By Order Of The Commander Kadena Air: Fill & Download for Free

This actually can be tricky territory. The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) is a bit different from the civilian legal system. It has to minimize the possibility of inappropriate relationships (AKA “fraternization”) and maintain good order and discipline while allowing for real-world situations like the one you describe (as a hypothetical, I assume) in your question.The general guidance covering such situations in the U.S. Air Force is contained in Air Force Instruction 36–2909, Professional and Unprofessional Relationships. They don’t pretend to offer it as a cookbook, but it at least gives some considerations for people who might find themselves getting into something outside the norms of officer/enlisted interactions.If an officer marries an enlisted member, that’s generally viewed as a significant offense. (It might very well go even worse when the officer involved is a military attorney and seemingly should know better; see Air Force takes action against Kadena officer married to enlisted wife for a media-documented case study.) In the linked article, it makes it clear that the two knew each other before the officer was commissioned. However, they got married after he was. The timeline offered by both sides makes interesting reading; you might want to look over their case as described, find some other references to it, and see which side you might take. Maybe the couple was trying to game the system; maybe they weren’t.(As an aside, I find it coincidental (not) that this instruction — which had been originally issued in 1999 — was comprehensively changed in a new release just months after this case was adjudicated. I don’t have time to read through everything that changed, but I’m willing to bet they’ve sharpened the basis of interpreting similar cases a tad.)One of the lead-off paragraphs in the AFI I mentioned above offers some perspective on how the Air Force tries to wrestle with these kinds of situations:“Personal relationships that are not initially unprofessional may become unprofessional when facts or circumstances change. For example, a close personal relationship between officers or between enlisted members can easily become unprofessional if one member becomes the commander, supervisor or rater of the other. Air Force members, both officer and enlisted, must be sensitive to the formation of these personal relationships, as well as the possibility that relationships that are not initially unprofessional may become so due to changed circumstances. The rules regarding personal relationships must be somewhat elastic to accommodate differing conditions and operational necessities; however, the underlying standard is that Air Force members are expected to avoid those relationships that negatively affect morale, discipline, respect for authority and unit cohesion.”To your specific question, I actually knew a military couple where the example you cite happened, back in the mists of time. Even in that unenlightened age, nobody ever seemed to have much of a problem with it, probably because there was no “negative effect” on their respective units. One of them was a hotshot who did extremely well in their specialty and earned a degree and a commission. No harm, no foul.I also knew an officer/enlisted couple that teetered on the brink of impropriety at one point (if they didn’t actually go over the falls in a barrel), but they were extremely discreet, and the enlisted member left the service within a few months of things getting revved up. They subsequently got married and have been for decades. The heart wants what the heart wants.

Dennis Watson's reply is spot on. The mentoring I do at local high schools and colleges for potential officer candidates and enlistees always surfaces plenty of interest in special forces/operations-related career fields. By any measure, there are no easy spec ops jobs, nor is there a sure-fire method to successfully make it through training.In terms of USAF's Pararescue Jumper ("PJ") training and the career field itself, here are a few points to ponder:1. There are approximately 450 currently qualified PJs actively serving in the Air Force. The PJ career field has never been fully staffed...never. The Air Force in the past 20 years has typically had 150-to-200 PJ and CRO openings available to qualified applicants. When comparing the number of mission qualified airmen exiting the career field vs. the number of airmen who successfully make it through training to become mission qualified PJ/CROs, there's little, if any, net gain.2. The Air Force has repeatedly studied PJs and every aspect of the career field and the training curriculum to better understand what it takes to become a qualified PJ, and then remain qualified. One of the things that has been documented repeatedly in every USAF study is there's no prototypical PJ, or a prototype of a successful PJ candidate. The studies did not re-state known factors or ones that are not easily remedied via changes to the training curriculum, such as: Good physical fitness; above average intellect; solid academic skills; strong moral fiber & ethical conduct; mental toughness; superior belief in the value of all human life. You might notice the foregoing traits are primarily intrinsic to an individual person's make-up, not just a learned behavior or skill coming from a teacher or textbook.3. The training washout rate for PJ candidates is the highest amongst all military special operations careers. I've acquired Air Force records that indicate the washout rate averages 70%. The training curriculum has been revised from time-to-time, including the length of time spent on various topics. PJ/CRO SMEs (subject matter experts) and USAF career field managers have stated repeatedly that when considering options to improve the washout rate, they are only comfortable in adjusting the program to allow for some more training hours in certain areas, or adjusting the training techniques. None are agreeable to watering-down the graduation qualification standards. Each SME has been emphatic that they'd rather have the career field remain understaffed, than relax the standards, and end up with airmen in the field with diminished skills, or less capable than PJ/CROs already down range who pipelined through the system before standards were adjusted.One training concession was made about five or six years ago to help boost the success rate of students graduating from the 9 week PJ Indoctrination Course at Lackland AFB. A significant portion of the 70% washout rate over the full, 77-week program was from the Indoc Course; many due to inadequate physical fitness progress. To that end, the PJ/CRO career field manager authorized a two week "pre-indoc" class called the Pararescue Development Course - mostly for added physical conditioning.The two hyperlinks below are USAF's manual for PJ operations, techniques & procedures, and the current PJ Career Field Education & Training Plan.The current 77-week program consists of the following:o Pararescue Development Course: Lackland AFB, Texas (2 weeks)o Indoctrination Course: Lackland AFB, Texas (9 weeks)o Combat Diver (Scuba School): Panama City, Fla. (4 weeks)o Basic Army Airborne School: Ft. Benning, Ga. (3 weeks)o Basic Survival & Underwater Egress: Fairchild AFB, Wash. (17 days)o Military Freefall Parachutist (HALO): Yuma Proving Grounds, Ariz. (4-weeks)o PJ Medical (EMT-Paramedic): (28 weeks)o Pararescue Apprentice Course: (24 weeks)Because PJs are assigned to two primary Air Force missions - CSAR and Special Operations, there's an additional 10 weeks of training at Hurlburt Field, FL. if your first duty squadron is a Special Tactics unit. The 3rd hyperlink below is a condensed PJ career field fact sheet prepared by the Air Force in 2012.Below is a list of possible duty stations in the PJ/CRO career field. There may be changes to this list; but, what is listed has been pretty typical for many years.Assignment Locations in Rescue Squadrons:o Moody AFB, (Valdosta) Ga. (38th Rescue Squadron)o Nellis AFB, (Las Vegas) Nev. (58th Rescue Squadron)o Davis-Monthan AFB, (Tucson) Ariz. (48th Rescue Squadron)o Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, Japan (31st Rescue Squadron)o RAF Lakenheath, (England) United Kingdom (OL 1, 48th Fighter Wing)Assignment Locations in Special Tactics Squadrons:o Hurlburt Field, (Ft. Walton Beach) Fla. (23rd Special Tactics Squadron)o Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, Japan (320th Special Tactics Squadron)o Mildenhall AB, (England) United Kingdom (321st Special Tactics Squadron)o Various state-side locations (371st SOCTS, Special Ops Recruiting Liaison)o Pope AFB, (Fayetteville) N.C. (24th Special Tactics Squadrons). Note: Assignment to 24 STS is possible after serving 2-years in an operational squadron. The 24 STS technically belongs to the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command, not the Air Force. This unit requires at least 2 years experience in a rescue or special tactics squadron, and able to pass the special selection process before you get PCS orders to the 24 STS.http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_a3_5/publication/afi16-1202/afi16-1202.pdfhttp://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_a3_5/publication/cfetp1t2xx/cfetp1t2xx.pdfhttp://www.rs.af.mil/shared/media/document/afd-120214-015.pdfSteve Miller, Copyright (c) 2009, 2013, 2015

Heres an intresting one, Operation Paul Bunyan in the Koren DMZ in the summer of 1976.For thoes who are unfamiliar with the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), essentually (feel free to edit if this if is inaccurate) after the korean war the border area was turned into a sort of no-go area to attempt to prevent the two opposing sides from getting too close and start shooting at eachother. The Joint Security Area (JSA) was the official border crossing and so contain troops from both sides to observe the border. However as the JSA was within the DMZ the amount of weaponry was surverly limited.The south side of the DMZ and JSA were controlled by the United Nations Command (UNC) wich comprised primerlly of US and South Korean Troops.In August 1976 UNC agreed with the North Korean Army that a tree in the JSA (within the DMZ) was obstructing an observation post on the South Korean side. The UN said it needs to be pruned to allow a clear line of sight to the border bridge, the North Koreans agreed and gave permission for some US Army Engineers and South Korean chaps to pop down to the bridge for a spot of hedge trimming.However, for reasons that arent all that clear, the North Korean guards on the other side of the bridge didnt like this very much and decided to brutally beat all of the South Korean and American troops attempting to adjust the foliage of the tree with clubs and axes, killing two of the Americans.This is obviously a pretty horrific thing to happen, not least of all because UNC had received permission from the North Koreans to trim the tree.The response to this brutal episode was perfect, and if you remember Gerald Ford for anything (US President at the time) remeber him for this:To Quote Wikipedia: “In response to the "ax murder incident", the UNC determined that instead of trimming the branches that obscured visibility, they would cut down the tree with the aid of overwhelming force”I could rewrite the wikipedia article, but that would seem pointless, so I shall just copy it below. Its rather long but its quite amusing to read allowed, you really get a feel for the phrase “overwhelming force":“Operation Paul Bunyan was carried out on August 21 at 07:00, three days after the killings. A convoy of 23 American and South Korean vehicles ("Task Force Vierra", named after Lieutenant Colonel Victor S. Vierra, commander of the United States Army Support Group) drove into the JSA without warning to the North Koreans, who had one observation post manned at that hour. In the vehicles were two eight-man teams of military engineers (from the 2nd Engineer Battalion, 2nd Infantry Division) equipped with chain-saws to cut down the tree.These teams were accompanied by two 30-man security platoons from the Joint Security Force, who were armed with pistols and axe handles. The 2nd Platoon secured the northern entrance to the JSA via the Bridge of No Return, while the 3rd Platoon secured the southern edge of the area.Concurrently, a team from B Company, commanded by Captain Walter Seifried, had activated the detonation systems for the charges on Freedom Bridge and had the 165mm main gun of the M728 combat engineer vehicle aimed mid-span to ensure that the bridge would fall should the order be given for its destruction. Also B Company, supporting E Company (bridge), were building M4T6 rafts on the Imjin River should the situation require emergency evacuation by that route.In addition, a 64-man South Korean Special Forces company accompanied them, armed with clubs and trained in Tae Kwon Do, supposedly without firearms. However, once they parked their trucks near the Bridge of No Return, they started throwing out the sandbags that lined the truck bottoms, and handing out M16 rifles and M79 grenade launchers that had been concealed below.Several of the special forces men also hadclaymore mines strapped to their chests with the firing mechanism in their hands, and were shouting at the North Koreans to cross the bridge.A U.S. Infantry company in 20 utility helicopters and seven Cobra attack helicopters circled behind them. Behind these helicopters, B-52 Stratofortresses from Guam escorted by U.S. F-4 Phantom IIs from Kunsan Air Base and South Korean F-5 and F-86fighters were visible flying across the sky at high altitude. At Taegu Air Base, F-111bombers of the 366th Tactical Fighter Wingout of Mountain Home Air Force Base, were stationed, and F-4 Phantoms C and D from the 18th TFW Kadena Air Base and Clark Air Basewere also deployed. The aircraft carrierUSS Midway task force had also been moved to a station just offshore.Near the edges of the DMZ, many more heavily armed U.S. and South Korean infantry,artillery including the Second Battalion, 71st Air Defense Regiment armed with Improved Hawk missiles, and armor were waiting to back up the special operations team. Bases near the DMZ were prepared for demolition in the case of a military response. The defense condition (DEFCON) was elevated on order of General Stilwell, as recounted in Colonel De LaTeur's research paper later. In addition, 12,000 additional troops were ordered to Korea, including 1,800 Marines from Okinawa.During the operation, nuclear-capable strategic bombers circled over the JSA.According to an intelligence analyst monitoring the North Korea tactical radio net, the accumulation of force "blew their... minds".”If you've made it this far, thanks for reading!