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The LM had a short tunnel sticking up out of it, and the CSM's lower avionics bay had a hole in it that matched the size of the tunnel. (There was a dogged-down hatch over it that kept it sealed and the CSM pressurized when the LM was not attached. There was a similar thing for the LM.)[1][1][1][1]Around the CSM opening were twelve spring-loaded latches that snapped down and held the two craft tightly together, ensuring a good seal. Sticking out from it was a slim docking probe.Inside the tunnel on the LM was a little pneumatic drogue device° that was intended to catch the docking probe from the CSM, pulling the probe in, which would then trigger those twelve latches, locking the two together.So. The Saturn V was stacked at launch, top to bottom, with the CSM at the top (the escape launch tower atop it), the LM in a round box below it and bolted to the SIVB, the third stage, then the first stage. (xkcd has a great graphic of what they refer to as the “Up-Goer 5” that is both brilliant and hilarious. I'll post it as a comment to this answer since it isn't germaine to the actual question and would make my answer ridiculously long. And if I think it's too long, you know it's long!) So here's a smaller diagram of just the very top:After launching and orbiting the Earth a few times to make sure everything had come through launch okay, the S IVB would light and send them on TLI - towards the Moon. When that burn was complete, the CSM undocked from the front of the S IVB as the four sides of the box that had protected the LM during launch were released, revealing the LM. The CSM then turned around and prepared to dock with the LM while it was held in place by bolts to the S IVB.The old joke about “throwing a hot dog down a hallway”? Imagine that, but with spacecraft.[2][2][2][2]The CM pilot had to line up the CSM with the LM, then insert the docking probe into the tunnel on the LM until it was caught by the drogue inside it, triggering the three latches on the probe and pulling the two together tightly, triggering the twelve latches on the CSM to keep them that way. Once they were secured, the LM was released from its bolted down position on the S IVB by a few pyro charges.And here's the maneuver all in one:[3][3][3][3]At that point, the LM was essentially a really strange hood ornament on the CSM, connected by that small tunnel. The now-connected ship then turned around and continued to the Moon. (Turning around right then wasn't strictly necessary, at least for the first few flights, as Apollo VIII (which had no LM), X, XI, and XII all went to the Moon on a free-return trajectory. However, pilots appear to prefer their craft be pointed in the right direction.)The crew then pressurized the tunnel. After that was done, the LMP had to remove the hatch, along with the probe and drogue device, so that he could get through the tunnel and into the LM itself to check everything out.The process was done in reverse, probe and drogue assembly and all, to release the LM at the Moon, then repeated when the ascent stage of the LM returned from the Moon.Footnotes[1] Two Become One: How the Apollo Spacecraft Stuck Together[1] Two Become One: How the Apollo Spacecraft Stuck Together[1] Two Become One: How the Apollo Spacecraft Stuck Together[1] Two Become One: How the Apollo Spacecraft Stuck Together[2] Photo-s68-50869[2] Photo-s68-50869[2] Photo-s68-50869[2] Photo-s68-50869[3] How did astronauts traverse from module to module in the Apollo craft?[3] How did astronauts traverse from module to module in the Apollo craft?[3] How did astronauts traverse from module to module in the Apollo craft?[3] How did astronauts traverse from module to module in the Apollo craft?

The telephone today is essentially the same thing as what existed in 1900 and is often referred to as POTS (or Plain Old Telephone System). While the public knows it as POTS, the telecom engineers prefer to call it PSTN (Public Switched Telephone Network). The phone system consists of a telephone instrument located at the end-users premises connected by two wires to a “telephone exchange” In this type there is no direct connection among the subscribers but instead the subscribers are connected to the exchange or switching system.The two wires are called the “tip” and the “ring”.Each wire of the local loop pair was connected to a different part of the operator’s plug. One wire attached to the tip of the plug and the other to a ring slightly farther back. Each jack or socket of the operator’s switchboard contained two metal contacts. When the plug was inserted into the jack, the electrical circuit was completed. When the telephone is idle, there is a 48-volt DC signal between tip and ring. When the telephone is “lifted” it puts a load on the circuit that is detected by the exchange. The exchange then drops the voltage to about 9-volts and sends an audible signal on the line called the dial tone.If you use a rotary dial, as the dial rotates back it “disconnects” the telephone momentarily—if you dial 1 there is 1 disconnect, if you dial 7 there are 7 disconnects. The exchange detects these disconnects and notes the digit you have dialed, which is of course followed by more digits. After the dialing is over the central switch connects you to the other end and rings that telephone. The ringing is achieved by sending a 90-volt, AC wave at 20Hz to the telephone causing the bell in the phone to vibrate and ring. When the phone is picked up, a voice circuit is established and over the 2-wire connection voices can flow in both directions. A simple circuit consisting of a microphone, a headphone, a balancing transformer and a battery achieves this two-way communication. The techniques used are simple, effective and highly reliable.The exchange used called a switchboard, comprised of wires terminating in plugs, one plug per telephone subscriber, on a large wooden board. Operators connected one subscriber to another by plugging two wires into a common patch panel. Connections that needed two exchanges needed two operators who simultaneously plugged the subscribers into the same inter-exchange wire, called a “trunk”. The first automated exchange was the Strowger exchange invented in 1892, but pressed into service in 1896 after the invention of the telephone dial. As the dial clicked out the numbers, large rotating arms at the exchange flipped around myriads of contacts, coming to rest on the selected destination thus connecting the call. Eventually in 1938 the crossbar switch was invented, and the squeak was replaced by little relays that were activated by dialing pulses. Even though crossbars were vastly superior to Strowgers, they were costly, bulky and complicated. The below is an image of Manual Switching System, Circa, 1880.The mechanical switching of crossbars became history soon after the most radical invention of the century—the transistor. Soon, transistors replaced the relays and the electronic exchange was born. The electronic exchange was not the final answer—soon the digital exchange became the panacea and today, the world’s telephones run of off a scheme that has no resemblance to the POTS of yester-years.Today, when you pick up the phone, the call does not go to the exchange, but it is detected by a little electronic gadget in a junction box located quite close to home called a concentrator. The concentrator converts the dialing and voices into digital pulses and collects all the digital pulses from all the phones in your neighborhood and sends them over a common wire to the exchange. At the exchange hundred of inputs from concentrators are mixed together and put on a trunk that connects all the exchanges in a city.At the exchange, your bits along with all the bits of all the people at all the concentrators get dumped into a trunk. The trunk is a wire that snakes its way to all the telephone exchanges in a city. This trunk is often not a real wire, but a glass fiber (also called fiber-optic cable). The bits over the glass fiber are no longer electrical but are pulses of light. Fiber optics allows millions of voices to be simultaneously transmitted over the same physical cable.Suppose we color your bits red, and leave all the other uncolored. Then we can see your red bits flowing over the trunk going to every exchange connected to the trunk. However, the destination exchange servicing your friend’s telephone recognizes the red bits and picks them up (the other exchanges ignore them). Then the exchange sends these bits to the concentrator near your friends home. This concentrator recognizes the red bits and plucks them and sends then to a converter where an analog signal emerges. The analog signal then is fed into the wires leading to your friend’s phone. That is how he or she can hear you, crisp and clear.There have been many challenges to POTS. The notable ones are digital phone systems with names such as Merlin, Rolm and a digital infrastructure called ISDN.

I’ll preface by saying that User-9605404516838986663, Quora subject matter expert on Guardiola and positional play, already has an answer that describes the tactical differences between 2011 Barca and 2017 City. You should probably read that first.To summarize his answer, the main difference is that 2011 Barca did most of their attacking build up in midfield areas, while City does most of their attacking build up in defensive areas.In my answer here, I’ll try to frame this difference in some historical context, and attempt to explain why that 2011 Barca team is almost a perfect implementation of Guardiola’s positional play principles, and how the failure to reproduce such perfection in Bayern forced Pep to change his playing style.Guardiola’s positional play can be more or less summarized in the following two principles:When your team has the ball, quickly pass it around the field to pull the opponent out of shape and generate a “free man” who can attack from an advantageous position.When your team doesn’t have the ball, press and counter-press to recover it quickly.Taking these two principles to perfection requires maintaining ball possession in your opponents’ half of the field. This allows your team to attack better because you are closer to your opponent’s goal, and to defend better because you’re further away from your own. It makes tactics like counter-pressing both less risky—if you fail, the opponent still has to run 60–70 meters to your goal—and more likely to succeed—since more of your players are in the rival half and ready to counter-press—.2011 Barca achieved this ball possession in their opponent’s half, even against UCL level opponents, and thus implemented Guardiola’s positional play principles perfectly. The pass map from the 2011 UCL final is an example of this.Barca could achieve this because they had some very specific and hard to find defender and midfielder profiles.Victor Valdés as a sweeper keeper with excellent ball distribution.Piqué and Mascherano as center backs who were good on the ball and could hold a high defensive lineDani Alves as a full back who almost acted like an extra midfielderBusquets as a holding midfielder who presses, steals and passes to the nearest teammate as quickly and perfectly as possible.Xavi as a central midfield playmaker with unparalleled mobility and decision making who built up attacks and slowly moved the team’s possession play forward.Iniesta as an attacking playmaker who contributed to the attacking build up and beat pressing lines with dribbling.Needless to say, no team in the past decade has even come close to reproducing all 6 of these player profiles.When Guardiola moved to Bayern in the 13–14 season, he still tried to reproduce the Barca model. He wanted to maintain a high defensive line and ball possession very high up the field but his Bayern players, especially center backs and creative midfielders, couldn’t reproduce the plan to the same degree of success as Barca.Real Madrid exploited this to no avail in the 2014 UCL semfinal. Luka Modric pressed Toni Kroos—Pep’s attempt at creating a new Xavi—out of the match, and directed the world’s best counterattack at the time—Bale, Benzema, Ronaldo and Di María—to destroy the fragile high defensive line held up by Boateng and Dante. The resulting tactical annihilation produced the now legendary 0–4 which completed Real Madrid’s resurrection as a European giant and has conditioned Guardiola’s playing style ever since. Never again would Pep neglect his team’s defensive transition to this degree.Pep had to rethink his entire positional play paradigm. He understood that unless he had a midfield trio that could come close to Busquets - Xavi - Iniesta, he had to give up on the idea of building up attacks in midfield areas, and unless he had center backs like Piqué, Sergio Ramos, Pepe or Varane, he couldn’t keep a high defensive line so often.With the signing of Xabi Alonso as holding midfielder, Pep came up with a plan. His new Bayern would use Alonso and center backs who where good on the ball—Alaba, Boateng, Javí Martínez, and even Kimmich—to build up attacks in their own half of the field, inviting the opponents to press higher and pulling them out shape. And once an opening was spotted, these players could send long, tense passes to wingers out wide, with full backs rushing forward to support them and central midfielders and strikers loading the box to strike the incoming crosses and key passes. The objective was to build up play like a Pep team and attack vertically like a German team.The best example of this style of play is the 2nd leg of the 2016 UCL semifinal against Atlético, in which Bayern’s long passing game, led by Alonso, completely broke down the best defense in Europe. Post-match, Simeone hailed this Bayern side as “the best opponents that I've played in my whole career”.Guardiola came to Manchester in 2016 with a similar idea of building up play from the back. He signed John Stones as a technically-gifted center back, but he lacked a defensive playmaker like Alonso to execute a similar plan to the one used in Bayern. Gundogan’s performance has been marred by injury, and Fernandinho possesses a more limited passing range and creativity. Besides, City’s full backs—Zabaleta, Clichy and Kolarov, could not provide the necessary depth and width to the positional attack.And that’s how we arrived to 2017 City. They acquired Mendy, Danilo and Kyle Walker to fix the full back issue, and with wingers Sané and Sterling fully adapted to the positional play system, 2017 City’s positional attack now exhibits excellent depth and width. To compensate for the creative limits of Fernandinho, Pep made Silva and De Bruyne drop down from their usual attacking midfield positions to help with build-up play below.The end result is a pass map like the one below, and a team that’s performing really, really well. As I said before, because City mostly retains possession and builds up attacking plays in defensive areas, it can’t achieve the perfection of 2011 Barca, but it’s still a damn good positional play team that has potential to win the Champions League.