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Union CarbideBhopal gas tragedy.The Bhopal disaster, also referred to as the Bhopal gas tragedy, was a gas leak incident on the night of 2–3 December 1984 at the Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) pesticide plant in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, India. It is considered to be the world's worst industrial disaster.[1][2]Over 500,000 people were exposed to methyl isocyanate (MIC) gas. The highly toxic substance made its way into and around the small towns located near the plant.[3]Bhopal disasterMemorial by Dutch artist Ruth Kupferschmidt for those killed and disabled by the 1984 toxic gas releaseDate2 December 1984 – 3 December 1984LocationBhopal, Madhya Pradesh, IndiaCoordinates23°16′51″N 77°24′38″EAlso known asBhopal gas tragedyCauseMethyl isocyanate leak from Union Carbide India Limited plantDeathsAt least 3,787; over 16,000 claimedNon-fatal injuriesAt least 558,125Estimates vary on the death toll. The official immediate death toll was 2,259. The government of Madhya Pradesh confirmed a total of 3,787 deaths related to the gas release.[4]A government affidavit in 2006 stated that the leak caused 558,125 injuries, including 38,478 temporary partial injuries and approximately 3,900 severely and permanently disabling injuries.[5]Others estimate that 8,000 died within two weeks, and another 8,000 or more have since died from gas-related diseases.[6]The cause of the disaster remains under debate. The Indian government and local activists argue that slack management and deferred maintenance created a situation where routine pipe maintenance caused a backflow of water into a MIC tank, triggering the disaster. Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) argues water entered the tank through an act of sabotage.The owner of the factory, UCIL, was majority owned by UCC, with Indian Government-controlled banks and the Indian public holding a 49.1 percent stake. In 1989, UCC paid $470 million (equivalent to $845 million in 2018) to settle litigation stemming from the disaster. In 1994, UCC sold its stake in UCIL to Eveready Industries India Limited (EIIL), which subsequently merged with McLeod Russel (India) Ltd. Eveready ended clean-up on the site in 1998, when it terminated its 99-year lease and turned over control of the site to the state government of Madhya Pradesh. Dow Chemical Company purchased UCC in 2001, seventeen years after the disaster.Civil and criminal cases filed in the United States against UCC and Warren Anderson, UCC CEO at the time of the disaster, were dismissed and redirected to Indian courts on multiple occasions between 1986 and 2012, as the US courts focused on UCIL being a standalone entity of India. Civil and criminal cases were also filed in the District Court of Bhopal, India, involving UCC, UCIL and UCC CEO Anderson.[7][8]In June 2010, seven Indian nationals who were UCIL employees in 1984, including the former UCIL chairman, were convicted in Bhopal of causing death by negligence and sentenced to two years imprisonment and a fine of about $2,000 each, the maximum punishment allowed by Indian law. All were released on bail shortly after the verdict. An eighth former employee was also convicted, but died before the judgement was passed.BackgroundThe UCIL factory was built in 1969 to produce the pesticide Sevin (UCC's brand name for carbaryl) using methyl isocyanate (MIC) as an intermediate.[6]An MIC production plant was added to the UCIL site in 1979.[9][10][11]The chemical process employed in the Bhopal plant had methylamine reacting with phosgene to form MIC, which was then reacted with 1-naphthol to form the final product, carbaryl. Another manufacturer, Bayer, also used this MIC-intermediate process at the chemical plant once owned by UCC at Institute, West Virginia, in the United States.[12][13]After the Bhopal plant was built, other manufacturers (including Bayer) produced carbaryl without MIC, though at a greater manufacturing cost. This "route" differed from the MIC-free routes used elsewhere, in which the same raw materials were combined in a different manufacturing order, with phosgene first reacting with naphthol to form a chloroformate ester, which was then reacted with methylamine. In the early 1980s, the demand for pesticides had fallen, but production continued, leading to build-up of stores of unused MIC where that method was used.[6][12]Earlier leaksIn 1976, two local trade unions complained of pollution within the plant.[6][14]In 1981, a worker was accidentally splashed with phosgene as he was carrying out a maintenance job of the plant's pipes. In a panic, he removed his gas mask and inhaled a large amount of toxic phosgene gas, leading to his death just 72 hours later.[6][14]Following these events, journalist Rajkumar Keswani began investigating and published his findings in Bhopal's local paper Rapat, in which he urged "Wake up people of Bhopal, you are on the edge of a volcano".[15][16]In January 1982, a phosgene leak exposed 24 workers, all of whom were admitted to a hospital. None of the workers had been ordered to wear protective masks. One month later, in February 1982, an MIC leak affected 18 workers. In August 1982, a chemical engineer came into contact with liquid MIC, resulting in burns over 30 percent of his body. Later that same year, in October 1982, there was another MIC leak. In attempting to stop the leak, the MIC supervisor suffered severe chemical burns and two other workers were severely exposed to the gases. During 1983 and 1984, there were leaks of MIC, chlorine, monomethylamine, phosgene, and carbon tetrachloride, sometimes in combination.[6][14]Leakage and its effectsLiquid MIC storageThe Bhopal UCIL facility housed three underground 68,000-liter liquid MIC storage tanks: E610, E611, and E619. In the months leading up to the December leak, liquid MIC production was in progress and being used to fill these tanks. UCC safety regulations specified that no one tank should be filled more than 50% (here, 30 tons) with liquid MIC. Each tank was pressurized with inert nitrogen gas. This pressurization allowed liquid MIC to be pumped out of each tank as needed, and also kept impurities out of the tanks.[17]In late October 1984, tank E610 lost the ability to effectively contain most of its nitrogen gas pressure, which meant that the liquid MIC contained within could not be pumped out. At the time of this failure, tank E610 contained 42 tons of liquid MIC.[17][18]Shortly after this failure, MIC production was halted at the Bhopal facility, and parts of the plant were shut down for maintenance. Maintenance included the shutdown of the plant's flare tower so that a corroded pipe could be repaired.[17]With the flare tower still out of service, production of carbaryl was resumed in late November, using MIC stored in the two tanks still in service. An attempt to re-establish pressure in tank E610 on 1 December failed, so the 42 tons of liquid MIC contained within still could not be pumped out of it.[18]The releaseTank 610 in 2010. During decontamination of the plant, tank 610 was removed from its foundation and left aside.Methylamine (1) reacts with phosgene (2) producing methyl isocyanate (3) which reacts with 1-naphthol (4) to yield carbaryl (5)By early December 1984, most of the plant's MIC related safety systems were malfunctioning and many valves and lines were in poor condition. In addition, several vent gas scrubbers had been out of service as well as the steam boiler, intended to clean the pipes.[6]During the late evening hours of 2 December 1984, water was believed to have entered a side pipe and into Tank E610 whilst trying to unclog it, which contained 42 tons of MIC that had been there since late October.[6]The introduction of water into the tank subsequently resulted in a runaway exothermic reaction, which was accelerated by contaminants, high ambient temperatures and various other factors, such as the presence of iron from corroding non-stainless steel pipelines.[6]The pressure in tank E610, although initially normal at 10:30 p.m., had increased by a factor of five to 10 psi (34.5 to 69 kPa) by 11 p.m. Two different senior refinery employees assumed the reading was instrumentation malfunction.[19]By 11:30 p.m., workers in the MIC area were feeling the effects of minor exposure to MIC gas, and began to look for a leak. One was found by 11:45 p.m., and reported to the MIC supervisor on duty at the time. The decision was made to address the problem after a 12:15 a.m. tea break, and in the meantime, employees were instructed to continue looking for leaks. The incident was discussed by MIC area employees during the break.[19]In the five minutes after the tea break ended at 12:40 a.m., the reaction in tank E610 reached a critical state at an alarming speed. Temperatures in the tank were off the scale, maxed out beyond 25 °C (77 °F), and the pressure in the tank was indicated at 40 psi (275.8 kPa). One employee witnessed a concrete slab above tank E610 crack as the emergency relief valve burst open, and pressure in the tank continued to increase to 55 psi (379.2 kPa) even after atmospheric venting of toxic MIC gas had begun.[19]Direct atmospheric venting should have been prevented or at least partially mitigated by at least three safety devices which were malfunctioning, not in use, insufficiently sized or otherwise rendered inoperable:[20][21]A refrigeration system meant to cool tanks containing liquid MIC, shut down in January 1982, and whose freon had been removed in June 1984. Since the MIC storage system assumed refrigeration, its high temperature alarm, set to sound at 11 °C (52 °F) had long since been disconnected, and tank storage temperatures ranged between 15 °C (59 °F) and 40 °C (104 °F)[22]A flare tower, to burn the MIC gas as it escaped, which had had a connecting pipe removed for maintenance, and was improperly sized to neutralise a leak of the size produced by tank E610A vent gas scrubber, which had been deactivated at the time and was in 'standby' mode, and similarly had insufficient caustic soda and power to safely stop a leak of the magnitude producedAbout 30 tonnes of MIC escaped from the tank into the atmosphere in 45 to 60 minutes.[3]This would increase to 40 tonnes within two hours time.[23]The gases were blown in a southeasterly direction over Bhopal.[6][24]A UCIL employee triggered the plant's alarm system at 12:50 a.m. as the concentration of gas in and around the plant became difficult to tolerate.[19][23]Activation of the system triggered two siren alarms: one that sounded inside the UCIL plant, and a second directed outward to the public and the city of Bhopal. The two siren systems had been decoupled from one another in 1982, so that it was possible to leave the factory warning siren on while turning off the public one, and this is exactly what was done: the public siren briefly sounded at 12:50 a.m. and was quickly turned off, as per company procedure meant to avoid alarming the public around the factory over tiny leaks.[23][25][26]Workers, meanwhile, evacuated the UCIL plant, travelling upwind.Bhopal's superintendent of police was informed by telephone, by a town inspector, that residents of the neighbourhood of Chola (about 2 km from the plant) were fleeing a gas leak at approximately 1 a.m.[25]Calls to the UCIL plant by police between 1:25 and 2:10 a.m. gave assurances twice that "everything is OK", and on the last attempt made, "we don't know what has happened, sir".[25]With the lack of timely information exchange between UCIL and Bhopal authorities, the city's Hamidia Hospital was first told that the gas leak was suspected to be ammonia, then phosgene. Finally, they received an updated report that it was "MIC" (rather than "methyl isocyanate"), which hospital staff had never heard of, had no antidote for, and received no immediate information about.[27]The MIC gas leak emanating from tank E610 petered out at approximately 2:00 a.m. Fifteen minutes later, the plant's public siren was sounded for an extended period of time, after first having been quickly silenced an hour and a half earlier.[28]Some minutes after the public siren sounded, a UCIL employee walked to a police control room to both inform them of the leak (their first acknowledgement that one had occurred at all), and that "the leak had been plugged."[28]Most city residents who were exposed to the MIC gas were first made aware of the leak by exposure to the gas itself, or by opening their doors to investigate commotion, rather than having been instructed to shelter in place, or to evacuate before the arrival of the gas in the first place.[26]Acute effectsReversible reaction of glutathione (top) with methyl isocyanate (MIC, middle) allows the MIC to be transported into the bodyThe initial effects of exposure were coughing, severe eye irritation and a feeling of suffocation, burning in the respiratory tract, blepharospasm, breathlessness, stomach pains and vomiting. People awakened by these symptoms fled away from the plant. Those who ran inhaled more than those who had a vehicle to ride. Owing to their height, children and other people of shorter stature inhaled higher concentrations, as methyl isocyanate gas is approximately twice as dense as air and hence in an open environment has a tendency to fall toward the ground.[29]Thousands of people had died by the following morning. Primary causes of deaths were choking, reflexogenic circulatory collapse and pulmonary oedema. Findings during autopsies revealed changes not only in the lungs but also cerebral oedema, tubular necrosis of the kidneys, fatty degeneration of the liver and necrotising enteritis.[30]The stillbirth rate increased by up to 300% and neonatal mortality rate by around 200%.[6]Gas cloud compositionApart from MIC, based on laboratory simulation conditions, the gas cloud most likely also contained chloroform, dichloromethane, hydrogen chloride, methylamine, dimethylamine, trimethylamine and carbon dioxide, that was either present in the tank or was produced in the storage tank when MIC, chloroform and water reacted. The gas cloud, composed mainly of materials denser than air, stayed close to the ground and spread in the southeasterly direction affecting the nearby communities.[29]The chemical reactions may have produced a liquid or solid aerosol.[31]Laboratory investigations by CSIR and UCC scientists failed to demonstrate the presence of hydrogen cyanide.[29][32]Immediate aftermathIn the immediate aftermath, the plant was closed to outsiders (including UCC) by the Indian government, which subsequently failed to make data public, contributing to the confusion. The initial investigation was conducted entirely by the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and the Central Bureau of Investigation. The UCC chairman and CEO Warren Anderson, together with a technical team, immediately traveled to India. Upon arrival Anderson was placed under house arrest and urged by the Indian government to leave the country within 24 hours. Union Carbide organized a team of international medical experts, as well as supplies and equipment, to work with the local Bhopal medical community, and the UCC technical team began assessing the cause of the gas leak.The health care system immediately became overloaded. In the severely affected areas, nearly 70 percent were under-qualified doctors. Medical staff were unprepared for the thousands of casualties. Doctors and hospitals were not aware of proper treatment methods for MIC gas inhalation.[6]:6There were mass funerals and cremations. Photographer Pablo Bartholemew, on commission with press agency Rapho, took an iconic color photograph of a burial on 4 December, Bhopal gas disaster girl. Another photographer present, Raghu Rai, took a black and white photo. The photographers did not ask for the identity of the father or child as she was buried, and no relative has since confirmed it. As such, the identity of the girl remains unknown. Both photos became symbolic of the suffering of victims of the Bhopal disaster, and Bartholomew's went on to win the 1984 World Press Photo of the Year.[33]Within a few days, trees in the vicinity became barren and bloated animal carcasses had to be disposed of. 170,000 people were treated at hospitals and temporary dispensaries, and 2,000 buffalo, goats, and other animals were collected and buried. Supplies, including food, became scarce owing to suppliers' safety fears. Fishing was prohibited causing further supply shortages.[6]Lacking any safe alternative, on 16 December, tanks 611 and 619 were emptied of the remaining MIC by reactivating the plant and continuing the manufacture of pesticide. Despite safety precautions such as having water carrying helicopters continually overflying the plant, this led to a second mass evacuation from Bhopal. The Government of India passed the "Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Act" that gave the government rights to represent all victims, whether or not in India. Complaints of lack of information or misinformation were widespread. An Indian government spokesman said, "Carbide is more interested in getting information from us than in helping our relief work".[6]Formal statements were issued that air, water, vegetation and foodstuffs were safe, but warned not to consume fish. The number of children exposed to the gases was at least 200,000.[6]Within weeks, the State Government established a number of hospitals, clinics and mobile units in the gas-affected area to treat the victims.Subsequent legal actionVictims of Bhopal disaster march in September 2006 demanding the extradition of American Warren Anderson from the United States.Legal proceedings involving UCC, the United States and Indian governments, local Bhopal authorities, and the disaster victims started immediately after the catastrophe. The Indian Government passed the Bhopal Gas Leak Act in March 1985, allowing the Government of India to act as the legal representative for victims of the disaster,[34]leading to the beginning of legal proceedings. Initial lawsuits were generated in the United States federal court system. On 17 April 1985, Federal District court judge John F. Keenan (overseeing one lawsuit) suggested that "'fundamental human decency' required Union Carbide to provide between $5 million and $10 million to immediately help the injured" and suggested the money could be quickly distributed through the International Red Cross.[35]UCC, on the notion that doing so did not constitute an admission of liability and the figure could be credited toward any future settlement or judgement, offered a $5 million relief fund two days later.[35]The Indian government turned down the offer.[29]In March 1986 UCC proposed a settlement figure, endorsed by plaintiffs' U.S. attorneys, of $350 million that would, according to the company, "generate a fund for Bhopal victims of between $500–600 million over 20 years". In May, litigation was transferred from the United States to Indian courts by a U.S. District Court ruling. Following an appeal of this decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed the transfer, judging, in January 1987, that UCIL was a "separate entity, owned, managed and operated exclusively by Indian citizens in India".[34]The Government of India refused the offer from Union Carbide and claimed US$3.3 billion.[6]The Indian Supreme Court told both sides to come to an agreement and "start with a clean slate" in November 1988.[34]Eventually, in an out-of-court settlement reached in February 1989, Union Carbide agreed to pay US$470 million for damages caused in the Bhopal disaster.[6]The amount was immediately paid.Throughout 1990, the Indian Supreme Court heard appeals against the settlement. In October 1991, the Supreme Court upheld the original $470 million, dismissing any other outstanding petitions that challenged the original decision. The Court ordered the Indian government "to purchase, out of settlement fund, a group medical insurance policy to cover 100,000 persons who may later develop symptoms" and cover any shortfall in the settlement fund. It also requested UCC and its subsidiary UCIL "voluntarily" fund a hospital in Bhopal, at an estimated $17 million, to specifically treat victims of the Bhopal disaster. The company agreed to this.[34]Post-settlement activityIn 1991, the local Bhopal authorities charged Anderson, who had retired in 1986, with manslaughter, a crime that carries a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison. He was declared a fugitive from justice by the Chief Judicial Magistrate of Bhopal on 1 February 1992 for failing to appear at the court hearings in a culpable homicide case in which he was named the chief defendant. Orders were passed to the Government of India to press for an extradition from the United States. The U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal of the decision of the lower federal courts in October 1993, meaning that victims of the Bhopal disaster could not seek damages in a U.S. court.[34]In 2004, the Indian Supreme Court ordered the Indian government to release any remaining settlement funds to victims. And in September 2006, the Welfare Commission for Bhopal Gas Victims announced that all original compensation claims and revised petitions had been "cleared".[34]The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York City upheld the dismissal of remaining claims in the case of Bano v. Union Carbide Corporation in 2006. This move blocked plaintiffs' motions for class certification and claims for property damages and remediation. In the view of UCC, "the ruling reaffirms UCC's long-held positions and finally puts to rest—both procedurally and substantively—the issues raised in the class action complaint first filed against Union Carbide in 1999 by Haseena Bi and several organisations representing the residents of Bhopal".[34]In June 2010, seven former employees of UCIL, all Indian nationals and many in their 70s, were convicted of causing death by negligence: Keshub Mahindra, former non-executive chairman of Union Carbide India Limited; V. P. Gokhale, managing director; Kishore Kamdar, vice-president; J. Mukund, works manager; S. P. Chowdhury, production manager; K. V. Shetty, plant superintendent; and S. I. Qureshi, production assistant. They were each sentenced to two years’ imprisonment and fined ₹100,000 (equivalent to ₹170,000 or US$2,400 in 2018). All were released on bail shortly after the verdict.US federal class action litigation, Sahu v. Union Carbide and Warren Anderson, was filed in 1999 under the U.S. Alien Torts Claims Act (ATCA), which provides for civil remedies for "crimes against humanity."[36]It sought damages for personal injury, medical monitoring and injunctive relief in the form of clean-up of the drinking water supplies for residential areas near the Bhopal plant. The lawsuit was dismissed in 2012 and the subsequent appeal was denied.[37]Former UCC CEO Anderson, then 92 years old, died on 29 September 2014.[38]Long-term effectsIn 2018, The Atlantic called it the "world’s worst industrial disaster."[1]Long-term health effectsSome data about the health effects are still not available. The Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) was forbidden to publish health effect data until 1994.[6]A total of 36 wards were marked by the authorities as being "gas affected," affecting a population of 520,000. Of these, 200,000 were below 15 years of age, and 3,000 were pregnant women. The official immediate death toll was 2,259, and in 1991, 3,928 deaths had been officially certified. Ingrid Eckerman estimated 8,000 died within two weeks.[6][39]The government of Madhya Pradesh confirmed a total of 3,787 deaths related to the gas release.[4]Later, the affected area was expanded to include 700,000 citizens. A government affidavit in 2006 stated the leak caused 558,125 injuries including 38,478 temporary partial injuries and approximately 3,900 severely and permanently disabling injuries.[5]A cohort of 80,021 exposed people was registered, along with a control group, a cohort of 15,931 people from areas not exposed to MIC. Nearly every year since 1986, they have answered the same questionnaire. It shows overmortality and overmorbidity in the exposed group. Bias and confounding factors cannot be excluded from the study. Because of migration and other factors, 75% of the cohort is lost, as the ones who moved out are not followed.[6][40]A number of clinical studies are performed. The quality varies, but the different reports support each other.[6]Studied and reported long term health effects are:Eyes: Chronic conjunctivitis, scars on cornea, corneal opacities, early cataractsRespiratory tracts: Obstructive and/or restrictive disease, pulmonary fibrosis, aggravation of TB and chronic bronchitisNeurological system: Impairment of memory, finer motor skills, numbness etc.Psychological problems: Post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)Children's health: Peri- and neonatal death rates increased. Failure to grow, intellectual impairment, etc.Missing or insufficient fields for research are female reproduction, chromosomal aberrations, cancer, immune deficiency, neurological sequelae, post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and children born after the disaster. Late cases that might never be highlighted are respiratory insufficiency, cardiac insufficiency (cor pulmonale), cancer and tuberculosis. Bhopal now has high rates of birth defects and records a miscarriage rate 7x higher than the national average.[16]A 2014 report in Mother Jones quotes a "spokesperson for the Bhopal Medical Appeal, which runs free health clinics for survivors" as saying "An estimated 120,000 to 150,000 survivors still struggle with serious medical conditions including nerve damage, growth problems, gynecological disorders, respiratory issues, birth defects, and elevated rates of cancer and tuberculosis."[41]Health careThe Government of India had focused primarily on increasing the hospital-based services for gas victims thus hospitals had been built after the disaster. When UCC wanted to sell its shares in UCIL, it was directed by the Supreme Court to finance a 500-bed hospital for the medical care of the survivors. Thus, Bhopal Memorial Hospital and Research Centre (BMHRC) was inaugurated in 1998 and was obliged to give free care for survivors for eight years. BMHRC was a 350-bedded super speciality hospital where heart surgery and hemodialysis were done. There was a dearth of gynaecology, obstetrics and paediatrics. Eight mini-units (outreach health centres) were started and free health care for gas victims were to be offered until 2006.[6]The management had also faced problems with strikes, and the quality of the health care being disputed.[42][43]Sambhavna Trust is a charitable trust, registered in 1995, that gives modern as well as ayurvedic treatments to gas victims, free of charge.[6][44]Environmental rehabilitationWhen the factory was closed in 1986, pipes, drums and tanks were sold. The MIC and the Sevin plants are still there, as are storages of different residues. Isolation material is falling down and spreading.[6]The area around the plant was used as a dumping area for hazardous chemicals. In 1982 tubewells in the vicinity of the UCIL factory had to be abandoned and tests in 1989 performed by UCC's laboratory revealed that soil and water samples collected from near the factory and inside the plant were toxic to fish.[45]Several other studies had also shown polluted soil and groundwater in the area. Reported polluting compounds include 1-naphthol, naphthalene, Sevin, tarry residue, mercury, toxic organochlorines, volatile organochlorine compounds, chromium, copper, nickel, lead, hexachloroethane, hexachlorobutadiene, and the pesticide HCH.[6]In order to provide safe drinking water to the population around the UCIL factory, Government of Madhya Pradesh presented a scheme for improvement of water supply.[46]In December 2008, the Madhya Pradesh High Court decided that the toxic waste should be incinerated at Ankleshwar in Gujarat, which was met by protests from activists all over India.[47]On 8 June 2012, the Centre for incineration of toxic Bhopal waste agreed to pay ₹250 million (US$3.6 million) to dispose of UCIL chemical plants waste in Germany.[48]On 9 August 2012, Supreme court directed the Union and Madhya Pradesh Governments to take immediate steps for disposal of toxic waste lying around and inside the factory within six months.[49]A U.S. court rejected the lawsuit blaming UCC for causing soil and water pollution around the site of the plant and ruled that responsibility for remedial measures or related claims rested with the State Government and not with UCC.[50]In 2005, the state government invited various Indian architects to enter their "concept for development of a memorial complex for Bhopal gas tragedy victims at the site of Union Carbide". In 2011, a conference was held on the site, with participants from European universities which was aimed for the same.[51][52]Occupational and habitation rehabilitation33 of the 50 planned work-sheds for gas victims started. All except one was closed down by 1992. 1986, the MP government invested in the Special Industrial Area Bhopal. 152 of the planned 200 work sheds were built and in 2000, 16 were partially functioning. It was estimated that 50,000 persons need alternative jobs, and that less than 100 gas victims had found regular employment under the government's scheme. The government also planned 2,486 flats in two- and four-story buildings in what is called the "widow's colony" outside Bhopal. The water did not reach the upper floors and it was not possible to keep cattle which were their primary occupation. Infrastructure like buses, schools, etc. were missing for at least a decade.[6]Economic rehabilitationImmediate relieves were decided two days after the tragedy. Relief measures commenced in 1985 when food was distributed for a short period along with ration cards.[6]Madhya Pradesh government's finance department allocated ₹874 million (US$13 million) for victim relief in July 1985.[53][54]Widow pension of ₹200 (US$2.90)/per month (later ₹750 (US$11)) were provided. The government also decided to pay ₹1,500 (US$22) to families with monthly income ₹500 (US$7.20) or less. As a result of the interim relief, more children were able to attend school, more money was spent on treatment and food, and housing also eventually improved. From 1990 interim relief of ₹200 (US$2.90) was paid to everyone in the family who was born before the disaster.[6]The final compensation, including interim relief for personal injury was for the majority ₹25,000 (US$360). For death claim, the average sum paid out was ₹62,000 (US$900). Each claimant were to be categorised by a doctor. In court, the claimants were expected to prove "beyond reasonable doubt" that death or injury in each case was attributable to exposure. In 1992, 44 percent of the claimants still had to be medically examined.[6]By the end of October 2003, according to the Bhopal Gas Tragedy Relief and Rehabilitation Department, compensation had been awarded to 554,895 people for injuries received and 15,310 survivors of those killed. The average amount to families of the dead was $2,200.[55]In 2007, 1,029,517 cases were registered and decided. Number of awarded cases were 574,304 and number of rejected cases 455,213. Total compensation awarded was ₹15,465 million (US$220 million).[46]On 24 June 2010, the Union Cabinet of the Government of India approved a ₹12,650 million (US$180 million) aid package which would be funded by Indian taxpayers through the government.[56]Other impactsIn 1985, Henry Waxman, a California Democrat, called for a U.S. government inquiry into the Bhopal disaster, which resulted in U.S. legislation regarding the accidental release of toxic chemicals in the United States.[57]CausesThere are two main lines of argument involving the disaster. The "Corporate Negligence" point of view argues that the disaster was caused by a potent combination of under-maintained and decaying facilities, a weak attitude towards safety, and an undertrained workforce, culminating in worker actions that inadvertently enabled water to penetrate the MIC tanks in the absence of properly working safeguards.[6][39]The "Worker Sabotage" point of view argues that it was not physically possible for the water to enter the tank without concerted human effort, and that extensive testimony and engineering analysis leads to a conclusion that water entered the tank when a rogue individual employee hooked a water hose directly to an empty valve on the side of the tank. This point of view further argues that the Indian government took extensive actions to hide this possibility in order to attach blame to UCC.[58]Theories differ as to how the water entered the tank. At the time, workers were cleaning out a clogged pipe with water about 400 feet from the tank. They claimed that they were not told to isolate the tank with a pipe slip-blind plate. The operators assumed that owing to bad maintenance and leaking valves, it was possible for the water to leak into the tank.[6][59]This water entry route could not be reproduced despite strenuous efforts by motivated parties.[60]UCC claims that a "disgruntled worker" deliberately connecting a hose to a pressure gauge connection was the real cause.[6][58]Early the next morning, a UCIL manager asked the instrument engineer to replace the gauge. UCIL's investigation team found no evidence of the necessary connection; the investigation was totally controlled by the government, denying UCC investigators access to the tank or interviews with the operators.[58][61]Corporate negligenceThis point of view argues that management (and to some extent, local government) underinvested in safety, which allowed for a dangerous working environment to develop. Factors cited include the filling of the MIC tanks beyond recommended levels, poor maintenance after the plant ceased MIC production at the end of 1984, allowing several safety systems to be inoperable due to poor maintenance, and switching off safety systems to save money— including the MIC tank refrigeration system which could have mitigated the disaster severity, and non-existent catastrophe management plans.[6][39]Other factors identified by government inquiries included undersized safety devices and the dependence on manual operations.[6]Specific plant management deficiencies that were identified include the lack of skilled operators, reduction of safety management, insufficient maintenance, and inadequate emergency action plans.[6][14]UnderinvestmentUnderinvestment is cited as contributing to an environment. In attempts to reduce expenses, $1.25 million of cuts were placed upon the plant which affected the factory's employees and their conditions.[16]Kurzman argues that "cuts ... meant less stringent quality control and thus looser safety rules. A pipe leaked? Don't replace it, employees said they were told ... MIC workers needed more training? They could do with less. Promotions were halted, seriously affecting employee morale and driving some of the most skilled ... elsewhere".[62]Workers were forced to use English manuals, even though only a few had a grasp of the language.[59][63]Subsequent research highlights a gradual deterioration of safety practices in regard to the MIC, which had become less relevant to plant operations. By 1984, only six of the original twelve operators were still working with MIC and the number of supervisory personnel had also been halved. No maintenance supervisor was placed on the night shift and instrument readings were taken every two hours, rather than the previous and required one-hour readings.[59][62]Workers made complaints about the cuts through their union but were ignored. One employee was fired after going on a 15-day hunger strike. 70% of the plant's employees were fined before the disaster for refusing to deviate from the proper safety regulations under pressure from the management.[59][62]In addition, some observers, such as those writing in the Trade Environmental Database (TED) Case Studies as part of the Mandala Project from American University, have pointed to "serious communication problems and management gaps between Union Carbide and its Indian operation", characterised by "the parent companies [sic] hands-off approach to its overseas operation" and "cross-cultural barriers".[64]Adequacy of equipment and regulationsThe factory was not well equipped to handle the gas created by the sudden addition of water to the MIC tank. The MIC tank alarms had not been working for four years and there was only one manual back-up system, compared to a four-stage system used in the United States.[6][39][59][65]The flare tower and several vent gas scrubbers had been out of service for five months before the disaster. Only one gas scrubber was operating: it could not treat such a large amount of MIC with sodium hydroxide (caustic soda), which would have brought the concentration down to a safe level.[65]The flare tower could only handle a quarter of the gas that leaked in 1984, and moreover it was out of order at the time of the incident.[6][39][59][66]To reduce energy costs, the refrigeration system was idle. The MIC was kept at 20 degrees Celsius, not the 4.5 degrees advised by the manual.[6][39][59][65]Even the steam boiler, intended to clean the pipes, was non-operational for unknown reasons.[6][39][59][65]Slip-blind plates that would have prevented water from pipes being cleaned from leaking into the MIC tanks, had the valves been faulty, were not installed and their installation had been omitted from the cleaning checklist.[6][39][59]As MIC is water-soluble, deluge guns were in place to contain escaping gases from the stack. The water pressure was too weak for the guns to spray high enough to reach the gas which would have reduced the concentration of escaping gas significantly.[6][39][59][65]In addition to it, carbon steel valves were used at the factory, even though they were known to corrode when exposed to acid.[12]According to the operators, the MIC tank pressure gauge had been malfunctioning for roughly a week. Other tanks were used, rather than repairing the gauge. The build-up in temperature and pressure is believed to have affected the magnitude of the gas release.[6][39][59][65]UCC admitted in their own investigation report that most of the safety systems were not functioning on the night of 3 December 1984.[67]The design of the MIC plant, following government guidelines, was "Indianized" by UCIL engineers to maximise the use of indigenous materials and products. Mumbai-based Humphreys and Glasgow Consultants Pvt. Ltd., were the main consultants, Larsen & Toubro fabricated the MIC storage tanks, and Taylor of India Ltd. provided the instrumentation.[29]In 1998, during civil action suits in India, it emerged that the plant was not prepared for problems. No action plans had been established to cope with incidents of this magnitude. This included not informing local authorities of the quantities or dangers of chemicals used and manufactured at Bhopal.[6][12][39][59]Safety auditsSafety audits were done every year in the US and European UCC plants, but only every two years in other parts of the world.[6][68]Before a "Business Confidential" safety audit by UCC in May 1982, the senior officials of the corporation were well aware of "a total of 61 hazards, 30 of them major and 11 minor in the dangerous phosgene/methyl isocyanate units" in Bhopal.[6][69]In the audit 1982, it was indicated that worker performance was below standards.[6][61]Ten major concerns were listed.[6]UCIL prepared an action plan, but UCC never sent a follow-up team to Bhopal. Many of the items in the 1982 report were temporarily fixed, but by 1984, conditions had again deteriorated.[61]In September 1984, an internal UCC report on the West Virginia plant in the USA revealed a number of defects and malfunctions. It warned that "a runaway reaction could occur in the MIC unit storage tanks, and that the planned response would not be timely or effective enough to prevent catastrophic failure of the tanks". This report was never forwarded to the Bhopal plant, although the main design was the same.[70]Impossibility of the "negligence"According to the "Corporate Negligence" argument, workers had been cleaning out pipes with water nearby. This water was diverted due to a combination of improper maintenance, leaking and clogging, and eventually ended up in the MIC storage tank. Indian scientists also suggested that additional water might have been introduced as a "back-flow" from a defectively designed vent-gas scrubber. None of these theoretical routes of entry were ever successfully demonstrated during tests by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and UCIL engineers.[59][61][68][71]A Union Carbide commissioned analysis conducted by Arthur D. Little claims that the Negligence argument was impossible for several tangible reasons:[58]The pipes being used by the nearby workers were only 1/2 inch in diameter and were physically incapable of producing enough hydraulic pressure to raise water the more than 10 feet that would have been necessary to enable the water to "backflow" into the MIC tank.A key intermediate valve would have had to be open for the Negligence argument to apply. This valve was "tagged" closed, meaning that it had been inspected and found to be closed. While it is possible for open valves to clog over time, the only way a closed valve allows penetration is if there is leakage, and 1985 tests carried out by the government of India found this valve to be non-leaking.In order for water to have reached the MIC tank from the pipe-cleaning area, it would have had to flow through a significant network of pipes ranging from 6 to 8 inches in diameter, before rising ten feet and flowing into the MIC tank. Had this occurred, most of the water that was in those pipes at the time the tank had its critical reaction would have remained in those pipes, as there was no drain for them. Investigation by the Indian government in 1985 revealed that the pipes were bone dry.Employee sabotageNow owned by Dow Chemical Company, Union Carbide maintains a website dedicated to the tragedy and claims that the incident was the result of sabotage, stating that sufficient safety systems were in place and operative to prevent the intrusion of water.[72]The Union Carbide-commissioned Arthur D. Little report concluded that it was likely that a single employee secretly and deliberately introduced a large amount of water into the MIC tank by removing a meter and connecting a water hose directly to the tank through the metering port.[58]UCC claims the plant staff falsified numerous records to distance themselves from the incident and absolve themselves of blame, and that the Indian government impeded its investigation and declined to prosecute the employee responsible, presumably because it would weaken its allegations of negligence by Union Carbide.[73]The evidence in favor of this point of view includes:A key witness (the "tea boy") testified that when he entered the control room at 12:15 am, prior to the disaster, the "atmosphere was tense and quiet".Another key witness (the "instrument supervisor") testified that when he arrived at the scene immediately following the incident, he noticed that the local pressure indicator on the critical Tank 610 was missing, and that he had found a hose lying next to the empty manhead created by the missing pressure indicator, and that the hose had had water running out of it.This testimony was corroborated by other witnesses.Graphological analysis revealed major attempts to alter logfiles and destroy log evidence.Other logfiles show that the control team had attempted to purge 1 ton of material out of Tank 610 immediately prior to the disaster. An attempt was then made to cover up this transfer via log alteration. Water is heavier than MIC, and the transfer line is attached to the bottom of the tank. The Arthur D. Little report concludes from this that the transfer was an effort to transfer water out of Tank 610 that had been discovered there.A third key witness (the "off-duty employee of another unit") stated that "he had been told by a close friend of one of the MIC operators that water had entered through a tube that had been connected to the tank." This had been discovered by the other MIC operators (so the story was recounted) who then tried to open and close valves to prevent the release.A fourth key witness (the "operator from a different unit") stated that after the release, two MIC operators had told him that water had entered the tank through a pressure gauge.The Little report argues that this evidence demonstrates that the following chronology took place:At 10:20pm, the tank was at normal pressure, indicating the absence of water.At 10:45pm, a shift change took place, after which the MIC storage area "would be completely deserted".During this period, a "disgruntled operator entered the storage area and hooked up one of the readily available rubber water hoses to Tank 610, with the intention of contaminating and spoiling the tank's contents."Water began to flow, beginning the chemical reaction that caused the disaster.After midnight, control room operators noticed the pressure rising and realized there was a problem with Tank 610. They discovered the water connection, and decided to transfer one ton of the contents out to try and remove the water.The MIC release then occurred.The cover-up activities discovered during the investigation then took place.After over 30 years, in November 2017, S. P. Choudhary, former MIC production manager, claimed in court that the disaster was not an accident but the result of a sabotage that claimed thousands of lives.Chaudry's counsel, Anirban Roy, argued that the theory of design defects was floated by the central government in its endeavour to protect the victims of the tragedy. Everyone else who was part of investigations into the case "just toed the line of the central government.... The government and the CBI suppressed the actual truth and saved the real perpetrators of the crime."[74][75]Roy argued to the district court that disgruntled plant operator M. L. Verma was behind the sabotage because he was unhappy with senior management. The counsel argued that there were discrepancies in the statements given by persons who were operating the plant at that time but the central agency chose not to investigate the case properly because it always wanted to prove that it was a mishap, and not sabotage. He alleged that Verma was unhappy with Chaudhary and Mukund.[76][2]Ongoing contaminationDeteriorating section of the MIC plant, decades after the gas leak.Chemicals abandoned at the plant continue to leak and pollute the groundwater.[55][85][86][87]Whether the chemicals pose a health hazard is disputed.[88]Contamination at the site and surrounding area was not caused by the gas leakage. The area around the plant was used as a dumping ground for hazardous chemicals and by 1982 water wells in the vicinity of the UCIL factory had to be abandoned.[6]UCC states that "after the incident, UCIL began clean-up work at the site under the direction of Indian central and state government authorities", which was continued after 1994 by the successor to UCIL. The successor, Eveready Industries India, Limited (EIIL), ended cleanup on the site in 1998, when it terminated its 99-year lease and turned over control of the site to the state government of Madhya Pradesh.[34][72]UCC's laboratory tests in 1989 revealed that soil and water samples collected from near the factory were toxic to fish. Twenty-one areas inside the plant were reported to be highly polluted. In 1991 the municipal authorities declared that water from over 100 wells was hazardous for health if used for drinking.[6]In 1994 it was reported that 21% of the factory premises were seriously contaminated with chemicals.[45][89][90]Beginning in 1999, studies made by Greenpeace and others from soil, groundwater, well water and vegetables from the residential areas around UCIL and from the UCIL factory area show contamination with a range of toxic heavy metals and chemical compounds. Substances found, according to the reports, are naphthol, naphthalene, Sevin, tarry residues, alpha naphthol, mercury, organochlorines, chromium, copper, nickel, lead, hexachlorethane, hexachlorobutadiene, pesticide HCH (BHC), volatile organic compounds and halo-organics.[89][90][91][92]Many of these contaminants were also found in breast milk of women living near the area.[93]Soil tests were conducted by Greenpeace in 1999. One sample (IT9012) from "sediment collected from drain under former Sevin plant" showed mercury levels to be at "20,000 and 6 million times" higher than expected levels. Organochlorine compounds at elevated levels were also present in groundwater collected from (sample IT9040) a 4.4 meter depth "bore-hole within the former UCIL site". This sample was obtained from a source posted with a warning sign which read "Water unfit for consumption".[94]Chemicals that have been linked to various forms of cancer were also discovered, as well as trichloroethylene, known to impair fetal development, at 50 times above safety limits specified by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).[93]In 2002, an inquiry by Fact-Finding Mission on Bhopal found a number of toxins, including mercury, lead, 1,3,5 trichlorobenzene, dichloromethane and chloroform, in nursing women's breast milk.A 2004 BBC Radio 5 broadcast reported the site is contaminated with toxic chemicals including benzene hexachloride and mercury, held in open containers or loose on the ground.[95]A drinking water sample from a well near the site had levels of contamination 500 times higher than the maximum limits recommended by the World Health Organization.[96]In 2009, the Centre for Science and Environment, a Delhi-based pollution monitoring lab, released test results showing pesticide groundwater contamination up to three kilometres from the factory.[97]Also in 2009, the BBC took a water sample from a frequently used hand pump, located just north of the plant. The sample, tested in UK, was found to contain 1,000 times the World Health Organization's recommended maximum amount of carbon tetrachloride, a carcinogenic toxin.[98]In 2010, a British photojournalist who ventured into the abandoned Union Carbide factory to investigate allegations of abandoned, leaking toxins, was hospitalized in Bhopal for a week after he was exposed to the chemicals. Doctors at the Sambhavna Clinic treated him with oxygen, painkillers and anti-inflammatories following a severe respiratory reaction to toxic dust inside the factory.[99][100]In October 2011, the Institute of Environmental Management and Assessment published an article and video by two British environmental scientists, showing the current state of the plant, landfill and solar evaporation ponds and calling for renewed international efforts to provide the necessary skills to clean up the site and contaminated groundwater.[101]Popular cultureActivismSince 1984, individual activists have played a role in the aftermath of the tragedy. The best-known is Satinath Sarangi (Sathyu), a metallurgic engineer who arrived at Bhopal the day after the leakage. He founded several activist groups, as well as Sambhavna Trust, the clinic for gas affected patients, where he is the manager.[6]Other activists include Rashida Bee and Champa Devi Shukla, who received the Goldman Prize in 2004, Abdul Jabbar and Rachna Dhingra.[105][106]Local activismProtest in Bhopal in 2010Soon after the accident, representatives from different activist groups arrived. The activists worked on organising the gas victims, which led to violent repression from the police and the government.[6]Numerous actions have been performed: demonstrations, sit-ins, hunger strikes, marches combined with pamphlets, books, and articles. Every anniversary, actions are performed. Often these include marches around Old Bhopal, ending with burning an effigy of Warren Anderson.International activismCooperation with international NGOs including Pesticide Action Network UK and Greenpeace started soon after the tragedy. One of the earliest reports is the Trade Union report from ILO 1985.[61]In 1992, a session of the Permanent Peoples' Tribunal on Industrial Hazards and Human Rights took place in Bhopal, and in 1996, the "Charter on Industrial Hazards and Human Rights" was adopted.In 1994, the International Medical Commission on Bhopal (IMCB) met in Bhopal. Their work contributed to long term health effects being officially recognised.Important international actions have been the tour to Europe and United States in 2003,[107]the marches to Delhi in 2006 and 2008, all including hunger strikes, and the Bhopal Europe Bus Tour in 2009.Activist organisationsBhopal People's Health and Documentation ClinicAt least 14 different NGOs were immediately engaged.[6]The first disaster reports were published by activist organisations, Eklavya and the Delhi Science Forum.Around ten local organisations, engaged on long term, have been identified. Two of the most active organisations are the women's organisations—Bhopal Gas Peedit Mahila-Stationery Karmachari Sangh and Bhopal Gas Peedit Mahila Udyog Sangthan.[6]More than 15 national organisations have been engaged along with a number of international organisations.[6]Some of the organisations are:International Campaign for Justice in Bhopal (ICJB), coordinates international activities.Bhopal Medical Appeal, collects funds for the Sambhavna Trust.Sambhavna Trust or Bhopal People's Health and Documentation Clinic. Provides medical care for gas affected patients and those living in water-contaminated area.Chingari Trust, provides medical care for children being born in Bhopal with malformations and brain damages.Students for Bhopal, based in USA.International Medical Commission on Bhopal, provided medical information 1994–2000.Settlement fund hoaxOn 3 December 2004, the twentieth anniversary of the disaster, a man falsely claiming to be a Dow representative named Jude Finisterra was interviewed on BBC World News. He claimed that the company had agreed to clean up the site and compensate those harmed in the incident, by liquidating Union Carbide for US$12 billion.[108][109]Dow quickly issued a statement saying that they had no employee by that name—that he was an impostor, not affiliated with Dow, and that his claims were a hoax. The BBC later broadcast a correction and an apology.[110]Jude Finisterra was actually Andy Bichlbaum, a member of the activist prankster group The Yes Men. In 2002, The Yes Men issued a fake press release explaining why Dow refused to take responsibility for the disaster and started up a website, at "Dow Ethics: My Blog about the Stock Market", designed to look like the real Dow website, but containing hoax information.[111]Monitoring of activistsThe release of an email cache related to intelligence research organisation Stratfor was leaked by WikiLeaks on 27 February 2012.[112]It revealed that Dow Chemical had engaged Stratfor to spy on the public and personal lives of activists involved in the Bhopal disaster, including the Yes Men. E-mails to Dow representatives from hired security analysts list the YouTube videos liked, Twitter and Facebook posts made and the public appearances of these activists.[113]Journalists, film-makers and authors who were investigating Bhopal and covering the issue of ongoing contamination, such as Jack Laurenson and Max Carlson, were also placed under surveillance.[114][115]Stratfor released a statement condemning the revelation by Wikileaks while neither confirming nor denying the accuracy of the reports, and would only state that it had acted within the bounds of the law. Dow Chemical also refrained to comment on the matter.[116]Ingrid Eckerman, a member of the International Medical Commission on Bhopal, has been denied a visa to visit India.[117](source[Wikipedia])All this happened and congress tried to cover up.Rajeev Gandhi was directly involved in this case.Corrupted Congress took money from Union Carbide.Thanks for reading

Yes. Nine years ago we wrote the Mt. Airy Emergency Operations Plan. It has been tested and updated and used in 3 events since then.Emergency Operations PlanMount Airy, MarylandTown Hall is located in downtown Mount Airy at 110 South Main Street, Mount Airy, MD 21771301 829 1424301 831 5768410 795 6012301 829 1259 faxAPPROVAL AND IMPLEMENTATIONTown of Mount Airy, MarylandEmergency Operations PlanThis emergency operations plan is hereby approved. This plan is effective immediately and supersedes all previous editions.Mayor DateTown Administrator DateRECORD OF CHANGESChange #Date of ChangeChange Entered ByDate EnteredTown Hall located at 110 South Main Street, Mount Airy, MD 21771EMERGENCY PHONE NUMBERSAMBULANCE/FIRE/POLICE 911FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) 1-202-646-4600Statewide Emergency NumberPoison Control Center 1-800-492-2414Chemical Spills 1-800-424-8802American Red CrossFrederick County 1- 301-662-5131Carroll County 1- 410-848-4334Fire/Rescue Services Frederick County 1- 301-600-1536Fire/Rescue Services Carroll CountyFrederick County Health Department 1-301-600-1029 (Urgent Calls) 1-301-600-1603Carroll County Health Department 1-410-857-5000Frederick Memorial HospitalGeneral Information 1-240-566-3300Emergency Room 1-240-566-3500Carroll Hospital CenterGeneral Information 1-410-876-3000Emergency Room 1-410-871-7186 TTYAllegheny Power 1-800-296-6460Baltimore Gas and Electric 1-410-685-0123Oil CompaniesTevis Oil 410-848-2200Voneiff Oil 301-829-0244Carroll Fuel 410-848-4477Southern States 410-848-9420Maryland Labor Department 1-866-487-9243Maryland Occupational Safety and Health 1-301-791-4600Maryland State Police - Westminster Barracks 1-410-386-3000Maryland Workers Compensation Commission 1-800-492-0479Frederick County Sheriffs Office 1-301-600-1046Non-Emergency 1-301-600-2071Carroll County Sheriffs Office 1-410-386-2900MAVFC, Non –Emergency 301-829-0100Carroll County Humane Society 410-848-4810Frederick County Humane Society 301-600-1546/1544TABLE OF CONTENTSAPPROVAL AND IMPLEMENTATION. iiRECORD OF CHANGES. iiiI. PURPOSE. 1II. EXPLANATION OF TERMS. 1A. Acronyms. 1B. Definitions. 2III. ASSUMPTIONS. 4IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. 5A. Objectives. 5B. General. 5C. Operational Guidance. 6D. Incident Command System (ICS) 7E. Incident Command System (ICS) — Town Command Center (TCC) Interface. 9F. State, Federal, and Other Assistance. 10G. Emergency Declarations. 10H. Activities by Phases of Emergency Management. 14V. ORGANIZATION AND ASSIGNMENTS OF RESPONSIBILITIES. 15A. Organization. 15B. Assignment of Responsibilities. 15C. Response Operations Functional Responsibilities. 18VI. DIRECTION AND CONTROL. 20A. General. 20B. Emergency Facilities. 20C. Continuity of Government. 21VII. EVACUATION. 22A. Evacuation. 22B. Evacuation Situation. 22C. Evacuation Assumptions. 23D. Concept of Operations. 24VIII. ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPORT.24A. Agreements and Contracts. 24B. Records. 24C. Consumer Protection. 25D. Post-Incident and Exercise Review.. 25IX. PLAN DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE. 25A. Plan Development. 25B. Distribution of Planning Documents. 26C. Review.. 26D. Update. 26X. APPENDICES. 26Distribution List. 27Town Contact List. 28Assignment of Town Responsibilities. 29Carroll County EOP Annex Assignments. 32BASIC PLANI. PURPOSEThe purpose of this Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) is to define the actions to be taken by Town Mount Airy, MD (hereafter referred to as Town) officials, in coordination with Carroll County, Frederick County, State of Maryland, federal agencies and other nongovernment organizations in the event of a significant disaster or emergency within the corporate limits of Mount Airy. This plan is intended to work in conjunction with the Carroll County (hereafter referred to as County) EOP and its more specific functional annexes. This plan establishes the overall roles and responsibilities for emergency operations, as well as the concept of operations for the Town. It is intended to be used in conjunction with established operational procedures, plans and protocols.II. EXPLANATION OF TERMSA. AcronymsBOCC Board of County Commissioners of Carroll CountyCCSO Carroll County Sheriff’s OfficeDOD Department of DefenseDOE Department of EnergyECC Emergency Communications CenterEMAC Emergency Management Assistance CompactEOC Emergency Operations CenterEOP Emergency Operations PlanEPA Environmental Protection AgencyEPI Emergency Public informationFEMA Federal Emergency Management AgencyHHS Health and Human ServicesIA Individual AssistanceIC Incident CommanderICP Incident Command PostICS Incident Command SystemJIC Joint Information CenterLWP Local Warning PointMEMA Maryland Emergency Management AgencyMEMAC Maryland Emergency Management Assistance CompactNCP National Contingency PlanNDMS National Disaster Medical SystemNIMS National Incident Management SystemNRF National Response FrameworkOPSSS Office of Public Safety Support ServicesOSC On-Scene CommanderPA Public AssistancePDA Preliminary Damage AssessmentSBA Small Business AdministrationSOG Standard Operating GuidelineSOP Standard Operating ProcedureTCC Town Command CenterB. Definitions1.Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)A congressionally ratified organization that provides form and structure to interstate mutual aid.2.Emergency Operations Center (EOC)Specially equipped facilities from which government officials exercise direction and control and coordinate necessary resources in an emergency situation.3.Emergency Operations Plan (EOP)A plan put into effect whenever a crisis, man-made or natural, disrupts operations, threatens life, creates major damage, and occurs within or nearby the community.4.Emergency Public Information (EPI)Emergency information that is disseminated to the public before, during, or after an emergency or disaster.5.Emergency Situation (See the County EOP for further information).As used in this plan, this term is intended to describe a range of situations, from an incident to a major disaster. It includes the following:a.Event- any large-scale emergency, disaster or planned activity that results in the implementation of the Incident Command System (ICS) or Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to manage County resources and command/control activities. An event may include, but is not limited to, tornado, tropical storm, severe thunderstorm with flash flooding, influenza outbreak, large public gathering or public festival.b.Incident - situation that is limited in scope and potential effects.c.Emergency - a situation larger in scope and more severe in terms of actual or potential effects than an incident.d.Disaster - the occurrence or threat of significant casualties or widespread property damage that is beyond the capability of the local government to handle with its own resources.6.Hazardous MaterialA substance in a quantity or form posing an unreasonable risk to health, safety, or property when manufactured, stored, or transported. The substance, by its nature, containment, and reactivity, has the capability for inflicting harm during an accidental occurrence. It can be toxic, corrosive, flammable, reactive, irritative, or strongly sensitizing, and poses a threat to health and the environment when improperly managed. Hazardous materials include toxic substances, certain infectious agents, radiological materials, and other related materials such as oil, used oil, petroleum products and industrial solid waste substances.7.Join Information CenterCentral location where Public Information Officers (PIOs) representing agencies or jurisdictions during an emergency gather to coordinate the content of information to be conveyed to the public.8.Inter-local agreementsArrangements between governments or organizations, either public or private, for reciprocal aid and assistance during emergency situations where the resources of a single jurisdiction or organization are insufficient or inappropriate for the tasks that must be performed to control the situation. Commonly referred to as a mutual aid agreement.9.Local Warning Point (LWP)A facility in a city, County, town or community that receives warnings and activates the public warning system in its jurisdictional area of responsibility.10.Maryland Emergency Management Assistance Compact (MEMAC)An intrastate assistance compact among local political subdivisions within the State of Maryland.11.National Contingency PlanThe federal government's plan for responding to both oil spills and hazardous substance releases.12.National Disaster Medical System (NDMS)A federally coordinated system that augments the Nation's medical response capability.13.National Incident Management System (NIMS)A system mandated by Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) - 5 that provides a consistent nationwide approach for federal, state, local and tribal governments, the private-sector and nongovernmental organizations to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size or complexity.14.National Response Framework (NRF)Part of the National Strategy for Homeland Security that presents the guiding principles enabling all levels of domestic response partners to prepare for and provide a unified national response to disasters and emergencies. Building on the existing National Incident Management System (NIMS) as well as the Incident Command System (ICS), the NRF coordinating structures are always in effect for implementation at any level and at any time for local, state, and national emergency or disaster response.15.On-Scene-Coordinator (OSC)The federal official responsible for providing access to federal resources and technical assistance and coordinating federal containment, removal, and disposal efforts and resources during an oil or hazardous material incident.16.Standard Operating Guide (SOG)A statement written to guide the performance or behavior of departmental staff, whether functioning alone or in groups.17.Standard Operating Procedure (SOP)Approved method for accomplishing a task or set of tasks. SOPs are typically prepared at the department or agency level.18.Town Command Center (TCC)The location where Town officials provide direction and control for local response to an emergency or disaster.19.Unified CommandIncident Commanders representing agencies or jurisdictions that share responsibility for the incident manage the response from a single Incident Command Post. This allows agencies with different legal, geographic, and functional authorities and responsibilities to work together effectively without affecting individual agency authority, responsibility or accountability.III. ASSUMPTIONSA.Since most of the Town is located within Carroll County, with only a small residential area lying within Frederick County, the Town will follow its’ normal process and seek assistance from Carroll County before seeking assistance from Frederick County.B.Most emergency situations will be handled routinely by the normal responding emergency service agencies.C.In the event of a significant disaster or emergency, the immediate response priority will be to protect public health and safety, preserve the environment and protect public and private property.D.Disasters and emergencies can periodically occur within the Town that may require the mobilization and reallocation of Town resources.E.Certain emergencies or disasters will occur with enough warning that appropriate emergency notifications will be made to ensure some level of preparedness. Other emergencies or disasters will occur with little or no warning.F.The Town’s main responsibility will be to commit available Town resources to save lives and minimize property damage in coordination with the County.G.For most emergencies or disasters, the Mount Airy Volunteer Fire Company, Resident State Trooper or Carroll County Sheriff’s Office (CCSO) will be the first responders and will implement initial incident command.H.Assistance may be available through mutual aid from nearby jurisdictions, including Frederick County, , the Maryland Emergency Management Assistance Compact (MEMAC), the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).I.Town residents and businesses can expect to use their own resources and be self-sufficient for at least three days following a significant disaster event.J.The effects of a disaster or emergency will likely extend beyond the Town boundaries. Many other areas of the County may also experience casualties, property loss and disruption of normal support systems.K.Employees of the Town may become casualties and/or experience damage to their home or property.L.Widespread power and communication outages may require the use of alternate methods of providing public information and delivering essential services. Everyday methods of communication may be difficult to use or unavailable due to demand exceeding capacity (i.e. no cell phone service).M.Upon request, the County, state or federal government will provide outside assistance if local capabilities or resources are overwhelmed or exhausted.N.Emergency operations will be managed in accordance with the National Incident Management System (NIMS).IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONSA. ObjectivesThe objectives of the Town emergency operations are to protect public health and safety, preserve the environment and protect public and private property.B. General1. The Town is vulnerable to various natural and technological hazards as detailed in the County EOP. The scope and magnitude of these emergencies may vary from minor impact requiring a minimum response to major impact requiring a significant response.2. It is the responsibility of Town and County officials to protect public health and safety and preserve property from the effects of hazardous events. This involves identifying and mitigating hazards, preparing for and responding to emergencies, and managing the recovery from emergency situations that affect the Town.3. It is impossible for government to do everything that is required to protect the lives and property of the population. Citizens of the Town have the responsibility to prepare themselves and their families to cope with emergency situations and manage their affairs and property in ways that will aid the government in managing emergencies. The Town will assist citizens in carrying out these responsibilities by providing public information and instructions prior to and during emergency situations in coordination with the County.4. The Town has limited capability to respond to emergency situations and will rely on the County to respond to significant incidents within the Town. The County maintains a robust emergency management program that includes organizing, training, and equipping local emergency responders and emergency management personnel, providing appropriate emergency facilities, providing suitable communications systems, and contracting for emergency services.5. This plan is based on an all-hazard approach to emergency planning. It addresses general functions that may need to be performed during any emergency situation.6. Town organizations tasked in this plan are expected to develop and keep current SOPs and SOGs that describe how their assigned emergency tasks will be performed.7. This plan is based upon the concept that the emergency functions that must be performed by many Town departments generally parallel some of their normal day-to-day functions. To the extent possible, the same personnel and material resources used for day-to-day activities will be employed during emergency situations. Because personnel and equipment resources are limited, some routine functions that do not contribute directly to the emergency may be suspended for the duration of an emergency. The personnel, equipment, and supplies that would normally be required for those functions will be redirected to accomplish emergency tasks.C. Operational Guidance1.Initial Responsea.The Mount Airy Volunteer Fire Company and local law enforcement are likely to be the first agencies on the scene of an emergency situation. They will normally take charge and remain in charge of the incident until it is resolved or others, who have legal authority to do so, assume responsibility. They will seek guidance and direction from local officials and seek technical assistance from state and federal agencies and industry, where appropriate.2.Implementation of the Incident Command System (ICS)a.The first local emergency responder to arrive at the scene of an emergency situation will implement the ICS and serve as the Incident Commander (IC) until relieved by a more senior or more qualified individual. The IC will establish an incident command post (ICP) and provide an assessment of the situation to Town and County officials, identify response resources required, and direct the on-scene response from the ICP.b.For some types of emergency situations, a specific incident scene may not exist in the initial response phase and the Town Command Center (TCC) or County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) may be activated to accomplish initial response actions, such as mobilizing personnel and equipment and issuing precautionary warning to the public. As the potential threat becomes clearer and a specific impact site or sites identified, an ICP may be established, and direction and control of the response transitioned to the IC.3.Source and Use of Resourcesa.The Town will use their own resources to respond to emergency situations, purchase supplies and equipment, if necessary, and request assistance if the resources are insufficient or inappropriate. The County should be the first channel through which the Town requests assistance when its resources are exceeded.b.The Town Administrator, or designee, will direct all requests for assistance that cannot be addressed through mutual aid to the County OPSSS or the County EOC.c.The following are sources for resources that may be available to the Town in responding to disasters and emergencies:1)Personnel, equipment, and facilities belonging to the Town.2)Resources available from the County and through mutual aid.3)Resources available from the private sector through acquisition/ purchasing.4)Resources of the state of Maryland, including the National Guard.5)Mutual aid available through MEMAC.6)Mutual aid resources from other states through the EMAC.7)Resources available from the federal government under the National Response Framework (NRF).8)Donations, whether monetary, goods or volunteer workers.D. Incident Command System (ICS)1.The Town and County will employ ICS in managing emergencies. ICS is both a strategy and a set of organizational arrangements for directing and controlling field operations. It is designed to effectively integrate resources from different agencies into a temporary emergency organization at an incident site that can expand and contract with the magnitude of the incident and resources on hand.a.The IC is responsible for carrying out the ICS function of command—managing the incident. The four other major management activities that form the basis of ICS are operations, planning, logistics, and finance/administration. For small-scale incidents, the IC and one or two individuals may perform all of these functions. For larger incidents, a number of individuals from different departments or agencies may be assigned to separate staff sections charged with those functions. The chart below depicts the standard ICS organization.2.An IC using response resources from one or two departments or agencies can handle the majority of emergency situations. Departments or agencies participating in this type of incident response will normally obtain support through their own department or agency.3.In emergency situations where other jurisdictions or the state or federal government are providing significant response resources or technical assistance, it is generally desirable to transition from the normal ICS structure to a Unified Command structure. This arrangement helps to ensure that all participating agencies are involved in developing objectives and strategies to deal with the emergency.4.Within the Town, the departments identified in the table below will serve as the primary agency for specific incidents and will assume initial IC role. Depending on the incident type and magnitude, incident command may default to an official of the Mt. Airy Volunteer Fire Company, County Division of Health Services (hereafter referred to as Health Department), Resident State Trooper or the CCSO with support, as needed, from the Town.Designated Departments for Establishing Incident CommandIncident TypeDepartment/AgencyBiological incident (e.g. influenza pandemic)Carroll County Health DepartmentBuilding collapse, construction accidentMount Airy Volunteer Fire CompanyFireMount Airy Volunteer Fire CompanyFloodMount Airy Department of Public WorksHazardous materialMount Airy Volunteer Fire DepartmentHurricane/tropical stormCoordination: Carroll County OPSSSRemediation: Town of Mount AiryMass fatalityDepending on the circumstances, the IC could be from Carroll County Sheriff’s Office, MD State Police or Carroll County Health Department.Nuclear/radiological incidentMount Airy Volunteer Fire CompanyPipeline spill/fire or explosionMount Airy Volunteer Fire CompanyRiots, civil disturbancesCarroll County Sheriff’s Office/MD State PoliceSevere thunderstorms/tornadoesCoordination: Carroll County OPSSSRemediation: Town of Mount AiryTerrorist incidentCarroll County Sheriff’s Office/ MD State PoliceTrain derailmentMount Airy Volunteer Fire CompanyWater distribution/water qualityMount Airy Department of Water and SewerWinter stormCoordination: Carroll County OPSSSRemediation: Town of Mount AiryE. Incident Command System (ICS) — Town Command Center (TCC) Interface1.For major emergencies and disasters, the Town will activate its Command Center, located at Town Hall, 110 S. Main Street, Mount Airy (alternate location is the Mount Airy Maintenance Building). When the TCC is activated, it is essential to establish a division of responsibilities between the ICP and the TCC. A general division of responsibilities is outlined below.2.The IC is generally responsible for field operations, including:a.Isolating the scene.b.Directing and controlling the on-scene response to the emergency situation and managing the emergency resources committed there.c.Warning the population in the area of the incident and providing emergency instructions to them.d.Determining and implementing protective measures (evacuation or in-place sheltering) for the population in the immediate area of the incident and for emergency responders at the scene.e.Implementing traffic control arrangements in and around the incident scene.f.Requesting additional resources from the TCC or County EOC, whichever is appropriate.3.The TCC is generally responsible for:a.Providing Town resource support for the incident command operations.b.Issuing public warnings in coordination with the IC.c.Issuing instructions and providing information to the general public.d.Organizing large-scale evacuations.e.Coordinating with the County, as necessary, to provide shelter and mass care arrangements for evacuees.f.Coordinating traffic control for large-scale evacuations.g.Requesting assistance from the County, state and other external sources through the County EOC.F. State, Federal, and Other Assistance1.State and Federal Assistancea.If Town and County resources are inadequate to deal with an emergency situation, assistance from the state will be requested through the County. State assistance furnished to local governments is intended to supplement local resources and not substitute for such resources, including mutual aid resources, equipment purchases or leases, or resources covered by emergency service contracts.b.Requests for state assistance will be made in accordance with the County EOP.2.Other Assistancea.If resources required to control an emergency situation are not available within the state, the Govenor may request assistance from other states pursuant to a number of interstate compacts or from the federal government through FEMA.b.For major emergencies and disasters for which a presidential declaration has been issued, federal agencies may be mobilized to provide assistance to states and local governments. The NRF describes the policies, planning assumptions, concept of operations, and responsibilities of designated federal agencies for various response and recovery functions.c.FEMA has the primary responsibility for coordinating federal disaster assistance. No direct federal assistance is authorized prior to a presidential emergency or disaster declaration, but FEMA has limited authority to stage initial response resources near the disaster site and activate command and control structures prior to a declaration and the Department of Defense (DOD) has the authority to commit its resources to save lives prior to an emergency or disaster declaration. The Recovery Annex to the County EOP provides additional information on the assistance that may be available during disaster recovery.G. Emergency Declarations1.Non-Declared DisastersThe mayor or Town Administrator may direct Town personnel to respond to emergencies or disasters without a formal declaration of an emergency when the expectation is that Town resources will be used. The Town Administrator, or designee, may redirect and deploy Town resources and assets, as necessary, to prepare for, adequately respond to, and quickly recover from an emergency incident.2.Emergency DeclarationsThere are three types of emergency declarations that may apply to a disaster or emergency within the Town, depending upon the scope and magnitude of the event:a.Local Declaration: A local emergency declaration activates the EOP and provides for the expeditious mobilization of Town resources in responding to a major incident. The County may also declare a local state of emergency that includes the Town for incidents that impact other areas of the County.b.State Declaration: A declaration of an emergency by the Govenor of Maryland provides the Town access to the resources and assistance of the departments and agencies of the state, including the National Guard, in the event local resources are insufficient to meet the needs.c.Federal Declaration: The Govenor may request a federal emergency or major disaster declaration. In the event that the Town is declared a federal disaster area, the resources of federal departments and agencies are available to provide resources and assistance to augment those of the Town, County and the state.3.Local Emergency DeclarationA local emergency is declared when, in the judgment of the mayor, the threat or actual occurrence of an emergency or disaster is of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant a coordinated response by the various Town departments and for assistance from outside the Town.a.The declaration of a local emergency by the mayor activates the Town Emergency Operations Plan (EOP). A local emergency is declared when, in the judgment of the mayor, the threat or occurrence of an incident is of sufficient severity to warrant a multi-department response by the Town and the need for outside assistance.b.The president of the Board of Commissioners (BOCC) of Carroll County has the authority to declare a local emergency that may include the Town.c.For instances where a resource shortage (e.g. gasoline, heating oil) is substantially or wholly the cause of a local emergency, a local emergency can only be declared by the Govenor based upon the request of the mayor though the County OPSSS.d.When, in their judgment, all emergency activities have been completed, the mayor or town council will take action to terminate the declared emergency.e.A local emergency declaration may be enacted by the mayor for up to seven days. A local emergency may only be extended beyond seven days with approval of the town council.4.State of Emergencya.The Maryland Emergency Management Act, found in the Annotated Code of Maryland, Public Safety Article, § 14-101, et. seq., prescribes the authority and implications of a declaration of a state of emergency by the Govenor.b.The Governor may declare a state of emergency to exist whenever the Governor finds an emergency has developed or is impeding due to any cause. The state of emergency is declared by executive order or proclamation.c.The Governor’s Declaration of a State of Emergency provides for the expeditious provision of assistance to local jurisdictions, including use of the Maryland National Guard.5.Federal Emergency and Major Disaster Declarationsa.Under the provisions of the Robert T. Stafford Act, the Govenor may request the president to declare a major disaster or emergency declaration for incidents that are (or threaten to be) beyond the scope of the state and local jurisdictions to effectively respond.b.A presidential Major Disaster Declaration puts into motion long-term federal recovery programs designed to help disaster victims, businesses, and public entities.c.An emergency declaration is more limited in scope and without the long-term federal recovery programs of a major disaster declaration. Generally, federal assistance and funding are provided to meet a specific emergency needs or to help prevent a major disaster from occurring.d.The major disaster or emergency declaration designates the political subdivisions within the state that are eligible for assistance. There are three major categories of disaster aid available under a major disaster declaration1)Individual Assistance (IA): Aid to individuals and households.a)Disaster Housing - provides up to 18 months temporary housing assistance for displaced persons whose residences were heavily damaged or destroyed. Funding also can be provided for housing repairs and replacement.b)Disaster Grants - may be available to help meet other serious disaster related needs and necessary expenses not covered by insurance and other aid programs. These may include replacement of personal property, transportation, medical, dental, and funeral expenses.c)Low-Interest Disaster Loans - may be available after a disaster for homeowners and renters from the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) to cover uninsured property losses. Loans may be for repair or replacement of homes, automobiles, clothing, or other damaged personal property. Loans are also available to businesses for property loss and economic injury.d)Other disaster aid programs include crisis counseling, disaster-related unemployment assistance, legal aid and assistance with income tax, Social Security, and Veteran’s benefits. Other State or local help may also be available.2)Public Assistance (PA): Aid to state or local governments to pay part of the costs of rebuilding a community’s damaged infrastructure. PA may include debris removal, emergency protective measures and public services, repair of damaged public property, loans needed by communities for essential government functions, and grants for repair of damaged public and private nonprofit schools and educational facilities.3)Hazard Mitigation: Funding for measures designed to reduce future losses to public and private property.6.Other Declarationsa.Several federal agencies have independent authorities to declare disasters or emergencies. These authorities may be exercised concurrently or become part of a major disaster or emergency declared under the Stafford Act. These other authorities include:1)The administrator of the SBA may make a disaster declaration based upon physical damage to buildings, machinery, equipment, homes, and other property as well as economic injury.2)The Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) may declare, after consultation with public health officials, a public health emergency in the event of a significant outbreak of infectious diseases or bioterrorist attack.3)The U. S. Army Corps of Engineers may issue a disaster declaration in response to flooding or coastal storms.4)The Secretary of Agriculture may declare a disaster in certain situations in which a County sustained a production loss of 30 percent or greater in a single major enterprise.5)A federal On-Scene-Coordinator (OSC), designated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), U.S. States Coast Guard, or the Department of Energy (DOE) under the National Contingency Plan (NCP), has the authority to direct response efforts at the scene of a discharge of oil, hazardous substance, pollutants, or contaminants, depending upon the location and source of the release.7.The Declaration Processa.A local emergency may be declared by the mayor. The mayor will consult with the County OPSSS, when possible, to assist with the declaration. The local emergency declaration may be based upon reports of an actual event or on the forecast or prediction of emergency conditions.b.Whenever a local emergency has been declared, the Town Administrator will immediately notify the County OPSSS. The County will notify the Maryland Emergency Management Agency (MEMA).c.For an incident that affects the Town and other areas of the County, the County, concurrently with the Town declaration or upon the request of the Town, may issue the local emergency declaration.d.A local emergency must be declared before state and federal assistance can be requested unless a state or federal state of emergency has already been declared.e.Based upon the request of the County or other information available, the Governor may declare a state of emergency. The Governor’s declaration of a state of emergency provides for expedited assistance from state departments, agencies and the Maryland National Guard.f.Once a determination is made by MEMA that the event is, or may be, beyond the capabilities of the Town, County and state, the Governor may request assistance from FEMA. Generally this request will result in joint federal/state Preliminary Damage Assessment (PDA).1)A PDA is an on-site survey of the affected area(s) by federal and state officials to determine the scope and magnitude of damages and to determine if federal assistance is warranted. Generally, a PDA is conducted prior to an official request by the Governor for a declaration of an emergency or major disaster by the president. The County OPSSS will provide assistance in facilitating the PDA process within the Town.a)Depending upon the extent and scope of damages provided in the initial reports, PDA teams may be organized to assess damage to private property (Individual Assistance) and/or public property (Public Assistance).b)For events of unusual severity and magnitude, state and federal officials may delay the PDA pending more immediate needs assessment activities.c)The PDA process verifies the general magnitude of damage and whether federal assistance will be requested.d)Based upon the results of the PDA and consultations with FEMA, MEMA will prepare for the Governor’s signature an official request for an emergency or major disaster declaration.g.The presidential declaration will stipulate the types of federal assistance authorized for the Town.H.Activities by Phases of Emergency Management1.MitigationThe Town will conduct mitigation activities to lessen or eliminate hazards, reduce the probability of hazards causing an emergency situation, or lesson the consequences of unavoidable hazards and participate in the review and updates of the County Natural Hazard Mitigation Plan.2.PreparednessPreparedness activities will be conducted in coordination with the County OPSSS to develop the response capabilities needed in the event of an emergency.3.ResponseThe Town will respond to emergency situations using the resources available and will request assistance, as needed, through the County for response operations. Response activities include emergency medical services, firefighting, law enforcement operations, evacuation, sheltering and mass care, search and rescue and other associated functions.4.RecoveryIf a disaster occurs, the Town will carry out a recovery program that involves both short-term and long-term efforts. Short-term operations seek to restore vital services to the community and provide for the basic needs of the public. Long-term recovery focuses on restoring the community to its natural state.V. ORGANIZATION AND ASSIGNMENTS OF RESPONSIBILITIESA. Organization1.In the event of a significant emergency or disaster impacting the Town, the mayor, assisted by the Town Administrator, will coordinate emergency operations within the Town and request outside resources, as needed. The TCC will be activated, as necessary, to coordinate the Town’s response operations. The Town may request a representative from the County OPSSS to assist the Town.2.In the event the County EOC is activated to coordinate operations, the mayor may designate a representative to the County EOC to coordinate activities within the Town.B.Assignment of Responsibilities1.The Mayor will:a.Establish objectives and priorities for the emergency management program and provide general policy guidance.b.Serve as, or appoint, a chief spokesperson for the Town during emergency events.c.Confer with the Town Administrator and other town officials, as appropriate, on policy issues related to the response and recovery operations.d.Coordinate with other elected officials at the County, regional and state level, including the congressional delegation.e.Order evacuations and implement this plan.f.Keep the public informed during emergency situations.g.In coordination with the County OPSSS, declare a local state of emergency, request the Governor declare a state of emergency, or invoke the emergency powers of government, when necessary.h.Request assistance from other local governments, when necessary.i.Exercise overall responsibility for plans and operations for emergency and disaster assistance within the Town.2.The town council will:a.Monitor the emergency response during disaster situations and provide direction where appropriate.b.Ensure funds are available to support emergency operations as outlined in this plan.c.Communicate with the public and provide guidance on responding to an emergency or disaster.d.As necessary, vote to extend a local emergency declaration beyond seven days.e.Host community meetings to ensure needs are being addressed and information is provided to residents.f.Promulgate the codes, regulations, and ordinances of the Town, and provides the funds required to implement and enforce an effective mitigation program.g.Enact emergency ordinances, as appropriate.3.Town Attorney will:a.Advise Town officials concerning legal responsibilities, powers and liabilities regarding emergency operations and post-disaster assistance.b.Prepare, as appropriate, emergency ordinances (i.e., gouging and curfews) and local declarations.c.Assist with the preparation of applications, legal interpretations or opinions.d.Assist in obtaining waivers and legal clearances needed to dispose of debris and materials resulting from an emergency or disaster.e.Assist with the implementation of isolation and quarantine orders and other court orders as needed.f.Advise Town officials on other legal matters arising from an emergency or disaster.4.The Town Administrator will:a.Activate the Town EOP.b.Provide direction and control of Town departments and organizations during emergency operations. In the event the TCC is activated, the Town Administrator will serve as the TCC manager.c.Direct and reallocate Town assets and resources during an emergency.d.Serve as the lead for the Town in managing recovery operations.e.Implement the policies and decisions of the governing body related to emergency management.5.The Town engineer will:a.Develop and maintain the Public Works and Engineering Annex to this plan.b.Manage the public works and engineering operations during emergency situations.c.Oversee the repair and restoration of key Town facilities and systems.d.Manage debris removal operations.6.The director, Streets and Road Department will:a.Provide personnel, equipment, and supplies to support emergency operations, upon request.b.Develop and maintain SOPs/SOGs for emergency tasks.c.Monitor the status of the Town’s transportation infrastructure and repair roads and traffic control systems, as necessary.d.Provide support for traffic control, as necessary.e.Manage snow and debris removal on Town streets.f.Provide support for evacuations.7.The director, Water and Sewer will:a.Develop and maintain SOPs/SOGS.b.Conduct damage assessments of water supply, distribution and control facilities, sanitary sewer systems and related facilities.c.Manage the repair and restoration, as necessary, of Town water and sanitary sewer systems.d.Provide for emergency water supply and assist with distribution.e.Ensure the continued supply of potable water.f.Ensure continuous wastewater collection services.g.In conjunction with the County Health Department, provide warnings and advice for contaminated or low water levels and “boil water” alerts.8.Law enforcement will:a.Provide available staff, resources, and facilities to support emergency operations.b.As appropriate, establish on-scene incident command.c.Assist in evacuation operations.d.Provide security of emergency site(s), evacuated areas, shelter areas, vital facilities, supplies, and other assigned locations.e.Provide assistance in search operations.f.Provide law enforcement services.g.Initiate on-scene warning and alerting in cooperation with the Mount Airy Volunteer Fire Company.h.Provide traffic control and management.i.Conduct investigations in accordance with Federal, State, and local laws.9.The Mount Airy Volunteer Fire Company will:a.Provide fire prevention, suppression and rescue services.b.Provide support for emergency notifications.c.As appropriate, establish initial on-scene incident command.d.Provide emergency triage, medical care and transportation of patients.e.Assist in evacuation operations.f.Assist in search operations.10.Parks and Recreation will:a.Provide available staff and resources to support emergency operations.b.Provide facilities, as required, for use as staging areas and/or points of distribution.C.Response Operations Functional Responsibilities1.The Town EOP is based upon common functions that may be needed following a significant emergency or disaster. These functions are based upon those identified in the County EOP.a.Warning – the Town will use all means available to provide the Town population with appropriate warning information. This includes radio and television, loudspeakers, sirens and telephones. Warning activities will be coordinated by the Mayor. The Town will request support from the County ECC and OPSSS, as needed. The Town receives warning information through the Carroll County ECC that serves as the Local Warning Point (LWP). Upon activation of the TCC, warning activities in the Town will be coordinated by the EOC Manager.b.Communications – the Town will request communication support, as needed, through the County. The Town will coordinate the use of its internal communication assets through the TCC.c.Radiological Protection – the Town will request support, as needed, from the County as detailed in the Radiological Protection Annex to the County EOP. Primary responsibility for this function is the Mount Airy Volunteer Fire Company.d.Evacuation – the Town will be assisted by the Mount Airy Volunteer Fire Company with support requested from the County, as needed, as detailed in the Evacuation Annex to the County EOP. The Mount Airy Volunteer Fire Company may provide support in conducting door-to-door warnings and instructions.e.Damage Assessment – the County OPSSS has primary responsibility for coordinating damage assessment activities as detailed in the Damage Assessment Annex to the County EOP. The Town will be responsible for damage assessment of critical infrastructure and for providing support and information for damage within the Town boundaries.f.Firefighting and other Fire/Rescue Functions – the Mount Airy Volunteer Fire Company has primary responsibility for these functions within the Town and will coordinate requests for support through existing mutual aid.g.Emergency Medical Services (EMS) – The Mount Airy Volunteer Fire Company has primary responsibility for this function within the Town and will coordinate requests for support with existing mutual aid.h.Law Enforcement – the Resident State Trooper has primary responsibility for law enforcement functions within the Town during emergency situations and will provide support as detailed in the Law Enforcement Annex to the County EOP.i.Direction and Control - primary responsibility for direction and control with the Town is assigned to the mayor, assisted by the Town Administrator. The Town Administrator will serve as the TCC manager upon activation and will manage the Town’s emergency response operations.j.Hazardous Materials and Oil Spills – the Mount Airy Volunteer Fire Company has primary responsibility for hazardous material response operations as detailed in the Hazardous Material and Oil Spill Response Annex to the County EOP.k.Search and Rescue – the MD State Police/CCSO has primary responsibility for search operations following a major disaster or emergency as detailed in the Law Enforcement Annex to the County EOP. The Mount Airy Volunteer Fire Company has primary responsibility for rescue operations following a major disaster or emergency as detailed in the Fire and Rescue Annex to the County EOP. (CC may have search and rescue annex)l.Terrorist Incident – the MD State Police/CCSO has primary responsibility for local response to a terrorist incident as detailed in the Terrorist Incident Annex to the County EOP.m.Shelter and Mass Care – the County Citizens Services Division has the primary responsibility for shelter and mass care operations as detailed in the Shelter and Mass Care Annex to the County EOP.n.Health and Medical Services – the County Health Department has the primary responsibility for health and medical service operations as detailed in the Health and Medical Services Annex to the County EOP.o.Human Services – the County Citizens Services Division has the primary responsibility of coordinating human services as detailed in the Human Services Annex to the County EOP.p.Transportation – the Town Department of Streets and Roads has primary responsibility for coordinating transportation support. The County will assist, when requested, as detailed in the Transportation Annex to the County EOP.q.Emergency Public Information (EPI) - The mayor or the mayor’s designee will serve as the chief spokesperson for the Town. The Town will coordinate its EPI with the County and assign a representative to the County Joint Information Center (JIC), if activated.r.Recovery – The Town Administrator will be the lead for recovery operations within the Town and will serve as the Town’s point of contact with the County.s.Public Works and Engineering – the Town’s Department of Public Works has the primary responsibility for this function.t.Utilities – the Town’s Superintendent, Water and Sewer, has the primary responsibility for this function.u.Resource Management – The Town will, upon exhaustion of Town resources, request assistance from the County.v.Donations and Volunteer Management - the County Citizens Services Division has the primary responsibility for coordinating donations and volunteers during an emergency response as detailed in the Donations and Volunteer Coordination Annex to the County EOP.w.Legal – The town attorney will provide appropriate advice to Town officials.VI. DIRECTION AND CONTROLA.General1.The mayor, assisted by the Town Administrator, is responsible for establishing objectives and policies for emergency management and providing general guidance for disaster response and recovery operations.2.The Town Administrator will provide overall direction of the response activities of all departments. As necessary, the Town Command Center (TCC) will be activated to coordinate emergency operations.3.The IC, assisted by a staff sufficient for the tasks to be performed, will manage the emergency response at an incident site.4.If the Town’s own resources are insufficient or unsuitable to deal with an emergency situation, assistance from other jurisdictions, the County, organized volunteer groups, or the state may be requested.B.Emergency Facilities1.Incident Command Post (ICP)Except when an emergency situation threatens, but has not yet occurred, and those situations for which there is no specific hazard impact site (such as severe winter storm or area-wide utility outage), an ICP or command posts will be established in the vicinity of the incident site(s). As noted previously, the IC will be responsible for directing the emergency response and managing the resources at the incident scene.2.Town Command Center (TCC)When major emergencies and disasters have occurred or appear imminent, the TCC, located at Mount Airy Town Hall, 110 S. Main Street, Mount Airy, will be activated. The alternate TCC is the Mount Airy Maintenance Facility. The mayor and OPSSS will determine if a Town liaison will be deployed to the County EOC or a liaison from the County OPSSS will be deployed to the TCC to coordinate emergency actions between the Town and the County.a.The following individuals are authorized to activate the TCC:1)mayor2)town administratorb.The general responsibilities of the TCC are:1)Assemble accurate information on the emergency situation and current resource data to allow local officials to make informed decisions on courses of action.2)Working with representatives of emergency services, determine and prioritize required response actions and coordinate their implementation.3)Provide resource support for emergency operations.4)Suspend or curtail government services, recommend the closure of schools and businesses, and cancellation of public events.5)Organize and activate large-scale evacuation and mass care operations.6)Provide emergency information to the public.c.Representatives of those departments and agencies assigned emergency functions in this plan will staff the TCC. TCC operations are addressed in the Direction and Control Annex. The interface between the TCC and the ICP is described in paragraph IV.E. above.C.Continuity of Government1.A major incident or emergency could include death or injury of key Town officials, the partial or complete destruction of established facilities, and the destruction of vital public records essential to the continued operations of the Town government. It is essential that law and order be preserved and government services maintained.2.Continuity of leadership and government services is particularly important with respect to emergency services, direction of emergency response operations, and management of recovery activities. A key aspect of this control is the continued capability to communicate official requests, situation reports, and other emergency information throughout the event.3.The line succession for the mayor is:a.Mayorb.President of the Town Councilc.Town administrator4.The line of succession for the Town Administrator is:a.Town Administratorb.Town engineerc.Director, Streets and Road DepartmentVII. EVACUATIONState law does not authorize the Governor or local officials to issue mandatory evacuation orders. State and local officials may recommend evacuation of threatened or stricken areas.A.EvacuationThe purpose of this section is to provide for the orderly and coordinated evacuation of all, or any part, of the population of the Town if it is determined that such action is the most effective means available for protecting the population from the effects of an emergency situation. This section is intended to work in conjunction with the County EOP.B.Evacuation Situation1.The Town is susceptible to both natural and man-made events such as floods, hurricanes, and hazardous material incidents that may necessitate an evacuation of nearby residents, businesses, and other facilities in order to save and protect lives. Evacuations may not always be the best option and Town officials or the on-scene IC may instead order affected populations to shelter in place. However, emergency situations such as a major fire, transportation accidents, hazardous material incidents, or localized flooding may require an evacuation of Town residents.2.The Town has the primary responsibility for ordering an evacuation and ensuring the safety of its citizens. The decision to evacuate will depend on the type of hazard, its magnitude, intensity, duration, and anticipated time of occurrence, assuming it hasn’t already happened.3.The on-scene IC may implement an evacuation, as necessary, to save lives and establish a zone around the impacted or potentially impacted area. The IC will request assistance from Town officials, as required, to provide notification, traffic management and control, and other support, as necessary. Should an evacuation become necessary, warning and evacuation instructions may be disseminated via radio, television, and other available media outlets, voice/tone siren, door-to-door notifications, etc.4.The primary means of transportation for evacuees will be by privately owned and operated motor vehicles. Town transportation resources may be utilized to provide supplementary transportation for those in need, including special needs populations, who may require accessible transportation. As necessary, additional transportation assets will be requested from the County.5.Depending upon the scope and magnitude of the incident, a Unified Command, including the Mount Airy Volunteer Fire Company, County OPSSS, CCSO and the MD State Police, may be established to coordinate notification to residents and businesses, and to provide direction for the orderly evacuation of the affected area. If the nature of the incident is escalating rapidly, or if large areas are impacted, the TCC may be activated to support the IC.6.In the event that emergency shelters will need to be established to support evacuations, the Town will request support from the County to establish and operate the shelter(s), as appropriate.7.Since the Town has no mandatory evacuation law, the mayor, or designee, can only recommend evacuation of a threatened area, not mandate it. However, when the mayor has issued a local disaster declaration, he or she may take action to control re-entry into a stricken area and the movement of people and occupancy of buildings within a disaster area.8.Town residents are expected to plan for the care of their pets in the event of a disaster or emergency. Companion animals are not be permitted in mass care shelters operated by the County except for service animals that accompany citizens with special needs. However, the County has made provisions for sheltering pets, as necessary, during emergencies. Refer to the County Animal Protection Annex for more information on the sheltering of pets during an emergency.C.Evacuation Assumptions1.Most people at risk will evacuate when local officials recommend that they do so. A general estimate is that 80 percent of those at risk will comply when local officials recommend evacuation. The proportion of the population that will evacuate typically increases as a threat becomes more obvious to the public or more serious.2.Some individuals will refuse to evacuate regardless of the threat.3.When there is sufficient warning of a significant threat, some individuals who are not at risk will evacuate.4.Some evacuation planning for known hazard areas can, and should be, done in advance.5.While some emergency situations are slow to develop, others occur without warning. Hence, there may be time for deliberate evacuation planning or an evacuation may have to be conducted with minimal preparation time. In the case of short notice evacuations, there may be little time to obtain personnel and equipment from external sources to support evacuation operations.6.The need to evacuate may become evident at any time and there could be little control over the evacuation start time.7.In most emergency situations, the majority of evacuees will seek shelter with relatives or friends or in commercial accommodations rather than in public shelters.8.Most evacuees will use their personal vehicles to evacuate; however, transportation may need to be provided for evacuees without personal vehicles.9.Public information messages that emphasize the need for citizens to help their neighbors who lack transportation or need assistance can significantly reduce requirements for public transportation during an evacuation.D.Concept of Operations1.The IC or, for large-scale emergencies, the mayor, shall assess the need for evacuation. The Town Administrator, as the TCC manager, will plan evacuations and coordinate support among Town departments and the County, as necessary, for the evacuation effort.2.It may be appropriate to recommend precautionary evacuation of certain residents in advance of a general evacuation recommendation.3.Evacuating residents with special needs may require specialized transportation.4.Advanced planning for special needs evacuees must be coordinated to ensure that proper care may be given at designated shelter locations.5.A recommendation to evacuate will be issued by the mayor or designee. The Town will use all means available to disseminate the evacuation recommendation.6.Actual evacuation movement will be controlled by the MD State Police/CCSO.7.The Town will request support, as needed, from the County as outlined in the County EOP. The Evacuation Annex to the County EOP provides additional information.VIII. ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPORTA.Agreements and ContractsShould local resources prove to be inadequate during an emergency; requests will be made for assistance from other local jurisdictions through mutual-aid and the County EOP.B.Records1.Record Keeping for Emergency OperationsThe Town is responsible for establishing the administrative controls necessary to manage the expenditure of funds and to provide reasonable accountability and justification for expenditures made to support emergency operations. This shall be done in accordance with the established Town fiscal policies and standard cost accounting procedures.a.Incident CostsAll departments shall maintain records summarizing the use of personnel, equipment, and supplies during the response to day-to-day incidents to obtain an estimate of annual emergency response costs that can be used in preparing future department budgets.b.Emergency or Disaster CostsFor major emergencies or disasters, all departments and agencies participating in the emergency response shall maintain detailed records of costs for emergency operations to include:1)Personnel costs, especially overtime costs.2)Equipment operation costs.3)Costs for leased or rented equipment.4)Costs for contract services to support emergency operations.5)Costs of specialized supplies expended for emergency operations.These records may be used to recover costs from the responsible party or insurers or as a basis for requesting financial assistance for certain allowable response and recovery costs from the state and/or federal government.2.Preservation of Recordsa.In order to continue normal Town operations following an emergency situation or disaster, vital records must be protected. These include legal documents as well as property and tax records. The principal causes of damage to records are fire and water; therefore, essential records should be protected accordingly. Each department will include protection of vital records in its SOPs/SOGs.b.If records are damaged during an emergency situation, the Town may seek professional assistance to preserve and restore them.C.Consumer ProtectionConsumer complaints regarding alleged unfair or illegal business practices often occur in the aftermath of a disaster. Such complaints will be referred to the town attorney who will pass such complaints to the Consumer Protection Division of the Office of the Attorney General.D.Post-Incident and Exercise ReviewThe mayor is responsible for organizing and conducting a critique following the conclusion of a significant emergency event/incident or exercise. The critique will entail both written and verbal input from all appropriate participants. Where deficiencies are identified, an individual or department will be assigned responsibility for correcting the deficiency and a due date shall be established for that action.IX. PLAN DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCEA. Plan DevelopmentThe Town Administrator is responsible for the overall development and completion of the Town’s EOP and identified supporting annexes. The mayor is responsible for approving and promulgating this plan.B. Distribution of Planning DocumentsThe Town Administrator shall determine the distribution of this plan and its annexes, if any. This plan includes a distribution list (See Appendix 1) that indicates who receives copies of the basic plan and its annexes.C. ReviewThis plan and its annexes shall be reviewed annually by local officials. The Town Administrator will establish a schedule for annual review of planning documents by those tasked in them.D. Update1.This plan will be updated based upon deficiencies identified during actual emergency situations and exercises and when changes in threat hazards, resources and capabilities, or government structure occur.2.This plan and its annexes, if any, must be revised or updated by a formal change at least every four years. Responsibility for revising or updating the plan is assigned to the Town Administrator.3.The Town Administrator is responsible for distributing all revised or updated planning documents to all departments, agencies, and individuals tasked in those documents.X. APPENDICESAppendix 1 Distribution ListAppendix 2 Town Emergency Contact InformationAppendix 3 Assignment of Town ResponsibilitiesAppendix 4 Carroll County Emergency Operations Plan AnnexesAPPENDIX 1Distribution ListJurisdiction/Agency PlanBasic PlanAnnexesTown Command Center1AllMayor1AllTown Council5AllTown Administrator1AllStreets and Roads1AllWater and Sewer1AllParks and Recreation1AllPlanning and Zoning1AllTown Attorney1AllMount Airy Volunteer Fire Company1AllCarroll County OPSSS1AllCarroll County Division of Health Services1AllCarroll County Citizens Services Division1AllCarroll County Sheriff’s Office1AllCarroll County Finance Division1AllFrederick County Division of Emergency Management1AllAPPENDIX 2Mount Airy Contact ListNAMETITLEOFFICEHOMECELL/PAGERPatrick RockinbergMayor301-829-1424301-829-0895301-448-2598Monika WeierbachTown Administrator301-829-1424301-834-3750301-748-4943Barney QuinnTown Engineer301-829-1424301-831-5838240-793-3703Mark MoxleyDirector Streets and Roads301-831-7844301-829-1156240-793-3701Tom RobersonDirector WWTP301-829-2674301-829-0525240-793-3699Brian JohnsonDirector Water and Sewer301-831-7844301-829-8188240-793-3697MAVFCLocal Fire Company301-829-0100MD State PoliceResident Troopers301-829-0218APPENDIX 3Assignment of ResponsibilitiesRESPONSIBLE PARTYASSIGNMENTMayor·Establish objectives and priorities for the emergency management program and provide general policy guidance.·Serve as, or appoint, a chief spokesperson for the Town during emergency events.·Confer with the Town Administrator and other town officials, as appropriate, on policy issues related to the response and recovery operations.·Coordinate with other elected officials at the County, regional and state level, including the congressional delegation.·Order evacuations and implement this plan.·Keep the public informed during emergency situations.·In coordination with the County OPSSS, declare a local state of emergency, request the Governor declare a state of emergency, or invoke the emergency powers of government, when necessary.·Request assistance from other local governments, when necessary.·Exercise overall responsibility for plans and operations for emergency and disaster assistance within the Town.Town Council·Monitor the emergency response during disaster situations and provide direction where appropriate.·Ensure funds are available to support emergency operations as outlined in this plan.·Communicate with the public and provide guidance on responding to an emergency or disaster.·As necessary, vote to extend the disaster declaration for the Town beyond seven days.·Host community meetings to ensure needs are being addressed and information is provided to residents.·Promulgate the codes, regulations, and ordinances of the Town, and provides the funds required to implement and enforce an effective mitigation program.·Enact emergency ordinances, as appropriate.Town Attorney·Advise Town officials concerning legal responsibilities, powers, and liabilities regarding emergency operations and post-disaster assistance.·Prepare, as appropriate, emergency ordinances (i.e., gouging and curfews) and local declarations.·Assist with the preparation of applications, legal interpretations or opinions.·Assist in obtaining waivers and legal clearances needed to dispose of debris and materials resulting from an emergency or disaster.·Assist with the implementation of isolation and quarantine orders and other court orders, as needed.·Advise town officials on other legal matters arising from an emergency or disaster.Town Administrator·Activate the Town EOP.·Provide direction and control of Town departments and organizations during emergency operations. In the event the TCC is activated, the Town Administrator will serve as the TCC manager.·Direct and reallocate Town assets and resources during an emergency.·Serve as the lead for the Town in managing recovery operations.·Implement the policies of the governing body related to emergency management.Town Engineer·Develop and maintain the Public Works and Engineering Annex to this plan.·Manage the public works and engineering operations during an emergency situations.·Oversee the repair and restoration of key Town facilities and systems.·Manager debris removal operations.Director, Street and Road Department·Provide personnel, equipment, and supplies to support emergency operations upon request.·Develop and maintain SOPs/SOGs for emergency tasks.·Assess damages to Town streets.·Monitor the status of the Town’s transportation infrastructure and repair roads and traffic control systems, as necessary.·Provide for traffic control, as necessary.·Manage snow and debris removal on Town streets.·Provide support for evacuations.Director, Water and Sewer·Develop and maintain SOPs/SOGs.·Conduct damage assessments of water supply, distribution and control facilities, sanitary sewer systems and related facilities.·Manage the repair and restoration, as necessary, for Town water and sanitary sewer systems.·Provide for emergency water supply and assist with distribution.·Ensure the continued supply of potable water.·Ensure continuous wastewater collection services.·In conjunction with the County division of Health Services provide warnings and advice for contaminated or low water levels and “boil water” alerts.Mount Airy Volunteer Fire Company·Provide fire prevention, suppression and rescue services.·Provide support for emergency notifications.·As appropriate, establish initial on-scene incident command.·Provide emergency triage, medical care and patient transportation.·Assist in evacuation operations.·Assist in search operations.·Provide emergency medical care, triage, and transportationLaw Enforcement·Provide available staff, resources, and facilities to support emergency operations.·As appropriate, establish on-scene incident command.·Assist in evacuation operations.·Provide security of emergency site(s), evacuated areas, shelter areas, vital facilities, supplies, and other assigned locations.·Provide assistance in search operations.·Provide law enforcement services.·Initiate on-scene warning and alerting in cooperation with the Mount Airy Volunteer Fire Company.·Provide traffic control and management.·Conduct investigations in accordance with Federal, State, and local laws.Parks and Recreation·Provide available staff and resources to support emergency operations.·Provide facilities, as required, for use as staging areas and/or points of distribution.APPENDIX 4Carroll County EOP Annex AssignmentsANNEXASSIGNED TO:Annex A: WarningAnnex B: Communications and Information TechnologyAnnex C: Shelter & Mass CareAnnex D: Radiological ProtectionAnnex E: EvacuationAnnex F: Fire and RescueAnnex G: Law EnforcementAnnex H: Health and Medical ServicesAnnex I: Emergency Public InformationAnnex J: RecoveryAnnex K: Public Works and EngineeringAnnex L: UtilitiesAnnex M: Resource ManagementAnnex N: Direction & ControlAnnex O: Human ServicesAnnex P: Reserved for future use.Annex Q: Hazardous Materials & Oil SpillResponseAnnex R: Reserved for future use.Annex S: TransportationAnnex T: Donations and Volunteer ManagementAnnex U: LegalAnnex V: Terrorist Incident ResponseAnnex W: Animal Health EmergencyAnnex X: Private Sector CoordinationAnnex Y: Family SupportAnnex Z: Damage AssessmentGEOGRAPHIC BRANCHES

The Great War was a total, global tragedy: its setting, the entire world; its duration, 1914–18; its main feature, mass violence. From the very beginning, the British, French, German and Belgian governments made the war global by pulling the inhabitants and resources of their empires into it. This took place long before the United States entered the war in 1917.Countries, whether neutral or not, helped maintain the epic scale of the violence through industrialized production of munitions, food and other supplies, while also seeking to uphold as much of the law of war as they could.Although the war officially ended in 1918, in some ways it continued into the 1920s and lasted right up to the Second World War.For the first time in history, the whole world waged war – a war that devoured men, resources and energy; that split loyalties, reignited old fervours and generated new horrors. What began in Europe, and might have been only the “Third Balkan War”, was turned into a global catastrophe upon the whim of the great imperial powers. Four of them – Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and Russia – were destroyed by it, but the war would also leave a vivid scar on the collective memory of all involved.The world would come to mourn the deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilians and ten million combatants, and the loss of an innocence never to be regained. In 1918, Maurice Busset produced a large painting entitled Bombardement de Ludwigshafen. He was so proud of his work – in both senses of the word – that he signed it “aviator”, a member of the new cavalry of the sky. His own plane can be seen above a factory in flames – bombs falling in a colourful, almost joyful setting in which Busset, a very patriotic man, depicts the destruction of a German factory, perhaps one of those that had produced the asphyxiating gases used on all the battlefields since 1915.What did civilian lives matter – the lives of the workers and residents of the area – when what counted was winning the war? The painting shows that in that conflict, civilians on the other side were simply the enemy (although Busset did not actually include any civilians in the image, as if they simply did not exist). In this way, it exemplifies the terrible novelty of total war. There was now more than one kind of front: sprawling military fronts mostly made up of men in uniform, and home fronts, where civilians came to be seen as targets, but their suffering went largely unnoticed and was often forgotten.In 1917, the poet Apollinaire, a soldier in the war, was already asking himself: What should this war be called? In the beginning, people called it ‘the war of 1914’, then as the war carried on into 1915 it became ‘the European war’; when the Americans got involved it became the ‘World War’ or ‘Universal War’. … The ‘Great War’ has its backers too. The ‘War of Nations’ could garner some votes. The ‘War of the Races’ might also be defensible. And the ‘War of the Alliances’ or the ‘War of the Peoples’. But the ‘War of the Fronts’ would perhaps express best the character of this gigantic struggle.For 100 years, the military fronts – land, sea and air – and those who fought on them have quite rightly received the most attention in discussions of conflict. But it is time to study everyone else’s war. Civilians were also caught up in the fight – through their tremendous work to keep the supplies moving to the fronts where they were needed – and they suffered and grieved their losses. The military fronts cannot be understood without looking at those fighting on the home fronts, who also were completely mobilized for the war effort. Every man, woman and child contributed in his or her own way in factories, fields and schools.The military fronts and the home fronts formed an immense, complex war machine: there were fronts on land, sea and air; there were sites of invasion and shelter, of Herculean labour, of military and civilian imprisonment, of tireless battles against wounds and disease, and of mourning and remembrance. This sowed the seeds of later catastrophes. In some areas, civilians were at the heart of the war; invaded, occupied, looted and bombed, they had become everyday targets in a total war.In these areas, outside the four walls of their laboratory, the authorities tested their ideas of how to repress large groups, displace entire populations, even attempt, in the words of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) at the time, the “systematic extermination” of the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire. In his essay, “Wars of the Twentieth Century and the Twentieth Century as War”, the Czech philosopher Jan Patocka fully grasped the paroxysmal nature of the conflict:The First World War is the decisive event in the history of the twentieth century. It determined its entire character. It was this war that demonstrated that the transformation of the world into a laboratory for releasing reserves of energy accumulated over billions of years can be achieved only by means of wars.Emmanuel Levinas, a Lithuanian philosopher exiled from his country for the first time as a child in 1914, spoke of the importance that the two world wars had had on his life: The war of 1914 never ended; the revolution and the unrest afterwards, the civil war, all of that comes together in the war of 1914. … The unrest started in August 1914 and never stopped, as if the order of things had been forever disturbed. Both thinkers point the way to how we should explore this laboratory of violence, the “unrest”, the “disturbances” and the extremely difficult task of perceiving, conceptualizing and remembering what happened.The Great War was, whether deliberately or unconsciously, a laboratory for the twentieth century: a field experiment or test site where violence could be carried out and the effectiveness of military materials to kill men measured and improved. As weapons became increasingly sophisticated, the white-coated technicians were sometimes located right at the front. When poison gas was deployed on a massive scale for the first time, Fritz Haber, a German chemist, was on the battlefield at Ypres to observe the consequences of his research at first hand.Psychologists set up laboratories as close as possible to the action to use war as an extended experiment, with men serving as lab rats. Experts like these became proselytizers of total war, a way of waging war ever more effectively in the service of their countries. The goal of the laboratory war was not universal knowledge but national victory. On the military fronts, that meant many more captured, wounded or dead.Total war meant globalization and industrialization; modernization and regression; atavism, anomie and cultural appropriation across regions, countries and continents. Facts and statistics are needed on an enormous scale to assess the Great War – but geography and statistics do not bleed. We will endeavour, therefore, to understand the blood and the tears by looking at this new face of war on both the military and the home fronts.The military front. Generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff coined the term “battle of materials” (Materialschlacht) to describe the battle of the Somme. Their soldiers, however, described it as Verwüstungschlacht: devastation or butchery. Officers of the General Staff and soldiers in the field were both right. Between 1914 and 1918, the various armies were engaged in battles of materials and battles of utter carnage.The more than 70 million soldiers fighting the war were trapped in a new kind of deadly violence. Even if they came out of the war in one piece, over half of those that survived developed psychological disorders, minor and major. From 1914, the battlefield became a place that was radically different and more terrifying than anything that had gone before. War had been transformed. Where previously soldiers had fought shoulder to shoulder, they were now isolated, spread out across the terrain, hiding wherever a shell had made a crater.While all battlefields had been frightening in the past, nothing had come close to the total dehumanization of this war. The difference between the means of protecting oneself and killing others was massive: machine guns, artillery, flamethrowers and poison gas turned the terrain into killing fields. Men were not even safe in their bunkers underground. The intense fighting lasted, on and off, for weeks, then months. But after the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, the initial period of battles that were brutal but brief was over. Battles on the Western Front, on the Eastern Front and in the Middle East would last for months.They became a series of sieges that laid waste to everything around them – without, however, preventing in the least the besieged from bringing in new supplies and reinforcements, or rebuilding their defences. Rear lines of trenches extended so far, sometimes dozens of kilometres, that defending forces could repel almost all the enemy’s attempts to break through. But how many were killed or wounded? How many were made prisoners of war? How many were declared missing or used as human shields? As a result, what is most remembered about the war is the mass slaughter of combatants: over 10 million dead in four and a half years.Unlike in previous wars, very few died of disease; almost all were killed in the fighting. The survivors did not fare much better. Nearly 50% of all those who fought were wounded, whether seriously or not, and often more than once. Shells were the main cause; poison gas, though a new terror, caused far fewer casualties. The new violence got under the skin and into the flesh of those who were both agents and patients. However, few would later be able to say “I survived, and I killed” – like Blaise Cendrars, the Swiss writer who volunteered to fight in the French army: All at once everything breaks, cracks, booms. General commotion. A thousand blasts. Infernos, fires, explosions. It’s an avalanche of cannon. The thunder rolls. Barricades. The firing pin. In light of the looming departure, oblique, ambiguous men, the index of a signboard, a crazy horse. The batting of an eyelid. The flash of magnesium. A quick snapshot. Everything disappears.“Everything”, it seems, including bodies: [H]e was blown up by a shell and I saw, with my own eyes I saw, this handsome legionary sucked up into the air, violated, crumpled, blasted in mid-air by an invisible ghoul in a yellow cloud, and his blood-stained trousers fall to the ground empty, while the frightful scream of pain emitted by the murdered man rang out louder than the explosion of the shell itself, and I heard it ringing still for a long moment after the [vaporized] body had ceased to exist.It was because there was so often no identifiable trace of killed men that governments started to commemorate the Unknown Soldier. Innovations in general medicine in the nineteenth century led to improvements in military medicine. Therapeutic practices had seen progress too – paradoxically because of new kinds of wounds and injuries. Wounded soldiers were now commonly evacuated to field hospitals, where operations would be carried out with antiseptic agents and anaesthetics, reducing the risk of gangrene and amputation. Bullets and shrapnel were located using X-rays. Doctors performed reconstructive facial surgery. The first blood transfusions took place and new vaccines were developed. But the intensity of the fighting caused extreme emotional and psychological trauma, and left some irreversibly damaged.Psychiatric science was not sufficiently developed to treat stress and trauma of this kind. While German had the scientific-sounding Kriegsneurosen, the far less sophisticated-seeming “shell shock” of the British and obusite of the French (obus means “shell”) left considerable room for unhelpful interpretation; in an atmosphere of feverish patriotism, combatants were frequently suspected of dissimulation. Nevertheless, little by little the experts had to accept the evidence before their eyes: not only did war mutilate men, it drove them mad. Even officers whose sense of honour and duty were beyond question could crack.For the philosopher Walter Benjamin, the generation of 1914–18 “had to experience one of the most monstrous events in the history of the world”. He insisted on the insignificance of human beings in this radically new kind of war: A generation that had gone to school in horse-drawn streetcars now stood in the open air, amid a landscape in which nothing was the same except the clouds and, at its centre, in a force field of destructive torrents and explosions, the tiny, fragile, human body.What he hadn’t understood, however, was that civilians had had their own fair share of frenzy.The home front. In occupied areas, the usual dichotomy between front and rear did not exist. In “normal” wars, wives and daughters “stayed at home” while the husbands and grown-up sons went off to fight at the front. But in war, men – franc-tireurs, or maverick soldiers – would invade houses and women’s bodies, venting their frustration on defenceless civilians. Hence the general fury against the Germans because of their atrocities in Belgium and France, against the Austro-Hungarians in Serbia, against the Russians in eastern Prussia. A consequence of making war total was that immense numbers of people were now forced to flee their village or town – to live, or die, elsewhere. At both the start and the end of the Great War, there was an exodus of people by road and rail – people on foot and horseback, people crammed in carts, cars and trains. Though displacements were as old as war itself, the Great War made them commonplace, and ushered in the century of the refugee.In the beginning, people were fleeing at the approach of invading armies, holding onto the more or less reasonable hope of returning soon, depending on the country and the way the war was going. They knew, or hoped, they would be coming back, just as soon as the war was over. But when would that be? Louis Malvy, the French interior minister, gave this tortuous description of the situation of masses of people on the fringes of the war, who had lost their houses, jobs and resources: There is obviously no uncertainty concerning the inhabitants of places in areas occupied by the enemy (whether they have withdrawn thereto or been repatriated thereto from Germany); nor is there any with regard to communes that, although located in an uninvaded or recovered area, have been evacuated by decision of the military or administrative authorities.The same cannot be said for inhabitants of communes that, unoccupied by the enemy and unevacuated, are located in an area that has to a greater or lesser extent been subjected to bombardment. … There may be individual cases that require examination; that is to say that inhabitants, having left their place of residence, found themselves in a situation that, whilst justifying their departure, thereby too provides the grounds for their transfer elsewhere. … These cases cannot be settled a priori by myself, and will therefore require referral to the prefects in the area of the military operations concerned for their assessment, who have hitherto always provided the most well-founded and equitable response to questions of this order. Should there be any doubts with regard to the situation of the interested party, the decision taken should be that which is the most generous and humane.These were men who were old or who had not been called up, and women and children. They were neither at the front nor at the rear, but somewhere else, in a new situation that paradoxically pushed them to the margins of the war simply because they had been, from the very first days and months, right in the eye of the storm. Many continued to be pushed from place to place; the evacuations and expulsions continued for the duration of the war, and these journeys were as diverse as they were painful. Those being displaced knew when they left that their houses would be occupied by soldiers. They hoped that these would be people from their own side in the rear lines, but what if they were enemy soldiers from the front?Enemy were barbarians, capable of anything – or so they thought, because that, after all, was why they were running away. These men, women and children, when they did find refuge, attracted various reactions – the best and worst of societies during wars.The care and concern of the first months, bolstered by patriotic declarations of solidarity, soon gave way to rejection as the war dragged on. Refugees became a burden; they were useless, poor, extra mouths to feed – in short, foreign. Refugees did not simply have a different nationality: they were fundamentally alien. They could not be integrated into society.The perspective shifted from refugees coming from somewhere else to refugees being determined by something else. In the language of the day, that meant race. On the Balkan, Ottoman and Eastern Fronts, invasions, counter-invasions and forced displacements made the movement and suffering of civilian populations even more dramatic.In 1914 the Russians advanced east, causing panic and terror, before the Central Powers turned the tables and thrust, in the summer of 1915 and after the Revolution in 1917–18, into the diverse immensity of Russia. As empires reorganized themselves internally, some displacements took the form of forced homogenization, reassembling and reordering society on social or racial lines.Particullary in Russia, the military had no qualms about how to treat “suspect populations” –Jews and subjects of German origin. They were locked up or transferred well away from the front. This “ethnic cleansing” marked a turning point: from being internal refugees, many were now deportees. A wave of pogroms coincided with other widespread violence by combatants against Jews, nourished by long-held ideas among the peasants of the Jews as “traitors”, “infidels”, “hoarders” and “speculators”.The authorities ordered the courts not to prosecute: people could “have a crack at the yid” with impunity, and many regular military units committed war crimes. Waves of anti-Semitic violence continued on a massive scale between 1918 and 1920, as boundaries shifted and territories were carved up. The refugee could be said to be both the first to suffer in the war and the last.Concentration Camps. In 1917, Gustave Ador, the president of the ICRC, said: Civilian internees are an innovation of this war; the international treaties did not foresee it. At the beginning of the war it may have been logical to immobilize them in order to detain suspects; a few months would have sufficed, it would appear, to separate the wheat from the chaff.We must, from different points of view, integrate civilian internees with civilian deportees in enemy countries, as well as the inhabitants of territories occupied by the enemy. These civilians have been denied their liberty, and their situation differs little from that of the prisoners. After three full years of war, we ask that the different categories of civilians in this war be the object of special attention and that a resolution to their situation, which in some regards is crueller than that of military prisoners, be seriously considered before the arrival of the fourth winter of this war.Russian children held in a Finnish concentration camp at Petrozavodsk in Karelia inWorld War I. The Red Army liberated approximately 7,000 Russian inmates held in six separate camps at this particular location.The war raised many questions. What should we call people who were in a particular geographical situation because of the conflict going on around them, who did not run away in time, who had become refugees and who had sometimes been captured and then locked up? “Internees”? “Deportees”? “Prisoners”?What should we do with them? They were not soldiers; there was, therefore, no international treaty to protect them. Although “normal” war always involves the violent separation of civilians from soldiers, who may be wounded or die, the elation of heroism and the consent given to fight for one’s country may in part compensate for the soldier’s suffering. But there was none of that here: no heroism, no consent.There was just pure suffering on the part of civilians, made worse by the authorities’ inability to uncover abuses or identify the victims. The administrative and military texts simply said “captured civilian”; there was no mention of gender or age, and their specific situation was simply ignored. That was the paradox facing civilians in prison camps. The war homogenized their cases and favoured combatants. The landscape of the Great War was scarred by concentration camps, watchtowers and barbed wire – which was at times electrified. But in a world in which heroes were dying on the battlefield, few paid the civilian internees any attention. Civilian victims were marginalized, practically invisible.“Deportation” became synonymous with “concentration camps”. It was normal to displace people as a way of forcing them to work or keeping them under surveillance, often as a form of punishment. Detention was administrative and/or military, never judicial, because the deportees were never tried or sentenced. The word deportatio in classical Latin (“cart”, “carry away”) came to mean “expulsion” or “exile” in Late Latin. The modern term blends both meanings, combining being taken from one’s home and being expelled. Already before the war, the concepts of deportation and concentration camps were being fused by the means that made them possible – railways – and the objective: the separation of civilians – old men, women and children – from soldiers, so that the former would not “bother” the latter because of their family ties.This went on in a context of social Darwinism that grew out of colonialism: concentration camps had been invented by the Spanish in Cuba in 1896 and almost simultaneously reinvented in South Africa by the British during the Boer War. Because Europeans had immediately made the war global by attacking other countries’ colonies and calling on their own to come to their aid, concentration camps existed throughout the world in 1914. Civilian citizens of countries that had become enemies were labelled “enemy aliens” and interned in camps not only in their home countries but also in the colonies (e.g., Ukrainians in Canada, Germans in Australia, Galician Poles of Austria-Hungary in France).Men were the main target. Those who were of fighting age were seen as potential spies. Paradoxically, those of fighting age thus interned were saved from death at the front by this decision, however arbitrary it may have been. They were deemed to be military prisoners, saved from the trenches by capture and the original Geneva Convention. Men and women soon suffered the same fate of deportation, something that was coming to be viewed as normal, even banal, as early as 1914. John Reed, an American journalist, caught the mood of the time: Everybody kept up an incessant and anxious discussion as to whether Greece and Bulgaria would intervene, and on what side. For at any moment they might be cut off from home and condemned to perpetual wandering on neutral seas; they might be captured on landing and penned into concentration camps; they might be taken off the ship as alien enemies by a hostile cruiser.The populations of areas that had been invaded and then occupied by enemy armies formed a second group of civilian prisoners, who suffered different kinds of alienation and internment. This ranged from being isolated from their compatriots to being deported to concentration camps where, in some circumstances, they were held as hostages or subjected to forced labour. The major problem facing the economies of the warring countries was a shortage of manpower. Global, total war required global, total means. But if men had been mobilized en masse, women, prisoners of war and colonial workers in Great Britain and France were needed on the home front. The Central Powers turned to forced labour in their occupied areas: Belgian and French miners, Lithuanian (Ober Ost) or Serbian lumberjacks and farmers. Thousands, in some cases hundreds of thousands, of Belgians, French, Germans, Italians, Romanians, Russians and Serbs suffered the same fate, in Europe and the colonies. This was not only forced labour but a return to a kind of slavery.The presence of women in the camps was an extraordinary novelty of this war, which was peculiar in mixing soldiers with civilians, uniforms with everyday clothes. Women in dresses, their bundles of belongings in hand, seemed incongruous and, indeed, out of place. The things that civilian prisoners made – as did their so similar and yet so different counterparts, the military prisoners – show how much they tried to improve their everyday conditions materially and psychologically. They were fighting boredom and depression, so often the causes of “barbed wire disease”, and doing time, the time in prison replacing that of the war. The handicraft of civilians caught up in the war is like the handicraft of the trenches: objects from the war to represent the war; objects from the camp to represent the camp.The murder of a nation. The Armenians of the Ottoman Empire represent the most extreme case of civilian displacement during the Great War; indeed, the case was so extreme that there was no word at the time for their deportation-extermination. The catastrophe grew out of the Turkish dread that their national security was at risk and from the decision to begin “ethnic cleansing” – Christians in Anatolia being forced to make way for Muslim refugees from the Balkans. For the Young Turks, the Armenians were powerful traitors, an enemy within. They were represented as pests, as beasts, their humanity denied. They needed to be “taken care of”, shorthand even then for murder.17 Talaat Pasha, one of the heads of the Committee of Union and Progress that ruled the Ottoman Empire, described these deportations, which began with the children, as logical retribution against “traitors”, people who were obviously in the pay of Russia: “The expulsion of Armenians from our eastern provinces is a military necessity.”As is all too typical when groups decide on mass murder, the Turks blamed their own crimes on their victims and claimed to be defending themselves from these “civilized criminals”, an oxymoron more apt as self-definition in this case.When deportations of Armenians to Syria began in April 1915, nothing had been done to prepare for their arrival. It is probable that the Armenians were not expected to survive the uprooting, or the thirst, starvation, rapes and massacres along the way. Armin Wegner, a nurse in the German army, recorded a telegram exchange between the mayor of Aleppo and Talaat Pasha. The mayor asked: “Thousands of deported Armenians have arrived. What should I do with them?” To which Talaat is alleged to have replied: “The destination of the deportation is: nowhere.” Wegner adds: “That was another name for the desert.”Finally, in July 1915, camps were organized by the Aleppo Sub-Directorate of Deportees that handled the deportees when they arrived by train. The camps consisted of tents – when available, most were simply cloth hung to provide some shelter against the sun – and had no sanitary facilities or food; they were generally situated over 25 kilometres from the railway station, and had to be reached on foot. Famine and typhus were rife, doing the murderers’ work for them before they emptied the camps, one by one, by sending the living further east or finishing off those who remained. The Ras ul Aïn site was described by some as a “death camp”. Even as early as 1915, the massacre of the Armenians was being called a “crime against humanity and civilization”.But this was not an official term in international law at the time – that had to wait until after 1945 and the Nuremberg trials. This was a cry for vengeance raised by the Triple Entente against the Central Powers and their ally, the Ottoman Empire. But although the Allies made much use of these crimes against the Armenians during the war as damning propaganda, they were quickly forgotten once the war was over. There was a shift from the “banality of evil” to the “banality of indifference”, and silence.Conclusion. The war began with many expressing their determination and willingness to take part, but these attitudes shifted to rejection and outright pacifism after the conflict. As Freud said as early as 1915, modern warfare had produced extraordinarily traumatizing situations that nobody was prepared for: the mutilated bodies, the death of so many young people – an entire generation lost – and the massive destruction of homes and of hope. A nineteenth-century vision of progress and civilization had left behind nothing but barbarity – cruelty, brutality, internalized violence expressed as visceral patriotism – which whether it was accepted or rejected, fought or given into, would be reflected and refracted in the post-war period, in the private sphere and in the political, literary and artistic worlds.From his earliest work in the 1920s, the Polish jurist Raphael Lemkin was motivated by what had happened during the invasions and occupations of the Great War. In a report prepared for the Fifth Conference for the Unification of Criminal Law in Madrid in 1933, he proposed calling these specific offences against the law of nations “acts of barbarism” and “acts of vandalism”.He had understood – although he did not put it as clearly then as he later did – that the extermination of a people was not a random act of cruelty but the essence of this kind of war against civilians and the desire to homogenize peoples and religions. Lemkin went as far as he could in 1933 towards finding a legal term that encompassed offences against cultures and against individuals because they belonged to certain groups. He was looking for a legal chain of reasoning that would enable such unprecedented acts to be punished.Invasions, occupations, atrocities, deportations and massacres of civilians kept pace with the radicalization of the fighting on the battlefield, yet they have been practically obliterated from the collective memory of the war. It would take another war – a total war on an even greater scale – for the word “genocide” to be coined by Lemkin. Memory had been defeated. It was laid low by the hypercommemoration of those who were seen either as heroes or as victims of the trenches, and by collective amnesia with regard to all the others, including the Armenians and the prisoners of war. Who now remembers the fate of the British prisoners – mainly Indians – forced to march across the desert of Iraq, to die there in their thousands? Raymond Aron spoke about those he believed had got it wrong post-1918: “The Second World War reminded us that memory which was too faithful was just as dangerous as forgetting. 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