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As others have already pointed out, the answer largely depends on who is meant by “the Germans.” (Below two German fighter pilots. Photo courtesy of Chris Goss.)Many individual airmen engaged directly in the Battle, particularly those flying in the bombers, may well have experienced serious doubts about a German victory by the end of August. Many more probably felt a degree of despair when the RAF put up such a vigorous defense on September 15. Their opinions, however, were largely immaterial.The people who mattered — the Luftwaffe General Staff, the Luftwaffe Senior Leadership and the German political leadership (Hitler) were the people who needed to understand what had happened, to draw the right conclusions and take appropriate action. The historical record suggests that it was precisely these elements that utterly failed to recognize that the Luftwaffe had been soundly defeated.Allow me to describe the situation from the German perspective for the three stages of the Battle of Britain: the Kanalkampf, the attacks on RAF infrastructure, and the attack on London.Phase I: KanalkampfOn July 10, Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft spotted a juice “target of opportunity” in the form of a large convoy making for the Straits of Dover and ordered an assault on it. The RAF sent a flight of Spitfires to defend the convoy — a moderate and measured response. Yet both sides called in reinforcements and the largest single dogfight of the war so far ensued — causing many historians to date the start of the Battle of Britain from this day.Significantly for this discussion, both sides claimed victory. The RAF had successfully broken up the bomber formations and prevented their effectiveness; only one ship was lost. In addition, they had destroyed six Luftwaffe aircraft (three bombers and three of the escorting Me110s) for the loss of only one aircraft and pilot, although four additional Hurricanes had sustained damage. However, the Luftwaffe was convinced they had just attained a stunning victory. They believed they had shot down thirty RAF fighters! The German Army High Command (OKW) was told that the RAF would be “neutralized” in between two to four weeks.In the following days, fate favored first one and then the other side, and both air forces learned valuable lessons. The Germans learned that the British would shoot down their air ambulances mercilessly, despite the fact that they were unarmed and marked by the Red Cross — something the Germans considered barbaric right to the end of the war. The Germans also gradually came to recognize that the Me 110 was not a match for the British Hurricanes and Spitfires.The British, however, learned that their own two-seater fighter was a disaster. On July 19, the Luftwaffe annihilated the RAF’s only Defiant squadron in just 30 minutes.Perhaps it was this victory that encouraged Goering to make a dramatic appeal to the British public in a speech before the Reichstag that same evening. Goering argued that the British were already defeated and there was no need to senselessly prolong the destruction and casualties. Recognizing that Churchill was not receptive to peace overtures, Goering’s speech was aimed not at the British government per se, but rather at presumably reasonable and peace-loving elements inside Britain, who were thereby encouraged to bring down Churchill’s government. Goering is said to have been astonished that his words did not fall on fertile ground. The BBC sent a rejection within an hour, while the official rejection was broadcast by Lord Halifax — the leader of the British peace faction — two days later.On July 25, a westbound convoy was all but wiped out, only two merchantmen remaining afloat at the end of the day, and two Royal Navy destroyers sent to their assistance were so badly damaged that they were withdrawn from the fight. The Admiralty concluded that the advantages of sending shipping through the Straits of Dover did not justify the risks and cancelled all merchant shipping in the confined waters of the Channel by daylight starting July 26. Two days later, because RAF reconnaissance showed that long-range guns were being installed at Calais the Admiralty went one step farther and abandoned Dover as a base for the Royal Navy. Thus by July 29, the English Channel was effectively closed to all British shipping during the hours of daylight.On 7 August, a British attempt to slip a convoy through the Straits of Dover under cover of darkness resulted in a massacre of British merchantmen. Of 20 ships, only four came through unscathed, while seven were sunk outright, six rendered temporarily unseaworthy, and the remainder damaged. The RAF had, furthermore, lost thirteen fighters while another five were shot up while bringing down ten Stukas, four Me 110s and two Me 109s. The Germans claimed 20 British fighters, reinforcing their sense of superiority and victory.August 11 saw three separate air battles, two over convoys off the Essex coast and the Thames Estuary and a third over the naval base of Portland on the Dorset coast. The later was a taste of things to come with 165 German aircraft deployed on the raid, the largest raid against British targets up to that time. British and German aircraft losses were almost identical. Nineteen Luftwaffe aircraft (five bombers, eight Me 109s and six Me 110s) were shot down and an additional six sustained damage. The RAF lost sixteen fighters and an additional seven aircraft were damaged. However, the Luftwaffe claimed fifty-seven kills, including aircraft types never deployed by the RAF at all.The Germans had every reason to think they were winning the Kanalkampf.Phase II: Attacks on RAF Infrastructure(Above photo of damage to an RAF hangar, courtesy of Chris Goss)The Luftwaffe opened its main offensive against British air defenses with high morale. According to their calculations, during the Kanalkampf they had achieved a “kill ratio” (number of enemy aircraft shot down per friendly aircraft lost) of 5:1. That is, they believed that they had destroyed five RAF aircraft for every Luftwaffe loss. German intelligence, meanwhile, underestimated British aircraft production by 50% — that is they believed the British aircraft manufacturers were delivering only 250 fighters per month when, in fact, under Lord Beaverbrook’s management British aircraft factories were producing 500 Hurricanes and Spitfires every month.On so-called “Eagle Day,” the start of the Luftwaffe offensive against the RAF the Luftwaffe leadership was aware that a mix-up about timing had hurt them and cost them lives and aircraft, but they consoled themselves with the “fact” — unfortunately largely self-fabricated — that they had destroyed 84 RAF fighters. The correct figure for RAF losses were 13 aircraft lost in the air and one on the ground. RAF pilot losses amounted to just three. The RAF had handily won on Eagle Day — the Germans just didn’t know it yet.On August 15, in contrast, the results for the Luftwaffe were shockingly disappointing — and this time they knew it. The northern raids had been intercepted early, forcing many bombers to drop their loads into the sea, while the Me110 again proved completely incapable of providing an effective protection for the bombers. The raids on the south had provoked a savage response and many of the targets had been missed. Critically, instead of Biggin Hill, the Luftwaffe had bombed West Malling, a satellite airfield still under construction, and instead of Kenley they had hit the satellite airfield at Croydon. Altogether the Luftwaffe had flown 2,000 sorties and lost 75 aircraft, including some key senior officers.While the Luftwaffe's loss rate of 3.75% was far below what RAF Bomber Command and the U.S. Eighth Air Force would endure at the height of the Allied bombing offensive, it was sobering to an air force that until this date had believed it was easily winning the air war against Britain. August 15 went down in Luftwaffe history as “Black Thursday.” But it didn’t convince anyone in authority that the Battle could not be won.On August 16, the important Sector Airfield of Tangmere was badly hit and so was the Ventnor radar station. The former was only temporarily inoperable, but Ventnor was knocked off the air for seven days. Other targets that day were the Portsmouth docks, Manston, and the non-Fighter Command airfields at Lee-on-Solent and Brize Norton. At Tangmere, the Stukas were attacked by Tangmere based squadrons with such viciousness and effect that 70% of the Stuka unit engaged was wiped out. Nevertheless, based on the intelligence reports received and (false) assumptions about aircraft production, the Luftwaffe General Staff concluded that the RAF had at most 300 operable fighter aircraft left. In fact, there were 855 serviceable aircraft with front line squadrons alone, and another 363 fighter aircraft available at training units and maintenance units.By August 18, the Luftwaffe had lost roughly 300 aircraft, thirty percent more than in the entire previous month. Yet Goering’s response to the situation was essentially “more of the same.”In the next ten days, the Luftwaffe’s hammering of Fighter Command started to have an impact. Park acknowledged in a memo to the Ministry that his squadrons were not getting the support they needed. Furthermore, while the Luftwaffe was still losing more aircraft than the RAF, the margin had narrowed dramatically. In the second half of August, 380 Luftwaffe machines were lost for 286 RAF fighters. The RAF was losing more than 140 fighters per week. At that rate, even Beaverbrook was hard pressed to keep pace, and one effective strike on a Hurricane or Spitfire factory would have wiped out the ability of the British aircraft industry to replace losses in a timely fashion.More critical, of course, were the pilot losses that simply could not be replaced in a short space of time. By the end of August 1940, RAF Training Command was “producing” pilots with nominal training on operational fighter aircraft at a rate of 280 per month. Casualties in August, however, had been 348 pilots. The training infrastructure was not keeping up with demand.That was not a situation that could be reversed by a change in policy or priorities. It took roughly one year to train a young man to fly monoplane fighter aircraft; there were no short-cuts or means of speeding up “production.” Furthermore, turning that pilot into an effective fighter pilot took more than time — it took experience. Inexperienced pilots had a six-times higher chance of being killed than an experienced pilot. Many replacement pilots did not survive their first sortie; many more did not survive their first week.The same was true of inexperienced squadrons. In squadrons with experienced leaders, fledgling pilots got advice, guidance and support from their more-savvy comrades. When entire squadrons without recent front-line experience were rotated into 11 Group, there were no leaders who could warn, coach and protect their charges and slaughters occurred in which six or seven aircraft were shot down in a single engagement often with the loss of several pilots. Some squadrons all but ceased to exist within a week.But the Germans didn’t know any of this.The Germans relied on aerial reconnaissance and the combat reports of their own pilots. As we have seen, Luftwaffe fighter pilots overestimated their victories by huge margins, while the Luftwaffe staff severely underestimated the capacity of the British industry to produce replacement aircraft. At the end of the first week of September, the Luftwaffe was again convinced that the British could have no more than 200 Spitfires and Hurricanes left.Meanwhile, the quality of high-altitude photo reconnaissance was still quite low. It was not always possible to tell what kind of aircraft were on an airfield, let alone the extent of damage. Furthermore, the damage that threatened Fighter Command most severely — electricity and telecommunications cuts to the Operations Rooms and radar stations — were virtually impossible to detect from the recce photos. The destruction of buildings on the other hand was easily recorded and looked very impressive, even if the immediate impact was far less damaging to the RAF’s ability to keep fighting. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the Luftwaffe continued to believe that they were winning the air war against Britain.Phase III: LondonThe decision to switch the focus of the air offensive from RAF Fighter Command to the British capital was not made flippantly. The commander of Luftflotte 3, Generalfeldmarshall Hugo Sperrle opposed the move vehemently. He believed the German fighters were greatly exaggerating their claims (whether intentionally or unintentionally) and he doubted that Fighter Command on was on its last legs. He believed that the assaults on the RAF itself should remain the primary objective of the air offensive.His counterpart in Luftflotte 2, Generalfeldmarshall Albert Kesselring, wasn’t convinced the RAF was broken either, but he noted that (unlike the Dutch, Belgians, and French) the RAF was not allowing itself to be destroyed on the ground. That is, he was fully cognizant of the fact that the Luftwaffe had caught very few RAF fighter aircraft on the ground and drew the incorrect conclusion that the Luftwaffe’s attacks on RAF fighter stations were not terribly effective. He noted further that the RAF possessed a plenitude of airfields beyond the range of his fighters and — since he could not afford to send in unescorted bombers — that meant these fields were de facto immune to attack. Kesselring believed that the RAF would defend itself from destruction by pulling their aircraft back to stations beyond the range of the Luftwaffe.In other words, German ignorance of the vital role of the Sector Operations Rooms at the Sector Control Stations misled the Luftwaffe into underestimating the effect their concentrated attacks on key (albeit not all) RAF airfields had had. This miscalculation combined with the over-estimation of the losses the RAF suffered in the air, led Kesselring to the conclusion that the Luftwaffe needed to concentrate on a target that the RAF would be forced to defend in the air. The British capital seemed ideal for this purpose.Goering, however, was probably swayed not by Kesselring’s military arguments so much as by political considerations. The bottom line was that Hitler wanted an attack on London.On September 7, Goering set out to show Hitler, the German people, and — almost incidentally — the British, just what the Luftwaffe could do. In a maximum effort, 348 bombers escorted by 617 fighters were launched on a single late-afternoon raid. Goering and his field marshals watched through binoculars from the Pas de Calais while picnicking on fine food and selected wines.The attack caught Air Vice Marshal Park flat-footed. He was himself away at a meeting with Dowding and others. His controllers, anticipating attacks on airfields, kept waiting for the large force to split up into multiple smaller raids heading for a variety of different targets. The first squadrons to make visual contact with the raid had never seen anything like it and could hardly believe their eyes.Amazed though they were, a section of three aircraft was detailed to “deal with" the 600 fighters while the remaining nine aircraft attacked the bombers. Naturally, other squadrons were soon sent into the fray, but they arrived piecemeal, one or two at a time. The RAF pilots could not see their comrades coming from different stations on different vectors and attacking in a staggered fashion. They were left feeling that they — a squadron or two — were utterly alone against this gigantic air armada.The Luftwaffe had the same feeling. The RAF did not come up in hoards or swarms, but instead nibbled at the fringes more like irritable gnats than the vicious eagles they had been the weeks before. That is, until they reached London itself. Then more aircraft appeared and a great dog-fight involving close to 1,000 aircraft altogether developed, but it was a fighter-fighter engagement for the most part. Meanwhile, the bombers had set the London docks on fire, destroyed a gas works and shattered hundreds of buildings. At the end of the day, the Luftwaffe lost only fourteen bombers, sixteen 109s and seven 110s. That didn’t seem so bad. All the intelligence about RAF attrition appeared confirmed.Furthermore, with the target now the huge city of London, precision bombing was a luxury. All that mattered was delivering Hitler’s message of vengeance and obliteration until the British surrendered. The Luftwaffe started a round-the-clock bombing offensive, with night as well as daylight raids whenever weather permitted. For the next week, bombing by night and cloud, the Luftwaffe inflicted damage and encountered comparatively little opposition as interceptions went awry in cloud. The impression of a weakening RAF was reinforced.On Sunday September 15, conditions appeared perfect for a new massive daylight raid on London — a final effort before Hitler decided yea-or-nay about an invasion of England. The Luftwaffe confidently mustered its full strength again and sent the raid in. The RAF, however, knew where they were headed this time. There was no need to hold squadron’s back to protect airfields and radar. Instead, Park timed his interceptions to first peel the German escorts away from the bombers with high level, predominantly Spitfire attacks, and then sent the remaining (mostly Hurricane) squadrons in to take out the bombers after their escorts were fully engaged with the Spitfires. Meanwhile, 12 Group had been alerted of the incoming raid and had time to assemble a “Big Wing” of five squadrons just north of London. By the time the last German aircraft of this raid had landed back at base, the Luftwaffe had lost one-quarter of the bombers deployed and more than 12% of the fighters. But this raid had only been the “prelude” to the real strike.The second raid of the day was composed of 114 bombers escorted by 340 fighters. While smaller than the raid of September 7, the fighter/bomber ratio was higher.AVM Park answered with every squadron he had and then some — 10 Group put up squadrons over 11 Group airfields and 12 Group was asked again to provide a Big Wing over London. By 14:35 every available RAF squadron was in the air — with PM Churchill was at Uxbridge watching the entire show -- rather nervously.By evening, however, the RAF was claiming 185 Luftwaffe aircraft for the loss of 28 fighters. Actual Luftwaffe losses were 56. It was now the RAF that was wildly exaggerating their claims, particularly in inexperienced squadrons and those in the Big Wing of 12 Group. But the pilot losses were markedly different. The 81 Luftwaffe airmen had been killed, 63 captured and 31 returned to base wounded. The effective loss to the Luftwaffe was 144 killed and captured. In contrast, 12 RAF pilots were killed and one captured after bailing out into the Channel and being picked up by Luftwaffe air/sea rescue. Even with respect to wounded, the RAF had escaped lightly with only 14 casualties.The returning bomber crews were shaken. Individual units had sustained casualty rates of 30% or more, the worst being 60%. They were shaken too by head-on attacks that appeared suicidal and ramming that was equally so. The RAF did not look beaten to the pilots and aircrew of the Luftwaffe.But in the jovial and congenial atmosphere of Goering’s hunting lodge Karin Hall, all was still well. The RAF had only managed to ‘scrape together’ so many aircraft by denuding the rest of the country and concentrating their fighters around London. They had thrown untrained pilots into the fight who didn’t even know how to shoot — which was why they tried ramming their enemy. If only the days were longer and the weather more stable, the Luftwaffe would have air superiority in a day or two. Fortunately for Goering, his commanders and above all his aircrews, the weather was bad and Hitler postponed the invasion of Great Britain “indefinitely”.The RAF had just won the Battle of Britain -- but the Luftwaffe leadership still hadn’t figured that out!Where Eagles Never Flew shows the Battle of Britain from both sides of the channel. The repeated intelligence failures of the Luftwaffe and their impact on pilot morale is one of the themes. See a video teaser of Where Eagles Never Flew here:For review experts and award information see:Cross Seas PressUNDERSTANDING OURSELVES BY UNDERSTANDING THE PASThttps://crossseaspress.com/where-eagles-never-flew

Charley Ross (Wikimedia Commons/Public Domain)There were numerous cautionary life lessons our parents tried to instill in us as small children. Most warned against getting into cars with strangers, talking to strangers and “don't take candy from strangers”. The last seems the most difficult for young children to process, as every Halloween they go door to door asking strangers for candy and every Easter, a large bunny and his helpers hide eggs and candy. From the mind of a toddler, how is it ok to take candy from these strangers, but not others.According to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, roughly 800,000 children are reported missing each year in the United States -- that's roughly 2,000 per day.[1] Of those, there are 115 child "stranger abduction" cases each year, which means the child was taken by an unknown person.[2]The Gilded Age kidnapping of Charley Rose became the forerunner of sensational child abductions that transfixed the nation, much as the kidnapping of the Lindbergh baby did half a century later. To the current generation, Charley Ross was the JonBenét Ramsey of his day.[3] Indeed, it wasn’t until the disappearance of Etan Patz[4]and later, Adam Walsh, that mass media became a tool crucial to cracking the cases as well as passing legislation meant to curb the number of abductions that ended in death.[5]"Don't take candy from strangers."[6]Ross family home 1910 (A Notorious 19th-Century Kidnapping in Brooklyn)Sadly, the origins of the phrase lie with a four-year-old named Charley Ross, who was abducted in 1874. The kidnapping of Charley Ross shocked the nation. Perhaps the child was targeted for his family's assumed wealth. To all outward appearances, the family appeared financially well off, despite being deeply in debt. His father, Christian Ross, owned a well-appointed house on Washington Lane in Germantown, an upper-middle-class community at the time.[7]It started in the summer of 1874, when two men in a horse-drawn carriage halted in front of the estate. They befriended two little boys who were playing in front of their stately home, in part by giving them candy. For five days in a row, four-year-old Charley Ross and his six-year-old brother Walter chatted with the pair.[8]On July 1, 1874, the men pulled up as usual, but this time the men gave the young Rosses an invitation: come in the carriage, and they would buy the boys candy firecrackers for the upcoming Independence Day celebrations.[9] The children got in, and they went off to a local store where Walter was given 25 cents to spend.[10] But when Walter got out, Charley remained behind with the two men in the carriage. When Walter exited the store minutes later, the buggy, Charlie and the two men were gone.A dam stretching across the Schuylkill River in Philadelphia (The Disappearance of Charley Ross)After the two men sped off in a carriage with little Charlie , five-year-old Walter Ross was left behind on the sidewalk, in an unfamiliar part of Philadelphia. Thankfully, Walter made it back home, though reports differ on how he got there; either his frantic father found him[11] , or a neighbor returned him safely[12] . Either way, once Walter returned to his parent's house, he told them about everything that had happened.Shortly thereafter, disturbing ransom notes began arriving at the Ross home. In 2012, a Philadelphia school librarian, Bridget Flynn, discovered the ransom notes in several storage containers stored in the basement.[13] The first two ransom notes are considered the first ransom notes in American history.[14] Overall, 22 letters were.addressed to the kidnapped boy’s father.Pinkerton Detective Agency - For 150 YearsCharley's panicked and grief stricken father went to the police, eventually hiring the Pinkerton Detective Agency to assist in the search for Charley as the media spread the story around the country.[15] The Pinkertons were.known for their inexhaustible efforts - in fact, their company motto was "we never sleep" [16] - and they had a large collection of mugshots and related information about criminals.When the kidnapping occurred, Sarah Ross, Charley's mother, was in Atlantic City, NJ, tending to her sick daughter.[17] She was completely unaware that her young son had been kidnapped - that is until front page articles pleading for his return hit the front page of the newspapers.[18] The frantic mother returned home to Philadelphia at once.Why not rely on the local authorities? Christian Ross had doubts that the Philadelphia police force had his best interests at heart, and didn't think they were doing enough to find Charley.[19] However, the Pinkertons' efforts also failed to turn up any answers about the boy's disappearance. Ross used the personal column in the Public Ledger to try and communicate with the blackmailers, but to no avail.[20]First Ross ransom note (The Story Behind the First Ransom Note in American History)The first ransom noted, dated July 3, 1874, read:Mr. Ross - be not uneasy you son charly bruster he al writ we as got him and no powers on earth can deliver out of our hand. You wil hav two pay us befor you git him from us. an pay us a big cent to. if you put the cops hunting for him yu is only defeeting yu own end. we is got him fitt so no living power can gits him from us a live. if any aproch is maid to his hidin place that is the signil for his instant anihilation. if yu regard his lif puts no one to search for him you money can fech him out alive an no other existin powers don't deceve yuself and think the detectives can git him from us for that is one imposebel. yu here from us in few day.[21]Five days later a second ransom note appeared, addressing the ransom price for the first time:“This is the lever that moved the rock that hides him from yu $20,000. Not one doler les—impossible—impossible—you cannot get him without it.”[22]The sum of $20,000 in 1874 was the equivalent of about $400,000 today. Over the next several years, the Ross family ultimately spent $60,000 in the search for Charley, the modern-day equivalent of a small fortune.[23]Crimes of the Centuries: Notorious Crimes, Criminals, and Criminal Trials in American History [3 volumes]In the end, little Charley was never seen again. Articles about him appeared in national publications, including the Illustrated Newspaper, and local papers around the country wrote about the shocking kidnapping.[24] A record 700,000 flyers[25] also were passed out with information about the boy in the hopes that someone, somewhere knew something about the case. In addition to print media, Charley's plight was popularized in song. Two songs, "Bring Back Our Darling" and "I Want To See Mamma Once More," kept his story in the public imagination.[26]It wasn’t until December 13, five months after Charley’s disappearance, that the case received a major break. Two career criminals, William Mosher and Joseph Douglas, were burglarizing the home of Judge Charles Van Brunt in Bay Ridge, Brooklyn on that night.[27] Van Brunt’s brother, Holmes, lived next door and spotted the robbery in progress.[28] He assembled a group of men and marched into his brother’s home, all armed with guns.Soon after entering, the house erupted in gunfire. Both burglars were gunned down—William Mosher was shot dead, while Joseph Douglas lay mortally wounded.[29] What happened next remains difficult, if not impossible, to prove. The police and Pinkerton agents had been searching for them for months.The Most Famous Shootout in Bay Ridge HistoryAs early as August, detectives in New York broke the case, following leads about Mosher and Douglas, who had planned, according to an informant, to abduct a Vanderbilt child[30] and ransom him in a manner very similar to what had happened to Ross. Mosher and Douglas traveled the country selling a powdered moth poison called “Mothee,” [31] and Mosher was also a boat-builder known to frequent “the waters around New York in a boat on marauding expeditions.”[32]According to those present, a dying Douglas admitted to kidnapping Charley Ross. He either claimed that the boy was dead, or that he was alive but only Mosher knew of his whereabouts Douglas then succumbed to his wounds, providing no additional clues.[33] The bodies were brought to the morgue, and once the Eagle reported it, curiosity seekers arrived in large numbers to see the bodies.“It was the general remark of all who saw the face of Douglas…that he did not look like a bad man, in fact, he who would rather have been credited with the possession of some intellect,” the Eagle reported. “No one seemed to pity Mosher at all. ‘He’s got a bad face’ was the remark, and the reply generally came promptly, ‘yes, he has, he’s well out of the way.”[34]Walter Ross was brought to the morgue in Brooklyn, on (what’s now) Ashland Place in Fort Greene, and left alone with the bodies, no one telling him or asking him anything, until he spontaneously recognized and identified the bodies as those of the men who had invited him and his little brother Charley into their horse-drawn carriage.[35]Police later arrested a third member of the gang, William Westervelt, who was a disgraced Philadelphia policeman and brother-in-law of William Mosher.[36] Although Westervelt insisted he was not involved in the actual kidnapping, police were convinced he was complicit in the abduction. While in prison waiting for his trial, Westervelt told Christian Rose that Charley had been alive when Mosher was killed.[37]In August 1875, Westervelt went on trial for the kidnapping of Charley Ross and although the jury found him innocent of kidnapping, he was convicted of conspiracy and sentenced to six years in prison.[38]In February 1875, Pennsylvania made kidnapping for extortion a felony crime with serious penalties; before, no one had envisaged the need for such a law.[39] The mayor of Philadelphia also declared a 30-day immunity from charges relating to the Ross abduction, since the killers were dead.Christian Ross spent the next 23 years trying to locate Charley and bring his body back home for a proper burial.[40] When he died in 1897, he was no closer to a solution than the day Charley disappeared. They followed leads and interviewed over 570 boys, teenagers, and eventually grown men from around the world who claimed to have been Charley Ross, wanting to become a part of the reportedly wealthy Ross family.[41]Gustave Blair (The Kidnapping of Little Charley Ross)One of the last and most enduring claims was that of carpenter Gustave Blair. In 1939, an Arizona court ruled that he was Charley Ross after he told a jury that he vaguely remembered being held prisoner in a cave as a small boy and that the family who had raised him told him that he was a kidnap victim.[42] After the ruling, he officially changed his name and travelled to Pennsylvania, but the Ross family refused to accept him.“This man’s claims are entirely unfounded and we intend to ignore the action of the court,” Walter told the Associated Press. “Blair is evidently just another one of the cranks who have been bothering us for the last 65 years. The idea that my brother is still alive is not only absurd, but the man’s story seems unconvincing.”[43]The Rosses had given up hope by then, 65 years after the abduction, that Charley would ever be found alive.Charley's tragic tale left a legacy: it was the first kidnapping for ransom to receive substantial media attention in American history, and today a major missing persons database still bears his name.Footnotes[1] 2015 NCIC Missing Person and Unidentified Person Statistics | Federal Bureau of Investigation[2] Child Kidnapping in America[3] Annals of True Crime: The Kidnapping of Charley Ross[4] What Happened to Etan Patz?[5] The Tragic Origins Of The Phrase "Don't Take Candy From Strangers"[6] The Tragic Origins Of The Phrase "Don't Take Candy From Strangers"[7] Germantown's 1874 unsolved child abduction case - WHYY[8] The Disappearance of Charley Ross[9] http://Carrie Hagen, we is got him: The Kidnapping that Changed America (The Overlook Press, 2011)[10] A Baby Boy Vanishes, an Heiress Abducted & More Infamous Kidnappings Throughout History[11] 12 Disturbing Ransom Notes with Strange and Tragic Consequences[12] The Disappearance of Charley Ross[13] The Story Behind the First Ransom Note in American History [14] The Story Behind the First Ransom Note in American History [15] The Tragic Origins Of The Phrase "Don't Take Candy From Strangers"[16] Allan Pinkerton's Detective Agency | American Experience | PBS[17] https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&url=https://journals.psu.edu/phj/article/download/25641/25410&ved=2ahUKEwibsKST8-_oAhWUGc0KHYMmDDkQFjAAegQIARAB&usg=AOvVaw0QhtsqLNFCTCXDjnQEacv4[18] The Disappearance of Charley Ross[19] We Is Got Him[20] Item Information (Full Record)[21] The first people kidnapped in the U.S.[22] The Story Behind the First Ransom Note in American History [23] Charley Ross - Crime Museum[24] Defy All the Devils[25] Crimes of the Centuries: Notorious Crimes, Criminals, and Criminal Trials in American History [3 volumes][26] The Kidnapping of Charley Ross | Historic Mysteries[27] A Notorious 19th-Century Kidnapping in Brooklyn[28] The Disappearance of Percy Fawcett[29] A Notorious 19th-Century Kidnapping in Brooklyn[30] The Father's Story of Charley Ross[31] Why "More Work for Mother?" Knowledge and Household Behavior, 1870-1945[32] City of Brotherly Mayhem[33] The Most Famous Shootout in Bay Ridge History[34] The Most Famous Shootout in Bay Ridge History[35] Recollections of a New York Chief of Police[36] The Cincinnati daily star. [volume] ([Cincinnati, Ohio]) 1875-1880, August 21, 1875, LAST EDITION., Image 2[37] The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, August 15, 1875, Page 7, Image 7[38] The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, August 31, 1875, Page 4, Image 4[39] Laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania[40] http://Christian Ross, The Father’s Story of Charley Ross, the Kidnapped Child (John E. Potter, 1876)[41] Searching for Charley Ross[42] Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, May 09, 1939, Page A-5, Image 5[43] The Most Famous Shootout in Bay Ridge History

I am speculating here, but I guess President Obama at some point might have been informed of FBI efforts against then presidential candidate Trump.To get to the point, let’s start with:FBI operation into Trump-Russia collusion started earlier than official “Crossfire Hurricane” investigation (official start July 31, 2016 Wikipedia)The day I meet Mifsud in Rome in March 2016, Peter Strzok is texting Lisa Page: “our guy is now talking.”In April 2016 the same day Mifsud is emailing me, Strzok texts Page: “now we have switched from the patriot act to a wire carrying current.”— George Papadopoulos (@GeorgePapa19) March 15, 2019Look at this tweet from George Papadopulusas you can see above Peter Sztrok was already “on it”, actively working with western intelligence operative Josef Mifsud who was introduced to George Papadopulus in Rome in March 14, 2016 (one day before Fancy Bear began their alleged activities on the DNC server)Later in April Josef Mifsud meets Papadopulus in London and offers him a rumor: “Russia has dirt on Hillary” this was his “bait”, George Papadopulus was suppose to email this “good news” to Trump campaign in April of 2016 (Papadopulus was under surveillance outside of US jurisdiction, his electronic communications was spied on by Peter Sztrok of FBI (based on tweet above)). but he didn’t. in fact, Papadopulus in two part interview to Mark Steyn claims he never intended to share such rumor to anyone (interview part 1, part 2)FBI and Peter Sztrok felt desperate, they couldn’t “started” their investigation because rumor of Russians having dirt on Hillary did not spread out over electronic communication (there no such record of it)Someone approached Papadopulus in Israel and asked him of some favor. George Papadopulus was given $10k in cash and was about to return to Washington. However Papadopulus became suspicious, so he stops in Greece and gives money to his lawyer for safekeeping. Upon arrival to Dulles international airport Papadopulus baggage was already searched and FBI detained him for questioning.George Papadopulus even goes on to claim — ”I do not recall talking about Hillary with Australian Diplomat Alexander Downer”. Based on conversation with Australian diplomat FBI officially started their “belated” investigation — “Crossfire Hurricane”.i previously answered Why Donnald Trump still talking about Hillary emails? In my answer you can find the reason why Peter Sztrok seems uninterested upon discovery that all Hillary emails ended up in cryptic unsecured gmail account which resembles the name of Chinese company. It’s my understanding FBI helped Hillary IT aide Paul Cobetta to create and move Hillary emails to that gmail account, then subsequently gave him immunity against prosecution. The reason of this is because President Obama was communicating with Hillary Clinton via unofficial email server Hillary used at her home “hillaryclinton.com” instead of “state.gov”. Those communications between President Obama and Hillary Clinton was deleted.March 7, 2015: 15:41:16 -0800 (PST) Cheryl Mills writes EMAIL ID 31077 as revealed by Podesta Emails Part 18: “we need to clean this up — he has emails from her — they do not say state.gov“ Obama was knowingly receiving/exchanging emails with Hillary Clinton while she was using private email server which was different from .govMarch 7, 2015: Hillary Surrogate Terry McCauliffe met with the FBI agent who oversaw the Clinton e-mail case and his wife and promised financial support ($500k+) if she ran for office. — Wall Street Journal March, 25–31, 2015 – Paul Cobetta, a Platte River Networks employee working for Hillary Clinton, permanently and irreversibly deletes the email archive of Hillary Clinton using software called BleachBit likely under orders from Cheryl Mills, an attorney for the Clinton Foundation. Cobetta received advice on Reddit under the user name “stonetear” on how to delete e-mails for a “VIP”. The evidence under congressional subpoena is completely destroyed, including e-mails sent between Hillary Clinton and former President Obama.June 16, 2015 — Trump announces that he is running for president.conclusion: President Obama might have had “foreknowledge” of FBI operation against Trump or simply Senator Lindsey Graham only wanted to troll Obama and question him about email communications between him and Hillary using unofficial server since Obama is under oath, he have to answer honestly that he was aware but still used Hillary’s unsecure email server.