Supplemental Guidance For Planning And Implementing The National: Fill & Download for Free

This will be dealing with several aspects, not just bio-terrorism but a pandemic in general, and what is happening now. I don’t want to cherry-pick but there’s a lot involved here and I have tabs open with ~3,000 pages of documents, I can’t cover everything so this is going to be the Sparknotes version where I address the general concepts. If you want to see the stuff more in-depth (and boring) this will be heavily sourced.***The current pandemic is not a result of bioterrorism or biological warfare.***First things first, yes, there are plans. However, unlike another author dangerously, irresponsibly, and misleadingly claims (considering the current situation), the military would not be given control or execute civilians who don’t “follow orders” after a bioterror/warfare attack. That claim is patently false and there is not one shred of evidence to back it up. Even in cordon sanitaires during the West Africa Ebola Outbreak soldiers did not execute civilians. If they didn’t do it then we sure as hell wouldn’t do it now, whether it be a natural pandemic or the result of bioterror/warfare.What is the military doing now?Northern Command officially began the implementation of its plan for a pandemic on February 20th. A fact that this person who is supposedly “in the know” neglected to mention. This order can be found (for the Navy and Marine Corps) in the form of NAVADMIN 033/20.[1] That footnote will take you straight to the NAVADMIN, it’s not shady or “classified” it’s publicly available for all to see.This NAVADMIN calls for the implementation of CONPLAN 3551–13 “Concept Plan to Synchronize DOD Pandemic Influenza Planning”, the most recent version that I could find was CONPLAN 3551–09.[2] The last two digits are simply the year, there’s usually not really big sweeping changes between them, mostly changes in graphics, vocabulary, anecdotes, and other banal items. We’ll be revisiting the plan later on.The Marine Corps also issued MARADMIN 082/20.[3] This MARADMIN has become something of a conspiracy theorist's delight, namely because they are militarily illiterate and have no clue what they are reading or what the words mean.[4] [5] It’s boring, there is nothing exciting or out of order in the document or its follow-on updates. And to claim that it’s leaked is pure bovine feces, it’s a damn public website, anyone can use it. Those people are straight-up omnishambles.Most of it has to do with travel restrictions, force protection, and what to do if a Marine falls ill/contracts the virus. As of the most current update:Institute the following domestic travel restrictions:3.C.2.A. Effective 16 March to 11 May 2020, all Marines will stop movement. This includes PCS and TDY.3.C.2.B. Effective 16 March to 11 May 2020, USMC civilian personnel and family members, whose transportation is government funded, will stop movement. This includes PCS and TDY.3.C.2.B.1. Until the travel restrictions described above are lifted, commands may only onboard civilian employees within the local commuting area.3.C.2.C. Marines are only authorized local leave and liberty.[6](Permanent Change of Station.) (Temporary Duty.) All prior updates:[7] [8]Those who are not sick are not confined to base but all nonessential travel has been canceled/postponed and all orders to move from one base to another have been delayed. There are exemptions, mainly that if you’re getting out they won’t keep you from doing so, or your spouse/immediate family is going through “extreme hardship”. Deployments will go on, training will still take place, it’s not business as usual but things are a lot more normal on base compared to the public.Parris Island, and I presume MCRD San Diego as well, has canceled all upcoming public graduation ceremonies but the Marines are still graduating. They’re still training like normal. However, MARADMIN 082/20 still applies to them so their post-graduation leave is suspended and they will remain aboard Parris Island until at least May 11th.[9] (That’s probably going to have some manpower implications.)Yes, this is all part of CONPLAN 3551–09/13.So, to tear apart the “The guvmint would shoot people” claim I present this paragraph right off the bat:a. SROE/SRUF will apply during a response to a PI. In addition, any GCC theater specific ROE and SecDef approved mission specific RUF will remain in effect. GCCs may augment the SROE/SRUF as necessary by submitting a request for mission specific ROE/ RUF to the CJCS. National Guard Forces performing lin a non-federalized status are governed by their respective state's RUF.[10](SROE-Standing Rules of Engagement. SRUF-Standing Rules for Use of Force. PI-Pandemic Influenza. GCC-Geographic Combatant Commander. CJCS-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.)That may not mean much to the average person but it means a lot to me. SROE and SRUF are rules that apply at all times, whether that be on deployment to the Middle East or back in the United States.I break that down a bit more here:Thomas Lewandowski's answer to Does the US or any military have protocols for killing civilians? It's a common trope in apocalyptic-thrillers, but would the military kill civilians to prevent infections from spreading, or target healthy people along with infected people?Thomas Lewandowski's answer to What are your thoughts on the Military's Rules of Engagement? Do you consider them overly restrictive and are they necessary?1.) We can’t operate while armed on US soil unless directly authorized by either the President or the Secretary of Defense. No. One. Else.2.) SROE and SRUF are both inherently defensive. We cannot go seek you out and shoot you or use any form of force unless we are threatened or attacked. The threshold for the use of force under these circumstances is very high. If you think we’re going to shoot someone because they didn’t want to do something you would be mistaken. A person has to use force or reasonably threaten the use of force against a servicemember in order for them to defend themself. Even then, the force used against that person must be proportional to the threat posed and the person. I.e. you can’t beat a 100lb. teenager with a nightstick because they pushed you.Murdering civilians for not acting as a labor force or being a little disobedient, preposterous. (I’m sorry but that claim really irks me.)There are six phases in CONPLAN 3551:(a) Phase 0 - Shape. Prepare DOD for continued operations in the event of a Pl. The priority of effort is surveillance of virus outbreaks. The secondary effort is to plan development and synchronization.(b) Phase 1 - Prevent. DOD supports USG efforts to prevent or inhibit the geographic spread of the virus. The priority of effort is to prepare for and respond to a potential PI, including: surveillance; training, organizing and equipping the force; educating the Key Population, continued planning strategic communication. Secondary efforts are actions to maintain situational awareness and coordinate with interagency, state, tribal, local, and international partners.(c) Phase 2 - Contain. DOD's decisive phase; containing the virus at this point may prevents or delay a PI, potentially alleviating the need for additional phases. The priority of effort is to support USG containment efforts, protect DOD Key Population, and maintain freedom of action to conduct assigned missions within GCC AORs.(d) Phase 3 - Interdict. DOD supports USG efforts in delaying or halting the spread of the virus geographically. Priority of effort is on preparations to ensure freedom of action to conduct assigned missions in the face of an impending Pl.(e) Phase 4 - Stabilize. DOD maintains continuity of operations. Priority of effort is the protection of Key Population while providing mission assurance of priority missions to protect vital national interest. The secondary effort is support of USG efforts.f) Phase 5 - Recover. DOD reconstitutes the force in preparation for the next wave or returns to the inter-pandemic period. Priority of effort is redeployment and reconstitution of the force. Secondary effort is support to USG efforts· to re-establish inter /pre-pandemic conditions.(AOR-Area of Responsibility. USG-United States Government.) More specific information on the phases can be found here on page 43:[11]We’re not really in one single phase at the moment but a combination of 1–3, though 3 would be most appropriate. The whole point right now isn’t necessarily pure containment, we’re past that, all that can be done right now is slowing the spread to acceptable levels. That’s why the military is taking actions such as what’s outlined in MARADMIN 082/20, we can’t actually stop it from spreading but the military can do its part to alleviate some of the burdens on the public medical system. We already take care of our own health care so there’s little need to worry about that, spouses/children can also receive care at military hospitals. That potentially removes millions of possible cases from flooding the public health system.Not trying to simplify a ~400-page plan in a few sentences but most of what DoD is going to do is shelter-in-place and reduce interactions. Their role here is very passive. There could be some logistical support, opening up stocks of medical supplies for example or building hospitals. They will also aid the government with surveillance, no, not the NSA spying kind just screening for cases amongst personnel and likely their dependents. If need be they will supplement some state and national agencies but the typically shown apocalyptic scenario where they’re running around in gas masks and suits like in The Crazies isn’t part of the plan. They don’t want people to come in contact with personnel, especially since those servicemembers all live and work in the same place and would easily spread any disease amongst them. Force protection, operability, and maintaining manpower is the goal right now.DoD would also not send National Guardsmen overseas and they would remain in their home states to be used by their Governor if needed.With the current pandemic there will likely be no widespread, direct, active-duty military involvement, at least not the way portrayed in movies. Even active-duty chem-bio incident response units are unlikely to be used, this is not a situation that they are really suited for. (No pun intended.) If it got to the point where the bodies were literally piling up in stadiums, which I doubt, maybe they would be utilized to move cadavers but they don’t bring anything appropriate to this fight right now. They mostly concentrate on more acute bioterror events such as the anthrax attacks after 9/11 or operating in irradiated areas or those hit by chemical agents. Containment of a pandemic is not in their playbook at all.Now, finally, on to the bioterrorism part. There is a plan for this as well, CONPLAN 3500 CBRNE CM.[12] (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, high-yield Explosion Consequence Management.) I’d tell you what’s in it but it’s classified Secret. I have never seen it so I’m not saying that to imply that I do know, I don’t. It’s not publicly available and there have been FOIA requests made for redacted versions but DoD has declined all these requests. However, the fact that it’s only Secret kind of implies it doesn’t entail murder, so I’m confident killing civilians isn’t mentioned there either.Very little of what’s in there is known to the public and it isn’t particularly informative either. That said, the biological part is probably fairly similar to CONPLAN 3551. When it comes to bioterror the scariest threat is something like Smallpox, Ebola, Marburg, Tularemia, Lassa, or Plague but they are also the least likely agents to be used.[13] The vast majority of bioterror attacks have been more acute in nature, mainly agents such as Anthrax or Botulinum Toxin.However, neither of the latter can be transmitted from human to human so it’s easily contained, unless someone crop dusted an area with anthrax spores it’s not realistic to see large incidents.[14] There are also sentinel systems in some heavily trafficked places, think Grand Central, around the US that would detect such agents if they were exposed to them. Then it’s just a matter of coming in, decontaminating the area, and treating the affected. It should also be noted that there are millions of vaccines and treatments for anthrax available if the need arises, procured by Project Bioshield.[15] Bioterror, as it stands today, is more about creating fear than causing death.Even if smallpox were used it wouldn’t be as effective as it would have fifteen years or so ago. HHS has stockpiles of smallpox vaccines spread throughout the country and with 90% of the population within one hour of these centers. As it stands today there are enough vaccines for the entirety of the US population, with the stockpiles currently undergoing replenishment.[16] [17] (Thousands of servicemembers are vaccinated every year usually before an overseas deployment or if in a chem-bio unit, I’ve still got the scar.)Finally, as to why the system isn’t put into play? Well, it is, at least on the military side. The concepts, systems, and tactics for a widespread bioterror event and that of a natural pandemic are not that dissimilar.While the 2009-2010 H1N1 pandemic was a naturally occurring disease outbreak and not a deliberate attack, the symptoms, infection rates and response mechanisms associated with the virus could be similar to the impacts of a deliberate attack employing a contagious biological agent.Unlike nuclear or chemical weapons that have clearly identifiable signatures, biological agents may be disseminated covertly, and therefore they may not be identified immediately. The first indication of a biological event could be more numerous-than-expected hospital visits in a particular location, or in a group of people who were in the same location at the same time.Whether natural or deliberate, biological outbreaks will have similar impacts on employee absenteeism, school and work closures, the availability and distribution of medical and non-medical countermeasures, and mortality rates.While influenza is not a viable biological warfare (BW) agent, the H1N1 outbreak provided the U.S. Government and the Military Services an opportunity to identify and assess valuable lessons learned that can be applied in the event of a deliberate BW attack. It also can provide insight into how to improve DoD responses to future WMD attacks.[18]The military took that H1N1 pandemic seriously and did almost the exact thing they are doing today:DoD also responded to the H1N1 pandemic by enacting the social distancing measures called for in USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3551 with the goal of mitigating the spread of the disease. As early as April 2009, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) issued a message to U.S. forces within its area of responsibility stressing the importance of preventative measures against the virus.The message included simple social distancing precautions, such as “staying at home when sick; covering your mouth and nose when coughing or sneezing; washing your hands regularly; avoiding touching your nose, mouth or eyes; and seeking medical care if you are ill.”Social distancing measures were particularly necessary at the U.S. Army’s Fort Jackson, through which more than 50,000 Initial Entry Training Soldiers pass each year and where H1N1 cases were “steadily climbing.”…Force health protection measures continued throughout the summer of 2009 while the H1N1 vaccine was under development. The Services updated and tested the USNORTHCOM-directed disease containment plans and mitigation measures, including social distancing, working from alternate locations and other non-medical countermeasures. At Fort Jackson, for example, the Army instituted social distancing through “sick-in-quarters,” an isolated area on-post for confirmed H1N1 cases, and took additional prevention measures, asking all soldiers to re-arrange their bunks to sleep head-to-toe “so that if one coughs or sneezes during the night, the other soldier is on the opposite end of the dispersion droplets.”These social distancing measures were essential to protecting the health of the force. According to Department of the Navy (DON) Work/Life Program Manager Karen Meyer, “40 percent of flu cases could be prevented by stopping the spread of germs.” She further noted that “avoiding human contact by ‘social distancing’ was and remains the most effective method of minimizing the effects of the pandemic flu emergency.”To that end, the DON practiced teleworking (working from an alternate location) and appointed telework coordinators at each of the Navy’s Major Commands. While not everyone in DON was eligible to telework—either because of the sensitive nature of the work or because of mission requirements—allowing even a portion of the Department to work remotely limited the spread of the disease.[19]I’m sure we’ve all heard something similar to this on the news the past few days. The system is almost the exact same at this level. While the viruses are different the basic protections and actions remain obviously connected.So I think that’s enough for now, if I have to add to this later I might but I think this does an okay job upfront. If you have questions about the virus, the pandemic, or need rumors to be dispelled I’d suggest going here: Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) or here: Coronavirus and to read the CDC’s CONPLAN for a pandemic you can check that out here: CDC Influenza Pandemic Operation Plan (OPLAN)To quote Douglas Adams, “Don’t Panic.”Footnotes[1] https://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/reference/messages/Documents/NAVADMINS/NAV2020/NAV20033.txt[2] https://www.governmentattic.org/8docs/NORTHCON_CONPLAN_3551-09_2009.pdf[3] U.S. MARINE CORPS DISEASE CONTAINMENT PREPAREDNESS PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR 2019 NOVEL CORONAVIRUS > United States Marine Corps Flagship > Messages Display[4] US Marines Are Coming To A Local Community Near You! (Or, The Covid-19 Plan Sounds A Lot Like Martial Law)[5] [Leaked] Military Containment Documents for Novel Coronavirus: R 112111Z FEB - Pastebin.com[6] UPDATE #3: U.S MARINE CORPS DISEASE CONTAINMENT PREPAREDNESS PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR 2019 NOVEL CORONAVIRUS (COVID-19); STOP MOVEMENT > United States Marine Corps Flagship > Messages Display[7] UPDATE #1: U.S. MARINE CORPS DISEASE CONTAINMENT PREPAREDNESS PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR 2019 NOVEL CORONAVIRUS (COVID-19); COMMANDERS’ RISK-BASED MEASURED RESPONSES > United States Marine Corps Flagship > Messages Display[8] UPDATE #2: U.S MARINE CORPS DISEASE CONTAINMENT PREPAREDNESS PLANNING GUIDANCE FOR 2019 NOVEL CORONAVIRUS (COVID-19); TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS AND PERSONNEL GUIDANCE FOR TRAVEL > United States Marine Corps Flagship > Messages Display[9] https://www.islandpacket.com/news/coronavirus/article241264976.html[10] https://www.governmentattic.org/8docs/NORTHCON_CONPLAN_3551-09_2009.pdf[11] https://nsarchive.files.wordpress.com/2010/10/pandemic.pdf[12] https://info.publicintelligence.net/USNORTHCOM-Overview.pdf[13] http://documents.theblackvault.com/documents/biological/MedAspectsBio.pdf[14] https://www.oodaloop.com/documents/Legacy/asis/13apr99APIC-CDCBioterrorism.pdf[15] MedicalCountermeaures.gov - Home[16] https://www.researchgate.net/publication/235040924_US_Strategy_for_Bioterrorism_Emergency_Medical_Preparedness_and_Response[17] HHS Purchases Smallpox Vaccine to Enhance Biodefense Preparedness[18] https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/11/2002115515/-1/-1/0/51DODBIOTHREAT.PDF[19] https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/11/2002115515/-1/-1/0/51DODBIOTHREAT.PDF

The US Govt, at the highest levels, has highly classified Continuity of Operations plans for almost everything conceivable. The Constitution already states what the Presidential line of succession will be: Vice Pres, Speaker of the House, President Pro Tempore of the Senate, then the Cabinet Executives of each Department from oldest to newest (State, DoD, etc…down the line), then the Deputy and Under and Assistant and then the Assistant to the Assistant, etc., of each Department until you find a living, breathing Executive Branch Officer to succeed to the Presidency, even if only temporarily until you can find one higher up in the chain. Or have an election and get a new one.Notice: NOT ONE of these involves a military officer…NEVER in the history of the USA has a military officer assumed the presidency while still on active duty. (The scene in the Second Independence Day movie where the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is “anointed” as the new President notwithstanding!) Any surviving Officer of the United States serving in any of the Executive Departments would be senior to the CJCS…but that was just a movie, right?Notice also: previous presidents like Eisenhower, Grant, Jackson, and Washington, all of whom served as general officers in the Army, ALL resigned/retired from their military offices before they assumed the presidency. Eisenhower especially was so worried about the mere appearance of impropriety, the possibility he was seen as making a military coup d’etat while he was even a retired officer, that he flat out resigned his commission and was removed from the Retired List of the Army while he was the President. This is because retired officers technically never lose their “office,” even after retirement, because once appointed under the Constitution until they resign their office or it is stripped from them through a due process procedure like a Board of Inquiry or a Court-Martial, they remain Officers of the United States (but without a “portfolio” meaning they had no specific duties to perform while retired). Eisenhower also had the problem of being a “retired” 5-star General of the Army. The law that created the 5-stars during WWII didn’t actually provide for a way for them to retire…so they would request “retirement” and then go off and play golf, or work in their home office, or make the rounds on talk shows or whatever. BUT, they would still be drawing their full active duty pay and allowances until the day they died, because they were still considered to be on active duty for all intents and purposes…just not working because they had “gone home.” So, Eisenhower asked to be completely stripped of his office while he was the President, this was done. One of the first things that his successor JFK did upon assuming the Presidency was to get Congress to pass a private bill that “undid” — retroactively— Eisenhower’s resignation so that he would be reinstated and have his Date of Rank and seniority restored (without back pay of course, because you can’t double dip for the same period of service).Now back to the question.See this page: http://www.ncrhomelandsecurity.org/security/security/otherplans/pres_dir_sum.pdfPresidential Decision DirectivesPresidential Decision Directives (PDDs) are the signed or authorized decisions of the President on foreign policy issues and national security matters. Facts and views of appropriate government agencies are collected and analyzed by the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC then determines alternatives and presents them to the President. A number of recent PDDs are classified.Presidential Decision Directive 67: Enduring Constitutional Government and Continuity of GovernmentPDD 67, issued in 1998, addressed enduring constitutional government and introduced continuity of operations plan (COOP) and continuity of government operations. PDD 67 succeeded NSD 69 “Enduring Constitutional Government” of June 1992.PDD 67, among other things, requires federal agencies to develop COOP plans for essential operations. These COOP plans were viewed as a unifying concept not to replace existing plans but, instead, to be superimposed if and when a problem threatens a serious disruption of agency operations.Several Federal Preparedness Circulars (FPCs) that detail a series of government policies specific to COOP planning and national security emergency preparedness have been written under the authority of PDD 67. The focus of these documents includes succession, vital records, training, COOP requirements, alternative facility requirements, and communications. They are associated with supporting all Federal organizations with viable COOP programs. FPC 65, for example, provides guidance to all Federal Executive Branch departments, agencies, and independent organizations on the development of viable and executable COOP plans. FPC 66 further supports COOP efforts by providing guidance on the development of test, training, and exercise programs to support the implementation and validation of COOP plans. FPC 67, designed as a supplement to FPC 65, provides guidance on implementing COOP plans, specifically in locating alternate facilities to support COOP efforts.And this excellent, although somewhat dated (2005) and copyrighted document (credit to the author, William Arkin!): https://williamaarkin.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/arkins-contingency-plans-of-the-us-government.pdfMost of the details of contingency planning is highly classified; even the existence of most plans is kept secret. Many contingency plans have unclassified code names associated with them (e.g., “Power Geyser,” the federal continuity of government plan), but the details of the planning and the various options within plans are highly protected.And this site: Continuity of Operations Programs (COOP)And the Mount Weather FEMA COOP site is a National asset, and a very likely candidate for any civilian (and military) continuity of Government if needed: Mount Weather Emergency Operations Center - WikipediaOf course, everyone has heard of Cheyenne Mountain, near Colorado Springs and Peterson AFB. Designed to withstand nuclear strikes during the Cold War, it’s mostly been put on “warm standby” but supposedly can be reactivated in 1 hour: Military to put Cheyenne Mountain on standbyAnd see: Cheyenne Mountain Complex - WikipediaReviewing this material, you can see that the real materials are all highly classified, but there is a lot of material available open-source and for those employees who don’t need to know the specifics of their Agency’s COOP. Or at least not the White House’s COOP! Which is a very different matter.Bottom line:There is a Presidential Succession Act that prescribes who will head the US Govt at all times, in war and peace.There is at least one specific contingency plan, Power Geyser, as a Continuity of Government Operations (COOP) plan for the US Govt.PDD 67, Enduring Constitutional Government and Continuity of Government, exists (mostly as a highly classified document) to guide the operationalization of the COOP for the US Govt, and undoubtedly embedded within the various annexes thereto is specific instructions about the actual President, staff, nuclear football, communications, etc.The more serious the threat of, or actual attacks during, a war or national emergency will govern the response. Parts of the Govt and certain people will always be moved to safer locations (the “undisclosed location” of Vice President Cheney during 9/11, for example) if there is a threat. The bigger the threat, the more serious the response and the more people and portions of the COOP will be activated.If Washington DC was either destroyed, or threatened for destruction by something capable of actually doing so (nuclear strikes, other WMD, asteroid strike, tsunami, etc.), and there was time of warning, most if not all the Govt would be moved in advance…to where?A combination of places, most likely, because no single location is both safer than Wash DC AND capable of holding tens of thousands if not more civil servants trying to continue their Nation’s work of Government. You can get one, or the other, but not BOTH. Safe, or huge.So, I would agree with another answer that Colorado Springs/Denver metroplex is a good candidate: centrally located, moderately remote and yet accessible from at least north, south, and east without much difficulty. Cheyenne Mountain and several other military installations are thereabouts. But there will be other places involved, on both coasts, and other places.BUT…what IS the capital? The place where a bunch of civil servants work? Or where the President and/or Congress are physically located? Or symbolic place all eyes look toward? Right now, WashDC is all of that. If displaced, those three things may all be in different physical locations…on purpose.Cheers, WKB

A PIL under Article 32 was filed by the NGO, Swaraj Abhiyan praying for directions for declaration of drought and relief in affected areas. The SC court came out with a 3 part judgment on May 11 2016 the first one dealt with the issue of drought and the latter judgments took up the poor implementation of the National Food Security Act, 200513 (NFSA) and the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005 (NREGA). These directions largely signify the failure of the governance in tackling drought and suggest actions to be taken hence, we need to be thankful to the petitioners and apex court for this. We also hope the apex court continues to monitor the implementation of the directions.SC Directions for dealing with the droughtImplementation of Disaster Management Act 2005 The SC noted that drought is a disaster and its assessment and management is covered under the provisions of the Disaster Management Act 2005. It directed implementation of the provisions of the Disaster Management Act 2005 which provides for constituting a National Disaster Response Force, establishing a National Disaster Mitigation Fund and formulation of a National Plan relating to assessment and management of disasters. The Court noted that the aforementioned provisions of the Act had not been implemented even a decade after coming into force. The media latter on reported that the notification about NDMF has not been notified, but that also shows the failure of the governance of disasters.Revision of Drought Manual The Ministry of Agriculture has published a Manual for drought management (Drought Manual) in 2009. The Court commended the Drought Manual and directed its revision based on recent experience and new technology.Indices for drought declarationThe drought manual recommends rainfall deficiency, the extent of area sown, normalized difference vegetation index(NDVI) and moisture adequacy index(MAI) as the four standard monitoring tools which could be applied in combination for drought declaration. Rainfall is the most important indicator and the manual recommends declaration of drought if rainfall for June and July is less than 50% of the average or if the total rainfall in the rainy season from June to September (the south-west monsoon) or from December to March (north-east monsoon), is less than 75% of the average accompanied by reduction in vegetation and soil moisture.The SC observed that many states have their own procedure for declaring drought and there has been little observance of the Manual. But the Central government claimed that the manual does not have any binding force and is only for reference. Moreover the Centre claimed that it would go against the principles of federalism for it to overrule the decision of the states or to issue binding guidelines for all states to declare drought. State Governments could face situations under which they may need to deviate from the guidance given in the Manual as some states are more irrigated than others, availability of water and type of crops differ.During the proceedings, the decision of the states of Bihar, Haryana and Gujarat to not declare drought came into question.Bihar: Bihar’s denial of drought was based on the overall rainfall deficiency figures for the state that too only until August 2015. It had not looked at district or block level information. However, rainfall in June and July 2015 in 10 out of 38 districts and by the end of October 2015 the state wide rainfall was deficient to the extent of falling within the drought range.While deviation in the sown crop area was within normal limits, there was no assessment of crop failure from subsequent lack of rain and performance. Bihar had also ignored the NDVI and MAI for determining the extent of drought. The Court observed that taking all information into account, some districts in Bihar were facing drought, yet the state was denying it.Haryana: Although agricultural productivity in Haryana was unaffected, the state had deficient rainfall. The state has been tapping ground water through lakhs of tube wells to supplement water from canals for irrigation. However the MAI – reflecting the moisture available for crops – at the end of Sept 2015, was observed by the SC as indicative that most of the state was in the grip of a severe or moderate or mild drought. Indicators of drought recommended by the drought manual were ignored and a completely different set of factors such as wages, supply of essential commodities and prices (which, we feel, might not reflect the situation at the micro level) were being used by Haryana for not declaring drought.Gujarat: Districts in Central Gujarat and South Gujarat and two districts of Saurashtra had received inadequate rainfall but the state wide rainfall was relied upon the State to deny deficiency in rainfall.The SC directed that the Manual should specify the weightage to be given to each of the four key indicators as far as possible. This would make the State governments consider all factors appropriately rather than only focussing on area of crop sown.Standardization of drought declaration The SC directed that the nomenclature and methodology for declaring drought be standardized. The Gujarat government was seen using the term ‘semi-scarcity’ instead of ‘drought’.Traditionally, declaration of drought was recommended through the annewari / paisewari / girdawari system which provides an estimate of agricultural losses after crop production. The Drought Manual has recommended discarding the annewari system. Yet, Gujarat and Maharashtra continue to use the annewari system; the cuttoff for drought in Maharashtra is 50% decrease in crop, while in Gujarat, ‘scarcity; is declared if the crop produce is less than 33% and the state government uses its discretion when it falls between 33-50% to declare ‘semi-scarcity’. Gujarat ignores NDVI and MAI in favour of the traditional annewari system citing that the moisture indices are low because of the type of the soil. (But it is the deviation of the NDVI from the normal value in the area which is used for drought assessment. MAI also takes soil characteristic into account.)The SC directed that the manual should include more relevant factors and reduce the flexibility available to states in declaring drought.Timely drought declarationDeclaration of drought was inordinately delayed in Gujarat – the state declared semi-scarcity in 526 villages on Apr 1 2016 and subsequently declared another 468 villages as affected by drought. Maharashtra, which also uses the annewari system, completed estimation exercise and declared drought hit districts in October 2015. All states that declared drought completed their assessment exercise between August 2015 and December 2015. Final figures of the Kharif crop are available in December and there is nothing to wait for until March of the following year to declare drought.The SC directed that the drought manual should mandate a time limit for declaring a drought.The Manual currently recommends that States declare drought in October as the complete rainfall figures, reservoir storage and crop conditions are known by then. Timely drought declaration is necessary to provide relief and assistance required to the drought affected people in near real time. The SC came down on the delayed declaration by Gujarat government saying that the declaration was too late for the people in distress and can only facilitate crisis management rather than preventive management of risk to avoid distress.Regarding declaration of drought The SC observed that drought need not be declared in the entire state or even in an entire district as the manual allows that state government may declare drought even at the level of Taluka / Tehsil / Block as the information on the recommended indices for drought declaration are available at that level.While the final decision to declare a drought is of the State Governments, the Centre is also responsible for upholding the right to life of the people under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Central government has to maintain a balance between its constitutional responsibility to the people and the principle of federalism preventing the Centre from trudging in the domain of the statesOther Directions The Court directed considering social factors such as migrations, suicides and extreme distress in assessing and managing drought.Water conservation techniques should be considered to prevent and prepare for droughts.Drought Relief While the petition had also sought directions for drought relief for farmers including compensation for crop loss, input subsidy for next crop, restructuring crop loans and subsidizing cattle fodder, the court did not give any such direction.The drought manual recommends that relief measures should be implemented as soon as distress signs of drought are visible even before a drought is formally declared. The manual recommends organizing of relief measures for Contingency crop planning providing alternatives that withstand drought conditions, Relief employment to check migration and provide livelihood, Water resource management for supply of drinking water, Food Security, provision of fodder for cattle, containing health issues arising from contaminated water and poor levels of nutrition and assistance to dependent population such as the aged, children etc.Formal declaration of drought is necessary only for the state to seek assistance from the Central Government and for providing relief through tax waivers and concessions.Directions regarding NREGA The government admitted that funds released are not adequate and delayed. It was admitted that for the financial year 2015-16 the liability was in excess of Rs.12,000 crore. The Court observed that delayed payments act as a disincentive to work under the Scheme. It directed the government to release adequate funds in a timely manner and ensure that compensation is made to workers whose wages have been delayed beyond 15 days. In view of the poor performance of the scheme, the Court directed the government to ensure that the provisions of the Act are faithfully implemented.Directions for implementation of the National Food Security Act The NFS Act has not been implemented in some states although the legislation was passed in July 2013.The Court directed that in the States in which drought is declared, all households should be provided with their monthly entitlement of food grains in terms of the NFS Act regardless of whether they fall in the category of priority household or not. In case the household does not have a ration card, it should be provided food grains under the NFS Act using alternate identification or residence acceptable to the State Government. The Court also directed extention of the Mid-Day Meal Scheme for children during the summer vacation period in schools in drought-affected areas.The petitioner suggested that households affected by the drought be provided 2 kg of dal per month and one litre of edible oil per month at subsidized rates through the Public Distribution System.The Central government declined claiming that it was faced by fiscal constraints to subsidize dal and oils. While the Court found that it was unable to direct the government to subsidize dal and oils, it drew the attention of the government to the Directive Principle under Art 47 enjoining the State to raise the level of nutrition and the standard of living of the people. It held that relief to persons in drought affected areas cannot be denied on grounds of fiscal constraints. The Court buttressed with case law the view that plea of financial inability cannot be used to abdicate constitutional obligations such as provision of free legal services, adequate medical services etc. The principle extends to the obligation of upholding the right to food, which is a constitutional right.Conclusion: Agriculture is facing a crisis because of wrong policies and programs like prioritising big irrigation projects that are delivering only impacts and no new benefits, poor water management, wrong cropping patterns, lack of support for appropriate crops and farmers, degradation of land, over exploitation of ground water, high prices of inputs, poor support for farmers. Farm incomes are unsustainably low and are in a precarious condition. In such a scenario, a drought pushed the farmers over the verge. Farmers talk of earlier times when they were not so hard pushed and they could still rely on ground water and water in the wells when rains failed. In many ways it is the policies adopted by successive governments which have led to the extreme impact of the present drought.The drought hit in the states which have declared drought have not received much by way of relief. The Centre has approved amounts much smaller than what has been sought by states for drought assistance and only a fraction of the approved amount had been released until Mar 2016 for the drought suffered in the Kharif crop season of 2015. The compensation amounts which are yet to make their way to the farmers after months are lesser than the cost of cultivation.In the past, drought relief was a source of income for the rural economy providing immense scope for corruption the benefits of which were reaped by contractors with a small part trickling down to the drought affected people. States were overzealous in declaring droughts.Funds were made over for plans to mitigate impacts of lean rainfall in drought prone areas and yet these areas saw no change. However the recent trend of states refusing to declare drought seems an outcome of the pressure on governments from investors and market forces to decrease social spending and commit to austerity and also continue to flog growth horse by hook or by crook. Expenditure on the agricultural sector is seen as wasteful and subsidies for farmers as market distorting, whereas subsidies for industry and commerce as incentives. Reluctance of governments to implement the National Food Security Act or to encourage employment under NREGA is also an outcome of this pro-business bias in policies.