Cal Fire 294: Fill & Download for Free

Robert Clouse cited a great case, but here's a few others that should explain that the government - DBA the military and police you so highly laud - is NOT the entity responsible for our protection as ordinary citizens. I've included the Court Reporter references in case there's a doubt as to the legitimacy of the citation.South v. Maryland 59 U.S. (How.) 396, 15 L.Ed.433 (1856)Robinson, a resident of Washington County, owed a judgment debt to Pottle, a resident of Massachusetts. When Pottle and a party consisting of his attorney and a deputy sheriff attempted to assert a levy upon Robinson's property, they were surrounded by a group of workmen armed with stones and other weapons. The workmen threatened violence should any attempt be made to assert the levy. After Pottle and his party took refuge in a nearby house, the workmen (described in the case as "rioters") maintained an armed guard around it. The deputy sheriff left Pottle and his attorney imprisoned in the house and went to consult with the High Sheriff, South. When South returned with the deputy, Pottle demanded that he be protected from the armed workmen, but South refused to do so. Pottle and his attorney were released, after four days of imprisonment, when they paid the workmen $2,500, a sum apparently equal to the amount of back wages owed them by Robinson.After the federal Circuit Court for the District of Maryland found for the plaintiff Pottle in a civil suit for damages against the sheriff, South appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, in reversing the lower court, found no cause of action under Maryland common law. The Court held that a sheriff, as a public officer, was liable personally only for misfeasance or nonfeasance of ministerial acts, where the sheriff is bound to an individual for a fee or salary, but not for a breach of his public duty.Cocking v Wade 87 Md. 529 (1898)Following indictment by a grand jury for the murder of his wife and her sister, Cocking was taken into the custody of the sheriff of Charles County, Wade. The sheriff placed Cocking in "an old, dilapidated building" in Port Tobacco that was used as a jail and under the care of "an aged and infirm negro," leaving the prisoner "wholly unprotected." That night a mob, in the presence of the sheriff, proceeded to lynch Cocking. Despite some evidence that the sheriff was told of the possibility of lynching and had been urged to either move the prisoner to Baltimore or to a newer jail, the Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the trial court in a civil action brought by the family of the hanged man in finding no liability on the part of the sheriff.Riss v. City of New York 22 N.Y.2d 579, 293 NYS2d 897, 240 N.E.2d 860 (N.Y. Ct. of Ap. 1958);Ms. Riss was being harassed by a former boyfriend, in a familiar pattern of increasingly violent threats. She went to the police for help many times, but was always rebuffed. Desperate because she could not get police protection, she applied for a gun permit, but was refused that as well. On the eve of her engagement party she and her mother went to the police one last time pleading for protection against what they were certain was a serious and dangerous threat. And one last time the police refused. As she was leaving the party, a thug hired by her former boyfriend threw acid in her face, blinding and permanently disfiguring her.Her case against the City of New York for failing to protect her was, not surprisingly, unsuccessful. The lone dissenting justice of New York's high court wrote in his opinion: "What makes the City's position [denying any obligation to protect the woman] particularly difficult to understand is that, in conformity to the dictates of the law [she] did not carry any weapon for self-defense. Thus, by a rather bitter irony she was required to rely for protection on the City of New York which now denies all responsibility to her."Ne Casek v. City of Los Angeles 233 Cal.App.2d 131, 43 Cal.Rptr. 294 (1965)Kathryne Ne Casek was knocked down on a sidewalk by two suspects who had been arrested by the officers, the Court of Appeal held the amount of force or method used by a police officer in attempting to keep an arrested person or persons in custody is a discretionary act for purpose of application of doctrine of immunity of government officials from civil liability for their discretionary acts, and therefore Ms. Ne Casek (who was injured by two escaped suspects who had been handcuffed together) could not maintain an action against the arresting officers based on the officer's alleged negligence in using insufficient force to keep the prisoners in custody.)Keane v. City of Chicago 98 Ill. App.2d 460, 240 N.E.2d 321 (1968);A Chicago public school teacher was killed while on the premises of the school to which she had been assigned was killed by a student enrolled at the school. The plaintiff alleged that the City was negligent in failing to assign police protection to the school, although it knew or should have known that failure to provide this protection would result in harm to persons lawfully on the premises in the removal of police protection from the school prior to the event, although it knew or should have known of the dangerous condition then existing at the school and in permitting a dangerous condition to exist at the school. The court dismissed the case because of the existing state law granting tort immunity with no proof the City had ever affirmatively assumed a "special duty”.Susman v. City of Los Angeles, et al. 269 Cal.App.2d 803, 75 Cal.Rptr. 240 (1969)Action was brought by several landowners against the City of Los Angeles and the State pleading eleven separate causes of action for damages arising out of the ‘Watts’ Riots’ of 1965. The Court of Appeal held that none of the allegations presented was sufficient to show any duty owed by any of the officials named as defendants to act to prevent or avoid the harm suffered by the plaintiffs.Silver v. City of Minneapolis 170 N.W.2d 206 (S.Ct. Minn. 1969)A riot occurred in the Plymouth Avenue North area of Minneapolis in July, 1967. Plaintiffs owned real estate located at 1709-1711 Plymouth Avenue North. On July 19, 1967, a riot occurred in that area during which looting occurred and a number of business and commercial properties along Plymouth Avenue were damaged or destroyed. The windows in the plaintiff’s store were broken in plaintiffs' store by rioters; this was investigated by the Minneapolis Police Department. According to plaintiffs, they received indications that their building and store were being threatened by further damage in riots that might follow.According to plaintiffs, after they had received indications that their building and store were being threatened by further damage they boarded up the windows and doors and contacted the police concerning the threats. A representative from MPD stated “we know about it and we are going to have some extra police to guard Plymouth Avenue, but we haven't got enough police, you know, to watch every business place on Plymouth. He says we are going to keep an eye on your place, but we cannot give you special protection."Following this conversation, Silver went home about 7 p. m., informing the police of his intention to leave at that hour and told them that he had boarded up his doors and windows. During the night of July 20-21, plaintiffs' building and store were burned by rioters throwing "Molotov cocktails" against the building. They sought recovery from the city for the damage to the building and store, alleging the city of Minneapolis was negligent in failing to provide police and fire protection to their building after it had been requested by plaintiffs, or to take reasonable measures to prevent the riot.The court was satisfied that under the facts of the present case the city was exercising discretion in determining how to best cope with impending trouble by deploying its police and fire manpower so as to protect the property of as many people as was possible within its limited resources, and as such fell under the existing Tort Immunity of state law.Evett v. City of Inverness, 224 So.2d 365, 366-67 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1969).The plaintiff's husband was killed when an automobile operated by him on U.S. Highway 41 was struck on its own side of the road by an automobile negligently operated by an intoxicated driver.A short time before the collision, a police officer of the City of Inverness had stopped the intoxicated driver for speeding on the same highway within the municipal limits of the City of Inverness. The plaintiffs alleged that the officer “knew or should have known that the operator was intoxicated to the extent that his normal faculties were impaired and that his continued operation of the vehicle would injure persons or property upon the public highways”, and that the officer negligently permitted him to continue driving upon the public highways, resulting in the crash.The court rejected the idea that the duty owed to the plaintiff's deceased husband was different from that owed to any other member of the public, and as such rejected the suit.Massengill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518, 456 P.2d 376 (1969);This case involved an automobile collision in which plaintiffs' decedents were killed. The plaintiffs argued that it resulted from a deputy sheriff's failure to apprehend and arrest intoxicated motorists observed driving in a reckless manner immediately prior to the accident. The court disagreed:"The general rule pertaining to governmental agencies and public officers is that `... if the duty which the official authority imposes upon an officer is a duty to the public, a failure to perform it, or an inadequate or erroneous performance, must be a public, not an individual injury, and must be redressed, if at all, in some form of public prosecution.”Simpson's Food Fair v. Evansville 272 N.E. 2d 871 (Ind.Ct. of Ap.) 1971;The plaintiff-appellant alleged that the City of Evansville knew or should have known of the high incidence of criminal activity in the plaintiff's neighborhood. He held that it refused to assign extra police to patrol the area or to request outside police assistance from the State, that a duty to protect the plaintiff and to prevent crime was breached, and that such breach proximately caused the plaintiff to lose customers and merchandise and ultimately to cease business operation. The court held that in this case, a general public duty was involved, and that no special duty had been undertaken.Antique Arts Corp. v. City of Torrence 39 Cal.App.3d 588, 114 Cal.Rptr. 332 (1974)A silent burglar alarm installed on the premises of the store operated by the plaintiff was, during the course of a robbery by two armed men, activated at 3:32 p.m. and the alert message was relayed to the police department.The dispatch message to the units in the field was at 3:43 p.m., and a police unit arrived at the scene of the robbery at 3:44 p.m. The delay in the transmission of the dispatch enabled the robbers to complete the robbery and escape with jewelry and merchandise in the amount of $49,000. The Court of Appeal held that Govt. Code section 846 provides for immunity if no police protection is provided; or, if police protection is provided, but that protection is not sufficient.Hartzler v. City of San Jose 46 Cal.App.3d 6, 120 Cal.Rptr. 5 (1975)Plaintiff's decedent, Ruth Bunnell, telephoned the main office of the San Jose Police Department and reported that her estranged husband, Mack Bunnell, had called her, saying that he was coming to her residence to kill her. She requested immediate police aid; the department refused to come to her aid at that time, and asked that she call the department again when Mack Bunnell had arrived.Approximately 45 minutes later, Mack Bunnell arrived at her home and stabbed her to death. The police did not arrive until 3 a.m., in response to a call of a neighbor. By this time Mrs. Bunnell was dead.Appellant has failed to plead facts supporting an assumption that a special relationship existed between decedent and the San Jose Police Department. The allegation that the police had responded 20 times to her calls and had arrested her husband once does not indicate that the department had assumed a duty toward decedent greater than the duty owed to another member of the public. The police may have responded repeatedly to her calls, only to discover that she was not in danger. Absent an indication that the police had induced decedent's reliance on a promise, express or implied, that they would provide her with protection, it must be concluded that no special relationship existed and that appellant has not stated a cause of action.Walters v. Hampton, 14 Wash. App. 548, 543 P.2d 648 (1975);Robert Walters was shot with a rifle by Gordon A. Hampton, while visiting in the latter's home in Port Orchard. Walters presented police records which showed that on three occasions in 1968 and two occasions in 1970 Gordon Hampton's wife complained to the police that her husband, while drunk, had threatened to kill her. On the three 1968 occasions Mrs. Hampton reported that Hampton had aimed a gun at her. Twice the police investigated her complaints and talked to Hampton. In June 1970 and September 1970 Mrs. Hampton again complained Hampton was beating her and had threatened to kill her. In the September incident Mrs. Hampton told the police Hampton had fired a gun at her. She also asked the police to remove a woman Hampton had allegedly brought to the home. The police officers observed no other woman in the house, but took Hampton's gun to the police station. It should be noted Hampton denied firing the gun. The firearm was returned to Hampton 2 days later. On almost all these occasions, the investigating officers found both Mr. and Mrs. Hampton either to have been drinking or drunk. Between the time Hampton retrieved his gun in September 1970 and when Walters was shot the police had no contact with either Mr. or Mrs. Hampton.Plaintiff's principal theory was that the chief of police had a mandatory statutory duty to prosecute Hampton for violation of city ordinances prohibiting the aiming or discharging of firearms, or to initiate criminal prosecution for assault. Plaintiff's apparent contention is that had Hampton been prosecuted, the gun could have been confiscated in 1968 or 1970 and plaintiff would not have been injured in 1972. Second, plaintiff contends the police had a mandatory and nondiscretionary duty to protect him against the harm which in fact befell him.The court held that the plaintiff's entire argument is based upon the false premise that arrest and the criminal process is the exclusive method available to the police in dealing with the variety of behavioral or social problems they confront; additionally, given that the only complaints received by the police prior to the shooting related to the Hampton's marital disputes (and the last contact the police had with the Hamptons prior to the shooting in February 1972 was in September 1970). In the absence of any allegation that the police knew Hampton posed a danger to the plaintiff, that the plaintiff required protection from Hampton, or that plaintiff was in some particular danger, these facts are inadequate to establish a specific duty owed by the City to plaintiff.Henderson v. St. Petersburg, 247 So.2d 23 (Fla. Ct. App. 1971);On May 9, 1969, Matthew Henderson came to the City of St. Petersburg, Florida, for the purpose of making business deliveries, which he has done on prior occasions. Because of prior criminal attacks previously made on him, he went to the Police Department, and alleged he made “specific arrangements with the officers, agents and employees of the defendant City acting within the scope of their employment” (a desk sergeant on duty at the precinct) created “a privity for specific police protection” while he was making his deliveries.He later proceeded to the area where he claims he was “assured officers would be there to protect him”. However, arriving at the above address, he was accosted by unknown assailants, who shot him. He sued for injury, damages and loss of future income, alleging that they were the result of the carelessness and negligence of the City, through “it's Police Department, officers and agents, in failing to properly protect the plaintiff as they had specifically undertaken through the direct contact..."The court held that the plaintiff did not make causal connection between the alleged negligence of the City and the injuries, prove that the presence of the police officers would have prevented the injuries, and did not show that the City owed Henderson a "special duty."Evers v. Westerberg, (1972)38 A.D.2d 751, 329 N.Y.S. 615;On December 4, 1966, at about 1:50 A.M., an automobile accident occurred in Valley Stream, NY, when an automobile driven by defendant Thomas Westerberg and owned by defendant Celeste Westerberg collided with a vehicle driven by John Evers, in which his wife (plaintiff) was a passenger, causing Evers' death. About 20 minutes earlier, the Westerberg vehicle had been involved in a rear-end collision with another automobile in the Village of Lynbrook.Mrs. Evers sued the Westerbergs and the Village of Lynbrook, charging them with negligence through the officers, for having failed to take Westerberg into custody on the ground of intoxication and/or impounding his damaged vehicle to prevent him from driving it away from the scene.They also complained that the village failed to provide Mr. and Mrs. Evers with adequate police protection insofar as it permitted Westerberg to drive away from the scene of the first accident. The court disagreed:“It is well settled that a municipality, acting in its governmental capacity for the protection of the general public, cannot be cast in damages for a mere failure to furnish adequate protection to a particular individual to whom it has assumed no special duty.”Huey v. Cicero, 41 Ill.2d 361, 243 N.E.2d 214 (1968);This action arose from the fatal beating of Jerome Huey, a black man, by four white youths armed with baseball bats. The attack occurred at about 10:00 P.M. on May 25, 1966, near the intersection of 25th Place and Laramie Avenue in Cicero, Illinois, while decedent was en route to an employment office. The complaint recited these facts and alleged that the defendants knew or would have known by the exercise of ordinary care that a large number of blacks entered and departed the confines of Cicero daily in pursuit of employment at various factories and that "The (city) however, or one or more of them so wantonly and wilfully neglected to use ordinary care for the protection and safety due to dark-skinned persons… that as a direct and proximate result, JEROME HUEY, was assaulted and severe injuries were inflicted from which he died."Plaintiffs charged that the defendants were under a duty to “warn, advise, or otherwise give notice to dark-skinned persons of the unusual and extraordinary hazards and perils to such persons as existed” in the town of Cicero and that they willfully and wantonly failed to exercise ordinary care to so advise, warn or otherwise give notice”The court ruled that the plaintiff failed to prove any special relationship that would exempt the city from the Tort Immunity statute, could not prove that the City knew of the presence of Mr. Huey in the town, that he had requested police protection, that he was in some peculiar danger, and did not actually allege any specific acts or omissions by the City or any causal connection between such conduct or lack of conduct and the fatal injury.Trautman v. City of Stamford, (1975 Super. Ct.)32 Conn. Sup. 258, 350 A.2d 782Trautman, injured after being struck by an automobile while standing on a public sidewalk in the city of Stamford, filed a suit against the City and two police officers individually, claiming that they “allowed automobile drag racing to occur in their presence for a substantial period of time on the street adjacent to the sidewalk on which he stood… when they knew or should have known that such activity could cause injury”. He also claimed that they failed to stop such drag racing when they knew that such activity in public was a violation of ordinance and statute, they “failed to disperse the persons congregating on the public sidewalk or to arrest the participants of the drag races when they had the authority and the duty to do so”; he also claimed that they “failed to warn the public lawfully using the sidewalk of the danger involved; and failed to properly and adequately to control and supervise the street in accordance with their duties as police officers”.The court held that because that alleged breach of duty was one owed not to the plaintiff individually but to the public generally the patrolmen and the city could not be held liable to the plaintiff in a negligence case.Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. City of Wichita, 217 Kan. 44, 536 P.2d 54 (1975);After having a business in the area suffer firebombings, a detective performed a stake-out on a business that had received specific threats. He observed two vehicles slow through the area then turn a corner, after which four males came from around that corner. Three went into an L-shaped recess where the shop was, while one stayed on the sidewalk. They were not carrying anything the detective could see, but as he attempted to request another unit to the scene via radio, he “saw a bright red flare” and as he neared he saw a front window in the area was burning, and saw the 4 males run away. Shortly thereafter as he was looking for them he saw one of the vehicles he had seen earlier flee the scene. He gave chase, and after a twenty to thirty block chase was able to apprehend four of the five occupants. During interviews, three young men told of being at a party earlier that evening in Wichita, and the idea came up to set fire to several businesses with Molotov cocktails.The insurance company alleged that the police failed to enforce the “mob action” statute and thus prevent the fire. They also argue that the detective breached his duty under state law to order the dispersal of the four boys in front of the Gentry Shop, and that such a breach of a statutory duty made him personally liable for the ensuing damage.The court held that “The statute amounts to a codification of the common law duty of a peace officer to preserve the peace. The duty owed is to the public at large, and not to any particular individual. For the breach of such duty an officer is answerable only to the public acting through its official representatives, and not to any particular individual.”Sapp v. City of Tallahassee 348 So.2d 363 (Fla. Ct. of Ap. 1977);Ms. Sapp's complaint alleged Tallahassee Police Department officers, on the evening of September 4, 1974, were on special assignment at the Tallahassee round Holiday Inn. One of the officers observed two males in the rear parking area and radioed a suspicious persons report to another officer on stake-out within the hotel. The officers observed the men loiter at opposite ends of the sidewalk near the rear entrance of the hotel for about ten minutes. Ms. Sapp, a temporary employee of the Inn, was then observed leaving the rear entrance, and looking for her ride before reentering the hotel. The officer on stake-out saw the two males follow her into the hotel about a minute later. Other than reporting in, the officer took no action. Twenty minutes later he saw the males running from the hotel after severely beating and robbing Ms. Sapp inside the hotel near the rear entrance. The complaint alleged the officers owed appellant a special duty to protect her from physical assaults and were negligent in failing to properly investigate the behavior of the men.The court held that there was no showing of a violation of statutory procedures by the Tallahassee police — nor a showing of a direct and personal contact with Ms. Sapp, and while the police were conducting surveillance at the time the incident took place, it was not a situation where police authorities undertook a responsibility to particular members of the public, exposing them, without adequate protection, to risks which then materialize into actual injury.Jamison v. Chicago, 48 Ill. App. 3d 567 (1st Dist. 1977)James O'Malley shot and killed John Jamison. For three days prior to the shooting, O'Malley's son had warned the Chicago police that his father had been acting in a violent manner and requested that the police arrest him. The police refused to do so and the shooting occurred. Plaintiff, administratrix of Jamison's estate, filed a wrongful death action against the city of Chicago and the individual police officers, alleging, inter alia, that the individual officers were guilty of willful and wanton negligence in refusing to arrest O'Malley.After appeal, the court held that the existing tort immunity legislation provided “blanket immunity in the area of police discretion over arrests”, as well as “any failure to prevent the commission of crimes, the failure to apprehend criminals, and the failure to make an arrest” unless such act or omission constituted willful and wanton negligence.Weutrich v. Delia 155 N.J. Super 324, 326, 382 A.2d 929, 930 (1978);The plaintiff alleged that on several occasions during the afternoon and evening of February 9, 1974 notification was given to the police department of the township that defendant John Delia was menacing with a firearm certain persons within a short distance of the Berkeley Heights police headquarters. The police department made no response to these warnings. Less than 12 hours later, in the early morning of February 10, 1974, John Delia in that same area shot John Weuthrich in the head with a gun, killing him instantly, leaving as survivors his wife and three infant children.The complaint alleged that decedent's death was caused not only by the wrongful act of defendant Delia but also by the neglect, failure and default of the township police department to carry out its duty (1) to "apprehend and disarm" defendant after receiving warning of his armed threats of imminent personal harm, and (2) to take "appropriate action to disarm [defendant]…file a Complaint against him or otherwise confiscate the firearms in his possession."The City replied that state law provided immunity for public entities and officers for adopting or failing to adopt or enforce (any) law, failing to provide police protection and failing to make arrests or retain persons so placed in custody.The court agreed, holding “While it is true that police officers have a duty to investigate information from citizens concerning unlawful or criminal activity, (cite), the failure of the police to make an arrest as a consequence does not subject the municipality to tort liability…Municipalities are expressly immunized from tort liability for the failure to provide police protection or the failure to provide sufficient police protection.”DeHoney v. Hernandez, 122 Ariz. 367, 372, 595 P.2d 159, 164 (1979)After consulting informally with several officers, DeHoney, the owner of a jewelry store, installed a silent alarm sytem. On the evening of 30 June 1975, the silent alarm for the Showcase was activated at the police station at 2:11 a.m. The dispatcher immediately radioed the officers in the field, and at 2:13 a.m. Sgt. Hernandez and Officer Hill simultaneously arrived in front of the Showcase and Officer Hovis arrived at the rear. The front and back doors were secure; the police saw no indications of disturbance. Sgt. Hernandez then instructed Edwards to telephone DeHoney and also directed Officer Hovis to remain in the general vicinity. Officers Hill and Hernandez left the area for other duties, not realizing a burglar had entered through the roof and remained inside, exiting thorough a back door once the officer left the rear of the building.The dispatcher had some difficulty in locating DeHoney’s phone number and reached him approximately 30 minutes later. He arrived on scene at 2:45 and entered the building with Officer Hovitz to discover the theft.DeHoney alleged the police were negligent in their delay in notifying him and their failure to remain at the building until the owner arrived. The court disagreed, stating “…there was no specific promise or representation that the owner would always be immediately notified, or that the officers would remain on the premises pending the owner's arrival in every instance... Certainly there are many situations where emergencies confronting the police in the discharge of their duties to the public generally would make it impossible to immediately notify the owner and await his arrival. There was, then, no narrowing of the general public duty to a special duty to prevent harm to plaintiffs' property.”Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 93 N.M. 564, 569, 603 P.2d 303 (1979)On June 22, 1975, plaintiff's decedent, Ernest Trujillo, along with a group of friends, was in Roosevelt Park, a park established and maintained by the City of Albuquerque. Earlier in the day, a rock concert had been held but Ernest and his friends went to the park after the concert was over. They were sitting on the grass when they were approached by, and had some kind of altercation with, another person who then left the park. Shortly thereafter, a second person approached Ernest and his group, accusing them of having "picked on" his brother, and drew a gun, firing it once or twice. Ernest and his friends then chased this person to the top of a knoll where a third person, Wilbert Miles, stood and fired a shotgun "into the ground", hitting and killing Ernest.Her complaint alleged that the City maintained the park; that the maintenance of the park was a proprietary function of the City; that the City allowed the rock concert to be held in the park without proper police and security arrangements; that the City had a duty to secure the park and protect citizens using it, particularly a duty to protect Ernest's well-being; and that the City breached its duty and was therefore liable in damages.The court held that “lacking proof of a direct relationship or contact between the victim and the police creating a special duty, there is no liability on the part of the police and municipality… Failing to establish that a special duty existed between the victim and the police, there is no liability.” The court also stated “To hold a municipality liable for the conduct of third persons, such as is alleged in the complaint before us, would, in our opinion, be contrary to sound public policy and create policing requirements difficult of fulfillment.”Crouch v. Hall, 406 N.E.2d 303, 304 (Ind.App.1980);Mildred Crouch brought suit against three police officers, individually and in their capacity as officers, for failure to properly investigate a rape of a third person by one Anthony Wayne Hall and to detect and apprehend Hall, who one week later raped and murdered Mildred Crouch's daughter Jeanne Crouch. The officers moved for summary judgment based on immunity under the Tort Claims Act.Upon appeal, the court agreed that while “there is no factual dispute… the police owed no special duty to the victim. The duty owed in the investigation of the rape was to the general public.”Porter v. Urbana, 88 Ill.App.3d 443, 445, 43 Ill.Dec. 610, 612, 410 N.E.2d 610, 612 (1980)The plaintiff's complaint alleges that Clarence King, Jr., invaded her home December 3, 1976, and beat and raped her, and that the Urbana Police Department and Gordon knew of six other rapes committed by King in Urbana beginning March 22, 1976, and claimed they were negligent for failing to investigate, question, or arrest the man that was known to them (having eyewitness descriptions of King, his fingerprints, and his name connecting him with the series of rapes) in time to prevent her assault.The Court disagreed, citing the Illinois Tort Immunity Act, which reads “Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for failure to provide adequate police protection or service, failure to prevent the commission of crimes and failure to apprehend criminals”.Stone v. State 106 Cal.App.3d 924, 165 Cal Rep. 339 (1980)The plaintiffs, together with some friends, attended the Cal Expo fairgrounds on September 9, 1975. They agreed to meet at the main gate prior to returning home. Near the gate the plaintiffs were overrun by a gang of youths who were shouting and hitting persons. During the melee Joyce Stone was attacked, her purse was taken and the plaintiffs were beaten and injured.In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the state “negligently owned, maintained, controlled, managed and operated” the premises, and negligently failed to provide adequate security measures, exposing persons on the premises to danger and injury. They also alleged that the State Of California, in making a policy decision not to use State Police for security but to use private security, assumed a duty to provide security, and that the persons hired by the State failed to use normal care while exercising their functions.The court found that the limited exception to tort immunity in cases involving discretionary acts in which a special relationship between the plaintiff and the public employee exist had not been proven, and given the existing law immunizing the government for failure to establish a police department, provide police protection or to provide sufficient police protection service, no liability existed for such failure.Warren v. District of Columbia (444 A.2d 1, 1981)Two women were upstairs in a townhouse when they heard their roommate, a third woman, being attacked downstairs by intruders. They phoned the police several times and were assured that officers were on the way. After about 30 minutes, when their roommate's screams had stopped, they assumed the police had finally arrived. When the two women went downstairs they saw that in fact the police never came, but the intruders were still there. As the Warren court graphically states in the opinion: "For the next fourteen hours the women were held captive, raped, robbed, beaten, forced to commit sexual acts upon each other, and made to submit to the sexual demands of their attackers."The three women sued the District of Columbia for failing to protect them, but D.C.'s highest court exonerated the District and its police, saying that it is a "fundamental principle of American law that a government and its agents are under no general duty to provide public services, such as police protection, to any individual citizen."Chapman v. City of Philadelphia, 434 A.2d 753 (Sup.Ct. Penn. 1981);William F. Chapman, died on August 14, 1978 as a result of injuries he sustained on August 11, 1978 when he was attacked and robbed by three men on the platform of the Wayne Junction Railroad Station. The complaint alleges that the City of Philadelphia negligently breached its duty to plaintiff's decedent by failing to maintain law and order, protect the citizens and prevent unsafe conditions from existing.The court held that “the duty of the City of Philadelphia to provide police protection is a public one which may not be claimed by an individual unless a special relationship exists between the city and the individual” and that the plaintiff had failed to “set forth any facts from which it would be possible to infer that a special relationship existed between William F. Chapman and the City of Philadelphia”.Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 61 (7th Cir. 1982).Thomas Vanda, was convicted of aggravated battery with a knife, and while being evaluated was diagnosed with schizophrenia. Less than a year later was charged in using a knife to murder of a woman. He was found “not guilty by reason of insanity” and was committed to a psychiatric facility. Five years later he was released and subsequently killed Marguerite Anne Bowers with a knife.The complaint alleged that the defendants knew that Vanda was dangerous when they released him, and acted recklessly in doing so, but the court held that “there is no constitutional right to be protected by the state against being murdered by criminals or madmen. It is monstrous if the state fails to protect its residents against such predators but it does not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or, we suppose, any other provision of the Constitution.”Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 C.3d 197, 185 Cal.Rptr. 252, 649 P.2d 894 (S.Ct. Cal. 1982);Yolanda Davidson was stabbed four times by Jack Blackmun while in a public laundromat. On three earlier occasions women had been stabbed at the same or nearby laundromats. The evening before Yolanda's stabbing, two police officers had the laundromat under surveillance when another stabbing occurred; the police chased the suspect but failed to catch him. The next evening the officers had the laundromat under surveillance for the purpose of preventing assaults and apprehending the felon. The officers were aware of Yolanda's presence in the laundromat throughout the surveillance. After about an hour of surveillance, they saw a man on the premises who closely resembled the attacker of the previous evening and, while watching him for 15 minutes, identified him as the likely perpetrator of that assault. As the officers watched, the suspect entered and left the laundromat "several times." The officers did not warn Yolanda. Eventually she was stabbed.Shore v. Town of Stonington, 187 Conn. 147, ___, 444 A.2d 1379, 1381 (1982);On January 14, 1980 at approximately 10:40 p.m., Lieutenant Edward Sylvia, a police officer of the town of Stonington, was engaged in the performance of his duties as a shift supervisor. As Sylvia proceeded east on Route One in Stonington, he observed a green Pontiac automobile on the same highway heading in a westerly direction at a fast rate of speed. Sylvia turned his cruiser around and proceeded to follow the Pontiac. He observed the vehicle cross the center line of the highway a few times and then pull into the parking lot of the defendant Veterans of Foreign Wars, Harley P. Chase Post 1265 (hereinafter V.F.W.).Sylvia followed the vehicle into the lot, got out of his cruiser, and approached the driver, later identified as Mark Cugini. When the officer asked Cugini where he was going in such a hurry, Cugini replied that he was there to pick up his girlfriend at the V.F.W. Sylvia informed him that if he wanted to keep his driver's license, he had better slow down and should let his girlfriend drive. The officer departed for other duties. Cugini entered the V.F.W. The evidence concerning his condition of sobriety as he entered the V.F.W., considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, could reasonably lead to a conclusion that he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs. Cugini did not drink at the V.F.W. After a short conversation with one of its patrons, he left and drove away in the green Pontiac.Subsequently that evening at about 11:30 p.m., Cugini, driving along Route 78 in Westerly, Rhode Island at a high rate of speed, struck a vehicle being operated by the plaintiff's decedent, Sherry Shore. Mrs. Shore died from the injuries suffered as a result of the collision.The plaintiff, whose decedent was killed by a drunk driver who had been stopped but not arrested by a town police officer, has a cause of action in negligence against the officer and the town for failure to enforce Connecticut General Statutes. The trial court granted the defendant town's motion for summary judgment, finding that the police officer owed no specific duty to the plaintiff's decedent to enforce the motor vehicle laws of the state, and the CT Supreme Court agreed.Morgan v. District of Columbia, 468 A.2d 1306 (D.C. Ct. of Ap. 1983);Over a three month period, Garnett Morgan had contacted her husband’s employer, the District of Columbia PD, and related that he had beaten and threatened her. She eventually moved, not informing her husband of her whereabouts and maintaining an unlisted telephone number.Three months later, Officer Morgan arrived at his wife's apartment, choked her into unconsciousness, and forced her into his car. Threatening to kill her if she objected, he drove to her parents' home, took their two children and left. Garnett Morgan then called the police. Along with two other officers, Lieutenant John R. Bowles, Jr. responded to the call and she told him what had happened, including the beating in July and the August gun threat. Lieutenant Bowles contacted Officer Morgan and directed him to report to the precinct. Morgan said that he would do so after he brought the children to the Pinkney house. When Morgan arrived, he was met by the Lieutenant, but rather than proceed with him to the precinct, Morgan carried the youngest child, with the older child beside him, toward the house. Lieutenant Bowles walked behind them. Officer Morgan walked into the house, said to his wife, "I told you so," then took out his revolver and shot at her twice; one of the bullets wounded her and the other hit John Keith, his son. Morgan then turned and shot Lieutenant Bowles, shot and killed Elton Pinkney, and surrendered to the police“Absent a special relationship between police department and victim, liability for failure to protect individual citizens from crime does not generally lie against police officials, who occupy positions necessarily fraught with discretion in the administration of justice. Appellants do not fall within the narrow exception to this longstanding rule. Furthermore, the facts of this case, as a matter of law, cannot support a finding of negligence by the city.”Morris v. Musser, 478 A.2d 937 (1984);On June 28, 1980 four assailants invaded plaintiffs' Gulf Service Station, viciously beat Mr. Morris, who suffered multiple injuries including a fractured jaw, and struck and terrorized Mrs. Morris, who vainly attempted to shield her unconscious husband from further punishment. Although on duty and apprised of the attack, Officer Musser did not intervene in sufficient time to prevent or reduce plaintiffs' injuries. The plaintiffs also alleged that in a prior incident, Officer Musser had refused to assist crime victims in jeopardy. They sued, contending that Officer Musser's “negligent, willful, reckless or intentional delay in furnishing assistance, after being notified of the assault in progress, proximately caused or aggravated their injuries”, and also sued because he continued to be employed by the Township after such behavior.The court, reviewing the state tort immunity law, concluded that “York Township is the only defendant cloaked with immunity…. The Township's conduct — failure to remove officer Musser from active duty and furnish adequate police protection to plaintiffs — does not fit within any of the eight types of negligent activity for which immunity is waived.”. They further held that while the Officer might be individually liable if his behavior was as alleged, the plaintiffs needed to prove that a special relationship existed, “those who are imperiled because they have aided law enforcement as informers or witnesses” or when the police “expressly promise to protect specific individuals from precise harm”. In this case, since “plaintiffs were neither allied with the police in a law enforcement project nor were they individually promised police protection from delineated harm. Further, an emergency aid request communicated to the police does not create a special duty owing to crime victims; thus, the police are not liable to crime victims for failing to furnish prompt and efficient aid upon request.” The court also dismissed a claim concerning Constitutional protection, stating “Since the defendants had no federal constitutional duty to protect plaintiffs from criminal assault, the inadequate provision of police protection services is not actionable under Section 1983 or the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”Thurman v. City of Torrington 595 F.Supp.1521 (D.Conn. 1984)A woman and her son were harassed, threatened and assaulted by her estranged husband, all in violation of his probation and a restraining order. Despite numerous requests for police protection, the police did nothing because "the police department used an administrative classification that resulted in police protection being fully provided to persons abused by someone with whom the victim has no domestic relationship, but less protection when the victim is either: 1) a woman abused or assaulted by a spouse or boyfriend, or 2) a child abused by a father or stepfather."Westbrooks v. State, 173 Cal.App.3d 1203, 219 Cal.Rtr. 674 (1985)The widow and sons of a motorist who drove into the void where a collapsed bridge had been, brought action against the State, county, and county deputy sheriff. The California Department of Transportation (Cal Trans) was aware that a violent storm with heavy rains had caused a bridge on State route 118 to collapse. A county deputy sheriff had observed the beginning of the collapse, reported it and requested assistance from Cal Trans. A jury award of $1,300,000 was reversed in part by the Court of Appeal which held: (1) the county deputy sheriff had no duty to warn drivers that the state highway bridge had collapsed during the storm, and his efforts to warn drivers did not in any way increase the risk of harm to users of the highway, and therefore the county was not liable to motorist's wife and children; and (2) the judgment was upheld against the state because the Cal Trans was notified at 1:52 a.m. and at 2:35 a.m., but no Cal Trans personnel nor CHP officer appeared at the scene until 5:45 a.m., and that such delay was unreasonable.)Calogrides v. City of Mobile, 475 So.2d 560 (S.Ct. A;a. 1985);John M. Calogrides attended a fireworks display sponsored in part by the City of Mobile at Ladd Memorial Stadium on July 3, 1982. After he arrived and as he was walking up the stadium ramp to find a seat, he was assaulted by a group of five or six teenage males. He was stabbed a number of times. Calogrides claimed the City was negligent in making its decision to deploy only eighty-two police officers to Ladd Stadium on the occasion of his injury. The Court held that liability cannot be predicated on that basis.DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 109 S.Ct. 998, 1989 (1989)Injured party was a boy who was beaten and permanently injured by his father. He claimed a special relationship existed because local officials knew he was being abused, indeed they had "specifically proclaimed by word and deed [their] intention to protect him against that danger," [7] but failed to remove him from his father's custody.The Court in DeShaney held that no duty arose because of a "special relationship," concluding that Constitutional duties of care and protection only exist as to certain individuals, such as incarcerated prisoners, involuntarily committed mental patients and others restrained against their will and therefore unable to protect themselves. "The affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State's knowledge of the individual's predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf."Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Department, 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990).Ms. Balistreri, beaten and harassed by her estranged husband, alleged a "special relationship" existed between her and the Pacifica Police Department, to wit, they were duty-bound to protect her because there was a restraining order against her husband. The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that DeShaney limited the circumstances that would give rise to a "special relationship" to instances of custody. Because no such custody existed in Balistreri, the Pacifica Police had no duty to protect her, so when they failed to do so and she was injured they were not liable.McKee v. City of Rockwall, Texas, 877 F.2d409 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct.727 (1990).Plaintiff claimed she was injured because the police refused to make an arrest following a domestic violence call. She claimed their refusal to arrest was due to a city policy of gender- based discrimination. In that case the U. S. District Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that "no constitutional violation [occurred] when the most that can be said of the police is that they stood by and did nothing..."Castle Rock v. Gonzales (04-278) 545 U.S. 748 (2005)The Supreme Court ruled that the police did not have a constitutional duty to protect a person from harm, even a woman who had obtained a court-issued protective order against a violent husband making an arrest mandatory for a violation.The decision, with an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia and dissents from Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, overturned a ruling by a federal appeals court in Colorado. The appeals court had permitted a lawsuitto proceed against a Colorado town, Castle Rock, for the failure of the police to respond to a woman's pleas for help after her estranged husband violated a protective order by kidnapping their three young daughters, whomhe eventually killed.

Well, given that the government bears no affirmative duty* to protect ordinary individuals, what makes you think that they are supposed to be responsible for our protection to start with?*-an affirmative duty is an obligation that you can be held liable for failing to perform.Every politician who tells you that you don’t need a gun and can “just call 9–1–1”? They know full well of this, but your potential death is inconsequential to advancing their agenda - while armed guard we pay for protect them but not us.In case anyone wants to try and challenge my statement, here’s the supporting case law with reporting citation and a brief synopsis:South v. Maryland 59 U.S. (How.) 396, 15 L.Ed.433 (1856)Robinson, a resident of Washington County, owed a judgment debt to Pottle, a resident of Massachusetts. When Pottle and a party consisting of his attorney and a deputy sheriff attempted to assert a levy upon Robinson's property, they were surrounded by a group of workmen armed with stones and other weapons. The workmen threatened violence should any attempt be made to assert the levy. After Pottle and his party took refuge in a nearby house, the workmen (described in the case as "rioters") maintained an armed guard around it. The deputy sheriff left Pottle and his attorney imprisoned in the house and went to consult with the High Sheriff, South. When South returned with the deputy, Pottle demanded that he be protected from the armed workmen, but South refused to do so. Pottle and his attorney were released, after four days of imprisonment, when they paid the workmen $2,500, a sum apparently equal to the amount of back wages owed them by Robinson.After the federal Circuit Court for the District of Maryland found for the plaintiff Pottle in a civil suit for damages against the sheriff, South appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, in reversing the lower court, found no cause of action under Maryland common law. The Court held that a sheriff, as a public officer, was liable personally only for misfeasance or nonfeasance of ministerial acts, where the sheriff is bound to an individual for a fee or salary, but not for a breach of his public duty.Cocking v Wade 87 Md. 529 (1898)Following indictment by a grand jury for the murder of his wife and her sister, Cocking was taken into the custody of the sheriff of Charles County, Wade. The sheriff placed Cocking in "an old, dilapidated building" in Port Tobacco that was used as a jail and under the care of "an aged and infirm negro," leaving the prisoner "wholly unprotected." That night a mob, in the presence of the sheriff, proceeded to lynch Cocking. Despite some evidence that the sheriff was told of the possibility of lynching and had been urged to either move the prisoner to Baltimore or to a newer jail, the Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the trial court in a civil action brought by the family of the hanged man in finding no liability on the part of the sheriff.Riss v. City of New York 22 N.Y.2d 579, 293 NYS2d 897, 240 N.E.2d 860 (N.Y. Ct. of Ap. 1958);Ms. Riss was being harassed by a former boyfriend, in a familiar pattern of increasingly violent threats. She went to the police for help many times, but was always rebuffed. Desperate because she could not get police protection, she applied for a gun permit, but was refused that as well. On the eve of her engagement party she and her mother went to the police one last time pleading for protection against what they were certain was a serious and dangerous threat. And one last time the police refused. As she was leaving the party, a thug hired by her former boyfriend threw acid in her face, blinding and permanently disfiguring her.Her case against the City of New York for failing to protect her was, not surprisingly, unsuccessful. The lone dissenting justice of New York's high court wrote in his opinion: "What makes the City's position [denying any obligation to protect the woman] particularly difficult to understand is that, in conformity to the dictates of the law [she] did not carry any weapon for self-defense. Thus, by a rather bitter irony she was required to rely for protection on the City of New York which now denies all responsibility to her."Ne Casek v. City of Los Angeles 233 Cal.App.2d 131, 43 Cal.Rptr. 294 (1965)Kathryne Ne Casek was knocked down on a sidewalk by two suspects who had been arrested by the officers, the Court of Appeal held the amount of force or method used by a police officer in attempting to keep an arrested person or persons in custody is a discretionary act for purpose of application of doctrine of immunity of government officials from civil liability for their discretionary acts, and therefore Ms. Ne Casek (who was injured by two escaped suspects who had been handcuffed together) could not maintain an action against the arresting officers based on the officer's alleged negligence in using insufficient force to keep the prisoners in custody.)Susman v. City of Los Angeles, et al. 269 Cal.App.2d 803, 75 Cal.Rptr. 240 (1969)Action was brought by several landowners against the City of Los Angeles and the State pleading eleven separate causes of action for damages arising out of the ‘Watts’ Riots’ of 1965. The Court of Appeal held that none of the allegations presented was sufficient to show any duty owed by any of the officials named as defendants to act to prevent or avoid the harm suffered by the plaintiffs.Silver v. City of Minneapolis 170 N.W.2d 206 (S.Ct. Minn. 1969)A riot occurred in the Plymouth Avenue North area of Minneapolis in July, 1967. Plaintiffs owned real estate located at 1709-1711 Plymouth Avenue North. On July 19, 1967, a riot occurred in that area during which looting occurred and a number of business and commercial properties along Plymouth Avenue were damaged or destroyed. The windows in the plaintiff’s store were broken in plaintiffs' store by rioters; this was investigated by the Minneapolis Police Department. According to plaintiffs, they received indications that their building and store were being threatened by further damage in riots that might follow.According to plaintiffs, after they had received indications that their building and store were being threatened by further damage they boarded up the windows and doors and contacted the police concerning the threats. A representative from MPD stated “we know about it and we are going to have some extra police to guard Plymouth Avenue, but we haven't got enough police, you know, to watch every business place on Plymouth. He says we are going to keep an eye on your place, but we cannot give you special protection."Following this conversation, Silver went home about 7 p. m., informing the police of his intention to leave at that hour and told them that he had boarded up his doors and windows. During the night of July 20-21, plaintiffs' building and store were burned by rioters throwing "Molotov cocktails" against the building. They sought recovery from the city for the damage to the building and store, alleging the city of Minneapolis was negligent in failing to provide police and fire protection to their building after it had been requested by plaintiffs, or to take reasonable measures to prevent the riot.The court was satisfied that under the facts of the present case the city was exercising discretion in determining how to best cope with impending trouble by deploying its police and fire manpower so as to protect the property of as many people as was possible within its limited resources, and as such fell under the existing Tort Immunity of state law.Keane v. City of Chicago 98 Ill. App.2d 460, 240 N.E.2d 321 (1968);A Chicago public school teacher was killed while on the premises of the school to which she had been assigned was killed by a student enrolled at the school. The plaintiff alleged that the City was negligent in failing to assign police protection to the school, although it knew or should have known that failure to provide this protection would result in harm to persons lawfully on the premises in the removal of police protection from the school prior to the event, although it knew or should have known of the dangerous condition then existing at the school and in permitting a dangerous condition to exist at the school. The court dismissed the case because of the existing state law granting tort immunity with no proof the City had ever affirmatively assumed a "special duty”.Simpson's Food Fair v. Evansville 272 N.E. 2d 871 (Ind.Ct. of Ap.) 1971;The plaintiff-appellant alleged that the City of Evansville knew or should have known of the high incidence of criminal activity in the plaintiff's neighborhood. He held that it refused to assign extra police to patrol the area or to request outside police assistance from the State, that a duty to protect the plaintiff and to prevent crime was breached, and that such breach proximately caused the plaintiff to lose customers and merchandise and ultimately to cease business operation. The court held that in this case, a general public duty was involved, and that no special duty had been undertaken.Antique Arts Corp. v. City of Torrence 39 Cal.App.3d 588, 114 Cal.Rptr. 332 (1974)A silent burglar alarm installed on the premises of the store operated by the plaintiff was, during the course of a robbery by two armed men, activated at 3:32 p.m. and the alert message was relayed to the police department.The dispatch message to the units in the field was at 3:43 p.m., and a police unit arrived at the scene of the robbery at 3:44 p.m. The delay in the transmission of the dispatch enabled the robbers to complete the robbery and escape with jewelry and merchandise in the amount of $49,000. The Court of Appeal held that Govt. Code section 846 provides for immunity if no police protection is provided; or, if police protection is provided, but that protection is not sufficient.Hartzler v. City of San Jose 46 Cal.App.3d 6, 120 Cal.Rptr. 5 (1975)Plaintiff's decedent, Ruth Bunnell, telephoned the main office of the San Jose Police Department and reported that her estranged husband, Mack Bunnell, had called her, saying that he was coming to her residence to kill her. She requested immediate police aid; the department refused to come to her aid at that time, and asked that she call the department again when Mack Bunnell had arrived.Approximately 45 minutes later, Mack Bunnell arrived at her home and stabbed her to death. The police did not arrive until 3 a.m., in response to a call of a neighbor. By this time Mrs. Bunnell was dead.Appellant has failed to plead facts supporting an assumption that a special relationship existed between decedent and the San Jose Police Department. The allegation that the police had responded 20 times to her calls and had arrested her husband once does not indicate that the department had assumed a duty toward decedent greater than the duty owed to another member of the public. The police may have responded repeatedly to her calls, only to discover that she was not in danger. Absent an indication that the police had induced decedent's reliance on a promise, express or implied, that they would provide her with protection, it must be concluded that no special relationship existed and that appellant has not stated a cause of action.Walters v. Hampton, 14 Wash. App. 548, 543 P.2d 648 (1975);Robert Walters was shot with a rifle by Gordon A. Hampton, while visiting in the latter's home in Port Orchard. Walters presented police records which showed that on three occasions in 1968 and two occasions in 1970 Gordon Hampton's wife complained to the police that her husband, while drunk, had threatened to kill her. On the three 1968 occasions Mrs. Hampton reported that Hampton had aimed a gun at her. Twice the police investigated her complaints and talked to Hampton. In June 1970 and September 1970 Mrs. Hampton again complained Hampton was beating her and had threatened to kill her. In the September incident Mrs. Hampton told the police Hampton had fired a gun at her. She also asked the police to remove a woman Hampton had allegedly brought to the home. The police officers observed no other woman in the house, but took Hampton's gun to the police station. It should be noted Hampton denied firing the gun. The firearm was returned to Hampton 2 days later. On almost all these occasions, the investigating officers found both Mr. and Mrs. Hampton either to have been drinking or drunk. Between the time Hampton retrieved his gun in September 1970 and when Walters was shot the police had no contact with either Mr. or Mrs. Hampton.Plaintiff's principal theory was that the chief of police had a mandatory statutory duty to prosecute Hampton for violation of city ordinances prohibiting the aiming or discharging of firearms, or to initiate criminal prosecution for assault. Plaintiff's apparent contention is that had Hampton been prosecuted, the gun could have been confiscated in 1968 or 1970 and plaintiff would not have been injured in 1972. Second, plaintiff contends the police had a mandatory and nondiscretionary duty to protect him against the harm which in fact befell him.The court held that the plaintiff's entire argument is based upon the false premise that arrest and the criminal process is the exclusive method available to the police in dealing with the variety of behavioral or social problems they confront; additionally, given that the only complaints received by the police prior to the shooting related to the Hampton's marital disputes (and the last contact the police had with the Hamptons prior to the shooting in February 1972 was in September 1970). In the absence of any allegation that the police knew Hampton posed a danger to the plaintiff, that the plaintiff required protection from Hampton, or that plaintiff was in some particular danger, these facts are inadequate to establish a specific duty owed by the City to plaintiff.Massengill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518, 456 P.2d 376 (1969);This case involved an automobile collision in which plaintiffs' decedents were killed. The plaintiffs argued that it resulted from a deputy sheriff's failure to apprehend and arrest intoxicated motorists observed driving in a reckless manner immediately prior to the accident. The court disagreed:"The general rule pertaining to governmental agencies and public officers is that `... if the duty which the official authority imposes upon an officer is a duty to the public, a failure to perform it, or an inadequate or erroneous performance, must be a public, not an individual injury, and must be redressed, if at all, in some form of public prosecution.”Henderson v. St. Petersburg, 247 So.2d 23 (Fla. Ct. App. 1971);On May 9, 1969, Matthew Henderson came to the City of St. Petersburg, Florida, for the purpose of making business deliveries, which he has done on prior occasions. Because of prior criminal attacks previously made on him, he went to the Police Department, and alleged he made “specific arrangements with the officers, agents and employees of the defendant City acting within the scope of their employment” (a desk sergeant on duty at the precinct) created “a privity for specific police protection” while he was making his deliveries.He later proceeded to the area where he claims he was “assured officers would be there to protect him”. However, arriving at the above address, he was accosted by unknown assailants, who shot him. He sued for injury, damages and loss of future income, alleging that they were the result of the carelessness and negligence of the City, through “it's Police Department, officers and agents, in failing to properly protect the plaintiff as they had specifically undertaken through the direct contact..."The court held that the plaintiff did not make causal connection between the alleged negligence of the City and the injuries, prove that the presence of the police officers would have prevented the injuries, and did not show that the City owed Henderson a "special duty."Evers v. Westerberg, (1972)38 A.D.2d 751, 329 N.Y.S. 615;On December 4, 1966, at about 1:50 A.M., an automobile accident occurred in Valley Stream, NY, when an automobile driven by defendant Thomas Westerberg and owned by defendant Celeste Westerberg collided with a vehicle driven by John Evers, in which his wife (plaintiff) was a passenger, causing Evers' death. About 20 minutes earlier, the Westerberg vehicle had been involved in a rear-end collision with another automobile in the Village of Lynbrook.Mrs. Evers sued the Westerbergs and the Village of Lynbrook, charging them with negligence through the officers, for having failed to take Westerberg into custody on the ground of intoxication and/or impounding his damaged vehicle to prevent him from driving it away from the scene.They also complained that the village failed to provide Mr. and Mrs. Evers with adequate police protection insofar as it permitted Westerberg to drive away from the scene of the first accident. The court disagreed:“It is well settled that a municipality, acting in its governmental capacity for the protection of the general public, cannot be cast in damages for a mere failure to furnish adequate protection to a particular individual to whom it has assumed no special duty.”Huey v. Cicero, 41 Ill.2d 361, 243 N.E.2d 214 (1968);Plaintiff, Isaac Huey, the administrator of the estate of his deceased minor son, Jerome, instituted a wrongful-death action in the circuit court of Cook County against the Town of Cicero, its board of trustees, and certain named individual officials of the town for the death of his son from a fatal felonious beating by four white youths armed with baseball bats while he was on his way to an employment office.The plaintiff alleged that the defendants knew or would have known by the exercise of ordinary care that a large number of Negroes entered and departed the confines of Cicero daily in pursuit of employment at various factories and that "the presence of a Negro on the public streets and ways of Cicero on or about May 25, 1966, constituted a peril and hazard to the personal safety [of such person]."They charged that "The defendants, however, or one or more of them so wantonly and willfully neglected to use ordinary care for the protection and safety due to dark-skinned persons and to plaintiff's intestate on May 25, 1966, that as a direct and proximate result, Jerome Huey was assaulted and severe injuries were inflicted from which he died on May 29th, 1966."They further charged that "Notwithstanding that the defendants, or one or more of them, were under a duty to warn, advise, or otherwise give notice to dark-skinned persons and plaintiff's intestate of the unusual and extraordinary hazards and perils to such persons as existed on May 25th, 1966 in the Town of Cicero, the defendants or one or more of them, willfully and wantonly failed to exercise ordinary care to so advise, warn or otherwise give notice to Jerome Huey."The Court dismissed the case for the defendants, citing “Independent of statutory or common-law concepts of sovereign immunity, the general rule is that a municipality or its employees is not liable for failure to supply general police or fire protection. (Vossler v. DeSmet, 204 Ill. App. 292, 295; Adamczyk v. Zambelli, 25 Ill. App.2d 121, 128. See also Motyka v. City of Amsterdam, 15 N.Y.2d 134, 204 N.E.2d 635.) This rule has been maintained in the face of decisions holding municipalities liable for affirmative negligent or wilful acts by their employees. (Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District, 18 Ill. 2d 11; Andrews v. City of Chicago, 37 Ill. 2d 309.) Exceptions to the rule have been found only in instances where the municipality was under a special duty to a particular individual, such as protecting a material witness from threatened injury by third parties.Trautman v. City of Stamford, (1975 Super. Ct.)32 Conn. Sup. 258, 350 A.2d 782The plaintiff's complaint alleged that he was seriously injured after being struck by a drag racing automobile while standing on a public sidewalk in the city of Stamford. He sued the city and the two officers who were present for a breach of duty for failing to enforce the anti-drag racing laws. Since the alleged breach of duty was one owed not to the plaintiff individually but to the public generally the patrolmen could not be held liable to the plaintiff in negligence.Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. City of Wichita, 217 Kan. 44, 536 P.2d 54 (1975);After having a business in the area suffer firebombings, a detective performed a stake-out on a business that had received specific threats. He observed two vehicles slow through the area then turn a corner, after which four males came from around that corner. Three went into an L-shaped recess where the shop was, while one stayed on the sidewalk. They were not carrying anything the detective could see, but as he attempted to request another unit to the scene via radio, he “saw a bright red flare” and as he neared he saw a front window in the area was burning, and saw the 4 males run away. Shortly thereafter as he was looking for them he saw one of the vehicles he had seen earlier flee the scene. He gave chase, and after a twenty to thirty block chase was able to apprehend four of the five occupants. During interviews, three young men told of being at a party earlier that evening in Wichita, and the idea came up to set fire to several businesses with Molotov cocktails.The insurance company alleged that the police failed to enforce the “mob action” statute and thus prevent the fire. They also argue that the detective breached his duty under state law to order the dispersal of the four boys in front of the Gentry Shop, and that such a breach of a statutory duty made him personally liable for the ensuing damage.The court held that “The statute amounts to a codification of the common law duty of a peace officer to preserve the peace. The duty owed is to the public at large, and not to any particular individual. For the breach of such duty an officer is answerable only to the public acting through its official representatives, and not to any particular individual.”Sapp v. City of Tallahassee 348 So.2d 363 (Fla. Ct. of Ap. 1977);Ms. Sapp's complaint alleged Tallahassee Police Department officers, on the evening of September 4, 1974, were on special assignment at the Tallahassee round Holiday Inn. One of the officers observed two males in the rear parking area and radioed a suspicious persons report to another officer on stake-out within the hotel. The officers observed the men loiter at opposite ends of the sidewalk near the rear entrance of the hotel for about ten minutes. Ms. Sapp, a temporary employee of the Inn, was then observed leaving the rear entrance, and looking for her ride before reentering the hotel. The officer on stake-out saw the two males follow her into the hotel about a minute later. Other than reporting in, the officer took no action. Twenty minutes later he saw the males running from the hotel after severely beating and robbing Ms. Sapp inside the hotel near the rear entrance. The complaint alleged the officers owed appellant a special duty to protect her from physical assaults and were negligent in failing to properly investigate the behavior of the men.The court held that there was no showing of a violation of statutory procedures by the Tallahassee police — nor a showing of a direct and personal contact with Ms. Sapp, and while the police were conducting surveillance at the time the incident took place, it was not a situation where police authorities undertook a responsibility to particular members of the public, exposing them, without adequate protection, to risks which then materialize into actual injury.Jamison v. Chicago, 48 Ill. App. 3d 567 (1st Dist. 1977)James O'Malley shot and killed John Jamison. For three days prior to the shooting, O'Malley's son had warned the Chicago police that his father had been acting in a violent manner and requested that the police arrest him. The police refused to do so and the shooting occurred. Plaintiff, administratrix of Jamison's estate, filed a wrongful death action against the city of Chicago and the individual police officers, alleging, inter alia, that the individual officers were guilty of willful and wanton negligence in refusing to arrest O'Malley.After appeal, the court held that the existing tort immunity legislation provided “blanket immunity in the area of police discretion over arrests”, as well as “any failure to prevent the commission of crimes, the failure to apprehend criminals, and the failure to make an arrest” unless such act or omission constituted willful and wanton negligence.Weutrich v. Delia 155 N.J. Super 324, 326, 382 A.2d 929, 930 (1978);The plaintiff alleged that on several occasions during the afternoon and evening of February 9, 1974 notification was given to the police department of the township that defendant John Delia was menacing with a firearm certain persons within a short distance of the Berkeley Heights police headquarters. The police department made no response to these warnings. Less than 12 hours later, in the early morning of February 10, 1974, John Delia in that same area shot John Weuthrich in the head with a gun, killing him instantly, leaving as survivors his wife and three infant children.The complaint alleged that decedent's death was caused not only by the wrongful act of defendant Delia but also by the neglect, failure and default of the township police department to carry out its duty (1) to "apprehend and disarm" defendant after receiving warning of his armed threats of imminent personal harm, and (2) to take "appropriate action to disarm [defendant]…file a Complaint against him or otherwise confiscate the firearms in his possession."The City replied that state law provided immunity for public entities and officers for adopting or failing to adopt or enforce (any) law, failing to provide police protection and failing to make arrests or retain persons so placed in custody.The court agreed, holding “While it is true that police officers have a duty to investigate information from citizens concerning unlawful or criminal activity, (cite), the failure of the police to make an arrest as a consequence does not subject the municipality to tort liability…Municipalities are expressly immunized from tort liability for the failure to provide police protection or the failure to provide sufficient police protection.”DeHoney v. Hernandez, 122 Ariz. 367, 372, 595 P.2d 159, 164 (1979)After consulting informally with several officers, DeHoney, the owner of a jewelry store, installed a silent alarm sytem. On the evening of 30 June 1975, the silent alarm for the Showcase was activated at the police station at 2:11 a.m. The dispatcher immediately radioed the officers in the field, and at 2:13 a.m. Sgt. Hernandez and Officer Hill simultaneously arrived in front of the Showcase and Officer Hovis arrived at the rear. The front and back doors were secure; the police saw no indications of disturbance. Sgt. Hernandez then instructed Edwards to telephone DeHoney and also directed Officer Hovis to remain in the general vicinity. Officers Hill and Hernandez left the area for other duties, not realizing a burglar had entered through the roof and remained inside, exiting thorough a back door once the officer left the rear of the building.The dispatcher had some difficulty in locating DeHoney’s phone number and reached him approximately 30 minutes later. He arrived on scene at 2:45 and entered the building with Officer Hovitz to discover the theft.DeHoney alleged the police were negligent in their delay in notifying him and their failure to remain at the building until the owner arrived. The court disagreed, stating “…there was no specific promise or representation that the owner would always be immediately notified, or that the officers would remain on the premises pending the owner's arrival in every instance... Certainly there are many situations where emergencies confronting the police in the discharge of their duties to the public generally would make it impossible to immediately notify the owner and await his arrival. There was, then, no narrowing of the general public duty to a special duty to prevent harm to plaintiffs' property.”Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 93 N.M. 564, 569, 603 P.2d 303 (1979)On June 22, 1975, plaintiff's decedent, Ernest Trujillo, along with a group of friends, was in Roosevelt Park, a park established and maintained by the City of Albuquerque. Earlier in the day, a rock concert had been held but Ernest and his friends went to the park after the concert was over. They were sitting on the grass when they were approached by, and had some kind of altercation with, another person who then left the park. Shortly thereafter, a second person approached Ernest and his group, accusing them of having "picked on" his brother, and drew a gun, firing it once or twice. Ernest and his friends then chased this person to the top of a knoll where a third person, Wilbert Miles, stood and fired a shotgun "into the ground", hitting and killing Ernest.Her complaint alleged that the City maintained the park; that the maintenance of the park was a proprietary function of the City; that the City allowed the rock concert to be held in the park without proper police and security arrangements; that the City had a duty to secure the park and protect citizens using it, particularly a duty to protect Ernest's well-being; and that the City breached its duty and was therefore liable in damages.The court held that “lacking proof of a direct relationship or contact between the victim and the police creating a special duty, there is no liability on the part of the police and municipality… Failing to establish that a special duty existed between the victim and the police, there is no liability.” The court also stated “To hold a municipality liable for the conduct of third persons, such as is alleged in the complaint before us, would, in our opinion, be contrary to sound public policy and create policing requirements difficult of fulfillment.”Crouch v. Hall, 406 N.E.2d 303, 304 (Ind.App.1980);Mildred Crouch brought suit against three police officers, individually and in their capacity as officers, for failure to properly investigate a rape of a third person by one Anthony Wayne Hall and to detect and apprehend Hall, who one week later raped and murdered Mildred Crouch's daughter Jeanne Crouch. The officers moved for summary judgment based on immunity under the Tort Claims Act.Upon appeal, the court agreed that while “there is no factual dispute… the police owed no special duty to the victim. The duty owed in the investigation of the rape was to the general public.”Porter v. Urbana, 88 Ill.App.3d 443, 445, 43 Ill.Dec. 610, 612, 410 N.E.2d 610, 612 (1980)The plaintiff's complaint alleges that Clarence King, Jr., invaded her home December 3, 1976, and beat and raped her, and that the Urbana Police Department and Gordon knew of six other rapes committed by King in Urbana beginning March 22, 1976, and claimed they were negligent for failing to investigate, question, or arrest the man that was known to them (having eyewitness descriptions of King, his fingerprints, and his name connecting him with the series of rapes) in time to prevent her assault.The Court disagreed, citing the Illinois Tort Immunity Act, which reads “Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for failure to provide adequate police protection or service, failure to prevent the commission of crimes and failure to apprehend criminals”.Stone v. State 106 Cal.App.3d 924, 165 Cal Rep. 339 (1980)The plaintiffs, together with some friends, attended the Cal Expo fairgrounds on September 9, 1975. They agreed to meet at the main gate prior to returning home. Near the gate the plaintiffs were overrun by a gang of youths who were shouting and hitting persons. During the melee Joyce Stone was attacked, her purse was taken and the plaintiffs were beaten and injured.In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the state “negligently owned, maintained, controlled, managed and operated” the premises, and negligently failed to provide adequate security measures, exposing persons on the premises to danger and injury. They also alleged that the State Of California, in making a policy decision not to use State Police for security but to use private security, assumed a duty to provide security, and that the persons hired by the State failed to use normal care while exercising their functions.The court found that the limited exception to tort immunity in cases involving discretionary acts in which a special relationship between the plaintiff and the public employee exist had not been proven, and given the existing law immunizing the government for failure to establish a police department, provide police protection or to provide sufficient police protection service, no liability existed for such failure.Warren v. District of Columbia (444 A.2d 1, 1981)Two women were upstairs in a townhouse when they heard their roommate, a third woman, being attacked downstairs by intruders. They phoned the police several times and were assured that officers were on the way. After about 30 minutes, when their roommate's screams had stopped, they assumed the police had finally arrived. When the two women went downstairs they saw that in fact the police never came, but the intruders were still there. As the Warren court graphically states in the opinion: "For the next fourteen hours the women were held captive, raped, robbed, beaten, forced to commit sexual acts upon each other, and made to submit to the sexual demands of their attackers."The three women sued the District of Columbia for failing to protect them, but D.C.'s highest court exonerated the District and its police, saying that it is a "fundamental principle of American law that a government and its agents are under no general duty to provide public services, such as police protection, to any individual citizen."Chapman v. City of Philadelphia, 434 A.2d 753 (Sup.Ct. Penn. 1981);William F. Chapman, died on August 14, 1978 as a result of injuries he sustained on August 11, 1978 when he was attacked and robbed by three men on the platform of the Wayne Junction Railroad Station. The complaint alleges that the City of Philadelphia negligently breached its duty to plaintiff's decedent by failing to maintain law and order, protect the citizens and prevent unsafe conditions from existing.The court held that “the duty of the City of Philadelphia to provide police protection is a public one which may not be claimed by an individual unless a special relationship exists between the city and the individual” and that the plaintiff had failed to “set forth any facts from which it would be possible to infer that a special relationship existed between William F. Chapman and the City of Philadelphia”.Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 61 (7th Cir. 1982).Thomas Vanda, was convicted of aggravated battery with a knife, and while being evaluated was diagnosed with schizophrenia. Less than a year later was charged in using a knife to murder of a woman. He was found “not guilty by reason of insanity” and was committed to a psychiatric facility. Five years later he was released and subsequently killed Marguerite Anne Bowers with a knife.The complaint alleged that the defendants knew that Vanda was dangerous when they released him, and acted recklessly in doing so, but the court held that “there is no constitutional right to be protected by the state against being murdered by criminals or madmen. It is monstrous if the state fails to protect its residents against such predators but it does not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or, we suppose, any other provision of the Constitution.”Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 C.3d 197, 185 Cal.Rptr. 252, 649 P.2d 894 (S.Ct. Cal. 1982);Yolanda Davidson was stabbed four times by Jack Blackmun while in a public laundromat. On three earlier occasions women had been stabbed at the same or nearby laundromats. The evening before Yolanda's stabbing, two police officers had the laundromat under surveillance when another stabbing occurred; the police chased the suspect but failed to catch him. The next evening the officers had the laundromat under surveillance for the purpose of preventing assaults and apprehending the felon. The officers were aware of Yolanda's presence in the laundromat throughout the surveillance. After about an hour of surveillance, they saw a man on the premises who closely resembled the attacker of the previous evening and, while watching him for 15 minutes, identified him as the likely perpetrator of that assault. As the officers watched, the suspect entered and left the laundromat "several times." The officers did not warn Yolanda. Eventually she was stabbed.Shore v. Town of Stonington, 187 Conn. 147, ___, 444 A.2d 1379, 1381 (1982);On January 14, 1980 at approximately 10:40 p.m., Lieutenant Edward Sylvia, a police officer of the town of Stonington, was engaged in the performance of his duties as a shift supervisor. As Sylvia proceeded east on Route One in Stonington, he observed a green Pontiac automobile on the same highway heading in a westerly direction at a fast rate of speed. Sylvia turned his cruiser around and proceeded to follow the Pontiac. He observed the vehicle cross the center line of the highway a few times and then pull into the parking lot of the defendant Veterans of Foreign Wars, Harley P. Chase Post 1265 (hereinafter V.F.W.).Sylvia followed the vehicle into the lot, got out of his cruiser, and approached the driver, later identified as Mark Cugini. When the officer asked Cugini where he was going in such a hurry, Cugini replied that he was there to pick up his girlfriend at the V.F.W. Sylvia informed him that if he wanted to keep his driver's license, he had better slow down and should let his girlfriend drive. The officer departed for other duties. Cugini entered the V.F.W. The evidence concerning his condition of sobriety as he entered the V.F.W., considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, could reasonably lead to a conclusion that he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs. Cugini did not drink at the V.F.W. After a short conversation with one of its patrons, he left and drove away in the green Pontiac.Subsequently that evening at about 11:30 p.m., Cugini, driving along Route 78 in Westerly, Rhode Island at a high rate of speed, struck a vehicle being operated by the plaintiff's decedent, Sherry Shore. Mrs. Shore died from the injuries suffered as a result of the collision.The plaintiff, whose decedent was killed by a drunk driver who had been stopped but not arrested by a town police officer, has a cause of action in negligence against the officer and the town for failure to enforce Connecticut General Statutes. The trial court granted the defendant town's motion for summary judgment, finding that the police officer owed no specific duty to the plaintiff's decedent to enforce the motor vehicle laws of the state, and the CT Supreme Court agreed.Morgan v. District of Columbia, 468 A.2d 1306 (D.C. Ct. of Ap. 1983);Over a three month period, Garnett Morgan had contacted her husband’s employer, the District of Columbia PD, and related that he had beaten and threatened her. She eventually moved, not informing her husband of her whereabouts and maintaining an unlisted telephone number.Three months later, Officer Morgan arrived at his wife's apartment, choked her into unconsciousness, and forced her into his car. Threatening to kill her if she objected, he drove to her parents' home, took their two children and left. Garnett Morgan then called the police. Along with two other officers, Lieutenant John R. Bowles, Jr. responded to the call and she told him what had happened, including the beating in July and the August gun threat. Lieutenant Bowles contacted Officer Morgan and directed him to report to the precinct. Morgan said that he would do so after he brought the children to the Pinkney house. When Morgan arrived, he was met by the Lieutenant, but rather than proceed with him to the precinct, Morgan carried the youngest child, with the older child beside him, toward the house. Lieutenant Bowles walked behind them. Officer Morgan walked into the house, said to his wife, "I told you so," then took out his revolver and shot at her twice; one of the bullets wounded her and the other hit John Keith, his son. Morgan then turned and shot Lieutenant Bowles, shot and killed Elton Pinkney, and surrendered to the police“Absent a special relationship between police department and victim, liability for failure to protect individual citizens from crime does not generally lie against police officials, who occupy positions necessarily fraught with discretion in the administration of justice. Appellants do not fall within the narrow exception to this longstanding rule. Furthermore, the facts of this case, as a matter of law, cannot support a finding of negligence by the city.”Morris v. Musser, 478 A.2d 937 (1984);On June 28, 1980 four assailants invaded plaintiffs' Gulf Service Station, viciously beat Mr. Morris, who suffered multiple injuries including a fractured jaw, and struck and terrorized Mrs. Morris, who vainly attempted to shield her unconscious husband from further punishment. Although on duty and apprised of the attack, Officer Musser did not intervene in sufficient time to prevent or reduce plaintiffs' injuries. The plaintiffs also alleged that in a prior incident, Officer Musser had refused to assist crime victims in jeopardy. They sued, contending that Officer Musser's “negligent, willful, reckless or intentional delay in furnishing assistance, after being notified of the assault in progress, proximately caused or aggravated their injuries”, and also sued because he continued to be employed by the Township after such behavior.The court, reviewing the state tort immunity law, concluded that “York Township is the only defendant cloaked with immunity…. The Township's conduct — failure to remove officer Musser from active duty and furnish adequate police protection to plaintiffs — does not fit within any of the eight types of negligent activity for which immunity is waived.”. They further held that while the Officer might be individually liable if his behavior was as alleged, the plaintiffs needed to prove that a special relationship existed, “those who are imperiled because they have aided law enforcement as informers or witnesses” or when the police “expressly promise to protect specific individuals from precise harm”. In this case, since “plaintiffs were neither allied with the police in a law enforcement project nor were they individually promised police protection from delineated harm. Further, an emergency aid request communicated to the police does not create a special duty owing to crime victims; thus, the police are not liable to crime victims for failing to furnish prompt and efficient aid upon request.” The court also dismissed a claim concerning Constitutional protection, stating “Since the defendants had no federal constitutional duty to protect plaintiffs from criminal assault, the inadequate provision of police protection services is not actionable under Section 1983 or the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”Thurman v. City of Torrington 595 F.Supp.1521 (D.Conn. 1984)A woman and her son were harassed, threatened and assaulted by her estranged husband, all in violation of his probation and a restraining order. Despite numerous requests for police protection, the police did nothing because "the police department used an administrative classification that resulted in police protection being fully provided to persons abused by someone with whom the victim has no domestic relationship, but less protection when the victim is either: 1) a woman abused or assaulted by a spouse or boyfriend, or 2) a child abused by a father or stepfather."Westbrooks v. State, 173 Cal.App.3d 1203, 219 Cal.Rtr. 674 (1985)The widow and sons of a motorist who drove into the void where a collapsed bridge had been, brought action against the State, county, and county deputy sheriff. The California Department of Transportation (Cal Trans) was aware that a violent storm with heavy rains had caused a bridge on State route 118 to collapse. A county deputy sheriff had observed the beginning of the collapse, reported it and requested assistance from Cal Trans. A jury award of $1,300,000 was reversed in part by the Court of Appeal which held: (1) the county deputy sheriff had no duty to warn drivers that the state highway bridge had collapsed during the storm, and his efforts to warn drivers did not in any way increase the risk of harm to users of the highway, and therefore the county was not liable to motorist's wife and children; and (2) the judgment was upheld against the state because the Cal Trans was notified at 1:52 a.m. and at 2:35 a.m., but no Cal Trans personnel nor CHP officer appeared at the scene until 5:45 a.m., and that such delay was unreasonable.)Calogrides v. City of Mobile, 475 So.2d 560 (S.Ct. A;a. 1985);In 1988, Lisa Bianco's violently abusive husband was finally in jail for beating and kidnapping her, after having victimized her for years. Ms. Bianco was somewhat comforted by the facts that he was supposedly serving a seven-year sentence, and she had been promised by the authorities that she'd be notified well in advance of his release. Nevertheless, after being in only a short time, he was temporarily released on an eight-hour pass, and she wasn't notified. He went directly to her house and, in front of their 6- and 10- year old daughters, beat Lisa Bianco to death.In 1989, in a suburb of Los Angeles, Maria Navarro called the L. A. County Sheriff's 911 emergency line asking for help. It was her birthday and there was a party at her house, but her estranged husband, against whom she had had a restraining order, said he was coming over to kill her. She believed him, but got no sympathy from the 911 dispatcher, who said: "What do you want us to do lady, send a car to sit outside your house?" Less than half an hour after Maria hung up in frustration, one of her guests called the same 911 line and informed the dispatcher that the husband was there and had already killed Maria and one other guest. Before the cops arrived, he had killed another.DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 109 S.Ct. 998, 1989 (1989)Injured party was a boy who was beaten and permanently injured by his father. He claimed a special relationship existed because local officials knew he was being abused, indeed they had "specifically proclaimed by word and deed [their] intention to protect him against that danger," [7] but failed to remove him from his father's custody.The Court in DeShaney held that no duty arose because of a "special relationship," concluding that Constitutional duties of care and protection only exist as to certain individuals, such as incarcerated prisoners, involuntarily committed mental patients and others restrained against their will and therefore unable to protect themselves. "The affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State's knowledge of the individual's predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf."Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Department, 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990).Ms. Balistreri, beaten and harassed by her estranged husband, alleged a "special relationship" existed between her and the Pacifica Police Department, to wit, they were duty-bound to protect her because there was a restraining order against her husband. The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that DeShaney limited the circumstances that would give rise to a "special relationship" to instances of custody. Because no such custody existed in Balistreri, the Pacifica Police had no duty to protect her, so when they failed to do so and she was injured they were not liable.McKee v. City of Rockwall, Texas, 877 F.2d409 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct.727 (1990).Plaintiff claimed she was injured because the police refused to make an arrest following a domestic violence call. She claimed their refusal to arrest was due to a city policy of gender- based discrimination. In that case the U. S. District Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that "no constitutional violation [occurred] when the most that can be said of the police is that they stood by and did nothing..."Castle Rock v. Gonzales (04-278) 545 U.S. 748 (2005)The Supreme Court ruled that the police did not have a constitutional duty to protect a person from harm, even a woman who had obtained a court-issued protective order against a violent husband making an arrest mandatory for a violation.The decision, with an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia and dissents from Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, overturned a ruling by a federal appeals court in Colorado. The appeals court had permitted a lawsuitto proceed against a Colorado town, Castle Rock, for the failure of the police to respond to a woman's pleas for help after her estranged husband violated a protective order by kidnapping their three young daughters, whom he eventually killed.Source Materials:Police Have No Duty to Protect Individuals by Peter Kaslerhttp://whatreallyhappened.com/WRHARTICLES/courtrulingsonpoliceprotection.php#axzz3XC8XgnOgNO AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO PROTECT USSmarter Legal Research | CasetextLawLink - The Attorney NetworkLeagle.com | The place to find U. S. Law, Lawyers and OpinionsCourtListener

It kind of depends on what you count as "visited." Some were visited that we never saw, and were just referenced. Some were not named. In any case, I count at least 250 in SG-1 alone, pulled from the Stargate Wiki:Planets By EpisodeAbydos — home of Daniel's family by marriageAdora — planet where Arlos and Vala spent romantic evenings (may be Arlos's planet)Alaris — a planet to which SG-12 conducted a surveyAlien Fugitive Planet — home of Martin LloydAmon Shek — headquarters of Lord KhonsuAmra — planet with squabbling delegates. SG-5 escorted them to the base for negotiationsArlos' Planet — home of Arlos's laboratoryAtlantis — location of Earth outpost in Pegasus galaxyBeta Site — back-up to Alpha SiteBP6-3Q1 — home of the flying alien insects who attack Teal'cCal Mah — Base of rebel Jaffa led by a charismatic warriorCastiana / Taoth Vaclarush — potential location of Sangreal, toxic planetCelestis — home of the OriChodawa — where Lord Yu sends his fleet when they are about to ambush AnubisChulak — home base of Apophis and his JaffaCo'rak — site where Teal'c as Apophis's First Prime won a major victory against ArkadDakara — seat of Free Jaffa governmentDar Eshkalon — site of a peaceful Jaffa summit; struck by terrorist attackDelmak — headquarters of SokarErebus — labor camp where Bra'tac and Rya'c are trappedEuronda — home to sinister Alar and his followers fighting a war of racial purity against the BreedersGalar — where Mitchell was framed for murder while the planet's government sought an alliance with Earth, offering their modified Goa'uld memory device technology in exchangeGamma Site — location from where SG-11 contacted Teal'cGrannus's shrine — planet where Caius is pretending to be a monkHadante — prison planet where SG-1 was imprisoned after helping an escaped murdererHaktyl — home to Ishta and her tribe of rebel female JaffaHala — Asgard homeworld, where O'Neill has just finished constructionHarry Maybourne's Planet — where Maybourne became the ruler; former planet of Goa'uld Ares; place where Ancient time machine is discoveredHathor's Planet — where Hathor held SG-1 in a replica of the SGCHebridan — technologically sophisticated homeworld of space pilot Warrick, whom SG-1 rescued from P2X-005Inago's Planet — where Inago sells his waresJebanna — Kendra's original homeworldKallana — where Priors defeat locals and try to establish beachheadKawawn — naquadah mine controlled by ApophisKelowna/Langara — homeworld of Jonas QuinnKheb — legendary temple of the powerful Oma Desala, Mother Nature herself, who is caring for Sha're's sonKresh'tar — where Teal'c and Bra'tac lie dying after an ambushKS7-535 — icy planet where Col. Vaselov and his possessor Anubis are sentK'tau — Asgard protected planet and where SG-2 tried to contact the AsgardM4C-862 — Moon-based research station invaded by lethal swarming 'light' beesMeronat — a world with twin suns where Jacek took Vala when she was a childMubastas — mentioned as Bastet's headquartersNasya — site of a Goa'uld attack where Carter is taken over by the Tok'ra Jolinar of MalkshurNetu — moon of Delmak and Sokar's prison worldOrban — Aztec-influenced home of the nanotechnology-enhanced OrbaniansOrilla — Asgard homeworldOthala — Asgard homeworld in the Ida galaxy, here O'Neill seeks help to remove the Ancients' downloadP2A-018 — Latona — site of The Sentinel computer-human hybrid defense systemP2A-347 — planet where Stromos crashed on its way from Talthus to ArdenaP2A-463 — planet with language similar to the LatonansP2A-509 — planet where SG-3 had a scheduled standard recon mission; SG-1 traveled to this planet when escaping Hadante and rendezvoused with SG-3.P2A-870 — planet the wormhole jumped to after the bomb created a power surge on the SGC Stargate.P2C-106 — planet Mitchell believes he is going to on recon for his 200th trip through the StargateP2C-257 — where Daniel and Carter find Jacob on a covert missionP2M-903 — planet under Ba'al's control where his mothership has landedP2Q-463 — Vyus — home of the Vyans and Destroyer of Worlds Linea in her youthful alter ego Minister Ke'raP2R-866 — planet where SG-12 conducted covert surveillance on Ori converted planet until monster appearedP2X-005 — planet with crash-landed vessel and stranded passengersP2X-338 — deserted planet, previously home to System Lord MardukP2X-374 — planet with primitive population visited by SG-1P2X-416 — Bedrosia/Optrica — home to an ideological/holy war and the archaeologist NyanP2X-555 — planet where SG-5 conducted SG-1's planned mission.P2X-787 — planet previously visited by SG-13 where they encountered an ugly alienP2X-885 — where SGC tried but failed to stop the impoverished population from converting to the Ori religionP2X-887 — where SG-1 goes to look for technology left by AnubisP30-255 — planet previously visited by SG-1 with cuneiform writingP34-353J — secret Tok'ra baseP36-231 — planet where SG-2 and Jonas Quinn were on an excavationP3A-194 — Volian homeworld, agrarian planet whose population was wiped out by the AschenP3A-575 — First planet SG-1 explores with Teal'c as member of the unitP3A-577 — Planet scheduled for SG-2's first solo mission.P3A-707 — possible escape route for SG-1 when they use the Stargate to escape Hadante. Was not ultimately used.P3C-117 — Planet visited by SG-5P3C-249 — Jaffa world where O'Neill and Teal'c are trappedP3H-826 — potential site of SG-1's next mission; SG-1 instead returned to P3R-636.P3L-997 — flooded world where Daniel is trappedP3R-112 — where Ba'al clones are scheduled to meetP3R-118 — arctic world where SG-1 are imprisoned as slaves in a power plantP3R-233 — site of the quantum mirror that takes Daniel to an alternate universeP3R-272 — Place of Our Legacy — location of Ancients' repository of knowledge that gets downloaded into O'NeillP3R-636 — home of King Pyrus the God Slayer and Princess Shyla and their naquadah minesP3S-114 — where Teal'c and M'zel go in search of the Tok'ra operative ZarinP3S-452 — Goa'uld stronghold to which Teal'c was ordered to get more naquadahP3W-451 — planet engulfed by black hole.P3W-924 — Ma'chello's planetP3X-116 — Goa'uld planet where Teal'c finally kills nemesis TanithP3X-118 — planet the aliens came fromP3X-1279 — Cartago — Byrsa homeworldP3X-234 — place SG-1 gated to as an escape from BelisknerP3X-234 — Where O'Neill, Carter, and Teal'c gated to and stayed for two weeksP3X-289 — planet with all inhabitants living within a shrinking bubbleP3X-298 — planet with mask fragment dating from same time as predynastic EgyptP3X-367 — Nirrti's final base of operationsP3X-403 — resource-rich mining world home to Iron Shirt and his vast tribes of aboriginal UnasP3X-421 — desert planet, where SGC personnel first encounter a Prior of the OriP3X-422 — potential new home for the displaced Nasyans.P3X-439 — site of second Ancients repositoryP3X-474 — planet with Stargate visited by Odyssey as an escape route for crewP3X-513 — planet with broken sun shield and cave dwellers; ruled by Jonas HansonP3X-562 — home of the "Crystal Unity"P3X-584 — Anubis's protected laboratory planet, where Khalek was foundP3X-595 — planet previously visited by SG-1 that was mentioned in passingP3X-666 — site of an Ancient city ruinP3X-729 — Juna — planet under control of Cronus, which 'robot' SG-1 visitsP3X-744 — Tagrea — where Prometheus is forced to landP3X-774 — Nox homeworldP3X-775 — planet on which SG-1 was accused by the Taldor ("justice") for aiding a murderer and sentenced to life in prison on the planet HadanteP3X-7763 — Tollan — Original Tollan homeworld, destroyed by a cataclysmP3X-797 — Land of Light — home of Tuplo's people where the Tollan were welcomed to relocateP3X-808 — planet where Daniel Jackson and SG-6 are conducting an archeological digP3X-8596 — Argos — Argosian homeworld, site of a genetic experiment by the Goa'uld PelopsP3X-866 — Oannes — Nem's volcanic homeworldP3X-888 — Unas homeworldP3X-955 — world controlled by Goa'uld MolocP3X-972 — Ernest's planet — location of the Heliopolis repository; Daniel's videos of the planet are studied at Area 51P3X-974 — Cimmeria — Cimmerian homeworld, an Asgard Protected PlanetP3X-984 — Alpha Site — secret Earth baseP3X-989 — Altair — home planet of Harlan and the 'robot' SG-1P3Y-229 — planet destroyed by the Ori's creation of their supergate; surrounding space is location of first space battle between Ori ships and Asgard, Jaffa, Tau'ri, and Lucian alliance vesselsP3Y-294 — planet previously visited by the rogue NID who broke off any diplomatic relations with the SGCP4A-571 — planet close to P5C-629P4A-771 — planet SG-1 gates to and immediately comes under enemy fire.P4C-796 — planet scheduled for routine recon mission by SG-2P4C-970 — Aschen homeworldP4F-221 — planet where SGC had a mining expeditionP4G-881 — primordial world where orb and organisms are sent to surviveP4M-328 — modern planet dealing with a series of terrorist attacks by home grown religious fanaticsP4S-161 — where Teal'c meets with rebel Jaffa leaders and later returns to find them killed by the Trust's symbiote poisonP4S-237 — planet ruled by Ba'alP4X-131 — planet from where Jonas claimed the various gold items cluttering his office originatedP4X-233 — planet previously explored by SGC team where they found a ring platformP4X-347 — Goa'uld resort planet where the addictive Light imprisons SG-1P4X-377 — Entity's homeworld.P4X-636 — Velona — homeworld and prison of the ascended being OrlinP4X-639 — a former Ancients colonyP4X-650 — New Alpha Site, where Carter brings ColsonP4X-884 — laboratory in which the program Urgo was created; home of TogarP5C-11 — planet between P4A-771 and Earth which has no atmosphere.P5C-12 — planet between P4A-771 and Earth which has no atmosphere.P5C-353 — home of the orb and its organismsP5C-629 — potential location for the "Seeker Project" to alert Earth of impending Goa'uld attacks.P5C-768 — Edora — home of Laira and the Edorans. O'Neill travels there for "retirement" before redialing to the NID base.P5R-357 — planet abandoned by Ba'alP5S-117 — site of the Stargate infected by Felger's virus, controlled by Ba'alP5S-381 — temporary home of Enkarans, terraformed by the GadmeerP5X-112 — planet where SG-1 is babysitting physicists doing an excavationP5X-327 — planet scheduled for long-term reconnaissance by MALPP63-2031 — location of rebel Reetou baseP6G-452 — planet controlled by Lucian Alliance where kassa crops are grownP6J-908 — planet from which incredible growing plant was takenP6Y-325 — planet where SG-15 and other teams encountered Goa'uldP7J-989 — planet with virtual reality technology.P7S-441 — planet on which O'Neill is trapped by Goa'uld searching for the alien 'Lt. Tyler'P7X-009 — planned maiden voyage destination for PrometheusP7X-377 — giant pyramid, home to a Crystal Skull through which SG-1 are transported along with Daniel's grandfather Nick Ballard to meet the giant alien QuetlzelcoatlP89-534 — last planet which SG-11 was known to be before they were declared MIAP8F-809 — planet SG-2 has just returned fromP8T-365 — a mostly Jaffa planet under Ori control with an underground Jaffa resistence movement that provides SG-3 with intelligenceP8X-362 — planet scheduled for exploration by SG-4P8X-412 — planet where Vala once ruled as a Goa'uldP8X-873 — where Amaunet held Abydonian people prisonerP8X-987 — Hanka — Cassandra's homeworld in the domain of NirrtiP9C-882 — planet wishing to resist the Ori where a large scale test of the cloaking technology of Arthur's Mantle was tested by SG-1 and SG-3.P9G-844 — planet of the Sodan WarriorsP9J-333 — planet where SG-3 conducted covert surveillance on natives until monster appearedP9Q-281 — binary system planet with defective Stargate where Sam Carter, Teal'c and Maj. Castleman are trapped while futilely trying to find the AncientsP9X-391 — home of the Ancients where interdimensional device is foundPangar — where Goa'uld Queen is used to create TretoninPB5-926 — desert world on which Apophis crashes and begs for help from SG-1PJ2-445 — homeworld of the silent white aliens and their symbiotic plantsPJ6-877 — forest world where SG-1 are trapped by devilish bounty hunter Aris BochPraclarush Taonas — molten planet, site of an Ancients map and power sourcePX1-767 — Camelot — location of Merlin's library and where Daniel finds reference to VagonbreiPX3-595 — Asgard protected planet, home of the Tirnoks and location of portable Asgard cloak technologyPX7-455 — planet where Black BDU alternate SG-1 originated and was eventually gated back to.PX7-941 — Madrona — planet with powerful weather controlling technologyPX9-757 — planet occupied by Apophis' forces, where a new mothership is being builtPXY-887 — home of the Salish Indians and their powerful alien 'spirits'PY3-948 — meeting place of the LinvrisRavanna — planet with underground Tok'ra baseReetalia — homeworld of the Reetou from where Charlie travelledSahal / Valos Cor — potential location of Sangreal; ruins appear abandoned for 40,000 yearsSartorus — Jaffa colony destroyed by the OriSelenis — location of past battle between Ba'al and QeteshSerras-Dia — in the past, Jacek and Vala had to avoid the authorities here after Jacek went back for "seconds"Simarka — home of the ShavadaiSureeta — planet whose destruction after misuse of Tollan technology caused the cataclysm on Tollan (P3X-7763)Tartarus — Anubis's home baseTegalus, home of Rand Protectorate and Caledonian Federation, warring continentsThree unnamed worlds — location of Merlin's lab in a cave which shifted/gated from location to location, transporting all inhabitants. One world was desert like, one was in a blizzard, and the last one before the shifting program was stopped was in a jungle.Tok'ra base near the Risa system, from where they had to flee from AnubisTollana — home of the TollanTwo unnamed planets where Vala believed the Clava Thessara Infinitas could be foundUnidentified planet where Nirrti is mining weapons grade naquadahUnknown area, in a galaxy far distant from EarthUnknown offworld location — where initial test of Arthur's Mantle was conducted by SG-1Unknown planet where SG-1 heads on another mission.Unknown planet where the rogue team stealing alien artifacts escapes using the StargateUnknown planet where the Tok'ra evacuate to after the Goa'uld attack; because of spies among their ranks, Garshaw, Martouf, and Selmak immediately leave the SGC to relocate once again.Unknown Tok'ra base.Unnamed Goa'uld outpost ruled by Ba'alUnnamed Jaffa planetUnnamed location where cloaked mothership was located (in flashback)Unnamed planet — believed to be location of the SangrealUnnamed planet — formerly where ships were built by the Goa'uld; the human population now allies with the Lucian AllianceUnnamed planet — temporary Jaffa rebel baseUnnamed planet — where SG-1 searched for SangrealUnnamed planet — where team meet with Tenat and JupUnnamed planet and its moon, location of a paradise presumably created by the FurlingsUnnamed planet controlled by Goa'uld RamiusUnnamed planet from where the Goa'uld delegation originatedUnnamed planet from where the Tok'ra leave to reach the SGC via Stargate and warn them of Sokar.Unnamed planet on which the SGC detonated the test naquadah bombUnnamed planet that is Lord Yu's headquartersUnnamed planet that is Yu's headquartersUnnamed planet that was the temporary rebel Jaffa base where Drey'auc dies and is buriedUnnamed planet visited by SG-1 and a "soft-selling" Prior of the OriUnnamed planet where Adria found ValaUnnamed planet where Anubis was using an Ancient Stargate destroying weaponUnnamed planet where Arkad's naquadah filled ships were keptUnnamed planet where Caius meets the teamUnnamed planet where Carter and SG-5 were sent by Anubis's gate protectionUnnamed planet where Daniel met alien tradersUnnamed Planet where Dark Age English Christians were terrorized by Sokar's UnasUnnamed planet where Jacek meets naquadah buyerUnnamed planet where Jacek rendezvouses with SG-1Unnamed planet where Ramius and Tilgath were ambushed during a meetingunnamed planet where SG-1 conduct a standard recon missionUnnamed planet where SG-1 was captured and Teal'c left for deadUnnamed planet where the Ori warship containing Merlin's weapon orbitsUnnamed planet where the planet was converted to Origin and where Dakara sent a blast from their Ancient weaponunnamed planet where the rogue NID was basedUnnamed planet with sentient liquid beingsUnnamed planet, home of Burrock and the enslaved UnasUnnamed planet, identified as a safe haven for Ishta's people but taken by Moloc's forcesUnnamed planet, place of origin of the replicatorsUnnamed planets where Teal'c found Lizan and Ba'kalUnnamed Tok'ra base from where Jacob Carter arrivedUnnamed Tok'ra base where Jacob Carter/Selmak left to arrive at the SGCVagonbrei — planet referenced at Camelot as possible location of Sangreal; almost all living things killed by a parasitical infectionvarious unnamed planets where Ba'al clones are captured.Velong — location of Yu's secret base before attacked by MorriganVer Ager — village of Harrid and Sallis, where Daniel and Vala 'travel'Ver Isca — village on a world in the Ori galaxy, where Vala arrived after going through the Kallana black hole.Vis Uban — planet where Daniel Jackson is foundVorash — Tok'ra stronghold