Navy Goals And Objectives For Fiscal: Fill & Download for Free

The 355 ship number can be somewhat confusing. The Navy has five ship classifications: 1. Commissioned, 2. Non-Commissioned, 3. Support, 4. Ready Reserve Force and 5. Reserve Fleet. The number of ships total 490 + with the Commissioned group totaling 250 + ships.. The 355 ship number apparently consists of mixed classifications. The following is from a Congressional report:Navy’s 355-Ship Ship Force-Structure GoalIntroduction On December 15, 2016, the Navy released a force-structure goal that calls for achieving and maintaining a fleet of 355 ships of certain types and numbers.1 The force level of 355 ships is a goal to be attained in the future; the actual size of the Navy in recent years has generally been between 270 and 300 ships. Table 1 shows the composition of the 355-ship force-level objective.Table 1. 355-Ship Force-Level GoalShip Category Number of shipsBallistic missile submarines (SSBNs) 12 Attack submarines (SSNs) 66 Aircraft carriers (CVNs) 12 Large surface combatants (i.e., cruisers [CGs] and destroyers [DDGs]) 104 Small surface combatants (i.e., frigates [FFGs], Littoral Combat Ships, and mine warfare ships) 52 Amphibious ships 38 Combat Logistics Force (CLF) ships (i.e., at-sea resupply ships) 32 Command and support ships 39 TOTAL 355Source: U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal YearThe 355 ship fleet involves a ton of new ships which will cost a ton of money. The US has the largest military budget but it all doesn’t go to the Navy.

Q: How well do the US Army Special Forces learn to speak their assigned foreign language (assuming no previous knowledge of the language)?Overall, U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) learn to speak their assigned foreign language by attending the various military & DOD language schools/training offered. High-level language skills for SF personnel are still a requirement for current & future operations, but they are very difficult and costly to achieve & maintain. As they said to us before any class attended, “foreign language proficiency is a perishable skill” which means use it or lose it.In response to the needs for high-level foreign language in SF units, the United States Army Special Forces Command (USASFC) set the goal of having at least one SF team member qualified at the 2/2 & 3/3 levels in each deploying twelve-man Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA). The Defense Language Institute (DLI) considers a 2/2 to be “Limited Working Proficiency” & is the minimum score for certification as a Defense Department Basic Linguist while a 3/3 is considered “General Professional Proficiency” & is the score needed for most positions in the Defense Attaché system.It has been estimated the hours & what is achieved between the initial foreign language training at the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC) & the language courses at the Defense Language Institute (DLI). Language training at the SFQC is only designed to train students to the 1/1 level (elementary proficiency), while the DLI advanced courses produce 3/3 speakers & the DLI basic courses produce 2/2 speakers. There is a gap between the SFQC & DLI as an approximation of the additional training Special Forces Soldiers require to reach advanced proficiencies. This gap was multiplied by the hourly rate for foreign language instruction at a major General Services Administration (GSA) certified foreign language contractor to determine the cost required to achieve proficiency at the 2/2 and 3/3 level in all SOF priority languages. A total cost for the program was then determined under four language distribution scenarios: a base scenario that evenly distributed languages in each SF group, a current needs scenario that placed priority on operationally critical languages such as Arabic & Chinese, a low-cost scenario that assigned all the easiest to learn language & least expensive, relevant to their assigned SF group, and a high-cost scenario that assigned all the hardest to learn language and therefore most expensive relevant to their assigned SF group.Foreign Language skills are key for current and future SF missions for Army SF. Army SF is often confused with the broader term Special Operations Forces (SOF). SOF refers to all forces assigned to US Special Operations Command & includes not only SF units but also Navy SEALS, Air Force Commandos, Marine Corps Special Operations personnel as well as other Army Special Operations units such as the 75th Ranger Regiment & the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment. Army SF is the Defense Department’s DOD) primary force for conducting unconventional warfare (UW) & foreign internal defense (FID) along with the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade & the 4th Military Information Support Group, are distinct from other SOF units due in large part to their language training & cultural and regional expertise. Active duty SF qualified Soldiers are assigned to one of five regionally oriented SF groups where the individual language & cultural skills of these SF are leveraged to execute the regional specific missions of each SF group. As an example, an SF qualified Soldier initially assigned to the PACOM oriented 1st SF Group would receive language training in an Asian language such as Chinese, Korean, Thai, Tagalog or Indonesian with some being harder or easier to learn than others.Many years of post-9/11 operational experience have reinforced what SOF leaders have long understood which is foreign language skills are essential to conducting the unique missions of Army SF. Going back to their World War II roots in the OSS, SF has long been distinguished by their foreign language skills. In recent years, these skills have only become more important. In the foreword to the Army’s doctrinal publication involving SF, ADP 3-05, Special Operations, it was written that success for SOF in future conflicts requires a profound understanding of foreign culture & fluency in local languages. It has been stressed the operational need for SOF personnel with languages, more cultural attunements, & regional expertise.USASFC set ambitious goals for its organic foreign language capabilities in response to the need for high-level foreign language skills for SF personnel. Beyond the basic requirement for all SF to maintain a 1/1 in their assigned languages, USASFC set as the unit objective for each deploying ODA as having one SF proficient at the 2/2 level & one SF proficient at the 3/3 level. These goals continue to be ambitious given that the required minimum for SF is 1/1.Reviewing these requirements to every active duty ODA will require at most 360 2/2 qualified SF & 360 3/3 qualified SF. This number is based on a fully manned SF organization of 4 battalions per SF group, 3 companies per battalion & 6 ODAs per company.SF are provided with 2 types of language training: acquisition and sustainment. Currently, acquisition training comes in the form of Basic Special Operations Language Training (BSOLT). All students in the SFQC attend BSOLT as the last phase of the qualification course before graduation. BSOLT is 26 weeks for all students regardless of the difficulty of the language studied & students are required to achieve a 1/1 before they can earn their green beret. Foreign languages are grouped into 4 categories based on their difficulty. Category I languages, such as French or Spanish, & Category II languages, such as Indonesian, are the easiest to learn, while Category III languages, such as Russian, & Category IV languages, such as Chinese, are the most difficult. SF students are assigned their target language based on their aptitude for learning foreign languages as demonstrated through scores on the Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB).After graduation, SF personnel continue to receive sustainment ( use it or lose it) training & are expected to maintain a 1/1 in their designated target language. Soldiers who fail to maintain a 1/1 are not eligible for advanced skills training & are less competitive for promotion. SF personnel who are assigned a Category I or II language must have, at a minimum, 80 hours of annual foreign language sustainment training while others who have a Category III or IV language must have 120 hours. In all cases only 40 hours of this annual training can be independent study, the remainder must be instructor-led in some form. Based on operational needs & availability, SF personnel also have access to alternative training venues to include distance education through video conferencing, resident courses at DLI & participating universities, intermediate level courses specifically designed for SOF & short-term overseas immersion programs.An analysis of the current SF foreign language program indicates that it will be almost impossible to reach the goal of a 2/2 and 3/3 qualified Solider per ODA without more additional changes to the training language program. Using training at DLI as the standard for the length of time required to achieve high-level proficiency, it is clear that there is an enormous gap between a typical SF Soldier’s initial language training & what is required to achieve a 3/3 or even only a 2/2 in all but the easiest to learn languages.At DLI, the basic course in each language is designed to reach a 2/2 level, the intermediate course a 2+/2+ & the advanced course a 3/3. Graduating the DLI basic course & earning a 2/2 takes between 26 weeks for Category I languages & 64 weeks for Category IV languages. If the DLI basic, intermediate & advanced courses were placed back to back to back, reaching a 3/3 would require 62 weeks for Category I languages & 158 weeks for Category IV languages. As BSOLT is only 26 weeks in length, there is a huge gap between initial acquisition & the DLI requirements for advanced proficiency. For Category, I languages BSOLT is the same length as the DLI basic course, as a result, it is likely that enough learners can earn a 2/2 out of BSOLT to meet USASFC’s goal of a 2/2 speaker per ODA. For the hardest to learn languages there is a gap of up to 38 additional weeks between the length of BSOLT & the DLI Basic Course. For achieving a 3/3, Category I languages have a gap of 36 weeks & Category IV languages have a gap of 132 weeks.Scholarship on foreign language maintenance indicates that it is very difficult for learners with low initial acquisition levels to significantly improve their skills without another iteration of prolonged intensive study. In fact, according to a study by instructors at the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute (FSI), learners who do not initially acquire at least a 3/3 level of proficiency are unlikely to improve & are likely to see their skills degrade outside of intensive formal training. This is significant for SF Soldiers because it will be very difficult for them to improve their skills solely through independent study. Critically, however, if SF personnel achieve very high levels of proficiency initially they are much more likely to retain those skills throughout their careers.Assuming that annual sustainment training will improve an SF’s language score over time, the gap between initial acquisition & a 2/2 or 3/3 level of proficiency is so great that it would take decades to make up the difference. Assuming an SF only received the minimum annual language training & his skills increased at a constant rate, it would still take 13.5 years to reach a 3/3 in a language such as French & it would take over 30 years to do so in a Category IV language like Arabic!!Unfortunately, DOD studies indicate that additional sustainment training must be intensive & lengthy to successfully raise an individual’s proficiency level. Short or part-time command programs will help sustain a skill but are not effective enough to raise a proficiency score. Only full-time training seems to be truly sufficient to raise an SF’s score. Most of the additional training venues available to SF, such as online training or study at participating universities are not long or intensive enough to raise a Soldier’s proficiency level. Even overseas language immersion is not as effective or cost-efficient as intensive daily training for acquiring higher-level langue skills. The learning center for SF personnel, the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center & School (USAJFKSWCS), does offer intensive 32-week intermediate level SOLT where personnel are expected to graduate with a 2/2, but not all languages are currently offered & class sizes & numbers are not sufficient to meet USASFC’s goalIf regular annual training and the additional training venues currently available to Special Forces Soldiers are not sufficient to meet USASFC’s unit goal of a 2/2 and 3/3 qualified Soldier per ODA, then what methods would be sufficient? As described earlier, only long-term, intensive training can reliably improve foreign language proficiency. Though attendance at DLI or additional advanced and intermediate level SOLT classes would be optimal, this strategy would require support from outside agencies or lengthy implementation timelines. The simplest and most direct solution is for USASFC to take recently qualified Special Forces Soldiers and contract a private company to provide enough additional hours of instruction to make up the gap between SOLT and the DLI basic or advanced course. USASFC could select from many GSA approved contractors that already have the necessary capacity to train 720 Soldiers in any of the Special Operations priority languages. This solution would provide the intensive, long-term training that Defense Department studies and outside scholarship indicate are necessary to achieve high-level proficiency.Each SF group has associated languages based on each group’s regional orientation. Because teaching cost increases as languages become more difficult to learn, the number of SF Soldiers studying each language has a significant impact. Here are some things to consider.1) A baseline scenario that evenly distributed languages within each SF Group. For instance, in the CENTCOM oriented 5th SF group, half of the Soldiers were assumed to have Arabic as a target language & half were assumed to have Persian-Farsi.2) A current needs scenario that distributed languages based on current operational priorities. For example, in the PACOM oriented 1st SF Group, half of the soldiers were assumed to have Chinese as their target language.3) A low-cost scenario that analyzed each group with all soldiers assigned the easiest (and therefore least expensive to teach) language associated with their SF group. In this scenario, for example, the EUCOM and AFRICOM oriented 10th SF group as assumed to have all 144 Soldiers learn French4) A high-cost scenario that assumed that all Soldiers would have the most difficult (and therefore most expensive to teach) language in their Special Forces group. For instance, in Central Asia oriented 3rd SF Group, all 144 Soldiers were analyzed with Pasto-Afghan as their target language.In the current fiscal environment, millions of dollars may be too great an expense. However, USASFC could pursue several alternative courses of action that could come close to achieving their language proficiency goal at a significantly lowered cost. In all scenarios, achieving a 3/3 level of proficiency in each ODA constitutes more than 79% of the program’s total cost (that is achieving 2/2 level for 720 Soldiers costs approximately 20% of the program’s total cost, while achieving 3/3 level for the other 720 Soldiers costs approximately 80% of the program’s total cost). As a result, lowering the goal for upper-level proficiency has significant cost-saving opportunities.For example, a less ambitious goal of having a 2+/2+ qualified Soldier (the equivalent of the DLI intermediate course) instead of a 3/3 would reduce the cost of the “current needs” scenario from millions of dollars spent. More dramatic courses of action may be able to achieve the spirit of the USASFC goal of increasing high-level proficiency within deploying ODAs. For instance, because of their relatively greater focus on Special Warfare activities versus Surgical Strike missions, SOF Civil Affairs, & Military Information Support Operations ( MISO) forces may be a more appropriate place for USASOC to develop high-level language skills. Civil Affairs & Miso units regularly deploy with Sf units & a 3/3 speaker in each Civil Affairs Team or Military Information Support Team could provide a similar level of mission effectiveness as having the same level of proficiency organic to the deploying ODA.In conclusion, maybe contracting a private company to provide intensive long-term language training is certainly the most direct & effective way of reaching USASFC’s language goals. This program can be thought of as a major, long-term investment that would meet USASFC’s language needs for possibly as long as ten to fifteen years. Once an initial cohort of 720 Soldiers was qualified at the necessary proficiency level, only a few new Soldiers every year would have to receive high-level language training. Because Soldiers at the 3/3 and 2/2 levels are less likely to lose language proficiency over time, less spending on language sustainment training within the SF would be necessary. As a result, this program may be able to save USASFC money in the long term.

Why is it, the shortest questions and points are always the hardest one's to answer without writing an epic War and Peace novel. I've answered a similar question along the lines of; are aircraft carriers obsolete.First, let me answer your two points that nobody else has yet to weigh in; why the US Navy has its own "air force". It would not be easier and would be more expensive over any period of time, if the branch of services were always distinct and independent.Now onto the details without writing a novel.The United States like other countries with large coastal regions require a defense and the capability to counter-attack, learned naval combat doctrine and tactics, after army warfare and like other nations before it, observed and learned naval tactics independently because the expertise is (obviously) different between land and water. But with it came experience that initially, had no concept or ability of multi-role technology (airplanes). Before World War I, the airplane was considered an inferior weapon of war and had no serious followers. By the end of the great war, that attitude drastically changed. The use of the airplane takes on very different needs and requirements for those in combat between land and water. The result is different aircraft types to carry out missions.This carries on right until the start of World War II. Until then, the Battleship is still considered the front line weapon of war on the high seas. The airplane and aircraft carrier were still not considered to be the best weapon for the Navy to be focused on. It is careful in its acquisition and development of the aircraft carrier, not believing what the British invented, the aerial torpedo bomber, which sunk the slow and heavy battleships like they were over sized oceanliners. Senior naval officers quickly realized this could tip the balance of naval power in a single mission. The Army (which controlled the Air Force until 1946) had no interest in naval aviation but fully supported the Navy developing naval aircraft suited specifically for its needs.For the U.S. Navy, the final blow was December 7th, 1941. The carrier was not the ultimate naval weapon (yet). Since that time, the unique role of American Naval carrier forces has been to ensure it can achieve three primary objectivesForward operating presence that can project U.S. foreign policy. (deterrence)Rapidly deploy air strikes that can achieve naval and coastal attack and counter-attack options when called upon.Patrol and escort U.S. or allied flagged vessels that span large areas of blue water continental regions.By and large, Naval operations are unique and very specialized. A U.S. Air Force unit operates in the same manner. The U.S.A.F. also has three primary objectives;Fighter and Bomber role with fast Attack capability for short and long range missions over land.Operate from multiple types of land bases of its own and those of its allies as part of a projection of force.Operate as a multi-role aerial fighter (escort, attack - CAP), bomber (conventional or nuclear) for front line ground defensive and offensive roles and finally, as a front line defense of home territory.Since the late 1970's, the three branches of the U.S. military has shrunk, expanded, again contracted, then a small expansion and finally, a reset to a steady tempo and level of vessels. The Navy's role within foreign policy was generally narrowed down to three key readiness elements that every President since Kennedy has effectively asked when things go bad - "where are the carriers". The Navy learned that the carriers were a key asset to counter-strike when stuff hits the fan and can respond rather quickly without overflying someone else's airspace and generally carry out the task within 6 to 12 hours of the go order.To your questions;The role of a naval aviator as you have read from real naval pilots (which do have a few loose screws - just look at Tim Hibbetts long list of highly accurate answers concerning naval aviation) the role is highly complex and demands specific training not only in how to land and take off from a rolling and moving flight deck, but naval tactics and very specific operational requirements. For a U.S. Air Force pilot that was flying an F-15 strike fighter to simply transition between one role to the next without continuous high tempo training increases risk by more than 200%. Some studies indicate that if the training has distinct and unique attributes that exceed more than 25% and is not continuously practiced, the likelihood of an accident due to pilot error or lack of seat time increases fourfold at minimum. (the same is true with commercial pilots that are trained in multiple types of different aircraft, only the accident rate risk is higher). So it is not easy from any perspective.Costs. In addition to the additional training costs, the types of aircraft that each services have are unique and different as well. The F-15 and 22 do not have a tail hook or have the ability to land on less than 300' of runway. Their missions are different as are the role of the aircraft. Even the new Joint Strike Fighter is not really a "joint" anything airplane. It has some common bits and pieces in the fuselage - but really, it is not a joint strike airplane flying the same components, weapons, electronics, engines or tactical uses. The JSF-35 A, B and C's are three different airplanes. And so far, damned expensive, way behind schedule and suffering from severe procurement management problems. The actual commonality between the three airplanes compared to what was promised and shown in the prototype is almost non-existent. So the cost are not cheaper. They are in fact, skyrocketing no matter what the USAF and Navy do now. Expect to see F-15's and F-18's to continue coming off the assembly lines for at least another 15 years. Possibly longer. They are very good airplanes that continuously receive small but very smart upgrades that are reliable and more than adequate compared to what the opposition has.In my opinion (such as it is), there is a real possibility that like the F-22, the JSF program maybe halted after 300 airplanes - maybe less.Edit; As of July 2019, the production of JSF 35 aircraft has surpassed 450 aircraft and is likely to continue at 125–150 aircraft per year.The costs (at the time) were simply out of control. Projections are never accurate as the cost per airplane now exceeds $175 million dollars per airplane - not including weapons, spare parts or updates for the first 300 - 400 airplanes. A revised budget was approved, if the cost per airplane was $113 million, assuming 1,000 airplanes were built during Congressional budget planning for the fiscal 2009 year. In 2011, ballooned to $133M. Since then, there is still a "hope" that the airplane will cost between $80-90M per airplane by 2020. Hidden in the background is the retrofit of existing aircraft that have yet to be priced.I bring all this up in some detail because one of the problems in the JSF-35 procurement phase was that all three branches of the services involved, the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps all wanted different things for unique objectives and the military procurement office agreed to go along. Lockheed Martin loved it. Each different request (long after the fly off between Boeing and Lockheed had been completed and Lockheed won) was driving up costs and changes. There was zero oversight on the change order system or improvements wanted by all three services. So far apart was the Marine Corps version of the JSF-35B that was not objected to that the changes for its specific needs required 400+ different changes to the original B model design. This behavior was also evident in the first 4 years of the program with the Air Force and Naval A and C variants. None of the three organizations could agree to the originally specifications and continuously wanted to tinker with it - for their own independent goals.Imagine a USAF F-35A attempting to land on an aircraft carrier. It might end in a military war among themselves, let alone the country. All this to say, based on the experiences of each service branch, their roles, missions and requirements are all very different. They can cooperate with each other very well, as they do today during joint military operations. But don't ask an Air Force jockey to run flight operations on a carrier deck, let alone maneuver the ship.