Ics After Action Report: Fill & Download for Free

First, the article cited (and the arguments being made by the administration) are misleading. The article says the NSA (signals intelligence) didn’t have any information to prove this. But the CIA and US Special Operations teams did have information (as did DIA).Let me give you an example: a Russian GRU officer visits an Afghan war lord and says face-to-face “we’ll give you a bounty for every American soldier you kill.” The war lord travels back to his territory and spreads the word to the Taliban (groups are very incestuous in Afghanistan) that the Russians are paying for American heads. The CIA has a human asset infiltrated in to a group of fighters who hears this message and reports it back to his control officer. Meanwhile a SEAL team ambushes a group of bomb makers outside of a US facility in Afghanistan. As one of the SEALs converses with one of the bombmakers (who was mortally wounded and dying), the SEAL asks “so, any regrets Haji?” and the dying bomb maker replies “only that I will not be able to collect my bounty for killing Americans!” The SEAL asks “Bounty? What bounty?” and the dying bomb maker says “the one the Russians give for killing infidels like you.” Except these information sources are repeated multiple times in the field. It’s not just one CIA asset and one Special Ops debrief. And every time there is an engagement in Afghanistan, the US troops involved will do an after-action report to look at what was going on, how tactics have shifted. They’ll see hints that are consistent with this (for instance, Taliban fighters avoiding Afghan police or troops but targeting Americans. Or taking risks to confirm the death of an American).So the CIA and the DIA both report they have reached a conclusion that this program exists. But there have been no radio intercepts, no cellphone calls, or no emails intercepted that talk about this program (mostly because the Taliban knows that anything they send electronically will make them a target). So the NSA says “we have no proof such a program exists” (they aren’t saying it doesn’t exist, only that they have no SIGINT confirming it). Do you know who else didn’t say they could confirm this? The NRO (the people that manage our satellites)—do you think our satellites would pick up any proof of such a program? Of course not. The FBI didn’t have any evidence—because it’s not happening domestically or a violation of US law or as a target of a US counterintelligence investigation. So multiple intelligence agencies will say “we have no proof this is happening” and that’s only because they specialize in areas of intelligence that wouldn’t be relevant to this specific program.A WH spokesperson then says “the intelligence agencies disagree that this is actually happening, it’s just a theory. There is no consensus.” Of course there isn’t a consensus—there won’t be because most of the IC won’t be collecting information relevant to this.The US people in the field say this is happening. The US Special Ops and the CIA field personnel who would be most likely to have exposure to this evidence concluded it’s happening, it’s real, it’s not a theory or a possibility. The Special Ops personnel concluded this back in 2019. The CIA was late to the game and only reached a conclusion in Feb. 2020 (when Trump was focusing on getting revenge on anyone who had testified against him regarding Ukraine). What you’re seeing from the Administration is smoke and mirrors on this issue.

I agree with some of the other comments that in most ways the show isn't a realistic depiction of the IC, and that IC work is far more boring, in a way, than anything in the show. But I also think that the way the show depicts, perhaps unintentionally, persistent analytical sloppiness and assumption- and gut-driven intelligence work is sadly very realistic.I was fairly excited when Homeland first aired because I had recently left my job as an analyst in the IC, after 2+ years and a deployment to Kabul, Afghanistan. It was often fascinating work and more often deeply engaging than I would have preferred (especially during my deployment - because of the mental and emotional toll that it takes on you). I was excited to see a current high-quality depiction of IC work, because it's important and it deserves public attention. Unfortunately it ended up being far too fantastical (especially after the first season).It isn't fantastical, however, in the way the first season depicts Carrie's analytical work. I'm not talking about the illegal stuff, or the high-tech sleuthing either. I'm talking about the way she consistently leads with assumptions and refuses to consider alternative hypotheses or to do more to justify her assertions than make vague statements like that "she just knows it" ("it" being whatever she's asserting at the moment). Of course, in the show her stupid faith in her gut is usually justified and that can sometimes make it less apparent how poor her analytic standards are or why that's such a bad thing. But in real life, that kind of analysis is a big part of why the IC has done such a repeatedly poor job in tackling some of the bigger social- and human-based problems it's faced in the last decade (Iraq, Afghanistan, the Arab Spring, Syria, etc.).For example, take the scene in the second episode of season 1 (at 12:34) where she's showing Saul her camera monitoring Brody. She describes his actions as if they obviously and irrefutably demonstrate his terrorist intentions. Saul responds to her assertions by pointing out that everything she's said has several very plausible explanations, including that it might just be adjustment to life after a terrible period in captivity. Her response is: "but what if it isn't?" That's it. That's why justifies her spending entire days watching him on camera.Then in the third episode she's giving a briefing asserting the ill-intentions of a Saudi VIP's visit to the US (approx 9:30). Saul asks her why she thinks the visit is ill-intentioned and her response is several seconds of bafflement that he would ask her to justify her assertions, followed by an incoherent reference to a timing coincidence. She then (in the hall) berates Saul for pressing her during the briefing and suggests that he shouldn't have asked her such questions in front of everyone. That was the moment that really did it for me, because it reminded me of so many of my own experiences. I was repeatedly shocked as a young analyst (until I acclimatized) that so many other analysts refused to be questioned during meetings or in front of other analysts. Saving-face and forming a solid front (especially in opposition to other agencies and offices) seemed far more important than rigorously criticizing and questioning analytical assessments.Homeland has wonderfully depicted several of the reasons that I ultimately left the IC. And for me, it offers insights into intelligence failures like these: "The CIA And The Hazards Of Middle East Forecasting : NPR"Analysts like Carrie are the reason that Major General Flynn (who at the time was the head of intelligence in Afghanistan, and is now the head of the DIA) publicly wrote that the US intelligence community had largely failed the ISAF leadership in Afghanistan:http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/AfghanIntel_Flynn_Jan2010_code507_voices.pdfOne of the other important things that Homeland, again perhaps unintentionally, gets right is its depiction of "evidence" and data. Despite all the data you hear about that the IC collects, the only kind of data (besides the real-time monitoring) that shows up in Homeland is the kind of paper-and-scissors reports and single-page bios from "databases" that you'd see on police detective shows. In the supposed age of "big data", intelligence analysts still rely on big file-folders full of paper that they read and interpret in whatever way that strikes them best. It's all anecdotal and individual-level storylines. And that's a fairly accurate depiction of the kind of analytical work I saw in real life.For example, Wired magazine recently referenced an analytical assessment published by the Department of Homeland Security. You can see it here: "Here Are the Patterns the Feds Found for U.S. Mass Killings | Danger Room | Wired.com" It's basically a poorly-written summary of a haphazard collection of media reports and stories. But it's actually not that un-representative (DHS Counterterror Centers Produce 'a Bunch of Crap,' Senate Finds | Danger Room | Wired.com), and perhaps that's why then-CIA Director Leon Panetta got it so wrong in his assessment of the likelihood of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak stepping down in 2011 and why he publicly suggested he got the same information as everyone else at the hearing he was testifying before and that "the CIA chief was not necessarily any better informed than the others" at the hearing: "Faulty comment on Egypt by Panetta leads to confusion"Carrie is an intelligence analyst that depends almost entirely on anecdotal facts and on the hunches and beliefs that "just make sense" to her. Data and rigorous analysis doesn't really belong in her world, and in that way she's a realistic potrayal of far too many IC analysts.All this said, I wish that this is what the show had ended up being about (the analytical process). For the first couple of episodes it looked like it might have at least remained a big part of the show (if competing with things like the Carrie-Brody romance or the family-drama). But in the end the writers decided to make everything Carrie suggested seem borderline intelligence-genius (if sometimes misguided and over-enthusiastic). And meanwhile, the popular conception will remain that the IC is a thoroughly competent and cutting-edge sector (in terms of data and analysis and forecasting), and the IC will continue to foster way too much belligerent and bureaucratic mediocrity.

I was a very young and sheltered kid at 18. This is what I learnt:I learnt how to deal with forces beyond my controlMy first brush with National Service [NS] was one of disappointment. I had been a huge fanboy of the military, of guns and war, like any young kid would be. I used to stay up late reading about the strategies and accounts of various battles throughout history. I was thus extremely disappointed to find out upon receiving the pink government letter that I had been posted to the fire-fighting service. Till this day, I have yet to fire a gun, a massive anomaly among Singaporean men.The first lesson of NS was something I learned before NS had even began: I learnt how to make full use of a bad situation.FYI: Based on the experience I will describe below, I am now more than happy and proud that I have served in SCDF.I learnt how to deal with embarrassmentDue to a combination of a fear of failure and laziness, I had never done anything particularly extraordinary in my younger years. NS forced me to do things, simply because other people, particularly my coursemates during training, counted on me to do them.Unlike a Disney movie, I did not quickly rise up to the opportunity. I let people down a lot.In the second week of training, I took an instruction to 'put on swimming costume' literally and showed up on the parade square with only swimming trunks on. The rest of the company wore their swimming trunks underneath the uniform. [I had not been informed because I was the Dorm IC and was last-man out.] I was named 'that idiot' for the duration of Basic Training as the company was forced in push-up positions while I ran back to the barracks to change.During my Sergeant training, I had heat exhaustion in the middle of training and simply collapsed. I remember my section mates screaming at me, and the rage and disappointment that they had in me when everything I could give was not good enough. Again, they suffered because of me.Coming from someone who was introverted and shy, the embarrassment and shame from NS represented a nightmare to me. It was something that I had to get over; I simply had to realize that my failure was not inevitable, that progress and improving myself had to happen to prevent myself and my friends from being caught in a never-ending cycle of my failure. I did this because I came to believe in the importance of the work I did. The slogan of the SCDF is the 'Life-Saving Force'. Realizing the significance of this, and the importance of my role in helping to actually save people's lives helped me through this process.I learnt how to deal with politicsPolitics, the art of dealing with people, was not really a big issue in school for someone introverted. Unfortunately, this was not something that could be avoided in NS. Dealing with other people, understanding what they wanted from you and surviving with others is a crucial skill, especially when you are cooped up, eating, sleeping and working with them for months on end.One especially crucial thing that was necessary in NS, especially if one wanted to be competent when put in the position of saving lives, was the ability to get those who are experienced to teach you. This meant that you had to be especially mindful of the way that the Seniors or Regulars look at you, to be able to persuade them that you were worth their time to teach.Learning to deal with others also meant that you had to grit your teeth and bear with it when others get lazy, when others get hostile and/or offensive.You learn to rise above the petty attitudes, to deal with and learn from other people.I learnt how to deal with painI sweat a lot. An unnatural amount. To this day, I still don't wear more than a t-shirt if it's anything more than 10 degrees celsius outside. I choose my clothing purchases solely based on the potential visibility of sweat stains.A 2-year stint as a firefighter in the tropical country of Singapore was for me, nothing short of a sick cosmic joke.Training allowed me to learn a significant amount about how my body sweat, including how it was entirely possible to drink 5-liters of water at one go after an exercise, and how you can actually sweat to the point that you sweat pure water [as opposed to salt water]. During some of the worst moments in training, the pain involved due to dehydration was close to unbearable.One of the more disgusting moments involved having to suck the sweat that had pooled on my helmet straps.Just to be clear, this was not a norm in the service, nor was it acceptable practice. I had the option of quitting at any point of time for safety. I was just too stubborn to. This was my weakness, and I had to compensate for it somehow.If there are, other Singapore firefighters on Quora may attest to the drill known as S1W3, which may involve a poor guy running at full sprint for about 50m with 55kg worth of equipment to set up two hose jets, as the beginning of an extensive exercise or operation. [There are worse drills.]The kind of pain involved in the training phase of NS made me more resilient to the pain I would experience later on in life. When you've done something incredibly painful, it helps push you during other tough times in life [like when I almost died trekking Everest Base camp, an entirely different story for another time].NS makes you a more resilient person, if you bother to take it up on its challenges.I learnt how to deal with people from outside my bubbleWhen I was given my posting, I was posted into a Hazmat unit which practically speaking, essentially only saw action as reserve/support firefighters during large-scale fires. A significant majority of the men that were sent to this unit, and that I had to manage, were known to SCDF to be troublemakers, many of them with prison records or gang affliations.As a sheltered JC kid, this represented a side of Singapore that I would never have gained much exposure from otherwise. Learning how to talk to them, work with them and most importantly, lead them was a particularly challenging exercise. It was very clear that there was an emotional, social and intellectual disconnect that had to be bridged, at least somewhat.An example of the many dilemmas I had with my men include a man, who would repeatedly AWOL, telling me about how he was refusing to do NS as he was living on his own and needed money to clear off his debts.Dealing with my men also incidentally helped shape my own philosophy in regards to what constitutes the rule of law and the necessary institutions of a stable society.I learnt I could be brave [and proud]Alternatively, this can be renamed as 'I learnt to devote myself to a greater calling'.There are very few causes that can [appropriately] motivate a person in life, especially to the point of risking one's life, especially for someone young. NS represented an opportunity for you to devote your time and efforts into a greater calling: serving the nation and the society around you.Though my personal NS career did not have significant levels of danger as compared to many of my other peers, I found myself incredibly passionate and motivated to serve and respond to fire calls, simply for the ability to be proud of what I have done, and for being able to make a real change in the lives of others. Responding to a real fire alarm and turning out is something that is simply unparalleled - from the rush of the adrenaline, the potential severity of the situation, the screams from your teammates, the people that you know may need you to the simple badass-ness of getting into a giant fire engine, sirens blazing, rushing through traffic.Even till today, there is nothing that makes me prouder than being able to see a fire engine go past and knowing that I once had the brief opportunity to do my own part.I learnt how to deal with leadershipI learnt what leadership was from my Commanding Officer [OC]. Although he had his own flaws, he particularly impressed me on one singular occasion.During a force-wide exercise involving hundreds of men, I happened to mess up the placing of my vehicle and screwed up the entire exercise. Given the important of that particular exercise, I knew that I was about to get screwed over, particularly since my OC was on the scene. When the senior management officials started yelling about the error, my OC came forward to take the blame instead of shifting it onto me, the NSF. The fact that he kept silent my involvement, and took the blame was something I respected a lot, and taught me a lot about what leadership was.To me, it meant being ultimately responsible. It meant understanding that when one is a leader, one leads not only themselves but others under their charge, and being at fault when they screw up. This was something that I adhered to when given charge of my own platoon when I was promoted to a Lieutenant - The failures of my men were ultimately my own.NS taught me that a leader leads, not just through his actions, but also through his responsibilities.I learnt how to deal with managementA lieutenant [officer] occupies a special place in Hell. He is close enough to the men that he is required to be intimately familiar with the personal psychology of each and every one of them [since he works with them on the field], yet senior enough that he has to deal with, appease and negotiate with senior management officers.As a learning experience, it is unparalleled. Not only do you get to see how policies get created when senior officers get together to discuss, particularly after a fire in After-Action Reports, but you also get to see [and deal with the complaints about] how well-meaning theory-based policies may sometimes be ineffectual or counter-intuitive to the men who are supposed to carry them out. You quickly learn what people care about and how to craft policies to address these concerns.To an officer who is in the field and takes their job properly, this represents an amazing opportunity for you to learn how to balance various concerns on an issue, both above and below you, to bring about a better and more effective working environment.I learnt how to deal with responsibilities[The objective of this exercise is to switch off the tank by being safely close enough to touch it.]I was in charge of human beings. I was to bring them to gigantic fires in enormous specialist vehicles, they were supposed to fight warehouse fires and they were supposed to leave literally without a scratch. I was 19 going on 20, whose serious sustained outdoor activity months ago was doing 2.4km runs during NAPFA. Now, I was responsible for the lives of 24 people. Seriously, what the hell?!When faced with a situation like this, your only choice is to grow quickly, to bring yourself up, mentally and physically, to the level of a person who you think can deal with these responsibilities. After you've done this, doing that university Powerpoint project with 3 teammates doesn't seem like that much of a big deal anymore.You become more ambitious and you become more confident of your abilities.I learnt how to find and take opportunitiesWhen you become more ambitious, and when you realize that as a NSF, you have a ton of free time, you become more eager to find and take advantage of opportunities [To make you guys slightly jealous, after my 10-month training, I was stay-in 24 hours/stay-out 48 hours.]As a NSF, I had access to the kind of freedom that was literally a gap-year. This time allowed me to develop myself in more practical ways, I experimented with startups, found a passion in hiking, managed to publish a paper and planned backpacking adventures which helped me grow in another story for another time.I learnt to deal with heartbreakLike many other National Servicemen, I had my first break-up in the middle of NS. In the end, this became a blessing in disguise as I was able to spend more time to learn more about myself during these important formulative years.It helped emphasized that who I was, not only as a person, but also as an entity with value to society, might not and need not be dependent on the way other people saw me.I learnt to think about the futureOne underrated thing that many people don't mention a lot about is the time that NS gives to think about your future. Many students get caught up in the rat-race in Singaporean schools and don't have the time or maturity to think about what they were working so hard for or why.NS is an excellent time for a teenager to gather their thoughts and craft a better understanding of who you are, and who you want to be moving forward.National Service was absolutely crucial and important for me in developing myself. You can learn and achieve a lot in 2 years. I was still a young and sheltered person when I left National Service, but now slightly less so, and with a whole bunch of pretty interesting stories.If anyone is curious about what life is like as a SCDF NSF, you can get a small glimpse of it in my Sergeant course passing out video: