taken from “Malvinas, la Guerra Aérea”, Ediciones Open, Buenos Aires, 1988Therefore, it was understood that the contact should be classified with the relatively low index of certainty noted above.It should not be forgotten, likewise, that the problem of underwater identification was not exclusively on the Argentine side, while during the hostilities in the Falklands, the British Task Force carried out 200 antisubmarine attacks against what they believed to be the ARA San Luis or the ARA Salta , without making a single target. [xv]In short, promptly and immediately after the operations, it could not be reliably classified upon contact as a submarine, merely as possible.AN ANALYSIS 25 YEARS OF THE CONFLICT.Appreciations about the contact.Now, with the data that were released after the war, it is interesting to ask, carrying out an impartial analysis, if it is now possible to determine if the contact attacked on May 5 by a submarine (which should have been British), or it turned out to be a biological and / or human phenomenon alien to said ingenuity.Certainly the attacked contact, prima facie, and even on basic analysis (merely taking a chart and a calculator), did indeed behave like a submarine.That is, beyond the information that the analysis of the acoustic signature and the multiple contacts in various sensors could provide, it is worth noting that, since the contact was attacked and sighted, it moved at an approximate speed of 11.5 knots from 0746 (first contact) to 0910 (second contact), which is almost twice the usual speed of a southern right whale (approx 7 knots), and then slows down to 7 knots.This speed is certainly consistent with the stealth required in a submarine for operations in littoral waters, even when escaping from a threat.In addition to this, the object moved from shallower waters (74 meters at the first contact) to deeper waters on its way (95 meters at the last contact), consistent with what in the usual cases would be carried out by a commander of submarine when attacked: that is, search depth to put more distance with the weapons and search systems of its aggressor.Finally, the duplication of the active sonar of the Mk-44 torpedo (indicating that the "ping" found a specific object on which to "bounce"), taking into account that at the place of the attack the bottom is flat and sandy, it is a strong presumption of the existence of an intruder in the area.Map positions of the three contacts (Author's elaboration)In other words, in a basic analysis, and even ignoring the analysis of acoustic signatures, etc., the contact can be said, analogously to what was established at the time, that it was possibly a submarine.Now, was the contact from a British submarine?British submarines in the Falklands War.In principle, it should be noted that, from documents immediately known about the conflict [xvi], as well as from others much later [xvii] (which denotes a certain coherence that makes the information credible), it appears that five nuclear submarines participated. in the Falklands War: HMS Conqueror, HMS Splendid, HMS Spartan, HMS Courageous and HMS Valiant, as well as a conventional one (diesel-electric), the HMS Onyx.However, only three of them were in the South Atlantic on May 5, HMS Conqueror, Splendid and Spartan, which had entered the area of ​​operations on approximately April 11 [xviii].Indeed, HMS Courageous and HMS Valiant did not set sail from the United Kingdom until May 3, and it took approximately 15 days to reach their patrol stations [xix].And for its part, HMS Onyx departed from Gosport (England) on April 26 [xx].Taking into account that it made part of the journey on the surface (with a maximum speed of 12 knots) and part submerged (maximum speed: 18 knots), it did not reach the area of ​​operations, more than eight thousand nautical miles from its base, but until approximately one month after leaving [xxi].Now, taking into account that, insistently, it was indicated that HMS Onyx was the attacked submarine (even though, it was noted, it was not in the war zone), it is convenient to return to this later.Therefore, and beyond some divergences of sources regarding the precise dates of arrival of the units in the area of ​​operations [xxii] it is clear that, as of May 5, only the aforementioned submarines were in the theater. .Taking into account the departure date of the rest, it would have been impossible for them to be there on the aforementioned day.Therefore, the above questioning is now limited to three of the British submarines.Position of the submarines HMS Conqueror, HMS Spartan and HMS Splendid on the morning of May 5.Positions of British submarines in the area of ​​operations.(Author's elaboration)Obviously, little is known about the precise locations of the three submarines on May 5 in the morning.However, with the available documentation, their position can be politely ascertained.It is well known that HMS Conqueror had attacked the cruiser ARA General Belgrano (CRUBE) on May 2.After the attack, feeling attacked, his captain headed south.According to his blog [xxiii], on May 3 (last entry available to the public) at 0800, he was in position 56º 10´S, 62º 34´O, with the intention of navigating to meet on the 4th at the afternoon in a patrol area between the area of ​​the attack on CRUBE and Isla de los Estados.That is to say, 48 hours.prior to the May 5 encounter, HMS Conqueror was approximately 720 nm from the position where TN Cal located a surface appendage.Obviously, with a maximum diving speed of 28 knots [xxiv], the submarine had the theoretical ability to reach the area on May 5 in the morning, but three circumstances make this doubtful.The first of these is that the manifest intention of the Frigate Captain Christopher Louis Wreford-Brown, commander of HMS Conqueror, was to patrol, at least on the afternoon of the 4th, the area in the vicinity of the sinking, making no mention of to a northbound run.The second circumstance is that HMS Conqueror had orders to patrol in the assigned area, while another submarine was trying to locate Task Group 79.1 (the aircraft carrier).The third circumstance is that the relatively shallow depth of the transit zone (in very general terms around 180 meters) prevented the submarine from developing its full speed, limiting its safe operating speed to 10 to 15 knots.And still, the sub should have slowed down frequently for passive sonar listening purposes.In other words, in practice, it lacked the necessary speed to complete the journey in the required time.For the above reasons, there is little chance that HMS Conqueror was the submarine attacked by its own forces.As for HMS Spartan, the patrol area assigned to it since mid-April was in the vicinity of Soledad Island [xxv].Likewise, it was clear that HMS Spartan could not leave its patrol area, something that not even Admiral Woodward could, despite himself (as he needed the two nuclear submarines to find the "lost" PAL May 25), modify [xxvi].Of course, that one of the nuclear submarines remained close to the battle nucleus of the Task Force, implied, in a certain way, complying with the current naval doctrine, which imposed that a nuclear submarine should provide anti-sub and anti-surface protection of barrier to it. [xxvii]In other words, it is also difficult for this submarine to have been attacked in the vicinity of the continent.For its part, the last known position of HMS Splendid is near the 12 nautical mile line of the continent, just off the coast of Puerto Deseado (212 nautical miles from the place of contact) on the morning of May 4. , when it was trying to locate and sink the aircraft carrier May 25 [xxviii].This position is consistent with the orders received on April 15, which established its patrol area between the Falkland Islands and the mainland. [Xxix] (and which, remember, limited the presence of HMS Spartan to the vicinity of Soledad Island )By May 4, the submarine had located four sonar contacts within Argentine territorial waters (which it estimated were the PAL and its escorts), those that were transiting with north heading, so it can be inferred, and according to the current orders, which he proceeded to follow up on.However, according to known positions, the submarine was 212 nautical miles south of the sighting site, 24 hours before it, and heading north.To have arrived at the appointment with the Tracker plane at the appointed time, and to have run in a straight line, it must have sailed at an average speed of 8.3 knots, which is logical, taking into account the shallow depth of the area in which it was operating as well as the frequent need to listen to sonar.In sum, if one of the three British submarines in operation at that time had been the attacked contact, and according to its position, heading and designated exclusive patrol area, it should have been HMS Splendid.It should be added, on the other hand, that there is no reference to an attack on this submarine by the British forces.Beyond this, the secrecy imposed by the enemy on all operations in the Malvinas, as well as the natural discretion that surrounds submarine activities, make this silence inconclusive..The HMS Onyx.From Argentine sources, it has been repeatedly written that HMS Onyx was the contact attacked on May 5.There are two versions, one with slight variations on the other: either that the ship was observed in a dry dock in Brazil, damaged and with a torpedo lodged in its hull [xxx], or that in an exhibition after the war, taken to carried out in the United Kingdom, a photograph of the submarine was shown with the bow completely destroyed and a torpedo lodged in it [xxxi].With this, an attempt is made to prove that the submarine was hit by an aerial torpedo on the date under study.The testimonies that are cited are never first-hand, but rather someone who saw, or worse, who was told.That is, they lack the minimum probative value.The various versions grew as the submarine had slight to moderate damage, presumably and according to British sources, having hit a submerged rock.The Argentine versions of damages to this submarine must be discarded, without prejudice to the fact that HMS Onyx may have been injured by its own forces on some other occasion, which exceeds the scope of this work.Indeed, in the first place, and as already noted, the submarine was not in the theater of operations at the time of the attack.Next, it must be said that HMS Onyx completed its war patrol with some normality, returning to its port of origin after 117 days of patrol [xxxii], which included, on June 21, the sinking of the remains of the LSL Sir Galahad as a war grave.Of course, all this would have been impossible if the submarine had a totally destroyed hull and a live torpedo in its superstructure.In other words, it is impossible that the target attacked on May 5 was HMS Onyx.Notwithstanding what has been stated heretofore, taking into account the depth of the attack zone, that the Mk-44 torpedo is for active search only, has a helical locating trajectory, and that it dives looking for its target at around 7 At 7 meters per second [xxxiii], the damage to HMS Onyx, if it had been hit by the torpedo, should have been on the sail and the upper part of the hull, but not on her bow and lower part, as it happened.Submarine HMS Onyx on its return to the UK.Note that he is carrying the Jolly Roger (perhaps due to the sinking of the LSL Sir Galahad or special forces operations).There is no visible damage to the upper part of the hull and / or the sail.(Photo by M. Lennon, taken from English, Adrian and Watts, Antonhy "Battle for the Falklands. Naval Forces", Osprey Men at Arms Series, London, 1982)IN CONCLUSION.The contact attacked on May 5 was, according to the Argentine Navy, possibly, and with a degree of certainty 2/3, a submarine.The basic (and independent) analysis of the behavior of said contact carried out on these lines also allows us to conclude that it was a POSSUB.We have seen that, by that date, only three British submarines were in the South Atlantic, the HMS Conqueror, Spartan and Splendid, and it was not feasible, for the reasons indicated in the text, that the first two were attacked.However, the HMS Splendid was, a few hours before the attack, on patrol in a place close to where it happened, with an ideal course to find the aircraft of the Embarked Air Group.Therefore, it can be stated that, had the contact attacked on 5 May been a submarine, this should have been HMS Splendid.Beyond this, and whether or not an enemy submarine was harassed on that date, the truth is that the anti-submarine air assets of the aircraft carrier effectively achieved their mission, as it did not suffer any damage in the war, despite the efforts made. by British forces in their destruction.And it is that, in anti-submarine warfare, as important as achieving a sinking of your own, is to prevent the enemy from making his own.[i] Mariano Pablo Sciaroni ([email protected]) is a lawyer and holds a Master in Strategy and Geopolitics from the Higher School of War of the Argentine Army.[ii] Martini, Héctor A., ​​"History of Argentine Naval Aviation", Volume III, Buenos Aires, 1992, available athttp : // www . trackerenmalvinas . com . ar / html / download . html[iii] Mayorga, Horacio A., "Not expired", Planeta, Buenos Aires, 1998, p.473.[iv] Fortini, Enrique A., "War of the South Atlantic, little known experiences (Task Unit 80.2.2)", in the Bulletin of the Naval Center, No. 817, May / August 2007, p.243.[v] Mayorga, Horacio A., “Not defeated”, Planeta, Buenos Aires, 1998, p.474.[vi] Mayorga, Horacio A., “Not defeated”, Planeta, Buenos Aires, 1998, p.474.[vii] Martini, Héctor A., ​​"History of Argentine Naval Aviation", Volume III, Buenos Aires, 1992, available athttp : // www . trackerenmalvinas . com . ar / html / download . html[viii] Fortini, Enrique A., "War of the South Atlantic, little known experiences (Task Unit 80.2.2)", in the Bulletin of the Naval Center, No. 817, May / August 2007, p.244.[ix] Fortini, Enrique A., “War of the South Atlantic, little known experiences (Task Unit 80.2.2)”, in the Bulletin of the Naval Center, No. 817, May / August 2007, p.244.[x] Mayorga, Horacio A., “Not defeated”, Planeta, Buenos Aires, 1998, p.474.[xi] Fortini, Enrique A., "War of the South Atlantic, little known experiences (Task Unit 80.2.2)", in the Bulletin of the Naval Center, No. 817, May / August 2007, p.244.[xii] Fortini, Enrique A., “War of the South Atlantic, little known experiences (Task Unit 80.2.2)”, in the Bulletin of the Naval Center, No. 817, May / August 2007, p.244.[xiii] Fortini, Enrique A., “Anti-Submarine Operation, carried out by aircraft based on aircraft carriers on May 5, 1982”, atwww . naval forces . com, Magazine nº 18.[xiv] Rader, Karl A “Forward… from the sea into the torpedo danger zone”, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1994, p.52.[xv] Benedict, John “Third world submarine developments,” The Submarine Review, October 1990, p.53.[xvi] Fieldhouse, Sir John, "Dispatch by Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse, GCB, GBE, Commander of the Task Force operations in the south atlantic: April to June 1982", London Gazette, December 13, 1982.[xvii ] Evans, Michael "Underwater and undercover: how nuclear subs were first line of Falklands defense" in The Times, November 27, 2007.[xviii] Finlan, Alastair "The Royal Navy in the Falklands Conflict and the Gulf War", Routledge , London, 2004, p.81.[xix] Rader, Karl A “Forward… from the sea into the torpedo danger zone”, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1994, p.fifty.[xx] "War Patrol The Falklands - HMS Onyx", in The Submariner, March 2004, available atwww . submariners . co . uk[xxi] Rader, Karl A “Forward… from the sea into the torpedo danger zone”, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1994, p.50.[xxii] For example the sitehttp : // www . britains - smallwars . com / Falklands / Brit - units . htm, which generally has good information, indicates that the arrival dates were: HMS Conqueror: 16.4.82, HMS Spartan: 12.4.82, HMS Splendid: 19.4.82, HMS Courageous: 30.5.82, HMS Valiant: 16.5.82 and HMS Onyx: 28.5.82.[xxiii] “Operation CORPORATE 1982, Key documents concerning the sinking of the BELGRANO Released in support of the Official History of the Falklands Campaign”, MoD, (UK), p.151, athttp : // www . mod . uk / DefenseInternet / AboutDefence / CorporatePublications / BoardsOfInquiry / OperationCorporate1982 . htm[xxiv] Submarine speeds are generally confidential.The indicated speed comes fromhttp : // en . wikipedia . org / wiki / HMS _ Conqueror _ ( S48 )[xxv] Freedman, Sir Lawrence, “The official story of the Falklands Campaign”, Volume II, Routledge, London, 2005, p.89.[xxvi] Freedman, Sir Lawrence, “The official story of the Falklands Campaign”, Volume II, Routledge, London, 2005, p.286.[xxvii] Finlan, Alastair “The Royal Navy in the Falklands Conflict and the Gulf War”, Routledge, London, 2004, p.58.[xxviii] Freedman, Sir Lawrence, “The official story of the Falklands Campaign”, Volume II, Routledge, London, 2005, p.303.[xxix] Freedman, Sir Lawrence, “The official story of the Falklands Campaign”, Volume II, Routledge, London, 2005, p.89.[xxx] Muñoz, Jorge “Attack Rio Grande”, Institute of Naval Publications, Buenos Aires, 2005, p.143.[xxxi] Fortini, Enrique A., "War of the South Atlantic, little known experiences (Task Unit 80.2.2)", in the Bulletin of the Naval Center, No. 817, May / August 2007, p.247.[xxxii] "War Patrol The Falklands - HMS Onyx", in The Submariner, March 2004, available atwww . submariners . co . uk[xxxiii] Friedman, Norman “The Naval Institute guide to world naval weapons systems 1991/92”, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1992, page 710.The referenced web pages were accessed and were working on February 12, 2007.-