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I am going to speak as a Marine and a former hiring manager. I was once a Sergeant in the United States Marine Corps with two Iraq tours and have worked in the retail, real estate, the tech industry start-up and education sectors. In that time, I've hired more than enough people to know that it's one of the hardest decisions you have to regularly make. The choices of who you bring into an organization will either make or break you far quicker than anything you as the individual are capable of. I also know that almost all the decisions you make as a hiring manager happen as the sum result of the generalizations and stereotypes you have attached to the bullet points on their résumé. Don't feel bad. It's important to not follow that instinct that all individuals are fundamentally good and fundamentally the same. That's how you get robbed and your employees drive your company into the ground.The facts are, you rely on those generalizations to give you the best guess of who is going to add value to your company's culture and who isn't going to burn the place to the ground. That said, what happens when you see military experience show up in your inbox? What generalizations do you hold? Do you really not know what it is you're looking at? Would you like to know more? The problem with many hiring managers is that they have no idea what it means when they see a veteran's resume. What qualities should you expect? What flaws? What do they add? How are they different from someone else? I wrote this piece to help communicate what to expect. Hopefully after reading you will be able to make an informed decision. You'll be able to know better if this applicant is not only a good worker for you, but also someone who can grow and drive your company in the future, someone who can grow with you, and maybe even someone who can help you take your operations to the next level.Leadership is Ingrained in VetsWhat many people don't know is that the United States Marine has an average age of only 19. What? Yes, that Marine is incredibly young, but it still needs to be led. Who do you think is doing this? 19 year olds. By the time most people are twenty in the Marines (this goes for the other services, as well) they are already an NCO. This stands for Non-Commissioned-Officer. Don't let the "Non" throw you off. What an NCO means is, "The guy in charge who will make my life Hell if I screw up," or just as often, "the guy whose job it is to make sure I stay alive." By the age of 20 some kids have already become technical experts in a professional field, are teachers to younger service-members and have led small teams in everything from shop operations to combat deployments.By the time I was 22 I was a Sergeant in charge of a team of 13 other Marines. We were all occupying very technical jobs in the computer networking field and responsible for overseeing the maintenance and distribution of over $3 million dollars of Marine Corps property. You probably might think that that was a stupid investment on someone so young, but we pulled it off, with no fanfare I might add, and we did things like that all the time. It wasn't until I received a degree in Business Management at 25, that the civilian world could trust me again with doing the same thing. I suppose, on the outside, people can't be trusted with that kind of responsibility. Every day, though, vets do. The fact is that I could not have done this alone. I had those thirteen Marines who did the work and it was my job to coordinate. I had a very solid framework for leadership that include such gems as the Five Paragraph Order, Six Troop Leading steps, and the Thirteen Leadership Traits. These have become pivotal to my personal growth as a manager, teacher, and how I lead others. The military philosophies on the science of leading aren't something that leave you. The military trains Service Members to lead by example. Skills like motivation and delegation are actually given time to be trained and implemented in the most hostile environments imaginable.The military doesn't just educate their members on the practical ways to manage behavior, such as the discipline and communication methods. Leadership is truly studied on the academic and theoretical level. More so than in other organization, this theoretical and practical leadership are put in practice as a matter of survival.You want another note on leadership? In the military, no one can be fired, not at the bottom tiers at least. That means that you have to get the job done with the idiots God gave you. You are out there for seven to fourteen months with no replacements and just the same team along with all their problems. You have to train them, discipline them, correct them, counsel them and shape them, because you have no other choices. You didn’t even get to hire them. They were just assigned to you, more or less, at random. That is another reason why vets have such strong leadership skills. Could you honestly say that you could run a company the way the Marines do, with their success record, if you couldn't even pick who gets hired and can't even get rid of the ones who suck? You probably couldn't, but the military does. Choosing team members and leaders who have proven they are able to do this means that you are choosing team members who are adaptable and know how to lead others.Vets Understand ResponsibilityIn most veterans you will see a strong vein of personal integrity. It isn't that they are better people than anyone else, far to the point. Many are socially unacceptable misfits by most people's terms. It is that integrity is driven to such a degree that it is presented as a matter of life or death. Ethics and standards of behavior are codified, they're policed, and a part of life to the point that it is a standard which will follow an individual. In the civilian world, that doesn't go away. It creates employees with a proven track record of trustworthiness that are often assets to the organizations they join after they leaving military service.I don't mean to imply that civilians have no integrity. To contrary, there are many who are the most reliable people I have ever met, but in my experience, it can be hit or miss. In one job I had, by the time I had worked there for no more than a month nearly the entire staff had called out sick at least once, people wouldn't show up for work, complained incessantly, and generally, would do anything to avoid work. It wasn't legitimate sickness. It was dishonesty and an inability to be relied upon. The worst part... corporate wouldn't even let me fire them! I know that I said that the Marines and the military in general can't be fired and that makes vets good leaders, but firing people is a tool and needs to be used when you have it. Let's face it, because of lawyers and HR reps afraid of wrongful termination lawsuits, people can get away with murder without being let go far too often. This blows the minds of some vets.In the military there are no sick days. I am not exaggerating. You absolutely must come to work and then must go to Sick Call before they will ever acknowledge that there might be something wrong with you. And if it is a PT day you will run three miles before you get to go.When on deployment we also work every day. Every single day. There are no holidays, no weekends, no birthdays. It is the same thing every day. If you show up late, even by five minutes, or so, you will be running for miles or end up digging a massive fighting hole and 300 sandbags in an effort to make the base more secure. (It's not really about making the base more secure.) So you learn how not to get punished. In the civilian world they don't reward this behavior, but they also don't punish the latter."Why should I reward them for doing their jobs?" some might say."Because you won't punish them for not doing it." I'd reply.People like us show up early, stay late and if you ask them to do something they work hard to see that it is done. In the worst case scenario, they will be responsible enough to tell you when they need help. There is a point I made in the last section that I would like to take the opportunity to repeat for emphasis.By the time I was 22 I was a Sergeant in charge of a team of 13 other Marines. We were all occupying very technical jobs in the computer networking field and responsible for overseeing the maintenance and distribution of over $3 million dollars of Marine Corps property.Most organizations wouldn't consider this type of thing a wise decision, but in the military it is common for very young people to be given a great deal of responsibility, relative to civilian counterparts. You wonder how. This might help. Image you give an 18-year-old a rifle and tell him that it is only thing that will protect his life for next seven months. Follow this up with a few months of proof and little else but living with the constant reminder of this fact and I promise you that rifle will not be lost, broken, damaged and will come back to you polished and good as new. I promise. Military people get responsibility because when they were very young, there were serious consequences to the decisions they made. Civilians don't go through this kind of trial by fire and training and many of them don't make good decisions because of it. The military has given young men and women real life and death responsibility and choices before a regular civilian would have graduated college.Intuition is a skill. It can be learned. The military teaches it.What many people think is that leaders are born. Not in the military. Simply put, many times in the military people are presented with situations where they must make life and death decisions in the blink of an eye. How do you do that given that there are no pie charts to help you make the decision, no data scientists to weigh all the variables and no spreadsheets, journals or time to decide? Intuition. How exactly do you trust that someone will make the right decision when you plan to throw them into that kind of situation? Faith in a system of training which focuses on immediate decision making in response to only the information available at the time, intuition. The Marines and the military train intuition into their culture. You might not even know what intuition really is. Well, here goes.Intuition is the ability to take massive amounts of information and quickly come to a decision from all possible options quickly and correctly. It is the precise execution of understanding gained through experience and study. You don't do it with charts and graphs, you do it by absorbing all the knowledge available to you ahead of time and making it so readily available that the employee can access it at any given moment they wish. This sounds a lot like memory, but there is more than just recalling information. This means using that mental database to its fullest capacity. They are also able to sort through it and glean the right information without all the excessive over analysis that comes with having an abundance of information and options, often labeled “analysis paralysis” that can accompany a lot corporate level thinkers. This is one of the hardest things in the world to do and most people think you are either born with the ability you aren’t. This is a false assumption given to many by a society that worships heroes who magically just know what to do. Intuition, in truth, is a trainable skill and the vets have it already.What they don’t have? They may not have the specific job essential abilities and skills you need. Provide them the training and let it add to their knowledge base. After that, let them use what they know, namely the ability to think, a skill often missing from many fresh college grads. You just have to provide the training and watch them succeed in implementing it.Military people will tell you when something is wrong, even when you don't like it, often.I remember, more than just about anything in the military, life is punctuated with a steady stream of inspections. Almost impossibly high standards are demanded in everything from uniforms to gear. Even after getting out, the habit of a strong sense of standards runs deep. Vets have the wont of maintaining a certain level of acceptability in operations, safety, and professionalism in others. This often is directed downwards, but they also develop built in mechanisms for directing problems that are discovered upwards as well. Many that I know, also have a real problem not accepting that same level excellence in others. If a failure is present, expect the vet to let you know.You need to understand that the military are people who have an incredible amount of responsibility, not only for "company property", but for lives. Many seem to think that you give them an order, they say, "Sir, yes, sir!" and run off to their doom like mindless drones. It actually doesn't work that way, and I'm sorry if that is what you want from a veteran employee. Remember, they've spent years earning respect and a place of distinction as field experts so expecting them to just go to a point of utter subservience to you is both demeaning and ridiculous. It also throws away one of their most valuable assets, their independence and strength of character to be able to tell those they work with when something is wrong without damaging those relationships. This really does go back to the habit of self preservation, in that you don't just do what that young and inexperienced officer says when your experience tells you, it's going to get you killed. National security and all, but you are going to at least offer your opinion before leaping off the cliff like a flock of lemmings.That, however, is what I see in a lot of corporate scenarios I have seen and been a part of... Lemmings. Yes Men. If you all you're looking for is a government sponsored yesman, you should keep looking. Most veterans won't accept a place where their input isn't valued and they shouldn't. They have valuable knowledge, training and skills. That said, they aren't going to disrespect you just to let their opinion be known. A military person knows how to use tact, a word I am learning more and more, doesn't seem to appear in lexicon of most industry professionals. They will try to communicates to you that you may not be making a good choice. That much needs to be expected, so fragile egos need not apply. They are also not so afraid of you as to speak their mind when they have a good idea or think that one of yours could use a second look. They already have self-confidence gained through life experience. This type of mentality is important, but is often squashed by egotistical bosses.Vets can get the job done in an environment where they are trained to succeed in.When you make the choice to hire a veteran, you can know that when you give them a task they will do it, provided they have the means and support to get the job done. If it is safe, sound, and smart, vets will go at the task without the "incentive programs", "rewards", "blue jeans days" and all the other forms of extrinsic motivation that get in the way of doing business with a bunch of self-centered egotists. Veterans know what it means to have something that needs to be done. Vets have gained a sense of urgency and have seen the world through a big picture type mentality. If you ask them to do something they aren't going to complain because it is too tough, too hard or infringes on their break time. When you need someone who is willing to work the long hours, do the hard tasks and the seemingly impossible, remember that in the back of their heads is, "Well at least I'm not getting shot at." They have a strong respect for procedures and accountability. Service members know how policies and procedures enable an organization to be successful and they easily understand their place within an organizational framework. Vets get the obligation that comes with being responsible for the actions of subordinates and they understand how to properly alleviate issues through the proper supervisory channels.Considering that, you may wonder why veterans you have worked with in the past, didn't shape up like what was expected. A good thing to consider is that most hiring managers hire veterans with the wrong idea in mind. Usually, they are hiring lower to mid-level managers of whatever it is they are doing because that is the experience level that most veterans have. The problem is that these individuals often lack much of the tacit knowledge others gain through working their way up through the civilian side of the latter. You might be surprised at some of the things you would think are obvious that a veteran just won't think of at first. It's important to remember that most of their knowledge comes from the military, not civilian side of any industry, which has its own culture, regulations, implications, and priorities. That said, they solve problems in a completely different manner. They will do things completely differently than you have seen in your career. Often, this will be good because of the diversity it brings. Without an understanding of what is good in a civilian industry model, however, their techniques may be harmful. This is why, in the beginning, you should watch your veteran employees more to gear them for the new industry and be patient with these new mid-level employees making mistakes you wouldn't otherwise expect from more junior employees who have worked the civilian side for a while.That said, the important element of this combination is you giving them the instructions. If you don't provide the support they need to do the work, they will fail. If you don't make wise decisions and then ask them to do stupid things, they will fail. If you don't make it possible for them do their job right, they will fail. Given a good vet and good task, however, they will never fail you. That's why it is so important for managers to know that many military people need a great deal of structure in the beginning to survive in many organizations. They need to be trained well and given a solid framework with which to perform. Many hiring managers make the mistake of believing they will simply be able to hire a veteran and then that veteran will be a magic wand which can "get things done" absent any real training or supervision from the manager. This may happen, but just as likely that veteran employee might go off and drive your company or division into some random direction because you didn't adequately direct their energy with training or guidance. Their drive is a useful fuel for the engine of progress in any strong company, but could just as easily have them fixing thousands of problems that either aren't problems or don't need to be fixed right now. They might even cause new issues because the military teaches and encourages movement and drive. If you don't show them where they need to focus and what they need to do, then you have created a thermite mixture; a high energy burn that causes a big flash but usually breaks more than it builds.When given a proper framework and adequate training, your veteran employees can amaze you at how hard they can work and what they can get done. Once that framework is established, many veterans are extremely independent. The thing that so many people seem to think about vets is that they want to have the strict and regimented hierarchy. Think about it, there is a reason they left the military. Most, in my experience, are confident in their abilities and just want to be left alone or to get busy with their team without strong supervision. From that point have flexibility to work strongly in teams or work independently. Military training teaches service members to work as a team by instilling a sense of a responsibility to one's colleagues. In addition, the size and scope of military operations necessitates that service members understand how groups of all sizes relate to each other and support the overarching objective. While military duties stress teamwork and group productivity, they also build individuals who are able to perform independently at a very high level. As I mentioned before, military vets can be extremely independent. There have been numerous reports that show that military vets are more likely to start their own businesses than other demographic groups. They have natural drives to solve complex problems. They think tactically and strategically about problems. If you have given them the training and a framework to work within your organization they will be able to achieve your goals in ways you hadn't considered before. They are resourceful and know how to use what assets they are given rather than look outside for support. This is what makes them entrepreneurial by nature and can help grow your companies from the inside rather than just be another task follower.The Government Pays Them to get Educated, so You Don't Have to.Military vets come equipped with knowledge that isn't comparable to most others. The United States military boasts some of the most educated war fighters in the world, not to mention in the history of warfare. All US service members must have, at the time of their enlistment, a high school diploma or the general equivalency diploma. To be more clear, more than 99% of those enlisted have a high school education comparable to about 60% that you will find in the general population. Also compared to the population of the United States more service members have also attended some college compared to their typical 18 to 24-year-old counterparts. They have all also passed a standardized test on to test for skills in English proficiency, mathematics, science and government. This test also serves as a placement exam for military jobs. Curious about the rigorous qualifications required to be good enough to join the United States Military? United States Military Enlistment Standards. Good luck.To top this, most MOS schools or Military Occupational Specialty schools boast world-class educational training. First, you have to be good enough to get into the school you want, which can have very high scores required to get in. No, we don't have the greatest recreational facilities and the dorms suck. It isn't the Ivy League, but the education level is beyond par. While stationed in 29 Palms California, a hole in the middle of the California desert, I received two years worth of the most rigorous training in Computer Science, Data Network Administration and Information Systems maintenance. I say two-year except that I only had six months to do it. The training is taken very seriously. In 29 Palms I was 19-year-old PFC working on workstations and equipment with a cost of over half a million dollars, a task, by the way, I would be doing in the real world very soon anyway.In your typical civilians education, students are allowed to pass with virtually any grade so long as they beg enough. In the military, every test is a fail if scored under an 80%, and if you fail you can be booted from the program. This is because, in the civilian education world, a school which doesn't pass enough student's isn't viewed as exclusive, it is viewed as too hard. Students then refuse to attend, dropping tuition payments and the courses must be reevaluated to encourage more revenue. In the military, standards aren't questioned. The service member fails and gets to demoted to a job set he can handle.Add to this, military veterans are virtually the only class of citizens which earns a full ride scholarship to most any higher education they wish. While this is overlooked today, with a society where fresh college graduates are severely overpopulated and under educated, in the future labor will be a much more scarce commodity. Add to this, you have a person who already comes equipped with all the other training they've already endured. Lastly, if you have in your employ a trusted veteran who has not yet used his GI Bill, you have an amazing asset. You, as the employer, can encourage that employee to get their education and work for you during that time. Given a few years, you will have a marvelous manager with years experience and ready to take the reigns you've prepared for them. The best part of this arrangement is that you don't have to pay for this. Many companies offer this as an incentive to join and in the future it will become a more common benefit. You, however, get to save that carrot for a Master's degree.Useful DiversityMany companies hire a large portion of their staff where diversity is the prime differentiator. The theory is that diversity gives a company a large base of ideas with which to draw from for problem solving. This is thought of, normally, as racial or ethnic diversity, but can be applied to different backgrounds and even sub-cultures as well. This form of diversity is important, especially when the discussion of civil rights is a matter at hand. That said, in and of itself, ethnicity should not be considered a quality companies should hire for if the goal is to hire for diversity. What types of diversity are necessary for company success and evolution are those which make an individual useful while being very different from everyone else in the organization. Race and ethnicity, all else equal, rarely does this.There are not ethnicities that provide true, useful diversities any culture, but there are cultures that add unique and predictable experiences that can help companies prosper. These cultures have their quirks, eccentricities, values, specialties, and perspectives which can guide teams in new directions and solve unique problems. For that reason, the real question isn’t if you are finding a HR perfect, color coordinated team page, but if you have a team with real depth based on a broad range of experiences. The better question might be for hiring managers, "Which cultures out there might add value, because they just care a lot about getting things done?" The point of diversity is not just to get different people working together, but also to get many different experience sets working together.Think of it this way. If you build your diversity around different countries of origin, but everyone in the company has an almost identical skillsets, which were gained through almost identical means, how have you actually diversified your experience base? Say you are fortunate enough to have the ability to hire a team of Harvard graduates. Harvard is arguably the best university in the world in most many important fields. It is extremely exclusive and extremely competitive. For that reason, one would assume that success would come from a group such as this. Likely, it will, but the question is, will be it the greatest success? Consider adding in a few people from Stanford. Now you have two cultures of success with with two very different education systems. Different solutions are going to come from these two groups, one all of Harvard and one of a mixed class. Now consider how very different would the solutions formed from a group mixed in with a few graduates of the United States Naval Academy, or even one of self made entrepreneurial millionaires? How vastly different would the solutions to various problems be if such an amalgamation were to exist? The truth of the matter is that sometimes the Harvard group will sometimes create the best solution. Still, many other times, they will miss many things were would have been extremely obvious to everyone else, in spite of their individual and collective brilliance. For that reason, most of the time the greatest solution will come from the highly diversified group. They still have access to all their personal thought processes and their successful cultural quirk, but also now have access to another, the solutions that only become visible when multiple viewpoints are combined. This is a strategic asset and which can't be replicated easily which means that the culture you build will differentiate you from other firms like you.Few people can add as much constructive diversity as a military veteran. Few cultures have been engineered quite like those that military veterans have had memberships within. There are even fewer cultures that focus entirely on mission achievement, cooperation, and personal development. The fact is there is no culture in the world that shapes people in the way the military does. It changes people into something that civilians don't really understand. What is more important is that it gives them options, mentalities, philosophies and a framework that sees opportunities and solves problems that will pass up most civilians. Even more important is that the thoughts going through their minds are centered around finding the problem and fixing it in the fastest and most efficient ways possible.So to achieve useful diversity, it isn't to focus on just bringing in different people, but people who have had experience successful cultures, cultures that somehow add value and are different than the culture already present an organization. That isn't to say that the military is the only good and achieving culture in the world. It is just another one. What you want, to be clear, is an environment where there is a constant collision of successful problem solving systems in which only unique and inventive ideas can be generated. I know that this last section is more a concept of general business theory and not so centric on the military's contribution to hiring a veteran. Well, I did graduated Cum Laude from business school and now run my own publishing firm, so I hope you take the advice regardless.Having said this, when you start to try to diversify you team for success, you're going to need a team which is capable of working with diversity. It isn't built in. I will ask you a series of questions that might make it more clear why I would suggest a few military members be incorporated into such a team. What type of people have experience with extremely diverse teams? What type of group regularly asks its members to uproot and join new units and new teams? What is a group made of people from many different ethnic groups, income brackets, religious backgrounds and still manages to achieve world class results? What type of group regularly takes part in international activities with different cultures in which the fate of the mission revolves around team work? What type of group gives its members a huge amount of international travel and experience living abroad? It's obvious the point I am making here. The military systematically builds individuals with experience that, later on as an unintended benefit, are built to join new groups of highly diverse individuals. More than that, the military is a culture which focuses on achievement, so by adding their processes to your own, you incorporate individuals who are already highly achieved in the arts of teamwork.Adaptability and Global ThinkersI remember when I was a young Marine I thought my only job would be to work on computers. I signed on to be a 0656, Tactical Data Network Specialist, which meant I did the same job of an IT support or network administrator, only I did it in a godforsaken desert or jungle environment with absolutely zero internal or external logistical support and with the possibility that my entire relay could be blown up on any given day. Most people don't even realize the Marines have a computer nerd job specialty, but we do. It's actually quite sophisticated and since my day has evolved to become part of the US' strategy for offensive and defensive cyber operations. By the time I was 19, I was able to do what most people spend years in technical school attempting to be qualified for. It wasn't my only job, though. After my first Iraq tour, the unit had to immediately begin getting ready for the next one. That meant training and most importantly, marksmanship training. One of the slots for coaches fell on my shop and being that all the other computer nerds were horrible shots, I was the only natural choice. So I tacked on an additional occupational specialty. Eventually I would also have under my belt proficiency with a number of weapons systems, not to mention the ability also be communicating in Arabic. All this to say, for all the jokes one has heard about the oxymoron of "military intelligence", the military, and not just myself, are forced to be adaptable to compensate for overwhelming shortcomings in the reality of resources.Consider the veteran's history of technological understanding and consider what it means about their ability to mold themselves to changing technological environments, such as your company may face. Today's military uses the cutting edge technology to maintain our dominance over the enemy in the battlefield. From communications technology to the security of computer networks and hardware, Service Members must stay aware of emerging technologies in the public and private sector. This means that the individual service member is always training and adapting their methodology to stay ahead and insure the greatest level of technological superiority of any fighting force. Add in to this the fact that their main job may not be their only job. The Squadron's First Sergeant may also be the Communications Chief. The training NCO may also be a heavy equipment operator. The A-gunner may also be the one trained in triage medicine. They aren't just adaptable because it looks good on a resume; in the military it is a necessity.Besides needing to adapt to changing technology, they also must adapt to changing teams. Diversity and strong interpersonal skills are another given. That doesn't necessarily mean that a Service member is a pleasant person to be around, but they have interpersonal skills that allow them to work with new and constantly evolving teams. They have learned to work side by side with individuals regardless of race, gender, religion, ethnic, and cultural backgrounds, economic status, and geographic origins as well as those of different mental, physical and attitudinal capabilities. Consider also, that none of us have every had the privilege of choosing who we work for, who we work with, or even who gets assigned to us. Imagine how successful your teams would be if you couldn't even control who you hired. Hired? It's almost impossible to get someone fired from the military, so imagine now your company without these to abilities. Now consider what kind of leadership makes it possible. Many Service members may also have also been deployed or stationed in numerous foreign countries that give them a greater appreciation for the diverse nature of our globalized economy. Many of those, like myself, had to also deal directly those in the foreign nations we worked. You really can't find that sort of malleability in many places.The hands on experience with technology and experiences with extreme diversity combine to give military vets one additional advantage that comes with the collision of these two experiences: A Global Mindset. Few people are knowledgeable of more than one realm of what makes the world tick. Fewer still, have first hand experience with these divergent metrics. Those who do have a unique grasp of geopolitics to the point that they can much more accurately see where the roads lead in their given focus, or at least have developed an eye for it. They look forward much more than those who look at the now. They have practice seeing how technology and culture interact because they have lived it. They care about what is going on in the world because they have been part of writing the history books. I'm not saying that your average Marine could predict how a new innovation in heat exchangers might fundamentally alter the social fabric of South East Asia. What I am saying is that if your business needs someone who is capable of learning a great deal about changing technologies or working internationally, or someone who has spent time thinking about the future of these realms, a military veteran might be a good choice for you to start your search.Esprit de Corps; a culture built for mission accomplishment.There is a French term that most Americans have never heard of. It’s called Esprit de Corps. Literally translated, it means, “the spirit of the group”. What it means is that there is a feeling in the culture of any collection of individuals that is affected by each one and that each is responsible for maintaining. Everyone in the organization comes into it each knowing the high expectations, history, heroes, and legends of the group. Each wishes to uphold the group’s traditions and each wishes not damage the reputation or morale of such an organization. They are motivated by one another and try harder not to let other members of the group down. When a culture such as this exists it’s expected average level of performance is above the normal for others like it. The normal is inferior and, when everyone is on board, you have an outstanding organization. You have a place where others will sacrifice their own time and resources to raise others. Esprit de Corps is the force that drives culture.The Marines have a saying. The Marine Corps is a perfect organization made up of imperfect people. That is the level of respect each individual Marine has for their organization and when you have that level of fanaticism, you start to see each of them drive each other that much harder. If you're that hiring manager, probably work for an imperfect organization and you surely know some imperfect people that work their. Vets aren't perfect, by any means. I’m not saying they are, but they have experienced powerful cultures. Culture is what drives a company, far more so than leaders. Leaders will fail. They will grow and leave. They will become sick. They will make mistakes. They will die. Culture will never stop working for you. That is, it will never stop working for you, or working against you. What you need to do is get people who have experienced a strong working culture, maybe even a few who can lead that culture and get it spread around. It's only when a team, or even a whole company works to the point that the individuals work for reasons other than themselves, for more than themselves, that you see explosive growth. More than that, it's how you ensure long-term organizational success, regardless of leadership, regardless of temporary slumps in the economy, regardless of any storms which the company endures.In summary, vets are a special breed. They have all the mentalities that good companies want. Tenacity, intuition, reliability, capability, responsibility, leadership and are part of a culture built on getting the job done. They are smart and they are serious. Seriously, why are all of our vets having such a hard time finding jobs? Perhaps it’s you.The truth is, and this is why I write so much about fellow vets, many of us are having a hard time. Many civilians don't understand us. People who have served are an enigma for many. They exist in contrast to many American values; an individualist society which champions personal expression, civil liberties, and personal financial, career, and political achievement, but that is built upon the presence of a class of warriors who, themselves enjoy little privilege to express themselves, have forgone many liberties, and have delayed their opportunities for the forms of achievement which society celebrates. In its extreme, we are society which cherishes our freedoms, luxuries, and security, but require, from time-to-time, volunteers who willingly sacrifice themselves in the greatest way imaginable. It's a contradiction that I don't think many have truly explored.What's more, the sheer presence of a veteran is becoming a rarer and rarer thing. Consider many years ago when our parents would tell stories about their fathers who fought in WWII in the Pacific, or their grandfather who battled in Europe. Those were truly different times. According the United States Census Bureau, the number of U.S. armed forces personnel who served in World War II between Dec. 1, 1941, and Dec. 31, 1946 was around 16 million people. For the period since 9/11, the number of US Service members is around 10 million with around 2.5 million actually having served either in Iraq or Afghanistan. These statistics sound comparable until you think about the fact that the War on Terror has gone on for more than twice, nearly three times as long as World War II for the Americans. The 1940 US census calculated a total population of 132,164,569 citizens. Today that number is estimated to be more than 312,000,000. That means that the odds of you running into, or even being a veteran in 1945 was around 12%. Nearly 1 in every 8 people was a veteran. Given also that at that time the entire population was also directed toward the war effort, it's reasonable to say that there was no one without an understanding of the military and a passion for caring for the returning war fighter. Today, however, the story is different. Considering all living veterans today, of any period, you will find a veteran population of about 22 million, that's roughly 7% of the total population of the United States and only 3% having served since 9/11. You also don't see a culture that is wired around service towards ending the war effort. Few work for the defense industry or toward any activity that has a real involvement in the wars. War bonds also aren't a thing. No one ever planted victory gardens in hopes of bringing home the troops. No one is recycling bacon grease or rationing gasoline in hopes that it will help us fight the terrorists. Realistically, nothing has changed much for the average American that one could really say relates to military activities. In truth it's an afterthought or a political stance. Many citizens have opinions, but few have ownership. The truth of the matter, people who have any active role, veterans in particular, are getting rarer and rarer. One the one hand, it's a sign of a peaceful society with few actual problems. One the other hand, its the pattern of a culture that has lost touch with the warrior subculture which shoulders the burden of American security without experiencing many of the rewards of it. This is a pattern which will continue in the future. By 2050, expect that the entire US veteran community will be less than 3% of the total population. Imagine, if you will, what this will mean for veteran benefits in the ballot boxes of the future when they are an even smaller minority of the voting population than they are today.Frankly, people don't associate with veterans that often. It isn't often an intentional discrimination. It's just much rare to find one than you think, as I have shown. Their rarity today is something of a novelty, owing a degree of admiration, a great deal of curiosity, often suspicion and fear, a few times disdain, but otherwise ignored because they are so severely misunderstood. This misunderstanding, in my opinion, comes from that break where no one really knows veterans. When people don't really have any first hand experience with a veteran they fall back on stereotypes. There are many stereotypes which define us. Many of these I focused on because they are positive and help further the image of the United States warrior who has left the service. The truth is, no one perfectly captures all positive qualities of military service, but for the most part, there are so many good qualities which have been imbued into the character of a veteran of the United States. Many, if not most of qualities we have in common, are fundamental assets to employers. The pledge to support veterans is so strong that, for more than a decade thousands of companies have joined in numerous campaigns to hire veterans.Yet you still aren't hiring us. I wrote this post, if not just to show those individuals with hiring capacity some of the benefits that come attached to hiring veterans, but to address the fact that, in spite of so many companies' very public advertising toward campaigns supporting returning troops, vets aren't being hired.Since the slump in 2009 and the massive unemployment that followed, veterans have led in unemployment for reasons I can only guess. I assume much of it is based on unfair biases I have faced since getting out myself. I've often heard things like, "You're so articulate for veteran" or "I don't know, I just sort of expected you be, like, crazy hard core or something." Many people asked if I had been shot at, or even killed someone. I've also been asked in interviews if I had ever been in combat, which I don't know someone at Chase's local bank branch would need to know for a standard sales position, and some have even asked if I have ever had an actual job before. I'm not sure what an actual job constitutes for most people many of the people I interviewed for after college. I guess my experiences running a telecommunications service team of 11 technicians and responsible for more than $3 million dollars in gear and equipment for what amounted to a four hundred person company didn't count as an actual job. In college I even had to correct a professor who threw out the old joke when asked what an oxymoron was. She replied, "Military Intelligence" to the laughter of a roomful of 19 year olds still living in their childhood homes. To say "corrected" is probably not the appropriate term, but everyone in the room knew better than to make such an unfair generalization again.“Ma’am, are you aware of what it takes to re-calculate the trajectory of an object traveling at 3,110 ft/s for a three inch change in elevation at 5 times the length of a standard football field when factoring in for wind speed and direction as well as differences in elevation?” (Marine recruits do in week six of their basic training.)Perhaps people do view that, because one forgoes college as a means to seek higher education, they are uneducated, or lack higher order cognitive processes. Perhaps media portrayal in movies, video games, and TV has simply just watered us down to two conflicting views as either a brave knight running off to do justice and make sacrifice, or of the radical bloodthirsty and murderous barbarian, too stupid to know when they are being used, both of which are completely unfit for the corporate world. Perhaps, as USA today back April of last year, followed by Forbes, have reported, there is more going on.Many, apparently as many as one in three, employers consider the possibility of post-traumatic stress disorder to be an impediment to hiring a veteran, according to a survey report by the Society for Human Resource Management. Since it is illegal to ask about mental health status during an interview many just take the safe route and assume there is a problem. Considering that as low as 7% of post-9/11 veterans are estimated to be experiencing PTSD it's a far cry from a necessary precaution. I've read that some of the reasons for this fear are that there is a fear of safety, owing to the fear that a veteran with PTSD might "go postal" and commit an office shooting or other acts of violence. I'm just going to be honest, this is as ignorant as not hiring a black guy because he was probably in a gang.“There’s stigma attached to PTSD and traumatic brain injury and other hidden disabilities that people may assume soldiers have when they’re leaving the military,” says Nancy B. Adams, branch chief at the U.S. Army Warrior Transition Command. “They may always have that at the back of their mind.”Others consider that in the military, everyone is conditioned to follow orders and lack the ability to think for themselves. I hope I've shown this to be a major fallacy as service people are regularly given complex problems with limited resources where their creative thinking and ability to solve unusual problems are showcased. Sadly, the effectiveness of a Marine Corps logistics chief saving her squadron more than three million dollars over the course of a fiscal year, rarely makes the local news real when much more sensationalized media is available.Lastly, there is the fact that you probably have no idea what a tactical data network specialist is or the qualifications and capabilities of Platoon Sergeant. What is the difference between a Major and Chief Petty Officer? Are they the same? Does it matter? What's a DD-214? It's all foreign jargon and no one knows what any of this nonsense means. There are even classes that transitioning veterans must take to communicate their value to hiring managers who don't know how to read the résumé. I don't really blame civilians for this. It isn't really anyone's fault, but just owes to the fact that there are realistically so very few veterans out there, relative to the number of people who know anything about them. That said, the best way to solve this problem might not be for you to learn what all the military lingo is. Perhaps the best thing to do is ask someone on your staff with military experience to decode it and see what kind of diamond lies beneath the rough of a sheet of paper which will determine their fate. Don't have any veterans on staff to help you out with this? Oh... Well thank you for your service. You should probably think about this Veterans Day.So the next time Veterans Day rolls around, I hope you don't just give the ceremonial greeting, "Thank you for your service." Do something for them that they can't do for themselves. Give a résumé or application that runs over your desk a second look, or a third. There is nothing sadder in the world we live in today than seeing someone who gave up four years of their lives of their life for the reward of a handshake and a pat on the back by people who don't honestly respect them enough to want to work with them.Don't worry about me. I'm proud to say that after many employment struggles trying to get noticed after college, I am happily employed doing something I love where I can feel my experience is valued and crucial to the work I am doing. In my spare time, I am fortunate enough to get also get to write and share my experiences and assistance for other veterans for free thanks to patronage from the crowdsourcing platform Patreon. It let's followers and supporters donate to on a recurring basis so that I can continue helping get the good word out about veterans. If you did enjoy this post, please consider pledging your support through the link I've provided at the bottom of this post. If you don't want to go that far, please like, share and comment to get the word out about ways you can help veterans on this Veterans Day.The last section I was going to write about in this series was "Triumph over adversity." I'm not going to write that section though. We all know that the military is made of winners. They haven't lost a battle since Korea. Wars may be lost if the politics are incorrectly managed, but that failure isn't owed to those who fought them. We all know that the military produces people who are capable of overcoming adversity, but once they get out, they are alone. Their adversity is now and the military doesn't prepare them for a society that doesn't understand them, nor value their abilities. They are without the collective network of support one receives in the military. Now they are in the realm where they are judged based, not on their actions, but on current politics and media perception. Frankly, they don't need your thanks. They need your support. They need your connections. They need to be introduced into your networks. They need to be invited to the opportunities extended to others. They need you to give them a job.Thanks for reading!For more answers like this check out The Veteran Perspective by Jon Davis and follow my blog War Elephant for more new content. Everything I write is completely independent research and is supported by fan and follower pledges. Please consider showing your support directly by visiting my Patreon support page here: Jon Davis on Patreon: Help support in writing Military Novels, Articles, and Essays.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW …“Police Ethics encompass a broad range of behavior from interpersonal relations to outright criminal activity” (Hyams, 1990, pp. 40-41). As such, it is intertwined in the definition of corruption. This section will attempt to focus on philosophical aspects, while following sections discuss the specifics and ramifications of unethical acts.Kleinig (1990) stated, "Police ethics is characterized by a particular focus rather than a particular set of values" (p. 3). In other words, the situational context within law enforcement may differ, but the underlying philosophy, or decision-making process, cannot vary from the culture represented. He further cites John Stewart Mill's description of an ethical decision maker as using his senses and mental abilities to first collect the information necessary, then to make the decision, and further to stay the course once the decision is made.Spader (1994) paraphrased Plato: "All major legal issues are simultaneously ethical issues" (p. 100), and "justice" is "the act of giving each person his 'due'" (p. 83). Spader also stated, "[W]hether the ends justify the means is central to due process" (p. 83). This leads to the so-called “dirty hands” dilemma.That is, on some occasions a public official may find that the only way he can do his job successfully, meet his official obligations, is to do something that, from the perspective of private life, would be morally unacceptable. (French, 1983/1992, pp. 243-244)French (1983/1992) differentiates public obligations from private obligations by identifying the primary objective. Public obligations emphasize “the accomplishment of certain recognized ends, whereas ... private-sector obligations concern the way things are done and what particular things are done, and less with outcomes” (p. 251).Kleinig (1996) pointed out that this dilemma was discussed early on, from ancient Greek tragedies to The Prince, and includes Sartre more recently. Plato wrote, “[W]e must discover who are best guardians ..., that they must do whatever they think at any time best for the city” (1935/1992, p. 93). Modern advocates of this point of view still believe thatanyone who would act up to a perfect standard of goodness in everything, must be ruined among so many who are not good. It is essential, therefore, for a Prince who desires to maintain his position, to have learned how to be other than good, and to use or not use his goodness as necessity requires. (Machiavelli, 1910, p. 53)A social and ethical phenomenon described by Pollock (1994) is the glorification of "strong" criminals vs. ridicule of "weak" moralists (e.g., public acclaim for Bonnie and Clyde), the antithesis of morality. Popular culture seems to project a similar justification for police who exceed their authority in pursuit of justice, as portrayed by the “Dirty Harry” character and many of a similar nature.A scenario from a Dirty Harry screenplay has Harry forcibly extracting the location of a kidnap victim from the perpetrator by shooting him in the leg, only to have the case dropped when his tactics are exposed in court (Delattre, 1994; Kleinig, 1996). Barker (1996) highlighted this mixed message when he wrote that “’Dirty Harry’ may be a character we applaud on the screen, but” (p. 51) “[w]e, as a free society, will not tolerate a law enforcement agency staffed by Dirty Harry’s, who use illegal and unethical means to accomplish what they perceive as legitimate ends” (p. 12).Delattre (1994) indicated that “[e]nds do justify the means up to a point, and in certain ways, depending on what you mean, but not simply or unqualifiedly” (p. 193). Every person is significant and worthy, “even if that person appears without merit” (p. 193). Once prohibitions against cruel treatment are broached without recourse, even in the area of rights for innocent victims versus perpetrators, the implications are poor for all civil liberties.However, Delattre (1994) also added “that illegal conduct in a specific case may or may not be excusable—and I believe that it could be—depending on the particulars, and even the minute details, of the case” (p. 212-213).In The Ethics of Policing, Kleinig (1996), a recognized police ethics scholar, discussed the dirty hands concept at length. Two primary issues were raised by this concept. First, was the consideration that two alternative courses of action are in fact wrong. He argued that it would not be morally wrong to adhere to the law and therefore not seek a desirable outcome. And, secondly, if it is true that both actions are wrong, what should be done about the person who made a decision under those circumstances?Kleinig (1996) wrote that Machiavelli advocated resignation or punishment for officials caught in such a situation. Kleinig stated that he has sought not to accept the premise of the necessity to commit a crime to thwart a crime, while acknowledging that it is accepted by others. But he still raised the issue of the public being placed in the position of punishing a person who performed a service that could be identified with the preservation of social order, thereby raising the dirty hands question for those who would inflict the punishment.Skolnick and Leo (1992) pointed out that "the acceptability of deception seems to vary inversely with the level of the criminal process" (p. 3). It is legally acceptable to lie during the course of an investigation. Undercover investigations and "sting" operations are almost routine. Courts have upheld the authority of police to lie during interrogations under most circumstances. However, deception is supposed to stop when testimony is called for.Whether it does or not is questionable, for example, when investigations encompass the use of what is sometimes referred to as a "wall" between a confidential covert investigation and the parallel construction of a prosecutable case that has been creatively disengaged from the original source of information.In further exemplification, a confidential informant in a position to be of long-term use reports that he/she will be receiving money identifiable as narcotics proceeds. The investigation for record purposes, and future testimony, begins once the delivery has been made, without further reference to that event.Investigation from that point will focus on the person that made the delivery and subsequent activities and contacts, totally excluding the informant’s participation. The tainted money will be passed on within the criminal organization. This deception will help to ensure the safety of the informant and facilitate the detection of future crimes. However, it will also allow criminals to profit, even if only in the interest of potential neutralization of the organization in the future.In 1992, Skolnick and Leo warned that authorized deception "tends to encourage further deceit, undermining the general norm" (p. 10). Kleinig (1996) identified four negative aspects and consequences of lying: (a) it violates expectations of truthfulness in interpersonal relations; (b) it subverts the natural purpose of language; (c) it negates the concept of humans as worthy of dignity and respect by denying them an accurate reflection of reality; and, (d) it does not meet ethical requirements of universalizability.Universalizability has to do with the “fundamental requirement of morality, as the activity of a rational being, that we act only on maxims that we could, without ‘contradiction,’ will to be universal laws” (Kleinig, 1996, p. 125). It would be impossible to rely on untruth as a universal law. In consequence, “Not only does the liar violate another’s being, but also his own” (p. 126). …Fishman (1994) presented an analysis of two celebrated cases of police corruption involving Robert "Prince of the City" Leuci and Frank Serpico, which differed from the interpretation of the acts of these men by Pollock (1994). Pollock equates the two and failed to note, as Fishman did, that Leuci was a pragmatist. He was caught "red handed" and acted in his own self interest when he cooperated with a corruption investigation (Fishman, 1994).Serpico was apparently honest in his personal acts but prudently silent about the corruption swirling around him until it reached a level he found to be overly destructive. He had at first known that it was unlikely that he could change the system, so he worked within it, thereby remaining employed.When a parolee convicted of killing a police officer was released on a subsequent charge due to graft, he was overcome by what can be characterized as a violation of natural law and became the first New York City officer to testify against his own on corruption charges. "In short, Serpico practiced prudential realism because his fight against lawlessness was based on moral ideals, but he did not ignore material circumstances" (Fishman, 1994, p. 201). …Chief G. S. Kniffen (1996) cited a lack of ethics as a cause for numerous problems in law enforcement within recent years, from Rodney King, to O. J. Simpson, to the federal shoot-out in Idaho. Kniffen laid these problems at the feet of leadership, and more specifically a lack of ethical leadership. He quoted the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) Law Enforcement Code of Ethics from 1957, and decried a lack of compliance. He also cast aspersions on suggestions that it be "updated to reflect the changes in this postindustrial age" (p. 9). However, there has been a change. In 1992, the IACP added a line to the code addressing cooperation in internal investigations (Pollock, 1994)(see Appendix C).Barker’s (1996) Police Ethics: Crisis in Law Enforcement examined the four questions:(1) Is law enforcement a profession? (2) Can law enforcement officers be professional? (3) What forms of behavior are the major law enforcement ethical violations? and (4) Can we control police ethical violations? (Barker, 1996, p. v)Barker (1996) addressed each of these questions as they relate to and are exemplified by the IACP’s Law Enforcement Code of Ethics. He concluded that law enforcement falls short of professional standards on several counts. It is deficient on admission standards based upon educational achievement, and also with regard to standardized certification and decertification.Both Delattre (1994) and Kleinig (1996) agree with this assessment. Failure to reach professional status has at least in part been attributed to internal organized bargaining pressures. Representatives of organized bargaining entities have displayed interest in preserving the status quo in the interest of their membership, who may be negatively affected by increased requirements (Barker, 1996).Inasmuch as the term “professional” refers to behavior, Barker (1996) is convinced that officers can be professional. Common forms of corruption (addressed in following sections of this chapter) can be controlled, according to Barker, through reducing opportunity, eliminating peer support for unethical behavior, and increasing the likelihood of punishment for such behavior.Delattre (1994) stated that codes of ethics may be useful, but they “do not motivate people to behave well. They assist only people who want to do so” (p. 33). If an organization’s leaders do not take seriously failure to live up to the codes, they “will be treated as worthless platitudes” (p. 33). Sherman (1991) stated that "[s]uch codes provide useful frameworks ... but are usually too general to provide guidance" within the "complex circumstances" of law enforcement (p. 10).According to Pollock-Byrne (1989), calls for codes of ethics may be missing the point, and the codes themselves may be counter-productive. "Since they are so far removed from reality, they are worse than ignored since they in fact encourage officers to believe there are no relevant ethical guides to behavior" (p. 96).Felkenes (1984) conducted a study in several police agencies to determine how officers view professional ethics outlined in the Law Enforcement Code of Ethics and the Canons of Police Ethics. The results indicated that a majority of the respondents clearly understood the requirements for honesty and self-restraint under provocation, although more than 20% were unclear about “obligations to colleagues, the profession of law enforcement, other officials, and criminal subjects” (p. 215).About 60% of the respondents were neutral, unclear, or very unclear about “[o]bligations in relation to confidentiality, enforcement of the law without fear, and engaging in appropriate private conduct” (Felkenes, 1984, p. 215). Thirty-eight percent responded “that it was not wrong to accept small gifts from the public” (p. 215), in spite of explicit identification of this behavior as unethical in the Code.Twenty-nine percent agreed that “[l]aw enforcement’s professional ethics serve primarily as a pledge rather than as a guide to action” (Felkenes, 1984, p. 215). And 97% of the respondents indicated that they rely on personal ethical beliefs in professional matters.Another attempt at developing ethical law enforcement personnel, with similar inherent problems, involves specific written organizational policy. Murphy and Caplan (1989) state that policy manuals normally contain "provisions so unrealistic that no officer, however dedicated, can obey all of them all the time" (p. 317). They cite the all-pervasive specter of punishment induced by policy manuals as a cause for people to conceal unintentional and minor violations, which in turn creates the environment that could stimulate corruption. Pollock-Byrne (1989) stated that studies suggested "extensive rules seem to be present in inverse proportion to high ethical standards" (p. 96). …Another reason Kleinig (1990) believes that collegiate ethics training is necessary is the partisanship of academies brought on by "social isolation" and organizational identity (p. 7). Kleinig further stated that the fact that law enforcement recruits do not come morally prepared for the decisions they must make and argued for inclusion of ethics in basic training.In 1997, the IACP conducted the “most extensive ethics training survey ever conducted by law enforcement” (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1998, p. 2), with over 900 responses. Over 80% of the responding agencies reported providing ethics training for new officers, and over 70% provided some type of in-service ethics training. For more than 70% of these agencies, ethics training consisted of 4 hours or less in the classroom. Just over 50% of these agencies sought outside assistance in course design.“One major finding was that the amount of time devoted to ethics training did not appear to be consistent with how important the needs were, based on the responses” (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1998, p. 5). One of the survey questions requested participants to “provide us with any ‘working definition of ethics’ your organization uses” (p. 8). “[O]nly a handful [of respondents] provided any ‘working definition’” (p. 8).Recommendations of the IACP Committee on Police Image and Ethics arising from this study (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1998) included (a) adoption of a law enforcement oath; (b) job specific ethics training; (c) an enhanced curriculum and training style; and (d) insistence on recruit ethics training that incorporates ethics training by field training officers.As suggested at the beginning of this section, any discussion of ethics is simultaneously a discussion of corruption.Corruption DefinedThe definition of corruption may be limited by some to receipt of financial or other considerations in exchange for overlooking crime in some manner. Corruption can include "those activities regarded by society as illegitimate or seen by the power elite as contradictory to the logic of the system" (Jacek Tarkowski cited in Johnston, 1992, p. 160). Police corruption is an occupational crime within the institutions responsible for control of crime, and a form of "elite" deviance (Henderson & Simon, 1994).Punch (1985) provided a four-element definition of police corruption. With an added a fifth element, this definition guided the present study.I Straitforward Corruption: something is done or not done for some form of reward....II Predatory (Strategic) Corruption: the police stimulate crime, extort money and actively organize graft ...III Combative (Strategic) Corruption: 'flaking', 'padding', falsifying testimony, 'verbals', intimidating witnesses, buying and selling drugs, 'scoring' or 'burning' informants, and paying informants with illegally obtained drugs. ('Flaking' refers to 'planting' evidence on a suspect; 'padding' means to add to drugs or evidence to strengthen a case; 'verbals' is used in Britain to indicate where words attributed to a suspect are invented by a policeman to help incriminate him; 'scoring' concerns shakedowns where police take money, drugs or goods from suspects or prisoners, and 'burning' means revealing the identity of an informant). Most of these practices are involved in 'building a case' ... in which the major goal is to make arrests, obtain convictions, confiscate drugs, and get long sentences for criminals. It may involve accommodations with some criminals and certain informants but it is posited on using illicit means for organizationally and socially approved ends....IV Corruption as Perversion of Justice: lying under oath, intimidating witnesses, planting evidence on a suspect, etc.... It involves the perversion of justice largely in order to avoid the consequences of serious deviant behavior. (Punch, 1985, pp. 13-14)The fifth element is any abuse of power or authority—such as excessive force, theft while on duty, or other acts under color of law. The Knapp Commission (1974) (or the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and the City's Anti-Corruption Procedures, instituted in 1971) added other offenses to the list of corrupt practices, such as illegal wiretaps, financing of drug transactions, soliciting customers for drug traffickers, kidnapping witnesses, providing security for drug dealers, and offering to assist in murder of witnesses.The fifth element was added as a personal evaluation and in consideration of a dictionary definition of corruption that includes the following: "1. a changing or being changed for the worse; making, becoming, or being corrupt. 2. evil or wicked behavior; depravity" (Guralnik & Friend, 1968, p. 332). This definition is consistent with a statement by Jacek Tarkowski (cited in Johnston, 1992): "Also 'corrupt' are those activities regarded by society as illegitimate or seen by the power elite as contradictory to the logic of the system" (p. 160).The Mollen Commission (The Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and the Anti-Corruption Procedures of the New York City Police Department), formed in 1992, seems to support this expanded definition of corruption by stating that "twenty years ago police officers took bribes to accommodate criminals ... today's corrupt cop often is the criminal" (Commission to Investigate Allegations, 1993/1995, p. 31).This is also consistent with the assumption of the researcher that acts of criminal justice personnel leading to their own incarceration are an aberration from the state of their moral and ethical behavior at the commencement of their criminal justice career, in other words, a change for the worse.The Mollen Commission described brutality and corruption as being on a continuum, “with brutality against citizens serving as a sort of ‘rite of passage’ toward corruption” (cited in Human Rights Watch, 1998, p. 46). Commission interviews indicated that brutality was often the first deviant act, and when officers were not subjected to negative consequences as a result of this deviance, it became easier for them to progress to other abuses of authority.This seems consistent with self-reports of criminal involvement in a sample of the general population that “suggest a clear escalation in the seriousness of criminal behavior over time” (Elliott, 1994, p. 12). “[T]he behavioral repertoire was [found to be] accompanied by an increase in offending rates for all types of offenses” (p. 13).Public definitions of police brutality can include perceptions of verbal abuse, unnecessary stops for questioning, display of weapons, or physical contact short of levels that could cause physical harm (Klockars, 1996). Current legal definitions hinge upon the finding in Graham v. Connor [490 U.S. 386 (1989)].In accordance with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, “’[O]bjective reasonableness’ of a police officer’s use of force would be ‘judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight’” (cited in Klockars, 1996, p. 6). A single punch, or anything short of that, is not generally considered excessive.Worden (1996) differentiated between “excessive force” and “unnecessary force,” the former being more than reasonable force, and the later being where no force is reasonable. James Fyfe (1996) also subdivided excessive force.Extralegal violence—brutality—is “the willful and wrongful use of force by officers who knowingly exceed the bounds of their office.” Unnecessary force, by contrast, is the result of ineptitude or carelessness and “occurs when well-meaning officers prove incapable of dealing with the situations they encounter without needless or too hasty resort to force.” (Fyfe, 1996, p. 165)The IACP defines "excessive use of force" as "the application of an amount and/or frequency of force greater than what is required to compel compliance from a willing or unwilling subject" (Neubauer, 1999, p. 6). …Criminological TheoryIn the late 19th century, Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) (cited in Cohen & Machalek, 1994/1997) proposed “that crime is ‘normal’ behavior performed by normal individuals living in unexceptional social systems” (p. 113). Durkheim’s theory, in summary, consists of the contention that, since crime is known in all societies, it is therefore a fundamental element of societies.He [Durkheim] reasoned that a certain level of crime is both necessary and beneficial to society because (1) individual deviation from the social norm is a primary source of innovative social change; (2) increases in crime rates can warn or alert officials to damaging problems existing within social systems that give rise to such crimes; (3) crime enforcement helps to establish and to maintain behavioral boundaries within communities; and finally, (4) crime provokes punishment that in turn enhances solidarity within communities. (Cohen & Machalek, 1994/1997, p. 113)Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) were dismissive of the assertion that crime is “normal learned behavior” (p. xv). Cohen and Machalek (1994/1997) theorized that evolutionary and ecological explanations should be incorporated within Durkheim’s theory in order to make it viable. Ecology was incorporated in the form of availability of resources. …Criminological theories on crime causation supported by research include opportunity theories and rational choice theories. Opportunity theories generally state that three elements must coexist: (a) motivation, (b) an appropriate target, and (c) lack of deterrence. Rational choice theories assume a relatively constant level of criminal activity, with crime rates fluctuating due to increased or decreased opportunity (Cohen & Machalek, 1994/1997).Intrinsic to the perceptions of risks and rewards involved in rational choice theory is the thought that if one was a police officer, a lessened fear of the police might be assumed. In addition, the common presence of the code of silence, loyalty to other officers, and cynicism could be inferred to reinforce the perception of lessened risk.Conflict theory looks at crime as a "label produced by social values and political power" (Maxfield & Babbie, 1998, p. 40). Marxism is a macro level form of conflict theory. Conflict theory holds that prosecution is most likely when the violator lacks power and the public is aroused due to the nature of the violation (Henderson & Simon, 1994).Strain theory shares a similar outlook, in that it asserts that we are socialized to seek rewards (in effect positing of goals), and when the rewards are blocked strain is created that can be relieved by law breaking (Henderson & Simon, 1994). Burton et al. (1994/1997) conducted an empirical assessment of strain theory on three levels: strain created by the difference between aspirations and expectations, blocked opportunity, and relative deprivation.Burton et al. (1994/1997) found that only blocked opportunity and relative deprivation have a significant effect on adult deviance, with relative deprivation having the greatest correlation. However, they also measured self-control as a variable and found that it had a greater effect than any other variable. …Self-Control TheorySelf-control, an ability to control one’s emotions, desires, and actions (Guralnik & Friend, 1968), is considered an enduring individual difference, a personality trait that remains relatively consistent throughout life (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990). Nagin and Paternoster (1993/1997) identify six elements of self-control: impulsiveness, desire for simple tasks, preference for risk, preference for physical activity, self-centeredness (selfism), and temper. Those “who lack self-control will tend to be impulsive, insensitive, physical (as opposed to mental), risk-taking, short-sighted, and nonverbal” (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990, p. 90).In 1990, Gottfredson and Hirschi published A General Theory of Crime, in which they suggested that crime results from the sum of opportunity and low self-control, and stated that “people ... differ in the extent to which they are vulnerable to the temptations of the moment” (p. 87). The theory assumed that parental monitoring of childhood behavior, recognizing deviance, and consistently and appropriately punishing such deviance within a child’s first 8 years establishes self-control that leads to socially appropriate responses throughout life. Failure in this area leads to low self-control.Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) intended for their theory “to explain all crime, at all times, and, for that matter, many forms of behavior that are not sanctioned by the state” (p. 117), to include juvenile delinquency, sex-based differences, cross-culture comparisons, street crime, and occupational crime. A later publication elaborates upon the above statement:Our theory does not claim that self-control (or self-control and opportunity) is the only cause of crime. On the contrary, we explicitly mention important causes of crime that self-control cannot explain (e.g., age). To invoke an analogy we have used before ... : Trees and tides have gravity in common but more than gravity is required to account for their peculiar features. To admit this in no way limits the generality of the theory of gravity. (Hirschi & Gottfredson, 1993, p. 50) …Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990) theory posited that opportunity and self-control standing alone have little meaning, and that "[f]raud and force occur primarily when individuals with low self-control encounter opportunities to engage in fraud or force," according to Grasmick, Tittle, Bursik, and Arneklev (1993/1997, p. 180). Grasmick et al. cited and concurred with Gottfredson and Hirschi’s claim that "low self-control is a personality trait established early in life, which remains relatively stable over the life course" (p. 188), which was also accepted by and Nagin and Paternoster (1993/1997). …Gottfredson and Hirschi have credited individual motivation with too much influence, according to Henderson and Simon (1994). Henderson and Simon also took exception to the contention fostered by Gottfredson and Hirschi that white-collar criminals (to include corrupt police) share the same primary causative factor (i.e., self-interest) as other criminals. One particular factor noted is that recognizing that they hold jobs makes them less likely to commit crimes, which seems somewhat spurious in light of the known existence of criminal justice corruption.Hirschi and Gottfredson (1993) addressed this area of criticism, as exemplified by Henderson and Simon above.In the context of discussion of white collar crime, we have argued that position in the occupational structure is in part caused by self-control. Thus white-collar workers should on the whole have higher levels of self-control than those outside the labor force. White-collar offenders should therefore have higher levels of self-control on the average than offenders among the unemployed. It seems obvious to us that their criminal records should therefore show fewer offenses and “offense types,” a result that white-collar researchers … take to be actually contrary to our theory! Our theory is also said to be called into question by the finding that white-collar offenders start “later … in life than common offenders”.... In fact, a decade ago we pointed out that the connection between frequency and age of onset is a statistical necessity. (Hirschi & Gottfredson, 1993, pp. 53-54) …Corruption TheoryCorruption has been conceptualized as having been based upon either affinity or affiliation. Affinity represents the predisposition of individuals to commit crime that exists prior to their being hired as police officers. Affiliation refers to the subjecting "of the honest police recruit ... [to] a dishonest police subculture" (Sherman, 1974, p. 192).A more common label for affinity has been the “rotten apple” theory, wherein the rotten apple taints the barrel of apples. Conversely, the affiliation theory is commonly referred to as the “rotten barrel” theory. The barrel is responsible for making the apples rot.The affinity/affiliation question points out the different levels of inquiry and theorization. Macro level examination focuses upon entire societies. Middle level, or intermediate, inquiry focuses upon organizations, and micro level involves individuals (Sherman, 1974). One example of macro-level impact is described as follows:Richardson put the police graft system in its proper perspective: the political and ethnic conflicts of a fast-growing pluralist society. On the ethnic level New York was a classic case of culture conflict, where the puritan morality of the original settlers was intolerable to the new immigrants. Laws prohibiting liquor sales, gambling, and prostitution were focal points for this conflict.Seen from the functionalist perspective, corruption was a means of easing the conflict and satisfying both sides. Politicians won the support of Yankee groups with rhetoric against vice, while maintaining immigrant support by giving the police a free hand to permit vice—in exchange for a price. But the police hand was so free that graft grew to be intolerable, although the Lexow commission [of 1894] was the first indication ... of how large it really was. After Lexow, police graft became more sophisticated and centralized, surviving investigations right up to the present. (Sherman, 1974a, p. 45)In 2000, Klockars, Ivkovich, Harver, and Hagerfeld published research based upon an organizational theory of police corruption “which emphasizes the importance of organizational and occupational culture” (p. 1). They presented officers from 30 different departments with 11 hypothetical situations and asked them to rate the levels of seriousness, whether they would report these incidents, and their support for punishment for each situation. In the more serious scenarios (e.g., stealing from a crime scene, bribery, or excessive force), most officers indicated that they would report violations by a fellow officer. However, “substantial differences in the environment of integrity” (p. 2) were observed among the different departments.In comparing one high-scoring department (all scenarios were considered to be more serious violations relative to other agencies) to one low scoring department, it was found that the high-scoring department’s officers expected more severe discipline and would be much more likely to report violations by fellow officers. These characteristics of a department’s officers are said to provide a description of a department’s “culture that encourage its employees to resist or tolerate certain types of misconduct” (Klockars et al., 2000, p. 7).In 1997, a survey was administered to criminal justice students at Florida State University oriented toward determining values and expectations (Brand, 1999). Thirty-one percent said that they would not leave a party where marijuana was in use, 28% believed that a person with a felony arrest record should not be excluded from being hired as an officer, and about 18% believed that it may be acceptable for an officer to lie. Police will undoubtedly reflect the culture that surrounds them, as suggested by the writings of C. Wright Mills (cited in Henderson & Simon, 1994).Causes of corruption can best be described as being the result of an intricate matrix of potential actions and interactions impacted by numerous inputs (societal, organizational, biosociological, and psychological). Both middle-level and micro level aspects of corruption will be examined for cause-and-effect clues in the following review, in recognition of their apparent interrelatedness. In particular, the elements of conflict, control, differential association, interactional, neutralization, opportunity, rational choice, strain, symbolic interaction theories, and stress will be examined with sufficient depth that the criminality causation elements they propose can be inferred to exist for the purpose of this study.Ideology figures into criminological theory and corruption theory, from Marxism on the left to Lombrosians on the right, particularly when politicians attempt to establish policy (Henderson & Simon, 1994). Karl Marx (1818-1883) was a classical conflict theorist who deplored exploitation of the masses by a limited number of power-wielding elites. Classical criminological theory began with Cesare Lombroso (1835-1909), an Italian physician apparently influenced by Darwinism, who theorized that criminals were evolutional throwbacks, and who believed in biological determinism (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990).Henderson and Simon (1994) stated that conservatives generally embrace anomie and liberals generally embrace affiliation causation. A dichotomy generally equivalent to the affinity/affiliation theory described above.Henderson and Simon (1994) characterized the Christopher Commission as "liberal" based upon the suggested improvements in minority concerns. Conservative and liberal perspectives both lack sociological perspective, according to Henderson and Simon. Also lacking is an attempt to show the interconnection among macro, intermediate, and micro levels.Theories of occupational crime may have some relevance, but police corruption is a unique subcategory—crime within the institutions responsible for control of crime—and a form of "elite" deviance. Henderson and Simon (1994) proposed a synthesis of theoretical perspectives to account for this subcategory based for the most part upon the theory of C. Wright Mills (1917-1962).Mills stressed social structure (macro level composition, interrelationships, significance of the parts, etc.), historical epoch (cultural ascendancy or decline, what is considered historically significant, characteristics of change, etc.), and biography (roles of the individual, impacts of family, culture, and institutions, etc.).One important attribute of Mill's model is that institutions actually select and shape social character. This is because success in institutional settings ... requires that people, as role players, accept (internalize) the “expectations of institutional leaders” (elites). (Henderson & Simon, 1994, p. 34)Alienation was an important concept to Mills for understanding the structure of behavior; and it can occur at macro, intermediate, and micro levels (Henderson & Simon, 1994). Two types of alienation were identified: inauthenticity and dehumanization. Inauthenticity exists when outward or acknowledged appearances are stated in a positive manner, while the known situation is negative. A macro example would be the coupling of sexual images in advertising with alcohol or cigarettes.In a police department, alienation could be characterized by the Mollen Commission finding that anticorruption efforts were focused more on preventing disclosure than identifying and eliminating corruption (Commission to Investigate Allegations, 1993/1995). The consequence of this form of alienation is dehumanization (Henderson & Simon, 1994).Victor Bernard (cited in Henderson & Simon, 1994) argues that dehumanization is the result of a disconnection of mental concepts from one another and "unconscious denial, repression, depersonalization, isolation of effect, and compartmentalization" (p. 36). Dehumanization is a defense mechanism to internal and external stressors achieved through blinding oneself to the humanity of another.There are two types of dehumanization. The first is self-directed, wherein one mutes emotion and becomes robot-like. This can be a response to anxiety caused by being a powerless part of a bureaucracy. The second is object-directed, wherein one lessens the humanness of another through negative labeling and stereotyping, a self-protection against feelings of guilt and shame. "These two types of dehumanization are mutually reinforcing; reducing one's feelings for other people lessens one's feelings for the self, and lessening the humanness of one's self-image limits one's capacity to relate to others" (Henderson & Simon, 1994, p. 36).Consistent with alienation theorization is neutralization theory (Henderson & Simon, 1994). Guilt feelings that tend to prevent crime can be minimized by rationalizations learned previous to crime commission. Deviant groups commonly construct guilt neutralizing terminology and strategies, such as shifting blame to the victim, dehumanizing the victim, professing loyalty to the group that sanctions or condones the crime (following orders), and condemning the condemners (soft on crime).Henderson and Simon (1994) criticized neutralization theory as deficient because of an intentional disregard for the effects of cultural and societal norms. They pointed out that cultural patterns of crime have been shown to exist.Drawing from Mills and control, differential association, and neutralization theories, Henderson and Simon (1994) made the following theoretical statements:1.Criminal behavior is widespread in American society, including within the criminal justice system. It is widespread because it is often learned, tolerated and/or encouraged within the organizational contexts that make up criminal justice agencies....2.Only a tiny percentage of such crimes are explained by extreme behaviors of abnormal personalities.... The behavior and the ideologies that justify and excuse them are part of an organization's cultural value system.3.Crime as caused by the inability of immature individuals to delay gratification is a widespread occurrence, so widespread that it is part of the American character....We are not saying that human nature is evil.... We are saying that people are born innocent and relatively "blank" concerning their criminal propensities, and that criminal behavior is a socially acquired attribute. (Henderson & Simon, 1994, pp. 34-35)Sherman (1974c) wrote that it is appropriate to begin corruption causes and effects theorization with a simple model. He chose to "treat police corruption simply as a dependent variable—as effect not cause" (p. 2). However, he pointed out the complexity of the issue by asking: "Why are there different kinds and extents of police corruption in different communities, and in the same communities at different points in their history?" (p. 3). Sherman proposed a sociological theory of police corruption containing the following propositions that are identified as independent variables, or more likely, interdependent or covariant:COMMUNITY STRUCTURE1. There will be less police corruption in a community with little anomie, in terms of corrupters and corruptees.2. There will be less police corruption in communities with a more public-regarding ethos.3. There will be less police corruption in a community with less culture conflict.ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS4. A punishment-centered police bureaucracy will have the least corruption, a representative pattern will have more, and a mock pattern will have the most. [In a representative pattern there is enforcement of and obedience to rules to which workers can contribute. A mock pattern exists when action is only taken due to bad publicity.]5. There will be less corruption in a police agency having leadership highly reputed for integrity.6. There will be less organized police corruption when there is less work group solidarity.7. The less gradual the probable steps in a corrupt policeman's moral career, the less the ultimate 'seriousness' (self-defined) of the grafting.8. The greater the policeman's perception of legitimate advancement opportunities, the less likelihood there will be of their accepting corruption opportunities.LEGAL OPPORTUNITIES9. A decrease in either the scope of morals laws or the demand for the services they proscribe, while holding the other constant, will reduce police corruption opportunities (also the converse).10. An increase in either the scope of the regulative law or the economic incentive to violate it, while holding the other constant, will increase corruption opportunities (also the converse).CORRUPTION CONTROLS11. There will be a greater perceived risk of apprehension for corruption in police agencies that have an internal investigation unit.12. There will be proportionately less undiscovered corruption in police agencies that have an internal investigation unit using proactive methods.13. Controls will decrease corruption only when they can avoid amplifying the corruption's extent or methods.14. Less corruption will go undiscovered in a police agency watched by a vigorous and uncensored news media. (Sherman, 1974c, pp. 31-32)A study conducted by Herbert W. Eber, presented in 1991 at the annual meeting of Multivariate Experimental Psychology, as reported by Lorr and Strack (1994), administered a Clinical Analysis Questionnaire to about 15,000 police officer candidates to determine personality characteristics. The most distinctive finding was that personality profiles “were characterized by a strong pattern of self-discipline or Control, Tough Poise, and low Anxiety” (p. 200).Hyams (1990) conducted a study in which he hypothesized that police officers having unethical attitudes would be found to have higher narcissism (or selfism), and have a perception of their policing role as being more oriented toward arrest than service. In this study involving police officers from one West Coast agency, this hypothesis was confirmed; in addition, he found that[t]hose who are officers out of the academy, with higher levels of narcissism, a role perception oriented more toward arrest and apprehension and higher levels of dedication were found to have less ethical attitudes. (Hyams, 1990, p. 89)In 1998, Chamberlin, using Hyams’ police ethical attitudes instrument, conducted an experiment wherein this instrument was administered to treatment and control groups (pretest), followed by an 8-hour in-service training session on ethics for the treatment group. Six to eight weeks later, the instrument was again administered (posttest).The treatment group was found to show no difference in ethical attitudes between the pretest and the posttest. However, the control group was found to have “significantly increased their scores in the ethics, selfism, and role scales,” an indication of a tendency to have a more positive view of unethical behavior (Chamberlin, 1998, p. 82). Chamberlin does make a cautionary statement that because of the necessity of an “extended training effort and repeated testing, the probability of threats to the internal validity of the study due to history [outside influences such as the known focus of the testing] and maturation [gaining in knowledge over time] were significant” (p. 54).Sherman (1974b) used symbolic interationist theory to explain the existence of police corruption. The corrupt cop appears to have a moral view that differs from the view held prior to becoming an officer, and differs from the morality of his family, thus showing divergence and conflict of views.The school stems from the early work of George Herbert Meade, who saw life as a “conversation of significant symbols,” a process in which one continually defines and redefines one's self as a result of interacting with others. In this school of thought, police bribe-taking is to be explained as an individual process of becoming for each policeman, not as a static or “pressured” result of larger community structure. (Sherman, 1974b, p. 172)Consistent with the findings of the Mollen Commission cited earlier, wherein it is stated that unchecked excessive force is a precursor to corruption, Sherman (1974) indicated that corruption of a police officer is gradual and is characterized by the stages of contingencies, moral experiences, and apologia.Contingencies are circumstances or problems which a person must face, often for purely accidental reasons. The moral experience is a reaction to contingencies, often involving decision of action, that alters the "framework of imagery" in which a person evaluates himself and others. The moral experience is a benchmark between the stages in a moral career, which usually culminate (for the deviant) in an apologia: a distorted image of one's life course that brings it into alignment with the basic values of his society. (Sherman, 1974, p. 194)"Mills argued that people often experience their everyday, private lives as 'a series of traps'" (Henderson & Simon, 1994, p. 35). By this, he meant that people are unaware of how their behavior is unavoidably shaped by their immediate environment. Empirical evidence indicates that as violence-prone officers engage in subsequent confrontations, those confrontations are of increasing intensity (Babcock, 1998).Taylor and Braswell (1978) stated, "All police officers violate departmental rules and regulations and sometimes criminal statutes; it is inherent in their discretionary powers" (p. 177). They quoted a former officer as saying, "It's like a spider web, you're drawn in toward the center" (p. 177), with the center being the point where you have engaged in enough corrupt behavior that you must look the other way when a fellow officer takes another step outside the boundaries.In a similar vein, M. David Ermann (cited in Henderson & Simon, 1994) believed “that white-collar deviance takes place incrementally by merging normal administrative behavior with wrongdoing" (p. 28). In addition, new employees go along with behavior they find present upon their arrival, particularly in organizations that are results oriented. "Organizational crime also frequently occurs in instances where corporate employees are socially and spatially mobile, where they do not consider themselves part of the community in which they live" (p. 29).Biosociology/DemographicsOne consistent finding of research is that males are responsible for substantially more crime than females, “and this conclusion does not depend on the method of measurement (official or self-report), or time period and it seems to hold wherever the matter has been studied by criminologists” (Gottfredson & Polakowski, 1995, p. 68).Both Walsh (1995) and Goldsmith (1991) reported that physiological differences between male and female brains result from differences attributed to hormones and hormone ratios. Increasing testosterone levels in either sex increases assaultive behavior and decreases nurturing behavior, while estradiol decreases assaultive behavior and increases nurturing behavior. Progesterone also increases nurturing behavior, indicating more than mere coincidence regarding the differences of these hormones in males and females (Walsh, 1995). …Analysis yields good evidence that higher levels of testosterone are associated with adult deviance largely because they predispose an individual toward weak social integration and toward juvenile delinquency, and those are factors that considerably increase the likelihood of adult deviance. (Booth & Osgood, 1993, p. 105)Primate studies have shown that “testosterone increases to meet demand” and decreases “when submissiveness is deemed the path of least resistance” (Walsh, 1995, p. 86). It could be inferred that those assuming the role of law enforcer, who must also adopt the trappings (i.e., gun, badge, power to arrest, etc.), will show increased testosterone production. It is also known that as males age the production of testosterone decreases and hormonal ratios favoring nurturant behavior increase. …Gottfredson and Polakowski (1995) related that “[t]he relationship between age and crime is one of the most significant and well established general correlates in the field of criminology” (p. 68). Late adolescence and early adulthood stages account for a "vastly disproportionate amount of crime" (p. 69).The Christopher Commission found that just over 2% of Los Angeles police officers accounted for a disproportionately large number of citizen complaints (Independent Commission, 1991/1995). Lersch and Mieczkowski (1996) conducted a study to test this phenomenon and to determine if there are characteristics shared between officers with higher numbers of complaints, in effect testing the rotten apple theory (affinity theory). They also examined characteristics of complainants and complaints to determine if patterns existed.Lersch and Mieczkowski (1996) reviewed 682 allegations against 274 officers. "A small group of 37 officers, or about 7 percent of the sworn personnel, accounted for over one-third of the total number of complaints filed over the three-year period of analysis" (p. 37). The repeat offenders were all male, and "significantly younger and less experienced than their peers," and they were "more likely to be accused of violent and non-violent harassment resulting from a proactive contact" (p. 37).Babcock (1998) examined "the relationship between individual police officer characteristics, situational factors and the incidence of violent police-citizen encounters" (p. iv). He studied 117 officers in a department numbering about 350. Babcock also found that younger and less experienced officers had a significantly larger number of use-of-force incidents. "The group data suggested that as the number of use-of-force incidents per officer increased, so did the level and severity of violence inflicted by the officer" (p. 246).The age related findings of Lersch and Mieczkowski (1996) and Babcock (1998) were consistent with the findings of Burton et al. (1994/1997), who also reported that age was significantly related to nonutilitarian crime (not providing economic reward).Girodo (1991) conducted a psychological assessment of 271 undercover drug agents, with the purpose of correlating deviant behavior with personality dimensions. Among other findings, he determined that drug and alcohol abuse and disciplinary problems increased as undercover experience increased, somewhat contrary to the age-related findings cited earlier in this paper.Disinhibition was the significant predictor of risk for corruption in nearly half the agents … Disinhibition, however, did not predict risk for corruption among the best ... [person-environment] fit notwithstanding their obtaining the highest ... [disinhibition] scores of all. Their risk for corruption, while not particularly high, was best accounted for inversely by scores on the trait of Disciplined Self-Image. Finally, the High Extraversion-High Neuroticism agents produced the largest risk for corruption index; their higher scores on Experience Seeking and Neuroticism, would appear to be a poor combination.... The personality traits associated with corruption risk were impulsivity, emotionality, and undisciplined self-image. When these were found together, as in the Extraverted-Neurotic, we also found an increased risk for drug/alcohol abuse and disciplinary problems. (Girodo, 1991, pp. 368-369)Psychological theory has been unable to shed much light on the actions of individual officers, according to Worden (1996). Attitudinal studies, including Worden’s work, have indicated only a weak correlation between use of force and outlooks on human nature and “moral attitudes toward coercive authority” (p. 26). Organizational and social factors were shown to have a greater impact upon behavior. However,A larger body of evidence has accumulated on the relationship of officer’s behavior to their background and characteristics—race, gender, length of police service, and especially education. Officer’s educational backgrounds have been the subject of a number of studies, and although this research has shown that education bears no more than a weak relationship to officer’s attitudes ... and no relationship to the use of deadly force ..., it also indicates that college-educated officers generate fewer citizen complaints.... [O]n most behavioral dimensions the differences [between men and women] are negligible.... [B]lack officers ... are more likely to use deadly force ..., but these differences can be attributed to ... duty assignments.... Finally, analyses of officer’s length of service indicate that less experienced officers ... patrol more aggressively, ... are more likely to make arrests, ... and use deadly force. (Worden, 1996, p. 27)In research by Robert Friedrich (cited in Worden, 1996), published in 1980, the explanations of the use of force were characterized as having three contributory aspects—individual, situational, and organizational—were subjected to analysis. Friedrich found marginal correlation only regarding situational aspects. Provocative acts of a low-class, intoxicated, felon were most likely to evoke the use of force. Officer characteristics were not found to be significant.The GAO noted that police officers “lacking in experience and some higher education were considered to be more susceptible to involvement in illicit drug-related activities" (United States General Accounting Office, 1998, p. 4). Brown and Campbell (1994) concluded that response to stress is related to “personality, and life experiences, as well as variables such as age, gender and family history” (p. 19).StressGary Hankins (cited in Sulc, 1995), an official with the Fraternal Order of Police, related that "[p]olice officers die younger, suffer more injuries and stress-related disabilities than the average American ... [and] have high rates of alcoholism, divorce and suicide" (pp. 80-81). Hankins contended that stress inherent to criminal justice positions exceeds that of most other occupational groups. Corruption has been identified as a reaction to stress (Winter, 1993).In 1973, Haney, Banks, and Zimbardo (1973/1981), psychologists at Stanford University, conducted an experiment wherein “normal” college students were randomly selected as either guards or prisoners for a prison simulation. The planned 2-week experiment was terminated after less than half that time due to unexpectedly high levels of stress, and even distress in some cases, on the part of prisoners.Interactions between guards and prisoners were typically hostile and negative, with guards displaying increasing levels of aggression and authoritarianism. Haney et al. (cited in Maxfield & Babbie, 1998) concluded that their "results are ... congruent with Milgram who most convincingly demonstrated the proposition that evil acts are not necessarily the deeds of evil men, but may be attributable to the operation of powerful social forces" (p. 191). "Moreover, since both prisoners and guards are locked into a dynamic, symbiotic relationship which is destructive to their human nature, guards are also society's prisoners" (Haney et al., 1973/1981, p. 68).The reference to Milgram above concerns an experiment wherein subjects were directed to administer what were in fact simulated electrical shocks to an experimenter's confederate. The device manipulated by the subject was marked to purportedly indicate severity of the shock up to “severe,” while no shock was actually administered.The level of shock the subject was willing to give upon command of the experimenter was the primary dependent variable. Unexpected findings included "the sheer strength of obedient tendencies manifested" and "the extraordinary tension and emotional strain" on the subjects when they complied with orders to inflict high shock levels (Milgram, 1963/1981, pp. 33-34).This reference to stress induced by inflicting punishment is significant to the researcher, and is a stressor not specifically listed as applicable to police in relevant literature. "As former Chief Justice Earl Warren has said, the policeman is more powerful than the President. Only the policeman has the power to deprive an American of his liberty" (Sherman, 1974c, p. vii).Shooting, even shooting at, someone in the line of duty can readily be identified as a traumatic event. Arresting a father and mother while restraining their grieving 4 year-old, particularly when the crime involved is mala prohibida versus mala in se (prohibited by law versus a crime such as murder that is bad in and of itself), can also be an enduringly stressful event, as the researcher can personally attest.This is stress of punishment infliction as opposed to stress from the potential of personal injury at the hands of an arrestee. It would seem easily verifiable that most arrests are for transgressions of the former (mala prohibida). For more than one reason, an arrest—even if one does not fear for one’s own safety—can be stressful.Moreover, “ever-present danger lies in taking an action that is judged improper” (Waddington, 1999, p. 14). A judgment made in haste will be reviewed at leisure though official channels, as well as by a society as a whole.Brown and Campbell (1994) reported that it is “well documented that high levels of stress among employees, whether induced at work or by personal problems, can reduce productivity” (p. 1). Selye (cited in Winter, 1993), a stress research pioneer, stated that law enforcement is "one of the most hazardous professions, even exceeding the formidable stresses and strains of air traffic control" (p. 253). However, Brown and Campbell relate that empirical support for this position is not consistent.Winter (1993) defined stress as "the awareness of potential threat, or in other words [in the context of police corruption], awareness of the potential for a comprehensive change in one's core structures," such as experienced by a newly hired police officer (p. 254). Brown and Campbell (1994) offered three definitions of stress. The first was a model wherein an external factor causes “some degree of physical or psychological discomfort” (pp. 14-15).The second was a process that relies upon Selye’s General Adaptation Syndrome. This included:·The initial alarm reaction. The “fight or flight” response [from exposure to a threat] ... which ... includes physiological changes preparing the body for “fight or flight.”·The stage of resistance. The period during which the person adapts to external stressors and symptoms of stress improve or disappear.·The stage of exhaustion. [I]f the stressor is sufficiently severe or prolonged ... symptoms reappear and the end result is death. (Brown & Campbell, 1994, p. 15) …“The accumulation of evidence ... does indicate that stress levels within the police do play a significant role in absenteeism and wastage through early retirement” (p. 10), and “some research has indeed shown that the police tend to exhibit higher rates of stress-related disease, higher suicide rates and higher divorce rates” (p. 13).United States and British police “listed poor and insensitive supervision, unreasonable workload, shift work, personal safety and volume of paperwork as the most significant sources of stress at work” (Brown & Campbell, 1994, p. 14). However, “police work” being somewhat non-specific, it must be noted that “[r]ank, role, gender, ethnicity and sexual orientation result in some distinctive patterns of stress experiences” (p. 167).For Winter (1993), police stress lies in problems encountered with administrative procedures and legal proceedings that lead torole ambiguity and role conflict (e.g., between the roles of community servant, as exemplified in the stereotype of the general British Bobby, and crime fighter and between the requirement to enforce the law and the procedural constraints imposed on the officer by that same law). (Winter, 1993, p. 254)Kirkcaldy (1993) conducted a study of police stress involving 42 officers from several countries attending a stress. The police officers studied showed a higher level of internal control than the general population, and they "were more likely to be stressed in terms of organizational structure and climate ..., home and work interface ..., and relationships with other people" when compared to the general British population (p. 386). Though not stated in the article, it may be fair to assume that these were not run-of-the-mill patrol officers on this junket to Germany. Whether or not the sample population is representative of the population of street-level officers could be questioned.Violanti and Aron (1993) found that police organizational stressors (court decisions, regulations, nonparticipation in job decisions, disagreeable duties, discipline matters, etc.) were 6.3 times more likely to cause distress than was "police work." This study was conducted in a large New York department and consisted of 103 respondents who submitted a self-report survey.Similarly, Kirkcaldy, Cooper, and Ruffalo (1995) conducted a study of 49 officers in one Illinois town (the size of the department is unknown), and determined that these officers found "factors intrinsic to the job" to be lesser stress producers than "organizational structure and climate" (p. 700). Kirkcaldy et al. observed positive correlation between both psychological and physical illness and stress. In addition, they observed a significant negative correlation between perceived stress and job satisfaction. They recommended providing counseling and coping strategies to enhance self-control.Carona (1998) conducted a study having as its hypothesis the expectation that police departments having high-quality stress-relief programs would have fewer losses to sick leave, fewer resignations, fewer vehicle accidents, and fewer sustained excessive force complaints. Carona discovered no significant correlations in this research. However, it was determined that departments with longer running stress programs had "fewer sustained excessive force complaints" (p. 27).One possibly confounding variable that was apparently not addressed by these studies of stress in police (Kirkcaldy, 1993; Kirkcaldy et al., 1995; Violanti & Aron, 1993) could be the traditional stoicism expected of authority figures, and how this could be affected by self-reporting of police officers through under reporting perceptions of stress caused by intrinsic factors.As stated by Brown and Grover (1998), "Police officers are taught to respond personably rather than personally to their operational duties, to project strength and authority, to deal with events without displaying emotion and put the requirements of the work before their own emotional needs" (p. 181). This phenomenon has also been described as the “cult of masculinity” (Waddington, 1999, p. 11).Brown and Grover (1998) studied police officers and the role moderating factors have on coping and distress when stressors are present. One finding was that those exposed to both high and low levels of stress show the greatest levels of psychological distress when they lack social support, have high negative attitudes concerning emotional expression, and low just world beliefs. Those with low just world beliefs "perceive the threats as being in excess of their capacity to cope," making them unable to assimilate and integrate stressful experiences (p. 181). Also assumed in the definition of low just world beliefs was a feeling of low control on the part of the officer.A Gallup survey of randomly selected workers indicated that "the most common cause of workplace anger ... [is] the actions of supervisors or managers" (Wuensche, 1999, p. 1D). The next most anger-producing circumstances were, respectively, "irritating co-workers" and "dealing with the public" (p. 1D). Donald Gibson (cited in Wuensche, 1999), a Yale University School of Management professor, stated, "In an environment where you think people are satisfied with their jobs, there is a sort of undercurrent of anger and resentment aimed at the workplace that could potentially lead to the kinds of explosions or rage we have seen" (p. 1D). The rage Gibson refers to was that found in "normal" jobs, as opposed to police work.PrejudiceResearch on prejudice disclosed that those who perceive that they have been subjected to prejudice "reported more aggression, sadness, anxiety, and egotism" than those not perceiving such prejudice (Dion & Earn, 1975/1981, p. 281). Winter (1993) reported what appears to be an analogous perception of prejudice when he related that "there is evidence that police officers perceive the public and the press as construing them more negatively than is in fact the case," citing five studies (p. 254). The GAO (1998) also reported that “officers’ dissatisfaction with how they were viewed and treated by the people of the community” has been cited as a factor contributing to corruption (p. 9).The 1968 Kerner Commission examination of the New York police indicated that minorities perceived the police to "symbolize white power, white racism and white repression" (cited in Human Rights Watch, 1998, p. 40). The Christopher Commission surveyed a sample of Los Angeles police officers and found that about 25% of them believed that racial prejudice toward minorities exists and negatively impacts police community relations (Independent Commission, 1991/1995).In 1992, the St. Clair Commission examined excessive force complaints against the Boston Police Department and found that "50 percent of complainants in the sample group were African-American, while 26 percent of Boston's population was African-American" (Human Rights Watch, 1998, p. 41). Worden (1996) related that “empirical evidence confirms that minorities are in fact, overrepresented among the human targets at which police shoot …, but it also indicates that minorities are overrepresented among those whose actions precipitate the use of deadly force by police” (p. 25).The results of a reciprocal negative interchange between police who perceive prejudice from minorities and minorities who perceive prejudice from police, each feeding the negative spiral of the other, should not be overlooked in the search for corruption causes.The Mollen Commission reported in 1993 that the "us versus them" police attitude was particularly strong in minority neighborhoods and contributed to a divisiveness that "makes many police officers feel isolated from, and often hostile toward, the community they are meant to serve" (Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption, 1993/1995, p. 33). The Mollen Commission further reported that the us versus them attitude was "present wherever we found corruption" (p. 33).The GAO (1998) determined that a “commonly identified factor associated with drug-related corruption was a police culture that was characterized by a code of silence, unquestioned loyalty to other officers, and cynicism about the criminal justice system” (p. 4). These characteristics reportedly promote corruption while impeding its detection and control.Paradoxically, the structures of occupation that Durkheim predicted would function to strengthen them as autonomous, professional associations working for the common good (helping to clarify and maintain the value system of the broader society) are often "turned inward." That is, in criminal justice agencies (for several historic, political, economic, and social reasons) professional particularity, the cult of the individual, and extreme social solidarity reflected in a quasi-unification of all authority levels generates the unanticipated consequences of a high degree of corruption and graft in all components of the criminal justice system in virtually every region of the United States. (Henderson & Simon, 1994, p. 102)One aspect of neutralization theory, consistent with the us versus them characteristic, states that "subgroups take on a culture of their own that has been termed 'groupthink'" (Henderson & Simon, 1994, p. 30). One groupthink outcome is that prerationalized criminal acts are agreed upon before their commission. "Those objecting to the proposed ‘policies’ are often criticized by other group members, and, if they persist in their criticism, are threatened with ostracism from the group or firing" (p. 30).Reference:Robb, D. L. (2002). An investigation of self-control and its relationship to ethical attitudes in criminal justice personnel. Dissertation Abstracts International, 62 (12), 4343. (UMI No. 3036984)

The examples provided by the Stanford Prison Experiment and Milgram’s electric shock experiment (elaborated upon below), make it apparent that being in a position of power is contributory in inducing changes in behavior. Conclusions drawn from those empirical inquiries indicate the human proclivity (to include large portions of the general population as well as police) to be negatively influenced by circumstances to an extent that greatly exceeds their usual behavior.Group-think appears to also have an effect, to the extent that it engenders an “us versus them” attitude. Group-think can lead to poor decision making, due to belief in group morality, illusion of invulnerability, illusion of unanimity, intimidation of dissent, self-censorship, diffusion of responsibility, collective rationalization, and poor risk assessment. These judgment errors lead to collective action, becoming more severe with group size increase. Even if the role of the group is only to brainstorm, discuss, advocate, or argue for one course of action over others, misleading statements can adversely alter the course of events; which is exemplified in empirical findings indicating that individual effort applied prior to joint group efforts usually provides superior results (Myers, 2012).Other comments on how police corruption comes about from my dissertation: An Investigation of Self-Control and its Relationship to Ethical Attitudes in Criminal Justice PersonnelCHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW …“Police Ethics encompass a broad range of behavior from interpersonal relations to outright criminal activity” (Hyams, 1990, pp. 40-41). As such, it is intertwined in the definition of corruption. This section will attempt to focus on philosophical aspects, while following sections discuss the specifics and ramifications of unethical acts.Kleinig (1990) stated, "Police ethics is characterized by a particular focus rather than a particular set of values" (p. 3). In other words, the situational context within law enforcement may differ, but the underlying philosophy, or decision-making process, cannot vary from the culture represented. He further cites John Stewart Mill's description of an ethical decision maker as using his senses and mental abilities to first collect the information necessary, then to make the decision, and further to stay the course once the decision is made.Spader (1994) paraphrased Plato: "All major legal issues are simultaneously ethical issues" (p. 100), and "justice" is "the act of giving each person his 'due'" (p. 83). Spader also stated, "[W]hether the ends justify the means is central to due process" (p. 83). This leads to the so-called “dirty hands” dilemma.That is, on some occasions a public official may find that the only way he can do his job successfully, meet his official obligations, is to do something that, from the perspective of private life, would be morally unacceptable. (French, 1983/1992, pp. 243-244)French (1983/1992) differentiates public obligations from private obligations by identifying the primary objective. Public obligations emphasize “the accomplishment of certain recognized ends, whereas ... private-sector obligations concern the way things are done and what particular things are done, and less with outcomes” (p. 251).Kleinig (1996) pointed out that this dilemma was discussed early on, from ancient Greek tragedies to The Prince, and includes Sartre more recently. Plato wrote, “[W]e must discover who are best guardians ..., that they must do whatever they think at any time best for the city” (1935/1992, p. 93). Modern advocates of this point of view still believe thatanyone who would act up to a perfect standard of goodness in everything, must be ruined among so many who are not good. It is essential, therefore, for a Prince who desires to maintain his position, to have learned how to be other than good, and to use or not use his goodness as necessity requires. (Machiavelli, 1910, p. 53)A social and ethical phenomenon described by Pollock (1994) is the glorification of "strong" criminals vs. ridicule of "weak" moralists (e.g., public acclaim for Bonnie and Clyde), the antithesis of morality. Popular culture seems to project a similar justification for police who exceed their authority in pursuit of justice, as portrayed by the “Dirty Harry” character and many of a similar nature.A scenario from a Dirty Harry screenplay has Harry forcibly extracting the location of a kidnap victim from the perpetrator by shooting him in the leg, only to have the case dropped when his tactics are exposed in court (Delattre, 1994; Kleinig, 1996). Barker (1996) highlighted this mixed message when he wrote that “’Dirty Harry’ may be a character we applaud on the screen, but” (p. 51) “[w]e, as a free society, will not tolerate a law enforcement agency staffed by Dirty Harry’s, who use illegal and unethical means to accomplish what they perceive as legitimate ends” (p. 12).Delattre (1994) indicated that “[e]nds do justify the means up to a point, and in certain ways, depending on what you mean, but not simply or unqualifiedly” (p. 193). Every person is significant and worthy, “even if that person appears without merit” (p. 193). Once prohibitions against cruel treatment are broached without recourse, even in the area of rights for innocent victims versus perpetrators, the implications are poor for all civil liberties.However, Delattre (1994) also added “that illegal conduct in a specific case may or may not be excusable—and I believe that it could be—depending on the particulars, and even the minute details, of the case” (p. 212-213).In The Ethics of Policing, Kleinig (1996), a recognized police ethics scholar, discussed the dirty hands concept at length. Two primary issues were raised by this concept. First, was the consideration that two alternative courses of action are in fact wrong. He argued that it would not be morally wrong to adhere to the law and therefore not seek a desirable outcome. And, secondly, if it is true that both actions are wrong, what should be done about the person who made a decision under those circumstances?Kleinig (1996) wrote that Machiavelli advocated resignation or punishment for officials caught in such a situation. Kleinig stated that he has sought not to accept the premise of the necessity to commit a crime to thwart a crime, while acknowledging that it is accepted by others. But he still raised the issue of the public being placed in the position of punishing a person who performed a service that could be identified with the preservation of social order, thereby raising the dirty hands question for those who would inflict the punishment.Skolnick and Leo (1992) pointed out that "the acceptability of deception seems to vary inversely with the level of the criminal process" (p. 3). It is legally acceptable to lie during the course of an investigation. Undercover investigations and "sting" operations are almost routine. Courts have upheld the authority of police to lie during interrogations under most circumstances. However, deception is supposed to stop when testimony is called for.Whether it does or not is questionable, for example, when investigations encompass the use of what is sometimes referred to as a "wall" between a confidential covert investigation and the parallel construction of a prosecutable case that has been creatively disengaged from the original source of information.In further exemplification, a confidential informant in a position to be of long-term use reports that he/she will be receiving money identifiable as narcotics proceeds. The investigation for record purposes, and future testimony, begins once the delivery has been made, without further reference to that event.Investigation from that point will focus on the person that made the delivery and subsequent activities and contacts, totally excluding the informant’s participation. The tainted money will be passed on within the criminal organization. This deception will help to ensure the safety of the informant and facilitate the detection of future crimes. However, it will also allow criminals to profit, even if only in the interest of potential neutralization of the organization in the future.In 1992, Skolnick and Leo warned that authorized deception "tends to encourage further deceit, undermining the general norm" (p. 10). Kleinig (1996) identified four negative aspects and consequences of lying: (a) it violates expectations of truthfulness in interpersonal relations; (b) it subverts the natural purpose of language; (c) it negates the concept of humans as worthy of dignity and respect by denying them an accurate reflection of reality; and, (d) it does not meet ethical requirements of universalizability.Universalizability has to do with the “fundamental requirement of morality, as the activity of a rational being, that we act only on maxims that we could, without ‘contradiction,’ will to be universal laws” (Kleinig, 1996, p. 125). It would be impossible to rely on untruth as a universal law. In consequence, “Not only does the liar violate another’s being, but also his own” (p. 126). …Fishman (1994) presented an analysis of two celebrated cases of police corruption involving Robert "Prince of the City" Leuci and Frank Serpico, which differed from the interpretation of the acts of these men by Pollock (1994). Pollock equates the two and failed to note, as Fishman did, that Leuci was a pragmatist. He was caught "red handed" and acted in his own self interest when he cooperated with a corruption investigation (Fishman, 1994).Serpico was apparently honest in his personal acts but prudently silent about the corruption swirling around him until it reached a level he found to be overly destructive. He had at first known that it was unlikely that he could change the system, so he worked within it, thereby remaining employed.When a parolee convicted of killing a police officer was released on a subsequent charge due to graft, he was overcome by what can be characterized as a violation of natural law and became the first New York City officer to testify against his own on corruption charges. "In short, Serpico practiced prudential realism because his fight against lawlessness was based on moral ideals, but he did not ignore material circumstances" (Fishman, 1994, p. 201). …Chief G. S. Kniffen (1996) cited a lack of ethics as a cause for numerous problems in law enforcement within recent years, from Rodney King, to O. J. Simpson, to the federal shoot-out in Idaho. Kniffen laid these problems at the feet of leadership, and more specifically a lack of ethical leadership. He quoted the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) Law Enforcement Code of Ethics from 1957, and decried a lack of compliance. He also cast aspersions on suggestions that it be "updated to reflect the changes in this postindustrial age" (p. 9). However, there has been a change. In 1992, the IACP added a line to the code addressing cooperation in internal investigations (Pollock, 1994)(see Appendix C).Barker’s (1996) Police Ethics: Crisis in Law Enforcement examined the four questions:(1) Is law enforcement a profession? (2) Can law enforcement officers be professional? (3) What forms of behavior are the major law enforcement ethical violations? and (4) Can we control police ethical violations? (Barker, 1996, p. v)Barker (1996) addressed each of these questions as they relate to and are exemplified by the IACP’s Law Enforcement Code of Ethics. He concluded that law enforcement falls short of professional standards on several counts. It is deficient on admission standards based upon educational achievement, and also with regard to standardized certification and decertification.Both Delattre (1994) and Kleinig (1996) agree with this assessment. Failure to reach professional status has at least in part been attributed to internal organized bargaining pressures. Representatives of organized bargaining entities have displayed interest in preserving the status quo in the interest of their membership, who may be negatively affected by increased requirements (Barker, 1996).Inasmuch as the term “professional” refers to behavior, Barker (1996) is convinced that officers can be professional. Common forms of corruption (addressed in following sections of this chapter) can be controlled, according to Barker, through reducing opportunity, eliminating peer support for unethical behavior, and increasing the likelihood of punishment for such behavior.Delattre (1994) stated that codes of ethics may be useful, but they “do not motivate people to behave well. They assist only people who want to do so” (p. 33). If an organization’s leaders do not take seriously failure to live up to the codes, they “will be treated as worthless platitudes” (p. 33). Sherman (1991) stated that "[s]uch codes provide useful frameworks ... but are usually too general to provide guidance" within the "complex circumstances" of law enforcement (p. 10).According to Pollock-Byrne (1989), calls for codes of ethics may be missing the point, and the codes themselves may be counter-productive. "Since they are so far removed from reality, they are worse than ignored since they in fact encourage officers to believe there are no relevant ethical guides to behavior" (p. 96).Felkenes (1984) conducted a study in several police agencies to determine how officers view professional ethics outlined in the Law Enforcement Code of Ethics and the Canons of Police Ethics. The results indicated that a majority of the respondents clearly understood the requirements for honesty and self-restraint under provocation, although more than 20% were unclear about “obligations to colleagues, the profession of law enforcement, other officials, and criminal subjects” (p. 215).About 60% of the respondents were neutral, unclear, or very unclear about “[o]bligations in relation to confidentiality, enforcement of the law without fear, and engaging in appropriate private conduct” (Felkenes, 1984, p. 215). Thirty-eight percent responded “that it was not wrong to accept small gifts from the public” (p. 215), in spite of explicit identification of this behavior as unethical in the Code.Twenty-nine percent agreed that “[l]aw enforcement’s professional ethics serve primarily as a pledge rather than as a guide to action” (Felkenes, 1984, p. 215). And 97% of the respondents indicated that they rely on personal ethical beliefs in professional matters.Another attempt at developing ethical law enforcement personnel, with similar inherent problems, involves specific written organizational policy. Murphy and Caplan (1989) state that policy manuals normally contain "provisions so unrealistic that no officer, however dedicated, can obey all of them all the time" (p. 317). They cite the all-pervasive specter of punishment induced by policy manuals as a cause for people to conceal unintentional and minor violations, which in turn creates the environment that could stimulate corruption. Pollock-Byrne (1989) stated that studies suggested "extensive rules seem to be present in inverse proportion to high ethical standards" (p. 96). …Another reason Kleinig (1990) believes that collegiate ethics training is necessary is the partisanship of academies brought on by "social isolation" and organizational identity (p. 7). Kleinig further stated that the fact that law enforcement recruits do not come morally prepared for the decisions they must make and argued for inclusion of ethics in basic training.In 1997, the IACP conducted the “most extensive ethics training survey ever conducted by law enforcement” (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1998, p. 2), with over 900 responses. Over 80% of the responding agencies reported providing ethics training for new officers, and over 70% provided some type of in-service ethics training. For more than 70% of these agencies, ethics training consisted of 4 hours or less in the classroom. Just over 50% of these agencies sought outside assistance in course design.“One major finding was that the amount of time devoted to ethics training did not appear to be consistent with how important the needs were, based on the responses” (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1998, p. 5). One of the survey questions requested participants to “provide us with any ‘working definition of ethics’ your organization uses” (p. 8). “[O]nly a handful [of respondents] provided any ‘working definition’” (p. 8).Recommendations of the IACP Committee on Police Image and Ethics arising from this study (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1998) included (a) adoption of a law enforcement oath; (b) job specific ethics training; (c) an enhanced curriculum and training style; and (d) insistence on recruit ethics training that incorporates ethics training by field training officers.As suggested at the beginning of this section, any discussion of ethics is simultaneously a discussion of corruption.Corruption DefinedThe definition of corruption may be limited by some to receipt of financial or other considerations in exchange for overlooking crime in some manner. Corruption can include "those activities regarded by society as illegitimate or seen by the power elite as contradictory to the logic of the system" (Jacek Tarkowski cited in Johnston, 1992, p. 160). Police corruption is an occupational crime within the institutions responsible for control of crime, and a form of "elite" deviance (Henderson & Simon, 1994).Punch (1985) provided a four-element definition of police corruption. With an added a fifth element, this definition guided the present study.I Straitforward Corruption: something is done or not done for some form of reward....II Predatory (Strategic) Corruption: the police stimulate crime, extort money and actively organize graft ...III Combative (Strategic) Corruption: 'flaking', 'padding', falsifying testimony, 'verbals', intimidating witnesses, buying and selling drugs, 'scoring' or 'burning' informants, and paying informants with illegally obtained drugs. ('Flaking' refers to 'planting' evidence on a suspect; 'padding' means to add to drugs or evidence to strengthen a case; 'verbals' is used in Britain to indicate where words attributed to a suspect are invented by a policeman to help incriminate him; 'scoring' concerns shakedowns where police take money, drugs or goods from suspects or prisoners, and 'burning' means revealing the identity of an informant). Most of these practices are involved in 'building a case' ... in which the major goal is to make arrests, obtain convictions, confiscate drugs, and get long sentences for criminals. It may involve accommodations with some criminals and certain informants but it is posited on using illicit means for organizationally and socially approved ends....IV Corruption as Perversion of Justice: lying under oath, intimidating witnesses, planting evidence on a suspect, etc.... It involves the perversion of justice largely in order to avoid the consequences of serious deviant behavior. (Punch, 1985, pp. 13-14)The fifth element is any abuse of power or authority—such as excessive force, theft while on duty, or other acts under color of law. The Knapp Commission (1974) (or the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and the City's Anti-Corruption Procedures, instituted in 1971) added other offenses to the list of corrupt practices, such as illegal wiretaps, financing of drug transactions, soliciting customers for drug traffickers, kidnapping witnesses, providing security for drug dealers, and offering to assist in murder of witnesses.The fifth element was added as a personal evaluation and in consideration of a dictionary definition of corruption that includes the following: "1. a changing or being changed for the worse; making, becoming, or being corrupt. 2. evil or wicked behavior; depravity" (Guralnik & Friend, 1968, p. 332). This definition is consistent with a statement by Jacek Tarkowski (cited in Johnston, 1992): "Also 'corrupt' are those activities regarded by society as illegitimate or seen by the power elite as contradictory to the logic of the system" (p. 160).The Mollen Commission (The Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and the Anti-Corruption Procedures of the New York City Police Department), formed in 1992, seems to support this expanded definition of corruption by stating that "twenty years ago police officers took bribes to accommodate criminals ... today's corrupt cop often is the criminal" (Commission to Investigate Allegations, 1993/1995, p. 31).This is also consistent with the assumption of the researcher that acts of criminal justice personnel leading to their own incarceration are an aberration from the state of their moral and ethical behavior at the commencement of their criminal justice career, in other words, a change for the worse.The Mollen Commission described brutality and corruption as being on a continuum, “with brutality against citizens serving as a sort of ‘rite of passage’ toward corruption” (cited in Human Rights Watch, 1998, p. 46). Commission interviews indicated that brutality was often the first deviant act, and when officers were not subjected to negative consequences as a result of this deviance, it became easier for them to progress to other abuses of authority.This seems consistent with self-reports of criminal involvement in a sample of the general population that “suggest a clear escalation in the seriousness of criminal behavior over time” (Elliott, 1994, p. 12). “[T]he behavioral repertoire was [found to be] accompanied by an increase in offending rates for all types of offenses” (p. 13).Public definitions of police brutality can include perceptions of verbal abuse, unnecessary stops for questioning, display of weapons, or physical contact short of levels that could cause physical harm (Klockars, 1996). Current legal definitions hinge upon the finding in Graham v. Connor [490 U.S. 386 (1989)].In accordance with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, “’[O]bjective reasonableness’ of a police officer’s use of force would be ‘judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight’” (cited in Klockars, 1996, p. 6). A single punch, or anything short of that, is not generally considered excessive.Worden (1996) differentiated between “excessive force” and “unnecessary force,” the former being more than reasonable force, and the later being where no force is reasonable. James Fyfe (1996) also subdivided excessive force.Extralegal violence—brutality—is “the willful and wrongful use of force by officers who knowingly exceed the bounds of their office.” Unnecessary force, by contrast, is the result of ineptitude or carelessness and “occurs when well-meaning officers prove incapable of dealing with the situations they encounter without needless or too hasty resort to force.” (Fyfe, 1996, p. 165)The IACP defines "excessive use of force" as "the application of an amount and/or frequency of force greater than what is required to compel compliance from a willing or unwilling subject" (Neubauer, 1999, p. 6). …Criminological TheoryIn the late 19th century, Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) (cited in Cohen & Machalek, 1994/1997) proposed “that crime is ‘normal’ behavior performed by normal individuals living in unexceptional social systems” (p. 113). Durkheim’s theory, in summary, consists of the contention that, since crime is known in all societies, it is therefore a fundamental element of societies.He [Durkheim] reasoned that a certain level of crime is both necessary and beneficial to society because (1) individual deviation from the social norm is a primary source of innovative social change; (2) increases in crime rates can warn or alert officials to damaging problems existing within social systems that give rise to such crimes; (3) crime enforcement helps to establish and to maintain behavioral boundaries within communities; and finally, (4) crime provokes punishment that in turn enhances solidarity within communities. (Cohen & Machalek, 1994/1997, p. 113)Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) were dismissive of the assertion that crime is “normal learned behavior” (p. xv). Cohen and Machalek (1994/1997) theorized that evolutionary and ecological explanations should be incorporated within Durkheim’s theory in order to make it viable. Ecology was incorporated in the form of availability of resources. …Criminological theories on crime causation supported by research include opportunity theories and rational choice theories. Opportunity theories generally state that three elements must coexist: (a) motivation, (b) an appropriate target, and (c) lack of deterrence. Rational choice theories assume a relatively constant level of criminal activity, with crime rates fluctuating due to increased or decreased opportunity (Cohen & Machalek, 1994/1997).Intrinsic to the perceptions of risks and rewards involved in rational choice theory is the thought that if one was a police officer, a lessened fear of the police might be assumed. In addition, the common presence of the code of silence, loyalty to other officers, and cynicism could be inferred to reinforce the perception of lessened risk.Conflict theory looks at crime as a "label produced by social values and political power" (Maxfield & Babbie, 1998, p. 40). Marxism is a macro level form of conflict theory. Conflict theory holds that prosecution is most likely when the violator lacks power and the public is aroused due to the nature of the violation (Henderson & Simon, 1994).Strain theory shares a similar outlook, in that it asserts that we are socialized to seek rewards (in effect positing of goals), and when the rewards are blocked strain is created that can be relieved by law breaking (Henderson & Simon, 1994). Burton et al. (1994/1997) conducted an empirical assessment of strain theory on three levels: strain created by the difference between aspirations and expectations, blocked opportunity, and relative deprivation.Burton et al. (1994/1997) found that only blocked opportunity and relative deprivation have a significant effect on adult deviance, with relative deprivation having the greatest correlation. However, they also measured self-control as a variable and found that it had a greater effect than any other variable. …Self-Control TheorySelf-control, an ability to control one’s emotions, desires, and actions (Guralnik & Friend, 1968), is considered an enduring individual difference, a personality trait that remains relatively consistent throughout life (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990). Nagin and Paternoster (1993/1997) identify six elements of self-control: impulsiveness, desire for simple tasks, preference for risk, preference for physical activity, self-centeredness (selfism), and temper. Those “who lack self-control will tend to be impulsive, insensitive, physical (as opposed to mental), risk-taking, short-sighted, and nonverbal” (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990, p. 90).In 1990, Gottfredson and Hirschi published A General Theory of Crime, in which they suggested that crime results from the sum of opportunity and low self-control, and stated that “people ... differ in the extent to which they are vulnerable to the temptations of the moment” (p. 87). The theory assumed that parental monitoring of childhood behavior, recognizing deviance, and consistently and appropriately punishing such deviance within a child’s first 8 years establishes self-control that leads to socially appropriate responses throughout life. Failure in this area leads to low self-control.Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) intended for their theory “to explain all crime, at all times, and, for that matter, many forms of behavior that are not sanctioned by the state” (p. 117), to include juvenile delinquency, sex-based differences, cross-culture comparisons, street crime, and occupational crime. A later publication elaborates upon the above statement:Our theory does not claim that self-control (or self-control and opportunity) is the only cause of crime. On the contrary, we explicitly mention important causes of crime that self-control cannot explain (e.g., age). To invoke an analogy we have used before ... : Trees and tides have gravity in common but more than gravity is required to account for their peculiar features. To admit this in no way limits the generality of the theory of gravity. (Hirschi & Gottfredson, 1993, p. 50) …Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990) theory posited that opportunity and self-control standing alone have little meaning, and that "[f]raud and force occur primarily when individuals with low self-control encounter opportunities to engage in fraud or force," according to Grasmick, Tittle, Bursik, and Arneklev (1993/1997, p. 180). Grasmick et al. cited and concurred with Gottfredson and Hirschi’s claim that "low self-control is a personality trait established early in life, which remains relatively stable over the life course" (p. 188), which was also accepted by and Nagin and Paternoster (1993/1997). …Gottfredson and Hirschi have credited individual motivation with too much influence, according to Henderson and Simon (1994). Henderson and Simon also took exception to the contention fostered by Gottfredson and Hirschi that white-collar criminals (to include corrupt police) share the same primary causative factor (i.e., self-interest) as other criminals. One particular factor noted is that recognizing that they hold jobs makes them less likely to commit crimes, which seems somewhat spurious in light of the known existence of criminal justice corruption.Hirschi and Gottfredson (1993) addressed this area of criticism, as exemplified by Henderson and Simon above.In the context of discussion of white collar crime, we have argued that position in the occupational structure is in part caused by self-control. Thus white-collar workers should on the whole have higher levels of self-control than those outside the labor force. White-collar offenders should therefore have higher levels of self-control on the average than offenders among the unemployed. It seems obvious to us that their criminal records should therefore show fewer offenses and “offense types,” a result that white-collar researchers … take to be actually contrary to our theory! Our theory is also said to be called into question by the finding that white-collar offenders start “later … in life than common offenders”.... In fact, a decade ago we pointed out that the connection between frequency and age of onset is a statistical necessity. (Hirschi & Gottfredson, 1993, pp. 53-54) …Corruption TheoryCorruption has been conceptualized as having been based upon either affinity or affiliation. Affinity represents the predisposition of individuals to commit crime that exists prior to their being hired as police officers. Affiliation refers to the subjecting "of the honest police recruit ... [to] a dishonest police subculture" (Sherman, 1974, p. 192).A more common label for affinity has been the “rotten apple” theory, wherein the rotten apple taints the barrel of apples. Conversely, the affiliation theory is commonly referred to as the “rotten barrel” theory. The barrel is responsible for making the apples rot.The affinity/affiliation question points out the different levels of inquiry and theorization. Macro level examination focuses upon entire societies. Middle level, or intermediate, inquiry focuses upon organizations, and micro level involves individuals (Sherman, 1974). One example of macro-level impact is described as follows:Richardson put the police graft system in its proper perspective: the political and ethnic conflicts of a fast-growing pluralist society. On the ethnic level New York was a classic case of culture conflict, where the puritan morality of the original settlers was intolerable to the new immigrants. Laws prohibiting liquor sales, gambling, and prostitution were focal points for this conflict.Seen from the functionalist perspective, corruption was a means of easing the conflict and satisfying both sides. Politicians won the support of Yankee groups with rhetoric against vice, while maintaining immigrant support by giving the police a free hand to permit vice—in exchange for a price. But the police hand was so free that graft grew to be intolerable, although the Lexow commission [of 1894] was the first indication ... of how large it really was. After Lexow, police graft became more sophisticated and centralized, surviving investigations right up to the present. (Sherman, 1974a, p. 45)In 2000, Klockars, Ivkovich, Harver, and Hagerfeld published research based upon an organizational theory of police corruption “which emphasizes the importance of organizational and occupational culture” (p. 1). They presented officers from 30 different departments with 11 hypothetical situations and asked them to rate the levels of seriousness, whether they would report these incidents, and their support for punishment for each situation. In the more serious scenarios (e.g., stealing from a crime scene, bribery, or excessive force), most officers indicated that they would report violations by a fellow officer. However, “substantial differences in the environment of integrity” (p. 2) were observed among the different departments.In comparing one high-scoring department (all scenarios were considered to be more serious violations relative to other agencies) to one low scoring department, it was found that the high-scoring department’s officers expected more severe discipline and would be much more likely to report violations by fellow officers. These characteristics of a department’s officers are said to provide a description of a department’s “culture that encourage its employees to resist or tolerate certain types of misconduct” (Klockars et al., 2000, p. 7).In 1997, a survey was administered to criminal justice students at Florida State University oriented toward determining values and expectations (Brand, 1999). Thirty-one percent said that they would not leave a party where marijuana was in use, 28% believed that a person with a felony arrest record should not be excluded from being hired as an officer, and about 18% believed that it may be acceptable for an officer to lie. Police will undoubtedly reflect the culture that surrounds them, as suggested by the writings of C. Wright Mills (cited in Henderson & Simon, 1994).Causes of corruption can best be described as being the result of an intricate matrix of potential actions and interactions impacted by numerous inputs (societal, organizational, biosociological, and psychological). Both middle-level and micro level aspects of corruption will be examined for cause-and-effect clues in the following review, in recognition of their apparent interrelatedness. In particular, the elements of conflict, control, differential association, interactional, neutralization, opportunity, rational choice, strain, symbolic interaction theories, and stress will be examined with sufficient depth that the criminality causation elements they propose can be inferred to exist for the purpose of this study.Ideology figures into criminological theory and corruption theory, from Marxism on the left to Lombrosians on the right, particularly when politicians attempt to establish policy (Henderson & Simon, 1994). Karl Marx (1818-1883) was a classical conflict theorist who deplored exploitation of the masses by a limited number of power-wielding elites. Classical criminological theory began with Cesare Lombroso (1835-1909), an Italian physician apparently influenced by Darwinism, who theorized that criminals were evolutional throwbacks, and who believed in biological determinism (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990).Henderson and Simon (1994) stated that conservatives generally embrace anomie and liberals generally embrace affiliation causation. A dichotomy generally equivalent to the affinity/affiliation theory described above.Henderson and Simon (1994) characterized the Christopher Commission as "liberal" based upon the suggested improvements in minority concerns. Conservative and liberal perspectives both lack sociological perspective, according to Henderson and Simon. Also lacking is an attempt to show the interconnection among macro, intermediate, and micro levels.Theories of occupational crime may have some relevance, but police corruption is a unique subcategory—crime within the institutions responsible for control of crime—and a form of "elite" deviance. Henderson and Simon (1994) proposed a synthesis of theoretical perspectives to account for this subcategory based for the most part upon the theory of C. Wright Mills (1917-1962).Mills stressed social structure (macro level composition, interrelationships, significance of the parts, etc.), historical epoch (cultural ascendancy or decline, what is considered historically significant, characteristics of change, etc.), and biography (roles of the individual, impacts of family, culture, and institutions, etc.).One important attribute of Mill's model is that institutions actually select and shape social character. This is because success in institutional settings ... requires that people, as role players, accept (internalize) the “expectations of institutional leaders” (elites). (Henderson & Simon, 1994, p. 34)Alienation was an important concept to Mills for understanding the structure of behavior; and it can occur at macro, intermediate, and micro levels (Henderson & Simon, 1994). Two types of alienation were identified: inauthenticity and dehumanization. Inauthenticity exists when outward or acknowledged appearances are stated in a positive manner, while the known situation is negative. A macro example would be the coupling of sexual images in advertising with alcohol or cigarettes.In a police department, alienation could be characterized by the Mollen Commission finding that anticorruption efforts were focused more on preventing disclosure than identifying and eliminating corruption (Commission to Investigate Allegations, 1993/1995). The consequence of this form of alienation is dehumanization (Henderson & Simon, 1994).Victor Bernard (cited in Henderson & Simon, 1994) argues that dehumanization is the result of a disconnection of mental concepts from one another and "unconscious denial, repression, depersonalization, isolation of effect, and compartmentalization" (p. 36). Dehumanization is a defense mechanism to internal and external stressors achieved through blinding oneself to the humanity of another.There are two types of dehumanization. The first is self-directed, wherein one mutes emotion and becomes robot-like. This can be a response to anxiety caused by being a powerless part of a bureaucracy. The second is object-directed, wherein one lessens the humanness of another through negative labeling and stereotyping, a self-protection against feelings of guilt and shame. "These two types of dehumanization are mutually reinforcing; reducing one's feelings for other people lessens one's feelings for the self, and lessening the humanness of one's self-image limits one's capacity to relate to others" (Henderson & Simon, 1994, p. 36).Consistent with alienation theorization is neutralization theory (Henderson & Simon, 1994). Guilt feelings that tend to prevent crime can be minimized by rationalizations learned previous to crime commission. Deviant groups commonly construct guilt neutralizing terminology and strategies, such as shifting blame to the victim, dehumanizing the victim, professing loyalty to the group that sanctions or condones the crime (following orders), and condemning the condemners (soft on crime).Henderson and Simon (1994) criticized neutralization theory as deficient because of an intentional disregard for the effects of cultural and societal norms. They pointed out that cultural patterns of crime have been shown to exist.Drawing from Mills and control, differential association, and neutralization theories, Henderson and Simon (1994) made the following theoretical statementsCriminal behavior is widespread in American society, including within the criminal justice system. It is widespread because it is often learned, tolerated and/or encouraged within the organizational contexts that make up criminal justice agencies....2. Only a tiny percentage of such crimes are explained by extreme behaviors of abnormal personalities.... The behavior and the ideologies that justify and excuse them are part of an organization's cultural value system.3. Crime as caused by the inability of immature individuals to delay gratification is a widespread occurrence, so widespread that it is part of the American character....We are not saying that human nature is evil.... We are saying that people are born innocent and relatively "blank" concerning their criminal propensities, and that criminal behavior is a socially acquired attribute. (Henderson & Simon, 1994, pp. 34-35)Sherman (1974c) wrote that it is appropriate to begin corruption causes and effects theorization with a simple model. He chose to "treat police corruption simply as a dependent variable—as effect not cause" (p. 2). However, he pointed out the complexity of the issue by asking: "Why are there different kinds and extents of police corruption in different communities, and in the same communities at different points in their history?" (p. 3). Sherman proposed a sociological theory of police corruption containing the following propositions that are identified as independent variables, or more likely, interdependent or covariant:COMMUNITY STRUCTURE1. There will be less police corruption in a community with little anomie, in terms of corrupters and corruptees.2. There will be less police corruption in communities with a more public-regarding ethos.3. There will be less police corruption in a community with less culture conflict.ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS4. A punishment-centered police bureaucracy will have the least corruption, a representative pattern will have more, and a mock pattern will have the most. [In a representative pattern there is enforcement of and obedience to rules to which workers can contribute. A mock pattern exists when action is only taken due to bad publicity.]5. There will be less corruption in a police agency having leadership highly reputed for integrity.6. There will be less organized police corruption when there is less work group solidarity.7. The less gradual the probable steps in a corrupt policeman's moral career, the less the ultimate 'seriousness' (self-defined) of the grafting.8. The greater the policeman's perception of legitimate advancement opportunities, the less likelihood there will be of their accepting corruption opportunities.LEGAL OPPORTUNITIES9. A decrease in either the scope of morals laws or the demand for the services they proscribe, while holding the other constant, will reduce police corruption opportunities (also the converse).10. An increase in either the scope of the regulative law or the economic incentive to violate it, while holding the other constant, will increase corruption opportunities (also the converse).CORRUPTION CONTROLS11. There will be a greater perceived risk of apprehension for corruption in police agencies that have an internal investigation unit.12. There will be proportionately less undiscovered corruption in police agencies that have an internal investigation unit using proactive methods.13. Controls will decrease corruption only when they can avoid amplifying the corruption's extent or methods.14. Less corruption will go undiscovered in a police agency watched by a vigorous and uncensored news media. (Sherman, 1974c, pp. 31-32)A study conducted by Herbert W. Eber, presented in 1991 at the annual meeting of Multivariate Experimental Psychology, as reported by Lorr and Strack (1994), administered a Clinical Analysis Questionnaire to about 15,000 police officer candidates to determine personality characteristics. The most distinctive finding was that personality profiles “were characterized by a strong pattern of self-discipline or Control, Tough Poise, and low Anxiety” (p. 200).Hyams (1990) conducted a study in which he hypothesized that police officers having unethical attitudes would be found to have higher narcissism (or selfism), and have a perception of their policing role as being more oriented toward arrest than service. In this study involving police officers from one West Coast agency, this hypothesis was confirmed; in addition, he found that[t]hose who are officers out of the academy, with higher levels of narcissism, a role perception oriented more toward arrest and apprehension and higher levels of dedication were found to have less ethical attitudes. (Hyams, 1990, p. 89)In 1998, Chamberlin, using Hyams’ police ethical attitudes instrument, conducted an experiment wherein this instrument was administered to treatment and control groups (pretest), followed by an 8-hour in-service training session on ethics for the treatment group. Six to eight weeks later, the instrument was again administered (posttest).The treatment group was found to show no difference in ethical attitudes between the pretest and the posttest. However, the control group was found to have “significantly increased their scores in the ethics, selfism, and role scales,” an indication of a tendency to have a more positive view of unethical behavior (Chamberlin, 1998, p. 82). Chamberlin does make a cautionary statement that because of the necessity of an “extended training effort and repeated testing, the probability of threats to the internal validity of the study due to history [outside influences such as the known focus of the testing] and maturation [gaining in knowledge over time] were significant” (p. 54).Sherman (1974b) used symbolic interationist theory to explain the existence of police corruption. The corrupt cop appears to have a moral view that differs from the view held prior to becoming an officer, and differs from the morality of his family, thus showing divergence and conflict of views.The school stems from the early work of George Herbert Meade, who saw life as a “conversation of significant symbols,” a process in which one continually defines and redefines one's self as a result of interacting with others. In this school of thought, police bribe-taking is to be explained as an individual process of becoming for each policeman, not as a static or “pressured” result of larger community structure. (Sherman, 1974b, p. 172)Consistent with the findings of the Mollen Commission cited earlier, wherein it is stated that unchecked excessive force is a precursor to corruption, Sherman (1974) indicated that corruption of a police officer is gradual and is characterized by the stages of contingencies, moral experiences, and apologia.Contingencies are circumstances or problems which a person must face, often for purely accidental reasons. The moral experience is a reaction to contingencies, often involving decision of action, that alters the "framework of imagery" in which a person evaluates himself and others. The moral experience is a benchmark between the stages in a moral career, which usually culminate (for the deviant) in an apologia: a distorted image of one's life course that brings it into alignment with the basic values of his society. (Sherman, 1974, p. 194)"Mills argued that people often experience their everyday, private lives as 'a series of traps'" (Henderson & Simon, 1994, p. 35). By this, he meant that people are unaware of how their behavior is unavoidably shaped by their immediate environment. Empirical evidence indicates that as violence-prone officers engage in subsequent confrontations, those confrontations are of increasing intensity (Babcock, 1998).Taylor and Braswell (1978) stated, "All police officers violate departmental rules and regulations and sometimes criminal statutes; it is inherent in their discretionary powers" (p. 177). They quoted a former officer as saying, "It's like a spider web, you're drawn in toward the center" (p. 177), with the center being the point where you have engaged in enough corrupt behavior that you must look the other way when a fellow officer takes another step outside the boundaries.In a similar vein, M. David Ermann (cited in Henderson & Simon, 1994) believed “that white-collar deviance takes place incrementally by merging normal administrative behavior with wrongdoing" (p. 28). In addition, new employees go along with behavior they find present upon their arrival, particularly in organizations that are results oriented. "Organizational crime also frequently occurs in instances where corporate employees are socially and spatially mobile, where they do not consider themselves part of the community in which they live" (p. 29).Biosociology/DemographicsOne consistent finding of research is that males are responsible for substantially more crime than females, “and this conclusion does not depend on the method of measurement (official or self-report), or time period and it seems to hold wherever the matter has been studied by criminologists” (Gottfredson & Polakowski, 1995, p. 68).Both Walsh (1995) and Goldsmith (1991) reported that physiological differences between male and female brains result from differences attributed to hormones and hormone ratios. Increasing testosterone levels in either sex increases assaultive behavior and decreases nurturing behavior, while estradiol decreases assaultive behavior and increases nurturing behavior. Progesterone also increases nurturing behavior, indicating more than mere coincidence regarding the differences of these hormones in males and females (Walsh, 1995). …Analysis yields good evidence that higher levels of testosterone are associated with adult deviance largely because they predispose an individual toward weak social integration and toward juvenile delinquency, and those are factors that considerably increase the likelihood of adult deviance. (Booth & Osgood, 1993, p. 105)Primate studies have shown that “testosterone increases to meet demand” and decreases “when submissiveness is deemed the path of least resistance” (Walsh, 1995, p. 86). It could be inferred that those assuming the role of law enforcer, who must also adopt the trappings (i.e., gun, badge, power to arrest, etc.), will show increased testosterone production. It is also known that as males age the production of testosterone decreases and hormonal ratios favoring nurturant behavior increase. …Gottfredson and Polakowski (1995) related that “[t]he relationship between age and crime is one of the most significant and well established general correlates in the field of criminology” (p. 68). Late adolescence and early adulthood stages account for a "vastly disproportionate amount of crime" (p. 69).The Christopher Commission found that just over 2% of Los Angeles police officers accounted for a disproportionately large number of citizen complaints (Independent Commission, 1991/1995). Lersch and Mieczkowski (1996) conducted a study to test this phenomenon and to determine if there are characteristics shared between officers with higher numbers of complaints, in effect testing the rotten apple theory (affinity theory). They also examined characteristics of complainants and complaints to determine if patterns existed.Lersch and Mieczkowski (1996) reviewed 682 allegations against 274 officers. "A small group of 37 officers, or about 7 percent of the sworn personnel, accounted for over one-third of the total number of complaints filed over the three-year period of analysis" (p. 37). The repeat offenders were all male, and "significantly younger and less experienced than their peers," and they were "more likely to be accused of violent and non-violent harassment resulting from a proactive contact" (p. 37).Babcock (1998) examined "the relationship between individual police officer characteristics, situational factors and the incidence of violent police-citizen encounters" (p. iv). He studied 117 officers in a department numbering about 350. Babcock also found that younger and less experienced officers had a significantly larger number of use-of-force incidents. "The group data suggested that as the number of use-of-force incidents per officer increased, so did the level and severity of violence inflicted by the officer" (p. 246).The age related findings of Lersch and Mieczkowski (1996) and Babcock (1998) were consistent with the findings of Burton et al. (1994/1997), who also reported that age was significantly related to nonutilitarian crime (not providing economic reward).Girodo (1991) conducted a psychological assessment of 271 undercover drug agents, with the purpose of correlating deviant behavior with personality dimensions. Among other findings, he determined that drug and alcohol abuse and disciplinary problems increased as undercover experience increased, somewhat contrary to the age-related findings cited earlier in this paper.Disinhibition was the significant predictor of risk for corruption in nearly half the agents … Disinhibition, however, did not predict risk for corruption among the best ... [person-environment] fit notwithstanding their obtaining the highest ... [disinhibition] scores of all. Their risk for corruption, while not particularly high, was best accounted for inversely by scores on the trait of Disciplined Self-Image. Finally, the High Extraversion-High Neuroticism agents produced the largest risk for corruption index; their higher scores on Experience Seeking and Neuroticism, would appear to be a poor combination.... The personality traits associated with corruption risk were impulsivity, emotionality, and undisciplined self-image. When these were found together, as in the Extraverted-Neurotic, we also found an increased risk for drug/alcohol abuse and disciplinary problems. (Girodo, 1991, pp. 368-369)Psychological theory has been unable to shed much light on the actions of individual officers, according to Worden (1996). Attitudinal studies, including Worden’s work, have indicated only a weak correlation between use of force and outlooks on human nature and “moral attitudes toward coercive authority” (p. 26). Organizational and social factors were shown to have a greater impact upon behavior. However,A larger body of evidence has accumulated on the relationship of officer’s behavior to their background and characteristics—race, gender, length of police service, and especially education. Officer’s educational backgrounds have been the subject of a number of studies, and although this research has shown that education bears no more than a weak relationship to officer’s attitudes ... and no relationship to the use of deadly force ..., it also indicates that college-educated officers generate fewer citizen complaints.... [O]n most behavioral dimensions the differences [between men and women] are negligible.... [B]lack officers ... are more likely to use deadly force ..., but these differences can be attributed to ... duty assignments.... Finally, analyses of officer’s length of service indicate that less experienced officers ... patrol more aggressively, ... are more likely to make arrests, ... and use deadly force. (Worden, 1996, p. 27)In research by Robert Friedrich (cited in Worden, 1996), published in 1980, the explanations of the use of force were characterized as having three contributory aspects—individual, situational, and organizational—were subjected to analysis. Friedrich found marginal correlation only regarding situational aspects. Provocative acts of a low-class, intoxicated, felon were most likely to evoke the use of force. Officer characteristics were not found to be significant.The GAO noted that police officers “lacking in experience and some higher education were considered to be more susceptible to involvement in illicit drug-related activities" (United States General Accounting Office, 1998, p. 4). Brown and Campbell (1994) concluded that response to stress is related to “personality, and life experiences, as well as variables such as age, gender and family history” (p. 19).StressGary Hankins (cited in Sulc, 1995), an official with the Fraternal Order of Police, related that "[p]olice officers die younger, suffer more injuries and stress-related disabilities than the average American ... [and] have high rates of alcoholism, divorce and suicide" (pp. 80-81). Hankins contended that stress inherent to criminal justice positions exceeds that of most other occupational groups. Corruption has been identified as a reaction to stress (Winter, 1993).In 1973, Haney, Banks, and Zimbardo (1973/1981), psychologists at Stanford University, conducted an experiment wherein “normal” college students were randomly selected as either guards or prisoners for a prison simulation. The planned 2-week experiment was terminated after less than half that time due to unexpectedly high levels of stress, and even distress in some cases, on the part of prisoners.Interactions between guards and prisoners were typically hostile and negative, with guards displaying increasing levels of aggression and authoritarianism. Haney et al. (cited in Maxfield & Babbie, 1998) concluded that their "results are ... congruent with Milgram who most convincingly demonstrated the proposition that evil acts are not necessarily the deeds of evil men, but may be attributable to the operation of powerful social forces" (p. 191). "Moreover, since both prisoners and guards are locked into a dynamic, symbiotic relationship which is destructive to their human nature, guards are also society's prisoners" (Haney et al., 1973/1981, p. 68).The reference to Milgram above concerns an experiment wherein subjects were directed to administer what were in fact simulated electrical shocks to an experimenter's confederate. The device manipulated by the subject was marked to purportedly indicate severity of the shock up to “severe,” while no shock was actually administered.The level of shock the subject was willing to give upon command of the experimenter was the primary dependent variable. Unexpected findings included "the sheer strength of obedient tendencies manifested" and "the extraordinary tension and emotional strain" on the subjects when they complied with orders to inflict high shock levels (Milgram, 1963/1981, pp. 33-34).This reference to stress induced by inflicting punishment is significant to the researcher, and is a stressor not specifically listed as applicable to police in relevant literature. "As former Chief Justice Earl Warren has said, the policeman is more powerful than the President. Only the policeman has the power to deprive an American of his liberty" (Sherman, 1974c, p. vii).Shooting, even shooting at, someone in the line of duty can readily be identified as a traumatic event. Arresting a father and mother while restraining their grieving 4 year-old, particularly when the crime involved is mala prohibida versus mala in se (prohibited by law versus a crime such as murder that is bad in and of itself), can also be an enduringly stressful event, as the researcher can personally attest.This is stress of punishment infliction as opposed to stress from the potential of personal injury at the hands of an arrestee. It would seem easily verifiable that most arrests are for transgressions of the former (mala prohibida). For more than one reason, an arrest—even if one does not fear for one’s own safety—can be stressful.Moreover, “ever-present danger lies in taking an action that is judged improper” (Waddington, 1999, p. 14). A judgment made in haste will be reviewed at leisure though official channels, as well as by a society as a whole.Brown and Campbell (1994) reported that it is “well documented that high levels of stress among employees, whether induced at work or by personal problems, can reduce productivity” (p. 1). Selye (cited in Winter, 1993), a stress research pioneer, stated that law enforcement is "one of the most hazardous professions, even exceeding the formidable stresses and strains of air traffic control" (p. 253). However, Brown and Campbell relate that empirical support for this position is not consistent.Winter (1993) defined stress as "the awareness of potential threat, or in other words [in the context of police corruption], awareness of the potential for a comprehensive change in one's core structures," such as experienced by a newly hired police officer (p. 254). Brown and Campbell (1994) offered three definitions of stress. The first was a model wherein an external factor causes “some degree of physical or psychological discomfort” (pp. 14-15).The second was a process that relies upon Selye’s General Adaptation Syndrome. This included:·The initial alarm reaction. The “fight or flight” response [from exposure to a threat] ... which ... includes physiological changes preparing the body for “fight or flight.”·The stage of resistance. The period during which the person adapts to external stressors and symptoms of stress improve or disappear.·The stage of exhaustion. [I]f the stressor is sufficiently severe or prolonged ... symptoms reappear and the end result is death. (Brown & Campbell, 1994, p. 15) …“The accumulation of evidence ... does indicate that stress levels within the police do play a significant role in absenteeism and wastage through early retirement” (p. 10), and “some research has indeed shown that the police tend to exhibit higher rates of stress-related disease, higher suicide rates and higher divorce rates” (p. 13).United States and British police “listed poor and insensitive supervision, unreasonable workload, shift work, personal safety and volume of paperwork as the most significant sources of stress at work” (Brown & Campbell, 1994, p. 14). However, “police work” being somewhat non-specific, it must be noted that “[r]ank, role, gender, ethnicity and sexual orientation result in some distinctive patterns of stress experiences” (p. 167).For Winter (1993), police stress lies in problems encountered with administrative procedures and legal proceedings that lead torole ambiguity and role conflict (e.g., between the roles of community servant, as exemplified in the stereotype of the general British Bobby, and crime fighter and between the requirement to enforce the law and the procedural constraints imposed on the officer by that same law). (Winter, 1993, p. 254)Kirkcaldy (1993) conducted a study of police stress involving 42 officers from several countries attending a stress. The police officers studied showed a higher level of internal control than the general population, and they "were more likely to be stressed in terms of organizational structure and climate ..., home and work interface ..., and relationships with other people" when compared to the general British population (p. 386). Though not stated in the article, it may be fair to assume that these were not run-of-the-mill patrol officers on this junket to Germany. Whether or not the sample population is representative of the population of street-level officers could be questioned.Violanti and Aron (1993) found that police organizational stressors (court decisions, regulations, nonparticipation in job decisions, disagreeable duties, discipline matters, etc.) were 6.3 times more likely to cause distress than was "police work." This study was conducted in a large New York department and consisted of 103 respondents who submitted a self-report survey.Similarly, Kirkcaldy, Cooper, and Ruffalo (1995) conducted a study of 49 officers in one Illinois town (the size of the department is unknown), and determined that these officers found "factors intrinsic to the job" to be lesser stress producers than "organizational structure and climate" (p. 700). Kirkcaldy et al. observed positive correlation between both psychological and physical illness and stress. In addition, they observed a significant negative correlation between perceived stress and job satisfaction. They recommended providing counseling and coping strategies to enhance self-control.Carona (1998) conducted a study having as its hypothesis the expectation that police departments having high-quality stress-relief programs would have fewer losses to sick leave, fewer resignations, fewer vehicle accidents, and fewer sustained excessive force complaints. Carona discovered no significant correlations in this research. However, it was determined that departments with longer running stress programs had "fewer sustained excessive force complaints" (p. 27).One possibly confounding variable that was apparently not addressed by these studies of stress in police (Kirkcaldy, 1993; Kirkcaldy et al., 1995; Violanti & Aron, 1993) could be the traditional stoicism expected of authority figures, and how this could be affected by self-reporting of police officers through under reporting perceptions of stress caused by intrinsic factors.As stated by Brown and Grover (1998), "Police officers are taught to respond personably rather than personally to their operational duties, to project strength and authority, to deal with events without displaying emotion and put the requirements of the work before their own emotional needs" (p. 181). This phenomenon has also been described as the “cult of masculinity” (Waddington, 1999, p. 11).Brown and Grover (1998) studied police officers and the role moderating factors have on coping and distress when stressors are present. One finding was that those exposed to both high and low levels of stress show the greatest levels of psychological distress when they lack social support, have high negative attitudes concerning emotional expression, and low just world beliefs. Those with low just world beliefs "perceive the threats as being in excess of their capacity to cope," making them unable to assimilate and integrate stressful experiences (p. 181). Also assumed in the definition of low just world beliefs was a feeling of low control on the part of the officer.A Gallup survey of randomly selected workers indicated that "the most common cause of workplace anger ... [is] the actions of supervisors or managers" (Wuensche, 1999, p. 1D). The next most anger-producing circumstances were, respectively, "irritating co-workers" and "dealing with the public" (p. 1D). Donald Gibson (cited in Wuensche, 1999), a Yale University School of Management professor, stated, "In an environment where you think people are satisfied with their jobs, there is a sort of undercurrent of anger and resentment aimed at the workplace that could potentially lead to the kinds of explosions or rage we have seen" (p. 1D). The rage Gibson refers to was that found in "normal" jobs, as opposed to police work.PrejudiceResearch on prejudice disclosed that those who perceive that they have been subjected to prejudice "reported more aggression, sadness, anxiety, and egotism" than those not perceiving such prejudice (Dion & Earn, 1975/1981, p. 281). Winter (1993) reported what appears to be an analogous perception of prejudice when he related that "there is evidence that police officers perceive the public and the press as construing them more negatively than is in fact the case," citing five studies (p. 254). The GAO (1998) also reported that “officers’ dissatisfaction with how they were viewed and treated by the people of the community” has been cited as a factor contributing to corruption (p. 9).The 1968 Kerner Commission examination of the New York police indicated that minorities perceived the police to "symbolize white power, white racism and white repression" (cited in Human Rights Watch, 1998, p. 40). The Christopher Commission surveyed a sample of Los Angeles police officers and found that about 25% of them believed that racial prejudice toward minorities exists and negatively impacts police community relations (Independent Commission, 1991/1995).In 1992, the St. Clair Commission examined excessive force complaints against the Boston Police Department and found that "50 percent of complainants in the sample group were African-American, while 26 percent of Boston's population was African-American" (Human Rights Watch, 1998, p. 41). Worden (1996) related that “empirical evidence confirms that minorities are in fact, overrepresented among the human targets at which police shoot …, but it also indicates that minorities are overrepresented among those whose actions precipitate the use of deadly force by police” (p. 25).The results of a reciprocal negative interchange between police who perceive prejudice from minorities and minorities who perceive prejudice from police, each feeding the negative spiral of the other, should not be overlooked in the search for corruption causes.The Mollen Commission reported in 1993 that the "us versus them" police attitude was particularly strong in minority neighborhoods and contributed to a divisiveness that "makes many police officers feel isolated from, and often hostile toward, the community they are meant to serve" (Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption, 1993/1995, p. 33). The Mollen Commission further reported that the us versus them attitude was "present wherever we found corruption" (p. 33).The GAO (1998) determined that a “commonly identified factor associated with drug-related corruption was a police culture that was characterized by a code of silence, unquestioned loyalty to other officers, and cynicism about the criminal justice system” (p. 4). These characteristics reportedly promote corruption while impeding its detection and control.Paradoxically, the structures of occupation that Durkheim predicted would function to strengthen them as autonomous, professional associations working for the common good (helping to clarify and maintain the value system of the broader society) are often "turned inward." That is, in criminal justice agencies (for several historic, political, economic, and social reasons) professional particularity, the cult of the individual, and extreme social solidarity reflected in a quasi-unification of all authority levels generates the unanticipated consequences of a high degree of corruption and graft in all components of the criminal justice system in virtually every region of the United States. (Henderson & Simon, 1994, p. 102)One aspect of neutralization theory, consistent with the us versus them characteristic, states that "subgroups take on a culture of their own that has been termed 'groupthink'" (Henderson & Simon, 1994, p. 30). One groupthink outcome is that prerationalized criminal acts are agreed upon before their commission. "Those objecting to the proposed ‘policies’ are often criticized by other group members, and, if they persist in their criticism, are threatened with ostracism from the group or firing" (p. 30). (Robb, 2012, Ch. 2)Zimbardo (2008) discussed the Stanford Prison Experiment at length, as well as other examples of the common human failing of resorting to violence or antisocial behavior when subjected to certain situations (e.g., U.S. military mistreatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib); stating:“I argue that while most people are good most of the time, they can be readily seduced into engaging in what would normally qualify as ego-alien deeds, as antisocial, as destructive of others. That seduction or initiation into evil can be understood by recognizing that most actors are not solitary figures improvising soliloquies on the empty stage of life. … They comprise situational features we must come to appreciate as influencing how behavior can be dramatically modified” (p. vii-viii).References:Robb, D. L. (2002). An investigation of self-control and its relationship to ethical attitudes in criminal justice personnel. Dissertation Abstracts International, 62 (12), 4343. (UMI No. 3036984). Retrieved from: https://www.academia.edu/28412566/TITLE_An_investigation_of_self-control_and_its_relationship_to_ethical_attitudes_in_criminal_justice_personnelMyers, D. G. (2012). Social psychology (11th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.Zimbardo, P. (2008). The Lucifer Effect: Understanding how good people turn evil. New York: Random House.