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Well it’s not accurate statement. Phoenix has only 100 days in the 3 figure temperatures(100+).Essentially from 15th June to 15th Sep - it’s super hot summer.During 15th Mar to 15th June and 15th Sep to 15th Oct - NOT super but hot summer(over 90 but less than 100).Just avoid the direct sun and do all the indoor activities during the super hot summer and you are good. For e.g. be in the shade of the tree or the building rather than be outside during summer time. Keep water bottle with you always during super hot summer. During super hot summer avoid being outside from 10am - 7pm.You need to evaluate other qualities of Phoenix AZ. Some positivesOne of the best places to live for seniors/retirees due to laid back life styleOne of the best places in terms of road infrastructure. Pleasure to drive here. Roads are built first then buildings and structures. I moved to Dallas TX during Aug 2017. Any time I enjoy driving in Phoenix far more than Dallas TX. Good part is roads are all straight most of the times, people follow the rules and they are really sober drivers.Phoenix is grid based city. Addresses are 3400S 1470W etc…so this is the place where you don’t need GPS at all.One of the best places in terms of health care facilities. Mayo Clinics are simply the best - some of the best doctors.Almost half of the top 10 best high schools are near to this area(Phoenix valley and Tucson). Basis Scottsdale is the #1 school in the country.Very nice and friendly peopleLot of places to visit around with car drive - Las Vegas, Los Angeles, San Diego, Grand Canyon, other nice canyons and Sedona, Tucson and Mexico.Low cost of livingAffordable housing. Property tax only 0.85% and still very good governance. Just think about it, in Phoenix I was paying less than $200 /month for property tax and Dallas TX - it’s above $1000 per month.Very good outdoor activities - hiking, biking, playing outside.Very good parks in the neighborhood. During super hot months - parks are having night lights for play purpose. I used to visit Anthem park - it’s so good.Peaceful placeNice drivers - no honking placeLess crime rateLots of social gathering at and outside work environment.Landscape is beautiful - surrounded by mountainsUnlike many people think it’s a desert and have a certain perception of a desert - Phoenix is essentially a rocky desert not sandy desert. Phoenix is greener than Las Vegas and lots of places in southern California as lots of trees are planted here. During 2007 - when i came to Phoenix very first time - it used to rain only 2–3 times in a year. Now almost 15–20 rains per year. Lots of golf coursesSouth Scottsdale is almost like Beverly hillsIt’s dry heat which a lot of my white american friends like better than humidity. A lot of them would prefer Phoenix AZ over Dallas TX(20–30% humidity) any day.Best place to have solar - i have it on my roof - saves a lot of money on electricity bills and i stay cool at home during super hot summer month. The more it is hot - the more electricity it will produce to compensate the high electricity rates of APS(Arizona Power Supply) and keep you cool. Return of Investment(ROI) is less than 6 years in Phoenix AZ - best among any other place in USA.Lots of birds migrate to this area during winter - it’s beautiful out during that time.Lots of folks from Cold places migrate to Phoenix AZ for golfing, hiking and medical treatment. Oct - Feb is very busy season here.Football stadium and lots of crazy crowd during the games.Roads are very wide - lots of lanes - fast moving traffic and definitely not crowded except peak hours. Straight - not curvy roads - best for cruise control.Mansoon rains are so beautiful that you will enjoy getting wet in that. My younger one just go outside in the backyard to enjoy it - he loves that the most.I have lived in these places - NewYork/New Jersey, Washington D.C. area, Chicago, San Francisco and Salt Lake City. Visited other places also. I feel only Salt Lake City, Charlotte NC, Dallas TX are some what near to Phoenix in terms of overall quality of life. I prefer not to clean up snow in upper states for almost 6–7 months per year and stay indoors. Like other busy places where I lived in the past - I can easily enjoy happy hours and outing with my coworkers after the work. Other busy places - nobody has got time(and energy left) to do anything after the work.Originally from India - yes it’s hotter than my place(Bhopal India) - but still much close in terms of weather - so at least i like the weather. I don’t trust some Asian Indians who will simply say it’s so hot here even when their native place in India is much hotter than Phoenix AZ(it’s fashion or flamboyance to tell others that we are from cooler place by some of the folks :) )During all the Indian festivals - right from Ganesh Chaturthi(Aug) to Holi(March) - it’s a perfect weather to have a good outdoor life.It’s very clear sky due to almost 300 days of sunshine. Good amount of pilot training centers are located here. Sky is so clear that you can see the dark blue sky and the stars/planets during night. It’s natural planetarium.Sky harbor airport is one of the most customer friendly airport in the whole world.Cops are nice. Try being in New Jersey - very first 90 days - at least 2–3 traffic tickets.No tolls on the roads even when it is such a large metro area.Basis schools and public charter schools. School teachers has individual attention on the students and open communication with the parents.Some of the best places for schooling for the kids with special needs. My younger one with mild autism spectrum used to get in home therapy from AZ state. Medical, Dental, vision, pharmacy and even going to the provider was covered. After leaving Phoenix AZ and being in Dallas TX - nothing is provided by TX government - everything i need to use my private insurance. Many people will be tempted to go to Zero state taxes(on income, anyway these are just 8 such states in USA, TX is one of them) but do a in-depth study. AZ state charges one of the lowest state tax on income but returns are really good compared to TX. Sometimes i feel in TX, nobody cares.No natural calamities like earthquakes, hurricanes, snow storm etc.. I have only witnessed one dust storm in 4 years. That’s why almost all the fortune 1000 companies has data center at this locationSomething got broken - labor is not very expensive. Honest labor. In AZ, by law, one has to provide the estimate before fixing anything. Estimate in general is free.It’s a medical capital. A lot of people come here during winter for treatment. Mayo Clinics are the best.As and when I visited Phoenix for business/personal trips and was at the car rental at the airport and other places. These car rental companies always offered complementary cold water bottle to all their customers. Very nice gesture.Overall quality of life is much better in Phoenix. Let me tell you experience being a home owner in Phoenix AZ Vs Dallas TX. Phoenix you can get the equipment/appliance of your choice by any 3rd party contractor at really competitive rates. For example I wanted to get the Reverse Osmosys and Water softener installed in Phoenix AZ. I looked at Amazon and other places and finally went for the best. And i could get it installed by the contractor from thumbtack in less than $400 - it was complex installation for softener as it required gas welding machines(due to copper plumbing lines). While in Dallas TX - no 3rd party contractor wanted to install Reverse Osmosys system and Water softener that i wanted to install. Contractor will tell me what he want to install - take it or leave it. Contractor made money in parts(appliance) as well as installation. I got a average water softener installed which was more than 70% costlier than what i got in Phoenix(still not better) and labor cost me 3X compared to Phoenix. Reverse Osmosys i installed on my own in Dallas TX. The guy who installed softener and RO in Phoenix - tested water before and after and told me how to operate and maintain. Dallas TX person disappeared in less than 75 minutes without any telling me anything. Especially in Dallas TX so many folks have migrated during last 8–10 years that quality of life is going down.I have couple of friends in Phoenix AZ who does regular hiking. Cops make sure that somebody is not stranded and immediate help is provided(as and when needed). But understand not all the places are going to have good cell phone reception.Well it’s an endless list.I just lived in Phoenix AZ around 3.5 years but like it a lot. Yes, there is really hot summer months but there is so much being offered by this place that one can forget that aspect. Almost every place in the world has got some issues - there is no perfect place. Moreover I am an all weather person. Lived in the places where it snows a lot also but enjoyed that also. I always think “weather is for everybody and you are not the only one facing it - so just enjoy it”. And trust me there are much more important things in life to do than crib about the weatherNow I should ask you- why in the world you asked that question and which other places are better than Phoenix AZ to live?Update1More than 50K views and 200 upvotes. Thanks everyone.

I’m going to give you a simple answer, though it may sound glib.Invent a time machine and change history.No, really. I’m serious. The only way that you’re going to convince me it’s not needed or necessary is going to be going back in time and stopping all the things that have been done by governments in the last two centuries against people who were unarmed.“It can’t happen here!” It has happened here.. by the very political party who insists today that we shouldn’t own firearms.Look at the lists of massacres under Jim Crow and the post-civil-war insanity in the south. Look who did it. Look at the platforms of the time.1868 Democratic Party PlatformNotice in there that the ‘Freemen’s Bureau Act’ was mentioned as one of the major complaints.Online Library of LibertySec. 7. And be it further enacted, That whenever in any State or district in which the ordinary course of judicial proceedings has been interrupted by the rebellion, and wherein, in consequence of any State or local law, ordinance, police or other regulation, custom, or prejudice, any of the civil rights or immunities belonging to white persons, including the right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal property, and to have full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and estate, including the constitutional right of bearing arms, are refused or denied to negroes, mulattoes, freedmen, refugees, or any other persons, on account of race, color, or any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, or wherein they or any of them are subjected to any other or different punishment, pains, or penalties, for the commission of any act or offence, than are prescribed for white persons committing like acts or offences, it shall be the duty of the President of the United States, through the Commissioner, to extend military protection and jurisdiction over all cases affecting such persons so discriminated against.It’s hardly a new platform for the Democratic party to be against arms, sadly. The following law was passed in 1874, against that same Democratic party’s actions in the post-civil-war south.Deprivation Of Rights Under Color Of LawIt was an extension of the Freedmen’s bureau act. It is still law today. The intent and purpose of the law (and the 14th amendment which was engaged to support it) was simple. It was to guarantee the first 8 amendments to the Constitution would be fully applicable to the states, so that no person, white or black, or any other color that could be imagined by man, could for any purpose be deprived of those rights again.And when the ex-slaves in the southern states did engage in them, what happened?Colfax massacre - WikipediaCoushatta massacre - WikipediaHamburg massacre - WikipediaThibodaux massacre - WikipediaOcoee massacre - WikipediaTulsa race riot - WikipediaNor were the descendants of the slaves the only targets for injustice; we imprisoned numerous other people in the name of ‘national security’ with no trial, no evidence, no hearing, and put them to work in labor camps after seizing their property and their businesses.Internment of German Americans - WikipediaInternment of Japanese Americans - WikipediaThese were people who had not committed any crime. Who had not done anything cognizable as a crime beyond their ancestors or themselves being from the ‘wrong’ country.Bills of this type are called “Bills of Pains and Penalties” or “bills of attainder” when done by the congress… and it was done by presidential order, without even that threadbare protection of a congress.They were gathered up, trucked off, and unceremoniously dumped in tiny houses that were overpopulated and told to work for their dinner even though they were there against their will.The Klan's Favorite LawNancy Sinatra takes heat for saying NRA members 'should face a firing squad'At this point the work of the Abolitionists is unfinished, and that great bell of liberty has been not only given an uncertain sound, but been deliberately muffled by the same party who did so… in 1868.That is why we cannot accept that the amendment is outdated. The very party that claims that the police should protect us have made the same claims over 150 years ago, and then engaged in a tsunami of brutality and murder using the police and militia, all the while riding on a platform of ‘equal rights’ which had no equality to it.We would have to trust the very people who demand we give up our firearms that they would not do exactly as they have fantasized doing… lining us up for prison camps and the firing squad.Should all gun owners be rounded up and reeducated on gun safety?on the other hand NC Democratic Sheriff Candidate Jokes About Killing Gun Owners was misleading at best, he said that he’d take them when the people had died. (implying old age, misadventure, etc).Now, the problem with all this, is every single time the Democratic party has offered a ‘compromise’ it has said ‘we won’t go any further’. Then once the first compromise was made, ‘Well, obviously this right isn’t unlimited, you compromised! GIMME THIS! THEN I WILL STOP!” “You’re heartless, you don’t care about children. You’re a monster. You’re evil!”When all the ‘compromise’ goes one way, and we receive nothing out of it, no safety, no real ‘protection’…There is no constitutional right to be protected by the state against being murdered by criminals or madmen. It is monstrous if the state fails to protect its residents against such predators but it does not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or, we suppose, any other provision of the Constitution. The Constitution is a charter of negative liberties; it tells the state to let the people alone; it does not require the federal government or the state to provide services, even so elementary a service as maintaining law and order.Bowers v. Devito, 1980.As Winston Churchill said, “An appeaser is the one who feeds the crocodile, hoping that it will eat him last.”

The following is chapter 6 from [math]Karsh, Efraim. Palestine Betrayed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010.[/math] (Personal note: I live in Haifa since age 3).———[math]Fleeing Haifa[/math]“Every effort is being made by the Jews to persuade the Arab populace to stay and carry on with their normal lives, to get their shops and businesses open and to be assured that their lives and interests will be safe.”British district superintendent of police, April 1948From a marginal site containing some 1,000 people at the turn of the nine-teenth century, the smallest of Palestine’s twelve significant towns, by 1947 Haifa had developed into a major center of some 145,000 residents – 70,910 Arabs (41,000 Muslims, 29,910 Christians) and 74,230 Jews – second only to Jerusalem in national importance, and in certain respects even superior to it.[1]The city constituted the main socio-economic and administrative center in northern Palestine for both Arabs and Jews. It was one of the primary ports of the eastern Mediterranean, the hub of Palestine’s railway system, the site of the country’s oil refinery, and a formidable industrial center.As such, it was evident to all that, though assigned by the UN partition resolution to the prospective Jewish state, Haifa’s fate would be sealed by force of arms after the termination of the mandate. No sooner had the UN voted on partition than the city became engulfed in intermittent violence that pitted Arab fighters, recruited locally as well as from neighboring Arab countries, against the Hagana forces. Hostilities would reach their peak on April 21–22, when the Arab war effort collapsed overnight, triggering a mass exodus. But in fact Arab flight from Haifa began well before the outbreak of these hostilities, and even before the UN partition resolution.On October 23, 1947, over a month earlier, a British intelligence brief was already noting that “leading Arab personalities are acting on the assumption that disturbances are near at hand, and have already evacuated their families to neighboring Arab countries.”[2]By November 21, as the UN General Assembly was getting ready to vote, not only “leading Arab personalities” but “many Arabs of Haifa” were reported to be “evacuating their families to neighboring Arab countries in anticipation of the period of disorder they foresee.”[3]And as the violent Arab reaction to the UN resolution gathered force, eradicating any hope of its peaceful implementation, this stream of refugees turned into a flood.By mid-December 1947, some 15,000–20,000 Arabs had fled. A month later, according to Arab sources, this had swollen to 25,000 people, creating severe hardship for those remaining.[4]Economic and commercial activity ground to a halt as the wealthier classes converted their assets into gold or US dollars and transferred them abroad. Merchants and industrialists moved their businesses to Egypt, Syria, or Lebanon, causing unemployment and shortages in basic necessities. Entire areas were emptied of their residents.The situation was exacerbated by the deep schisms within the Arab popu-lace. Not only did the city’s Muslims and Christians lead a mutually antago-nistic and largely segregated existence, but both communities were beset by a string of socio-economic and religious divisions – between rich and poor, veterans and newcomers, urbanites and villagers, and so on and so forth. The Christian community, in particular, was fragmented into a colorful mosaic of sects, the largest and most affluent being the Greek Catholics, followed by the Greek Orthodox, the Maronites, and a string of smaller groups such as Protestants, Roman Catholics, and Armenians. This sectarianism prevented the development of an overarching Christian identity, as most groups had distinct religious, social, and educational institutions.The Muslims fared no better. Though less fractured than their Christian brethren, they were beset by power struggles among prominent families and were deeply alienated from their poor co-religionists who streamed into the city in the 1930s and the 1940s. Unaccustomed to city life, socially and economically attached to their villages, and given a cold shoulder by the Haifa veterans, the new arrivals quickly developed into a distinct underclass that scarcely interacted with the established urbanites, maintaining instead a rural lifestyle buttressed by separate social networks based on their villages of origin. They regularly returned to these villages for seasonal work (notably at harvest times), married spouses from their birthplaces, established their own charitable societies and social venues, and congregated with their kinsmen in both work places and residential areas, so much so that entire neighborhoods in Haifa came to be known by their residents’ places of origin.[5]Thus it was that, when fighting for the city ensued, the Haifa Arabs did not constitute a cohesive entity but rather an amalgam of parallel groups, each with its own interests, institutions, and leaders. The Christians, erecting clear boundaries between themselves and the Muslims, refused to feed the ALA’s Syrian, Lebanese, and Iraqi fighters when they arrived to wrest the city from the Jews, asserted their determination not to attack Jewish forces unless attacked first, and established a special guard to protect themselves from Muslim violence. Added to this was a growing lawlessness, including pandemic looting of deserted properties.[6]Nor did the public display excessive confidence in either its local leader-ship or the AHC. Rumors were rife about the sexual exploits of Bishop George Hakim, head of the Greek Catholic Church in northern Palestine, as well as about the ruthless profiteering of the prominent Islamist activist Sheik Muhammad Nimr Khatib, which allegedly compromised his national and religious convictions. The rosy stories emanating from the AHC Cairo headquarters of pan-Arab solidarity and commitment to the Palestine cause were met with skepticism. So was the praise heaped on the anti-Jewish economic boycott: not only did most of the Haifa Arabs continue to shop in Jewish neighborhoods in defiance of the boycott, but, bowing to the inevitable, the local boycott committee authorized this practice wherever certain products were unavailable in Arab areas, at times charging a hand-some commission for the issuance of such permits. Moreover, in June 1947 the committee temporarily ceased its activities in a stark admission of its own ineffectiveness and divisions.Lofty nationalist rhetoric left many unimpressed. The selling of lands to Jews continued, if covertly, despite the Mufti’s religious ruling ( fatwa) prohibiting such acts and the repeated death threats from his loyalists. There was muttering about the need for Arab-Jewish understanding and tacit satisfaction with the renewed activities of the anti-Husseini opposition. Even when the specter of violence began to loom large following UNSCOP’s majority recommendation on partition, many Haifa Arabs doubted its prudence and utility given their longtime coexistence with their Jewish neighbors and fears of Jewish military might. When, in August 1947, violent clashes between Arabs and Jews broke out along the Tel Aviv-Jaffa boundary, a special meeting of Haifa’s Arab leaders condemned the incidents and instructed the city’s imams to urge the public, in their Friday sermons, to exercise the utmost restraint – which they did. Even the Haifa branch of the militant Islamist group the Muslim Brothers sent its leader to Jaffa to convince the religious authorities there to issue a public plea for the cessation of violence.[7]At the time, the official leadership of the Haifa Arabs was a fifteen-member National Committee (NC), established on December 2, 1947, and headed by Rashid Hajj Ibrahim, a scion of a respected family of North African origin, whose public activity dated back to Ottoman times. Although the Committee strove to curb the mass flight, urging residents to stay put and castigating those who fled – occasionally, these warnings were backed up by the torching of escapees’ belongings – its remonstrations proved of no avail.[8]To be sure, the NC itself hardly constituted a model of commitment or self-sacrifice. Its members seemed to view their participation in the Committee as a hobby or a charitable activity undertaken in one’s free time, rather than the critical national endeavor it was supposed to be. Scarcely a meeting was attended by all members, with apologies for absence citing other commitments ranging from business trips, to a convalescence retreat, to participation in a meeting of the Anti-Tuberculosis League. It was only at the NC’s twenty-seventh meeting, more than two months after the commence-ment of its activities, that Ibrahim announced his intention to devote six days a week (apart from Sundays) to its affairs and NC members were gently reminded not to absent themselves from meetings.[9]Moreover, affluent though they were, NC members, while taking care to reimburse themselves for the smallest expense, rarely contributed financially to the national struggle. Nor did Muhammad Hamad Hunaiti, a young Transjordanian officer who resigned his commission as a lieutenant in the Arab Legion to become the city’s commander only after extracting a generous remuneration package from the NC, including a handsome salary, comfort-able accommodation, a car, and a telephone. “His terms were harsh,” recalled Muhammad Nimr Khatib, the NC’s most militant member and Hunaiti’s personal friend. “But we accepted them all, anxious as we were for a military commander.”[10]Transcripts of NC meetings do not exactly convey a grasp of the severity of the situation: they tend to be taken up instead with trivialities, from the placement of an office partition, to the purchase of library books, to the payment to a certain individual of £1.29 (£34 in today’s terms) in travel expenses, to the return of a typewriter borrowed by the Committee. As late as March 16, the NC was discussing such minor matters as the purchase of chairs (for £34.25), books (with vouchers worth £8), and a typewriter, as well as the mode of payment of the monthly rent on its office. In its last meeting, on April 13, nine days before the fall of Haifa, the NC found the time to approve the purchase of £5.40 worth of stationery.[11]Even when the committee did try to deal with the endemic violence in which the town was embroiled, its efforts were repeatedly undermined by the sheer number of armed groups operating in defiance of its authority, by infighting between its own moderates and militants, and by the total lack of coordination, if not outright hostility, between the Committee and its parent body, the Cairo-based, Mufti-controlled AHC. Giving his own terrorists free rein in Haifa, the Mufti paid no attention to the NC’s requests and recommendations.Not that the Committee was amenable to Haifa’s inclusion within the prospective Jewish state, as envisaged by the partition resolution, or that it eschewed violence as a means to avert this eventuality.[12]When on December 12, 1947, the city’s Jewish mayor, Shabtai Levy, suggested the issuance of a joint Arab-Jewish proclamation urging the population to forgo violence, and expressed his readiness, as representative of the Jewish community, to negotiate a ceasefire agreement with an authorized Arab body, the NC rejected his proposal. “We have been toiling day and night to maintain [peace and] quiet and to implement a high, unified Arab policy regardless of the incitement by the Jewish traitors,” argued Ibrahim. “There is no way we can negotiate with the Jews. Let them take care of their interests and we’ll ensure our security.”[13]Matters came to a head in mid-January 1948 following the bombing of a Jewish commercial center in which eight people were killed and scores of others wounded. Carried out by the Mufti’s local supporters, the atrocity brought to an abrupt end the tenuous truce, organized under pressure from the British in late December, and drove a few hundred (mostly Christian) families to flee the city.[14]At the NC’s meeting on January 18, Ibrahim left little doubt as to who, in his opinion, was culpable for this recent deterioration. “While we were navigating the ship with your help and maintaining its balance, a sudden storm has thrown us off course,” he told his colleagues, insisting that his words be recorded verbatim as evidence for future generations. “And this was done by people claiming association with the AHC and other officials abroad.” In Ibrahim’s view, the severity of the situation left the NC no choice but to send a delegation to Cairo to ascertain whether the AHC had indeed been behind the latest bombing and to impress upon the Mufti the seriousness of the situation. Were the supreme leader of the Palestinian Arabs to remain impervious to the city’s predicament, he was to be warned that, if terrorist activity did not cease, the result would be the eventual disappearance of the entire Haifa community.[15]The delegates pleaded to no avail. Though evidently shaken by the stark picture they painted, the Mufti decried the request for an armistice as tantamount to surrender. He agreed to the evacuation of women and children from danger zones so as to reduce casualties, but ordered the NC to intensify its efforts to shore up the city’s defenses, to stop the mass exodus, and to urge those who had fled to return. As a sweetener, the Mufti denied any connection with the January bombing and endorsed the NC as Haifa’s supreme political and military decision-making body, promising to put under its command a soon-to-be-formed 500-strong force.[16]This failed to impress the Haifa population. Notwithstanding the arrival of fresh arms shipments from Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt, together with military reinforcements, a general sense of foreboding engulfed the city, especially the Christian community. The Mufti’s rejection of the delegation’s request for emergency food supplies, coupled with the growing lawlessness in the Arab districts, drove many merchants to begin preparations to leave Haifa. Neither did Hajj Amin, for all his feigned affability, change his attitude toward the NC or pressure his Haifa loyalists to cease hostilities. As early as October 1947, he had rejected local requests for funds for the purchase of arms on the pretext that the matter had been entrusted to the Arab League. But when, two months later, the League sent some 600 rifles for the Haifa Arabs, only a fifth reached their destination: the rest were distributed elsewhere at the Mufti’s instructions.[17]When the NC appointed Hunaiti as Haifa’s military commander, it was reprimanded by the Mufti’s Beirut office for overstepping its authority and informed that an Iraqi officer, at the head of an armed group, was on his way to assume command of the city’s defense. Although Ibrahim managed to talk the group into quitting Haifa for the neighboring village of Shafa Amr, the episode eroded the already strained relations between the AHC and the Committee, which correctly interpreted the situation as a show of no confidence in its ability to direct Haifa’s military affairs. Phone conversations between Ibrahim and the Mufti, as well as several meetings in Cairo between Khatib and the supreme Palestinian leader, yielded no practical results. Before long Ibrahim was pleading with the Arab League and the Syrian government for weapons and tighter control of the Arab factions in Haifa, especially those dominated by the Mufti, and threatening to resign his post unless these were brought to heel. This act of insubordination did not pass unnoticed, and on January 29 the NC was peremptorily ordered to avoid any contact with the Arab states or the League, as this was the exclusive prerogative of the AHC in its capacity as the effective “government” of the Palestinian Arabs.[18]Meanwhile, as this power tussle was going on, further waves of Arab residents fled Haifa. Following the demolition of several houses in the Wadi Nisnas area in early February, for instance, the residents complained to Hunaiti of the shortage of guards, only to be told that he would not protect the properties of owners who had fled the country. Since the residents had no intention of being penalized for the actions of their absentee landlords, they unceremoniously fled their homes, shortly to be followed by residents of the Wadi Rushmiya, Wadi Salib, and Halisa neighborhoods.[19]In a revealing incident, Christian residents beat up a group of Arab fighters seeking to use their street for the shelling of Jewish targets. Lawlessness spiraled to new heights, with the foreign irregulars stationed in the city unabashedly exploiting their position to abuse the very people they had been brought in to defend.The alarmed Mufti instructed the NC to stamp out the burgeoning lawlessness.[20]Yet the Committee’s attempt to enforce tighter discipline by prohibiting individual use of weapons and authorizing its militia, the National Guard, to arrest persons bearing arms in public places and to open fire on undisciplined crowds backfired. The Guard was held in contempt by the Haifa populace on account of its repeated military failures and implication in countless acts of lawlessness and corruption, notably the plundering of deserted properties. Panic spread across the city, with many searching in vain for the few removal vans in the city; those who were fortunate enough to find a vehicle had to pay an exorbitant price for a delivery to the neigh-boring city of Nazareth; others seeking to flee to the more remote Nablus were informed that the city was already swarming with refugees.[21]In these circumstances, the NC apparently gave up hope of stemming further flight. Shortly after the return of the delegation from Cairo, a proposal was passed urging improvements in the condition of Palestinian refugees in the Arab states where they now found themselves, and requesting help in settling them there. This was momentous indeed: the official leadership of the second largest Arab community in mandate Palestine was not only condoning mass flight but suggesting that Arab refugee status be, however temporarily, institutionalized. As the months passed and Britain’s departure from Palestine neared, such attitudes gained further currency. Even the Mufti, who had warned that “the flight of . . . families abroad will weaken the morale of our noble, struggling nation,” was not averse to the evacuation of the non-fighting populace. In March 1948, the AHC evidently ordered the removal of women and children from Haifa; a special committee was established in Syria and Lebanon to oversee the operation, and preparations began in earnest with the chartering of a ship from an Egyptian company.[22]While the organized evacuation was moving slowly, the flight from the city gained momentum following a further escalation in the fighting. On March 17, the Hagana ambushed a large arms and ammunition convoy from Syria, killing fourteen Arab fighters, including Hunaiti, and destroying the entire shipment. This was a severe blow to Arab morale, not least since it was viewed as largely self-inflicted. During a visit to Muhammad Nimr Khatib in a Beirut hospital where the sheik was recuperating after a Hagana attempt on his life, Hunaiti had been warned not to expose himself, and the convoy, to the unnecessary risks attending land travel, given the densely populated Jewish neighborhoods en route to Haifa; the warning was repeated as the convoy reached Acre. Yet not only did Hunaiti fail to heed the advice, he seemed to do everything within his power to bring about his own demise. Already during his stay in Beirut he had attracted the Hagana’s attention to his mission by posing for a local newspaper photographer with the newly acquired weapons under the provocative caption “Where are you, O cowardly Jew?” Then, upon arriving at the border post of Ras Naqura, he phoned his Haifa headquarters to inform them of the convoy’s travel plans – a call that was monitored by the Hagana, which quickly organized the ambush.[23]The Arabs reacted to this setback by exploding a car bomb near a Jewish commercial building, killing six people and wounding twenty-eight. With the Hagana responding in kind a few days later, yet another torrent of people tried to pour out of Haifa. Long queues besieged the Syrian and Lebanese consulates, only to be told that no visas were on offer, especially to men between the ages of sixteen and sixty. Only women, children, and the elderly, as well as officials, holding travel permits from the AHC, were allowed entry. Flight was further hampered by the formidable obstacles to land travel to Lebanon: vehicular traffic had stopped almost completely while the railway line was sabotaged. Those fortunate enough to secure a visa, including a large number of Christian municipal officials, vied for a place on the cramped boats sailing to Lebanon; the less fortunate made their way to the increasingly congested Acre; the rest congregated in what were viewed as the safer parts of Haifa.[24]By early April 1948, according to Hajj Ibrahim, the city’s Arab populace had dwindled to some 35,000–40,000, nearly two-thirds its size four months earlier. A week later a meeting of Haifa’s trade, security, and political leaders estimated the remaining population at half its original size (or about 35,000). And “an Arab source,” quoted by the Hebrew daily Haaretz on April 14, set the number of Arab escapees at 30,000, leaving some 40,000 Arab souls in the city.[25]Severe shortages in foodstuffs, especially flour and bread, forced the NC to try to enforce an austerity regime, including a ban on the export of vict-uals from the city. Yet when it attempted to confiscate the lion’s share of a flour shipment received in early April from the mandatory authorities on behalf of the ALA forces deployed in the city, it encountered a violent back-lash from merchants who argued that these units had to be fed by the Arab states. The Committee’s public warning to absentee grocery-owners to return to Haifa immediately lest their stocks be transferred to their competitors who remained in town was similarly ignored.[26]By now the NC had lost any last vestiges of respect. Most of its members fled the city in late March or early April, with its final session on April 13 being attended by only four of the original fifteen members.[27]In a strongly worded letter to some of the absentees, in late March, Ibrahim had threatened that unless they returned to Haifa immediately, the NC would have to discuss their future;[28]yet he himself left for Egypt shortly after participating in the Committee’s meeting of April 1, never to return to the city in whose public life he had been actively involved for decades.The NC’s unceremonious demise epitomized the wider disintegration of the city’s Arab institutions. Arab municipal officialdom had practically withered away at a time when power was being devolved from the mandatory government to the local authorities, the absence of the representatives of the latter being further underscored by Mayor Levy’s plea to his Arab colleagues to return, widely interpreted in the Arab street as indicating that he had a greater concern for Arab interests than did his Arab peers. The hundreds of ALA fighters (Syrians, Iraqis, Transjordanians) arriving in late March proved more of a liability than an asset, spreading mayhem and lawlessness throughout the city. Relations were particularly acrimonious between the local populace and the Iraqis, who gained notoriety as plunderers, woman-izers, and drunkards; their officers were seen as seeking nothing but immediate gratification of their hedonistic impulses. In mid-April, about 100 National Guard troops deserted the city, taking their weapons with them, having failed to receive their salaries.[29]By way of establishing his military credentials, and arresting the Arab community’s rapid fragmentation, Amin Izz al-Din, a former captain in the Transjordan Frontier Force who assumed command over the city’s defense in early April, moved on to the offensive. On the afternoon of April 15, a truck-load of explosives went off near the Haifa flour mills, killing one person and causing widespread damage; only Jewish suspicions of the truck driver averted a greater loss of life. Jewish vigilance proved more successful the following day, when yet another vehicle loaded with explosives, seeking to infiltrate Hadar Hacarmel, the foremost Jewish neighborhood in Haifa, was stopped and disarmed. These bombing attempts were accompanied by a substantial intensification of the fighting, so much so that on the afternoon of April 16, the British Sixth Airborne Division, in charge of northern Palestine, recorded that “firing in Haifa in general and Sit[uation] appears out of control. Where mil[itary] take action there is temporary quiet but firing soon starts again.” And a battalion of the Hagana’s Carmeli Brigade, deployed in northern Palestine, reported on the same day that “in Haifa there is a general reinvigoration of enemy activities, manifested in numerous exchanges of fire in downtown Haifa and Hadar, and in a mortar attack. Four Jews were killed and another five wounded.”[30]Two days later one of the Sixth Airborne Division’s battalions in Haifa reported that “considerable automatic and mortar fire went on till midnight from both sides with the Arabs mainly on the offensive.” In the early hours of April 20, an Arab attack supported by mortar and machine-gun fire managed to penetrate the garden of the police station in Hadar.[31]It was not long, however, before the Arab offensive backfired in grand style. As early as March 1, Major General Hugh Stockwell, commander of northern Palestine, had informed Lt. General G. H. A. MacMillan, General Officer Commanding (GOC) the British forces in Palestine, of the inadequacy of the existing Haifa deployment and of the need for reinforcements “to enable the final evacuation [of British forces from Palestine] to be completed without hindrance, and to uphold the British prestige.”[32]Now that the Arab offensive aimed at nothing short of penetrating Hadar, Stockwell feared that a general conflagration was in the offing and ordered his forces to deploy in fewer but better-protected strategic points in Haifa by first light on April 21. This was completed by 6 am, and four hours later Stockwell informed a Jewish delegation of the move’s rationale and operational ramifications. At 11 am, he delivered the same message to an Arab delegation. Urging the two groups to stop the ongoing clashes, the general stated his determination not “to become involved in any way in these Arab-Jewish clashes.” He emphasized the vital importance of the redeployment for the completion of the British withdrawal from Palestine, as well as his resolve to “take such measures as I may deem necessary at any time” to prevent interference by either community with his forces’ disposition or with any of the municipal services in Haifa. On a more conciliatory note, Stockwell expressed his readiness “at all times to assist either community in any way they may desire for the maintenance of peace and order.” “It is my wish that the withdrawal of the British from Haifa shall be carried out smoothly and rapidly and that our good relations may continue in the future and that we may carry away the respect and comradeship of both Communities,” he told his interlocutors.[33]This is not what happened. No sooner had the two delegations left Stockwell’s office than the battle for the city was joined as Arabs and Jews rushed to fill the vacuum left by the British departure.For quite some time the two communities had been gearing up for the final battle for the city. In late March, at the height of Arab attacks on Haifa’s Jewish community, the Hagana’s Carmeli Brigade drew up a plan (code-named Operation Scissors) envisaging a series of strikes against enemy bases, forces, and arms depots. But the brigade’s involvement in combat operations elsewhere in north Palestine delayed its implementation, which was eventually set for April 22 regardless of the British military presence throughout the city. Once news of the British redeployment broke, Operation Scissors was immediately canceled and an alternative plan quickly implemented, aimed at opening up transport routes to downtown Haifa by capturing Wadi Rushmiya so as to secure the communication link between the city and the north of the country.[34]These plans were countered by similarly elaborate planning on the Arab side. On March 24, the Haifa NC was instructed by the AHC to draw up a list of people who would administer the city after the completion of the British withdrawal from Palestine. Four days later, the Arab League’s technical committee made the district of Haifa an independent operational unit answerable to the supreme command and assigned to it a detailed war plan. This envisaged the disruption of Jewish transportation throughout the district, attacks on Jewish urban and rural neighborhoods, and operations against the Hagana forces, preferably through guerrilla warfare in mountainous areas.[35]The plan had probably formed the basis of Izz al-Din’s offensive of early and mid-April. But when the moment of truth arrived, the commander of Arab Haifa failed to rise to the challenge. Shortly after his meeting with Stockwell on April 21, Izz al-Din sailed out of Haifa, ostensibly to gather reinforcements. He was quickly followed by one of his deputies, Amin Nabhani, while a second deputy, Yunas Nafa, a colorful local activist whose past occupations included partnership in a fish shop and a spell as a municipal sanitary inspector, left hurriedly the next day. “Nafa’s considerable weight did not appear to have materially impeded his rate of progress,” an Arab informant of the British commented ironically.[36]Whether these desertions stemmed from cowardice, as claimed at the time by embittered Arab fighters and refugees fleeing Haifa,[37] or from “miscalculation,” as suggested later by a Palestinian apologist,[38] they had a devastating impact on Arab morale. News of the flight quickly spread across the city, fanned by the Arabic-language broadcasts of the Hagana, which provided their numerous Arab listeners with real-time information about these desertions, mainly obtained through the interception of phone conversations.Knowledge of the desertion of the Haifa Arabs by their military commanders was not limited to the Hagana and the Arab community. The British had up-to-date information about this development, as did the American Haifa consulate, and both deemed it the foremost cause of the Arab collapse in Haifa.[39]“There was little unity of command in Haifa and as it transpired, the actual leaders left at the crucial stage,” Stockwell wrote on April 24 in his report on the events leading to the Jewish occupation of Haifa. And the American vice-consul in Haifa, Aubrey Lippincott, who had spent the night before the crucial fight with the Arab fighters, reported on April 23 that “they were much too remote from their higher command . . .some fairly reliable sources state that the Arab Higher Command all left Haifa some hours before the battle took place . . . those Arabs who escaped and with whom this officer has talked all feel that they have been let down by their leaders. The blow to Arab confidence is tremendous.”[40]Flight of military commanders at the most critical moment can wreck havoc even on the best of armies; its impact on a weakened and disorientated society can be nothing short of catastrophic. Debilitated by months of fighting, deeply divided along religious, political, and socio-economic lines, and lacking a coherent and accepted leadership, the depleted Arab community remaining in Haifa up to the final battle was simply too demoralized to mount the necessary final effort in its own defense. Describing this phenomenon with typical English understatement, Stockwell reported: “I think local Arab opinion felt that the Jews would gain control if in fact they launched their offensive”; while a fortnightly intelligence report from the headquarters of the British forces in Palestine scathingly observed that “the desertion of their leaders and the sight of so much cowardice in high places completely unnerved the inhabitants.” Lippincott put it in far harsher terms:The local Arabs are not 100% behind the present effort. Those who are fighting are in [a] small minority. . . . It may be that the Haifa Arab, partic-ularly the Christian Arab, is an exception, but generally speaking he is a coward and he is not the least bit interested in going out to fight his country’s battles. He is definitely counting on the interference of outside Arab elements to come in and settle this whole question for him.[41]It was only a question of time, therefore, before this defeatist mood translated itself into the all-too-familiar pattern of mass flight. In the early morning of April 22, as Hagana forces battled their way to the downtown market area, thousands streamed into the port, which was still held by the British army. Within hours, many of these had fled on trains and buses, while the rest awaited evacuation by sea.[42]What was left of the local Arab leadership now reconstituted itself as an ad hoc “Emergency Committee” and asked the British military to stop the fighting. When this failed, a delegation requested a meeting with Stockwell “with a view to obtaining a truce with the Jews.”[43]Having learned from the general the Hagana’s terms for such a truce, the delegates left to consult with their peers, in particular asking the Syrian consul in Haifa to inform his government and the Arab League. Very quickly, the British ambassador to Damascus, Philip Broadmead, was summoned to a meeting with President Quwatli. “An Arab delegation had seen the British Commander of the troops and had asked for intervention in order to stop [the] violent attack of the Jews against the Arabs,” said Quwatli.The Commander had refused to intervene, to allow Arab help to enter the town or to take measures to stop the killing of Arab women and children unless Arabs conclude a truce with [the] Hagana on conditions explained by the Commander, chief of which was the delivery of all arms to the Jews. Immediate instructions were asked for in view of the meeting between the Arab Delegation, [the] British Commander and the Jewish representatives at 4 p.m.Quwatli then expressed his bewilderment at the Jewish demand for the surrender of Arab weapons. Nor could he see what instructions he could send. What did the ambassador propose to do?Reminding the president that neither of them was familiar with the real situation on the ground, Broadmead begged him “to urge moderation and to take no action which would bring this local Haifa issue on to a wider plane.” To this, Quwatli responded that he “was very nervous concerning public opinion,” yet refrained from any threat of military intervention.[44]Thus, no instructions from Damascus or the other Arab capitals that were apprised of the situation seem to have reached the Haifa truce delegation by four o’clock in the afternoon, when it met its Jewish counterpart at City Hall.There, after an impassioned plea for peace and reconciliation by Mayor Levy,[45] the assembled delegates went through the truce terms point by point, modifying a number of them to meet Arab objections. These included the retention (rather than the surrender, as demanded by the Hagana) of licensed arms by their Arab owners, as well as the extension of the deadline for the surrender of all other weapons from the three hours demanded by the Hagana to nineteen hours – with a possible further extension to twenty-four hours at Stockwell’s discretion. Most importantly, in view of the adamant Arab refusal to surrender their weapons to the Hagana, it was agreed that the confiscated weapons would be “held by the military in trust of the Hagana and will be handed to them at the discretion of the GOC North Sector not later than midnight 15/16 May 1948,”[46]when Haifa would become an integral part of the newly established state of Israel.At this stage the Arabs requested a twenty-four-hour recess “to give them the opportunity to contact their brothers in the Arab states.”[47]Although this was deemed unacceptable, a briefer break was agreed and the meeting adjourned at 5:20.When the Arabs returned that evening at 7:15, they had a surprise in store: as Stockwell would later put it in his official report, they stated “that they were not in a position to sign the truce, as they had no control over the Arab military elements in the town and that, in all sincerity, they could not fulfill the terms of the truce, even if they were to sign.” Then they offered, “as an alternative, that the Arab population wished to evacuate Haifa and that they would be grateful for military assistance.”[48]This came as a bombshell. With tears in his eyes, the elderly Levy pleaded with the Arabs, most of whom were his personal acquaintances, to reconsider, saying that they were committing “a cruel crime against their own people.” Yaacov Salomon, a prominent Haifa lawyer and the Hagana’s chief liaison officer in the city, followed suit, assuring the Arab delegates that he “had the instructions of the commander of the zone . . . that if they stayed on they would enjoy equality and peace, and that we, the Jews, were interested in their staying on and the maintenance of harmonious relations.” Even the stoical Stockwell was shaken. “You have made a foolish decision,” he thundered at the Arabs. “Think it over, as you’ll regret it afterward. You must accept the conditions of the Jews. They are fair enough. Don’t permit life to be destroyed senselessly. After all, it was you who began the fighting, and the Jews have won.”[49]But the Arabs were unmoved. The next morning, they met with Stockwell and his advisors to discuss the practicalities of the evacuation. Of the 30,000-plus Arabs still in Haifa, only a handful, they said, wished to stay. Perhaps the British could provide eighty trucks a day, and in the meantime ensure an orderly supply of foodstuffs to the city and its environs? At this, an aide to Stockwell erupted, “If you sign your truce you would automatically get all your food worries over. You are merely starving your own people.” “We will not sign,” the Arabs retorted. “All is already lost, and it does not matter if everyone is killed so long as we do not sign the document.” These fatalistic words were publicly echoed in an ALA radio commentary, broadcast at the same time: “[The] Zionists have not dictated their conditions to us. We will have either to die for Palestine’s sake and thus nobody will remain to accept any Jewish conditions or we shall survive and dictate our own terms to the Jews.”[50]Within a matter of days, only about 3,000 of Haifa’s Arab residents remained in the city.What had produced the seemingly instantaneous about-turn from explicit interest in a truce to its rejection only a few hours later? In an address to the UN Security Council on April 23, AHC vice-president Jamal Husseini contended that the Arabs in Haifa had been “presented with humiliating conditions and preferred to abandon all their possessions and leave.”[51]But this was not so: not only had the Arab leadership in Haifa and elsewhere been apprised of the Hagana’s terms several hours before the meeting on April 22, but, as we have seen, the Arab delegates to the meeting had proceeded to negotiate on the basis of those terms and had succeeded in modifying several key elements.Later writers have spoken of “a Jewish propaganda blitz” aimed at frightening the Arabs into fleeing. Yet the only evidence offered for this “blitz” is a single sentence from a book by the Jewish writer Arthur Koestler, who was not even in Palestine at the time of the battle for Haifa but (in his own words) “pieced together the improbable story of the conquest by the Jews of this key harbor” about a week after his arrival on June 4 – that is, nearly two months after the event.[52]As against this isolated second-hand account, there is an overwhelming body of evidence from contemporary Arab, Jewish, British, and American sources to prove that, far from seeking to drive the Arabs out of Haifa, the Jewish authorities went to considerable lengths to convince them to stay.This effort was hardly confined to Levy’s and Salomon’s impassioned pleas, reiterated by Stockwell, at City Hall. The Hagana’s truce terms stipulated that Arabs were expected to “carry on their work as equal and free citizens of Haifa.”[53]In its Arabic-language broadcasts and communications, the Hagana consistently articulated the same message. On April 22, at the height of the fighting, it distributed an Arabic-language circular noting its ongoing campaign to clear the city of all “criminal foreign bands” so as to allow the restoration of “peace and security and good neighborly relations among all of the town’s inhabitants.” “We implore you again to keep your women, chil-dren, and the elderly from dangerous places,” read the circular, “and to keep yourselves away from gang bases that are still subjected to our retaliatory action. We do not wish to shed the innocent blood of the city’s peace-loving inhabitants.”[54]The following day, a Hagana broadcast asserted that “the Jews did, and do still believe that it is in the real interests of Haifa for its citizens to go on with their work and to ensure that normal conditions are restored to the city.” On April 24, another Hagana radio broadcast declared: “Arabs, we do not wish to harm you. Like you, we only want to live in peace. . . . If the Jews and [the] Arabs cooperate, no power in the world will ever attack our country or ignore our rights.” Two days later, informing its Arab listeners that “Haifa has returned to normal,” the Hagana reported that “between 15,000 and 20,000 Arabs had expressed their willingness to remain in the city,” that “Arab employees had been appointed to key posts such as that [of] looking after Arab property, religious matters and other work,” and that Arabs had been given “part of the corn, flour and rice intended for the Jews in Haifa.” And, on April 27, the Hagana distributed an Arabic-language leaflet urging the fleeing Arab populace to return home: “Peace and order reign supreme across the town and every resident can return to his free life and to resume his regular work in peace and security.”[55]That these were no hollow words was evidenced by, inter alia, the special dispensation given to Jewish bakers by the Haifa rabbinate to bake bread during the Passover holiday for distribution among the Arabs, and by the April 23 decision of the joint Jewish-Arab Committee for the Restoration of Life to Normalcy to dispatch two of its members to inform women, children, and the elderly that they could return home.[56]In a May 6 fact-finding report to the JAE, Golda Meyerson told her colleagues that while “we will not go to Acre or Nazareth to return the Arabs [to Haifa] . . . our behavior should be such that if they were to encourage them to return – they would be welcome; we should not mistreat the Arabs so as to deter them from returning.”[57]The sincerity of the Jewish position is also attested by reports from the US consulate in Haifa. Thus, on April 25, after the fighting was over, Vice-Consul Lippincott cabled Washington that the “Jews hope poverty will cause laborers [to] return [to] Haifa as many are already doing despite Arab attempts [to] persuade them [to] keep out.” And the following day: “[The] Jews want them [to] remain for political reasons to show [the] democratic treatment they will get [and] also need them for labor although [the] Jews claim latter not essential.” On April 29, according to Lippincott, even Farid Saad of the Haifa NC was saying that the Jewish leaders “have organized a large propaganda campaign to persuade [the] Arabs to return.”[58]Similarly, the British district superintendent of police reported on April 26 that “every effort is being made by the Jews to persuade the Arab populace to stay and carry on with their normal lives, to get their shops and businesses open and to be assured that their lives and interests will be safe.” Two days later he reported that “the Jews are still making every effort to persuade the Arab populace to remain and settle back into their normal lives in the town,” while the Sixth Airborne Division recorded in its logbook on May 1 that the “Jews in Haifa [are] now trying to get better relations with [the] Arabs and are encouraging them to return to the town.” And a weekly field security report of the same date noted that:the Jews have been making strenuous efforts to check the stream of refugees, in several cases resorting to actual intervention by [the] Hagana. Appeals have been made on the radio and in the press, urging Arabs to remain in the town. [The] Hagana issued a pamphlet along these lines, and the Histadrut in a similar publication appealed to those Arabs previously members of their organization to return. On the whole, [the] Arabs remain indifferent to this propaganda and their attitude to the present situation is one of apathetic resignation.[59]In fact, it was the received wisdom among contemporary observers that the continuation of the Arabs in Haifa, or their return home, would constitute a Jewish victory, whereas their departure would amount to a Jewish setback. As reported by the United Press correspondent in Haifa, Mano Dierkson: The shooting battle was followed by a political campaign between the Arabs and the Jews. The Arab leaders ordered the town’s complete evacuation whereas the Jewish leaders felt that such a development would be a tremendous defeat for them. . . . Should the situation remain calm, there is little doubt that many Arabs will stay despite the evacuation order by the Arab leadership, and one can hear many Arabs expressing their decision to stay. Jewish leaders walked around the Arab quarters today, talking to the Arab leaders who were busy urging their congregation to leave. It would seem today that the Arabs may well lose the political campaign just as they had lost the military campaign last Wednesday.[60]Meanwhile, as the Jews were attempting to keep the Arabs in Haifa, the Arab Emergency Committee was doing its best to get them out. Scaremongering was a major weapon in its arsenal. Some Arab residents received written threats that, unless they left town, they would be branded as traitors deserving of death.[61]Others were told they could expect no mercy from the Jews. Sheik Abdel Rahman Murad of the NC, who had headed the truce-negotiating team, proved particularly effective at spreading the latter scare story: on April 23, he warned a large group of escapees, who were about to return to their homes, that if they did so they would all be killed, as the Jews spared not even women and children. On the other hand, he continued, the Arab Legion had 200 trucks ready to transfer the Haifa refugees to a safe haven, where they would be given free accommodation, clothes, and food. Likewise, shortly after announcing their intention to remain in their work place, the Christian employees of the British army’s northern headquarters began leaving en masse. Asked for the reason for their sudden change of heart, they said that they had been threatened with severe punishment if they did not leave.[62]The importance of these actions cannot be overstated. The Emergency Committee was not a random collection of self-appointed vigilantes, as some Palestinian apologists would later argue. Rather, it was the successor to the Haifa NC and included two of its members: Farid Saad and Sheik Murad. In other words: the evacuation of the Haifa Arab community was ordered, and executed, by the AHC’s official local representatives. The only question is whether those representatives did what they did on their own, or under specific instructions from above.As indicated earlier, the Haifa leaders had been extremely reluctant to accept or reject the Hagana’s truce terms on their own recognizance: hence the initial appeal to their peers, and hence the request for a twenty-four-hour recess to seek the advice of the Arab states. When this was not granted, and the Emergency Committee had to make do with the brief respite granted to it, its delegates proceeded to telephone the AHC office in Beirut for instructions. They were then told explicitly not to sign, but rather to evacuate. Astonished, the Haifa delegates protested, but were assured that it was “only a matter of days” before Arab retaliatory action would commence, and “since there will be a lot of casualties following our intended action . . . you [would] be held responsible for the casualties among the Arab population left in the town.”This entire conversation was secretly recorded by the Hagana, and its substance was passed on to some of the Jewish negotiators at City Hall.[63]In retrospect, it helps explain a defiant comment made at the meeting by the Arab delegates after they announced the intended evacuation – namely, that “they had lost [the] first round but . . . there were more to come.”[64]It also sheds light on Meyerson’s assessment of the future of Haifa’s Arab community in her May 6 report to the JAE. Having told her colleagues of her personal distress at the sight of the Arab exodus, she added: “For my part I think that whether or not the Arabs will remain in Haifa will not depend on our behavior but rather on the instructions they’ll receive from their leaders. Until now the Arab leaders have said: ‘Leave Haifa, we will bomb it, we will send [our] army there and we don’t want you to get hurt.’ Should they receive different orders from Damascus and Amman, they will act accordingly.”[65]From Yaacov Salomon, one of the Jewish negotiators, we also learn of certain other emotions experienced by his Arab interlocutors:The Arab delegation arrived at the evening meeting under British escort, but when the meeting broke up they asked me to give them a lift and to take them home. I took them in my car.On the way back they told me that they had instructions not to sign the truce and that they could not sign the truce on any terms, as this would mean certain death at the hands of their own people, particularly the Muslim leaders, guided by the Mufti. While therefore they would remain in town, as they thought that would be best in their own interests, they had to advise the Arabs to leave.[66]What the Hagana had learned by covert means became public knowledge within days. Already on April 25 the American consulate in Haifa was reporting that the “local Mufti-dominated Arab leaders urge all Arabs [to] leave [the] city and large numbers [are] going.” Three days later it pointed to those responsible: “Reportedly [the] Arab Higher Committee [is] ordering all Arabs [to] leave.”[67]Writing on the same day to the colonial secretary in London, Cunningham was equally forthright: “British authorities in Haifa have formed the impression that total evacuation is being urged on the Haifa Arabs from higher Arab quarters and that the townsfolk themselves are against it.” Yet another contemporary British report asserted that: “Probable reason for [the] Arab Higher Executive ordering Arabs to evacuate Haifa is to avoid possibility of [the] Haifa Arabs being used as hostages in future operations after May 15. Arabs have already threatened to bomb Haifa from the air.”[68]Finally, a British intelligence report summing up the events of the week judged that, had it not been for the incitement and scaremongering of the Haifa Arab leadership, most Arab residents might well have stayed:After the Jews had gained control of the town, and in spite of a subsequent food shortage, many would not have responded to the call for a complete evacuation but for the rumours and propaganda spread by the National Committee members remaining in the town. Most widespread was a rumour that Arabs remaining in Haifa would be taken as hostages by [the] Jews in the event of future attacks on other Jewish areas: and an effective piece of propaganda with its implied threat of retribution when the Arabs recapture the town, is that [those] people remaining in Haifa acknowledged tacitly that they believe in the principle of a Jewish State.[69]There, no doubt, lay the reason why the Arab leadership preferred the exiling of Haifa’s Arabs to any truce with the Hagana. For, given the UN’s assignment of the city to the new Jewish state, any agreement by its Arab community to live under Jewish rule would have amounted to acquiescence in Jewish statehood in a part of Palestine. This, to both the Palestinian leader-ship and the Arab world at large, was anathema. As Azzam declared shortly after the fall of Haifa to the Hagana: “The Zionists are seizing the opportunity to establish a Zionist state against the will of the Arabs. The Arab peoples have accepted the challenge and soon they will close their account with them.”[70What the secretary-general failed to mention is that this fiery determination of the Arab peoples to “close their account” with the Zionists had just driven tens of thousands of their hapless fellow Arabs from their homes. Neither did he anticipate that this self-inflicted tragedy would be followed within days by a similarly monumental exodus, this time from Palestine’s largest Arab city: Jaffa.Chapter 6: Fleeing Haifa - Notes1.Yehoshua Ben-Arieh, “The Population of the Large Towns in Palestine during the First Eighty Years of the Nineteenth Century, According to Western Sources,” in Moshe Maoz (ed.), Studies on Palestine during the Ottoman Period (Jerusalem: Magness Press, 1975), p. 68; Government for Palestine, Supplement to Survey of Palestine: Notes Compiled for the Information of the United Nations Special Committee of Palestine (London: HMSO, June 1947; reprinted in full with permission by the Institute for Palestine Studies, Washington, D.C.), p. 12.2.Sixth Airborne Division, “Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 61, Based on Information Received up to Oct. 23, 1947,” WO 275/120, p. 3; “Fortnightly Intelligence Newsletter No. 54,” issued by HQ British Troops in Palestine, Nov. 8, 1947, WO 275/64, p. 2.3.Sixth Airborne Division, Historical Section: GHQ MELF, “Weekly Intelligence Review,” issued on Nov. 21, 1947, WO 275/120, No. 138.4.David Ben-Gurion, Yoman Hamilhama, Tashah-Tashat (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense Publishing House, 1982), Vol. 1, pp. 114, 171, 177 (entries for Jan. 5, 22, 1948). See also: “Tene News,” Jan. 2–4, 1948, HA 105/61, p. 158; “Yishuv Circular No. 18,” Feb. 6, 1948, IZL Archive (IA), K4-31/1/12.5.Mahmoud Yazbaq, al-Hijra al-Arabiya ila Haifa fi Zaman al-Intidab (Nazareth: n.p., 1988), pp. 112–17, 149–53; Yazbak, Haifa in the Late Ottoman Period 1864–1914: A Muslim Town in Transition (Leiden: Brill, 1998), pp. 127–39, 158–62; Yazbak, “The Arab Migration to Haifa 1933–1948: A Quantitative Analysis on the Basis of Arab Sources,” Katedra, No. 45 (Sept. 1987), p. 143; May Seikaly, Haifa: Transformation of a Palestinian Arab Society (London: I. B. Tauris, 1998), pp. 34–35; Yaacov Shimoni, Arviyei Eretz Israel (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1947), pp. 119–25, 236; Yossef Waschitz, “Rural Migration to Haifa during the Mandate: An Urbanization Process?” Katedra, No. 45 (Sept. 1987), pp. 119–28.6.“Tene News,” Dec. 11, 25, 1947, Jan. 2–5, 1948, HA, 105/61, pp. 43, 84, 155, 158, 164; “For our Members: Daily Information Bulletin No. 16,” Dec. 26, 1947, ibid.,3073_18_NOTES.qxp 11/21/10 1:11 PM Page 296296 N O T E S to pp. 1 2 6 – 2 8p.91; “Tene News – Daily Summary,” Jan. 12, 1948, HA 105/61a, p. 32; Muhammad Nimr Khatib, Min Athar al-Nakba (Damascus: al-Matba’a al-Amumiya, 1951), pp. 247, 276; Ben-Gurion, Yoman Hamilhama, Vol. 1, p. 114 (entry for Jan. 5, 1948); 317 Airborne Field Security Section, “Report No. 63 for the Week Ending 21 Jan 48,” para. 8, WO 275/79.7.Hanagid, “The Haifa Rally,” July 14, 1947, HA 105/358, p. 124; “The Mufti’s Letter to the Great Palestine National Gathering,” July 6, 1947, as translated from al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin, HA 105/358, pp. 127–28; Hanoch, “A Monthly Report on the Arab Sector in March 1947,” Apr. 8, 1947, HA 105/143, p. 36; idem, “Haifa and its Environs,” in “Among the Arabs: Report for April 1947,” May 14, 1947, ibid., pp. 42–43; Hanagid, “Miscellaneous,” May 20, 1947, ibid., p. 46; Hanoch, “Moods and Opinions [in Haifa],” ibid., p. 58; idem, “Haifa and its Environs,” in “Report on Arab Affairs for June 1947,” ibid., pp. 62–64; Hiram, “Haifa and its Environs,” in “A Monthly Report on Arab Affairs, August 1947,” ibid., pp. 68–70; Hiram, “A Monthly Report on the Developments among the Haifa Arabs during August 1947,” ibid., pp. 83–85.8.01011 to Tene, HA 105/215, p. 26.9.See, for example, “Protocol of the Haifa NC’s 9th Meeting, Held at the Residence of Hajj Muhammad Awwa on Dec. 16, 1947, 10.10am,” HA 100/60, p. 14; “Protocol of the Haifa NC’s 27th Meeting, Held at the Committee’s Headquarters on Feb. 10, 1948,” ibid., p. 46; “Proposals Accepted and Submitted to the Office for Implementation on Dec. 6, 1947,” ibid., p. 9; “Protocol of the Haifa NC’s 34th Meeting, Held at the Committee’s Headquarters on Tuesday, Mar. 30, 1948,” ibid., p. 57.10.See, for example, payment of £4.4, for miscellaneous expenses to Salah al-Din Abbasi, “Protocol of the Haifa NC’s 32nd Meeting, Held at the Committee’s Office on Tuesday, Mar. 16, 1948,” HA 100/60, p. 55; Khatib, Min Athar al-Nakba, p. 140.11.See, for example, “Protocol of the Haifa NC’s 9th Meeting, Held at the Residence of Hajj Muhammad Awwa,” p. 15; “Protocol of the Haifa NC’s 11th Meeting, Held at the Committee’s Office on Sunday, Dec. 21, 1947, 0900,” HA 100/60, p. 18; “Protocol of the Haifa NC’s 14th Meeting, Held at the Committee’s Office on Dec. 26, 1947, 11.00,” ibid., p. 22; “Protocol of the Haifa NC’s 15th Meeting, Held at the Committee’s Office on Dec. 30, 1947,” ibid., p. 22; “Protocol of the Haifa NC’s 25th Meeting, Held at the Committee’s Office on Tuesday, Jan. 27, 1948, 10.00,” ibid., p. 42; “Protocol of the Haifa NC’s 31st Meeting, Held on Mar. 9, 1948,” ibid., p. 51; “Protocol of the Haifa NC’s 32nd Meeting, Held at the Committee’s Office on Tuesday, Mar. 16, 1948,” ibid.,p.55; “Protocol of the NC’s 37th Meeting, Held at the Committee’s Office on Tues. Apr. 13, 1948,” ibid., p. 59.12.317 Airborne Field Security Section, “Report No. 63 for the Week Ending 21 Jan 48,” para. 8d, WO 275/79. See also Taha Hashemi, Mudhakkirat Taha al-Hashemi. Vol. 2: 1942–1955 (Beirut: Dar al-Tali’a li-l-Taba’a wa-l-Nashr, 1978), p. 173 (entry for Nov. 29, 1947).13.“Protocol of the Haifa National Committee’s 6th Meeting, Held at the Islamic Committee Center on Friday, Dec. 12, 1947,” HA 100/60, p. 10; “Protocol of the Haifa National Committee’s 7th Meeting, Held at the Islamic Committee Center on Saturday, Dec. 13, 1947,” ibid., p. 11. See also Khatib, Min Athar al-Nakba, pp. 150–51; Bayan Nuwaihid Hut, al-Qiyadat wa-l-Muasasat al-Siyasiyya fi Filastin 1917–1948 (Beirut: Muasassat al-Dirasat al-Filastiniyya, 1986), p. 628.14.Hiram to Tene, Jan. 18, 1948, HA 105/32a, p. 18; “Report on the Haifa Situation on Friday, Jan. 16, 1948,” ibid., p. 23; Hiram, Jan. 19, 1948, ibid., p. 25; “Report on Developments among the Haifa Arabs during January 1948,” Feb. 1, 1948, HA 105/69,pp.272–73; HA 105/61a, p. 112; 317 Airborne Field Security Section, “Report No. 62 for the Week Ending 14 Jan 48,” para. 8e & “Report No. 63 for the Week Ending 21 Jan 48,” pp. 1, 3–5, both in WO 275/79.15.“Protocol of the Haifa National Committee’s 22nd Meeting,” HA 100/60, pp. 36–37; “Tene News – Daily Brief,” Jan. 20, 1948, HA 105/61a, pp. 98, 105; “Developments among the Arabs,” Jan. 22, 1948, HA 105/54, p. 108; “A Report on Developments in3073_18_NOTES.qxp 11/21/10 1:11 PM Page 297N O T E S to pp. 1 2 8 – 3 1297Haifa on the Jan. 20,” HA, 105/72, p. 62; Hadad to Adina, “Details of Notes Taken Yesterday and Today of Various Conversations with Arabs Held in Haifa during the Last Couple of Days,” entry for Jan. 19, 1948, pp. 4–5, CZA, S25/7721.16.“Protocol of the Haifa National Committee’s 25th Meeting, Held at the Committee’s Headquarters on Tuesday, Jan. 27, 1948,” HA 100/60, pp. 40–41; Hiram-Nagid, “The Mufti and Haifa,” HA 105/54a, p. 24; “Yishuv Circular No. 18, Feb. 6, 1948,” IA, K4-31/1/12; Hadad to Adina, “On the Haifa Situation: the Delegation to Egypt,” Jan. 31, 1948, CZA, S25/7721; “Fortnightly Intelligence Newsletter No. 61, issued by HQ British Troops in Palestine, for the Period 2359 hrs 28 Jan–2359 hrs 11 Feb 48,” Feb.13, 1948, WO 275/64, p. 3.17.Hashemi, Mudhakkirat, pp. 199–200 (diary entry for Feb. 4, 1948); Khatib, Min Athar al-Nakba, pp. 140–42; Arif Arif, al-Nakba: Nakbat Bait al-Maqdis wa-l-Firdaws al-Mafqud (Beirut: al-Maktaba al-Asriya, 1956), Vol. 1, pp. 210–12; Hiram, “Report on Developments Among the Haifa Arabs, October 1947,” HA 105/143, p. 98; “Protocol of the Haifa NC’s 22nd Meeting, Held at the Committee’s Headquarters on Sunday, Jan. 18, 1948, 14.30,” HA 100/60, pp. 35–36.18.“Protocol of the Haifa NC’s 15th Meeting, Held at the Committee’s Office on Dec. 30, 1947,” HA 100/60, p. 23; “Protocol of the Haifa NC’s 22nd Meeting, Held at the Committee’s Office on Sunday, Jan. 18, 1948, 14.30,” ibid., pp. 36–37; “Conversation with Justice Ahmad Khalil, Jan. 18, 1948,” HA 105/54a, p. 15; Hajj Amin Husseini to the Haifa NC, Jan. 29, 1948, no. 521, IDFA, 1957/1/20.19.317 Airborne Field Security Section, “Report No. 65 for the Week Ending 4 Feb 48,” para. 8c & “Report No. 66 for the Week Ending 11 Feb 48,” para. 8b, both in WO 275/79; “Protocol of the Haifa National Committee’s 25th Meeting, pp. 41–42; “Tene News: Daily Summary,” Feb. 2, 1948, 105/61a, p. 152; “Report on Developments among the Haifa Arabs during January 1948,” Feb. 1, 1948, HA 105/69, pp. 273–74; “Tene News,” Feb. 12 & 23, HA 105/98, pp. 15, 25; Hiram to Tene, “Report on the Haifa Situation,” Feb. 10 & 13, 1948, HA 105/32a, pp. 65, 71; Hiram to Tene, Feb. 15, 1948, ibid., p. 73; Hiram to Tene, “Various News Items,” Feb. 18, 1948, ibid., p. 83; “Tene News,” Feb. 18 & 22, 1948, HA 105/98, pp. 21, 24.20.Hajj Amin Husseini to the Haifa National Committee, Feb. 12, 1948, No. 608, IDFA, 1957/1/20.21.See, for example, Hiram to Tene, “Summary of Ahitofel-Nitzoz News from Feb. 20, 1948,” HA 105/32a, p. 87; Hiram to Tene, “Report on the Haifa Situation on Friday, Feb. 20,” ibid., p. 90; Hiram to Tene, “Report on the Haifa Situation on Saturday, Feb. 21,” ibid., p. 89; Hiram, Feb. 23, 24, 25, 1948, ibid., pp. 98–99; Hiram to Tene, “Report on the Haifa Situation on Friday, Feb. 27,” ibid., p. 102; “Tene News,” Feb. 25, 1948, HA 105/98, p. 29; report by Hiram, Mar. 7, 1948, HA 105/257, p. 55.22.Hajj Amin Husseini to Rashid Hajj Ibrahim, Mar. 3, 1948, IDFA, 1957/1/20; Hiram to Tene, “Evacuation of Women and Children from Haifa,” Mar. 8, 1948, HA 105/257 p. 1; Hiram, “Evacuation of Women,” Mar. 10, 1948 & Dr. Yatsliah, “Haifa,” Mar. 10, 1948, ibid., p. 112; Hiram, report on AHC instructions to evacuate women, children, and the elderly, Mar. 17, 1948 & “Removal of Children to Beirut,” Mar. 14, 1948, ibid., p. 108; Hiram, report on the evacuation, ibid.; “Tene News,” Mar. 21, 1948, HA 105/98, p. 53; “Précis of Hiram News,” Mar. 25, 1948, HA, 105/143, p. 121.23.Khatib, Min Athar al-Nakba, pp. 248, 250–51; Zadoq Eshel, Maarachot Hahagana Behaifa (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense Publishing House, 1978), p. 338. For the detailed Hagana report on the battle, see Ehud to Carmeli, “Report on an Operation against Arms Convoy and Arab Commanders on 17.3.48,” Mar. 19, 1948, IDFA 1949/815/1.24.See, for example, 317 Airborne Field Security Section, “Report No. 71 for the Week Ending 24 Mar 48,” pp. 1–3, WO 275/79; Hiram, “Migration from Haifa to Acre,” Mar. 25, 1948 & untitled report from Mar. 24, 1948, HA 105/257, p. 106; Hiram, “Departure from the Country,” Apr. 2, 1948, HA 105/257; Hiram to Tene, “Flight of Christians to Lebanon,” Apr. 4, 1948 & “The Flats of the Christian Families,” Apr. 4, 1948, ibid., p. 222; Hiram to Tene, “The Haifa Residents,” Apr. 8, 1948, ibid., p. 30.3073_18_NOTES.qxp 11/21/10 1:11 PM Page 298298 N O T E S to pp. 1 3 1 – 3 425.Hiram to Tene, “The Food [Situation] in the City,” Apr. 6, 1948, HA 105/257, p. 53; Haifa National Committee, “Protocol of a Meeting at the Arab Bank, Apr. 12, 1948,” HA 105/400, p. 45; Haaretz, Apr. 14, 1948, p. 4.26.See, for example, Haifa National Committee, “Protocol of a Meeting at the Arab Bank”; “Protocol of the Haifa NC’s 36th Meeting, Held at the Committee’s Headquarters on Tuesday, Apr. 6, 1948,” 100/60, p. 58; Hiram to Tene, “The Qaraman, Dick & Salti Factory,” Mar. 31, 1948, Ha 105/257, p. 34; Hiram to Tene, “Transfer of Part of a Factory to Acre,” Apr. 8, 1948, ibid., p. 50; Hiram to Tene, untitled report & “[Removal of] Children to Beirut,” Apr. 15, 1948, ibid., p. 89; “Tene News,” Mar. 21, 1948, HA 105/98, p. 53; “Tene News,” Mar. 29, 1948, HA 105/98, p. 62; “Tene News,” Apr. 18, 1948, ibid., p 83; “In the Arab Public Sector,” HA 105/100, Mar. 30, 1948, p. 15; “News from the Arab Economy,” Bulletin No. 1, Apr. 11, 1948 & “Haifa from Operation Dichduch (Gloom) to the City’s Occupation,” HA 100/31a, p. 26.27.“Protocol of the Haifa National Committee’s 36th Meeting, Held at the Committee’s Headquarters on Tuesday, Apr. 13, 1948,” 100/60, p. 59.28.Hiram to Tene, “Various Messages from Abu Zaidan,” Apr. 5, 948, HA 105/257, p. 52.29.Hiram, Apr. 2, 1948, HA 105/257, p. 23; Hiram-Kafri, untitled report, Apr. 20, 1948, ibid., p. 57; Hiram-Farid, untitled report, Apr. 8, 1948, ibid.; “Tene News,” Mar. 25 & 26, 1948, HA 105/98, pp. 59–60.30.“257 and 317 FS Section Weekly Report No. 2 for Week Ending 21 April 1948,” pp. 1–2, WO 275/79; Logbook of the Sixth Airborne Division, Apr. 15, 1948, Sheet 65, Serials 283 & 284; Apr. 16, 1948, Sheet 69, Serial 306 (see also serials 307, 314, 316, 323, 350, 352, 366, 380, 385, 386, 387, 399 of Apr. 16–20, 1948), Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College London, Stockwell Collection, 6/17; Davar & Haaretz, Apr. 14, 16, 18, 1948; Carmeli Brigade, “Summary of Events,” Apr. 16, 1948, 0900, BGA.31.First Battalion Coldstream Guards, “Battalion Sitrep, No. 13, Apr. 19, 1948, 1630 hrs,” WO 261/297; Logbook of the Sixth Airborne Division, Apr. 20, 1948, Sheet 90, Serial 399. For descriptions of the clashes see also Filastin, Apr. 10, 11, 14, 1948; al-Difa, Apr. 14, 15, 19, 1948; Haaretz, Apr. 11, 12, 15, 18, 19, 1948.32.Stockwell to HQ, Palestine, “Withdrawal from Palestine,” Mar. 1, 1948, annex in Lt. General G. H. A. MacMillan, “Palestine: Narrative of Events from February 1947 until Withdrawal of All British Troops,” Stockwell Collection 6/25/2.33.For the text of Stockwell’s message, see “To:- The Arab and Jewish Executives in Haifa,” Apr. 21, 1948, Stockwell Collection, 6/13. See also “Appreciation of the Situation by Maj Gen HC Stockwell CB.CBE.DSO. at 0900 hrs 20 April 1948 at Haifa,” Stockwell Collection, 6/13, pp. 1–3.34.Second Brigade (Carmeli), Battalion 22, “War Diary,” entries for Apr. 20 & 21, 1948, IDFA 1972/721/389.35.From Hiram, “Report on Events in Haifa on Wednesday, 24.3.48,” Mar. 28, 1948, IDFA 1949/7249/152; ALA, General Headquarters of the Palestine Forces, “Operational Orders: Specifically for the Commander of the Haifa District,” Mar. 28, 1948 & “Operational Order No. 1 Regarding the Establishment of an Independent Headquarters in the Haifa District,” Mar. 28, 1948, IDFA, 1957/100001/64.36.Khatib, Min Athar al-Nakba, p. 265; “Report by GOC North Sector Major General HC Stockwell CB.CBE.DSO. Leading up to, and after the Arab-Jewish Clashes in Haifa on 21/22 April 1948,” Haifa, Apr. 24, 1948, Stockwell Collection, 6/15, p. 4, para. 14 (hereinafter Stockwell Report); Hiram to Tene, “News Bulletin,” Apr. 21, 1948, HA 105/143, p. 282; “257 and 317 FS Section Weekly Report No. 3 for Week Ending 28 April 1948,” para. 4, WO 275/79.37.See, for example, Hiram to Tene, “News Bulletin,” Apr. 23, 1948, HA 105/149, p. 287; Hiram to Tene, “General Moods,” Apr. 25, 1948, HA 105/257, p. 355; Lippincott (American Consulate, Haifa) to the Secretary of State, Airgram A-5, Apr. 23, 1948, p. 3, NA Record Group 84, Haifa Consulate, 800 – Political Affairs.38.Walid Khalidi, “Why Did the Palestinians Leave? An Examination of the Zionist Version of the Exodus of 1948,” Information Paper No. 3 (London, n.d.), p. 22.3073_18_NOTES.qxp 11/21/10 1:11 PM Page 299N O T E S to pp. 1 3 4 – 3 829939.See, for example, NorthSec to Troopers, Apr. 23, 1948, 0030, Stockwell Collection, 6/13; Lippincott to Secretary of State, Aigram A-5, Apr. 23, 1948, pp. 2–3, NA Record Group 84, Haifa Consulate, 800 – Political Affairs; and his telegram 33 of the same day (1300 hours), ibid.40.Stockwell Report, p. 5, para. 14e; Lippincott, airgram A-5 of Apr. 23, 1948.41.Stockwell Report, p. 5, para. 14d; “Fortnightly Intelligence Newsletter No. 67, issued by HQ British Troops in Palestine, for the Period 2359 hrs 19 April–2359 hrs 3 May 48,” WO 275/64, p. 1; Lippincott’s airgram A-5 of Apr. 23, 1948.42.Logbook of the Sixth Airborne Division, Apr. 22, 1948, Sheet 101, Serials 444 & 446; Sheet 102, Serial 450; “Intelligence Diary: the Occupation of Haifa,” entry for Apr. 22, 1948, 0805, IDFA 1949/815/1.43.Stockwell Report, p. 5, para. 15. See also NorthSec to Troopers, Apr. 23, 1948, Stockwell Collection, 6/13; report by the Superintendent of the District Police, “General Situation– Haifa District,” Apr. 23, 1948.44.Broadmead (Damascus) to Foreign Office, Apr. 22, 1948, FO 371/68544/E5019 & E5028.45.“Precis of a Meeting Held in the Town Hall Haifa between the Representatives of the Arab and Jewish Communities under the Chairmanship of the GOC North Sector on 22 April,” Appendix “A” to HQ North Sector letter 383/G (Ops) dated Mar. 24, 1948, Stockwell Collection, 6/15, p. 1.46.For the original terms of the truce and the amended version, see: “Terms of the Hagana Command for a Truce in Haifa,” Haifa, Apr. 24, 1948, Annexure I: to HQ North Sector letter 383/G (Ops) dated Apr. 24, 1948, Stockwell Collection, 6/15; “Terms of the Hagana Command for a Truce in and Applicable to Haifa, between Jews and Arabs, Haifa 22 April 48,” Annexure II: to HQ North Sector letter 383/G (Ops) dated Apr. 24, 1948, Stockwell Collection, 6/15.47.Arab Emergency Committee, “Mudhakkira Hawla Hujum al-Yahud ala-l-Arab fi Haifa Masa Yawm al-Arbi’a al-Waqi fi 21.4.1948,” p. 8, ISA 69.04/940F/15. The document was given to Yaacov Salomon by his personal friend and member of the Emergency Committee George Muammar. See Yaacov Salomon, Bedarki Sheli (Jerusalem: Idanim, 1980), pp. 134–35.48.Stockwell Report, p. 6, paragraph 24; Harry Beilin, “Operation Haifa,” Apr. 25, 1948, S25/10584.49.Salomon’s report to the Political Department, Israel’s Foreign Office, Apr. 1, 1949, ISA, FM 2401/11; Beilin, “Operation Haifa,” pp. 2–3; recollection of Abraham Kalfon (participant in the truce negotiations), Feb. 24, 1972, HA, File 284 (David Nativ’s personal archive), p. 27; Dan Kurzman, Genesis 1948: The First Arab-Israeli War(New York: New American Library, 1972), pp. 191–92; Moshe Carmel, Maarachot Tsafon (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuhad, 1949), p. 107.50.Cyril Marriott (Haifa) to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, “Report on the Events Leading Up to, During, and After the Arab-Jewish Clashes in Haifa on 21st/22nd April,” Apr. 26, 1948, FO 371/68505, para. 14 (hereinafter – Marriott Report); al-Inqaz, Arab Liberation Radio, clandestine, in Arabic to the Near East, Apr. 23, 1948, 6:00 am Est, FBIS-NME, Apr. 26, 1948, p. II/4.51.From Secretary of State for the Colonies to High Commissioner for Palestine, Apr. 24, 1948, Cunningham Collection, III/4/23. Palestinian scholar Bayan Nuwaihid Hut has similarly claimed (al-Qiyadat, p. 630) that the Jews refused to make the slightest amendment to the truce terms, thus making them unacceptable to the Arab delegates.52.Khalidi, “Why Did the Palestinians Leave?” p. 8; Erskine Childers, “The Other Exodus,”Spectator, May 12, 1961, p. 673; Arthur Koestler, Promise and Fulfillment: Palestine 1917–1949 (New York: Macmillan, 1949), pp. 187, 207.53.See “Terms of the Hagana Command for a Truce in Haifa,” Haifa, 22 April 48, Annexure I: to HQ North Sector letter 383/G (Ops) dated 24 April 1948,” Stockwell Collection, 6/15.54.Hagana Haifa Command, “Announcement No. 2 to the Haifa Arab Residents,” Apr. 22, 1948, 1200, HA 15/14.3073_18_NOTES.qxp 11/21/10 1:11 PM Page 300300 N O T E S to pp. 1 3 8 – 4 255.Hagana Arabic broadcasts, Apr. 23, 24, & 26, 1948, in BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts: Western Europe, Middle East, Far East and Americas, Part III, No. 48, Apr. 29, 1948, p. 61; Part III, No. 49, May 6, 1948, p. 70; Haaretz & Palestine Post, Apr. 27, 1948.56.ISA, “Protocol of the Joint Committee Meeting,” Apr. 23, 1948, 69–4/941/440a.57.CZA, “Protocol of the Jewish Agency Executive Meeting,” May 6, 1948, p. 125867.58.Lippincott to the Secretary of State, No. 40, Apr. 25, 1948; No. 44, Apr. 26, 1948; Airgram A-6, Apr. 29, 1948; all in NA Record Group 84, Haifa Consulate, 800 – Political Affairs.59.Superintendent of Police (CID), “Subject:- General Situation – Haifa District,” Apr. 26 & 28, 1948, HA 8/15, pp. 158, 161; Logbook of the Sixth Airborne Division, May 1, 1948, Sheet 135, Serial 602; “257 and 317 FS Section Weekly Report No. 4 for Week Ending 5 May 1948,” para. 4, WO 275/79.Several reports in the same vein were sent by the British authorities in Palestine to their superiors in London. On April 25, for example, High Commissioner Cunningham reported that at the Jewish-Arab committee established following the Arab decision to evacuate Haifa, under the mayor’s chairmanship, the “Jews fearing for the economic future of the town, pressed [the] Arabs to reconsider their decision of complete evacua-tion.” A fortnight later, Cyril Marriott, the British consul-designate in Haifa, reported that “they [i.e., the Jews] obviously want the Arab labour to return and are doing their best to instil confidence. Life in [the] town is normal even last night except of course for the absence of Arabs. I see no reason why [the] Palestine Arab residents of Haifa should not return.” And a fortnightly intelligence brief by the headquarters of the British forces in Palestine reported that “if it had not been for [the] conference held under the auspices of the British authorities (which included representatives from both communities), together with great efforts made by the Jews themselves and the voluntary return of a very small number of Arabs who had met with a cold reception in their places of asylum, the position in Haifa would have been a great deal worse than it now is.” See: Cunningham to Secretary of State, Apr. 25, 1948, Cunningham Collection, III/4/52; Marriott to Foreign Office, May 15, 1948, FO 371/68553/E6322; “Fortnightly Intelligence Newsletter No. 67, Issued by HQ British Troops in Palestine, for the Period 2359 hrs 19 April–2359 hrs 3 May 48,” WO 275/64, p. 2.60.UP Haifa report of Apr. 24, 1948, as quoted by Haaretz, Apr. 25, 1948. See also Davar, Apr. 25, 1948.61.Hiram to Tene, “The Returning Arabs to Haifa,” Apr. 28, 1948, HA 105/257, p. 365; report by Kafri, “Occurrences in Haifa on Sunday, May 9, 1948,” May 11, 1948, IDFA, 1949/7249/152; Hiram, “Tour of the Christian Neighborhoods in Haifa,” May 9, 1948, ibid.62.Hiram to Tene, “The Situation of the Arabs in Abbas Street,” Apr. 25, 1948, HA 105/257, p. 354; Hiram to Tene, “The Arabs’ Evacuation of Haifa,” Apr. 29, 1948, ibid., p. 3.63.Testimony of Ephraim Elroi (who carried out the tapping operation), Dec. 24, 1972, p. 10, HA, File 284 (David Nativ’s personal archive); testimony of Aharon Kari (Kramer) (who recorded the conversation), Jan. 17, 1973, ibid., pp. 6–7; testimony of Naftali Lifschitz (participant in the truce negotiations), Sept. 19, 1978, ibid., p. 1; testimony of Yaacov Salomon (participant in the truce negotiations), Mar. 10, 1971, ibid., p. 8; interview with Naftali Lifschitz (Apr. 13, 1994), in Tamir Goren, “Why Did the Arab Residents Leave Haifa? Examination of a Disputed Issue,” Katedra, No. 80 (1996), p. 189, fn. 92.64.Marriott to Foreign Office, Apr. 25, 1948, Stockwell Collection, 6/13.65.Protocol of the JAE Meeting, May 6, 1948, p. 12586.66.Salomon’s report to the political department, Israel’s Foreign Office, Apr. 1, 1949, ISA, FM 2401/11.67.Lippincott (American Consulate, Haifa) to Department, No. 40, Apr. 25, 1948 & No. 44, Apr. 26, 1948, NA Record Group 84, Haifa Consulate, 800 – Political Affairs.68.Cunningham to Secretary of State, Apr. 25, 1948, Cunningham Collection, III/4/52; Sixth Airborne Division’s Logbook of 1805 hrs, May 4, 1948, Sheet 148, Serial 653.3073_18_NOTES.qxp 11/21/10 1:11 PM Page 301N O T E S to pp. 1 4 2 – 4 630169.“257 and 317 FS Section Weekly Report No. 3 for Week Ending 28 April 1948,” paragraph 4, WO 275/79.70.Cairo Radio, Apr. 26, 1948, 20:00, in BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts: Western Europe, Middle East, Far East and Americas, Part III, No. 48, Apr. 29, 1948, p. 57.