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The main reason is he is well aware this investigation does not pass the smell test. For example, why didn’t Mueller investigate Hillary Clinton’s emails? There is an abundance of circumstantial evidence that the DNC and Hillary may of engaged in illegal activity. Wouldn’t an unbiased investigator have followed the trail?Take for example disgraced FBI Director Andrew McCabe who was fired the day before his pension vested for misconduct. His dismissal was prompted “after the Justice Department’s Office of Inspector General had found that he had “lacked candor [i.e.,lied], including under oath, on multiple occasions in connection with describing his role in connection with a disclosure” to the Wall Street Journal regarding a story about the FBI’s investigation of Hillary Clinton’s email server and his role in that investigation.”Now if you were head of an investigation and the FBI Dir. was caught lying and dismissed would you follow up to determine motive? Especially if what he lied about, the emails, was central to the case you were investigating? Of course you would. Mueller, in his infinite unbiased wisdom did not. Instead he issued a report, that a Federal Judge saying the proof Mueller’s used to make his claim is bogus. The proof Mueller used was his indictment. As we know an indictment is not proof of guilt.Mueller is concerned that this may, probably will come up.Another question is why did Mueller allow the cel phone records of Peter Strozk (also terminated) and his lover Lisa Page to be destroyed — one of the more damning texts was Strozk texting page that there was “no there there,” in the Russia investigation.Peter Van Buren, a 24-year State Department veteran listed a series of questions Mr Mueller may not be to keen in addressing… oh isn’t it interesting that the time allowed for questioning of Mueller has become an issue. Wonder why?Oh, I would no be surprised if Mueller ends up taking the 5th more than once…1) You didn’t charge President Donald Trump with “collusion,” obstruction, or any other new crime. Tell us why. If the answer is “the evidence did not support it,” please say so.2) Your Report did not refer any crimes to Congress, the SDNY, or anyone else. Again, tell us why. If the answer is “the evidence did not support it,” please say so again.3) Despite making no specific referrals, the Report does state, “The conclusion that Congress may apply the obstruction laws to the President’s corrupt exercise of the powers of the office accords with our constitutional system of checks and balances and the principle that no person is above the law.” Why did you include such a restating of a known fact? Many have read that line to mean you could not indict a sitting president and so you wanted to leave a clue to Congress. Yet you could have just spelled it out—”this is beyond my and the attorney general’s constitutional roles and must/can only be resolved by Congress.” Why didn’t you?4) Similarly, many believe they see clues (a footnote looms as the grassy knoll of your work) that the only reason you did not indict Trump was because of Department of Justice and Office of Legal Counsel guidance against indicting a sitting president. Absent that, would you have indicted? If so, why didn’t you say so unambiguously and trigger what would be the obvious next steps?5) When did you conclude there was no collusion, conspiracy, or coordination between Trump and the Russians such that you would make no indictments? You must have closed at least some of the subplots—the Trump Tower meeting, the Moscow Hotel project—months ago. Did you consider announcing key findings as they occurred? You were clearly aware that there was inaccurate reporting, damaging to the public trust. Yet you allowed that to happen. Why?6) But before you answer that question, answer this one. You made a pre-Report public statement saying Buzzfeed’s story that claimed Trump ordered Michael Cohen to lie to Congress was false. You restated that in the Report, where you also mentioned that you privately told Jeff Sessions’ lawyer in March 2018 that Sessions would not be charged. Since your work confirmed that nearly all bombshell reporting on Russiagate was wrong (Cohen was never in Prague, nothing criminal happened in the Seychelles, and so on), why was it only that single instance that caused you to speak out publicly? And as with Sessions, did you privately inform any others prior to the release of the Report that they would not be charged? What standard did you apply to those decisions?7) A cardinal rule for prosecutors is to not publicize negative information that does not lead them to indict someone—”the decision does the talking.” James Comey was criticized for doing this to Hillary Clinton during the campaign. Yet most of your Report’s Volume II is just that, descriptions of actions by Trump that contain elements of obstruction but that you ultimately did not charge. Why did you include this information so prominently? Some say it was because you wanted to draw a “road map” for impeachment. Why didn’t you just say that? You had no reason to speak in riddles.8) There is a lot of lying documented in the Report. But you seemed to only charge people with perjury (traps) early in your investigation. Was that aimed more at pressuring them to “flip” than at justice per se? Is one of the reasons several of the people in the Report who lied did not get charged with perjury later in the investigation because by then you knew they had nothing to flip on?9) In regard to the June 2016 Trump Tower meeting, where derogatory information on Hillary Clinton was offered (but never given), you declined prosecution. You cited in part questions over whether such information constituted the necessary “thing of value” that would have to exist, inter alia, to make its proffering a campaign finance violation. You don’t answer the question in the Report, but you do believe information could be a “thing of value” (the thing of value must exceed $2,000 for a misdemeanor and $25,000 for a felony). What about withholding information? Could someone saying they would not offer information publicly be a “thing of value” and thus potentially part of a campaign finance law violation? Of course I’m talking about Stormy Daniels, who received money not to offer information. Would you make the claim that silence itself, non-information, is a “thing” of value?10) You spend the entire first half of your Report, Volume I, explaining that “the Russians” sought to manipulate our 2016 election via social media and by hacking the Democratic National Committee. Though there is a lot of redacted material, at no point in the clear text is there information on whether the Russians actually did influence the election. Even trying was a crime, but given the importance of all this (some still claim the president is illegitimate) and the potential impact on future elections, did you look into the actual effects of Russian meddling? If not, why not?11) Everything the Russians did, according to Volume I, they did on Obama’s watch. Did you investigate anyone in the Obama administration in regard to Russian meddling? Did you look at what they did, what was missed, whether it could have been stopped, and how the response was formed? Given that Trump’s actions towards Russia followed on steps Obama took, this seems relevant. Did you look? If not, why not?12) Some of the information gathered about Michael Flynn was picked up inadvertently under existing surveillance of the Russian ambassador. As an American, Flynn’s name would have been routinely masked in the reporting on those intercepts in order to protect his privacy. The number of people with access to those intercepts is small, and the number inside the Obama White House with the authority to unmask names is even smaller. Yet details were leaked to the press and ended Flynn’s career. Given that the leak may have exposed U.S. intelligence methods, that it had to have been done at a very high level inside the Obama White House, and that the leak violated Flynn’s constitutional rights, did you investigate? If not, why not?13) The New York Times wrote that “some of the most sensational claims in the [Steele] dossier appeared to be false, and others were impossible to prove. Your report contained over a dozen passing references to the document’s claims but no overall assessment of why so much did not check out.” Given the central role the Steele Dossier played in your work, and certainly in the investigation that commenced as Crossfire Hurricane in summer 2016, why did you not include any overall assessment of why so much did not check out inside such a key document?14) Prosecutors do not issue certificates of exoneration. The job is to charge or drop a case. That’s what constitutes exoneration in any practical sense. Yet you have as your final line that “while this report does not conclude that the President committed a crime, it also does not exonerate him.” Why did you include that, and so prominently?15) You also wrote, “if we had confidence after a thorough investigation of the facts that the president clearly did not commit obstruction of justice, we would so state.” You argue elsewhere in the Report that because Trump is a sitting president, he cannot be indicted, so therefore it would be unjust to accuse him of something he could not go to court and defend himself over. But didn’t you do just that? Why did you leave the taint of guilt without giving Trump the means of defending himself in court? You must have understood that such wording would be raw meat to Democrats, and would force Trump to defend himself not in a court with legal protections, but in an often hostile media. Was that your intention?

Yes ….1,000,000 % Hyperiflation = Oil is the Devil's excrement;Dr Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonzo Venezuelan, Founder of OPEC: saw it all coming. The infamous lines: "ten years from now, twenty years from now, you will see; oil will bring us ruin. Oil is the Devil's excrement ; 'The Devil's Excrement' - February 3, 2003The ultimate outcome seeing corruption, poverty, war, pollution and all this revolving around a grim speculation… Oil the Devil's excrement…the case all along was that we had never been in control of oil, it’s oil that’s been in control of us. A Spanish economist said of his homeland, "What makes her poor is her wealth"--a suitable lament for Venezuelans who have been waiting so long for their ship of money to come in.Money itself cannot obtain objectives. It must he used wisely with an eye to the future. A wave of money can destroy as well as create, and it often does. Will building the biggest and best‐looking schools create the best education?”“Because of the sharp rise in the price of oil, if Venezuela cut its production it would still be earning just as much money,” he said.“If we don't cut production we will have economic indigestion. We will have too much money that we will not be able to put to good use creating super high hyperinflation , corruption and the highest level of crime.”Financial collapse and hyperinflation make Venezuela an economic disaster zone.The crisis is no longer confined to one nation: refugees and migrants are streaming by the millions into neighbouring countries. |Venezuela epidemics and violent crime are spilling over all borders, endangering Colombia’s fragile peace process in the frontier regions.As Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro looks to cement his hold on power, his country is sinking into a trough of misery.Hyperinflation has compounded the scarcity of food and medicines. Epidemics of preventable diseases and a child malnutrition crisis are increasingly deadly. Violent crime has spiked.As seriously estimated over four million Venezuelans have emigrated, with hundreds of thousands crossing the border with Colombia each month in search of a new home. Venezuela’s neighbours, once bystanders to its domestic tensions, face a catastrophe on their doorsteps involved with international drug trafiking , extrosion, fraud, thief and murders.It’s the Oil, Stupid!!!“it’s the oil, stupid!” makes sense without being really true. Certainly, as the embodiment of immense wealth and energy, oil appears to be a force capable of defining the destiny of modern nations. Yet this appearance is deceptive. Oil conditions but does not determine the social life of these nations. To understand this, it is enough to observe that oil has radically different effects in different oil producing societies—for instance, the United States and Canada, on the one hand, and Nigeria and Venezuela, on the other. Given its exceptional power, it is necessary to remind ourselves of a true truism: oil does not do anything by itself, but as it is transformed and used by people under given cultural frameworks, specific historical situations and global economic contexts. For this reason, it would be truer to say, “It’s the society, stupid!”As an extraordinarily valuable commodity, it is hard for people to control it, particularly when it undergoes its most dramatic metamorphosis: when it becomes money.As money, oil tends to have similar effects in societies where it is in fact the main source of money. In effect, as the major source of foreign exchange of many oil exporting countries, oil money typically brings about an erosion of their industrial and agricultural production, leading to 70% expensive imports is the generalization of various forms of “corruption,” and the concentration of political power in their states.Venezuela's Inflation Rate: Causes and SolutionsVenezuelan has been suffering from high inflation rates for many years. The figure has been between 25 and 30 % per year. Inflation has continued to rage even though GDP growth has been negative in 2009 and 2010, and will likely be negative to neutral in 2011.The high inflation rate led the government to impose price controls. Controlled prices range from the price of foods to what a parking lot owner can charge per hour. In some cases, prices have been frozen for years, leading businesses into poor maintenance, causing the inability to hire more workers, and driving some to near or full bankrupcy.Price controls have also led to spot shortages. Fresh milk, for example, isn't easy to find - beacause its price is controlled. Long duration milk is found easily because its price isn't controlled. Powdered milk has been difficult to find this week. Sometimes the government tries to attack shortages by importing food. This means we have seen chicken shortages, but later we saw lots of chicken in the markets, some of it in poor condition. Hundreds of thousands of tons of food have been found rotting in import containers held by the state owned company PDVAL. This appears to be caused by a broken supply chain - they bought the food but didn't figure out how to set up the distribution system to get it to the markets. According to analysts, food inflation is largely due to the fact that supply does not meet demand, even though the financial system has dramatically increased loans to the agricultural sector.As long as the government is tossing around money to buy votes, or printing it to pay its bills, then there's going to be excess money floating around, and the price of just about anything they don't control by fiat is going to increase. Their response has been to increase their controls. They want to control housing rental prices. They of course control the salaries of government workers (who are now very underpaid and are starting to complain). Now there's even talk by the Chavez suppporters in the Assembly of controlling the salaries of workers in the private sector - they don't like to see private sector labor making more than government sector labor, so they're going to "equalize" everybody into poverty.The bottom line is inflation continues to rage, they think they can keep on printing their monopoly money forever, price controls are being extended, and the country continues to suffer from both inflation and recession. I know some of you like to gloss over reality, and seek comfort in all those nice statistics about how Venezuelans are such happy people under Chavez. But this is getting really ugly, and you don't do anybody any good pushing feel good propaganda when things are getting this bad. Please go tell somebody somewhere to talk some sense into the Chavistas, because nobody is going to win when the country collapses and people start to riot.The erosion of productive activities as a result of the massive inflow of energy money has been commonly called the “Dutch disease,” a syndrome baptized as such to refer to the negative effects of windfall profits coming from North Sea gas exploitation on manufacturing activities in the Netherlands. I have preferred to call it the “neocolonial disease” not only because these consequences are far more pervasive and pernicious in the narrowly diversified economies of postcolonial nations, but because they include the reproduction of relations of colonial dependence between these formally independent nations and metropolitan centers (as I argued in The Magical State: Nature, Money and Modernity in Venezuela, p. 7).In these nations, these effects also involve the proliferation of different forms of corruption, ranging from the imaginative creation of myriad paths for privately appropriating public wealth, to the less visible and more pernicious consolidation of political and economic relations that trap these nations as mono-exporters; despite projects that claim to diversify their economies, these countries typically remain, as in colonial times, primary commodity producers for the international market. In Venezuela, this has happened under very different political administration, where all imported product was the rule of quality.Clearly, maintaining this skewed international division of labor requires the collusion of politics and business, and thus the formation of a social system and political culture deeply implicated in legitimating and consolidating the vast set of formal and informal mechanisms through which oil is produced and oil money is appropriated. If in capitalist nations based on the generation of value through human labor the business of politics is business, in oil exporting societies based on the extraction of rents through the capture of natural riches, the business of business is politics. This explains why in Venezuelan public life politics occupies such a central space. Of course, politics everywhere entangles vital collective issues with private interests, but in Venezuela the state has become a particularly privileged path to status, power, and riches.Oil fortune has unfortunately helped make Venezuela a typical exemplar—or patient—of this “neocolonial disease. ” This fortune has also turned its state into an incarnation of charismatic powers that appear to be providential—a “magical state.”From the outset, Chávez was critical of PDVSA’s oil policy. Instead of maximizing production, he sought to increase prices and to strengthen OPEC. What’s your evaluation of this aspect of his energy policy? However, whilst in a very severe over supply situation, cutting back production to improve prices is the right practice, maximizing production should be the preferred policy of every oil producing country.This generates employment, increases demand for goods and services and has a multiplier effect on the Gross National Product requiring a high percentage ( 70%) of imports creating hyperinflation. Moreover, very high prices in recent years have not been a result of production cuts. Chávez has made a serious mistake in reducing investment in the oil industry, minimizing maintenance expenditures in a rapidly decaying infrastructure and allowing large production losses at a time when the market (especially the United States) could have absorbed a considerable increase in Venezuela’s production levels, without seriously affecting world oil prices.The so-called Bolivarian Revolution conveys the message that Venezuela dictates the level of worldwide oil prices. Venezuela has not the ability nor capability for disrupting the supply-demand equation at short notice and for a long time, nor has it the lower production costs and significant oil reserves of conventional crudes. Venezuela is a price-taker. Ricardo Hausmann: It is a fact that Venezuelan oil production is way below where it was supposed to be according to the strategic plans Chávez inherited.Today Venezuela should have been producing close to 6 million barrels a day, instead of the current 2.4 million. But under Chávez, the published strategic plans remained very similar. What has happened is a huge increase in the gap between plan and reality. In fact, PDVSA has been grossly overstating the actual level of production. So, it is hard to argue that the current oil production outcome is the result of deliberate policies rather than inability to achieve desired goals. With regards to the international price of oil, Venezuela’s oil output collapse has certainly been a small contributing factor, but commodity prices have been rising across the board, including mining and agriculture. Should Chávez be credited with those price increases as well? In any counterfactual scenario, oil prices would have been much higher now than in 1999.“Sowing the oil” has been the goal of the Venezuelan state since the 1940s. Oil has been treated as a source of foreign exchange to be invested in other areas of the economy. The energy sector itself has also been seen as a field of industrial diversification. Has Chávez managed to “sembrar el petróleo?Far from being a scientific approach to the optimal allocation of oil revenues, the long-time hidden debate on oil revenues flourished. It was first the issue of maximizing oil revenues either by increasing production (vs. decreasing prices) or by increasing prices (vs. decreasing production). A ridiculous trial and error exercise. However, the higher the oil revenues, the more the boasting about nationalism and anti-imperialism. Much ado about nothing. As in the past, but even worse than ever, the sowing of oil became a dictum with no real content….Worse than ever, Venezuela is witnessing hyperinflation, devaluation, production capacity eroded, unemployment, a two-tier exchange rate, poverty, dilapidation and corruption. The essence of the problem Venezuela has, and has had since the 40s, is the optimal allocation of oil revenues. The PDVSA meta-state is not the optimal model for allocating the oil rent nor is the PDVSA para-state. Far from being a scientific approach to the optimal allocation of oil revenues, the long-time hidden debate on oil revenues flourished.It was first the issue of maximizing oil revenues either by increasing production (vs. decreasing prices) or by increasing prices (vs. decreasing production). But it was as well the false debate on increasing the royalties and taxes. In 2001 the oil royalty was set up in 30% (16.6% since the 40s). Why not 31%? Why not 29%? A ridiculous trial and error exercise. However, the higher the oil revenues, the more the boasting about nationalism and anti-imperialism. Much ado about nothing. Ricardo Hausmann: Definitely not.While pre-Chávez policies lead to the creation of steel, aluminium and petrochemical industries, export concentration in oil is at a historic peak. Chávez has even made the export of products other than oil almost a crime. He used the fact that steel and cement companies exported part of their output to justify their recent nationalization. The exchange rate regime coupled with a highly protective trade policy is also antiother exports. There are no plans to create or promote other export industries. Non-oil production is geared to the domestic market and thus is completely dependent on oil as a source of foreign exchange. If the price of oil were to falter, Venezuela would have no alternative industries that could expand to take its role in generating foreign exchange as in 2014.Furthermore, PDVSA Agriculture will complement government activities to provide assistance to farmers and consequently food to the people. PDVSA Agriculture has already started sowing soy on land owned by the company and will soon start sowing sugar cane. This is done with the help of Argentine machinery. PDVSA’s new core business is the People of Venezuela and its new business model reflects this priority. With this new model, we have successfully challenged the existing paradigm of inefficient state owned companies, by demonstrating that while maintaining the status as one of the world’s largest integrated oil companies, PDVSA is also effectively contributing to the development of the Nation. When he became president, Chávez claimed that PDVSA had become “a state within the state”—an enterprise disconnected from the nation pursuing its own interests. Now critics claim that PDVSA has become a“meta-state”: a powerful instrument of the state unaccountable to society. The claim that PDVSA was a “state within the state” preceded the current regime. Chávez, however, placed the state within PDVSA, transforming the company into a “cash cow” to finance government plans not included in the annual national budget, such as 70% of import and distribution of foods, manufacture of consumer goods and government “misiones” (social plans). PDVSA also provides cash for acquiring private companies (Electricidad de Caracas, etc). The few audits of these new activities, more in the nature of a conglomerate than of a company, show inefficiency, mismanagement and financial malpractice.Currently, 18 countries are working with the Venezuelan Petroleum and Energy Ministry and PDVSA to develop the Orinoco Belt. It is well known that Venezuela has 130 billion barrels of proven reserves in this region and, after finishing the certification process trough the Orinoco Magna Reserve Project, our country will have the largest reserves worldwide.The destruction of the managerial capacity of the oil industry and the renegotiation of the contracts with foreign companies (with the departure of those that did not agree with the changes) has diminished the capacity of PDVSA to achieve any desired goal. Contrast this outcome with Petrobras, a company that is now expanding its production internationally, and deploying its proprietary technology abroad. In the meantime, Venezuelan experts are in exile, working for other countries and companies. You would need a very peculiar definition of nationalism to count this as an example of it.Some critics argue that the project of orimulsion was the perfect opportunity for Chávez to use Venezuela’s resources to promote an ecological and socially responsible energy plan—one favoring electricity for people rather than gas for cars.The Orimulsion projects were part of a technological quest to make the best use of the extra heavy crudes. Associating the price of these products with that of carbon resulted in enormous losses for Venezuela. Mixing lighter crudes to obtain, for example, Merey 16—as ExxonMobil did—allowed for great competitive advantages compared to mixing heavy crudes with water. The introduction of new technologies to improve and transform the extra heavy crudes resulted in a commercial breakthrough that has made these products quite competitive. In conclusion, Orimulsion has turned out to be no more than a good technology to transport heavy crudes as was originally conceived.Since recovering from the oil industry sabotage of 2002–2003, PDVSA has played an extremely important role in helping fund necessary social programs in Venezuela. In 2007, the company invested over $13 billion into such programs, which have helped lower poverty and address longstanding social needs. From 2003 to 2007, the poverty rate in Venezuela decreased from 55.1 percent to 27.5 percent, according to the National Institute of Statistics. Furthermore, these programs also helped nearly a million children from the poorest villages obtain free access to education. Secondary education has been made available to 250,000 children whose economic situation previously excluded them from enjoying this right. Adult literacy programs have taught 1.2 million adults how to read and write. These are just a few examples of the many successes we have experienced in Venezuela.On the other hand, Venezuela is a country with almost 100 years of oil production experience; paradoxically, we do not have a national industrial park to provide the goods and services demanded by the current production levels and even less for Venezuela’s oil and gas business plan, “Sowing the oil.”Dismantling the PVDSA irreplaceable machinery of a professional body of more than 10,000 geologists, petrophysicists, production and refinery engineers, researchers and planners. If assessed in the context of a zero-sum game, the loss for Venezuela is a gain for the world, quite a remarkable achievement. The lack of accountability regarding oil activities. Chávez disregarded the technical knowledge and professional expertise required to efficiently run an oil company. His belief that PDVSA is an inexhaustible cash cow. Collaboration between producer and consumer countries is a key part of the solution, framed by changing the developing model of the so called industrialized countries. It challenges the paradigm of what “development” means for developing countries, offering an alternative way to generate social value.Venezuela’s oil policy was dominated by strong actors that led to the internationalization of the oil policy. They were leading the country towards a fully privatized oil industry that would have been controlled solely by these dominant actors. President Chávez managed to break PDVSA dominance, but he nearly lost his life in the 2002 coup attempt. country towards a fully privatized oil industry that would have been controlled solely by these dominant actors.Likewise, Venezuela maintains a tense relationship with its neighbor Colombia, which is closely allied with the United States. Colombia is the second major trading partner for Venezuela, and Venezuela is dependent on imported food from Colombia, especially as food shortages have arisen in Venezuela in 2008. Venezuela’s attempt to control soaring inflation through food price controls and foreign exchange controls, combined with soaring world food demand, led to serious shortages of milk, 5 6 R eVista • fall 2008 eggs, meat and rice. Venezuela also became involved, with the permission of the Colombian government, in negotiating a humanitarian hostage exchange with the FARC guerrillas. After securing the release of two hostages, Venezuela’s negotiating role was cut off by the Colombian government because of perceived intervention in Colombian domestic affairs. Future perspectives At the end of 2007—a year in which Chávez’s anti-US and anti-“capitalist” radicalism reached its zenith—the tide suddenly began to turn against him.Rising inflation, crime and corruption, scarcity of consumers’ goods, growing divisions within the chavista ranks, and the general inefficiency of the administration had begun to erode the prestige of El Lider.On December 2, 2007, he suffered his first electoral defeat, in a referendum on a series of radical constitutional reforms including the possibility of life-long presidential reelection. Later on, new restrictions on democratic rights within Venezuela, as well as the Colombian assertions of Venezuela’s support of the guerrillas, cost Chávez the sympathy of substantial sectors of an international democratic left that had until then granted him grudging support. The time has come for evaluations of the historical role of chavismo and for tentative drafts of what a democratic post Chávez Venezuela might look like. The forces opposing Chávez in Venezuela are united in the desire to restore democratic freedoms, but their differing political philosophies range all the way from conservatism to democratic socialism…..now comes Maduro !After Chávez, a Venezuelan right-wing government would probably cleanse the country’s foreign policy of “third-worldish” elements and go back to a modest diplomacy tending to repair and deepen the nation’s inter-dependence with its traditional foreign friends. Under such a government, Venezuela would concentrate on being a reliable provider and would totally cease to be a gadfly. On the other hand, a slightly more left-leaning democratic administration— supported not only by the present opposition but also by a portion of honest former chavistas— might try to combine the return to traditional friendships with the retention and improvement of some of Chávez’s more constructive impulses, such as: a wide scope of Venezuelan diplomatic presence, a drive to foster the unity of Latin America and a bi-regional dialogue within the Americas, an effort toward more North-South equity and more South-South cooperation, and an active wish to see a wider and better balanced distribution of power among the main regions of the world.Dr Pérez Alfonzo, leader of OPEC who died, aged 75, on 3 September 1979, was one of Venezuela’s greatest political thinkers of the 20th century. He was an eminent lawyer and professor of civil law at the Central University of Venezuela. “He wanted not only to increase the government’s share of the rents, but also to effect a transfer to the government, and away from the oil companies, of power and authority over production and marketing.“For the producing countries, oil was a national heritage, the benefits of which belonged to future generations, as well as to the present. Neither the resource, nor the wealth that flows from it, should be wasted. Instead the earnings should be used to develop the country more widely.Sovereign governments, rather than foreign corporations, should make the basic decisions about the production and the disposition of their petroleum. Human nature should not be allowed to squander the potential of this precious resource.”He was both a visionary and an achiever — a rare combination. The best proof of this can be found here and now, in the shape of OPEC! OPEC was his vision. But he played a big part in bringing this vision to reality.The Petroleum Pentagon, his book is now drawn.The first pillar is reasonable economic participation for the nation, as the owner of the natural resource. The second pillar is the creation of a government body to control the conservation of, and trade in, hydrocarbons. The third pillar is the creation of a state-owned company to handle oil activity directly, both upstream and downstream, as well as internally and externally, and which could simultaneously deal with existing private companies. The fourth pillar is a “moratorium on new concessions” to individuals and a complete review of the prevailing concessionary system which did not favour the host country. And the final pillar is OPEC, the Organization that establishes international cooperation as being indispensable for the effective implementation of the strategy.Today he seems a prophet. When it hit the jackpot in 1973 , Venezuela had a functioning democracy and the highest per-capita income on the continent. Now in 2018` it has a state of near-civil war and a per-capita income lower than its 1960 level. But the Midas myth dies hard.How could that be? For the same reason so many entertainers go bankrupt. Showered with sudden windfalls, governments start spending like rock stars, creating programs that are hard to undo when oil prices fall. And because nobody wants to pay taxes to a government that's swimming in petrodollars--"In Venezuela only the stupid pay taxes," a former President once said--the state finds itself living beyond its means….Hyperinflation: A cycle begins. The economy can't absorb the sudden influx of money, causing wages and prices to inflate and the nation's currency to appreciate (by an average of 50%, according to a World Bank economist's study). That makes it harder for local manufacturers to compete. Incentives, meanwhile, become wildly distorted. When free money is flowing out of the ground, people who might otherwise start a business or do something innovative instead busy themselves angling for a share of the spoils buying 70% imported products. Why slog it out in a low-margin industry when steering some oil business toward a contact could make you a millionaire?Venezuela’s economy will continue to be tied to the country’s great mineral wealth, fundamentally made up of its enormous oil resources. Among the mono-producing countries dependent on foreign trade, the case of Venezuela is typical of how dangerous this situation is for the normal life of a nation, a position that lacks the possibility of control of the events that can greatly affect its whole economy.“In addition to other unfavourable circumstances that mono-production implies, the fact that the predominant product, petroleum, is depletable is a serious aggravating factor.Thus a doubly deadly dynamic: a ballooning public sector, a withering private one "This is a country that can never, ever sustain itself on oil," Terry Lynn Karl, author of The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States, says of Venezuela. "But everyone from the President to the poor believes it can." And therein lies the trap. President Hugo Chavez rode popular rage into office by focusing on corruption. But what neither he nor anyone else will face up to is this: Oil is not an economy. Creative economic activities have spillover effects that become self-sustaining. Oil spills only into a barrel--and from there usually into the hands of a favored few. That's the real reason Venezuela's productivity growth has been roughly half 52% of the Latin American average.http://cepr.net/images/videos/BBC_News_Channel-2018-08-18_02-12-36.mp4Venezuela crisis: Hyperinflation, mass migration, food shortage, increasing number of crimes: murders, kidnapping and grinding poverty has spiralled Venezuela with a total corruption into a deep turmoil.$ 1,583 Million USD for free housing ; Pdvsa reporta la inversión para el desarrollo socialVenezuela, once a rich oil reserve country, is now battering an unprecedented economic crisis. Many in Venezuela blame President Nicolas Maduro for the country’s current condition. Here is a look at the crisis unfolding in Venezuela and how it is now affecting its people…..Dr Juan Pérez Alfonso, Venezuelan, Regarded as Founder of OPEC“I may sadly be the father of OPEC, but now sometimes I feel like renouncing my off spring,” he said wistfully in an interview in 1976.Dr Juan Perez expressed great concern that the flood of money entering Venezuela after oil prices quadrupled in 1974 had undermined the population's commitment to hard work into a group contemplating laziness and made the nation dependent on 70%+ of foreign imports.However, protection within the market and the promise of unfettered wealth arising from Venezuela’s immense oil reserves were undone by what economists came to term the 'natural resource curse'; the sudden influx of money would cause the national currency to dramatically appreciate, wages are driven up, prices inflate, manufacturing significantly slowed ,reduced, requiring up to 70% imports and exports all slump reaction creating hyperinflation.Hyperinflation in VenezuelaThe plummeting oil prices since 2014 is one of the main reasons why Venezuela’s currency has weakened sharply. The country, which has rich oil reserves largely depended on it for its revenue. But when the oil price dropped drastically in 2014, Venezuela which received 96 per cent of its revenue from the oil exports, suffered a shortage of foreign currency. This made 70% of the import of basic essentials like food and medicines difficult.Food and medicine shortage in VenezuelaVenezuela’s cannot produce the majority, now any of the goods and must import over 75% of required goods confirming that imports are down 50% from a year ago, according to Ecoanalitica, a national research firm, CNN reported. Venezuela’s minimum wage is now about the equivalent of $1 a month, making basics unaffordable for many. With a shortage of the import goods, the black market has got a free hand in the country. Prices have been doubling every 26 days on average, according to a report in BBC. According to an Al Jazeera report, many Venezuelans sift through the rubbish and bins in search for food.A survey from February this year found that almost 90% of Venezuelans live in poverty and more than 60% surveyed said that they had woken up hungry because they did not have enough money to buy food, reported Reuters. Apart from food, the country is also facing medicine shortage. The economic crisis has also hit the public health system, making medicine and equipment inaccessible to its peoples.New currency of VenezuelaAmid the growing crisis, the government issued new currency — with new clour notes and denomination — to keep up with the projected inflation. While earlier, Maduro had decided to remove three zeros from the bolivar currency, he later dropped off five zeros. The new currency will be released next month and overhaul would tie the bolivar to the recently launched state-backed cryptocurrency called the petro, Maduro said in a televised broadcast. The new “Bolivar Soberano” currency is worth 100,000 “old” Bolivares.Cryptocurrency experts have said the petro suffers from a lack of credibility because of a lack of confidence in Maduro’s government and the mismanagement of the country’s existing national currency.[PDVSA.USA], said on Wednesday that the United States had revoked the visa of its President chief executive Mr Asdrubal Chavez, cousin of Venezuela’s late president Hugo Chavez,Mass MigrationAngered by the economic crisis in the country, many Venezuelans have started leaving the country. Of the 4.3 million Venezuelans living abroad, more than 1.6 million have fled the country since the crisis began in 2015, according to the UN. The pace of departures has accelerated in recent days, sparking a warning from the UN. The majority have crossed into neighbouring Colombia and then to Panama, Ecuador, Peru and Chile. Others have gone south to Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, Argentina.The mass influx of people from Venezuela has triggered a strong response from Ecuador and Peru, Panama. According to news agency AFP, Colombia had criticised its two southern neighbours for implementing travel restrictions, warning it wouldn’t stop migration. Ecuador — where close to half a million people have fled this year alone — then lifted its week-long requirement for Venezuelans to produce a passport, all the while helping those migrants reach Peru. Peru’s citizens largely supported the move, though, worried about the impact that the 400,000 Venezuelans already in the country would have. In Brazil, rioters burning camps ans shelter this month drove over one thousand two hundreds back over the border, to Venezuela; reported Reuters.A man gets off the bridge as people queue to try to cross the Venezuela-Colombia border through Simon Bolivar international bridge in San Antonio del Tachira, Venezuela (Reuters)Colombia says it has already given temporary residence to 870,000 Venezuelans but it can barely cope. In Peru, record 5,100 people entered the country in a single day earlier this month. Colombia has pleaded with its southern neighbours to agree to a combined migration strategy, while Ecuador has called a meeting of 13 Latin American countries next month to discuss the crisis. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres will set up a special UN team to ensure a coordinated regional response.Increasing crime rate in VenezuelaAs the country slips into poverty, many are turning towards crime to make money. There were almost 27,000 violent deaths in the country last year, with Venezuela having the second highest murder rate in the world after El Salvador, according to the Venezuelan Observatory of Violence, a local crime monitoring group. Many Caracas residents refuse to go out at night due to security fears, and wealthier Venezuelans often travel in bullet-proof cars with bodyguards. A recent Gallup study placed Venezuela at the bottom of its 2018 Law and Order index, with 42 per cent of surveyed Venezuelans reporting they had been robbed the previous year and one-quarter saying they had been assaulted, reportedWilson Ramos: Inside KidnappedKIDNAPPING SCENEGetting Kidnapped (And Shot At) In Caracas, VenezuelaThe kidnapping in Venezuela started when I walked off the plane, this wasn’t the Venezuela I remembered. The second I walked through customs there were several individuals that walked up to me to exchange money. Of course I said! Who wouldn’t like to exchange money with a non official random person in a back alley of the airport in the most dangerous city in South America?Oil, & PDVSA State oil Company: Petro Caribbe stocks drainedVenezuela cancelled Oil delivery to 11 International customers in June 2018 incapable to pump 1,5 million barrels per day.Legal actions against PDVSA by U.S. producer ConocoPhillips aimed to satisfy a $2 billion arbitration award also have recently worsened the bottleneck as the Venezuelan firm is no longer fully using its Caribbean terminals to store and export.But an increase in production of diluted crude oil, or DCO, formulated by PDVSA by blending naphtha and extra heavy oils while its crude upgraders are out of service, and shipments from Aruba and Curacao ahead of seizure attempts by Conoco helped PDVSA and its joint ventures deliver more barrels to the United States in June.PDVSA exports have declined in recent months due to a stubborn tanker backlog around Venezuela’s main ports and its fast-declining crude output, which has stopped the firm from complying with supply contracts to almost all of its customers.A U.S. district court judge in Houston last week ruled Conoco can depose Citgo as preparation for a court case against PDVSA and others over alleged asset transfers in the Caribbean that Conoco claims were designed to frustrate its efforts to obtain payment under the arbitration award.Venezuela has begun testing sea-borne oil transfers to ease a severe backlog of crude deliveries from its main terminals, according to sources and data, as chronic delays and production declines could temporarily halt state-run PDVSA’s supply contracts if they are not cleared soon.Venezuela suspends oil delivery to Antigua and Barbuda and othersJune 12, 2018 OBSERVER media Antigua and Barbuda is among countries to be affected as Venezuela’s PDVSA says it is suspending petroleum deliveries to about half of the Caribbean countries in its Petrocaribe agreement.The move comes due to falling crude production and low refinery utilisation, according to a Venezuelan Oil Ministry report quoted on the online news agency Platts.PDVSA, according to the Platts report, is indefinitely suspending a combined 38,000 b/d of refined products deliveries to eight of the 17 countries that make up Petrocaribe: Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Dominica, El Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua, St. Vincent & the Grenadines and St. Kitts & Nevis.However, the report added that PDVSA will continue to supply 45,600 b/d of refined products in June to Cuba’s Cubametales, including 95 octane gasoline, aviation fuel, diesel, LPG, and residual fuel. Cuba has been one of the countries that has most benefited from the PetroCaribe agreement, receiving average deliveries from PDVSA of 95,000 b/d of crude and refined products.Under the Petro Caribe agreement, Venezuela sells petroleum to Central American and Caribbean nations on favorable terms….They pay 50 or 60% and the balance is financed up to 25 years .Venezuela inaugurated the plan in 2005 with Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas , Belize, Cuba Cienfuegos Refinery, Dominica, Granada, Guyana – which subsequently pulled out, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica Petrojam refinery, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic Refinery , St. Kitts & Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, and Suriname.The original agreement contemplated a supply of up to 185,000 b/d of crude oil and products under preferential conditions…50% / 60 days up to 25years financing. In 2017, Venezuelan shipments of petroleum via Petrocaribe dropped by 40%, or 54,400 b/d, from 136,000 b/d exported in 2015. The Oil Ministry report also said even though PDVSA does not have Mesa 30 crude available in June to supply Cuba, it is evaluating the possibility of buying light crude from third parties. In February, March, and April, PDVSA bought 4.2 million barrels at world wide price of Urals crude for Cuba.PDVSA has been operating its refineries below capacity because of a shortage of crude feedstock and various unscheduled shutdowns. PDVSA this month plans to process 499,000 b/d through its refining system, or 31 percent of its 1.6 million b/d capacity.Russian oil bought by PDVSA for Cuba discharges in the Caribbean -dataJune 25, 2018, 02:09:00 PM EDT By ReutersPDVSA has been unable to fully use its refining and storage facilities in the region, diverting cargoes that have contributed to export delays.Aframax tanker Advante Atom originally was to discharge Russian Urals crude in mid-May at PDVSA's Bullenbay terminal in Curacao, where it would be re-exported to Cuba, one of several such cargoes since January.PDVSA exported 765,000 barrels per day of crude and refined products to customers in the first two weeks of June, a 32 percent decline compared with May, excluding shipments by two of the company's joint ventures, which export separately.Manuel Quevedo, Venezuela's oil minister and the state-run firm's president, last week said the country expects to recover a portion of its lost crude output this year. But there are no early signs of a reversal in the declining trend. The number of active rigs fell to 28 in May versus 54 in the same month of 2017.Secondary sources quoted in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries' monthly report estimated Venezuela's oil production fell to 1.392 million bpd last month, the lowest since the 1950s.The lack of Venezuelan crude supply has forced the 335,000-bpd Isla refinery, owned by the Curacao government, to seek a temporary operator to replace PDVSA, which has not sent oil to the facility since late April.June’s expected throughput is down 144,000 b/d from the same month in 2017. PDVSA’s system is comprised of five refineries: Amuay, Cardon, El Palito, Puerto La Cruz, and Isla Curacao, which it operated in an agreement with the Curacao government.With the new tankers, Venezuela's fleet stands at 81 ships, up from 12 oil tankers in 2002.Next month PDVSA expects the Boyacá tanker to arrive, followed by the Carabobo tanker and the Junín tanker in April 2014, the release said.PDVSA on Friday, was operating Isla Curacao at just 29,000 b/d, or 8.7% of its capacity, as it was unable to obtain crude supply out of storage, according to a refinery official who spoke with Platts on the condition of anonymity.The alleged suspension in some Petrocaribe shipments is the major second blow to Venezuela’s hobbled oil industry in the past week. A PDVSA official told Platts last week the company notified 11 international customers that it will not be able to meet its full crude supply commitments in June. The source, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said PDVSA is contractually obligated to supply 1.495 million b/d to those customers in June, but only has 694,000 b/d available for export. PDVSA cannot supply 800,000 barels per day sold and paid for by international long time customers.Venezuela’s oil production has continued to shrink, plunging for the 10th straight month to 1.36 million b/d in May, according to a Platts survey. That is down 580,000 b/d from May 2017 and 910,000 b/d from May 2016.The drop in PDVSA deliveries may present an opportunity for US Gulf Coast refiners, who are increasingly exporting refined products throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.US refined products exports to PetroCaribe nations, including Venezuela, averaged 398,000 b/d in March, up from 256,000 b/d in March 2017, data from the US Energy Information Administration showed. The bulk of that increase has been going to Venezuela.Venezuela must import and depends on semi refined light oil for mixing heavy crude from the USA.[ CONCLUSIONS The conventional wisdom about leaders like Chávez is that their electoral successes depend on class voting, particularly the support of poor voters disenchanted with the old political establishment, corruption within traditional parties, and the neoliberal policies of the Washington Consensus. There are, however, intuitive reasons to doubt this interpretation, including Chávez’s conflicts with organized labor, potential middle class benefi ts from some of his economic policies and redistributive programs, and the scholarly contention that Latin American populist leaders generally rely on multiclass bases of support. My results show that this intuitive skepticism is indeed warranted; Chávez’s electoral base is not, in fact, disproportionately poor. That is, I find no evidence of a monotonic class vote outside the election of 1998.]This oligarchy, made up of Chavez's political heirs, is the third major component of the real power in Venezuela. Of course, Maduro; his wife, Cilia Flores; and many of his relatives and associates are part of that oligarchy. In this elite there are different “families,” “cartels,” and groups that compete for influence on government decisions, for political appointments, and for the control of illicit markets—ranging from human trafficking to money laundering. The smuggling and selling of food, medicines, and all kinds of products are just a few of the many other corrupt activities that enrich the Maduro oligarchy as well as the Cubans, the military, and their civilian accomplices.Getting rid of Maduro is necessary. But it's not enough as long as three criminal cartels—who are intermingled in business, corruption, and the exercise of power—continue to control Venezuela.Oil is the Devil's excrement".U.S. Drug Smuggling Trial of Venezuelan Leader Nicolás Maduro'sDrug Trafficking Within the Venezuelan Regime: The 'Cartel of the Suns'Venezuela's National Guard Commander Gen. Nestor Reverol (pictured in Caracas) is named in an indictment in federal court in New York City that accuses him of tipping off cocaine traffickers of incoming raidsNestor Reverol, the former head of Venezuela’s anti-narcotics agency and a long-time ally of late socialist leader Hugo Chavez, is named in a sealed indictment pending in federal court in Brooklyn, New York, according to the people.He would be one of the highest-ranking Venezuelan officials - and the only one currently in office - to face U.S. drug charges.Reverol, who leads the branch of Venezuela’s armed forces that controls the country’s borders, could not be reached for comment by Reuters.INTERNATIONAL COCAINE CORRIDOR VENEZUELA“The National Guard has been key to opening up the doors into Venezuela for Colombian drug trafficking organizations and subversive groups,” he said. “They have transformed Venezuela into a massive pipeline for cocaine into the United States and Europe.”US government sanctions on Venezuela vice president for drug chargesNicolas Maduro Doesn't Really Control VenezuelaMaduro doesn’t really matter. He is simply a useful idiot, the puppet of those who really control Venezuela: the Cubans, the drug traffickers, and Hugo Chavez’s political heirs. Those three groups effectively function as criminal cartels, and have co-opted the armed forces into their service; this is how it is possible that every day we see men in uniform willing to massacre their own people in order to keep Venezuela’s criminal oligarchy in power.Another important player in today’s Venezuela is the drug traffickers, whose power is also a constraint on Maduro. Venezuela is one of the main drug routes to the U.S. , Europe and Africa. This status is worth billions of dollars, and the country is home to a vast network of people and organizations that control the illicit trade and the enormous amount of money it generates. According to U.S. officials, one such person is Vice President Tareck El Aissami, and so are a large number of military officers and other relatives and members of the ruling oligarchy.Reuters (With inputs from agencies)Venezuela: The Chávez Effect (Fall 2008)( 96p history data )Venezuela’s economy collapses: All your questions answeredVenezuela's Inflation Rate: Causes and Solutionshttps://antiguaobserver.com/venezuela-suspends-oil-delivery-to-antigua-and-barbuda-and-others/Russian oil bought by PDVSA for Cuba discharges in the Caribbean -dataThe launch of the book "The Petroleum Pentagon"Poverty Reduction in VenezuelaThe Economics, Culture, and Politics of Oil in VenezuelaJuan Pérez Alfonso, Venezuelan, Regarded as Founder of OPEBiografía Juan Pablo Perez AlfonsoChina-made oil tankers arrive in Venezuela - BNamericasOil is the devil's excrementVenezuela's first lady says her nephews were kidnapped by U.S.https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/news/122120.pdfNicolas Maduro Doesn't Really Control Venezuela[1] Tugwell, Franklin (1975) The Politics of Oil in Venezuela. Stanford University Press, p.182[2] For example, while Venezuelan individual income taxes during the 70’s made up only 4.1% of total tax income and corporate taxes made up 70.3%, in neighboring Colombia, the tax burden is distributed much more evenly among different sources, so that individual income tax makes up 11% and corporate tax 12.8% of total tax income. (Source: Terry Lynn Karl, 1997, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro States, University of California Press, p.89)[3] Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin, 2001[4] Chávez’ visits to Saddam Hussein and Muammar Qaddafi would come to haunt him over and over again, as his opponents would site these visits as reasons for their dislike of Chávez.[5] As was the case of Dutch gas, which is where the name for the problem comes from.[6] World Development Report 2000/2001, p.297[7] Average annual inflation was over 50% between 1988 and 1998.[8] Terry Lynn Karl, p.235. This was a fate suffered by only 19 countries in the world in 1996.[9] Terry Lynn Karl (1997), p.184[10] Fernando Coronil (1997) The Magical State: Nature, Money, and Modernity in Venezuela. University of Chicago Press. p.4[11] [Source?][12] To list a few name changes: Shell became Maraven, Exxon became Lagoven, Mobil became Corpoven , Gulf became Menoven (sp?).[13] An oil industry expert, who briefly served on the PDVSA board of directors in the days leading to the April 11, 2002 coup attempt.[14] Bernard Mommer (2001) “Venezuelan Oil Politics at the Crossroads.” Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Monthly Commentary.[15] www.americaeconomia.com[16] PDVSA ranks #24 in terms of return on assets, #49 in terms of return on sales, and #50 in terms of return on fixed assets.[17] Source: Mark Weisbrot and Simone Baribeau (2003), “What happened to Profits?: The Record of Venezuela’s Oil Industry,” Center for Economic Policy Research paper: www.cepr.net/what_happened_to_profits.htm (their figures are based on SEC filings).[18] Carlos Rossi, “PDVSA’s Labor Problems,” The Daily Journal, April 18, 2002.[19] See: El Nacional, “Cuentas Crudas, Precios Refinados”, November 17, 1998[20] For 2001 outsourced oil fields cost $10.94 per barrel of oil equivalent produced, while non-outsourced oil fields cost only $2.03 per barrel of oil equivalent (in 1997 dollars). Source: CEPR Research Paper, “What Happened to Profits?”[21] See: www.soberania.info/tercerizacion_portada.htm The excess costs averaged about $90 million per year for 1998 to 2000.[22] See: Alexander Foster and Tulio Monsalve, “Quien Maneja las Computadoras de PDVSA?” Venezuela Analitica, December 17, 2002 www.analitica.com/bitbiblioteca/tulio_monsalve/computadoras_pdvsa.asp[23] Alí Rodríguez, the former president of OPEC and current president of PDVSA provides a good summary of the policy in: “La Reforma Petrolera Venezolana de 2001” in Revista Venezolana de Economía y Ciencias Sociales, No. 2/2002, May/August 2002.[24] Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Article 303.[25] Ibid.[26] Article 5 of the “Ley Organica de Hidrocarburos.”[27] Alí Rodríguez (2002), p.204[28] Chávez’ visits to Iraq—the first of any head of state since the Gulf War—and to Libya, both members of OPEC, would later be used repeatedly by his opponents at home and in the U.S. as proof for his unreliability and dangerous tendencies.[29] President Caldera had named the son of his chancellor to the board and Chávez’ first appointment to the PDVSA presidency, Hector Ciavaldini came from a lower management position. No protests were voiced against these appointments at the time.[30] Carlos Rossi, “PDVSA’s Labor Problems,” The Daily Journal, April 18, 2002. According to Rossi, PDVSA employees referred to the Caracas headquarters as “Hollywood” because every employee had at least one double that performed the same functions within the company.

What power? The person itself - Police General Tito Karnavian, or the National Police Chief title itself? The political image of Polri has been described in other answer. I want explained anotherFunction & ResourcesIndonesia National Police (Polri) for me its quite powerful. Indonesia National Police is one unity. It consist of around 400.000 personnel all around Indonesia. It has budget 72.43 Billion Rupiah ($ 5.4 Million) in 2017 Polri Urutan Ketiga Institusi Penerima Anggaran Terbesar di RAPBN 2017 . Its responsibility is super big, from law enforcement, law and order, national security, traffic, etc.OrganizationI want to compare with US Police/Sheriff which has decentralized to state and city/municipality and has also in federal level. Polri organization consist of:Leadership - Chief of Polri (Kapolri ****) & Vice Chief of Polri (Wakapolri ***). Chief of Polri is answer to President directly. President nominate from three star general candidates to become Chief (Four star). Chief of Polri also must an active personnel (internal candidate) and still has enough times before retirement. House of Representative conducted hearing, fit and proper test to agree/not with President choice. President is also indirectly controlled Commissioned Officer (General) mutation, promotion and rotation tour-of-duty. For Chief Police, there are no exact terms like FBI (10 years) or Secretary (2-4 years), but as President want, and usually followed the pension age (58 yo); Chief Police usually held the position from 2 until 3 years. Tito Karnavian as young and rising star (He is a good anomaly; still 52 years old and already four-star general) is expected to retired in 2022 (from 2016). There aren’t also protocol/ethical procedure like in US which coordinate between President, DOJ and FBI Chief independency (which Trump-Comey feud dominated US news right now); which Chief of Polri act publicly more like Homeland Security Secretary more (yes to President direction) than Chief Law Enforcement (like DOJ/FBI, which independent to White House).Criminal Investigative Agency (Badan Reserse Kriminal - Bareskrim ***) - Just like Federal Bureau of Investigation in national level. It consist of many directorate of criminal investigation (general crime, economic&special crime, cyber crime, narcotics crime, corruption crime) and forensic labs, criminal statistics center, fingerprint analysis center, etc. It also has supervisory mandate to all of detective in Regional & Local Police (Biro Pengawas Penyidik); assistance mandate to all of civil service investigator (Penyidik Pegawai Negeri Sipil - in similar of federal agents from other agency in US)Security Development Agency (Badan Pemelihara Keamanan - Baharkam ***) - just like Homeland Security, although not as big as DHS in US (I will discussed it below). It consist of Marine and Air Police (Polair dan Udara), Community Policing Directorate (Direktorat Pembinaan Masyarakat); Anti-Riot Police Directorate (Direktorat Sabhara, usually secure/escorts the demonstration or doing routine patrol on street too); K9 Directorate (Direktorat Satwa), Critical Infrastructure and Vital Object Directorate (Direktorat Pengamanan Objek Vital) and etc. The Regional & local police consist of that directorate too. But in national level, Its job to create regulation to all local police all over Indonesia in terms of homeland security. It also has supervisory and assistance mandate to all special cops (Train cops, Tourism cops, Forest Cops, etc) and also regulate private security industry (Company/community security like Satpam). In terms of community policing, Indonesia has its own force named Bhabinkamtibmas (Bhayangkara Pembina Keamanan Ketertiban Masyarakat) scattered all over Indonesia until village level. Baharkam regulate its use. Usually, Baharkam is on high alert when big events happening such as national election and local election, national holiday such as Mudik, Christmas, new year, happened, or security issues such as ISIS at Philippine-Sulawesi Border.Intelligence Security Agency (Badan Intelijen Keamanan - Baintelkam ***) - just like Intelligence Section of FBI or MI5 in UK, National Polices Chief has authority over domestic intelligence too (Although, BIN as State Intelligence Agency - leading agency, is tasked both into foreign and domestic intelligence). In local level, it use to issuing Daftar Pencarian Orang (DPO) against criminal (like all-points bulletin (APB/BOLO) in US). In National level, It consist of many intelligence analysis directorate such as Domestic Politics, Social-Culture, Economic, National Security, Cryptic section, and tech section. It also regulate gun use and explosives substance like ATF in US. In Indonesia, gun for personal use is heavy regulated (only for police/armed forces, and sport) and explosives for such as mining & construction company. It also receive and analyze permit to big events in society such as demonstration, crowd, parade, conference, etc. It also conducting background check to create certificate to employer - SKCK (Surat Keterangan Catatan Kepolisian). It also regulate supervision against foreigner and against deviant sect and local believer. It also has new directorate- Counterintelligence, to tackle propaganda/deception/hoax.Traffic Corps (Korps Lalu Lintas) - Traffic cops is available to each Local Police. In National level, it regulate inter-province transportation, National Traffic Management Center (NTMC), highway patrol, or in big events or national holiday like Mudik Lebaran or Christmas eve and new years. It also regulate driving permits, car ownership and license plate (in Indonesia, the permits and plate is standardized all over the country, not by each province/city. Province Gov just collects its taxes)Mobile Brigade Corps - (Brigade Mobil - Brimob **) - Paramilitary arms of Indonesia National Police. The forces is available and ready-to-deploy in each Local Police (Polda). It play a role as anti-riot police (anti-anarchist, riot control), counter-insurgence (and guerilla also), bomb disposal, bio, chemical and radioactive detachment, HRT, and backup to counter-terrorism force (Densus). When Government or Polri is tighten security level, escort VIP, escort or arrest high-value-target prisoner, you can see Brimob presence with fully armed there. In history of independence struggling, Brimob play a big role in there. Their presence is also increased in conflict area like Poso (leading fight against Mujahidin Indonesia Timur) or Papua (against Organisasi Papua Merdeka)Counter-Terrorism Special Detachment (Detasemen Khusus 88 Anti Teror **) - Special forces of Indonesia National Police, like SWAT. In the beginning, they are parts of Criminal Investigative Agency (Bareskrim), but due to nature of crime which elevated in the next couple years, in 2010 reorganization, Densus placed under Chief directly, with One-Star General as Commander (now, its Two-Star). It has its own investigative, intelligence, and enforcement function. Tito Karnavian (Chief Police right now) is popular and rising star in Polri because his last job here as commander.Supervisory Inspector General (Inspektorat Pengawasan Umum - Irwasum ***). Supervision of budget and organization. Different than internal affairs.Education and Training Agency (Lembaga Pendidikan dan Pelatihan ***) - Consist of Police Academy, Police University (STIK), leadership school for commissioned officer (Sespim), and special training. It is like FBI Academy+FLETCDivision and Center (**) - Internal Affairs (include Provost); Public Relation; ICT; International Affairs (include NCB Interpol and Police Attache); Treasury; History; Health and Doctor (also include Disaster Victim Investigation);Chief Assistant (**) - Assistant in Planning (Financial and Budget); Logistic; Operation (which command deployment/mobilize all police forces in Indonesia); Human Resource (regulate police tour-of-duty rotation, mutation, and promotion around Indonesia, yes around Indonesia, not limited to each local police); and also Special Staff to ChiefRegional Police (**/*) Polisi Daerah - Polda, local police in Province level; each consist of Polisi Resor (City Level), Polisi Sektor (district level); and many division like in national level (Crime Investigation, Security, Intel, Traffic, etc). Regional Police (Polda) is leading operational forces to implement police regulation, policy and function. Chief of Regional Police answer to Chief Police command directly, not to Governor or Mayor. Local Government can’t command local police only coordinate. Local police don’t have to face election, re-election, involved in local politics or anything like Sheriff in US there. Because tour-of-duty in national/local level is conducted by Chief Police, position holder is sometimes from outside those area, sometimes in Regional level (Chief - Kapolda), He usually get one-until-three years before get rotated, promoted, or mutated, to reduce local politics roots involvement in that area.So, if you ask how powerful authority Chief of Indonesia National Police has? look how big the organization, resource, budget, jurisdiction, one-command to all of police function and police personnel he has.Governance and Authority “Power-Grab”Police is also has regulatory function beside operational function. It differentiate Police and Armed Forces in Indonesia. For Example; Armed Forces (TNI) only has operational function, but the policy making and budget-decision is from Ministry of Defense (Kemhan). You can see my other answer here: Someone anonymous's answer to What does the average Indonesian feel about its defense policy?But in Police, Chief of Polri has dual-hat role, he create policy (about law enforcement, national security & community service) and regulation, control budget, and also implement it. Many Civil Society Organization also criticized this enormous authority. Some said, this create political rivalry between TNI-Police and create small conflict all around Indonesia because show-of-force and Because TNI is under Ministry but Police is under President directly. TNI itself still has many power over domestic issues; read my other answer Someone anonymous's answer to Do Indonesia military still play huge influential role in the domestic affairs of Indonesia after the downfall of Suharto?In fact, there are Commission of National Police (Kompolnas), like watchdog for Polri. It want to follow example like National Public Safety Commission in Japan, But their authority (Kompolnas) is weak Imparsial Minta Kewenangan Kompolnas Diperluas / Pemerintah Diminta Perluas Kewenangan Kompolnas, only doing watchdog, receive community complaint and critics, supervise, but has no strategic authority like approving budget, or policy making, or can give sanction and punishment to personnel, it only advise President in terms of policing policy and recommend new Police Chief candidates for President choose (and still not legally binding from that list, President still get his prerogative right as head of state to choose his own Chief), and it’s not independent, as Head of Kompolnas are automatically Coordinating Minister of Political, Law and Security, and Minister of Internal Affairs (Mendagri) and Minister of Law and Human Right (Menkumham) are also part of Kompolnas, beside 6 outsiders (society and academician) as commissioners Menko Polhukam Dinilai Kurang Pas Kepalai Kompolnas / "Kompolnas Diisi 3 Menteri, Bagaimana Memosisikan Diri Ketika Hadap Presiden?"From year-to-year there are already suggestion and rumored that Indonesia National Police will placed under like-Homeland Security/Home Office department, under Attorney General or under Ministry of Internal Affairs-Kemendagri (fyi, it controls Local Government, Local Autonomy, Domestic politics, local election, political party and mass organization, and Citizen ID) Perlu Dibentuk Kementerian Keamanan Dalam Negeri? | Republika Online / Perlu Dibentuk Kementrian Khusus Untuk Polri? / Keamanan Dalam Negeri / Tim Seleksi Menteri Usulkan Pembentukan Kementerian Keamanan Nasional But Polri rejected this idea Polri Tolak Kementerian Keamanan Dalam Negeri because in past Polri has been under many organization such as ABRI (with Armed Force) during New Order, Attorney General or Ministry of Internal Affairs in late 50s and there many excess like dual function, police can’t investigate criminal under its ministry (impartial issue), or there are potential to politicized the law enforcement section (because Police in Indonesia is not about Homeland Security only but also like FBI too) Kapolri Menolak Kedudukan di Bawah Kementerian. You can follow about their reorganization history on quora too Why isn’t the Indonesian National Police (Polri) under the Internal Affairs Ministry (Kemendagri)?Recently also, there are judicial review to Constitutional Court about Police authority to issue driving license (SIM) and car ownership license (BPKB) Kewenangan Polri Terbitkan SIM Digugat di MK. because plaintiff said that that authority has nothing to do with Police function in security and order (Kamtibmas) and its create conflict of interest with Police function in traffic management. but Court finally reject it MK Putuskan Wewenang Polisi Terbitkan SIM Tak Langgar AturanThere are opinion in intellectual/expert circle that we have to follow US Homeland Security alike that aggregated many agency after 9/11. If we followed the US Homeland Security logic, In Indonesia homeland security function scattered from Indonesia National Police (Polri), Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla), Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT), National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB), Search and Rescue (Basarnas), Secret Service (Paspampres, under TNI; Botasupal (Financial Anti-Counterfeit Police), under BIN), Border Security Forces (Army authority, under TNI), National Border Management Agency (Badan Nasional Pengelola Perbatasan, under Ministry of Internal Affairs), Directorate General of Immigration (under Law and Human Right Ministry), Directorate General of Custom and Excise (under Finance Ministry), Aviation Security (under PT Angkasa Pura, airport company and operator, each airport has one, not integrated like TSA), Nuclear Supervisory Agency (Bapeten, under Ministry or Research and Technology), and recently newest organization National Cyber Agency (Badan Siber dan Sandi Negara).US Department of Homeland SecurityUK Home Office, for comparisonAlthough, US DHS itself has many problem such as bureaucratic nightmare, ineffective, risk overestimate, its security paradigm, etc this is a good article Man-Made Disaster. UK later then facing the same problem UK spy agencies may face merger pressure - author / and recently in 2010 has reorganize National Crime Agency under UK Home OfficeIn past (New Order Era) there are Security and Order Commando (Kopkamtib) and Subsersive Law which has one command of all operational of security agency (police, military, intelligence) Komando pemulihan keamanan dan ketertiban - Wikipedia bahasa Indonesia, ensiklopedia bebas / Tragedi 1965 dan lembaga super bernama Kopkamtib | merdeka.com. (and now, there are tendency that our security forces wanted it again, that’s dangerous Cegah ISIS di RI, UU Anti-Subversi Diusulkan Diterapkan Lagi / Tindak gerakan radikal, Kapolri minta pengganti UU Subversif | merdeka.com)Now Maybe there are already Coordinating Minister for Political, Law and Security (Kemenkopolhukam) which ‘coordinate’ all that agency and Ministry. But Kemenkopolhukam not only coordinate security agency, but also political (Ministry of Internal Affairs; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; General Election Commission; National Resilience Agency/Lemhanas; Ministry of State Apparatur and Bureaucratic Reform; Ministry of Communication and Information; etc) and Law (Ministry of Law and Human Right; Attorney General; KPK; Human Right Commission; etc); Oh don’t forget that many security agency. Which is so many and not effective. You know, politics and law is the daily problem and issues which dominated our news.General Gatot (Commander of Armed Forces), Police General Tito Karnavian (Chief of National Police), Police General Budi Gunawan (Chief of State Intelligence Agency)You know in Indonesia, coordination is super bad between agency. There are many political rivalry; sectoral ego; budget contest; and it depends heavily with the people and its characters, competence, professionalism, focus, who sitting as Coordinating Minister of Polhukam, not the system and governance itself;Case study; You can see why National Cyber Agency took time many time (from 2013–2017) to be formed, beside President reshuffle Menkopolhukam 3 times; Bakamla formation also took many years from Bakorkamla, which don’t mention rivalry between Sea and Coast Guard (under Ministry of Transporation) and Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla; under Coordinating Ministry of Polhukam) and Marine & Fishery Resources Supervisor (under Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fishery); or Why National Security Law (which supposed be an umbrella legislation to all security issues) can’t passed to parliament from 2005 and deadlock again in 2010 until recently has not done either; Wewenang Polisi Dipereteli / Indonesia satu-satunya negara tanpa UU Keamanan Nasional / Imparsial Nilai UU Kamnas Tak Dibutuhkan or Why State Secret Law (RUU Rahasia Negara) can’t passed also to parliament together with Freedom of Information Law (Law no. 14/2008) & Intelligence Law (Law no. 17/2011) RUU Kebebasan Informasi Vs. RUU Rahasia Negara/Masih Perlukah UU Rahasia Negara? ; Why interception law has not been discussed until now although Constitutional Court has ordered Government and Parliament to do it (regulate interception according to Human Right issues) since judicial review in 2010 Mendamaikan Pengaturan Hukum Penyadapan di Indonesia; Why now anti-terrorism law revision can’t passed to parliament from 2016 early year until now that had deadlock in the same place; rivalry between TNI and Police or Police with someone else (let say; KPK).ConclusionWell; I have talk to nowhere. So hope can answer your question. (Or not). I hope at least it became our concern and attention about Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Indonesia since 1998 reformation which still ongoing until now. (And people already forget it).In my opinion right now; In democratic phase of Indonesia history as a state, police hold critical key to implement democratic country. Armed Forces already did their job to reform since 1998 (civil supremacy, creating new doctrine, remove dwi-fungsi, promote professionalism, etc). Now our attention must shifting to Police forces (although, political situation lately in 2017 has shown that our reform in TNI also still has the long road). I’m not saying that the best format to police is like US Homeland Security or UK Home Office. I’m just mention that two, because they are number one reference for democratic government. Indonesia political and bureaucracy characteristic are really different like theirs (we are not federal states, or fully devolved autonomy like UK, we still don’t implement meritocracy spirit yet-although it has started since Law 5/2014, the system is still depends on the leaders not the system itself, political ethics is not good as theirs, law enforcement and corruption, collusion and nepotism eradication still not satisfied enough, etc), so we can’t really copy-paste their organization and policy to our country. Maybe national police format is the best to our time right now. In the future? That’s our job as young generation.My recommendation for short-term:Amend the Law 2/2002 about National Police and Law 8/1981 about Criminal Procedure Code KUHAP. 15 years after the law started there must be many complaint. You can find the study everywhere.Polri organization is so big, has many authority, budget, jurisdiction, etc. But the supervision is so weak. Give Kompolnas more authority to strategic function like budgeting, and reward and punishment (like include them in discipline trial, or regulate remuneration review). I have already mention National Public Safety Commission in Japan, or in UK you can see there are many ad-hoc committee inside Home Office to doing remuneration review, handling complaint, regulate forensic science.Biggest component in democratic country is governance. Good governance require splitting the body who has policy-making function and implement-policy/operational function and who supervise it. I know it really depends on the new President to create Homeland Security-alike Ministry. But, the Law itself who stated that Police is right under the President not any Minister. So, include this to that law amendment. Or if its not ready in 2019, create roadmap to….(mention some year here) to create transition phase to that. Kompolnas already mentioned at this Law but still not strong. In the long term, split policy-making function and operational function in Polri and give it to Kompolnas.In the meantime, Stick to the plan on bureaucratic reform in Police. See this as reference http://ntb.polri.go.id/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/road-map-reformasi-birokrasi-polri-gel-iii-2016-2019.pdf. Polri also have doing self introspection to be consistent to his own regulation like Perkap 1/2009 for Use of Force, Perkap 8/2009 for Human Right principle for policing, Perkap 3/2015 for Community Policing. and as citizen, we must keep vocal about this one.Law enforcement and National Security is two different domain. In other country, they split this function at national level. Because law enforcement need independence from executive (like KPK, that’s why KPK works.) and national security needs loyalty to leadership and order. That’s kind of contrary. But in our police doctrine, law enforcement (either general crime/transnational-organized crime) is part of keeping security and order in society (kamtibmas), so you don’t have to confuse that sometimes police do penal law concept like restorative justice (promote mediation and non-judicial process or you can call it, damai) instead of process all report from society (like KPK, so they don’t have SP3-letter that can terminate the criminal investigation so they have to prosecute it all) and sometimes it creates disappointment from victim family or law society. I know this is a long shot and need comprehensive discussion and study more than above.