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EDIT # 1Someone anonymous's answer to When did race mixing become socially acceptable in the United States?It really isn’t acceptable, Race mixing usually means a black mixing with either a white or asian person and then the white or asian persons genes are wiped out, Genocide through breeding is only accepted by the extreme left.…..Dear M. Anonymous,This is another case of historical amnesia on the part of White nationalists and the Ultra-Whites.There is a popular saying among Native Americans that was shared on a popular forum by a Native American.The whole purpose of the Face Face has been and will always be to breed out the original inhabitants, create a fixed mixed race (the paler, the better), claim their Identity, steal their legacy and shut out the Native of all races.This is a called racial whitening or whitenization of the aboriginals and theft of history by Whites.It should be renamed genocide through breeding with Whites.It has been used time and time in lands that Whites invaded and later claimed as their ancestral lands.The worst case of racial whitening is Australia.How Australia Continues to 'Breed Out the Color' of Its Aboriginal PopulationCaught up in a scientific racism designed to breed out the blackIn 1933 a Sunday newspaper quoted Dr Cecil Evelyn Cook, dazzlingly qualified as an anthropologist, biologist, bacteriologist, chief medical officer and "chief protector" of Aborigines in North Australia, who pronounced there was no "throwback" to the black once enough white blood was bred in. "Generally by the fifth and invariably by the sixth generation, all native characteristics of the Australian Aborigine are eradicated. The problem of our half-castes will be quickly eliminated by the complete disappearance of the black race, and the swift submergence of their progeny in the white," he said."The Australian native is the most easily assimilated race on earth, physically and mentally. A blending with the Asiatic, though tending to increase virility, is not desirable. The quickest way out is to breed him white," Cook said.Longtime Australian policy: Kidnapping children from families – Center for Public IntegrityLONDON — In the United States, Native American children, “Red Indians,” had been forcibly taken from their parents and placed in institutions to “civilize” them. Australia tried a different approach.In 1937, the chief protector of Aboriginals in Western Australia, A. O. Neville, a man generally recognized as a decent, progressive bureaucrat but who nevertheless believed in “breeding out the color” (commonly called “[expletive deleted] them white”), spoke at the first national governmental conference on Aboriginals, an occasion Robert Marine, associate professor of politics at La Trobe University, Victoria, has described as “a terrible moment in the history of the 20th-century Australian state.”At the conference, Neville asked: “Are we going to have a population of one million blacks in the Commonwealth or are we going to merge them into our white community and eventually forget that there were any Aborigines in Australia?” The key resolution at the conference, “The Destiny of the Race,” passed unanimously, called for the total absorption into the white community of all non-full-blood Aborigines. Taking part-Aboriginal children from their mothers and families by force was part of this ambition. Over the years, various regulations had been invoked to make this possible.Illegal: White man with Aboriginal womanIn 1918, while the war in Europe was still on, the Australian government found time to pass regulations designed to segregate Aboriginals from the white population and reduce the number of children with mixed blood. It was now illegal for a white man to live with an Aboriginal woman. (No mention was made of a white woman living with an Aboriginal man because such a situation was considered unthinkable.) This met the approval of the Perth Sunday Times: “Central Australia’s half-caste problem must be tackled boldly and immediately. The greatest danger, experts agree, is that three races will develop in Australia — white, black, and the pathetic, sinister third race which is neither.” Control of all Aboriginal children was removed from their parents and given to government-appointed white superintendents. This was just another part of a process that lasted from the late 19th century until the middle 1960s. So-called “half-caste” children were seized by the state and placed in institutions where they suffered physical mistreatment and sexual abuse. To this day, no one is certain how many were involved — but Aboriginal authorities say at least 30,000.The 1918 law caused no outcry. Government figures released in 1921 suggested that there were only 75,000 Aboriginals left, the lowest figure ever, and that since colonization, their ranks had been reduced by nearly 80 per cent. There is doubt that these figures were accurate. In the 1970s, a period of strong Aboriginal activism, many Aboriginal leaders I spoke with said that they had done their own, admittedly limited, census-taking in their own areas, and that their figures for the number of Aboriginals suggested that the official figures had been understated by anything from 25 to 50 per cent.But the low official figures enabled the authorities to argue that since Aboriginals were dying out anyway, the new legislation was aimed at easing their passing and finding decent homes for their children, especially those who had some white blood or light-colored skin.Kidnapping becomes government policyThis cannot be over-emphasized: The Australian government literally kidnapped these children from their parents as a matter of policy. White welfare officers, often supported by police, would descend on Aboriginal camps, round up all the children, separate the ones with light-colored skin, bundle them into trucks and take them away. If their parents protested, they bundle them into trucks and take them away. If their parents protested, they were held at bay by the police.Sometimes, to avoid harrowing scenes of parents clinging to the sides of the trucks, and to frustrate attempts to hide the children when the trucks drove into the camp, the authorities resorted to subterfuge. They would fit out the back of a truck with a wire cage and a spring door — like an animal trap. Then they would park the truck a short distance from the camp and lure the children into the cage with sweets scattered on its door. When enough children were in the cage, they would spring the trap door and drive rapidly away.Aboriginals tried to save their children by blackening their skin so that they did not look half-caste. “Every morning, our people would crush charcoal and mix that with animal fat and smother it all over us, so that when the police came they could see only black children in the distance,” witness No. 681 told the National Inquiry into “stolen children” (1995-97). “We were told to be on the alert and, if white people came, to run into the bush, or stand behind the trees as stiff as a poker, or else run behind logs or run into culverts and hide.Mothers were equally stricken. “Bringing Them Home,” the 1997 report of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission into stolen children, tells of an Aboriginal woman so ashamed of being unable to prevent her children being taken from her that she carried on her person, until the day she died, references testifying to her good character. And of an Aboriginal family who for 32 years carried out a ritual mourning ceremony every sunrise and sunset to mark the loss of their daughter.Siblings separated — easier to controlWhere the children were taken depended on how old and how light-skinned they were. (Either way, siblings would not be allowed to stay together because the authorities believed that what they called the “split the litter” system made the children easier to control.) Some started out in Roman Catholic orphanages where they were well treated — “All the kids thought it was one big family. We didn’t know what it meant by ‘parents’ because we didn’t have parents and we thought those women [the nuns] were our mothers,” one said.But as they grew older, they were moved on to “homes” run by churches and missionary societies. There, they were beaten and sometimes sexually abused. Some of the stolen children did not have even a short spell of reasonable life, but went straight from the Aboriginal camp from which they had been abducted into so-called “half-caste homes” in Darwin or Alice Springs. The aim was to keep them segregated from local “full bloods.” Conditions in these homes were deplorable. At Alice Springs, the half-caste home, “The Bungalow,” consisted of a very rough frame of wood with some dilapidated sheets of corrugated iron thrown over it.The prime minister, Stanley Bruce, thought something should be done about the half-caste homes and made an approach to the South Australian government to try to persuade it to help. He suggested: “If these babies were removed at their present early age . . . to homes in South Australia, they would not know in later life that they had Aboriginal blood and would probably be absorbed into the white population and become useful citizens.” The South Australian government was having none of this. It replied: “To give effect to this suggestion would be greatly to the disadvantage of South Australia . . . These persons of Aboriginal blood almost invariably mate with the lowest class of whites and, in many cases, the girls become prostitutes.”Robert Manne found in the National Archives of Australia the views of Dr. Cecil Cook, who had the job of “chief protector of Aborigines” in the Northern Territory between 1927 and 1939 and the architect of Aboriginal policy there. Manne wrote in the Sydney Morning Herald in 1999, “No one endowed the sorry business of child removal with a grander social and geopolitical purpose than . . . the progressive intellectual, Dr. Cecil Cook.”“Cook’s thinking was fashioned by the fashionable pseudo-science of eugenics, which taught the virtues of state-engineered human breeding programs,” Manne wrote. “Cook believed that if the state encouraged marriages between half-caste females and white males, eventually, over four or five generations, the stain of Aboriginal blood could be bred out altogether.” Cook felt that the chances of “breeding out the color” were good. He believed that Aboriginals were the remote ancestors of Caucasians or Aryans, not of any Negroid race, and that therefore a systematic breeding program with whites would eliminate the darker blood with no danger of a “biological throwback” — two apparently white parents producing a black baby.The end of the Second World War, fought for freedom and the dignity of man, made no difference to Australia’s policy of trying to breed out the Aboriginal bloodline. Compassion would not be allowed to stand in the way of progress. Even those officials who accepted that Aboriginals had normal human feelings went about their distasteful work with the thought that although the Aboriginals might not realize it, “it’s for their own good.”The white settlers in Australia did their best to stamp out the country’s original inhabitants. They fought a war against them as ferocious as the Indian wars in America, if not on the same scale. Aboriginals held their own against the flintlock because it could be fired and reloaded only three times a minute, leaving an interval long enough for an Aboriginal warrior to hurl several spears. But when the Terry breech-loading rifle and then the Snider came along, the Aboriginals had no chance and war changed to massacre in which neither women nor children were spared. These massacres continued well into the 20th century.‘Breeding out’ Aboriginal bloodIn parallel with the murder of Aboriginals — but, as we have seen, continuing for much longer — ran a government policy of “breeding out” Aboriginal blood. Full-blood Aboriginals were dying out anyway, the theory ran, but we must do something about the “half-castes,” those born — in most cases — of a white father and an Aboriginal mother. The answer was to take such children, as young as possible, from their Aboriginal mothers, bring them up in a white environment and then marry them off to white people. In this way the Aboriginal strain of blood would be bred out in a few generations. It did not matter if the Aboriginal mother were a good one and objected to her child being taken. This was a legally approved policy in the child’s interest, so force could be used if necessary.How much Australia in general knew of this theft of children is disputed. It happened in remote places, parts of the country that most metropolitan Australians never visited and cared little about.There has to be more to it than this. Where were the historians, the writers, the filmmakers, the social workers, the lawyers, the clergy, the campaigning journalists? Yes, they were there for the Aboriginals in the ’80s and ’90s. But when the stolen generation was being dragged from its family, kicking, screaming and crying — and this went on right up into the 1970s — they were nowhere to be seen.Why didn’t more Australians see?The feminist Mary Bennett said Australia’s aim was “the extermination of the unhappy native race.” She went on, “This policy is euphemistically described by Australian officialdom as the absorption of the native race and the breeding out of color. We shall be better able to evaluate this policy when another race applies it to ourselves as the absorption of the white race and the breeding out of white people.” Why did more Australians not see this?The answer can be found in a letter, written on behalf of John Howard, who was elected prime minister in 1996, explaining why the Australian government had refused to apologize to the stolen generation. “Such an apology could imply that present generations are in some way responsible and accountable for the actions of earlier generations, actions that were sanctioned by the laws at the time, and that were believed to be in the best interests of the children concerned.”Neither excuse stands up. Stealing a generation of Aboriginal children from their families might have been legal but it was also immoral. Some of the white Australians involved in the theft might have believed that they were acting in the best interests of the children — the “good intentions” defense — but the policy itself was not concerned with the interests of the children. It was concerned with “breeding out” a race, that is, eliminating it.Lawyers can argue about the definition of genocide, but for power and simplicity it is hard to beat Hannah Arendt. Writing in Eichmann in Jerusalem, she said that genocide was the desire to make a distinct people disappear from the earth. That was the shameful desire of the Australian government for at least 60 year———————I really hate all these questions about the “acceptability” of race mixing in the USA or any other places where Whites came as invaders and later enslaved millions of Africans and countless Natives and on whom they practiced racial whitening and imposed paramour rights.SHEER HYPOCRISYWhites can breed out the melanin out of people of color but it is not called race mixing but racial whitening or paramour rights.Racial whitening has been used time and time again by Whites even when they declare that they want to remain a pure “race” but see no problem in breeding out the melanin out of “non-Whites”, the so-called people of color.5 Nations That Imported Europeans to Whiten The PopulationAfter the trans-Atlantic slave trade was officially abolished toward the end of the 19th century, many whites felt threatened and feared free Blacks would become dominant in the society. The elites spent a great deal of time mulling over how best to solve the so-called Negro problem. A popular solution that emerged during this period was the ideology of racial whitening or “whitening.”Supporters of the “whitening” ideology believed that if a “superior” white population was encouraged to mix with an “inferior” Black population, Blacks would advance culturally, genetically or even disappear totally, within several generations. Some also believed that an influx of immigrants from Europe would be necessary to successfully carry out the process.BrazilBrazil’s whitening ideology gained support from two pseudoscientific racist beliefs that were prominent during this time. One being social Darwinism, which applied Darwin’s theory of natural selection to a society or race, and the other being Aryanism, the belief that the “white” Aryan race was superior to all other cultures. By combining these two ideas, a certain portion of the Brazilian power elite believed, from roughly 1880 on, that the nation could be “whitened” and thus “improved” if whites were encouraged to mate with Blacks.CubaAt the dawn of the 20th century, Afro-Cubans enthusiastically joined the struggle for independence against Spain in hopes of building a nation based on racial democracy. However, the U.S. military presence in Cuba from 1898 to 1902 and again from 1906 to 1908 propped up and defended a racist ruling class, who pursued policies that actively sought the “whitening” or Blanqueamiento of the nation.The power elites promoted interracial marriage, and the Cuban government created immigration laws that invested more than $1 million into recruiting Europeans, mostly from Spain, into Cuba in order to whiten the state, all while excluding Blacks from every aspect of national life. A ban on “nonwhite” immigration was also implemented.JamaicaAfter the abolition of slavery in Jamaica (Aug. 1, 1834), many plantation owners feared an impending shortage of labor. Apparently the newly freed and well-experienced Africans on the island were not good candidates for a paid labor force.Consequently, the former slave owners sought new measures in an effort to solve this problem. One solution was the establishment of a European settlement by Lord Seaford, then-owner of Montpelier Estate and Shettlewood Pen, which were located in Westmoreland, in the parish of St. James. More than 1,000 Germans were brought to Jamaica with the promise of being granted housing, land and employment.South AfricaThe apartheid system was designed to maintain white domination in South Africa, and the associated immigration laws implemented during white rule reflected that ideology. However the groundwork was laid well before the apartheid system was officially put in place.Following the implementation of the apartheid regime’s immigration program, Europeans, primarily from Britain, arrived at three times the rate as they previously did. Meanwhile, native Africans were being murdered and forcibly removed from their land, and immigration laws were being used to arrest those who were found in “white-designated” areas for more than 72 hours.AustraliaAustralia’s natives have been victims of oppression in many ways and for various reasons for nearly 200 years. Their land had been taken over by European settlers, and later on they were forced to assimilate into white society.AO Neville, the Chief Protector of Aborigines from 1915 to 1940, inspired by the same eugenics propaganda that informed the Blanqueamiento in Latin America, attempted to use miscegenation to breed the blackness out of the indigenous population. Following the Second World War authorities began a slow shift away from biological assimilation to one of cultural assimilationparamour rights — Blog — Black Women's VoicesThe systemic practice to shroud the realities and silence the voices of black women is a recurring theme in American history, whose roots are established in antebellum atrocities and have been passed along through black codes uniquely crafted for African-American women in the form of implicitly permissible rape known as “paramour rights.Paramour Rights, the past you seldom hear aboutIn 1952, African American Ruby McCollum of Live Oak, Florida was tried and convicted of murdering a local white doctor whom she claimed had been forcing her to have sex with him for years. The Florida Supreme Court overturned the conviction due to a technicality, but McCollum was judged insane before a new trial could be convened and was placed in a state mental institution. Those who covered the trial think it was prejudicial in multiple ways, including the fact that McCollum was allowed to say little or nothing in her own defense.DVD About The McCollum TrialI mention this because, during this case, we heard the term “paramour rights,” the notion–stemming from the days of slavery–that white men could have non-consensual sex with any Black woman they wanted with little if any consequences. In the publisher’s description of one book about the trial, McCollum is said to have murdered her “white lover” rather than killing a man she claimed had been raping her for years. The word “lover” hardly applies.Danielle L. McGuire writes in her 2004 “The Journal of American History” article, “It Was like All of Us Had Been Raped: Sexual Violence, Community Mobilization, and the African American Freedom Struggle,” Despite a growing body of literature that focuses on the roles of black and white women and the operation of gender in the movement, sexualized violence-both as a tool of oppression and as a political spur for the movement has yet to find its place in the story of the African American freedom struggle. Rape, like lynching and murder, served as a tool of psychological and physical intimidation that expressed white male domination and buttressed white supremacy.”My novel Conjure Woman’s Cat mentions the rape of a black woman by white males. In my fictional account, the police don’t even bother to investigate because this was, sad to say, par for the course. Black women in those days were portrayed, even in official court transcripts, as sexual Jezebels, “Nigger wenches,” and as women who liked being assaulted by white men. When they claimed they were raped in the rare instances such cases came to trial, prosecutors asked if they enjoyed it.A “classmate” of mine (I put the word in quotes because we didn’t know each other) was one of four men who raped an African American woman at gun and knifepoint. His sister was in my high school class. We knew each other but moved in different circles, so we never discussed the crime or the impact it had upon her or the family. In the high school yearbook, X was a senior and–as such–appears wearing a black bow tie, a white jacket, and a white shirt. He was active in school activities. He didn’t look like a man who would spend the rest of his life on the sexual offender lists.He and his sister are still alive so I won’t mention their names or the name of the victim who has passed away. I never saw an interview with the victim or any account of long-term psychological damage after the verdict was announced. She showed great courage during the trial as she described the event and never flinched under defense attempts to paint the seven sexual encounters of the evening as what she wanted.The first surprising fact in 1959 was that X and the three other thugs who committed the crime were arrested. The second surprising fact was that they were held in jail while awaiting trial. They had confessed but claimed the sex was consensual and made light of the whole thing like it was boys having fun. The biggest surprise of all is that they were convicted and sentenced to life in prison. How unusual this way for that day and time.Those commenting on the disparate approach in the criminal justice system to the rapes of black women by white males and the rapes of white women by black males consistently view sex with a black woman as a rite of passage for young white men. This was probably the case in Tallahassee in 1959. Many think that the late Senator Strom Thurmond’s “affair” with an underage black maid in his family’s house falls into the “rite of passage” or “paramour rights” category.Few people knew about the segregationist’s black daughter until after he died. His black daughter Essie Mae Washington-Williams, who died in 2013, was silent about her birth father for 78 years wrote an elegant and even-handed memoir (Dear Senator) in 2006 that shows the confusion and disconnect between the black sons and daughters and their white fathers who were fascinated with black women. Commentators were quick to point out that apologists for Thurmond’s relationship with the teenage black maid employed by his family called that relationship an affair rather than statutory rape or sex under duress.After years of executing black men for raping white women, the 1959 Tallahassee trial was a victory, a wedge driven into the status quo, a precedent showing times might be changing, even though the rapists were out on parole within six or seven years. In Conjure Woman’s Cat, the men aren’t convicted because–in the “real life” of 1954 when the novel is set–they seldom were found guilty of anything. In those days, that was life as usual.

Here’s an excellent and footnoted discussion on the idea of martial law. If you read through the whole thing, you will see that the courts’ view of the legality of martial law is reflected by what the state of the union was at the time. But let it speak for itself. If you’d rather read it online at the source, it is Martial Law and Constitutional Limitations“Two theories of martial law are reflected in decisions of the Supreme Court. The first, which stems from the Petition of Right, 1628, provides that the common law knows no such thing as martial law;223 that is to say, martial law is not established by official authority of any sort, but arises from the nature of things, being the law of paramount necessity, leaving the civil courts to be the final judges of necessity.224 By the second theory, martial law can be validly and constitutionally established by supreme political authority in wartime. In the early years of the Supreme Court, the American judiciary embraced the latter theory as it held in Luther v. Borden225 that state declarations of martial law were conclusive and therefore not subject to judicial review.226 In this case, the Court found that the Rhode Island legislature had been within its rights in resorting to the rights and usages of war in combating insurrection in that state. The decision in the Prize Cases,227 although not dealing directly with the subject of martial law, gave national scope to the same general principle in 1863.The Civil War being safely over, however, a divided Court, in the elaborately argued Milligan case,228 reverting to the older doctrine, pronounced President Lincoln’s action void, following his suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in September, 1863, in ordering the trial by military commission of persons held in custody as “spies” and “abettors of the enemy.” The salient passage of the Court’s opinion bearing on this point is the following: “If, in foreign invasion or civil war, the courts are actually closed, and it is impossible to administer criminal justice according to law, then, on the theater of active military operations, where war really prevails, there is a necessity to furnish a substitute for the civil authority, thus overthrown, to preserve the safety of the army and society; and as no power is left but the military, it is allowed to govern by martial rule until the laws can have their free course. As necessity creates the rule, so it limits its duration; for, if this government is continued after the courts are reinstated, it is a gross usurpation of power. Martial rule can never exist where the courts are open, and in proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction. It is also confined to the locality of actual war.”229 Four Justices, speaking by Chief Justice Chase, while holding Milligan’s trial to have been void because it violated the Act of March 3, 1863, governing the custody and trial of persons who had been deprived of the habeas corpus privilege, declared their belief that Congress could have authorized Milligan’s trial. The Chief Justice wrote: “Congress has the power not only to raise and support and govern armies but to declare war. It has, therefore, the power to provide by law for carrying on war. This power necessarily extends to all legislation essential to the prosecution of war with vigor and success, except such as interferes with the command of the forces and the conduct of campaigns. That power and duty belong to the President as commander-in-chief. Both these powers are derived from the Constitution, but neither is defined by that instrument. Their extent must be determined by their nature, and by the principles of our institutions. . . .”“We by no means assert that Congress can establish and apply the laws of war where no war has been declared or exists.”“Where peace exists the laws of peace must prevail. What we do maintain is, that when the nation is involved in war, and some portions of the country are invaded, and all are exposed to invasion, it is within the power of Congress to determine in what states or districts such great and imminent public danger exists as justifies the authorization of military tribunals for the trial of crimes and offences against the discipline or security of the army or against the public safety.”230 In short, only Congress can authorize the substitution of military tribunals for civil tribunals for the trial of offenses; and Congress can do so only in wartime.Early in the 20th century, however, the Court appeared to retreat from its stand in Milligan insofar as it held in Moyer v. Peabody231 that “the Governor’s declaration that a state of insurrection existed is conclusive of that fact. . . . [T]he plaintiff ’s position is that he has been deprived of his liberty without due process of law. But it is familiar that what is due process of law depends on circumstances. . . . So long as such arrests are made in good faith and in honest belief that they are needed in order to head the insurrection off, the Governor is the final judge and cannot be subjected to an action after he is out of office on the ground that he had not reasonable ground for his belief.”232 The “good faith” test of Moyer, however, was superseded by the “direct relation” test of Sterling v. Constantin,233 where the Court made it very clear that “[i]t does not follow . . . that every sort of action the Governor may take, no matter how justified by the exigency or subversive of private right and the jurisdiction of the courts, otherwise available, is conclusively supported by mere executive fiat. . . . What are the allowable limits of military discretion, and whether or not they have been overstepped in a particular case, are judicial questions.”234Martial Law in Hawaii.The question of the constitutional status of martial law was raised again in World War II by the proclamation of Governor Poindexter of Hawaii, on December 7, 1941, suspending the writ of habeas corpus and conferring on the local commanding General of the Army all his own powers as governor and also “all of the powers normally exercised by the judicial officers . . . of this territory . . . during the present emergency and until the danger of invasion is removed.” Two days later the Governor’s action was approved by President Roosevelt. The regime which the proclamation set up continued with certain abatements until October 24, 1944.By section 67 of the Organic Act of April 30, 1900,235 the Territorial Governor was authorized “in case of rebellion or invasion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, [to] suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Territory, or any part thereof, under martial law until communication can be had with the President and his decision thereon made known.” By section 5 of the Organic Act, “the Constitution . . . shall have the same force and effect within the said Territory as elsewhere in the United States.” In a brace of cases which reached it in February 1945, but which it contrived to postpone deciding till February 1946,236 the Court, speaking by Justice Black, held that the term “martial law” as employed in the Organic Act, “while intended to authorize the military to act vigorously for the maintenance of an orderly civil government and for the defense of the Islands against actual or threatened rebellion or invasion, was not intended to authorize the supplanting of courts by military tribunals.”237The Court relied on the majority opinion in Ex parte Milligan. Chief Justice Stone concurred in the result. “I assume also,” he said, “that there could be circumstances in which the public safety requires, and the Constitution permits, substitution of trials by military tribunals for trials in the civil courts,”238 but added that the military authorities themselves had failed to show justifying facts in this instance. Justice Burton, speaking for himself and Justice Frankfurter, dissented. He stressed the importance of Hawaii as a military outpost and its constant exposure to the danger of fresh invasion. He warned that “courts must guard themselves with special care against judging past military action too closely by the inapplicable standards of judicial, or even military, hindsight.”239Articles of War: The Nazi Saboteurs.In 1942 eight youths, seven Germans and one an American, all of whom had received training in sabotage in Berlin, were brought to this country aboard two German submarines and put ashore, one group on the Florida coast, the other on Long Island, with the idea that they would proceed forthwith to practice their art on American factories, military equipment, and installations. Making their way inland, the saboteurs were soon picked up by the FBI, some in New York, others in Chicago, and turned over to the Provost Marshal of the District of Columbia. On July 2, the President appointed a military commission to try them for violation of the laws of war, to wit: for not wearing fixed emblems to indicate their combatant status. In the midst of the trial, the accused petitioned the Supreme Court and the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for leave to bring habeas corpus proceedings. Their argument embraced the contentions: (1) that the offense charged against them was not known to the laws of the United States; (2) that it was not one arising in the land and naval forces; and (3) that the tribunal trying them had not been constituted in accordance with the requirements of the Articles of War.The first argument the Court met as follows: The act of Congress in providing for the trial before military tribunals of offenses against the law of war is sufficiently definite, although Congress has not undertaken to codify or mark the precise boundaries of the law of war, or to enumerate or define by statute all the acts which that law condemns. “. . . [T]hose who during time of war pass surreptitiously from enemy territory into . . . [that of the United States], discarding their uniforms upon entry, for the commission of hostile acts involving destruction of life or property, have the status of unlawful combatants punishable as such by military commission.”240 The second argument it disposed of by showing that petitioners’ case was of a kind that was never deemed to be within the terms of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, citing in confirmation of this position the trial of Major Andre.241 The third contention the Court overruled by declining to draw the line between the powers of Congress and the President in the premises,242 thereby, in effect, attributing to the President the right to amend the Articles of War in a case of the kind before the Court ad libitum.The decision might well have rested on the ground that the Constitution is without restrictive force in wartime in a situation of this sort. The saboteurs were invaders; their penetration of the boundary of the country, projected from units of a hostile fleet, was essentially a military operation, their capture was a continuation of that operation. Punishment of the saboteurs was therefore within the President’s purely martial powers as Commander in Chief. Moreover, seven of the petitioners were enemy aliens, and so, strictly speaking, without constitutional status. Even had they been civilians properly domiciled in the United States at the outbreak of the war, they would have been subject under the statutes to restraint and other disciplinary action by the President without appeals to the courts. In any event, the Court rejected the jurisdictional challenge by one of the saboteurs on the basis of his claim to U.S. citizenship, finding U.S. citizenship wholly irrelevant to the determination of whether a wartime captive is an “enemy belligerent” within the meaning of the law of war.243Articles of War: World War II Crimes.As a matter of fact, in General Yamashita’s case,244 which was brought after the termination of hostilities for alleged “war crimes,” the Court abandoned its restrictive conception altogether. In the words of Justice Rutledge’s dissenting opinion in this case: “The difference between the Court’s view of this proceeding and my own comes down in the end to the view, on the one hand, that there is no law restrictive upon these proceedings other than whatever rules and regulations may be prescribed for their government by the executive authority or the military and, on the other hand, that the provisions of the Articles of War, of the Geneva Convention and the Fifth Amendment apply.”245 And the adherence of the United States to the Charter of London in August 1945, under which the Nazi leaders were brought to trial, is explicable by the same theory. These individuals were charged with the crime of instigating aggressive war, which at the time of its commission was not a crime either under international law or under the laws of the prosecuting governments. It must be presumed that the President is not in his capacity as Supreme Commander bound by the prohibition in the Constitution of ex post facto laws, nor does international law forbid ex post facto laws.246Articles of War: Response to the Attacks of September 11, 2001.In response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York City’s World Trade Center and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., Congress passed the “Authorization for Use of Military Force,”247 which provided that the President may use “all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks [or] harbored such organizations or persons.” During a military action in Afghanistan pursuant to this authorization, a United States citizen, Yaser Hamdi, was taken prisoner. The Executive Branch argued that it had plenary authority under Article II to hold such an “enemy combatant” for the duration of hostilities, and to deny him meaningful recourse to the federal courts. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court agreed that the President was authorized to detain a United States citizen seized in Afghanistan, although a majority of the Court appeared to reject the notion that such power was inherent in the Presidency, relying instead on statutory grounds.248 However, the Court did find that the government may not detain the petitioner indefinitely for purposes of interrogation, and must afford him the opportunity to offer evidence that he is not an enemy combatant.249In Rasul v. Bush,250 the Court rejected an Executive Branch argument that foreign prisoners being held at Guantanamo Bay were outside of federal court jurisdiction. The Court distinguished earlier case law arising during World War II that denied habeas corpus petitions from German citizens who had been captured and tried overseas by United States military tribunals.251 In Rasul, the Court noted that the Guantanamo petitioners were not citizens of a country at war with the United States,252 had not been afforded any form of tribunal, and were being held in a territory over which the United States exercised exclusive jurisdiction and control.253 In addition, the Court found that statutory grounds existed for the extension of habeas corpus to these prisoners.254In response to Rasul, Congress amended the habeas statute to eliminate all federal habeas jurisdiction over detainees, whether its basis was statutory or constitutional.255 This amendment was challenged in Boumediene v. Bush,256 as a violation of the Suspension Clause.257 Although the historical record did not contain significant common-law applications of the writ to foreign nationals who were apprehended and detained overseas, the Court did not find this conclusive in evaluating whether habeas applied in this case.258 Emphasizing a “functional” approach to the issue,259 the Court considered (1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process through which the status determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and detention took place; and (3) any practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ. As in Rasul, the Court distinguished previous case law, noting that the instant detainees disputed their enemy status, that their ability to dispute their status had been limited, that they were held in a location (Guantanamo Bay, Cuba) under the de facto jurisdiction of the United States, and that complying with the demands of habeas petitions would not interfere with the government’s military mission. Thus, the Court concluded that the Suspension Clause was in full effect regarding these detainees.Martial Law and Domestic Disorder.President Washing- ton himself took command of state militia called into federal service to quell the Whiskey Rebellion, but there were not too many occasions subsequently in which federal troops or state militia called into federal service were required.260 Since World War II, however, the President, by virtue of his own powers and the authority vested in him by Congress,261 has used federal troops on a number of occasions, five of them involving resistance to desegregation decrees in the South.262 In 1957, Governor Faubus employed the Arkansas National Guard to resist court-ordered desegregation in Little Rock, and President Eisenhower dispatched federal soldiers and brought the Guard under federal authority.263 In 1962, President Kennedy dispatched federal troops to Oxford, Mississippi, when federal marshals were unable to control with rioting that broke out upon the admission of an African American student to the University of Mississippi.264 In June and September of 1964, President Johnson sent troops into Alabama to enforce court decrees opening schools to blacks.265 And, in 1965, the President used federal troops and federalized local Guardsmen to protect participants in a civil rights march. The President justified his action on the ground that there was a substantial likelihood of domestic violence because state authorities were refusing to protect the marchers.266Footnotes223C. FAIRMAN, THE LAW OF MARTIAL RULE 20–22 (1930); A. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 283, 290 (5th ed. 1923).224Id. at 539–44.22548 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). See also Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 32–33 (1827).22648 U.S. (7 How.) at 45.22767 U.S. (2 Bl.) 635 (1863).228Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).22971 U.S. at 127.23071 U.S. at 139–40. In Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1864), the Court had held, while war was still flagrant, that it had no power to review by certiorari the proceedings of a military commission ordered by a general officer of the Army, commanding a military department.231212 U.S. 78 (1909).232212 U.S. at 83–85.233287 U.S. 378 (1932). “The nature of the power also necessarily implies that there is a permitted range of honest judgment as to the measures to be taken in meeting force with force, in suppressing violence and restoring order, for without such liberty to make immediate decision, the power itself would be useless. Such measures, conceived in good faith, in the face of the emergency and directly related to the quelling of the disorder or the prevention of its continuance, fall within the discretion of the Executive in the exercise of his authority to maintain peace.” Id. at 399–400.234287 U.S. at 400–01. This holding has been ignored by states on numerous occasions. E.g., Allen v. Oklahoma City, 175 Okla. 421, 52 P.2d 1054 (1935); Hearon v. Calus, 178 S.C. 381, 183 S.E. 13 (1935); and Joyner v. Browning, 30 F. Supp. 512 (W.D. Tenn. 1939).23531 Stat. 141, 153 (1900).236Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946).237327 U.S. at 324.238327 U.S. at 336.239327 U.S. at 343.240Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 29–30, 35 (1942).241317 U.S. at 41–42.242317 U.S. at 28–29.243Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37–38 (1942) (“Citizens who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents within the meaning of the Hague Convention and the law of war.”). See also Colepaugh v. Looney, 235 F.2d 429, 432 (10th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1014 (1957) (“[T]he petitioner’s citizenship in the United States does not . . . confer upon him any constitutional rights not accorded any other belligerent under the laws of war.”).244In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).245327 U.S. at 81.246See Gross, The Criminality of Aggressive War, 41 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 205 (1947).247Pub. L. 107–40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).248542 U.S. 507 (2004). There was no opinion of the Court. Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy and Justice Breyer, avoided ruling on the Executive Branch argument that such detentions could be authorized by its Article II powers alone, and relied instead on the “Authorization for Use of Military Force” passed by Congress. Justice Thomas also found that the Executive Branch had the power to detain the petitioner, although his dissenting opinion found that such detentions were authorized by Article II. Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsberg, rejected the argument that the Congress had authorized such detentions, while Justice Scalia, joined with Justice Stevens, denied that such congressional authorization was possible without a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.249At a minimum, the petitioner must be given notice of the asserted factual basis for holding him, must be given a fair chance to rebut that evidence before a neutral decisionmaker, and must be allowed to consult an attorney. 542 U.S. at 533, 539.250542 U.S. 466 (2004).251Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950).252The petitioners were Australians and Kuwaitis.253Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. at 467.254The Court found that 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which had previously been construed to require the presence of a petitioner in a district court’s jurisdiction, was now satisfied by the presence of a jailor-custodian. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973). Another “enemy combatant” case, this one involving an American citizen arrested on American soil, was remanded after the Court found that a federal court’s habeas jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 was limited to jurisdiction over the immediate custodian of a petitioner. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (federal court’s jurisdiction over Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld not sufficient to satisfy presence requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 2241). In Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008), the Court held that the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, applied to American citizens held by the Multinational Force—Iraq, an international coalition force operating in Iraq and composed of 26 different nations, including the United States. The Court concluded that the habeas statute extends to American citizens held overseas by American forces operating subject to an American chain of command, even when those forces are acting as part of a multinational coalition.255Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109–148, § 1005(e)(1) (providing that “no court . . . shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider . . . an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by . . . an alien detained . . . at Guantanamo Bay”). After the Court decided, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), that this language of the Detainee Treatment Act did not apply to detainees whose cases were pending at the time of enactment, the language was amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109–366, to also apply to pending cases where a detainee had been determined to be an enemy combatant.256553 U.S. 723 (2008).257U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9, cl. 2 provides: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” In Boumediene, the government argued only that the Suspension Clause did not apply to the detainees; it did not argue that Congress had acted to suspend habeas.258“[G]iven the unique status of Guantanamo Bay and the particular dangers of terrorism in the modern age, the common-law courts simply may not have confronted cases with close parallels to this one. We decline, therefore, to infer too much, one way or the other, from the lack of historical evidence on this point.” 553 U.S. at 752.259553 U.S. at 764. “[Q]uestions of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical concerns, not formalism.” Id.260United States Adjutant-General, Federal Aid in Domestic Disturbances 1787–1903, S. Doc. No. 209, 57th Congress, 2d sess. (1903); Pollitt, Presidential Use of Troops to Enforce Federal Laws: A Brief History, 36 N.C. L. REV. 117 (1958). United States Marshals were also used on approximately 30 occasions. United States Commission on Civil Rights, Law Enforcement: A Report on Equal Protection in the South (Washington: 1965), 155–159.26110 U.S.C. §§ 331–334, 3500, 8500, deriving from laws of 1795, 1 Stat. 424; 1861, 12 Stat. 281; and 1871, 17 Stat. 14.262The other instances were in domestic disturbances at the request of state governors.263Proc. No. 3204, 22 Fed. Reg. 7628 (1957); E.O. 10730, 22 Fed. Reg. 7628. See 41 Ops. Atty. Gen. 313 (1957); see also, Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Aaron v. McKinley, 173 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Ark. 1959), aff’d sub nom Faubus v. Aaron, 361 U.S. 197 (1959); Faubus v. United States, 254 F.2d 797 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 829 (1958).264Proc. No. 3497, 27 Fed. Reg. 9681 (1962); E.O. 11053, 27 Fed. Reg. 9693 (1962). See United States v. Barnett, 346 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1965).265Proc. 3542, 28 Fed. Reg. 5707 (1963); E.O. 11111, 28 Fed. Reg. 5709 (1963); Proc. No. 3554, 28 Fed. Reg. 9861; E.O. 11118, 28 Fed. Reg. 9863 (1963). See Alabama v. United States, 373 U.S. 545 (1963).266Proc. No. 3645, 30 Fed. Reg. 3739 (1965); E.O. 11207, 30 Fed. Reg. 2743 (1965). See Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965).

British citizens of mainland UK classify themselves both as a collection of non-foreign countries and as a single country depending on the context/situation. The name United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland (at the time 1801–1922) has a definition of being the Union of the Kingdoms of England (and Principality of Wales), Kingdom of Scotland and Kingdom of Ireland. Following the declaration of independence from the Irish Republic from the UK it was just deemed a politically distinct but “non-foreign” country. The UK changed its definition to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Even to this day the UK has mainland UK with devolved Administrations.There is a continuous debate between the nationalists (who aren’t exactly Nationalistic as they want to break off from the UK to subjugate themselves as a much smaller weaker country to the EU) and Unionists who want to strengthen the UK. Two of the most popular UK petitions are regional based and relate to both Northern Ireland and Scotland’s place in the UK Union.Although often confused with mainland UK there are 3 Crown Dependencies.Crown dependencies - WikipediaAnd 14 British Overseas Territories which all have a distinct political relationship with the UK.United Kingdom (+overseas territories) in the World (+Antarctica claims) - British Overseas Territories - Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Overseas_Territories#/media/File:United_Kingdom_(+overseas_territories)_in_the_World_(+Antarctica_claims).svg)The nationalist and unionist debate to some extent continued across the British Empire. It ultimately led to the Commonwealth of nations is a voluntary organisation which consists of 53 members which were mostly former territories of the British Empire. The Commonwealth family of nations acknowledges that these nations have common values, to a large extent a common language (not just in terms of words English) but also a political language and an approach to free trade. The Commonwealth is more of a cultural association opposed to a trade block however.Commonwealth of Nations - WikipediaWithin such a large grouping some of the Commonwealth of Nations some of the countries have a stronger relationship to each other than others. With respect to the Crown there are 16 Commonwealth Realms (in Blue) which are widely regarded as independent countries but share the same Monarch Queen Elizabeth II as their Head of State. Former Commonwealth Realms (now constitutional Republics) are in Brown.Commonwealth realm - WikipediaThe UK Foreign Office was created in 1782 and later became the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 1962.Members from Commonwealth Countries are technically “not foreign in the UK” and have some limited advantages over non-Commonwealth citizens when it comes to elections and employment (in the Civil Service).There is a general statutory prohibition on the employment of aliens in the Civil Service. An alien is any person who is not a British or Commonwealth citizen, a British protected person or a citizen of the Republic of Ireland.Nationality rules - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk)Since 1973, the British Establishment had a European obsession and largely pushed European Ties and European trade at the expense of Commonwealth Ties and Commonwealth preferential trade. The latter had created a steady continuous backlash of Eurosceptism and great dissatisfaction with British Immigration policy. The anti-Brexit media reported it usually exclusively as Brits being against immigration. They failed to cover the aspects of reciprocal British emigration in particular the affinity of the British public to the other Commonwealth Realms which the British Government state are foreign but previously treated as foreign on the UK border.Freedom of movement: how many Brits were up for living and working in the EU anyway? | YouGovThere is a two-thirds majority for free movement between Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the UK (“CANZUK”). This is a clear-cut example of where immigration policy can be liberalised with public support. Free movement between these countries should be introduced immediately, ideally on a reciprocal basis, or unilaterally if not. This could potentially be extended to other countries, if and when there is public support for it.Immigration: Picking the low-hanging fruits — Institute of Economic Affairs (iea.org.uk)There is a building political support for the UK to increase its ties with Canada, Australia and New Zealand post-Brexit.Who do voters want to trade with after Brexit? | YouGovLabour voters are in general the most protectionist and afraid of Free Trade with the USA, India, China, Israel and Russia. This is less so with the other Commonwealth Realms.These countries in Blue have already formed a trade block with Japan known as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Post-Brexit (the first failed deadline) the UK egates were updated to support the following passports. Previously all non-EEA/EU passports were unfortunately in the other category.The first trade deal the UK signed post-Brexit was with Japan. Japan wanted a separate FTA before giving the green light to the UK to apply to join the CPTPP. The UK joining the CPTPP has been widely encouraged in particular by Australia, New Zealand and Canada (i.e. other Commonwealth Realms). Britain is Canadas 2nd closest military partner and its 1st country for trade in Europe. Britain is also part of the Five Powers Defence Arrangement which covers Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia and Britain.Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership - WikipediaIf you compare the map with the CPTPP with the Commonwealth Realms you can see a substantial similarity. One can postulate that the other Commonwealth Realms as well as other allies may associate with the CPTPP in the years to follow after the UK also joins.When it comes to having an Empire under the previous model of the British Empire the main advantages are:Common values and common standardsFree TradeReciprocal Research and DevelopmentMutual DefenceThe main disadvantage is:Cost of administering anempirePolitical instability due to centralisationOrganisations such as the UN and NATO were made to roughly mimic some of the advantages of having an Empire. i.e. to push free trade and to group together as a collection to stop a war. The UN however has tried to expand too much and pretty much compromised on its core values becoming quite ineffective in general.Having a trade block (that isn’t centralised) and more or less encourages a set of bilaterals to be separately negotiated between each of the countries more or less gives each country the advantages of being in an empire without the disadvantages of being in an empire. This model is vastly different to European Union as it does not allow the UK and ROI for example to maintain as close a bilateral relationship as both countries desire without interference from other countries such as France, Germany and Belgium.While the UK was a member of the EU it actively encouraged both the EU to join the CPTPP and also the USA. It is aiming for as a free a trade as possible between the UK and these three trade blocks.Following the vote for Brexit and the intent for the UK to join the CPTPP, the Canadian Conservative Party has stated that a Canada, Australia, New Zealand and United Kingdom alliance is his flagship game-changing policy. This is supported also by the NZ National and NZ ACT parties. It has wide support in the Australian Liberal Party and in the UK Conservative Party. A UK CANZUK All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) has been setup. Left wing support for CANZUK is there, the Australian Liberal Democrats support the policies of CANZUK for example but don’t mention it directly. These four countries have a very closely aligned foreign policy and are routinely sending out joint statements at the United Nations and acting together when it comes to China and the situation in Hong Kong.The next crucial point to understand is that at the height of empire there was no internet with more or less instant access video conferencing and shipping took its time. i.e. the world wasn’t what we are used to today.The first cross-continental communication technology was the trans-Atlantic cable installed between the United Kingdom (Scotland) to Canada (Newfoundland).Transatlantic communications cable - WikipediaCompare the quote from Wikipedia talking about historic shipping times to the recent announcement by Qantas which shows that modern technology has made the world in effect 100 times smaller.The clipper ships bound for Australia and New Zealand would call at a variety of ports. A ship sailing from Plymouth to Sydney, for example, would cover around 13,750 miles (22,130 km); a fast time for this passage would be around 100 days. Cutty Sark made the fastest passage on this route by a clipper, in 72 days.Clipper route - WikipediaQF10 departs London Heathrow at 13:15, arriving into Perth at 13:00 the next day.Fly non-stop to Australia | QantasBare in mind mail and any form of communication would also be back and forth via ship and therefore take 2×100 days opposed to a routine video conference carried out between Australia and the United Kingdom today.In the Kingdom of England (1215). The Magna Carta was special because it held the king accountable to the rule of law, just like his subjects.What is Magna Carta?This has became one of the bedrocks of British society and across the Commonwealth. Many European countries are more politically centralised than the UK and this was reflected in their empires.The two factors above played a substantial role in 13 colonies of the first British Empire. After a war between the British and French empires in Canada. Taxes were raised to cover the cost of the war and defence costs. There were also policies against land expansion in the 13 colonies. British citizens in the 13 colonies were not happy that weren’t politically represented in the House of Commons and this was partially due to the distance between the 13 colonies and the UK. The distance also led to a lack of accountability and abhorrent practices that violated human rights such as slavery. Not that they would have been perfect in the mainland UK at that time either.The distance and lack of political accountability led to the American revolution where British subjects seeked their rights for self-determination under the Magna Carta. It is important to note that the population size of the 13 colonies and the UK were vastly different to the population size of the UK and USA today.From Wikipedia in 1800 (although the figures are likely widely inaccurate) just after the American Revolution the population recorded for the British Empire was:10,481,401 Kingdom of Great Britain5,200,000 Kingdom of Ireland40,340,098 British India300,000 Canada436,600 British Caribbean5,200 Australia15,000 Belize4,000 BermudaGibraltar 15,000And for the 13 Colonies:10,849,620Following the Revolutionary War. The relationship between the British Empire and the United States has been relatively close. However given this happened relatively early on, it likely changed the UKs approach to Empire building when compared to other European nations.In 1801 the Kingdom of Great Britain and the Kingdom of Ireland were United to form the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in the second act of Union. In 1867, Canada’s first Prime Minister Sir John A McDonald wanted to rebrand Canada, “the Kingdom of Canada”. Presumably a move like this would have eventually led to “The United Kingdom of Canada, Great Britain and Ireland”. However the move was blocked by the foreign office as they didn’t want to antagonise relations with the United States. He instead used a Latin word Dominion (which essentially meant Kingdom).The term Dominion was however very loosely defined and changed over the years. Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Ireland all became Dominions. 59 years later the Balfour declaration became an important definition for Dominion:The Balfour Declaration of 1926 recognised the Dominions as "autonomous Communities within the British Empire", and the 1931 Statute of Westminster confirmed their full legislative independence.Dominion - WikipediaIndia became a Dominion in 1947 shortly before becoming independent and breaking up into India and Pakistan where they became Republics. South Africa became a Republic in 1961. Ireland severed its link with the Monarchy in the Republic of Ireland Act 1948.In Canada, Australia and New Zealand the term Dominion became less commonly used and has effectively been superseded by the term Commonwealth Realm which have been mentioned above.