71st Transportation Battalion: Fill & Download for Free

This is not an account from myself, however, I’d like to share what it was like to experience combat for the first time through the eyes of a South Vietnamese soldier.This account was written by Doan Phuong Hai, a member of the 7th Airborne Batt. (TD7ND) and served during the entirety of the war from what I understand. It was originally written in Vietnamese, but I’ve translated it into English. His first taste of fighting occurred at the disastrous Battle of Dong Xoai in 1965 which was a major defeat for the South Vietnamese. Here is his account.Biography of the Author: Doan Phuong Hai graduated with Class 19 from the Da Lat Military Academy in 1964 and was assigned to the 7th Airborne Battalion. After being severely wounded during the Battle of Dong Xoai in 1965, he was initially transferred to the Gia Dinh Police, and then to the Military Police, where he was assigned to guard Prisoner of War (POW) camps in Bien Hoa and on Phu Quoc Island. Shortly before the 1968 Tet Offensive, he was able to get transferred back to the Airborne and was assigned to the 11th Airborne BattalionDong Xoai - Memories that are Difficult to Forget Dedicated to the memory of Tran Tri Dung, Vietnamese Military Academy Class 19, and the other comrades-in-arms who were lost at Dong XoaiIn late 1964, Dung, Nhut, Rot, and I, who had all graduated from the Military Academy together, were assigned to the 7th Airborne Battalion, which was stationed at the Bien Hoa Airfield. Bien Hoa was a military city, complete with bars, American soldiers, and naive country girls who had swarmed in from poverty-stricken remote villages to try to make money off the foreigners in the many bars that had sprouted up like mushrooms in the city. Bien Hoa, which was 30 miles from Saigon, was also famous for the memorial statue of a soldier sitting with his rifle laid across his thighs overlooking the Army Cemetery outside the city.The 7th Airborne Battalion had been formed during the last years of the French-Vietnamese war in the mountain jungle region next to Laos, stretching from Hoa Binh through Nassan and Dien Bien Phu.When I was first assigned to the battalion, I found that there were still many ethnic Cambodian, Montagnard, and Nung soldiers. These grizzled veterans had lived through many battles, from the burning desert sands of Algeria in Africa while serving with the French Army’s Foreign Legion to the bloody battlefields of the highlands of North Vietnam. I heard many war stories told by Captain Nham, Captain Hai, “Old Man” Phat, and Captain Dien about the bloody battles fought in Hoa Binh and on the hill-top positions at Dien Bien Phu.On Christmas of 1964, during my first confusing days with the unit, I had accompanied Phan Nhat Nam out to the Tan Phong forest on the outer security perimeter of the Bien Hoa Airfield. Lolling in our hammocks, we shared a piece of pastry and sips of a hot liquor that let us feel every artery and vein in our bodies. We heard the booms of artillery guns echoing from the direction of Tan Uyen and the roar of jets laden with bombs taking off for night bombing missions. We were quietly listening to a small, pocket-sized radio when the playing of hymns and the pealing of church bells made us suddenly realize that it was Christmas Eve! The night that Christ was born, Christ who had come to bring peace to the world, but mankind was still suffering from the miseries and loss of war.In the six months since I left the military academy I had been sent to many places: From An Khe and Cu Chi to Binh Ba-Binh Gia, and now, this mid-night, I was slinging my pack onto my back for another operation. The cool morning air woke me up as we drove past the bars and Ha Tien cement plant, and then down the main highway that we could see dimly by the streetlights. The truck convoy carried us troops through the streets of the city while Saigon was still sleeping. The street-sweepers stopped sweeping to wave at us, and then they returned to sweeping away the dry leaves that the rush of our speeding trucks had scattered across the streets of the city.On 9 June 1965 our battalion arrived at the rear base of the 8th Airborne Battalion on the Tan Son Nhat Airbase and waited for the aircraft that would fly us up to Phuoc Long. The front pages of the newspapers were emblazoned with reports of the fighting in Dong Xoai. We had not even left for the city yet, but the press was already reporting that “tomorrow the 7th Airborne Battalion will be sent to Phuoc Long and will then be landed by helicopter in an area north of Dong Xoai.”We cursed to ourselves, saying: “Those fuckers! We have not even received our official orders yet and have not yet received the battle plan, and yet these journalists have already drawn sketches of our landing zone and have all the details. How the hell are we supposed to be able to fight?”Some high-ranking officer in a pressed and starched uniform and wearing spit-shines shoes must have wanted to make himself look important in the eyes of some journalists.Early on the morning of 10 June, our unit was flown up to Phuoc Long. The C-123’s roared down to the end of the runway and we ran out of the aircraft through the big cargo door at the tail end of the aircraft. We moved quickly into the rubber trees next to the airfield to wait to be helicoptered up to the area north of Dong Xoai the next morning. I told several of my friends that yesterday’s newspaper reports had been correct - we were indeed going to be landed by helicopter north of the town. We slung our hammocks between rubber trees to wait for the next morning, when we would be landed in the battle area.From the radio we heard the voice of a female announcer in the rear area sending sweet words of greetings to the “beloved soldiers in the remote corners of our country.”Dong Xoai, whose official administrative name was Don Luan, was located on Route 14 in Phuoc Long Province, more than 70 kilometers north of Saigon. The vast rubber tree plantation stretched all the way to Quan Loi in Binh Long Province. On the morning of 11 June, a helicopter unit transported us to Dong Xoai. The helicopter carrying Bony Nam [Phan Nhat Nam] had just taken off when it experienced a mechanical problem and crashed. From high above I saw smoke swirling around the helicopter’s fuselage. Bony Nam was injured and had to remain behind at Phuoc Long. The other soldiers said to one another, “Well, he’s lucky. He gets to return home to ‘hug his wife’ for 29 days before he gets a medical clearance. Secretly though, I thought to myself: “Damn, we’ve lost a helicopter before even entering the fight. That is a bad omen for us!”I sat in the chopper with my legs dangling outside the cabin. The sky was blue, with a few wispy clouds floating beneath us. The cold wind blowing into my uniform made me shiver. Dong Xoai came into view. Smoke and flames enveloped the district capital. From high in the air I saw the town market sitting right beside the highway, several brick houses standing out from among the areas of tin-roofed houses and thatched-roofed huts spread along a few paved streets.The helicopter landed us right on the main highway north of the town. I led my platoon quickly into an area of charred, destroyed houses along both sides of the road. The stench made me want to vomit; bodies of our soldiers and enemy soldiers were strewn throughout the streets of the town. A pack of owner-less dogs barked loudly at the sound of the helicopters and then ran away, disappearing into the forest. The 52nd Ranger Battalion had arrived in Dong Xoai the day before, but because they did not have enough men they had only searched and set up defensive positions in the western part of the district capital.I led my men in running towards the eastern part of town. Collapsed buildings and body were everywhere. A dead young boy with his eyes still open wide, sat leaning against a wall with bullet wounds all over his body. He had died without having time to close his wide-open eyes and mouth after being terrified by the sight of a man wearing rubber sandals and a pith helmet firing AK bullets into him! A mother lay dead clutching her suckling baby to her breast, her arm still holding the baby tightly as if to try to block the bullets that had riddled her body. An ox lay dead on the side of the road, killed while pulling an ox-cart filled with the bodies of dead Viet Cong.Scattered along the highway were a few bicycles and a truck from the plantation loaded with enemy bodies that had been hit by a bomb. The truck was still smoking and stank with the smell of dead bodies. The battalion was ordered to chase the enemy out toward the Thuan Loi Plantation, located more than six kilometers north of Dong Xoai. The 72nd Company was the lead company and my platoon was the lead assault platoon. My soldiers said to me: “Sir, since the day your arrived at our platoon, we have always been ordered to take the lead. This is too hard on us, Lieutenant!” I raised my arms to sky and laughed, then I followed my lead soldiers. We had advanced about two kilometers out from the district headquarters when I saw several charred, burnt-out helicopters sitting very close to the highway in an area of young, immature rubber trees.Our unit spread out and deployed around the rubber forest area to collect the bodies of soldiers from our 5th Infantry Division who had been ambushed when the helicopters landed them to relieve and clear Dong Xoai. The massive firepower of an entire enemy regiment had been waiting for them when the helicopters landed, so they had suffered very heavy casualties.Under the blazing summer sun, we quickly became exhausted as we recovered the bodies and collected them all in one area. My nose grew swollen and red from the bottle of fragrant Nhi Thien Duong oil that I used to cover the stench from the bodies, and my arms grew numb from the exertion of pulling the dead bodies to the collection site. It had been only a little over two days, but the bodies were virtually falling apart from rotting under the hot sun and the heavy downpours of the early days of the rainy season. I shivered involuntarily and got goosebumps when I saw ants crawling out of the ears, noses, and eyes of the dead.The clouds of buzzing flies swarming around the bodies and my eyes simply took my breath away. I suddenly crazed a cigarette but I did not dare to stick my hand into my pocket to get one because my hand stank with the stench of death. After we had carried several dozen bodies to the collection point, darkness began to fall. The battalion moved almost a kilometer to the north and searched the surrounding area to prepare to set up there for the night. I was starving because I had not eaten anything since breakfast, so I opened a can of meat and a bag of milled rice. The pork was covered with a layer of grease that looked so much like the rotting flesh of the dead bodies I had seen that afternoon that I vomited. I smoked continuously, and my heart was filled with sadness. …The next morning, when we woke up, we learned that a soldier from 74th Company had been killed when a large branch had fallen on him while he was sleeping. Using Route 14 as its guideline, the battalion conducted a sweep up the left side of the road through thick rubber tree vegetation; on the right side of the forest was an area of banana orchards and sugar cane fields farmed by the local civilians. The battalion split into two columns. The first column consisted of the 72nd Company, including the lead company, followed by 70th Company, the battalion headquarters, and the 71st Company bringing up the rear. The second column consisted of the 74th Company, leading in an extended combat formation, followed by the 73rd company. A number of civilians along with several ARVN 5th Division soldiers who had become separated from their unit who were fleeing down the highway toward Dong Xoai told us that there were very large numbers of Viet Cong who totally filled several portions of the rubber tree forest and at the Thuan Loi Plantation.A few enemy troops appeared in front of us and gunfire started to crackle. It was shortly before 3:00 in the afternoon of 12 June that Captain Phat, the Commander of 74th Company, had just captured a prisoner. Preliminary interrogation of the prisoner had disclosed that the enemy, consisting of the Q726th and Q763rd Regiments, were deployed in ambush positions intending to wipe out our Airborne unit to mark the formation of the VC 7th Division. Enemy troops were running around visibly at the edge of the tree line in an effort to entice us to chase them deep into the forest. I reported this to my superiors, but I was ordered to continue to advance.We began to get glimpses of a large number of red brick houses and of an airstrip through the leaves of the trees. I saw Dung off on my left moving his troops up parallel to my platoon. Large numbers of enemy troops could be seen right along the tree-line and in several houses on the right. Second Lieutenant Do’s troops opened fire to prevent the enemy from blocking the way to the airstrip. Enemy 12.7mm machine-guns and all kinds of other weapons suddenly opened up on us accompanied by shells from several 82mm mortars emplaced behind several lines of houses on the other side of the airstrip. Volleys of mortar shells rained down on us. I radioed a request for artillery and air strikes, but Captain Dien just cursed in response because the Operations Command Headquarters had refused to allow artillery fire or air strikes because they said there still were still large numbers of civilians inside the plantation compound. I shouted into my radio, “What fucking civilians? They’re all VC!” I could not understand where the Headquarters had gotten their information. I was there right on the front, and I could not see any civilians. All I could see was men wearing yellow-green khaki uniforms and pith helmets running all around the area of the rubber processing compound and the adjacent housing compounds.I was ordered to take and occupy the tree-line and several houses nearby to serve as a springboard from which to launch an attack across the airstrip to destroy the 82mm mortars and several heavy machine-guns firing from a water tower. I muttered to myself, “Death is certain for all of us. How can a 26-man platoon be expected to charge across an airstrip to take a few mortars?” But I was a soldier, so I had to obey orders. I was only a 2nd lieutenant, and if I refused I would be reduced in rank to a buck private! However, charging across an airstrip, almost 200 meters of flat, open space into a curtain of fire from enemy guns and heavy weapons that were just waiting for us meant that not one of us would survive to return to our base. Well, I thought, first we’ll take the tree-line and the houses, and then we’ll decide what to do next. Therefore, I directed our 57mm recoilless rifle to destroy the houses and pound the rubber-trees along the tree-line.Using the bloody experience of veteran soldiers with many years of combat under their belts, the 26 of us charged forward with all the strength our legs could muster in a race with death, ignoring the bullets that cracked past our ears. We directed all of our fire to our front, throwing hand grenades, stabbing with bayonets, and jumping over the heads of enemy troops, striving to make every action quick and precise in order to kill the enemy and save our own lives.We were able to capture the tree-line, which was strewn with bodies of enemy soldiers in a line of foxholes beside the trunks of the trees. We had only a very short distance to go to capture the houses. Our 57mm gunner again concentrated his fire on trying to knock down two rows of houses as we simultaneously used grenades to capture and occupy the first house. Enemy bodies were scattered amongst the piles of bricks, but gunfire continued as we eliminated the last enemy troops who were sill resisting.Through the fog of gun smoke and bullets, I reached the place where several soldiers had been wounded and sadly closed the eyes of two who had been killed and broke off the metal tags on which were recorded the name, age, service number, and blood type of each soldier. At this same time, at a place far away, in a rear base next to a rubber plantation, children would be playing in a classroom and young wives would be preparing dinner or sitting at a window thinking about their husbands. The wives would suddenly hear the bugle call for the lowering of the flag at the end of the day. If the husband had been back at the rear base, he would soon be coming home for dinner - but the wife did not know that when the bugle call ended and the NCO folded the flag that at that very time her husband’s unit was engaged in heavy fighting and that her husband would never be coming home!It suddenly grew very windy and the forest turned dark because of an oncoming line of dark clouds. The rain poured down in buckets. Captain Dien, my company commander, and 2nd Lt. Do ran to the place where I was located. I pointed across to the other side of the airstrip and told him that when the enemy mortar fire ended, the enemy would launch an all-out assault, and that they would swing around to hit our battalion’s flank and rear. Looking through his binoculars, the captain saw everything. He nodded his head in agreement with me and then moved back to the rear.The rain was still pouring down. I gave the 57mm recoilless to Lt. Do. With the senses of an old fox who had almost 20 years of combat experience, having risen from the rank of buck private to second lieutenant, Do just shook his head and said to me, “We are surrounded by more than a regiment of enemy troops.” He squeezed my hand tightly, then his bent-over shadow could be seen moving through the charred walls of the collapsed house as he returned to his platoon. The scars on his gaunt old face were blackened with gunpowder. Do used the 57mm to take out the enemy machine-gun nests on the water tower.On the other side of the airstrip, the 82mm mortars ceased firing and swarms of enemy troops, as thick as ants, were reinforcing the enemy attack columns attacking the flank and rear of 71st and 73rd Companies. Our unit was surrounded, with the airstrip on one side and the open highway on the other. Our Airborne soldiers had only the section of forest in between which we could use to try to fight against the enemy’s bloody assault waves. We, who were professional soldiers right there on the front line, had clearly reported that there were no more civilians left in the plantation compound and that the enemy was massing more than a regiment of troops there, so why were they still refusing to provide us with artillery and air support? It was clear to me that our stupid senior commanders wanted to kill us; they wanted to allow two enemy regiments to annihilate our Airborne troopers. I watched as enemy troops moved around out in the open, out of range of our individual weapons, and I did not know what to do. If we were given the same air and artillery support we had received in previous battles, we could have taken on an entire enemy regiment!War has some extremely bitter moments. We knew we were about to die but all we could do was to close our eyes and wave our arms in the face of decisions made by our incompetent commanders. In extremely dangerous circumstances such as the one we were in, we had the right to think for ourselves and to curse our commanders!Through the rain I saw the enemy begin to launch their attack across the airstrip. Guns of all calibers opened fire as screams rang out from the enemy troops as bullets and shells ripped through their bodies. The enemy set up a medium machine gun, using the bodies of their dead as a shield from our bullets. Pieces of flesh erupted into the air when the bodies were hit by our bullets. The blood from the carnage mixed with the heavy downpour, dyeing the airstrip a bright red. Like moths rushing to a flame, the enemy insanely launched a third assault across the airstrip, but even though they used the bodies of their comrades to shield themselves, we stopped the enemy dead in the middle of the airstrip. Claymore mines blew away groups of enemy troops who had managed to get in close to our defense line. Enemy bodies were blown into the air and pieces of flesh and bone rained down on our heads and shoulders. The enemy stopped their attack, probably because of their heavy losses. The sounds of gunfire continued from all around us. Suddenly, I heard the voice of Captain Nham, our Battalion Commander, over my radio. He told me that Captain Dien had been killed, and he ordered me to collect the company and move back to the rear to help hold off the enemy’s overwhelming assault waves. I asked him why we still had not received any artillery or air support. He responded by cursing loudly into his radio microphone, then he told me that the Operation Headquarters still refused to authorize air or artillery support because they had an intelligence report that there were still civilians inside the plantation compound!At that moment, Sergeant Major Tang Man Tai reported to me that 2nd Lt. Do had been killed. I remembered his tight squeeze of my hand and his sad eyes from our last meeting that afternoon. After twenty years of near constant fighting, he was now truly gone. I silently told Do, “Rest in peace” and prayed that he would not be so weary and tired in his next life.The rain continued to fall. It was now after 6:00 in the afternoon, and the fighting continued along the edge of the forest, with our troops and enemy soldiers screaming at each other and fighting one another for the cover of individual rubber tree trunks. Our battalion’s casualties continued to increase and there were bodies strewn everywhere. I ran into Captain Phat, the Commander of 74th Company. I asked him about Dung. He shook his head and said that Dung had been killed right next to the airstrip while his men were attacking a line of brick houses next to the airstrip after they had destroyed several enemy machine-gun nests and 82mm mortar positions. Stunned by the news, I stumbled over to Corporal Phan Nien’s medium machine-gun, which was continuing to fire at the enemy. Not far from me, Captain Nham, our battalion commander who had taken over command of the battalion only a little over a month before, was shouting into his radio. Captain Hai, the 73rd Company Commander who was concurrently the deputy battalion commander, had just been killed. That stubborn old soldier who had fought in Laos and at the outpost named Beatrice at Dien Bien Phu was gone!First Lieutenant Hop, the 70th Company Commander, dove in beside me. He said that the 73rd and 71st Companies were fighting against enemy human-wave assaults being launched from the direction of Route 14 and the two sides were engaged in close-quarters combat on the road surface itself. Corporal Thang buckled over just as he was fired his M-79. He had been hit by an enemy bullet. I heard the bullet rip through his body and shatter his chest. I hugged my AR-15 and rolled over to another tree-trunk. At that moment an enemy grenade exploded. I fired a burst from my rifle. Several Viet Cong charged toward me and I emptied a magazine from my AR-15 into them, blasting them backward. As I heard a scream from 1st Lt. Hop, I glanced over and saw Captain Nham, wearing a rain poncho, running toward me. He was firing his folding-stock M2 carbine at a group of enemy soldiers charging toward him. Filled with blood-lust, I stood up and raked the enemy soldiers with an entire magazine from my AR-15. Captain Nham waved at me and then ran on, accompanied by his bodyguards.I jumped over the bodies and ran toward the highway. Several enemy 12.7mm machine-guns were tearing apart the tree-line and the road’s surface, cutting down any soldier who tried to cross the road to get to the banana orchard on the other side of the highway. Bodies of both our soldiers and enemy soldiers littered the road and lay across the barbed wire fence next to the banana orchard.Several soldiers from the 71st Company told me that 1st Lt. Ky, their company commander, had been killed as well. I tried calling out on my radio but I did not hear the voice of my battalion commander. Captain Phat came on the radio and said that the commander was fighting the enemy near the highway.Our battalion had virtually disintegrated. All four company commanders were dead and we had lost contact with the battalion commander. Suddenly I saw stars in front of my eyes, like someone had slapped my face. My arm flew upward and the AR-15 dropped from my grasp. I collapsed next to Corporal Phan Nien’s medium machine-gun, who continued to spray bullets at the enemy.When I recovered consciousness, it was almost dark. The rain was no longer coming down in large drops, but it was continuing to drip down in the rubber tree forest. The body of an enemy soldier lay across my stomach and his pith helmet lay right next to my face, making me feel like I couldn’t breathe. My face and my right army were numb and hurt like hell. I made an effort to pull my left arm out from under the enemy body. My watch said it was a little past 7:00 in the evening, and the sky was still light.I raised my left hand to my face. A bullet had cut through the bridge of my nose and my cheekbone. I was bleeding heavily and my face was swollen and so numb that I could not feel anything. My right arm had been pierced by two AK bullets, and the four holes were blackened by powder-burns.The raindrops finally woke me up completely. I was able to pull up my knees,and with my last bit of strength I was able to push the dead body off to one side. The enemy’s chest had been ripped wide open, and his bloody stomach and intestines had dyed my entire face and torso red with blood. I crawled to the foot of a rubber tree and lay there un-moving because of my extreme pain and exhaustion.There were now only a few scattered shots from both sides that could be heard. The enemy soldiers shouted out to each other and they began to police up the battlefield, searching and cursing as they went because of their tremendous losses in the just-concluded battle. Several enemy soldiers walked past the place where I was laying. Seeing the rank insignia on my shirt-collar, one of them let out a curse in a Northern accent, kicked my leg, and then bent down to look. I held my breath and was waiting for death when I felt the cold steel of an AK bayonet rake across my face. It was still raining, and perhaps the bleeding wounds on my face, the blackened bullet-holes in my arm, and the bloody chunks of intestine still sticking to my stomach made them think that I was dead. Cursing, they turned me over so they could take my cartridge belt off, which also contained my glasses and my transistor radio. Then they took my watch off my wrist, one of them stuck it in his pocket, and then they left. I heard the Viet Cong soldiers arguing about how to share the things they had taken from me. Tears began to fill my eyes as I thought about how my mother prayed at the altar for my good fortune every day.I truly had been granted a great deal of good fortune. I began to feel cold as if the cold rain penetrated right through me. I had virtually no strength left because I had lost so much blood. I crawled over to Corporal Tam’s body, pulled off his poncho and used it to cover my head and my chest, and then laid there next to the body of my radioman. The two of us laid there, one dead and one still alive, with our bodies curled up next to each other. I looked at Tam sadly, reminiscing on all of the good and bad times we’ve had together since I had been assigned to the platoon. I thought about my parents. At this time they would have been eating dinner. They would have certainly thought about me and my mother would have run over to the family altar and lit an incense stick to pray for me. As I faded from consciousness, I thought about Dung, my closest friend at the Academy and in the battalion, someone who often told me what I should do, but who still always hung around with me when we had free time at our unit. The image of Dung appeared in my mind….[Long section in which the author has a mental conversation with the dead Lt. Tran Tri Dung, recalling their past history together]The rain stopped and it was completely dark. I heard the sounds of aircraft and parachute flares lit up the night sky. Enemy soldiers were gathering and calling out to one another as they moved down the highway. They were using several large trucks and dozens of ox-carts from the plantation to transport their wounded.In the light of the flares, I saw large numbers of enemy soldiers, thick as ants, moving up the highway headed northward from the plantation. An hour later they used more trucks and ox-carts to carry off their dead, and then they all disappeared. I crawled over to the medical bag carried by our medic, who lay dead nearby. I took out a bottle iodine and alcohol and poured the contents on the wounds on my arm and on my face. Then I used my red neck scarf, the company insignia of 72nd Company, to wrap around my wounded arm and then tied the scarf around my neck to support my arm. In the light of the flares, I crawled forward and I encountered many bodies.I heard the sounds of fighter aircraft in the sky above and hurriedly crawled behind a tree-trunk. The aircraft’s machine-guns strafed the ground, and then it dropped bombs that whistled through the air into this patch of trees. I shook from the concussion and blood ran from my mouth because the bomb exploded too close to me. I cursed the pilot for dropping bombs on us after the battle was already over, while during the afternoon battle we had not received even a single round of artillery support! Totally exhausted, I passed out amidst the echoing bomb explosions.[More mental conversations with the dead Lt. Dung]Almost two days later, after falling down countless times and struggling to stand back up again, I ran into a few fellow soldiers who were also lost. Only then did I realize how deep was the feeling of true brotherhood between soldiers on the battlefieldBy the time I reached Dong Xoai, my wounds had changed color, my flesh had begun to smell and was infected. Dr. Dam treated me solicitously and I waited for an aircraft to transport me to the Cong Hoa Hospital [the main Army Hospital in Saigon]. When I walked past the operations room, I stuck my head in and asked why we had not been given any air or artillery support, but since I was just a 2nd Lieutenant, no one bothered to give me an answer. In fact, what I received in return was a statement that I will not forget for as long as I live: “You’re just a lieutenant. What the hell do you know! Get out of here. It’s still early in the morning and here you are making so much noise that the boss won’t be able to sleep! Be careful or we’ll lock you up right now!”I cursed the entire operations room and grabbed an M2 carbine that was propped up against the wall. Several officers and MPs grabbed me and pulled me outside. The kind of soldierly fellowship that was present in that goddamned operations room turned my stomach!When I got back to the Cong Hoa Hospital, I ran into Bony Nam [Phan Nhat Nam] and a number of other friends who were being treated there. Only then did I learn that two VC regiments, the Q762 and Q763 Regiments, had attacked Dong Xoai and ambushed the 7th Airborne Battalion in order to mark the formation of the National Liberation Front’s 7th Division. The Viet Cong had two entire regiments at full personnel strength and armed with modern weapons like AK-47s and B-40 rocket launchers that were being used on our battlefield for the first time, while our Airborne troops had only three AR-15s and M-79s in each platoon - at this time, those were the most modern weapons possessed by the South Vietnamese Army.Our battalion commander, deputy battalion commander, all four company commanders and many other officers had been killed. I was the only wounded officer who had been able to make it back several days later. Our battalion had been shattered - more than 200 soldiers had been killed and so many others had been wounded. Bony Nam and I felt sick with sorrow and pain. We walked the halls of the Cong Hoa Hospital and met with soldiers from the battalion’s other companies. They told us that Dung had led his platoon in destroying the 82mm mortar and machine-gun emplacements, they described how he fought the enemy hand to hand and how he had fallen when the enemy overwhelmed his platoon with a force many times as large. They also told us how Captain Phat had led some of the surviving soldiers in a fight that lasted all night and how he had withdraw to the banana orchard on the other side of the road and waited there for reinforcements, but after waiting and waiting uselessly, they had finally returned to Dong Xoai.A number of soldiers had followed Nhut in fighting their way to the other side of the barbed wire fence along the highway and then had waited there to collect soldiers who had become separated from their units and to collect the wounded. This group had not pulled back to the district capital until the next day. No one knew what had happened to Rot. Some said he had been killed but others said he had been captured. Two days after the battle, Captain Phat and 1st Lt. Nhat, along with the Rangers, had come back to Dong Xoai to collect the bodies of our dead comrades and evacuate them from the battlefield.[Translator’s Note: Phan Nhat Nam, in his book “Mark of a Combat Soldier” [Dau Binh Lua], published in Saigon in 1973, tells this same story and sources the story to his friend “Hai” (the author of this account, Doan Phuong Hai), who told it to him after the battle. The only significant difference between this story and the one told in Phan Nhat Nam’s book is that in this book Nam is reported to have been injured in a helicopter crash that occurred at the airstrip from which the helicopters took off to assault the Dong Xoai area, while in Nam’s book Nam says that he had stayed back at the battalion’s rear base because he was still recuperating from a stomach wound he suffered in an operation to clear Route 19 in the An Khe area in the Central Highlands in March 1965. It is probable that Phan Nhat Nam’s version of the reason he did not participate in this operation is the correct one.

Q. What was the morale like for the ARVN troops during the Battle of Xuan Loc in April 1975?A2A. Several excerpts about the meatgrinder battle of Xuan Loc.Battle of Xuan Loc is one great story not because many military tacticians, historians, or journalists have praised the successful repulse of one ARVN battered Division against four fully equipped PAVN Divisions backed with Regiments of tanks and artillery. It was great because of the spirit of the men who made a stand and fought: when all senior and junior officers who participated in the battle knew they had been betrayed by their US ally, and when all the soldiers under their command had witnessed the debacle of their fellow comrades' units from the 1st and 2nd Regional Corps. On those darkest, grieving days of April 1975, the ARVN soldiers stood up and fought at Xuan Loc for just a few simple reasons: the pride of their units' colors, camaraderie, and duty.ARVN soldiers were brilliantly defiant. It became a prideful battle for them and the NVA had to commit 40,000 men to take on a single division that simply refused to budge. ARVN air support was amazing and dropped daisy cutter and CBUs causing heavy NVA casualties in one swoop.Some say it was Vietnam "Stalingrad" on a small scale.18th Division (South Vietnam)XUAN LOC: The Meatgrinder Battle of the Vietnam War, 1975Map of Battle Area18th Division (South Vietnam)ARVN Marine DivisionARVN Airborne DivisionARVN RangersSouth Vietnam Air ForceIt was the final curtain of a very long standing play spanning 30 years. Nobody would have ever guessed that it would end at Xuan Loc, let alone with the South Vietnamese 18th Division, known to be an unreliable unit. Yet, it was here at the small town that the division stood and the world watched in amazement the defiant, heroic last stand from April 9 to 21. The NVA really had not planned for such a battle, they too, were surprised for their Spring Offensive was steamrolling everywhere and now focusing on Saigon with huge forces. For the NVA 4th Corps with three divisions, they had been meeting little resistance as they traveled down Highway 1 and Highway 20. The ARVN 18th had already repulsed the NVA in mid-March but now had fallen back into their defensive positions in and around Xuan Loc. Then the miracle began. Xuan Loc was important to the NVA, vital to the ARVN. For the NVA, the main road to Bien Hoa and Saigon went through the town and they wanted to take the key airbase at Bien Hoa. For the ARVN, they were blocking the way and desperately needed a victory to maintain troop cohesion. The NVA chose to engage and use the battle as a “meatgrinder” to wear down the last ARVN blocking force.The ARVN soldiers were brilliantly defiant. It became a prideful battle for them and the NVA had to commit 40,000 men to take on a single division that simply refused to budge. ARVN air support was amazing and dropped daisy cutter and CBUs causing heavy NVA casualties in one swoop. The town changed hands many times. Eventually, numbers prevailed as losses mounted. By the 21st, the 18th Division had withdrawn safely to defend the Bien Hoa airbase.CBU-55 cluster bomb Fuel Air Explosive in Battle of Xuân LộcIn more detail........It all began April 9th, when NVA Infantry and tanks were preceded by an artillery bombardment of about 4,000 rounds, one of the heaviest in the war. With tanks firing down the streets, hand-to-hand fighting developed in a fierce battle that lasted until dusk. By that time, the 43d ARVN Infantry had driven most of the shattered enemy force from the town, and the 52d ARVN Infantry base on Route 20 was still in friendly hands. The enemy resumed the attack the next day, this time committing the 165th Regiment of the 7th NVA Division along with regiments from the 6th and 341st NVA Divisions. Again the attack failed.By the 12th, NVA losses had been at least 800 killed, 5 captured, 300 weapons captured, and 11 T-54 tanks destroyed. The small town of barely 5,000 lay in total ruin, Most of the locals had long vanished. Some say it was a Vietnam "Stalingrad" on a small scale. In Saigon, its leaders continued to wait, wait for the American supplies and more importantly, their B-52s to raze the area. Demolish the enemy.VNAF F-5Republic of Vietnam Airborne DivisionBy the 14th, Xuan Loc was held by the entire ARVN 18th Division, 1st Airborne Brigade, three Ranger battalions and two tank task forces. Communist losses were well over 1200 men, 30 T-55 tanks and over 200 weapons had been captured including a 37mm gun, ten mortars, several recoil less guns and 25 B-40 grenade launchers. The South Vietnamese Air Force had flown two resupply missions into the besieged town; on 12 April, CH-47 helicopters brought in 93 tons of artillery ammunition and on the 13th, 100 tons. The VNAF reactivated some A1-E fighter-bombers and used a modified C-130 transport to drop 15,000-pound bombs (flown in by the U.S. Air Force) on enemy positions. These airplanes flew against some of the most intense antiaircraft fire of the war.VNAF ground supportSouth Vietnam Air ForceMiles away, in Saigon, frantic activity prepared for the expected worse, despite the events at Xuan Loc. The inner defenses of Saigon were manned by territorials and a few regular formations, some of which had been recently reconstituted. Three Ranger groups were on the western approaches. The new 8th Ranger Group had its 1,600-man force near Phu Lam on the edge of Saigon where Route 4 enters the city from the Mekong Delta. Southwest of Phu Lam on Route 4 near Binh Chanh was the 6th Ranger Group, recently reorganized with about 2,600 men. North of the city was the newly organized 9th Ranger Group with about 1,900 men protecting Hoc Mon District only five kilometers north of Tan Son Nhut Air Base. Each group had four 105-mm. howitzers but little fire-direction equipment, and all were short of radios and machine guns.After a week of resisting all NVA attacks, the 18th Division and others were ordered to start withdrawal to Trang Bom and Bien Hoa. NVA force was growing rapidly. Elements of five NVA divisions were now in Long An and southwestern Hau Nghia: the 3d, 5th, 8th, and 9th Infantry Divisions and the 27th Sapper Division. Additionally, the 262d Antiaircraft Regiment and the 71st Antiaircraft Brigade had batteries near the Long An-Hau Nghia boundary.ARVN RangersAs the ARVN troops pulled back from Xuan Loc, much material was left, the armor task forces had lost half of its tanks and had no replacements. The 15th and 18th Armored Cavalry Squadrons had only six APC carriers. The 22nd Armor still possessed 25 M-48 tanks.NVA tank DestroyedNVA 130-mm. gun batteries were seen in the jungles north of Route 1, also moving toward Bien Hoa and on April 15th and 16th, the air base was hit by 122-mm. rockets damaging 6 F-5s and 14 A-37s. By the 20th, the huge airbase at Tan Son Nhut was evacuated as enemy troops approached and pounded its runways.Vietnam fell to the Communists by the end of the week, ending American involvement after 15 years of skirmishes and battles.Battle of Xuân LộcARVN 18th Division soldiers at Xuân Lộc [1]Location Xuân Lộc, Đồng Nai Province, South VietnamCommanders and leaders Hoàng Cầm, Lê Minh ĐảoGeneral Lê Minh Đảo, commander of the South Vietnamese army at Xuan Loc.Photos before BattleThe Battle of Xuan Loc (Vietnamese: Trận Xuân Lộc) was the last major battle of the Vietnam War in which the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) committed almost all their remaining mobile forces, especially the South Vietnamese 18th Infantry Division, under General Le Minh Dao to the defense of Xuân Lộc, hoping to stall the advance of the North Vietnamese Army. The battle was fought between April 9 and 21, 1975, and ended when the town of Xuân Lộcwas captured by the PAVN 4th Army Corps. This was the ARVN III Corps' last defensive line of South Vietnam's capital, Sài Gòn (Saigon). The line connected the city of Bình Dương, Biên Hoà Air Base, Vũng Tàu, Long An and the lynch pin centered on the strategic city of Xuân Lộc, where both the ARVN-JGS and RVNAF-JGS committed the nation's final reserve forces in Saigon's defense.Once Xuân Lộc fell on 21 April 1975, the PVN battled with the last remaining elements of III Corp Armored Task Force, remnants of the 18th Infantry Division, and depleted ARVN Marine, Airborne and Ranger Battalions in a fighting retreat that lasted nine days, until they reached Saigon and PVN armored columns crashed throughout the gates of South Vietnam's Presidential Palace on 30 April 1975, effectively ending the war.From the beginning of 1975, North Vietnam's military forces swept through the northern provinces of South Vietnam virtually unopposed. In the Central Highlands, South Vietnam's II Corps Tactical Zone was completely destroyed, whilst attempting to evacuate to the Mekong Delta region. In the cities of Huếand Da Nang, ARVN units simply dissolved without putting up resistance.The devastating defeats suffered by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam prompted South Vietnam's National Assembly to question President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu's handling of the war, thereby placing him under tremendous pressure to resign.In the last-ditch effort to save South Vietnam, Nguyễn Văn Thiệu ordered his last military units, namely the ARVN 18th Infantry Division "The Super Men", to hold Xuân Lộc at all cost.The North Vietnamese 4th Army Corps, on the other hand, was ordered to capture Xuân Lộc in order to open the gateway to Saigon.During the early stages of the battle, the ARVN 18th Infantry Division managed to beat off early attempts by the Communists to capture the town, forcing North Vietnamese commanders to change their battle plan.However, on April 19, 1975, Dao's forces were ordered to withdraw after Xuân Lộc was almost completely isolated, with all remaining units badly mauled. The 18th disintegrated shortly afterward.This defeat also marked the end of Thiệu's political career, as he resigned on 21 April 1975.Contents1 Background2 Order of Battle 2.1 South Vietnam 2.2 North Vietnam3 Prelude4 Defense and Fall of Xuan Loc5 Aftermath 5.1 Military outcome 5.2 Political outcome6 Notes7 References8 External linksBackgroundIn the first half of 1975, the government of the Republic of Vietnam was in deep political turmoil, which reflected the military situation on the battlefield. At least two assassination attempts specifically targeting President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu were foiled. On January 23, a South Vietnamese army officer tried to shoot President Thieu with his pistol but failed. The officer was subsequently tried by a military court.On April 4, South Vietnamese pilot Nguyen Thanh Trung bombed the Independence Palace with his F-5 Tiger. It later turned out that the pilot had been an undercover member of the Viet Cong since 1969.Following those failed assassination attempts, President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu grew suspicious of his own military commanders.On April 2, the South Vietnamese Senate recommended the formation of a new government with Nguyễn Bá Cẩn as the new leader. As a result, Prime Minister Trần Thiện Khiêm resigned from his position. President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, in response to the Senate's recommendations, immediately approved Tran Thien Kiem's resignation and swore in Nguyen Ba Can as the new Prime Minister.On April 4, while announcing the changes of government on Saigon television, President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu also requested the arrest of three army commanders; Major General Phạm Văn Phú for the debacle in the Central Highlands, General Phạm Quốc Thuần for his failure to hold Nha Trang, and Lieutenant General Dư Quốc Đống for the loss of Phước Long. General Ngô Quang Trưởng, commander of I Corps Tactical Zone, was spared as he was undergoing medical treatment.During a meeting with U.S. General Frederick C. Weyand on April 3, President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu outlined his final strategy to defend South Vietnam, vowing to hold what was left of his country against Communist North Vietnam. In his strategy, President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu decided that Xuan Loc would be the center of his country's resistance, with Tây Ninh and Phan Rang on either side.Eventually, the meeting became more intense when Nguyễn Văn Thiệu produced a letter written by former U.S. President Richard Nixon, which promised military retaliation against North Vietnam if they violated the terms of the Paris Peace Accords. The meeting then concluded with Nguyễn Văn Thiệu accusing the United States Government of selling out his country the moment they signed the Paris Peace Accords with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.In contrast to the situation faced by their opponents in Saigon, the North Vietnamese government were buoyed by the victories achieved by their armies since December 1974. By April 8, 1975, the North Vietnamese military had captured all the provinces in South Vietnam's I and II Corps Tactical Zones, as well as Phước Long Province. While the South Vietnamese army were disintegrating all over the battlefield, North Vietnam had two army corps moving towards the last South Vietnamese stronghold at Xuan Loc.The North Vietnamese 4th Army Corps, which overran Phước Long several months earlier, approached Xuan Loc from the north-east after they conquered Tây Ninh, Binh Long and Long Khánh. The 3rd Army Corps, on the other hand, moved towards Xuan Loc from the north-west after they defeated the South Vietnamese army in the Central Highlands.Order of BattleSouth VietnamOn April 8, 1975, the ARVN 18th Infantry Division was the main unit defending Xuan Loc, which had three regiments (43rd, 48th and 52nd Infantry Regiments). There were also five armored brigades, four regional force battalions (340th, 342nd, 343rd and 367th Battalions), two artillery units (181st and 182nd Artillery Battalions) equipped with forty-two artillery guns, and two companies of civilian self-defense forces. [3]On April 12, Xuan Loc was reinforced with the 1st Airborne Brigade, three armored brigades (315th, 318th and 322nd Armored Brigades), the 8th Task Force from the 5th Infantry Division, and the 33rd Ranger Battalion. Air support came in the form of two air force divisions; the 5th Air Force Division based at Bien Hoa, and the 3rd Air Force Division at Tan Son Nhut. The commander of the South Vietnamese army at Xuan Loc was General Le Minh Dao.North VietnamAs the North Vietnamese 4th Army Corps was the first army to arrive on the battlefield at Xuan Loc, the Central Military Committee decided that the 4th Army Corps would lead the assault. The 4th Army Corps at Xuan Loc fielded three combat divisions (6th, 7th and 341st Infantry Divisions). Those divisions had support from the 71st Anti-Aircraft Regiment, two combat engineering regiments (24th and 25th Engineering Regiments), the 26th Communications Regiment, two armored battalions, two artillery battalions, and two Long Khánh provincial infantry battalions.On April 3, 1975, the 4th Army Corps Command came up with two options for attack; the first option would involve capturing all enemy outposts in the surrounding areas, and isolating the town center in the process. If the opportunity arose, the 4th Army Corps would launch a full frontal assault on the town center to capture all of Xuan Loc. In the second option, if enemy forces in Xuan Loc did not have the strength to resist, the 4th Army Corps would strike directly at the town center using infantry units, with armored and artillery units in support.PreludeIn March 1975 as the North Vietnamese 3rd Army Corps attacked Ban Me Thuot in the Central Highlands, the North Vietnamese 4th Army Corps also initiated their own operations against South Vietnamese installations in Tây Ninh and Bình Dương, which were located in the western regions of South Vietnam. Unlike the previous three years, South Vietnamese defenses around Tây Ninh and Bình Dương were significantly weakened due to the lack of manpower and resources. Even though Tây Ninh and Bình Dương did not play a significant role in the defensive posture of South Vietnam, large formations of South Vietnamese army units made their way into those areas as a result of the early defeats in 1975. Tây Ninh became a refuge for elements of the ARVN 25th Infantry Division, four armored brigades and two ranger battalions. Bình Dương, on the other hand, hosted the ARVN 5th Infantry Division, one ranger battalion and one armored brigade. To stop South Vietnamese military units from gathering in Tây Ninh and Bình Dương, and thereby regrouping for further resistance, the North Vietnamese decided to finally capture those regions.The North Vietnamese 4th Army Corps Command selected Dầu Tiếng–Chon Thanh as the first target for their operation, as it was the weakest point in the South Vietnamese defensive line in the north-west area. South Vietnam maintained four regional force battalions (35th, 304th, 312th and 352nd Battalions) which totaled 2,600 soldiers in the area, along with one armored brigade and ten 105 mm artillery guns. The military zone of Dầu Tiếng–Chon Thanh located in area adjacent to the three provinces of Tây Ninh, Bình Dương and Binh Long. The task of capturing Dầu Tiếng–Chon Thanh was entrusted to the North Vietnamese 9th Infantry Division, whose strength were bolstered by the 16th Infantry Regiment, the 22nd Armored Battalion, one artillery battalion and one air-defense battalion. At 5 am on March 11, the North Vietnamese 9th Infantry Division commenced their attack on Dầu Tiếng. South Vietnamese artillery positions in Rung Nan, Bau Don and Cha La were the primary targets of the 9th Infantry Division on the first day of the attack.On the afternoon of March 11, ARVN General Le Nguyen Khang ordered the 345th Armored Squadron to move out from Bau Don to relieve the military zone of Dau Tienh, but they were defeated by the North Vietnamese 16th Infantry Regiment at Suoi Ong Hung, and were forced to retreat to their base. At the same time, South Vietnamese artillery units at Bau Don and Rung Nan were subdued by elements of the 9th Infantry Division, so they were unable to return fire.By March 13, the North Vietnamese army was in complete control of the Dầu Tiếng military zone. After three hours of fighting, the North Vietnamese 3/9th Infantry Division also captured South Vietnamese positions at Vuon Chuoi, Nga ba Sac, Cau Tau and Ben Cui. The ARVN 3rd Brigade had planned to retake Dầu Tiếng using elements of the 5th Infantry Division, but President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu ordered them to pull back and defend Truong Mit, Bau Don and Tây Ninh instead.On March 24, two regiments from the North Vietnamese 9th Infantry Division, in coordination with two provincial infantry battalions from Bình Phước, attacked Chon Thanh with full force but were repeatedly driven back from South Vietnamese defensive lines. On March 31, the North Vietnamese 4th Army Corps sent the 273rd Regiment to bolster the strength of the 9th Infantry Division, and one artillery battalion equipped with 15 artillery guns. Following the arrival of fresh reinforcements, the North Vietnamese army continued their assault on the military zone of Chon Thanh. South Vietnam responded by deploying the 3rd Armored Brigade to relief Chon Thanh, but they were stopped by elements of the North Vietnamese 9th Infantry Division along Route 13.To avoid destruction, all surviving members from the ARVN 31st Ranger Battalion retreated to Bau Don in the east. On April 2, the North Vietnamese army captured Chon Thanh; they claimed to have killed 2,134 enemy soldiers, as well as capturing 472 men, and shot down 16 aircraft.In addition, North Vietnam captured 30 military vehicles (including eight tanks) and about 1,000 guns (including five artillery pieces) of various kinds. With the province of Binh Long firmly in their hands, the North Vietnamese army then set their sights on Xuan Loc.Defense and Fall of Xuan LocAfter the North Vietnamese 4th Army Corps successfully captured all key objectives surrounding Xuan Loc in Long Khánh Province, they had four days to prepare for the final push against the ARVN 18th Infantry Division. North Vietnamese Major General Hoang Cam personally took control of the operation; he decided to launch a full-frontal assault on Xuan Loc using his infantry, tank and artillery units from the north and northwest. Colonel Bui Cat Vu, deputy commander of the 4th Army Corps, would dictate operations from the east.While the North Vietnamese were closing in on Xuan Loc, ARVN General Le Minh Dao and the chief of Long Khánh Province, Colonel Nguyen Van Phuc, were also busy lining up their units in anticipation of the enemy onslaught. Prior to the battle, General Le Minh Dao told foreign media that: "I am determined to hold Xuan Loc. I don’t care how many divisions the Communist will send against me, I will smash them all! The world shall see the strength and skill of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam".At 5:40 am on April 9, 1975, the North Vietnamese 4th Army Corps began bombarding South Vietnamese positions around the town of Xuan Loc. From the north of Xuan Loc, the PAVN 341st Infantry Division captured the ARVNcommunications center and the local police station after more than one hour of heavy fighting.However, all North Vietnamese units moving down from the north were forced to stop when elements of the ARVN 52nd Task Force counter-attacked from the south. From the east, the North Vietnamese 7th Infantry Division advanced on South Vietnamese positions without tank support, and sustained heavy casualties in the initial stages of the fighting. At 8 am, the 4th Army Corps Command sent eight tanks to support the 7th Infantry Division, but three were destroyed by entrenched South Vietnamese soldiers at Bao Chanh A.By midday, the North Vietnamese 209th and 270th Infantry Regiments captured the Headquarters of the ARVN 18th Infantry Division and the Governor's Residence, which was defended by the ARVN 43rd and 48th Infantry Regiments, setting ablaze seven South Vietnamese tanks in the process.In the south, the North Vietnamese 6th Infantry Division attacked South Vietnamese positions on Highway No.1 from Hung Nghia to Me Bong Con, where they destroyed 11 tanks from the ARVN 322nd Armored Brigade.Throughout the day on April 9, the ARVN 18th Infantry Division staged counter-attacks on North Vietnamese flanks to slow down their enemies’ momentum, especially movements from the north and northwest. [25]Between April 10 and 11, elements of the North Vietnamese 7th Infantry Division tried to destroy the ARVN 18th Infantry Division, the 52nd Task Force and the 5 Armored Cavalry, but on each occasion they were forced to stop and deal with enemy counter-attacks on their flanks.In the northwest the North Vietnamese 226th and 270th Infantry Regiments, from the 341st Infantry Division, were also forced to deal with counter-attacks staged by the ARVN 43rd Infantry Regiment and the 322nd Armored Brigade. During those two days, South Vietnamese fighter-bombers from the 5th Air Force Division flew more than 200 bombing sorties in support of the ARVN 18th Infantry Division. On the night of April 11, General Le Minh Dao secretly relocated the headquarters of the ARVN 18th Infantry Division to the military zone of Tan Phong, to continue his resistance. Colonel Pham Van Phuc, on the other hand, also moved his headquarters to Nui Thi.On April 12, the ARVN General Staff made the decision to bolster the defenses at Xuan Loc with units drawn from the ARVN general reserve. Subsequently, the ARVN 1st Airborne Brigade arrived at the Bao Dinh rubber plantation, while two marine battalions defended the eastern corridor leading to Bien Hoa. In addition, Tan Phong and Dau Giay received reinforcements from the 33rd Ranger Battalion, 8/5th Infantry Division, 8th Artillery Battalion and three armoured brigades (315th, 318th and 322nd Armored Brigades). As the reinforcements were making their way onto the battlefield, South Vietnamese fighter-bombers from Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhat flew between 80 and 120 combat sorties per day to support the defenders at Xuan Loc.At 2 pm on April 12, South Vietnamese C-130 Hercules dropped two CBU-55 cluster bomb Fuel Air Explosive on North Vietnamese positions in the town of Xuan Vinh, close to Xuan Loc, killing about 200 civilians and North Vietnamese soldiers.However, the ARVN also suffered casualties from the blast.On April 13, General Tran Van Tra, commander of the National Liberation Front Armed Forces (Viet Cong) arrived at the headquarters of the 4th Army Corps. During the meeting with other commanders, General Tran Van Tra decided to alter certain aspects of the combat operation; the 6th Infantry Division and elements of the 341st Infantry Division would attack Dau Giay, which was the weakest point in the defensive line around Xuan Loc, set up blocking positions along Highway No.2 which leads to Bà Rịa–Vũng Tàu, and Highway No.1 between Xuan Loc and Bien Hoa.Gen Le Minh Dao and Col Ngo Van Minh at the forward command HQOn the same day, the North Vietnamese 2nd Army Corps ordered the 95B Infantry Regiment to join the units of the 4th Army Corps, in their efforts to capture Xuan Loc. As North Vietnamese commanders began to implement their new strategy, the South Vietnamese military declared it had successfully repulsed the "Communist attack" on Xuan Loc, thereby ending a period of continuous defeats. President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, buoyed by the fierce resistance of his army at Xuan Loc, announced that the Army of the Republic of Vietnam had "recovered its fighting ability" to defend the country.Resupplying the Armoured operation north of Xuan Loc.On April 15, the situation on the battlefield began to change as North Vietnamese artillery stopped their shelling of Xuan Loc, but started pounding Bien Hoa instead. In just one day, the South Vietnamese 3rd Air Force Division at Bien Hoa was forced to cease all operations due to continuous North Vietnamese artillery bombardments. To continue their support of ground troops at Xuan Loc, the South Vietnamese air force mobilized the 4th Air Force Division based at Tra Noc to conduct further missions.On the same day, the North Vietnamese 6th Infantry Division and the 95B Infantry Regiment defeated a combined ARVN formation which included the 52nd Task Force and the 13th Armored Squadron west of Xuan Loc. Between April 16 and 17, the North Vietnamese 6th Infantry Division and the 95B Infantry Regiment also defeated the ARVN 8th Task Force and 3rd Armored Brigade, when the South Vietnamese tried to recapture the military zone of Dau Giay. Around Xuan Loc the ARVN 43rd and 48th Infantry Regiments, as well as the 1st Airborne Brigade, suffered heavy casualties as North Vietnamese infantry units attacked them from all sides. [30]With Dau Giay and all the main roads under enemies control, Xuan Loc was completely isolated, the 18th cut off from reinforcements and surrounded by the North Vietnamese 4th Army Corps. On April 19, the ARVN General Staff ordered General Le Minh Dao to evacuate the 18th Infantry Division and other support units from Xuan Loc, in order to continue their resistance elsewhere. The ARVN 18th Infantry Division, which was the main unit defending Xuan Loc, was ordered to defend Bien Hoa.On April 20, under the cover of heavy rain, South Vietnamese soldiers and civilians began pulling out from Xuan Loc, in a convoy of about 200 military vehicles. On April 21, the town center of Xuan Loc was completely abandoned, with the ARVN 1st Airborne Brigade being the last unit to be evacuated from the area. At 4 am on April 21, the 3/1st Airborne Brigade was completely destroyed by the North Vietnamese army at the hamlet of Suoi Ca. By the end of the day Xuan Loc was under North Vietnamese control, and the gateway to Saigon was finally opened.Victorious NVA tanksNew York Times ArchivesBattle for Xuan Loc May Seal Fate of SaigonBy DREW MIDDLETON APRIL 13, 1975https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1975/04/13/355217552.pdfNorth Vietnam appears to be pursuing a strategy that seeks the commitment of all of the Saigon Government's physical and psychological resources to a single battle, the defense of Saigon around Xuan Loc, United States military sources suggested today. The situation is regarded as analogous to that in 1954 when France's ability to hold Dien Bien Phu became the touchIstone for defeat or victory against the Communist forces of Vo Nguyen Giap, who is still believed to be Hanoi's military planner.Military AnalysisThe impact on Saigon's morale of the withdrawal of Americans from Phnom Penh and the expected capitulation of the Cambodian capital will be much more important than the military effect, the sources said.North Vietnamese advisers are with the Cambodian insurgents and Hanoi has provided small arms, recoilless rifles, land mines and some light artillery. But there are no important North Vietnamese units in Cambodia that would be freed by Phnom Penh's fall to enter the campaign around Saigon.Refugees fleeing on the road from Xuan Loc to Saigon as North Vietnamese forces advanceResistance May Be SappedAny indication that United States support for anti‐Communist forces in Southeast Asia is weakening will sap Saigon's resistance, the sources said.They did not think that the impact of the Cambodian evacuation would be serious, especially when the Saigon forces have rewon some of their lost confidence after their defense of Xuan Loc. But they said the first hint of a comparable evacuation from Saigon could have a disastrous effect on morale.“What Congress does with the President's request for aid is far away and not too well understood by the average soldier,” one source said. “But Americans leaving Saigon? That would be proof they could see that we had given up.”Some sources discern the Dien Bien Phu pattern emerging from Communist operations. Under that strategy a key point is selected, in this case, Xuan Loc.Reds Rave SuperiorityAccording to the sources, the Saigon forces may be expected to make a major effort to hold Xuan Loc. It is a reflection of the importance that the Saigon high command attaches to the town that it has sent a parachute brigade, about one half of the defense force available, to assist in holding it. Xuan Loc thus becomes the focal point for the entire military effort.The attackers may suffer heavy losses, but they are in better position to do so. In regular forces, the Communists have demonstrated a numerical superiority of better than 2 to 1 in the battles around Saigon.The advantage to the Communists of this strategy is that, while they can be reasonably certain that the Saigon command cannot retire from Xuan Loc without a serious loss of morale, their forces are free to pursue other military options.A South Vietnamese air force Chinook helicopter lifts refugees from embattled Xuan LocArtillery Is MassingOne of these may be the movement of strong forces around Xuan Loc and toward Bien Hoa. Once the Communists believe, that the flow of Government reinforcements has ebbed, they can be directed to cut Route 1 between BIen Hoa and Xuan Loc.If the Communists are keeping to their schedule, they will soon have sufficient artillery to begin the systematic destruction of the Saigon forces.They could be underestimating the Government forces, American officers said. The Communists, they thought, are discounting the combat effectiveness of the defenders and their ability to conduct a mobile defense through the use of helicopters.They conceded that the Communists were able to raise the pressure at any point in the Saigon enclave in the event that their attack at Xuan Loc failed.In the Mekong delta, they have been able to attack where they pleased, with the result that the main highway, Route 4, from Can Tho to Saigon has been closed repeatedly.The Communist forces in the delta apparently are being reinforced by new units from Cambodia. The elements.of two new brigades have been identified in the righting between Tan An and, Ben Tranh on Route 4, southwest of Saigon.A Psychological ImpactThe strategic intent in the delta, according to the American interpretation, is as much psychological as military. By widening operations there, the Communists may hope to increase the sense of isolation in Saigon.Saigon's freedom of maneuver appears to be inhibited by the importance given the Xuan Loc battle as much as by the immobility of the three Government divisions in the delta.The command may soon have to choose between feeding more men into the Xuan Loc battle and leaving the troops on the ground to fight it out.The second choice, American analysts said, raises the specter of a defeat that would have a profound psychological impact on other forces.They caution that talk of defeat may be premature. The Communists around Xuan Loc have not met with the instant success to which they had become accustomed in the north and the Central Highlands.The development of determined opposition after weeks of easy success, the sources said, can reduce the combat morale of troops who “have had it too easy, too long.”AftermathMilitary outcomeFollowing their costly victory at Xuan Loc, the North Vietnamese army effectively controlled two-thirds of South Vietnam's territory. The loss of Xuan Loc dealt a severe blow to the military strength of South Vietnam, which had lost almost every unit from its general reserve. On April 18, 1975, General Nguyen Van Toan, commander of the ARVN III Corps, informed President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu that the South Vietnamese forces at Xuan Loc had been beaten and South Vietnam's armed forces could only hold out for a few more days as a result of their losses on the battlefield.According to Vietnam's official account of the battle, about 2,036 South Vietnamese soldiers were either killed or wounded and another 2,731 were captured.However, the 18th ARVN Division alone suffered over 30 percent casualties of 12,000 soldiers committed to the battle, not to mention other forces. Total casualties on the Communist side are largely unknown, but the 4th Army Corps alone claimed to have suffered 460 killed in action, and another 1,428 wounded.While Le Minh Dao claim that the battle has cost the North Vietnamese over 50,000 KIA and 370 tanks destroyed, American estimates only put North Vietnamese casualties at around 10 percent of those figures with 5,000 troops killed and/or wounded and 37 tanks destroyed.The Xuan Loc victory monument dedicated to the Vietnam People's Army, in Đồng Nai Province.Political outcomeIn the days following the loss of Xuan Loc, there was still much debate in both houses of South Vietnam's National Assembly about the country's wartime policies. Pro-war elements in the National Assembly argued South Vietnam should fight until the very end, in the belief that the United States would eventually give the country the necessary amount of aid to resist the North Vietnamese.Anti-war elements, on the other hand, strongly opposed the idea. They believed the Government of South Vietnam should negotiate with the Communists, in order to avoid a catastrophic defeat. Despite their differences of opinion, members in both houses of South Vietnam's National Assembly agreed that Nguyễn Văn Thiệu should be held responsible for the country's dire military and political situation, because his policies had allowed the enemies to easily penetrate South Vietnam's military defenses.An exhausted woman is helped by a South Vietnamese soldier after the evacuation of Xuan LocFinally at 8 pm on April 21, 1975, Nguyễn Văn Thiệu officially resigned from his position as the President of the Republic of Vietnam upon learning that Xuan Loc had fallen that morning. In his final effort to save South Vietnam, Nguyễn Văn Thiệu gambled his political career by sending the very last units of the South Vietnamese army to Xuan Loc in an attempt to hold off the North Vietnamese 4th Army Corps.Ultimately, however, Nguyễn Văn Thiệu's effort came too late. The defeat at Xuan Loc only added salt into the wound of Nguyễn Văn Thiệu's political career, as the National Assembly grew hostile towards his handling of the war. One day after Nguyễn Văn Thiệu's departure to Taiwan, Trần Văn Hương was appointed as South Vietnam's President, and he was ordered to seek a negotiated peace with North Vietnam at any cost, to the disappointment of many in South Vietnam's political elite, who argued that the situation could have been different if Thieu had gone earlier.Boat PeopleExternal linksBattle of Xuan LocWeb site of Veterans of the 18th Division/ARVNDocumentary video of the battle where the ARVN General was interviewed on YouTubeThe battle of Xuan LocBattle of Xuân Lộc - WikipediaGeneral Dao commander of 18th DivisionBBC reportingVietnam WarU.S. Marines in Operation Allen Brook (Vietnam War)Vietnam War FactsDates 1954-1973Location South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Cambodia and LaosResult North Vietnamese victorTroop StrengthSouth Vietnam: 850,00United States: 540,000South Korea: 50,000Others: 80,000 plusCasualtiesSouth Vietnam: 200,000 – 400,000 civilians dead, 170,000-220,000 military dead, and over 1 million woundedUnited States: 58,200 dead and 300,000 woundedNorth Vietnam: 50,000 plus civilian dead, 400,000-1 million military dead, and over 500,000 wounded

Because:The Soviets were superior to the Kwantung army both qualitatively and quantitatively.Soviet forces achieved total surprise at all levels: strategic, operational and tactical.The Kwantung Army was no longer the elite formation it used to be.The quantitative and qualitative superiority of Soviet forcesOne essential and decisive component of warfare is balance of force defined by the number of soldiers, tanks, aircraft, artillery guns committed by combatant nations. Although quality has a decisive influence on the outcome of battles and wars, quantity matters as well because it affects not only a combatant nation’s ability to replace battle losses and continue to fight but also the chance of achieving success in the offensive (in offensive warfare, it is the norm that the attacking force has to outnumber the defending force to stand a chance of success).So let’s look at the balance of force:Japanese order of battleSoviet order of battleSo the balance of force favored the Soviets. While there wasn’t much disparity in manpower (1,577,725 for the Soviets and 1,217,000 for the Japanese), the Soviets exceeded the Japanese in other vital categories of modern equipments: tanks, artillery and aircraft. In modern warfare, technologies and materials played a pivotal role in deciding outcome of battles, more so than manpower.Not only that, the quality of Soviet hardware were superior to that of the Japanese with the exception of aircraft.The Soviet army had at their disposal the battle-tested T-34–85 medium tanks, ISU-152 tank destroyer for offensive operations plus thousands of trucks for logistical support.In 1945, the T-34–85 was one of the best and reliable medium tanks in the world, having had all of the initial teething problems fixed. The IS-152 with its massive gun was capable of smashing any fortified position the Japanese had in Manchuria.By contrast, the counterparts of these formidable Soviet AFVs fielded by the Japanese were little more than junk (by European standards) that were inadequately armed and armored and vastly outclassed by Soviet tanks.Type 95 Ha-Go light tankType 97 Chi-Ha medium tankJapanese inferiority in armor was compounded by the lack of decent AT guns. The only Japanese weapons capable of stopping Soviet armors were what Soviet soldiers called “death squads” - Japanese soldiers strapped with explosives who hurled themselves unhesitatingly under Soviet tanks. It was typical of the Japanese in the final desperate years of WW2 to use suicide tactics. As one Japanese general stated: “lack of weapons is no excuse for defeat”. The Japanese compensated for their deficiencies in technologies and materials by good old-fashioned sheer fanaticism and stupid bravery made possible by a military culture that utterly disregarded human lives.The only categories in which the Japanese compared favorably to the Soviets were aircraft. The Japanese had several first-rate fighters such as the Nakajima Ki-84, Kawanishi N1K that were probably better than Soviet fighters. However, a weapon is only as good as the operator. After years of attritional battles that inflicted heavy losses on the Japanese army air force (IJAAF), and the massed kamikaze attacks during April-June 1945 against US forces around Okinawa, there weren’t that many veteran Japanese pilots left to operate those awesome fighters to their fullest potentials. To add more salt to the injury, shortage of aviation fuel (thanks to American submarine force) deprived the IJAAF of the fuel needed to conduct sorties to combat the Soviet air force and support IJA units on the ground.Apart from superiority in number and quality of weapons, the Soviet army in 1945 was vastly superior to the Kwantung Army. It was an army hardened through 4 years of relentless battles (1941–1945) with the best fighting force in the world: the German Wehrmacht. If in 1939, the Soviet army was a butt of joke, then in 1945, it was one of the most capable ground forces in the world, if not the best. Four years of battles with the Germans dramatically improved its leadership, operational and tactical capabilities.Soviet commanders at all levels - strategic, operation and tactical - were experienced and bold in conducting battles. The supreme commander of Soviet Far Eastern force - Field Marshal Aleksandr Vasilevsky - had been responsible for all decisive Soviet victories in Europe. His competence to formulate complex battle plans against the Japanese in Manchuria was indisputable. Soviet commanders at the army, divisional and regimental levels as well as the foot soldiers, tank crews and pilots all possessed considerable combat experience and competence to fight effectively.We will soon appreciate how the Soviets applied their vast reservoir of battle experience and military competence to execute an imaginative and daring offensive that took the Japanese by complete surprise.Strategic, operational and tactical surpriseSurprise at all levels contributed as much to ultimate Soviet victory as having better weapons and experienced leadership and soldiery.This decisive surprise was due to 2 things:Japanese erroneous estimation of the timetable of Soviet invasion AND their contempt of the Soviets.Soviet audacity and flexibility in executing the battle of maneuver.Japanese contempt of the Soviets stemmed from multiple sources: the Russo-Japanese War, foreign war report of wars with the Soviet Union and racial arrogance.Having defeat Russia in 1905, the Japanese were imbued with a mixture of arrogance and contempt for the Russian soldiers. This was the 1st time in history an Asiatic army defeated a white army. It certainly imbued the Japanese with a sense of superiority and contempt for Russian military ability. Despite being defeated by the Soviets in the Battles of Khalkhin Gol, Japanese contempt toward the Soviet enemies was unchanged. Instead, it intensified after reading reports of mediocre military performance of the Red Army in the war against Finland and Nazi Germany.That contempt caused the Japanese to underestimate the Soviet army. Even when an investigation into the state of strength of the Kwantung Army in 1945 concluded that it was understrength and subpar compared to the prewar state, the Japanese still regarded the Soviets as pushovers. They did not believe that an army that had been beaten repeatedly by their German ally was capable of mounting a successful large-scale offensive to defeat the million-man Kwantung army.That arrogance was strengthened by their faith in the difficulty of conducting large-scale offensive over a vast areas that abounded in mountains, hills, rivers compounded by torrential rains in the autumn that turned the ground into mud that hindered movements of vehicles. Thus, even after the Soviets announced that they would not renew the Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact, the Japanese high command were confident that unfavorable weather conditions would preclude the Soviets from attacking until Spring 1946. Although there were some Japanese commanders who warned against that overconfidence and suspected strongly that the Soviet would attack as early as August 1945, their warnings fell on deaf ears.Meanwhile on the other side, Soviet commanders geared their forces for a battle of maneuver. Unlike the Japanese, the Soviets did not underestimate their opponents. Soviet commanders regarded the Kwantung Army as a worthy opponent and this motivated them to plan their offensive meticulously to increase the chance fo success. One particular Soviet military ability honed during the German-Soviet war was how to conduct combined-arms and maneuver warfare successfully. Practice and battles with the Werhmacht brought allowed Soviet commanders at all levels to improve their skills in bewegungskrieg. Emulating the Germans, Soviet junior commanders were encouraged to act on their initiative.In 1945, Soviet units were ready to execute a war of fluid movements that would take the Japanese by complete surprise. Soviet armored and infantry units bypassed strong points, encircled and cut off Japanese units which threw them into total disarray and facilitated piecemeal destruction of IJA’s units.The performance of Soviet forces demonstrated impressive audacity and flexibility. They advanced under the cover of darkness or in unfavorable conditions or through difficult terrains the Japanese believed to be impassable.For examples,1/ The pioneer units of 1st Far Eastern Front advanced in adverse weather and in darkness. They were aided by easy-to-disable primitive Japanese minefields.2/ Soviet tanks and infantry brigades crossed small and large rivers.3/ The 6th Guard Tank Army successfully traversed the Grand Khingan Mountains under the cover of darkness and heavy rain.4/ The 5th and 113th Rifle Corps of the 39th Army advanced in adverse weather conditions.Soviet Katyusha rockets bombarding Japanese positionsTanks of the 46th Guards Tank Brigade crossing a riverTanks of the 6th Guards Tank Army crossing the Grand Khingan mountainsThe flexibility of Soviet forces was reflected through smart allocation of resources and adaption of units to suit the terrains and strength of Japanese defense.Armies that operated in a front that was narrow or without much room for maneuver and that was strongly defended received generous heavy artillery support to overwhelm the defenders. Armies that operated over a broader area with plenty of room for maneuvering received more heavy vehicles to allowed for high-speed maneuver on the fields to bypass and encircle the Japanese. Armies that moved over difficult terrains received many engineer and sapper battalions to facilitate movements. It could also be a mix of all types of supports depending on the nature of the theater of operations.Soviet units were varied to suit the terrains and nature of enemy defense. Commanders used the rule of thumb that the stronger enemy defense was, the deeper the echelon disposition had to be. This would impart great momentum to the offensive and ensure deep penetration of the enemy defense.This flexible organizations not only made efficient use of resources but also worsened the confusion of the Japanese who expected the Soviets to attack in formations whose compositions were well-known. It caused them to allocate resources improperly and make it more difficult for them to defeat Soviet attacks.Also, the use of Soviet forward detachments to probe deep and infiltrate Japanese positions was another big surprise for the Japanese. These mobile and fast-moving pioneering units were ably led by commanders allowed to act on their initiatives were very effective in preventing the Japanese from mounting a coherent defense.So all in all, a combination of:Japanese overconfidence, complacency that lulled them into a false sense of security about the timetable of Soviet invasionThe Soviets’ skillful execution of maneuver warfare under unfavorable weathers and difficult terrains.Use of mobile probing unitstook the Japanese by total surprise. Indeed, in post-war interrogation, several Japanese officers expressed their amazement at the boldness of the Soviets to advance in adverse conditions, their ability to cross difficult terrains and the speed with which they advanced. In fact, the Soviets advanced so quickly and the surprise was so total that it wasn’t until 24 hours later did the Japanese high commander appreciate the extent of penetration and magnitude of the Soviet offensives. By then, it was too late to turn the tide of the battle in Japan’s favor.The Kwantung Army was no longer the elite formation it used to beOriginally created to defend Japan’s Manchukuo puppet state, the Kwantung Army before the war (1941) had a fearsome reputation due to its composition of a million strong servicemen who were exceptionally fanatical, brave and well-trained. Although it was sorely lacking in heavy artillery and armors (by European standards), it still possessed great offensive and defensive capabilities.However in 1945, it had been reduced to a shadow of its formidable self due to several reasons.The war in the PacificOperation Ketsu-GoShortly after the Pacific War broke out with the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese succeeded in capturing vast landmasses once colonized by European powers as well as Islands in the Pacific. Anticipating that the Allies (primarily the Americans) would return to recapture these islands, the IJA sent troops to turn those islands into strong fortifications to resist invasion.In 1942, US forces engaged with IJA units on Guadalcanal in attritional battle that lasted 6 months. Both sides suffered heavy losses. Without reserve combat units from the home islands and wishing to renew their offensive, the IJA transferred units from China and other less active theaters to the Southwest Pacific to combat the Americans.The 20th and 41st Divisions were redeployed from Northern China and Korea to Guadalcanal where they would be decimated by a combination of disease, starvation and fanatical bravery and stupidity against US marines.In March 1943, the convoy carrying the entire 51st division from China to New Guinea was annihilated by US aircraft. Most men died in their transports. Shortly afterward, the 32nd and 35th divisions transported from China suffered the same fate by US submarines which sank most of the transport ships.The 52th Division was redeployed to Truk - Japan’s premier forward naval base in the South Pacific. Unfortunately, the US island hopping strategy - made possible by the growing naval and air superiority of the US navy and air force - obviated the need to invade Truk. The islands garrisoned by more than 100,000 men strong were bypassed, starved of supply and forced to languish for the remainder of the war - an ignominious fate for the Japanese.1944 marked the start of a gradual process of transfer of divisions from the Kwantung Army to reinforce islands in the Pacific. At that point, the Kwantung Army had 19 full-trained divisions.In February 1944, 2 infantry divisions (29th and 14th) were the first Kwantung units sent to Guam and Palau respectively where they would be destroyed in subsequent battles.In October 1944, 4 infantry divisions (1st, 8th, 10th and 24th) plus 2 armored divisions (2nd and 23rd) were sent to the Philippines in response to the US invasion at Leyte Gulf.3 infantry divisions (9th, 12th and 71st) were sent to Formosa to counter the anticipated US invasion that never took place.The 109th division was sent to Iwo Jima where it would be annihilated in 1945.So by 1945, the Kwantung Army had lost 2 + 4 + 2 + 3 + 1 = 12 fully-trained divisions. In addition, there was great reduction in the number of air units redeployed for South Pacific operations and Kamikaze missions.IJA leaderships attempted to rectify this deficiency by raising new divisions. However, shortage of weapons, ammunitions, veteran instructors and physically fit recruits (due to shortage of foods) meant that the newly raised replacement were not comparable to the veteran divisions that had been destroyed. A meticulous inquiry into the state of strength of the Kwantung Army made the following telling conclusion:its strength had been weakened far beyond estimation and that although new divisions had only a fractions of fighting effectiveness of the lost divisions.Finally, preparation for Ketsu-Go - Decisive Battle on the Home Islands - also weakened the Kwantung army. Ketsu-Go was the grand strategic plan intended to inflict extremely heavy losses on the US invasion forces predicted to invade Kyushu in November 1945. The Japanese knew that by killing/maiming enough Americans they would compel the US government to negotiate for a cease fire that would allow Japan’s leaders to exit the war with national honor and some gains of the imperialist conquest preserved (They feared that the US would not invade and instead strangle Japan by naval blockade.)The Japanese staked absolutely everything for Ketsu-Go: thousands of aircraft for kamikaze attacks, millions of men, ammunition and weapons. They raised new divisions on the islands and transferred several remaining combat-capable units from the Kwantung Army to the Home Islands. The Kwantung Army was therefore weakened even further. As a side note, this fact was proof that the Imperial General HQ had chosen to write off Manchuria (at least temporarily) because had they still wanted to protect Manchuria Kwantung against anticipated Soviet invasion, they would have maintained the Kwantung Army at a respectable level of strength.SummaryThe superb strategic, operational and tactical capabilities of the Soviet army in 1945 that resulted from 4 years of battles with the WehrmachtComplete surprise at all level due to Japanese complacency and Soviet imaginative operational performance that defied Japanese expectationThe qualitative deterioration of the KwantungAll of these made Soviet Victory in Manchuria a foregone conclusion.