Advance Directive For A Natural Death North Carolina: Fill & Download for Free

Vaccines Cause AutismMMR (Measles, Mumps and Rubella) Vaccines cause autism despite the inconvenient truth that the one and only study claiming such a link was retracted from medical journals and the physcian who authored the study proven to have manipulated the data in hopes of profiting by selling autism diagnosing kits.[1][2] The study has had deadly consequences and continues to put everyone at risk.Retracted autism study an 'elaborate fraud,' British journal findsNon-Vaccinators Don't Care If Other People DieAnti-Vaccination Arguments That Need To Be Shut DownVaccines are one of the most important medical advances in human history. It has been estimated that 3/4 of the worlds popukation would not be alive today if not for the discovery of vaccinations. Immunization averts an estimated 2 to 3 million deaths every year from diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis (whooping cough), and measles.[3]There are still many anti-vaxxers who believe immunizations are the problem. There is a natural distrust for big pharma because money corrupts medicine. Despite the industries capitalistic ideology, the vaccinations they provide are life saving.Part of the problem is that the vaccines have worked so well for generations that no one was alive when diseases like Polio, Lock Jaw and Smallpox killed and maimed neighbors and family. Witnessing the destruction of the disease motivated parents to immunize their children from such horrors.[4]Anti-vaxxer’s argue that the diseases are no longer a threat. This is true, since the majority of 1st world children are immunized. As the anti-vaxxer’s convince more parents to join their rank the societal protection of vaccinations is declining. These diseases are insidious and have never been eradicated, they just can’t penetrate the “force field” immunization provides.The recent outbreak of Mumps and Measles is a prime example of this fact.[5] [6] In the summer of 2017, Mumps and Measles outbreaks have occurred and lack of vaccinations are directly to blame.[7] These are relatively mild diseases with the worst complication being sterility. It will take a disease like Polio to make a comeback before there is a serious debate with the anti-vaxxers.I am a nurse in North Carolina far from these “outbreaks” and saw at least 10 suspected combined cases of these diseases this summer. All of the patients were in their early late teens to early twenties and had never been vaccinated.“Aren’t you worried about catching it?” One asked as I started his IV.“No, I’ve been vaccinated. I don’t have to worry about it,” I said.“Yeah, I wish I was,” he said.Footnotes[1] The MMR vaccine and autism: Sensation, refutation, retraction, and fraud[2] Andrew Wakefield - Wikipedia[3] Immunization coverage[4] Vaccination[5] More measles in Minnesota than all of US saw last year[6] Texas warns about biggest mumps outbreak in 22 years[7] Here are some diseases we're seeing thanks to anti-vaxxers

The Memoirs of General W.T. Sherman are a classic look at this. Before the war Sherman considered slavery unchristian not because of bondage, but because slaves were not taught to read and write (preventing their direct access to the bible), slave families were broken up (preventing the proper parenting he believed society needed for order) and because there was no law to guarantee their punishments fit their crimes.This was a result, he later admitted, of the great lie of Southern Society that he saw from outside. As a soldier stationed in southern communities, although valued by the Southerners he worked with, he was never permitted close inspection of slavery. Often there would be crude sexual jokes about slaves, or jokes about their harsh treatment, but he shrugged these off as what a modern person might call “locker room talk”, talk that he felt was dishonorable, but just talk by men who did not have sufficient tough upbringing or “class.”An article called General Sherman, The Negro, and Slavery: The Story of An Unrecognized Rebel, discusses how hard it was for him or anyone to know the truth of slavery in a society that hid its worst aspects. Quakers had for years tried to publish tracts about it, but were not allowed by blue laws from discussing sexual degradation or some of the horrible aspects of slave murder when the slaves became non-useful, and Quaker publishers themselves were under constant death threats, many that were carried out. Although the number of deaths caused by keeping the great Southern lie alive will never be known, Plantations owners had a reduced sense of empathy toward humans in general from their occupation. Publishing against slavery was a risky proposition before the Civil War.(ASIDE: We know the horrors of the worst of slavery through some weird avenues, and one of them is the book Mandingo. The author of the book traveled through the nation showing dogs form an early age, and was often invited to genteel southern society where, after drinks, he was told of the good old days of sex and violence. He wrote the book many, many years later, but it turned out that many of his notes were proven to be quite accurate when looked into. Although Mandingo the movie was rightfully panned, the book was almost a counter point to Gone With The Wind. And the oral history project associated with Gone with the Wind was produced by writers who had the enforced cooperations of old freedmen who had been enslaved 70 years before. Bessie Harvey describe it - they came and a local mayor had a deputy drag an old women, former slave out, and in front of the pride of white Alabama an oral historian asked how did the parents and grand parents of these fine people treat you when you were a slave… The story was tainted to say the least, but Mandingo in the crazy way of oral culture, survived to be written down.)So Sherman’s initial opinion of slavery was complicated, but so was his boss U.S. Grant. Grant’s wife owned slaves, and Grant was in essence required to make use of them for the comity of his marriage. It should noted on Quora each time you discuss Grant and slavery the slavery apology crowd will post that Grant was pro-slavery, an outright lie. According to Hamlin Garland, Grant hated working with slaves, hated slavery, his father was an abolitionist and Grant prayed or the day he could release his slaves without complicating his marriage. Garland quoted Jefferson Sapington who said ‘Grant was helpless when it came to making slaves work.’This fact was confirmed by the wife of a neighbor, Mrs. Boggs, who said ‘He (Grant) was no hand to manage negroes. He couldn’t force them to do anything. He wouldn’t whip them. He was too gentle and good tempered and besides he was not a slavery man.’”Unlike Grant though, Sherman did not believe in any way that slavery was worth fighting for before the war. He simply believed that the South had abandoned the teachings of Jesus and needed to get back to them or suffer damnation. He would often instruct slave owners who entered his presence to respect the men who labored for them, but he did not believe for a second they were equal.By 1864 his thinking was little changed. He had lost a lot of respect for Southern planters who were sitting out the war, not required to fight, not taxed to support the war, and in essence in complete control of what today we would call a fascist Republic where no universal rights existed that a local government could not declare void. It was also apparent to him that the South was willing to fight to the last drop of common people’s blood, and in his first inkling of the effect on the slaver of slavery, he felt that the Southern plantation owners were unmanned by slavery, made effeminate by the lack of work ethic. It was telling to him in fact that the South had to pass laws requiring a certain percentage of each smugglers load be war material, after smugglers essentially stopped carrying it and switched to luxuries for the plantation class, who had money to burn even after two years of ignominious defeats.In 1864 Grant, Lincoln, and by extension Sherman, rightfully believed that the war could still be lost if the South was left alone, and that the South was able to continuously strike the North given the untouched nature of the agriculture of Georgia and South Carolina. Given the proper opportunity though, they each felt that the structure of the South was a rotten egg. This had several salient objective pieces of evidence. First, more than a quarter of the South was in open rebellion against the Confederacy. One of the first major laws the Confederacy had promagulated was a law that made it illegal to succeed from the Confederacy, passed in reaction to West Virginia. The law, however, had no force without violence. Almost a half-million Southern men were held out of the field armies in the form of state militias to hold areas in general rebellion. Gettysburg, an attempt to take Washington DC by a left hook around the fortification lines, was ultimately a failure because Lee had to attack through the defended heights around that town, and he could not by law call up the 94,000 militia facing Hooker in Virginia. They could only advance when DC fell.So the goal of the 1864 campaign was in essence to go after the big plantation owners who did not feel the point of war until then, and destroy their unused military power. And here is where Sherman and his men encountered the truth of slavery. They knew already that the white free landowner was treated with savagery, 75% of the white population was treated like serfs in Russia due to the lack of value for human labor. They were hung, raped, their farms ransacked, whole families were massacred. In fact the word massacre was soon not allowed to be used in conjunction with the mass slaying of civilians by Southern militia. The goal of 1864 was to take on and destroy the plantations. And this is where Sherman’s mind was forever changed by the horrors he and his soldiers saw.Sherman often said afterwards:“The South deserves all she has got for her injustice to the negro.”This in no way made him a modern woke Christian who had completely found Jesus in his treatment of Blacks - he was miles from Grant on the subject and a planet away from Lincoln, but like them he evolved.“You cannot say what you saw in that conflict, in the treatment of negroes … they fought like beasts because they fought those who would treat them as we might an animal…”Before the war, Sherman believed the great lie that personal interest and capitalism would make slavery honorable and only the addition of Chrsitianity was needed. By war’s end he was still not convinced of the equality of Blacks, however he saw that capitalism did not protect them from the great lie the South had created. Instead he saw that slavery rotted the slave owners, had rotted their children, and would rot them until they embraced a path to God. He termed this the unmanliness of hate, and would support Grant in his more vigorous attempts to combat the effects of slavery after the war, and would die believing that the nation had not taken the last steps to fixing the issue of slavery forever.

Im going to throw one out there that you dont here much about anymore and part of the reason you dont is well, it failed. It failed on the strategic level because of very poor intelligence. However, the raid was carried out and was by all accounts, a complete success.Operation Ivory Coast/Kingpin 1970Son Tay North Vietnam.The mission was to rescue 55 POWs believed held at the camp south of Hanoi since 1968.Polar CircleThe concept of a rescue mission inside North Vietnam began on 9 May 1970. An Air Force intelligence unit concluded through analysis of aerial photography that a compound near Sơn Tây, suspected since late 1968 of being a prisoner of war camp, contained 55 American POWs and that at least six were in urgent need of rescue. The camp was situated in an area where 12,000 North Vietnamese troops were stationed within 5 miles (8.0 km). After validation of their findings, BG James R. Allen, the deputy director for plans and policy at Headquarters USAF, met in the Pentagon on 25 May with Army BG Donald Blackburn, Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (SACSA). Blackburn was responsible directly to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and had also been the first commander of the covert Studies and Observation Group in Vietnam.Blackburn immediately met with General Earle G. Wheeler, the outgoing JCS Chairman, to recommend a rescue of all the POWs at Son Tây. To study the feasibility of a raid, Wheeler authorized a 15-member planning group under the codename Polar Circle that convened on June 10. One of its members was an officer who would actually participate in the raid as a rescue helicopter pilot. The study group, after a review of all available intelligence, concluded that Sơn Tây contained 61 POWs.When Blackburn's recommendation that he lead the mission himself was turned down, he asked Colonel Arthur D. Simons on 13 July to command the Army's personnel. Eglin Air Force Base was selected as the joint training site for the prospective force. Personnel selection proceeded over the objections of the Marine Corps, which was excluded from participation, but selection and planning was performed by Special Operations "operators", not by the JCS, to avoid service parochialism, resulting in a force chosen for mission needs, highlighting combat experience in Southeast Asia and operational specialty skills, and not rank or branch of service.Ivory CoastThe second phase, Operation Ivory Coast, began on 8 August 1970, when Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, the new JCS Chairman, designated Manor as commander and Simons as deputy commander of the mission task force. Ivory Coast was the organization, planning, training, and deployment phase of the operation. Manor set up an Air Force training facility at Eglin's Duke Field and brought together a 27-member planning staff that included 11 from the prior feasibility study.Simons recruited 103 personnel from interviews of 500 volunteers, most Special Forces personnel of the 6th and 7th Special Forces Groups at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. USAF planners selected key Air Force commanders, who then picked personnel for their crews. Helicopter and A-1 Skyraider crews were put together from instructors at Eglin and personnel returned from Southeast Asia. Two crews for C-130E(I) Combat Talons were assembled from squadrons in Germany and North Carolina. All were then asked to volunteer for a temporary duty assignment without additional pay and without being told the nature of the mission. 103 Army and 116 Air Force personnel were selected for the project, including ground force members, aircrewmen, support members, and planners. The 219-man task force planned, trained, and operated under the title of the "Joint Contingency Task Group" (JCTG).The planning staff set up parameters for a nighttime raid, the key points of which were clear weather and a quarter moon at 35 degrees above the horizon for optimum visibility during low-level flight. From these parameters, two mission "windows" were identified, 18–25 October and 18–25 November.Training proceeded on Range C-2 at Eglin using an exact but crudely made replica of the prison compound for rehearsals and a $60,000 five-foot-by-five-foot scale table model (codenamed "Barbara") for familiarization.Air Force crews flew 1,054 hours in southern Alabama, Georgia, and Florida conducting "dissimilar (aircraft) formation" training with both UH-1H and HH-3E helicopters at night and at low-level (a flight profile for which procedures had to be innovated by the two selected crews), and gaining expertise in navigation training using forward looking infrared (FLIR), which, until Ivory Coast, had not been part of the Combat Talon's electronics suite. A vee formation in which the slower helicopters drafted in echelon slightly above and behind each wing of the Combat Talon escort aircraft was chosen and refined for the mission to give the helicopters the speed necessary to keep pace with the Talons flying just above their stall speeds.Special Forces training began on 9 September, advancing to night training on 17 September and joint training with air crews on 28 September that included six rehearsals a day, three of them under night conditions. By 6 October, 170 practice sessions of all or partial phases of the mission were performed on the mockup by the Special Forces troopers, many with live fire.On that date, the first full-scale dress rehearsal, using a UH-1H as the assault helicopter, was conducted at night and included a 5.5-hour, 687 miles (1,106 km) flight of all aircraft, replicating the timing, speeds, altitudes, and turns in the mission plan.The rehearsal spelled the end of the option to use the UH-1 when its small passenger compartment resulted in leg cramps to the Special Forces troopers that completely disrupted the timing of their assault, more than offsetting the UH-1's only advantage (smaller rotor radius) over the larger HH-3.Two further full night rehearsals and a total of 31 practice landings by the HH-3E in the mockup's courtyard confirmed the choice.On 24 September, Manor recommended approval of the October window to US Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, with 21 October as the primary execution date. However, at a White House briefing on 8 October with National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and General Alexander M. Haig, Kissinger delayed the mission to the November window because President Nixon was not in Washington and could not be briefed in time for approval of the October window. This delay, while posing a risk of compromising the secrecy of the mission, had the benefits of additional training, acquisition of night-vision equipment, and further reconnaissance of the prison.Manor and Simons met with the commander of Task Force 77, Vice Admiral Frederic A. Bardshar, aboard his flagship USS America on 5 November to arrange for a diversionary mission to be flown by naval aircraft. Because of policy restrictions of the bombing halt then in place, the naval aircraft would not carry ordnance except for a few planes tasked for Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR).Between 10 and 18 November, the JCTG moved to its staging base at Takhli Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand. The Combat Talons, using the call signs Daw 43 and Thumb 66 in the guise of being a part of Project Heavy Chain, left Eglin on 10 November, flew to Norton Air Force Base, California, and then routed through Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii and Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, arriving in Takhli on 14 November. The next day, four C-141 Starlifters departed one per day (to avoid the appearance of a major operation in progress), carrying the Army contingent of the JCTG, its equipment, and the UH-1 helicopter from Eglin to Thailand. The Special Forces personnel arrived in Thailand at 03:00 local time 18 November and later that date President Nixon approved execution of the mission, setting in motion the final phase, Operation Kingpin.After overcoming in-theater friction with the 1st Weather Group at Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Vietnam, planners began watching the weather during the week before the projected target date. On 18 November, Typhoon Patsy struck the Philippines and headed west towards Hanoi. Weather forecasts indicated that Patsy would cause bad weather over the Gulf of Tonkin on 21 November, preventing carrier support operations, and converging with a cold front coming out of southern China, would cause poor conditions over North Vietnam for the remainder of the window. The presence of the cold front, however, indicated that conditions in the objective area on 20 November would be good and possibly acceptable over Laos for navigation of the low-level penetration flights. A reconnaissance flight on the afternoon of 20 November by an RF-4C Phantom carrying a weather specialist confirmed the forecast. Manor decided to advance the mission date by 24 hours rather than delay it by five days.Manor issued the formal launch order at 15:56 local time 20 November, while the raiding force was in the final stages of crew rest, and brought together the entire ground contingent for a short briefing regarding the objective and launch times. Following the briefing, Manor and his staff flew by T-39 Sabreliner to Da Nang, where they would monitor the mission from the USAF Tactical Air Control Center, North Sector (TACC/NS) at Monkey Mountain Facility. Three theater lift C-130s previously staged at U-Tapao Royal Thai Navy Airfield arrived at Takhli to transport the Army contingent and helicopter crews to Udorn RTAFB and the A-1 pilots to Nakhon Phanom.Penetration into North VietnamBeginning at 22:00 20 November 1970, aircraft began leaving five bases in Thailand and one in South Vietnam. Cherry 02, the Combat Talon escort for the A-1 strike formation, took off from Takhli at 22:25. Cherry 01, scheduled to take off a half hour later, had difficulty starting an engine and took off 23 minutes late at 23:18. Cherry 01 adjusted its flight plan and made up the time lost at engine start. At 23:07, two HC-130P aerial refuelers (call signs Lime 01 and Lime 02) took off from Udorn, followed by the helicopters ten minutes later. Shortly after midnight, the A-1 Skyraiders lifted off four minutes early from Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base under clandestine, blacked-out conditions. The helicopters encountered thick clouds over northern Laos at their refueling altitude and climbed to 7,000 feet (2,100 m) AGL (Above Ground Level) to refuel from Lime 01 on the flight plan's fourth leg. Lime 01 then led them to the next checkpoint for hand-off to Cherry 01 at 01:16.The formations flew roughly parallel tracks that crossed Laos to the west of the Plain of Jars before turning northeastward. Both formations flew twelve planned legs.The flight path was a corridor 6 miles (9.7 km) wide, the width required for safe terrain clearance in the event of formation breakup or the loss of drafting position by a helicopter. The Combat Talon navigators had the task of keeping the formations on the center line of the corridor. Pilots of both formations required a flight path of descending legs, maintaining an altitude of 1,000 feet (300 m) above ground level in the mountain valleys, because the HH-3E had difficulties in climbing while in formation. The Combat Talon C-130s experienced sluggish flight controls at the required airspeeds, and the A-1s were hampered by their heavy ordnance loads.The slow speeds necessary for the formations, 105 knots (194 km/h; 121 mph) for the helicopters and 145 knots (269 km/h; 167 mph) for the A-1s, degraded nearly all modes of the Combat Talon's AN/APQ-115 TF/TA navigational radars. The Terrain Following mode computed changes in altitude only to a programmed minimum airspeed of 160 knots (300 km/h; 180 mph), well outside the parameters of the mission. The Terrain Avoidance mode (adapted from the AN/APQ-99 terrain avoidance radar of the RF-4C photo reconnaissance aircraft) was distorted by the nose-high attitude dictated by the slow speeds and would no longer display hazardous terrain directly in front of or below the Combat Talon's flight path. The Doppler radar (used to calculate wind drift and ground speed) often had to use information in its computer's memory because of processing lapses. While the ground-mapping radar (correlating landmarks shown on maps to radar returns) was not affected, the jungle terrain did not provide easily identifiable points. All of these handicaps were overcome with the external pod installation of FLIR, which readily identified the rivers and lakes used as turning points.The assault formation approached from the southwest using the clutter returns of the mountains to mask them from radar detection, while U.S. Navy aircraft launched at 01:00 21 November from the aircraft carriers USS Oriskany and USS Ranger in the largest carrier night operation of the Vietnam War. Starting at 01:52, twenty A-7 Corsairs and A-6 Intruders, flying in pairs at stepped-up altitudes to deconflict their flight paths, entered North Vietnamese airspace on three tracks, dropping flares to simulate an attack. The last track also dropped chaff to mimic the mining of Haiphong harbor. Over the Gulf of Tonkin, twenty-four other aircraft in thirteen orbits provided support and protection. The operation prompted a frantic air defense reaction at 02:17 that provided a highly effective diversion for the raiders and completely saturated the North Vietnamese air defense system.Both Air Force formations, over a period of thirteen minutes, were unavoidably but separately exposed for several minutes each to an early warning radar located at Na San, North Vietnam, 30 miles (48 km) to the north, because the flight tracks had to be routed around uncharted mountains. Neither formation was detected, possibly because of the diversion. The rescue forces entered the Red River valley at 500 feet (150 m) AGL to find conditions clear and visibility excellent. The helicopter formation reached its Initial Point (20 kilometers—12 minutes flying time—from Son Tây) with the A-1 strike formation two minutes behind, as planned. The HH-3E assault team helicopter had flown formation just behind and above the left wingtip of Cherry 01, drafting on the leader to gain the additional airspeed needed to bring its cruise airspeed safely above the stalling speed of the Combat Talon. Cherry 01 and the two HH-53s designated for prisoner pickup accelerated to climb to 1,500 feet (460 m) AGL, while the four assault helicopters broke formation and descended to 200 feet (61 m) in single file, timed to land forty-five seconds apart.Combat assaultAt 02:18 Cherry 01 transmitted the execute command "Alpha, Alpha, Alpha" to all aircraft as it overflew the prison and deployed four illumination flares, then performed a hard-turning descent to 500 feet (150 m) to drop two battle simulators south and southeast of Sơn Tây. After Apple 03 made its strafing pass with side-firing miniguns on the prison's guard towers, Cherry 01 successfully dropped one of two planned napalm ground markers as a point of reference for the A-1s, then departed the objective area to a holding point over Laos where it would provide UHF direction-finding steers for the departing aircraft.The assault helicopters in single file encountered winds that caused them to break formation 150 yards (140 m) to the right of their intended track. The pilots of Apple 03, the gunship helicopter preceding the others, observed a compound nearly identical to the prison camp in size and layout (previously labeled a "secondary school" by intelligence sources) and steered toward it, followed by the assault lift force. However, they recognized their error when they saw the river next to the actual location and corrected their flight path. Banana, the HH-3E carrying the Blueboy assault team, descended on the wrong location and observed that the expected courtyard was much smaller than required and that the expected treeline enclosed the compound rather than crossing through it. By that time, Blueboy (as previously rehearsed) was firing its weapons from all openings in the helicopter. Banana's pilots also recognized the error, applied power, and quickly veered north to the actual target.Despite the error, and trees taller than briefed that forced a steeper descent than rehearsed, the assault team crash-landed into the courtyard of Sơn Tây prison at 02:19 with all weapons firing. Although one raider, acting as a door gunner, was thrown from the aircraft, the only casualty was the helicopter's flight engineer, whose ankle was fractured by a dislodged fire extinguisher. Army Captain Richard J. Meadows used a bullhorn to announce their presence to the expected POWs, while the team dispersed in four elements on a rapid and violent assault of the prison, killing guards and methodically searching the five prisoner blocks cell by cell.Also at 02:19, Apple 01 (after its pilots saw Banana fire on the first location) landed the Greenleaf support group outside the south side of the secondary school, thinking it to be the target prison compound. Unaware that it was 400 meters from the objective, it lifted off to relocate to its holding area. The "secondary school" was actually a barracks for troops that, alerted by Banana's aborted assault, opened fire on Greenleaf as two of its elements assaulted the compound. The support group attacked the location with small arms and hand grenades in an eight-minute firefight, after which Simons estimated that 100 to 200 hostile soldiers had been killed. Two A-1s supported Greenleaf with an air strike using white phosphorus bombs on a wooden footbridge east of the area. Apple 01 returned at 02:23, and by 02:28, the support group had disengaged under fire and reboarded the helicopter for the short movement to the correct landing area.The pilot of Apple 02 observed the errors in navigation by the helicopters in front of him and made a hard turn towards the prison. He also observed Apple 01 unload at the secondary school and initiated Plan Green, the contingency plan for the loss or absence of Greenleaf. The Redwine security group, including ground force commander Sydnor, landed at 02:20 outside Sơn Tây prison and immediately executed the previously rehearsed contingency plan. In the meantime, Cherry 02 arrived with the A-1 force, dropped two more napalm ground markers, and created other diversions to disguise the target area by dropping MK-6 log flares and battle simulators at road intersections that North Vietnamese reaction forces might be expected to use. Cherry 02 then orbited in the area just west of the Black River acting as on-call support for the ground teams, jamming North Vietnamese radio communications, and providing a secure radio link to the mission command post in Da Nang.After a thorough search that included a second sweep ordered by Meadows, Blueboy's three teams found that the prison held no POWs. Meadows transmitted the code phrase "Negative Items" to the command group. Pathfinders clearing the extraction LZ blew up an electrical tower that blacked out the entire west side of Sơn Tây including the prison area. At 02:29, Sydnor ordered the A-1s to attack the vehicle bridge over the Song Con leading into the area and, three minutes later, called for extraction by the HH-53s idling on the ground in a holding area a mile away. Before the first helicopter arrived, a truck convoy approached the prison from the south, but was stopped by two Redwine security teams that each fired an M72 light antitank weapon into the lead vehicle.At 02:28, Cherry 02's electronic warfare operator noted that Fan Song fire control radars for North Vietnamese surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites had gone active. SAM launches at the F-105 Wild Weasel force began at 02:35, with at least 36 missiles fired at the rescue forces. One F-105 was briefly enveloped in burning fuel by a near-miss at 02:40 and returned to base. Its replacement was severely damaged six minutes later by another SAM. Twenty other SAMs fired at Navy aircraft all missed. Two MiG-21 interceptors on alert duty at Phúc Yên Air Base were never given permission to launch, despite several requests to do so.Extraction of the RaidersThe HH-53s returned singly to the extraction landing zone amidst the SAM barrage, flying well below the minimum effective level of the missiles, and Apple 01 landed first at 02:37. It lifted off with its passengers at 02:40, followed a minute later by the landing of Apple 02, which departed at 02:45. Apple 03, the last aircraft out, was cleared to leave its holding area at 02:48. The raid had been executed in only 27 minutes, well within the planned 30-minute optimum time. Although at first it was feared one raider had been left behind, all the troopers were accounted for. One Redwine trooper had been wounded in the leg and was the only casualty to hostile fire on the raid.Shortly after its departure, Apple 03 mistook a support fighter for a MiG and called a warning, and although one of the Combat Apple KC-135s supporting the mission issued information that no MiGs had taken off, the entire force descended to treetop altitude. Apple 04 reported that an air-to-air missile had been launched at it and missed, but this was later found to have been aerial rockets fired into a hillside by one of the A-1 escorts, jettisoning ordnance to increase maneuverability as a result of the erroneous MiG call.The assault formation was out of North Vietnam by 03:15 and landed back at Udorn at 04:28, five hours after launch. The crew of the damaged F-105 was compelled to eject over northern Laos thirty minutes after being hit and within sight of its tanker, when it flamed out from lack of fuel. Alleycat, the C-130E Airborne Control and Command (ABCCC) aircraft in orbit at the time over northern Laos, coordinated with several USAF entities, including Brigham Control in Thailand and ground resources in Laos, to cover the downed crewmen with supporting aircraft until a search and rescue effort could be mounted. Lime 01, refueling at Udorn, took off again using the call sign King 21 to coordinate the recovery, while Lime 02 refueled Apple 04 and Apple 05 to extend their flight time. Supported by the C-123 Candlestick flare aircraft diverted from its station on another mission by Alleycat, a SAR force was launched, and when its "Sandy" A-1s arrived from Nakhon Phanom to cover the pickups, Apple 04 and Apple 05 each recovered one of the downed airmen at first light after three hours on the ground.HH-3E in prison compound looking east. The guard tower is directly over the east entrance gate.Wreckage of HH-3E looking toward west compound wall, with the river beyondEquiptment left behind.Intelligence FailureThe mission was deemed a "tactical success" because of its execution, but clearly involved an "intelligence failure". The 65 prisoners at Sơn Tây had been moved on 14 July because its wells had been contaminated by flooding, or possibly due to the threat of further inundation, to a camp 15 miles (24 km) closer to Hanoi that the POWs dubbed "Camp Faith". Although relatively near Sơn Tây, the risk of disastrous consequences from lack of reconnaissance, planning, and rehearsing precluded a switch of targets at the last minute. A mission with Camp Faith as the objective required a lengthy delay for a new window of acceptable conditions, which increased the chance of security compromise and further withheld personnel and equipment from their parent commands. New reports of increasing numbers of deaths among POWs argued strongly against such a delay. The raid went as planned in the event that the renewed activity at Sơn Tây noted in aerial reconnaissance photos taken 13 November involved POWs.Although the mission objective involved an intelligence failure, the gathering of accurate intelligence for the operation, in both quality and quantity, was remarkably successful. The failure lay in "compartmentalization" of the information and isolation of the JTCG from "the normal intelligence flow". As early as the Polar Circle feasibility group, which conducted its capability assessment at the Defense Intelligence Agency's Arlington Hall facility rather than the Pentagon, members of the rescue operation were isolated from contact with outside organizations and closely monitored to prevent accidental leaks to the curious that might irreparably harm security. As a planner and participant stated in his history of the operation: "The raid was allowed to take place because those who had the correct intelligence information were not aware that someone was contemplating a POW rescue."Further, by the time intelligence regarding the moving of the prisoners was received, prompting the Defense Intelligence Agency to do an intensive overnight re-analysis of all of its data, the day of the operation had already arrived as a result of the 24-hour advancement of the operation due to Typhoon Patsy and the 12-hour time difference with Southeast Asia. When a final meeting with Defense Secretary Melvin Laird took place at 05:00 (Washington, D.C., time) to determine if the mission should proceed, its launch was less than five hours away. There was no consensus on the reliability of the data, and Blackburn was strongly predisposed to go ahead. One military analyst observed that as a result, the highest-level decision makers succumbed to the phenomenon of "groupthink".Operation Ivory Coast