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Really bad, to the point of being dysfunctional as to compromise the war effort.This esoteric question requires esoteric information that I will present in detail below.It would be boring and parochial if the answer just focuses solely on the inter-service rivalry in the armed forces of the Japanese Empire without any discussion to that in other major powers’ militaries.The one thing to appreciate is that during World War 2, Inter-service rivalry was not peculiar to the Japanese military. It pertained in the armed forces of Nazi Germany, the US, and Great Britain wherein the various arms of the armed forces competed for resources, funding, and power. In particular, the inter-service rivalry between the US Army and US Navy was fierce, as one senior British aviation officer who was no stranger to tensions in his own nation’s high command, remarked:The violence of inter-service rivalry in those days had to seen to be believed, and was an appreciable handicap to their war effort.However, the US was rich and her industrial output was so immense that it was able to afford the problems caused by such handicap. Most importantly, the US army and navy commanders displayed a willingness to put aside all political differences and work together toward one common goal: defeating Germany and Japan.While American inter-service rivalry was intense, it was not, unlike Japan, dysfunctional. In the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Leahy, General Marshall, General Arnold and Admiral King might have fought for their own ambitions and for their respective services, ultimately they worked together to ensure that professional support was rendered upon requests from rival services in all major operations, campaign in the Pacific.For example, the navy would provide transport ships to keep American GIs well-supplied as well as provide carrier airpower for ground support in battles on islands. The Navy organized rescue of downed aircrews in the sea by destroyers and submarines.In exchange, the army’s air force (during WW2, the air force was officially under the control of the US army until 1947 when it became an independent arms of the US military), would help the Navy by using B-29s to drop mines in Japanese ports and sea lanes, bomb urban-industrial areas to destroy aircraft and oil industry to prevent the Japanese from producing more aircraft for kamikaze attacks.Not only that, the US military chiefs cooperated with their counterparts in other allied nations: Britain, Dutch, Australia. Whenever agreements needed to be made with Allies, the regular meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, with their permanent staff in Washington, were supported by successive conferences, first in Washington, and then in Casablanca, Cairo, Tehran, and Yalta, as both Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek were drawn into the broad Allied coalition. At these high level meetings with political leaders and military commanders, broad strategies were discussed and agreed.By contrast, the Japanese war machine was feeble, fractious and inept due to rivalry between the IJA and IJN. While inter-service rivalry constituted a “second front” in Washington D.C, it was a full-contact sport in Tokyo. The postwar United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) concluded thatThere was no efficient pooling of the resources of the Army and Navy. Responsibility between the two services was divided in a completely impractical fashion with the Navy covering all ocean areas and naval targets and the Army everything else.Such rivalry was dysfunctional and resulted in the following deleterious consequences for the Japanese war effort:1/ It precluded an organization equivalent to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Chiefs of Staff that ensured coordination between the services and reasonable allocation of resources. A central command group may have existed in theory at the Imperial General Headquarters, but in practice it was a meeting point at which each service presented to the other what they were not prepared to do.2/ In Japan, no one could dictate effectively to either the army or the navy. Japan’s leaders failed to developed develop a coercive mechanism by which the army could commit the navy to a task and vice versa. By contrast, the US President and the British Prime Minister made definite decisions on matters of the utmost strategic importance. For example, they were able to agree upon the “Germany First” strategy.Even within the rival services, command was dysfunctional. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto was a kind of leader who ruled by intimidation by threatening to resign with his entire staff unless his plans were approved and he got to formulate and execute naval strategies at will. Japanese leadership was confused and their strategic direction lacked unity.3/ To an astounding extent, the IJA and IJN:Developed independent subordinate services with similar roles, capabilities and weapons. For examples:Each had its own air force to support the mother service (the Imperial Japanese Army Air Force (IJAAF) and Imperial Japanese Navy Air Force (IJNAF). Each had its own system of aircraft designation for the same aircraft.Each had its own paratrooper forces.Each developed its own AT weapons.Each pursued independent war policies, though the generals wielded much greater political clout than the admirals. Even the services’ respective primary enemies were different. For the IJA, it was the Soviet Union. For the IJN, it was the United States. This was the reason why the Army rejected the Navy’s proposal to invade Hawaii and North Australia because of the Army’s reluctance to redeploy troops from mainland China which continued to be the priority.4/ The lack of proper support for the army on the part of the navy. This was evident in the failure of the Navy to deliver adequate supplies for the IJA force that first landed on Guadalcanal which led to their defeat and caused the troops to starve. In the Philippine campaign in 1944, inadequate naval escort caused many Japanese troop transport ships to be sunk by American carrier planes and submarines. Thousands of troops died needlessly in the sea.5/ The best illustration of the deleterious effect the fierce rivalry had on Japan’s war effort was the dismal air defense of the Japanese home islands.In June 1944, the month of the first B-29 attack on the home islands, Imperial General Headquarters merged army and navy assets into an air defense command. But the navy objected to army control. A compromise had to be made, with the naval air groups at Atsugi, Omura, and Iwakuni assigned to the respective army district. Phone lines from Japanese Army Air Force (JAAF) command centers were provided to each of the three naval units, but operational integration was rarely attempted. Throughout Japan, the two air arms operated jointly in only three areas: Tsuiki on Kyushu, Kobe and Nagoya.Little inter-service coordination was made once B-29s intruded the airspace of the home islands. The army and navy set up separate warning systems that rarely cooperate and exchanged information with each other. Even when unit-level pooling was attempted, navy officers generally refused orders from army officers.Civilian observers were spread throughout Japan to watch for enemy aircraft. But even in this matter there was no unity and inter-service rivalry reduced the effectiveness of the civilian observer corp. The army and navy formed their own respective civilian observer corps, and neither cooperated with the other.At least 64 early-warning sites were built in the homeland and offshore islands: 37 navy and 27 army. But scarce assets often were squandered by duplicating effort: at 4 sites on Kyushu and 7 on Honshu, army and navy radars were located almost side by side.Tactically and operationally, the lack of army-navy cooperation hampered the already limited capability of Japanese interceptors. With unit commanders conducting their own localized battles, there was little opportunity to concentrate large numbers of fighters against a bomber formation as the German Luftwaffe repeatedly achieved.The end result was that Japanese fighters were spectacularly ineffective against B-29s. From more than 31,000 Superfortress sorties over the homeland, only 74 were known lost wholly to interceptors and perhaps 20 more were in concert with flak guns. During 15 months of combat, losses to interceptors amounted to merely 0.24 % of effective B-29 sorties. This was in stark contrast to the thousands of heavy British and American bombers lost to the German air force in Europe.Lieutenant General Saburo Endo of the army air force HQ stated:Those responsible for control at the beginning of the war did not recognize the true value of aviation… therefore one defeat led to another. Although they realized there was a need for merging the army and the navy, nothing was done about it. There were no leaders to unify the political and the war strategies, and the plans executed by the government were very inadequate. National resources were not concentrated to the best advantage.Hope this answers your question!Reference(s)1/ Retribution - Max Hastings2/ Whirlwind: The Air War against Japan, 1942–1945 - Barrett Tillman3/ Hirohito’s War: the war in the Pacific 1941–1945 - Francis Pike