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China doesn’t have bad geography. On the contrary, it has quite a few geostrategic strengths: the floodplain of the Yellow River, and more broadly, the entirety of Eastern China, is incredibly suited to agriculture; China in its current geographic form is largely secure against overland invasion, thanks to its control over buffer regions in the northeast, north, west, and northwest; it has a wealth of natural resources; it has a 9000-mile long coastline conducive to maritime trade and the development of sea power etc. I would go as far as to say it has one of the best geographies in the world. But since you asked specifically about its geographic weaknesses:1.The IsohyetChina’s geography can be understood as consisting of a Han Core (“China Proper”) and a shell of buffer regions that encloses it from the north and west. The 15-inch Isohyet encompasses the area of China that receives 15 or more inches of rainfall per year, and is thus capable of supporting substantial agricultural activity and hence people.As illustrated, much of the population is concentrated in the regions south of the Isohyet — the orange and brown areas — because the climate is so conducive to growing crops. The Isohyet therefore delimits (as it has for centuries) China’s demographic core, and by extension, its political core. Historically, geographical barriers, inhospitable terrain, and most importantly the Isohyet have impeded the expansion of the Han core. No rain means no crops. No crops means an inability to sustain large populations. Hence the demographic and political reach of the core remains constrained to south of the Isohyet. This perhaps explains the preservation of the non-Han cultural and ethnic identities existing in the buffer regions beyond the core. It is not a coincidence that the Great Wall parallels the Isohyet: it was only fortifying what nature had created. The core can definitely project power and influence beyond the Isohyet, but for Chinese civilization to take root, to settle in the form of people and cities beyond this line — that is a real challenge.2. Buffer regionsAn array strategic buffers shield the core, consisting of Tibet in the west, Xinjiang in the northwest, Inner Mongolia in the north and Manchuria in the northeast.Retaining control of the buffer regions has been an eternal geostrategic imperative for China. The Han core was extremely vulnerable to nomadic raids and incursions from the plains and steppes of the north and northeast. Case in point, the Mongols and the Manchu conquered and ruled China. Flat terrain is practically an invitation for conquest by nomadic horsemen. In the west the Himalayas presented a formidable barrier, but northwestern China, the interface for the ancient Silk Road, was where the fringes of the empire met the kingdoms of Central Asia and the influence of the Islamic world. Tibet was still particularly irritating because it was easier for the Tibetans to ride down and raid the Chinese than for the Chinese to climb the mountains and conquer them. In modern times, if control of Tibet was lost, India could move across the Himalayas and establish a base of operations on the plateau.Chinese history was therefore expressed as cycles where a strong core, with its various instruments of national power (military, economic, cultural) systematically asserts and maintains control over the borderlands and thus secures the empire……or where a weak core is simply unable (yet) to impose its will on the buffers and so remains constrained to its own territory of “China Proper”.In any case, control over or influence of the buffers was a security imperative. It provided defensible borders and anchored the empire. Without the buffers, the core would be exposed, soft, vulnerable: dense, massed stationary populations of farmers ripe for plunder. Historically, Chinese dynasties sought to accommodate, influence, and assimilate (if they were unwilling on incapable of incorporating them) the buffer regions with complex diplomacy and tributary systems rather than forcibly control them (though they sometimes did so). They were considered semi-integrated and semi-autonomous. The objective was to ensure that these regions, their populations and polities did not threaten the security of the core, or foreign adversaries/invaders did not do so through them. The disposition of the borderland polities and peoples had a direct effect on national security. Now the PRC is strong and it formally controls the buffer regions, so this is not so much a weakness per se (on the contrary, it is a strength) as a potential weakness.3. Ethnic/cultural fault linesNotably, three of the four buffer regions mentioned above are categorized as Autonomous Regions. This is primarily due to their distinct ethnic, cultural and religious non-Han identity, which has been a source of tension for much of Chinese history.As illustrated above, the populations that inhabit (and have historically inhabited) the buffer regions are distinct from the Han population of the core, in their ethnicity, culture and the languages that they speak. In this sense they pose a challenge in terms of national cohesion and inter-ethnic/cultural relations. In more recent times, Beijing has encouraged the settlement of Han Chinese into the buffer regions to dilute their demographic/ethnic composition; this has become a source of friction between the central government in the core and the peoples of the Autonomous Regions. Demographic tensions between the core and periphery are exacerbated by the economic and developmental disparities and what might be perceived as economic exploitation of the regions’ natural resources.Xinjiang is a particularly uneasy borderland, unsurprising given that it has much in common in its cultural and religious makeup with Turkic Muslim Central Asia than with Han Chinese civilization. A volatile mix of radical Islamist ideology and localized ethnic separatism has manifested in localized terrorist acts and insurgencies that threaten the central government’s grip over the region, and also threatens national unity. Tibet has experienced its share of convulsions and unrest from time to time, albeit not at the level of Xinjiang. Beijing fears Pan-Turkic sentiments in Central Asia spreading into Xinjiang and Tibetan resistance movements overseas and specifically in India generating unrest at home.4. Tibet and water securityAside from its geostrategic value as a buffer, there is another, perhaps more important reason why China must control Tibet. This has to do with water security. The Tibetan plateau is the source of China’s major rivers. The whole agricultural productivity of the Han core stems from all the water that comes down from the highlands. Therefore, China’s food security is also dependent on its control of Tibet. Foreign control of the sources of the Yellow and Yangtze Rivers would be unacceptable — the occupying power would have its hand on the throat of the Chinese nation.5. The Korean PeninsulaThere was a German military adviser to Imperial Japan who described Korea as a “dagger pointed at the heart of Japan”. I think the same expression could be reliably applied with regard to Chinese security.The Peninsula served as an invasion route for Japanese forces as early as the 1590s (see: the Imjin War — the Ming emperor sent troops to beat back the samurai advancing up the Peninsula), and again later by Imperial Japan during the First Sino-Japanese War. The 1950–1953 Korean War served as another reminder of Korea’s crucial position as a potential springboard for foreign incursions: when US-led forces advanced toward the Yalu River, the PRC found them too close for comfort and intervened.In a sense, the Korean Peninsula is a mini-buffer of sorts, an extension of Manchuria jutting out into the East China Sea invitingly toward the southern tip of Japan — a bridgehead for the invasion of Machuria and the Chinese heartland by foreign forces. But while the Chinese were able to consolidate control over Manchuria, the Peninsula’s mountainous terrain (the Kaema Plateau and Hamkyong Mountains provide a strong barrier on the northern border) allowed Korean kingdoms to retain their nominal independence. Right now, this is made even messier by a nuclear North Korea and the legacy of postwar partition. There is also the issue of ethnic Koreans within China and their identity in relation to a unified Korean state, if it ever comes about.6. North vs SouthHistorically, Chinese civilizations developed along two axes: the Yellow and Yangtze River systems. As a result of distinct geographical and climate differences, there has tended to be a noticeable divergence in the cultural and political nature of the polities/states orbiting the two rivers.Northern Chinese civilizations arose within the North China Plain, the fertile alluvial plain formed by the yellow sediment deposited along the banks of the Yellow River. The Wei Valley in particular was the power base of many northern Chinese dynasties: the Zhou, Qin, Han, and Tang all entrenched their capitals here.In terms of climate, the plain is cold and arid; too harsh for rice cultivation. Instead, crops such as millet and wheat were grown. Geographically, the North China Plain, as the name suggests, is relatively flat: the terrain comprises grasslands and plains largely unobstructed by mountain ranges. Upon this land transport and communication by horse was rapid, and the dominance of the mounted cavalry warrior undisputed. By implication, these conditions made it extremely conducive to political centralization and efficient administration. In the north, the plain transitioned gradually to steppes and desert, from which nomadic conquerors often invaded. This meant that northern Chinese civilizations frequently had to test their mettle against these invaders, and were often reinvigorated from time to time by the influxes of culture, technology, skills, and blood from these militant nomadic tribes, giving rise to a more martial disposition overall. Throughout history, there are many instances of northern Chinese dynasties expanding south (I believe the Qin and Han did this first) or forcibly incorporating southern dynasties. Mao himself followed this paradigm, consolidating his power first in Manchuria and the north, then pushing south. In conclusion, Northern China is a political-military entity.In contrast, southern Chinese dynasties emerged along the Yangtze River Valley and especially the Yangtze River Delta (this became a major hub later, after maritime commerce became a thing). As early as the Spring and Autumn period states such as Wu and Yue coalesced around the Delta, and Chu took up residence along the river basin.The climate of the south was considerably rainier, warmer and wetter than the north. This enabled the cultivation of rice, which has an extremely high calorie per acre output compared to wheat (11 million compared to 4 million). Growing rice demanded different methods and modes of organizations than growing wheat or millet (as Kaiser Kuo explains in this fantastic post: What are the historical and cultural differences between north and south China?) and so a more cooperative socio-cultural mindset arose. The landscape of southern China is considerably more hilly and uneven than the north, encompassing river valleys and mountains. Cavalry, so mobile on the North China Plain, therefore had a much more difficult time navigating the terrain further south. With the advent of seaborne trade (as opposed to overland trade) the south became more and more economically prosperous. After the Jurchen conquered the north, the Song Dynasty shifted south and brought with it the center of cultural, economic, and commercial activity. While northern Chinese states tended to be traditional land powers, Southern dynasties like the Song experimented more with navies and sea power. Southern China was therefore identified with trade, commerce, economics, and agriculture, instead of the militarism that defined the north.Throughout Chinese history, this North-South division has made itself apparent again and again, through the territorial configuration of dynasties along a North-South axis, as shown below during the Three Kingdoms period, the Sixteen Kingdoms period, the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period (note that the north remained united under one dynasty at a time, whereas the south was fragmented into numerous polities)Also note that the south is much more linguistically diverse than the Mandarin-speaking north, given that it continues to be home to a variety of Chinese dialectsThis ancient polarization of North and South is much less applicable today, given the existence of military, agricultural, communication and transportation technology capable of overcoming the tyranny of distance, geography and climate. Stereotypes of Northern and Southern people and culture remain but have largely been subsumed under a greater, all-encompassing modern Chinese nationalist identity.7. Interior vs CoastalThe more pertinent division right now pertains to economic disparities between inland and coastal provinces. The coast has historically been associated with great wealth and commerce due to maritime trade, beginning with the Southern Song Dynasty as mentioned. But from the dawn of the 20th century onwards and in particular the late 1970s after Deng’s reforms and globalization, this trend became ever more pronounced. As China began to trade more and more with the world, the coastal provinces became increasingly wealthy while the economies of the inland provinces remained poor and continued to rely on subsistence farming.In the early 20th century the divergent interests and sociopolitical orientations of the coastal and interior provinces began to make themselves apparent. The cosmopolitan coastal elite that profited from trade were affiliated with foreign European powers, and in time the influence of this alliance eclipsed the power of the central government in the coastal provinces. The Communists derided Shanghai, for instance, as the “whore of imperialism”. Eventually the country collapsed into chaos and civil war. Foreign imperialism and intrusion forced open China’s markets and led to prosperity, and this prosperity had destabilized the nation. No wonder the appeal of communist ideology was as strong as it was, especially inland: revolution arose from the interior. Mao’s solution was to raise a massive peasant army from the interior, liquidate the collaborators, expel the foreigners, and close China to the world. China lapsed into impoverished equality.When Deng reopened the economy to the world, he began with the coast, and in particular the south. The old problem re-emerged: massive economic tensions between the provinces and a disruptive impact on national unity. The coast is integrated into the global economy and prosperous; the interior is isolated and poor. The coast has the weight of international trade and commerce behind it; the interior has the mass of the Chinese population (900 million vs 400 million on the coast) . The interior wants the revenue generated by the coast transferred inland; the coast intends to continue enjoying its profits. The central government therefore has to balance the interests of the inland and coastal provinces, distributing the fruits of economic growth in an equitable way.The paradox is that China relies on its coast as an interface with global commerce. But in doing so the coastal provinces inevitably become incredibly wealthy, and this economic gap leads to political schisms within the country.8. Regionalism (Provinces vs Central government; Province vs Province)This brings us to another greater, enduring theme: that of regionalism within the Han core. The opening chapter of The Romance of the Three Kingdoms has a line that goes something like this: “It is a general truism of this world that anything long divided will surely unite, and anything long united will surely divide” (分久必合，合久必分 ). As mentioned, the geopolitical importance of a strong core cannot be understated. It is up to the central government to bridge the numerous aforementioned divisions (north-south, coastal-interior) and maintain the unity of the core. This struggle appears to be eternal.Throughout Chinese history there have been repeated instances where the Han core loses coherence, the central authority collapses in upon itself, and China fragments into a multiplicity of small local polities until after a while a strong central authority re-emerges and imposes its will on the core, uniting it once again. Rural revolts and peasant rebellions, regionalism and warlords are a recurring theme (e.g. Taiping Rebellion, An Lushan Rebellion, the Rebellion of the Seven States), as attempts to break away from the central authority or resist efforts at consolidation.This was most recently the case with the early 20th-century warlord era:But it happened as early as the late Zhou Dynasty, when the power of the Zhou court waned, and eventually China disintegrated into numerous independent fiefdoms. The Zhou kings wielded only nominal authority over these entities.Even in times where a strong central authority exists, the regions strain and chafe against the control of the central government, and often a firm hand is needed to bring them to heel and quell rebellious sentiments. Modern China is no exception. The Chinese saying “the mountains are high and the emperor is far away” (山高 皇帝远 ) applies even today. The dictates and edicts of the central authority are sometimes distorted, resisted or even ignored by the local bureaucracy, which tends to be preoccupied with managing local interests and issues. The center is distant and sometimes detached from the realities on the ground, and struggles to enforce its authority. Beijing is familiar with this challenge when it comes to implementing national economic policies across the provinces today.Furthermore, provincial identities are still extremely strong — identification with and by province is a pervasive phenomenon in Chinese society. There is fierce rivalry between and among provinces especially when it comes to economic growth and performance. They compete ferociously for resources and incentives/privileges dispensed by the central government and lobby for and against policies. Regional cliques are prevalent even among the highest echelons of Chinese politics, as the incumbent leader’s own province/region is often disproportionately represented in the top leadership. Under Mao, a large number of CCP leaders were peasants from central China, namely Hubei and Hunan provinces. Deng promoted his own fellow Sichuan officials to high positions. Jiang had his Shanghai Gang, and in both his and Hu’s administration, the eastern provinces and Jiangsu were strongly represented. In continuing with this trend, a new “Shaanxi clique” has begun to coalesce around President Xi.Beneath its visage of order and stability, modern China therefore still struggles with regionalist impulses, manifesting on two levels: one, tensions between the will of the central authority and the regional provinces; two, tensions among the provinces themselves. These latent centrifugal forces have the potential to destabilize the Han core with disastrous results.9. Dependence on maritime tradeWealth has always been the defining characteristic of Chinese civilizations, but historically this has been due to the vast profusion of natural resources the country has been blessed with. Emperor Qianlong of the last dynasty, the Qing, professed to a British envoy: “Our Celestial Empire possesses all things in prolific abundance and lacks no product within its borders. There is therefore no need to import the manufactures of outside barbarians in exchange for our own produce.” China was for most of its existence an incredibly self-sufficient economic entity and this accounted for much of its insular foreign policy. Trade was conducted to acquire luxury goods rather than necessities. Its interactions with the rest of East Asia mostly had to do with imperial tribute.Now, however, the modern Chinese nation-state is deeply integrated into the global economy and reliant on global commerce particularly for food and energy. Since the 1990s China has been a net importer of grain and oil and became a net importer of coal in 2008. It is set to become the world’s largest oil and gas importer, according to the International Energy Agency. By 2040 China will account for almost 30% of the oil being traded internationally and almost 25% of LNG traded over long distances. Never before has the prosperity of China been so inextricably bound up with international trade and so dependent on the fortunes and goodwill of other nations. China’s economic success has come at the cost of its self-sufficiency. As the 2008 crisis showed, the Chinese economy is vulnerable to contagion, and all the problems that being part of the global economy entails (note the dip in both imports and exports in the third graphic below).What’s more, much of this trade is conducted not overland, as has traditionally been the case, but across the oceans. As shown below, much of this trade transits the South China Sea and specifically the Strait of Malacca, through which about 25% of world trade passes.This is problematic for a country that has for much of its history been a land power that has displayed only periodic, cursory interest in the maritime realm. It does not have much enduring, established seafaring or naval traditions and expertise, and these take time to cultivate. Beijing understands that its supply chains and maritime lines of commerce and communication remain vulnerable. Expanded vital commercial interests overseas demand a commensurate naval capability to defend those interests, which China is still developing. Presently, as much as they deny it, the Chinese (and the rest of East Asia) have been relying on the US military presence in the Asia-Pacific to provide security for their maritime trade. China’s trade routes and access to international markets and resources could potentially be intercepted or disrupted by the US. This is the imperative that is therefore driving the PRC to develop a formidable navy, and to seek out alternative trade routes through its Belt and Road Initiative to diversify away from this single point of vulnerability — maritime trade.10. The Coastline and East/South China SeasBut modern China’s preoccupation with the sea goes beyond economic security; it is concerned also with the physical security of the core. The coastline and the adjacent seas themselves have proven to be dangerous geographical weaknesses in the past 200 years.Until now, China has always been a continental land power by nature. The state’s attention was largely focused inland, on maintaining control of the buffers, fighting off barbarian incursions, and holding the Han core together. Trade was conducted mostly overland (Silk Road trade routes leading into Central Asia and beyond to Persia and the West, the north-south Grand Canal). China had no need for navies. True, piracy in the East China Sea was an annoyance, and the Song Dynasty did develop an impressive navy for use against the Jin, but for the most part naval power was a curiosity, an indulgence. There was no major impulse to use its maritime power to engage with the rest of the world like the Europeans did. Navies were built in times of prosperity and then burned when they could no longer be maintained in times of strife. To the European powers, the maritime domain meant connectivity, possibility. To the Chinese, for much of their history, the East and South China Seas were for the most part just buffers rather than a medium for interaction; the coastline was a wall.The last two centuries showed the error of this assumption: European gunboats blasted their way into Chinese markets, seizing control of Qing ports; later, Imperial Japan destroyed the fledgling Chinese navy at sea and invaded across the East China Sea, seizing large swathes of the coastal provinces. China had learned through bitter experience that its coastline and the adjacent seas were no longer safe spaces.This physical, military threat to the security of the core has receded somewhat in recent decades. Invasion of the PRC, even by sea, is nearly unthinkable. But the memory of the Opium Wars and the Sino-Japanese Wars — where an enemy sea power wrested control of the adjacent East and South China Seas, attained a grip on its coastline, carved away huge chunks of coastal territory along with its precious ports, and proceeded inland to dismember the core and massacre the populace — still persists. Seen in this context, Chinese sensitivity to incursions and encroachment on its surrounding seas and coastline by foreign powers is therefore understandable from a national security viewpoint.11. BONUS: The Island ChainsIn Beijing’s quest to develop a naval capability it has run up against a natural barrier in the form of the First and Second Island Chains. The coast of China is encircled by a series of archipelagic bodies which serve to circumscribe the growth of Chinese sea power. From a purely geostrategic standpoint, these “island chains” could sustain a network of military bases from which an unfriendly foreign power (or powers) could project military force into the South and East China Seas — a maritime Great Wall around China’s periphery. To expand into the Indian and Pacific Oceans, Chinese sea power would have to first contend with these geographical barriers. For foreign powers seeking to contain Chinese naval power, the Island Chains are pre-built, permanent geostrategic outposts/fortifications enclosing the South and East China Seas, and the Western Pacific.Between the archipelagos there exist multiple narrow passages, or crucial maritime chokepoints, that in a time of confrontation could be blockaded by a foreign power, severing the vital arteries of Chinese maritime trade. These chokepoints include most notably the Strait of Malacca, but also the Korea Strait, the Sunda Strait, the Lombok Strait, the Karimata Strait, the Balabac Strait, and the Mindoro Strait. This geographical noose around the neck of the Chinese economy (see point 9 on dependence on maritime trade) has become a fixation of Chinese strategists.Currently, most of these states are allied to (Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand are US allies) or on friendly terms with the US (America has strategic/security partnerships with Singapore and Taiwan, among others, and Vietnam is pivoting toward Washington), and fairly nervous about Chinese assertiveness in international waters. A few of them already host US military bases, though the US presence is more heavily concentrated permanently in Northeast Asia; in Southeast Asia its military presence is lighter and mostly on a rotational basis.Interestingly, this notion of “island chains” is a very recent one; it originated as a construct of the Cold War: the Acheson Line that delineated the US containment policy in Asia, as shown below.Acheson himself described it as such: “This defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus. We hold important defense positions in the Ryukyu Islands, and those we will continue to hold…The defensive perimeter runs from Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands…So far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack. But it must also be clear that such a guarantee is hardly sensible or necessary within the realm of practical relationship.”For most of the Cold War, China was preoccupied with its internal turmoil and the traditional land-power mentality held sway, with the central government’s attention focused on the interior. With the end of the Cold War and the resurgence of China as a modern Great Power and potential superpower, with its maritime commerce and increasingly forceful behavior at sea, this idea gained new credence and attention.Now Beijing seeks to disrupt the coherence of the US’ Asian alliances and so degrade the Island Chains, breaking out into the Indo-Pacific. Washington may seek to proceed with its policy of “congagement” (containment+engagement), while rebalancing its military, economic, and diplomatic resources and assets to the Asia-Pacific. The states that comprise the Island Chains will be central to this strategic interplay.Thanks for reading! I really enjoyed writing this piece. But why did the question have to be “top ten” though…

This one really bothered me at first. I hated the Dothraki Charge in the Battle of Winterfell when I first saw it.That said, I had to spend some time thinking about it, and came to the conclusion that there weren’t many other great options.Let’s start with the premise that the Charge was a bad idea: okay, but why? Well, it failed to achieve any strategic objective.So let’s formulate some alternatives. The chief reason that the Charge failed was that it advanced on an enemy who were hiding in unknown numbers behind a veil of darkness. Traditionally, cavalry charges aren’t what you start with, they’re what you do to nullify a key enemy strength once the battle has taken shape. Thus, pretty much all of our alternatives will have to rest on the notion of keeping the Dothraki in reserve.Now, where do we keep this Dothraki Reserve? There are three options, one of which we can rule out as wholly impractical prima facie: (1) on the flanks, (2) behind the castle, or (3) inside the castle (which is the one we can rule out, because there’s no way we’re fitting them all in there).The deployment we ultimately go with would be decided by the timing we were aiming for. Since we’ve noted that the point of a cavalry charge is “to nullify a key enemy strength”, we also must size up our enemy’s and our own forces first. The enemy force has four main components: (1) a large contingent of wights, easily killed individually, but capable of mass attacks, (2) a handful of wight “monster infantry” like the undead Wun-Wun, (3) a small contingent of White Walkers, unarmored cavalrymen who rarely participate in hand-to-hand combat or any elemental/combat spellcasting, but serve as nexi for the Night King’s “Raise Dead” spell, and (4) the Night King himself, mounted on an undead ice dragon.We know that (1) and (2) will constitute the main initial charge; (3) will stay in reserve, and (4) will likely lurk in wait for an opportunity to neutralize our own army’s superior dragon contingent.For the Living, we have (A) the Dothraki, (B) the Unsullied, (C) the Army of the North, (D) two dragons with riders, and (E) assorted irregular/unconventional/hero units. We also have (F) a castle, and (G) a rather shallow fire trench. Finally, there’s the Three-Eyed Raven (H), an asset that must be protected at all costs and who is the ultimate objective of (3) and (4).Since (B) are primarily medium-armored pikemen, they’re guarding the gate in the center. (C) are guarding the flanks and center-rear, as well as manning the castle walls. (D) are providing Close Air Support, and (E) are guarding (H).Now we can get back to this question of timing for (A). The first opportunity (X) is immediately after the Wight Charge of (1) and (2) makes contact with (B) and (C). Next, if and when those units are forced inside the castle walls, we can charge before lighting the trench (Y). Or we can wait until after some wights cross the trench and play cleanup (Z). We can also storm the castle once the wights have broken in (W). And last, we can wait until the wights have stormed the castle, leaving the White Walkers unguarded, and make a run at them (U) to cut the wights down to size.(U), (W), and (Z) would require a “behind the castle” deployment.Conversely, (X) and (Y) would require an “on the flanks” deployment.(W) would make for some tough fighting. Winterfell is rather cramped. It isn’t the sort of castle you can just run horses through left and right, let alone when it’s full of melee combatants.(Z) would potentially trap our Dothraki between the fire and the wights. And those dead horses could potentially start piling up and give them a head start scaling the castle walls.(U) might be a smart play, but you’d still have to plow through the same unending mass of wights that the ill-fated Dothraki Charge originally succumbed to. (3) would never leave the protection of (1) if (4) could easily see the Dothraki hiding behind the castle with lit swords.(X) could help (B) and (C) absorb the charge of (1) and (2), but it’s really only buying time. At the end of the day, you just can’t draw (4) out if you’re actually winning, and the sheer size of (1)’s force means you can’t reasonably manage to kill them all.(Y) would be very poor timing, because you don’t want to light the trench and trap all those Dothraki outside.Ultimately, there’s really no good play here. (U) is strategically the best option, and it’s more or less doomed to fail. It probably still would’ve been the best way for the show to use the Dothraki from a plot standpoint, because then, instead of sending them off immediately to die in a mindless charge, having them make even a doomed, futile late run at the White Walkers would have at least highlighted the hopelessness of the situation or raised the tension. “Oh crap, they saved the Dothraki for the smartest time to attack, and still got their butts whooped… this is not looking good for the Living!”The Dothraki Charge was stupid. But it wouldn’t have been much better any other way. I sympathize with the cinematic argument for it, the cool visual of seeing all the lights go out, but that’s really been the problem with all of GoT writing ever since the show outpaced the books: the writers are writing it like TV writers, whereas GRRM wrote it like a book writer. The TV writers want spectacle, and they have been forced to twist the plot into more and more absurd contrivances in order to achieve it. GRRM created a detail-driven plot. It moved slowly, but it established its internal rules and developed according to them.The best play was not to deploy the Dothraki at all, or to hold them far off the battlefield to make a surprise attack. A lightly-armored army of steppe horsemen is pretty much useless in a winter castle siege defense against a horde of undead. They’d have been far more useful keeping an eye on the South after it became apparent that Cersei wasn’t sending her army.

According to Wikipedia, a superpower “is a state with a dominant position characterized by its extensive ability to exert influence or project power on a global scale”.According to Merriam-Webster, it’s either just “an extremely powerful nation” or more specifically “one of a very few dominant states in an era when the world is divided politically into these states and their satellites”.So, being a superpower doesn’t mean being locally stronger than any neighbouring country, and the British Empire should be legitimately regarded as a superpower, knowing that it allowed Britain, for a time, to be “an extremely powerful nation” and “to exert influence or project power on a global scale”.However, the British Empire is an outstanding historical exception and should not be compared with territorially integrated modern superpowers such as the United States, China, Russia, or past ones like the Ottoman and Roman Empires.The pre-industrial history is full of thalassocracies from various kinds, such as the Phoenician cities, Athens, Carthage, the Vikings, Venice, the Netherlands, and many others. The common characteristic of such maritime empires is the disproportion between a tiny homeland and huge overseas assets. They are allowed to appear, grow and survive as long as long as two main conditions are met:Anarchy or deep political decline in overseas countries, making them defenseless and sometimes in need of external help against aggressive neighbours or internal disorders;Absence of direct threat at home from neighbouring continental powers, meaning that these powers are either strictly and continuously neutralized by each other or in political turmoil, allowing remote military operations without exposing the mother country to an invasion.By nature, thalassocracies are less perennial than other geopolitical constructs, because their existence is at the mercy of any significant change in the international context and, in the very long run, the continental empires (with deep, politically integrated territorial masses and large populations) prevail against the maritime ones. Phenicians fell under Assyrian then Babylonian then Persian rule, Rome won against Carthage, Venice lost against the Ottoman Empire then against modern western nation-states, etc. Practically, seaborne empires are as fragile as nomadic asian “steppe empires” of the Middle-Ages.The British Empire benefited from very special circumstances. The first one is the tragic fate of Europe, whose human and economic resources were continuously wasted in bloody and undecisive wars, and that failed to rebuild the lost “pax romana”. The second one was the perfect timing of the real founding event of the Empire, namely the Seven Years War (that lasted nine years, not seven, 1754–1763, including the so-called French & Indian War), establishing the British naval supremacy a few decades before the first industrial revolution and the subsequent first wave of economic globalization. As a consequence, the British Empire became not only the last thalassocracy, but the largest one, so a mid-sized European country was perceived as the dominant power in the world for almost one century and a half.This indisputable reality hides another, very important one.While the British Empire was the top global power, Britain has never been a strong regional power in Europe. Historical hard facts demonstrates that the Kingdom of Great Britain (1707–1801), then the United Kingdom (since 1801), was never able to prevail by its own force in a military clash against any major European great power. The war “at home” against France, Austria, Prussia (then Germany) or Russia was not the same business as against the Maratha Empire, the Zulu Kingdom, the Mahdist Sudan or the Afghan Emirate. So, Britain could never manage to protect its colonial assets and, in the same time, be at war against a single European great power without the help of at least another European great power. In other words, the British Empire could not engage any large scale offensive action in Europe without a coalition. And, of course, nobody was ready to help Britain to become the next dominant continental power. In addition, the safety of the homeland was at stake, knowing that the Channel was not large enough to permanently discourage an invader so Britain was always dependent on continental reverse alliances and had to carefully avoid any behaviour that would have triggered a general coalition against itself.During the beginning of the story, i.e. the Seven Years War, Britain victoriously fought France and Spain overseas almost by its own forces (including the colonial American militias), but it won in the European theatre mainly thanks to the Prussian victories. During this war, even the British victories in Europe (such as Minden or Villinghausen) were won under the command of a Prussian general and with the help of Hanovrian, Hessian and Brunswicker troops.A few years later, the outcome of the American Revolutionary War (1776–1783) proved that naval and financial supremacy could not ensure victory, even out of Europe, as long as Britain was diplomatically isolated in Europe.The battle of Waterloo (1815), sometimes celebrated as the victory of the British Empire against an “European Empire”, looks like a German victory, knowing that it was fought against the French by not so British forces:Britain : 25,000Netherlands (including Belgium): 17,000Hanover (German state): 10,000Brunswick (German state): 7,000Nassau (German state): 3,000King’s German Legion (Hanovrian troops integrated in British forces): 3,000Prussia (German state): 38,000 !Ironically, one of the long term consequences of Waterloo was the rise of Prussia, that took over the status of dominant power in Europe at the expense of Austria and France, and created the German unified Reich half a century later. Then the subsequent world wars of the 20th century tragically demonstrated that Britain was almost defenseless against this new power without the French shield and/or the strong help of Russia and America.More dramatically, there is a significant contrast between the lack of determination of the British Expeditionary Force in France and Belgium in 1940 during the first phase of WWII, and the British pugnacity at sea and overseas later. During the French collapse of 1940, the main concern for the British was to run home, not to fight back. The Empire had neither the will nor the means to take the lead in the continental war against Germany after the French failure. While the Dunkirk evacuation is commonly presented as a moral success, it was just, in the real world, the last act of a huge military disaster that proved one more time that the British Empire was not in condition to fight against a strong European power on land without the support and the leadership of another strong European power. But this time, Britain couldn’t escape the fate of Europe and, as a consequence, the Empire collapsed a few years later, so it was clearly a loser of the world wars, in spite of its official recognition as a winner. Had the German-Soviet pact lasted one more year, Britain could be invaded just like France. This tragedy proved that, in a large scale European conflict, neither Britain nor the British Empire could survive without a strong and victorious European ally.It’s now evident that the resources of the Empire were mainly consumed in order to maintain the Empire, not to make Britain stronger.For cultural reasons, during the Modern Times (1500–1815) Britain became less and less interested in European affairs and favoured the blue water policy at the expense of continental power. Continental territories in Europe were regarded as liabilities more than assets. As a consequence, the union between the UK and the Kingdom of Hanover ended without serious British opposition in 1837, and nothing was done to prevent Hanover from being conquered by Prussia in 1866. A few years later, in 1870, the British Empire did nothing to prevent Prussia from crushing France and becoming the dominant power in Europe. In some way, the continuous British disinterest in continental affairs contributed to the build up of the future most dangerous enemy of the British Empire, namely the German Reich. So, while the Empire was at its apogee, it was unwilling and unable to become or remain a leading actor in European politics, even in order to protect the balance of power. Of course, it was even less in condition to engage in a domination strategy in Europe.Such a political orientation explains the astounding gap between the global power of the Empire and the weakness of the national army according to the European standards. One should note that France evolved in the opposite direction during the same period, with another strange result: France was for centuries the main European power, but it never was a global superpower, even when Europe dominated the world. We know the ultimate consequence: the English language became the world’s lingua franca, but no European power was able to build up both the fleets and the ground forces that were required in order to establish and maintain a superpower status for more than 150 years.So, whatever the deep causes of these phenomenons, the British Empire never owned the firepower, the logistics, the skills, and the human resources that were required to dominate France and/or Germany in the European hinterland because:it was not interested in doing that;financial and industrial strength is a key factor to build a successful army, but it doesn’t replace the army;A world-class army (like a world-class navy) can’t be built overnight; it requires decades of consistent policy, so it can’t exist without a strong support from both the people and the elite (remember that it took about 100 years for France to create an army, so the Hundred Years War lasted 116 years).Anyway, we could develop an interesting steampunk dystopia, starting with a (unlikely) political change in London, making the British Empire more “European” around 1830-1850. In such an alternative history, Britain could have blocked the Prussian ambitions and (using its Hanovrian bridgehead) the King of England could have become himself the new Kaiser, the German Emperor. In such a geopolitical context, France would have no choice but jumping in the train and become an “associated” power, if not a satellite, and the British Empire would have been the main superpower of the 20th century. Hopefully, the two world wars would have been avoided. Good news for Europe, and for anybody elsewhere. Maybe.